capable of doing more than one thing at a time. yes, iraq soaked up a great deal of resources. but i would suggest from would suggest from my perspective and this goes back to something zal said, what effect did our engagement in afghanistan was the initial position that this was going to be an economy of force mission and we were very slow to come off of that. iraq may of been a contributing factor but it was the initial mindset that we were going to keep our investments in exposure in afghanistan to a minimum. i will always remember in those early days in 2002, having take a shot at the british and a pat on the back, and enormously capable isaf commander named

john mccall, tni looking forward to the authority, came up with the idea of essentially a two battalion u.s. force. one kind is based in kabul with the assets to ensure that mobility. and the other battalion deployed in the key provincial centers. kandahar, sharif, herat. kind of a company of a level plus, very able to hold their ground against any likely force. if there was a serious challenge, you had the airmobile battalion set to go in and really kick some posterior. so two battalions. we send our messages to london

and washington. four hours later i had my response which was crocker, go sit under a tree until this insanity passes from you. there is no way we are going to send two battalions into afghanistan. i just think it was a very long time before we realized what we were up against. >> i believe as has been exaggerated that because of iraq, afghanistan suffered. i believe that because of erratic, at least during my period as ambassador, i was to a degree successful in increasing races is -- resources and saying

given what we are doing in iraq that afghanistan needed perhaps not as much as iraq given the challenge at that time in afghanistan wasn't as great of a challenge in iraq. the level of violence was not as high. there was concern about resurgent and concerned about misbehavior on the party what was called for a board at that time, that we needed a greater level of effort. i got the positive response more of the civilian side by increasing the construction by over a billion dollars. but on the military front ryan's analysis is quite right and there was not only an

unwillingness to send more forces along the concept by ryan talked about, but even to accelerate the creation of the afghan national army because there was a push to get an agreement before doing anything on the final number, which was the afghans are pushing for 100,000 plus. we are saying it would be 50 or lower. i remember we can't get to 100 before we get to 50. so why don't we get started with the start of the project to get the afghans do agree because we are not going to get to 50 in three or four years. we need to move earlier. we do think iraq may have been

some impact and i'm not the right person to ask that with some assets that are particularly there may be on the construction site afghanistan benefited because the numbers became large because adding for the two conflicts didn't be although i see ryan will complain about this issue during his period during my time we didn't suffer on the economic construction front but there may be some construction that occurred on the military -- on the military side. i don't know in detail what that was. i think there were some however. >> i think we did hurt for the diversion. and i think what one tries to

say is exactly how much or how much better things could have been. that could have been very problematic and very hypothetical. on the military side, unquestionably we hurt. we lost and could not get the overhead observation that we needed. in fact that was drained off. we were losing special forces. we were having great trouble getting the conventional force maintained, let alone expanded. economics gets to be a very complicated question. i salute the political and bureaucratic skill of my predecessor, who is able to get a very large increment. i was told if you don't spend it all, you don't need anymore. yes, we know where we are going to spend it. this is a frequent u.s. government problem. if you have a lot of money

people say you have money in the pipeline. you don't need anymore. even if you know very much how you are going to spend it. if you spend it you spend quickly come us say look at the waist. so you are under pressure to spend it and criticize and it's hard to get out of. the most complicated question is one that i absolutely cannot answer and that is to afghan political responsibility for the fact by 2005 in 2006 you had a situation for increasing the insurgency as well because of a lot of bad government. they put down their weapons after 2001 and people went home. they look inside where my buddies? many of those people were

treated badly. after years of civil war that is to be expected in many respects. but the rapacious score settling the people who came to power with us grow many other people back and help create the conditions for an insurgency. whether we could have actually done very much about that whether anybody could have done very much about that, you could have a very long discussion but we should not and kicking ourselves for taking our eyes off the ball forget that the afghan share in creating these conditions. >> i think ron has made an excellent point. that in addition, a general point that in afghanistan were involved in two-point -- i don't

know whether iran would agree with me but that we have a state, a nationbuilding almost which is a terrible word to mention at that time. in fact, we had a situation in which there was no state. we were trying to help the afghans set up a state. a nationbuilding on what it means to be afghans are what it means to be iraqi, how they can organize that and how they are going to be participating in it. but at the same time, increasingly you are doing counterinsurgency operations as well. and sometimes, the requirements of one was intentioned with the requirement that the othercommon meaning in order to do counterinsurgency we could cooperate with people that were not necessarily desirable and saying why were you working with

many warlords are big warlords, whatever name you give them. you need to get things done in that area from a security point of view. but the state and nationbuilding project would have required and we have a vision and strategy for how to decrease the capabilities that make them the political participants and not to be a source of instability on problems for the local population that would then help the insurgency and a sense because of their misbehavior in turn created back. so there was the afghan responsibility ron said quite correctly, that their behavior. but there was also this conflicting requirement and demand on asset as well and the

way we responded to it. >> you know there is another piece that i don't think my colleagues who disagree. ryan mentioned this life but print or unwillingness to engage. that meant that president karzai had no ability to confront political troublemakers because we wouldn't help him do that. so political appointment became his only tool. it is not completely foreign to america if you notice some of our ambassadorial climate. last night -- [laughter] i am not talking about the fact that political appointees as you know. this was his only tool because he had no force and he had no money and we didn't want to provide for sewer money for political discipline. so there is a huge afghan responsibility for the

conditions they grew but there is also a responsibility with a for not having helped provide any tool that might have given an alternative. >> it is a very limited time we have. the large number of people who would like to raise the question. i am going to take three questions and hope that we can get through at least those. [inaudible] would you raise the question of the security interest of an? we have a vital interest in afghanistan is debatable. certainly the pakistanis chinese hindu, russia with a russia with a vital interest in iraq and afghanistan.

do you see some sort of regional strategic architecture perhaps with the chinese in an arrangement where the major powers over ran in afghanistan cooperate? >> let me take a question over here, all the way in the rear. [inaudible] >> -- i served in iraq and afghanistan. where president ghani's afterwards -- [inaudible] and our short-term commitment of extending the relative small number of forces to the end of 2015. >> the iran question got

covered. >> let me take another question here. right there. yes. >> conny malan. [inaudible] >> is your microphone on? >> thank you. we don't have much negotiating conditions last to bring the taliban into the table. i would say that pakistan is a way of sort of beating them to the table. i [inaudible] what will it take to remove our support to afghanistan more strategically? >> i will take one more question and then we will somehow divvy

up the responses. that gentleman over there. wait for the microphone please. >> the two political cohesion and institutions, do you see a bill having a certain breaking point with the pakistanis and what will it be? >> that is a lot for you to chew on. why don't you choose which ones you would like to respond to. zal, do you want to -- >> thank you. well, on pakistan as i mentioned in the beginning, it was a great source of frustration for me that we couldn't make more progress with it on dealing with the issue at the sanctuaries that were being developed.

and i think at the present time i am uncertain myself as pakistan made a strategic decision by people that matter that a reconciliation in afghanistan is a critical or vital interest of pakistan. there is evidence that the internal situation that extremism and terrorism focus on trent poses a huge problem for pakistan. 165,000 pakistani troops that you are in line fighting. and therefore, with a government in afghanistan is clearly anxious to improve relations of pakistan i mentioned some of the steps with a whole range of

others that i did not mention on the economic front that the current government, president ghani in particular is open to that increased economic cooperation with pakistan and this whole idea of actualizing this idea that existed almost on the day we went to afghanistan this land bridge idea that afghanistan could be a transit point for regional economic integration and development. and whether it given the change in afghanistan with the new government, but the worsening security environment in pakistan, that they would have made it a shift. i am not sure of their indications that yes maybe but also lingering perhaps evidence

or concern for indications that may be the desire to dominate afghanistan to a proxy may be still dare and we will see. i'm the u.s. leverage i hope it will be the former that they will have made a decision. on the u.s. assistant it is a key factor. it is in shape in terms of the security that is worse and the economic situation in terms of discouraging investment and pakistan and trade is quite problematic. there is more of a need for external support although the crisis has been temporarily for

now. but we have been reluctant to push to the maximum extent possible to the fears that the consequences of the economic collapse. i have been an advocate of using more of the leverage because of the importance, especially when people were getting killed the allies getting killed by forces with the sanctuary in pakistan and the complex calculation and the intended consequences that would make a job that much harder. we need to stop the sanctuary.

and the broader calculations better they are. >> at last, the difference in views. while zal was sitting in kabul, i was in islamabad. here again history is very struck to. not just history objectively if there is such a thing, but how history is perceived and influences decision-makers at today. in pakistan, the narrative of the u.s. pakistani relationship is their narrative. not saying that corresponds with reality, is that it were not a reliable partner. and this goes way back to 1970. we did not stand with pakistan in their eyes and the struggle

that led to the creation of bangladesh and dismembered pakistan in their view. as we have said, we did not troops but we are very much engaged and in pakistan was her partner. we sanction them on the way out. what that means, my assessment is that we have got to be darned careful how we as -- how we use assistants. they would see anything moving in that direction and we have experienced this. with some initiatives in congress as absolute proof positive there goes the americans again. they are getting set to really stick it to us and that is an existential threat and we are going to hang on for life.

to an asset-backed taliban, not necessarily because they like the taliban. clearly it has bled over into their security programs. it could be far worse than afghanistan. so we've got to be very, very careful. >> i have to respond to the other two questions. iran does not see afghanistan as anywhere near in the same category that it sees iraq. iraq has been for the geographic space occupied mesopotamia has been a threat to the shia world since at least the battle of karbala. the years that i was in the ran under the shy every year the

iranian army drill bit through teeth from the iraqi invasion and it is pushing back from the invasion. their view as a potential strategic threat is very deeply ingrained. there is no similar view of afghanistan because afghanistan hasn't really had that level of threat may be since it held off the last siege of iraq. that was over 100 years ago. the iranians are in a row check about what we may do in iraq -- and afghanistan. there is that potential from us about which is serious. they do intervene. they could influence, but they have also been helpful in creating a better conditioned and afghanistan. they were hopeful that bond. the dialogue, which we had with them in kabul continued until i got -- after i got there, but then it was ordered to stop it which i thought was a mistake.

the short answer is i believe cooperation with iran in an afghan context is definitely possible. there's lots of ways you can pass it up on both sides. on the question -- they will find he has to break from the alliance. in theory, there is such a point. a point at which he feels he is taking too much political embarrassed that it destroys his career, that it destroys the potential of his alliance, having a bid for power that simply embarrasses him. but these are all questions that degree. they are all dynamic questions. there is an absolute make or break issue that you can easily define. there are some issues that are particularly important i believe. the issue of new election system is very important to him.

the reformed election commission, i mean these are issues that he used to sell his supporters on their requirement to take a secondary position in the government. so if he is too embarrassed in the outcome of those issues that could be a problem. but he also has every reason to hype his presentation at those issues when talking to us because he wants us involved. so the analysis of this has to be very careful. the bottom line is yes there is such a point. no, we don't know where that point is. yes, we need to be involved in order she tried to avoid getting to that point and no we shouldn't be panicked in any particular moment to rush in desperate fear. there is a point, but it is also a point that is important to the ghani side of the government.

the collapse of the government is potentially fatal and we need to keep reminding them of that and hope to god that they can sort things out between themselves most of the time. so it is they are. we have to work on it. it is not automatic. >> i started this afternoon's program by likening the three ambassadors to the three tenors. whatever the differences may be, i'm sure you see the connection here in that we have had this afternoon three gentlemen with strong voices, clear voice is and most the time in harmony. let's join me now in thanking them. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> panelists will discuss the challenges of rescuing americans taken hostage abroad in the debate over whether the u.s. should negotiate with hostage takers or pay ransoms. >> the national security agency is building one of the world's largest cloud data centers in a secure mountain facility in utah. it is doing so because its

surveillance needs require that degree of storage and security. the u.s. government's chief information officer three, four years ago ordered u.s. government agency to move to the cloud. and as a result, even civilian agencies are turning to cloud services.

next, we'll take a look at the white house atrocities prevention board. she has at the state department civilian security democracy and human rights division. she talks about the process of the board over the last three years in trying to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. the discussion was hosted by the council on foreign relations. >> good evening.

my name is jerry guenther and i'm a human rights lawyer here in washington. i am pleased to welcome sarah sewall to the council on foreign relations. .. here's how it will proceed.

undersecretary sewall will first make some opening remarks for about 15 minutes. i will engage her into further conversation and follow-up to remarks for another 15 minutes. we believe 30 minutes for questions and probably end at 17. for the sake of brevity i will note undersecretary sewall the senate is in was great in government and academia. you can see her detailed resume on the program tonight. and without further ado undersecretary sewall, thank you. [applause] >> thank you, jared. it's wonderful to be here be seeking. and thank you all for joining us. i'm really always happy to talk about atrocity prevention. i know that's sort of a strange thing to say, but for those who are in the community and to have spent much of their lives working to prevent and respond to mass atrocities, we all know the bond that we share and it's

really a delight to be with so many of you here tonight. to include senior fellow from the council, paul stares, does not too many of you as a guiding force in the prevention of arena, to include atrocity prevention. but before i get started, i have to explain why really truly why i'm here with you tonight. there was an event that reminded me how very important was to speak publicly about the work that we do in government to prevent atrocities. and it was not president obama and it was not secretary. it was alex trebek. this occurred because in january on the famous game show jeopardy, america's brightest treaty contestants were working their way through the category bad words. and when they reached the $1000 question, the most difficult

question and the section alex provided this clip and classic jeopardy style. in 2012, the state department put out an apb a new prevention board, for these terrible crimes. what is an assault? incorrect, he replied. no one else even ventured a guess. and to make matters worse it was not entirely accurate, right? the clue was not even crude. the atrocities prevention board was not launched by the state department. it was launched by president obama and the national security council. i will confess i've tried to reach out to clear up this confusion. i've even tweeted at him, but without luck. so here i am at the council on foreign relations, the at the center of trivia knowledge to explain the administration's commitment to elevate within u.s. foreign policy efforts to prevent the mass killings of civilians. as jared said three and half

years ago the president identified the prevention of mass atrocities as a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the united states. eddie committed this country to becoming a global leader in preventing large-scale violence against civilians worldwide. he made it clear the u.s. cannot and should not into the militarily every time there is an injustice or an imminent threat. instead he calls for the u.s. government to use its full arsenal of tools, including diplomatic, political, financial, intelligence and law enforcement capabilities to prevent these crimes before the evolve into large-scale civilian atrocities. and the u.s. government is working now to put these goals into practice. as one element of this approach the president established and atrocities prevention board commonly referred to inside the government as the apb. it brings together senior officials from across government to focus and coordinate their

respective efforts. this in the agency group seeks to identify a atrocity risks in their early stages and then develop coordinated hope of government responses to prevent or mitigate them. and each month as part of an early warning exercise, the intelligence community helps the apb identify countries experiencing or at greatest risk of atrocities. the board that has an opportunity to consider which cases need additional policy focus and usually the board mayors down on one or two at risk countries in particular. and, of course, the apb process feeds into a larger interagency process of decision-making. the apb's work is meant to complement and enhance not supplant ongoing original work that is an everyday at the state department and throughout our government. so when practice this means that the apb is not spending the bulk of its time are threats to civilians, such as assad's

brutalities against the syrian people, already been recognized and addressed in ongoing regional policy discussions. most of the apb's effort is devoted to potential or ongoing violence that might escape focused attention in existing policy for a year so i apologize for the mindnumbing bureaucratic speak, not as anyone who's worked in government knows the key to getting things done and affecting change is to be a bureaucratic catalyst. and the apb is a tool to help empower prevention catalysts. it speeds up the cogs of our government's bureaucracy by bring attention to cases earlier in the buildup to violence and in turn given the u.s. government or other international partners additional reaction time to plan and implement appropriate de-escalation interventions. and when threats emerged the apb a cyst by helping martial personnel, technical expertise,

and occasionally financial resources to strengthen our embassy led responses on the ground. in the intervening three years since the president's call to action, the u.s. government has achieved significant progress in bringing atrocity prevention into the mainstream of our foreign policy process. the governments new coordination efforts elevate the profile of the issue within the interagency and within the state department where i live. for example within state we've established and anti-atrocities coordination group which serves as a kitchen cabinet of sorts in elevating addressing atrocity risk internally. regional and functional bureaus collaborate and assessing at risk cases in the weeks leading up to the monthly interagency meetings and the prevention perspective is well integrated into our policy work from central africa republic to iraq to nigeria. atrocity prevention is also becoming better integrated into our embassy level were. frontline officers are not often the first defense to report on emerging atrocity risks and

chiefs of mission can request that the apb conduct risk analyses of their host countries or provide planners to help identify appropriate interventions to mitigate the risks. since becoming undersecretary for civilian security i have worked not osha strengthen the state departments in to respond to mass atrocities but also to build a close relationship with our key prevention partner, the u.s. agency for international development. for example person to the strategic roadmap, the bureau of conflict and stabilization operations has become dedicating expertise and assuming a formal analysis of planning and coordinating role in support of apb priorities within state, and as the new hub for estate planning and implementation of our atrocities prevention board this bureau works with usaid to produce assessments of the drivers of conflict in targeted set of countries at risk for atrocities and produces corresponding risk assessments.

the new analytical atrocities assessment framework, something that has been developed in coordination with usaid allows chso to work with the department regional bureaus develop evidence-based civilian focused intervention options including diplomatic programmatic multilateral and economic efforts. cs vote is developing a growing collection of best practices that are informing more targeted effective government response and the u.s. government has also refined and expanded his tool to prevent atrocities. so in addition to the traditional lever of influence such as diplomacy and economic assistance, we now can impose targeted sanctions such as visa restrictions and asset freezes against perpetrators of human rights violations in specific cases. we also the first ever national intelligence estimate on global atrocities risk. new mass atrocities response doctrine for our military which i know a little bit about, and a

presidential block commission because as an additional tool for watchlisting in the ninth entry. state department and aid are working to empower our frontline officers through a series of internal training programs to identify and respond to atrocity threats. and american diplomats are now monitoring media and political dialogue for dangerous speech. we've launched initiatives to strengthen and amplify the voices of nonviolent leaders to counter extremist narratives. our embassies are better equipped to engage community voice the religious leaders and others, respected elders to encourage them to promote message of peace and nonviolence in their community. this is deeply important in the lead up to the kind of events that are prone to fueling outbreaks of violence such as elections. and nigeria is a great example of that. we provide specific examples bill should have the u.s. government is now more prepared

to identify and respond to risks of extreme violence. taking you back in time over about a year and half ago when the department's atrocities watchers grew very concerned about escalating tensions in burundi. this initiated the apb process elevating the focus on the threat and state and a.i.d. put together an interagency team from both the regional and functional components of the agencies to conduct a thorough analysis of potential risks for violence in burgundy. this letter brought diplomatic engagement and a programmatic strategy that was operationalized ibm pc. the apb process talibanize over $7 million in state and usaid funds to address the risks that have been identified in the assessment and it included catalyzed the deployment of a prevention advisor to support the embassy in the lead up to the 2015 national elections which was as i mentioned earlier

and often is a potential trigger for violence and mass atrocities. the advisor and his views government monitoring of early warning signals of violence to consummate the execution of a set of de-escalation programs that were specifically targeted against potential perpetrators and messengers of violence. through its programming the indus was able to engage local leaders ranging from political party youth groups to religious leaders to facilitate dialogue between regional and national political elites, and to support community stakeholders in the locally developed efforts to prevent conflicts. let me offer a different example of the apb's impact. here would be an example of the central african republic. so when violence quickly escalated in the african nation in december 2013, aboard a trusted prevention experts worked hand-in-hand with regional bureaus and senior leaders from across government identified key interventions including some duty eight and state, and together we marshaled up, up to $100 million in

assistance. we were funding everything from peace and reconciliation programs to the purchase of vehicles for peacekeepers to critical life-saving humanitarian assistance and now we support u.n. forces with the planning and coordination. and when the islamic state of iraq in the levant drove tens of thousands of members of the iraqi ucd religious minority from their homes last year, the apb help catalyzed a swift response. it's an efficient help ensure that local information collected by the embassy in by the state department office of religious freedom was able to inform the u.s. strikes against isil that degraded isil and give local kurdish military forces enough momentum to break the siege and free the yazidis from the end happened on mount center. and although i have shared with you my confident assessment of the progress that we've made and some examples thereof and i

think it's fair to use governments initial atrocity prevention efforts have wretched very many important achievements, clearly challenges remain. and chief among these are resource constraints. while the apb coordination process doesn't require anything the, effective prevention, tools, survey do. they depend on resources, particularly source of funding that can be accessed quickly and deployed weekly. and in a constrained budget environment we often see prevention needs that we are unable to meet. and, of course, in addition to building our own capacity where seeking to encourage and collaborate with like my department. i led a group of state and usaid officials to meet with the u.n. interlocutors who oversee issues of atrocity prevention in new york. not a atrocity prevention in new york. they are in new york where the work to oversee atrocity prevention. [laughter] our dialogue is one hope will be institutionalized in the years ahead to ensure greater

connectivity among concerned actors. we are integrating us to atrocity prevention into ongoing bilateral multilateral diplomatic discussions such as the useu civilian security and development dialogue. in closing it's no small feat to try to change the way any government does its business. institutional change is a difficult and slow process. it we have the began to make enduring progress, integrating and atrocities prevention board's into the government's policymaking and we're working to strengthen agency capability and to institutionalize those capabilities within agencies as well as to strengthen the apb itself. some observers have expressed dissatisfaction with the obama administration's commitment to prevent mass atrocities across the globe. i can understand their perspective. the apb has not halted violence worldwide. in its three years of existence it is not protected every civilian from governments, insurgents, and the terrorists.

yet as imperfect as our efforts are the reps and undeniable progress both in symbolism and in concrete results. as we approach the apb's third anniversary we are closer to realizing the presidents intent that the u.s. government embraces the mission of preventing mass atrocities. it's my hope that three years from now the united states will have made its decision making tools, resources and actions even more effective in preventing mass violence against civilians. president obama took a bold step in 2012 by elevating concerned about mass atrocities as a foreign policy priority. atrocity prevention he said is not just a matter of values but also an issue of national security. the president acknowledged it can be tempting to throw up our hands and resign ourselves to man's endless capacity for cruelty. but he also reminded us that holocaust survivors chose never to give up and nor can the united states of america.

thank you. [applause] >> well, thank you for those very useful and eliminating initial remarks. i wanted to talk to for the most -- eliminating. one of the biggest challenges i think in atrocity prevention is measuring your success because if you succeed, nothing happened. in other words, you prevent and mass atrocities situation. there are other examples where you're on the verge of a mass atrocities situation that is clear to see where you impact the how does he apb or how do you at the state department look at the measuring success in your work on an ongoing basis? >> i think what's there to say right now is that we are at this point in our efforts focusing more on outputs and outcomes. in part because they are easier to measure. we can see where we have moved a

policy process or garnered resources or had an impact on statistics in a particular way. but it's harder to measure success because as you said the success is a non-barking dog. that will always be i think an enormous challenge. i think anecdotally when we hear from ambassadors that we equip them with tools to make a difference in their country, that serves as a pretty good proxy for now. and likewise there have been governments and particularly in postelection when there's a transition of power, apollo i government will express its great thanks for the work that the united states more broadly has done to help ensure a safe and peaceful transition and election. so those are some of the ways that we can we satisfy ourselves with. i'm sure again in three years time we can move to a better metric. >> how do you strike a balance

between having the u.s. be visibly viewed as engaging on atrocity prevention and anything to prevent atrocities, versus the desire for a range of actors toengage with the government in discussing these things? you alluded to concern for civil society. would've been is i think the apb itself has been very much like the proverbial iceberg which isn't entirely surprising given that many of the briefings are classified and what is being done is classified. but the apb itself has not been very visible publicly, nor has its work. so how do you see striking the balance over time with the american public being able to understand what any administration, this or future administrations, are doing to advance atrocity prevention and to get the american public behind this work as well? >> i think part of the reason why i'm here tonight is because i'm very committed to doing as much as they can to speak about both the progress and the challenges that we face as a

nation and indeed, as a global community. and addressing atrocity crimes. i think that this is one of those rare issues where i don't sense a partisan divide at all. i think all americans from every walk of life every side of the aisle, are very proud of america's tradition in promoting and protecting human rights and generally certainly in the abstract feel that we should do more. and so i think that there is a great need to communicate more fully about the president's directive and about the ways in which we are seeking to ensure that a bureaucracy can the dead and itself to the human costs overseas. but i think that in part because, because as i just confessed to some of his a real bureaucratic speak that is

probably not necessarily congenial, even understandable by many americans. and i would love to think that process doesn't matter and bureaucracy doesn't matter, but i can fully confessed after you're back in government, it does. so that's not a very easily translatable piece of the story but it's a very important part of the story but then you also have the difficulty of galvanizing the process to get about a problem before it is a visible problem. and that is a perennial challenge on the prevention work, as many people in this room will appreciate. everyone agrees in principle to prevention is much more economical much more desirable and far better than the alternative but it's difficult to galvanize attention and resources for the work. i think that the more we can talk about those challenges and possibilities that exist to make a difference, the better it is. and, of course trying to do that in a way that is both concrete but not in any way tied

up in government deliberations. i think has perhaps been perceived as a challenge and i'm doing my level best to square the circle. >> the apb had been consulting with civil society more intimately. and i would be interested in your thoughts as to your view now looking back at it over the last three years, only one of which you've visited back in government, as to what the vision is for the apb and how it might engage further with the congress or civil society that it undertakes its work acknowledging that certain things it does are never going to be public or capable of being public, and maybe in a lot of cases they will be passively receiving information. but do you see further channels for civil society and the congress to be engaging with the apb? >> i can't speak to earlier because i wasn't in government but in the year i've been at the state department i've had a

number of roundtable with civil society to talk about the atrocity prevention work we're doing both at state and more broadly within the u.s. government. and i've had an opportunity to speak at a variety of gatherings of civil society groups. and as they said i'm committed to reaching out to partners in the united nations, partners in bilateral dialogues and other multilateral fora. so i can't speak to what the nsc role in that is but i can say that i see it as a wonderful opportunity both to learn from people who are truly expert. many people have spent their careers in this field and many have very particular areas of expertise in regions of the world that are actually extremely useful for the u.s. government to before. i also think more broadly that we have to rely on civil society organizations to both keep us honest in our efforts to make

progress and to spur us on where we fall short. and i look very much forward to continuing that dialogue. >> you were talking about partners before and the u.n. they also have seriously limited resources when it comes to the offices of special advisor to prevent or genocide prevention and the special advisor to protect. the u.s. has been more public and outspoken and creating a framework for engaging on issues as compared your usual partners, shall we say internationally. i'm wondering from your perspective engaging with diplomats around the world from various governments how they have taken to the atrocity prevention approach of the united states and whether any of this might rub off to some extent of the partners and enable more systematic approach is to be taken in other governments? >> it's really an interesting question because with them as atrocities prevention and we have a particular bureaucratic response that seeks to address

what we see the our government of addressing these issues. other countries approach the question to fully. they may define it differently. for example the uk is are comfortable about talking about stabilization were. we have a stabilization and leaders forum for which we exchange views with a number of like-minded countries about work that includes the atrocity prevention conversation but also is broader, editing different governments define both the issued and the challenge as well as the response differently. another example of that is an interesting innovation within the u.n. system and the way in which it is seeking to also be more adept at identifying challenges to human rights early and galvanizing different elements of the system to respond, often behind the scene, often diplomatically. i think there are a variety of responses out there. i don't think we are the only ones engaged in a. i think there's a lot of complementarity to the ways

different organizations and states act and expanding and regularizing that conversation which we began to do i think is really an exciting development. >> how do you see or how does the administration see this role in atrocity prevention relative to other partners around the world? the united states has an outsized global footprint and capacity. it doesn't change the moral responsibility and legal responsibly under the genocide convention or the geneva conventions or otherwise. i'm curious how the u.s. looks to calibrate its responses on some of the examples you gave and how much it expects from partners, for them to be able to put him and to what extent decisions are being made in relation to other partners potentially working with the united states on these issues we don't go it alone. >> it's a good question. i'm thinking about some of the recent experiences we've had in coordinating these are the same that you. i think that vis-à-vis, nigeria.

every case is like tolstoy's unhappy families to their similarity everywhere but there are very important distinctions. and so the potential for partners to play different roles is going to vary so much by the case. sometimes you really need someone who is who has ties with people that you fear will be the perpetrators. sometimes what you want our deep historical linkages and ongoing relationships with communities that could be victimized. it depends on history. it depends on geography. it depends on a lot of different things as to who can be helpful in whatlittle chaotic in terms of trying to think about all the different avenues that you can use to seek to affect the situation in a way that is

in advancing the prevention agenda. >> let me ask you one last question before we open it up to the audience. i'm curious what you see as the biggest challenge in let's say the next year for the administration on atrocity prevention. you've got and i'm sure knee-deep in all of this stuff, and see of the interagency process has played out and now you are working to facilitate this process at the state department. what are your thoughts as to the biggest challenge at the three-year mark with the going from where we are today to where you would like to see it as entity participates in this process? >> i think on the prevention side, i think resources really are a challenge. when i think about the way that we are organizing the government, which is if we have a crisis we can request supplemental funding and we can see the need for it. we need to move swiftly and there's a certain sense of urgency politically and bureaucratically. such a different scenario than you face on the prevention side.

we don't have dedicated funding for prevention efforts. and so as difficult as the charting out what the right that is, you have been a whole second level of hurdle in terms of is there any money available, what authorities could possibly use who still is something out, but can be reprogrammed? if you were designing a process to facilitate prevention efforts, the way we currently do our budgeting is not what you would define. so i think both the existence of dedicated funding for atrocity prevention as well as the flexibility and access to that funding is a huge challenge. i think stepping back and thinking about mass atrocities as a global challenge, clearly the biggest failing that we as a global canada is our inability to respond effectively, and that is a function of a great variety of factors to include the costs

of responding. .. i'm interested in when you were at the harvard and the kennedy school, did you

draw upon your work on that peacekeeping and helped to set something up and then set up the same kind of work we enforced the structure at the department of state because it seems to me when i was on the staff president reagan used to talk about that and with regards to madeleine. >> i have not put them in the same category of the questions

so that may ponder on that for a moment. we are on our own experience and so there is no question that having served in the department of defense in a period of enormous military and challenge and experiments in the response. and then working on the moral project so i think our experience always informs us and there are many people in government today who have been in the trenches of trying to prevent those efforts and are a big part of the reason why president obama's commencement is becoming real. when i think about the world

that i would like my children to grow up in it is one in which the specific comments that president obama articulated in terms of mass atrocities not just a moral but a national security concern. my hope is that the u.s. government with regards to their political tenor would move forward and continue to institutionalize the responses. and where i think part of the reason it's so meaningful that the process and the way that we are trying to institutionalize the process at state focuses the state focuses on prevention is because i don't think there is any debate or dissension about the value of doing that where

you can use to public tools or smaller amounts of resources where you can make a significant difference and i think there always tends to see the divide occurring in terms of where the government is appropriately responding to the mass atrocities worldwide. it's in the crisis stage and so ibb there is a deep road home on the prevention side when it comes to atrocities regardless to what you were referring to. >> i'm interested in the dod site of things. the engagement is a big part of

how they help with this mission. what do you see in terms of what we are getting right and what we can improve on? >> good question. i used to work more on the military when i was at harvard and i do now. but i think that while there is the response doctrine, my impression is that there is a way to go in terms of it being internalized in the department of defense. i think that there has been more progress on the tactical angle when we think about our training of the foreign peacekeepers to contract at the state department

about what i think there is much more that the dod could do with the military partnership and capacity building on atrocity prevention. one of the interesting things in watching the evolution of the un peacekeeping is that it is serving so many different functions now and i think that it may in fact be an opposite framework to engage rather than necessarily having to do it on a bilateral basis. but it's in the protection of the mission and the atrocity prevention so that might be the most fruitful way for the dod to initially think about expanding the role, but i do think they have their own learning to do because one of the dangers of importing the doctrine is that

it hasn't necessarily gone through its own process of intellectually absorbing the concepts and owning and inculcating the standard operating procedure so i think there is more to be done as well. but i haven't been working closely. >> steve hamilton with the department of state. you mentioned that obviously that elections are the key to this aspect areas with nigeria i know it's not over over there but there may be some of the early lessons learned and how this leads to the future template. >> i think that it will be really dangerous to talk about those right now because historically of course the violence occurs more in the days following the results then it does during the elections results and we are waiting for the results. i would prefer not to talk about

that case. that's what i can say is there has been an enormous amount of learning certainly in the u.s. government and i think probably also in the foreign partners about those that can make a difference in preventing violence around elections. one of the things president obama has been doing with some regularity is taking the methods and distributing them broadly. you talked about bringing it down to the personal level and here we have not just the abstract sense watching in the united states care but the president talking to the people and in the case of nigeria, the secretary of state directly with the candidates themselves about the nonviolence. there are a host of issues relating to the mobilization which is a discouraging potential issue that we can focus on in the prevention

efforts of updating the voices of those who speak for peace within. it was done in the case of nigeria faerber a host there were a host of things and again one of the things that i came in with the secretary tried to refocus and steer the efforts of the different bureau to make them complementary and the key ways that is happening is through the stabilization office and they are working on capturing those kinds of lessons around interventions so that the learning is not just people's hope which i'm really struck by when i asked the policy debates what do we know of?

show or suzy knows. the institutionalized knowledge playing a leading the leading role in that respect but i do think we have an enormous knowledge and that's again why it can be frustrating when we are scraping to find the resources to implement what we believe can make a difference. >> thanks very much for that speech. it is a huge and important step in the public diplomacy on this issue and i appreciate the initiative that you've taken. what do you think are the two or three steps that have -- that could be taken but have not yet been taken by whether the government, the administration congress, society to ensure continuity in the games that we have made from the administration whatever the

administration might be. >> i think the key is to make sure that each agency that has a role to play is internally embedding that process to the agency and again that this could be different for each agency but again already the intelligence community is night and day. there is a unit in a different piece of the intelligence almost every which way that has the response of the for this issue of atrocity. that is a different reality.

they forked in the system to work on the atrocity prevention and now what we are trying to do is take that energy and catalyze the president directed so we got the anti-atrocity working group that can bring together the different pieces of the state department for a regular process. that means that each of the bureaus that is present partly with responsibility, it isn't just someone else's problem. i think inculcating the sense of responsibility in the perfect bill you don't need this. in a perfect world that's what our government does but we are transitioning. we are not there yet. so it is too broad in the community of people that feel responsible for this work and i

think we've talked about challenges in the funding and galvanizing people to act early. those are real challenges but i do think that in terms of ensuring that there is in the system a reflux of the muscle memory of a problem to which a response absolution is required i think that is beginning to happen and i'm hopeful that in the next two years, that will have a hopeful way. >> i have a follow-up on that for one of the questions people are asking is when the president will be issuing the executive order that makes permanent the status and i think a lot of people have been anticipating that.

>> i'm sure that when the president is ready the president will do that. >> thanks so much. the international rescue committee. when we talk about violence and atrocities i think that we think about these big inflection points like election insurgencies that a breakout in the populations. my question pertains to the slow-growing problems and maybe over the course of years don't look that different but if you look over time they get worse among the particular groups and populations like one example is the situation in western burma. we talked about the whole government type of thing and then monitoring for what's to come. but what are these things that change and have the potential to get worse over time or put people in the position they are

exposed to violence in this case because of the discrimination i want to see where they stand on that. >> i will go in the abstract rather than getting specific to this case. both of the intelligence community and also the policy shocks within the different pieces look at issues that today they are looking at precipitating because sometimes it is the combination of the two that can create the most dire circumstance. so there is no preclusion.

many people characterize the situation for a long period of time, but clearly it was recognized as an atrocity case and one that deserves attention. i think in the case of burma they are very well aware of the issue and have been on monitoring that and they have elections coming up so the issue we will be looking at is how those do or do not intercept. there are many different forms in which they can trigger violence whether you are talking about burma or nigeria, the underlining conflict that has a potential to spark very enormously throughout the countries, but they are often a precipitating factor. so i think the answer is that there is no distinction made but

that the prioritization process tends to push the interagency focus on precipitating events that we have no reason to believe are the underlining potential atrocity. >> president of the nonprofit service corps and former diplomat. i appreciate your opening remarks. if i asked you to use two additional words and you open your remarks the remarks i would appreciate how you would respond. one is genocide and the second is syria. >> the way that it works is that it's stripped of the case but it's very much on the minds of

the issue in the context of the analysis that we do. in syria the category of issues with which the policy process is already seized but the role isn't to duplicate those that already exist particularly in the state department it is focused and it is a policy that frames and makes decisions and so where there are large recognized challenges there is a process very much in the category where it's come to play is where we believe there is insufficient attention being paid to particular instances or angles of mass atrocity issues and the example of the

protection is one that i gave in the context of iraq but most is an area they are not covering and that relieves to the difference between the agenda and the response agenda. >> thank you for coming here today and i commend you for the work that you've done today. another situation as mexico there are 250,000 displaced people with gangs and violence and drug dealers. 22,000 disappearances. the 22,000 disappearances. this is our neighbor to the south. obviously they will have a vested interest and also joint citizenship issues grecian

issues but i don't think that we can pay enough attention to what's going on in mexico and some of the other countries in latin america and the children don't show up at the border and the reason that we are precipitating the violence that causes children to flee and the terrible reaction in and the public the newspapers basically as if they were gangsters themselves were criminal victims >> there's a lot of competition for attention and the world of atrocities and their character and scale and pace of systematic purposeful attacks have issues that are deserving so i come

back to the answer before this is between the precipitating event and the way we seek to look across the globe at the issues that are in need of prevention and those that we are able to envision. i hate to say the word marrow that it's the difference between fixing a country and intervening to prevent mass atrocities and it is almost proximate cause timeframe issue that comes into play but if we were to ask them to solve every problem related they wouldn't be able to focus and so we do focus. so that is not to say that issues wax and wane and come and go and so those will always be in flux and part of the way the way that we set the process is

precisely because there is a limited ability to look at issues and we want to prioritize the cases as best we can. >> my question is a direct follow on that. as you know i wrote about atrocities when i was in the "washington post" and there are large-scale and small-scale. a lot of the questions were getting from the audience is what are the criteria that you use to decide is very numerical criteria, what constitutes an atrocity of sufficient scale and scope to demand your attention and how do you set where that car is and the bar is and i also understand i presume that you will say it is somewhat in flux depending on other events going on in the world but i wonder if your work is guided by an

overall consensus about what constitutes an atrocity or mass atrocity. that would be helpful. >> i can be more specific about the terms but not the application of them to be fair because there is a timeframe issue and there are judgments analysts make. as for talking about the atrocities we talk about violence directed against civilians in the range of 500 people over a sustained period of time. that is a low bar so there is a lot that's captured by that. the fact that you have this situation that has a number that

is lower than the threshold. it can ignite something bigger because of the events whether it's the war next door or whatever it is so that the answer. want to ask but ask about your broad set of responsibilities because of some are like the cop tried to get their or even in the slowburn mode but on the bigger level what are the strategies you think about in creating the context in which there is respect for human rights or democracy or pluralism

are the foundations of doing enough to invest in those kind of things? i've heard criticism not doing enough to invest for example say in the moderate countries. have you tried to engage that sector in supporting that kind of work and can you address those topics? thanks to. >> let me try to answer the first piece. when i looked at the undersecretary of and behind the issues of the counterterrorism and the security sector reform as well as the democracy human rights office can't toomey was

the biggest and most profound difference is i think the state department can make is in bringing them together the harder security pieces with the softer security pieces and blending them in areas that have attention so we are focusing on for example building up a legal regime while we are training the police to do the same ensuring there is a justice system that can actually reach the verdict and make people feel as though it will come at the end of the day while we are making sure the refugees are actually accepted in the area in other words, the integration of the tools that we use so that there is a more concrete and perched the government means that's where the money has been made and that is part of the reason why it's such an important partner for the states because if they can't

do it all alone we have certain pieces in the security sector reform so to me as we think about what it means to create an environment in which they are second it relates to a broad set of interventions that i think we can do more to foster those and partnership. i was just in the horn of africa looking at how we might envision our intervention from preventing the violent extremism. for me everything is all connected to so building the rule of law is all integrated and our bureaucracy by

definition has expertise that comes in the form of silos. you just can't get away with it when you think of what we should be doing by the way of the foreign-policy sustained integration is something i'm really looking for and the consolidation of efforts in the regional bureau. in terms of the foundation we had a seminar on the extremism and a secretary secretary hosted secretary who stood for a states that daylong ministerial at the state department that was unique in a bunch of ways that are important and exciting. it was one of the first major events coming in to president obama spoke. lots of high level government

but also included the private sector so the conversation was diverted into the focus of the summit was the prevention of the violent extremism in the reaction to violent extremism because the reality is if you look at all of our incredible investment, and the distinct successes in addressing the terrorist networks and part of the challenge for the international community in the years ahead and what that means is thinking at the outer edge of the safe haven activity and doing more to create the communities and good governance so that together it reinforces the ability of any target of extremist ideology to resist the likelihood that they will find themselves practically. anyway background on extremism

one is a big take away from the conference that this set of interventions that are very locally driven very fundamentally about people into their relationship to their future and their government really requires all hands on deck to include the foundations and to include the private sector and i think that we have now laid out a challenge through september the un general september assembly with the same set of factors ask them to all make inroads working on the series of agreed-upon objectives we are working now to try to find that because so many have stepped forward and said i want to host a summit but i don't know if i can afford to this or

that or the other. they won't partnership from all non- governmental actors. and i think the beauty of the prevention as it pertains to extremism is that it is relatively mappable in a way that is conducive to partnerships. when we are talking about the mass atrocities, so often we are -- it is harder to find the right partner with whom to have a foundation work with the early stages of an election. there is no reason we cannot enroll to do that. what i have not heard is foundations seeing that as their role. they see themselves in the direct service than they do the more political for the lack of a better word kind of initiative necessary to prevent the

violence that we then look at and try to repair with civil society and so in all of these prevention cases there is a potential for a concern about being politicized to detour people from doing the very things they demand that needed to be done. and yet, it is eerie clear to me whether you you're talking about the pre- election violence if this kind of solutions and many of the same tools apply and there are local organizations that can do that -- >> wife to the new america foundation. if you want to watch the rest of this conversation you can find it online, c-span.org. going to a discussion on the policy whether the government should negotiate with hostage takers or pay the ransom and the americans that have been taken hostage a broad. >> -- by the idea that the united states government will

make no exceptions is an interesting distinction that they make. they say we will negotiate but we want to make concessions, which i think is a distinction without a difference because what the negotiation begins in the idea that we won't do anything. that doesn't seem like much of a negotiating position. so we have a outstanding panel of people to discuss these difficult issues. the governor has been an associate for many years and has been involved in the negotiations involving 120 kidnapping cases involving american citizens. we had a long career in the fbi and then retire retirement became a senior vice president of risk and while he was there that's when i got to know him. he was very much involved in the case of the americans taken for

more than half a decade. he continues to consult and he is also the author of an excellent book which is available outside and i'm sure he would be happy to sign for you. the mother of seven children including her son austin who was taken hostage two and a half years ago kidnapped in syria in 2012 if it wasn't for the clergy and "washington post" among other organizations. and finally the new america specializes in reporting from libya, egypt syria, other countries. he would be principal advisor to an american journalist executed by isis as you all know and he shares the family spokesman said we are going to start with gary

and deborah. >> thank you. kidnapping is certainly been on all of our minds since the terrible events perpetrated by isis. but it's a crime that's been around quite a long time and we've had to deal with it. the u.s. policy is officially as peter said, we will not make substantive concessions to the terrorists. and it that has morphed through the years to become no ransom and often no negotiations although as peter suggested something out we can negotiate. but we give you a little bit of the background. probably 85 to 90% of the kidnappings because her round the world are for criminal purposes. the u.s. law does not prohibit a family or corporations can pay the ransom and a criminal kidnapping case. the remaining ten or 15% probably less than that are

kidnappings undertaken by terrorist groups. his arrest groups on the state department list. we have to examine it because not every terrorist kidnapping is for political purposes. for example most of that we've worked with are on duty for simply efforts to obtain money and we would negotiate with them in a normal fashion and secure a safe release. i think one of the issues we have to contend with is the fact that there's very few americans taken overall. we have anywhere from ten to 12 per year and almost all of those are by kroll undertakings. the major concern with terrorism of course is that paying the ransom provides material support to these organizations. there is no question that anytime a ransom is any time a ransom is paid kidnappers beat a

criminal or political committee encourages more kidnapping. however, with choices are we left with to deal with each situation? a state is a very infrequent event in these incidences. military rescue very dramatic but also high risk for the hostages at the time they are the most likely to be killed, and so the outcomes are generally best achieved through a negotiation process. the fbi began deploying hostage negotiators in response to the kidnapping of american citizens as dictated by law. we have an enormous success rate in the 13 years of my career where we worked about 120 of these cases. the fbi probably has worked to death many cents. how do we do that? we worked with other authorities in the united states and with the families. the policy that we adopted then was essentially going back to

the lindbergh kidnapping and that is the decision whether or not to pay is the decision of the family. so, we would deploy and ask the company with a wanted to do. if they decided to pay the ransom even though that was officially frowned upon by the government cannot we didn't withdraw our support. we needed to need to be involved identify, locate and hopefully prosecute the promise to veto kidnappers. the other 98% success rate and we dealt with many of the other terrorist organizations out there with some success. i will tell you in the middle east when we deal with isis and al qaeda it is far more challenging. one of the cases i was involved with the daniel pearl case and it was clear from the outset there were no realistic

expectations on the part of the kidnappers. i negotiations has become a dirty word that means a bylaw that allows us to gather information, by -- by tim and it generally does regard the situation. for me the use of military force because of the high risk involved should be the last resort and one that we would look at very carefully because the risks. but i'm afraid has happened since 9/11 has been a movement towards the exclusive problem. as it was said that every hammer looks like a nail and because we have a robust and strong military.

i am not biased against the military by any stretch of the imagination but we have to take these events and have a variety of options. peter brings up a good point about. i do not agree that they should be seen as openly willingly wanting to pay a ransom. i think because of the the visit of policy implications. however, i also very strongly don't feel as though the government should try to prevent the family or company of paying the ransom indicate that case. there are four lower expectations on the part of the kidnappers when a family is expected to come up with money than if the government is expected to come up with money. we need to be true to the policy that we have and i will give you an example is a plane loaded with hijackers had hostages

landed at the dallas airport tonight i guarantee the fbi would negotiate. that would be a violation of the policy that we could do so in order to stabilize the event to secure the release of hostages so that we could gain information and intelligence and secure but we could bring the time to assemble the resources and gather information and increase the likelihood that we would be successful if we have to take practical action and that is important to remember negotiating doesn't mean weakness. john kennedy said best we should not negotiate here but we shouldn't fear to negotiate. so for the fault of having a conversation with terrorists is looked upon and frowned upon as being a capitulation or acquiescence, it's not. i once spoke to make it happen in colombia and the visitors that there is no sense talking

to them. and i said i've done it 20 times successfully so i would argue the point. i was surprised that the diplomat said that because we should open those conversations and always do that. the families are in a pickle. it is difficult for them to secure the safe release of their loved ones when there's public announcements that we will not negotiate, we will not talk. i think that things would be handled better if the government was a little less vocal on the matters in the support support of the families and allow them to conduct the association's as we used to and give them our undivided support and share information and the families. in the families. there is a tendency that we over classified information and deny access to the families the information they need to make their decisions. so my recommendations are the first and foremost we stop

saying no negotiating, no ransom and replace it with the policy the government will not make such conceptions. second, do not impede families were companies from conducting negotiations and in fact assist them in the process support the family with as much time information as we used to in the fbi and i think they still make a good effort to that. it's important that families are briefed regularly on a dalia basis on what they are doing. families need information and support that we can just leave them to their resources to handle these matters. we are talking about the relatively small number of americans working on the political kidnappings although our focus today is on those. on the unyielding policy as it

is dictated by summitt has a more broad effect on any kidnapping and it could be an impediment to using the best resources we have in the government to try to resolve these and i would say one last thing, we worked a fair number of kidnap for ransom in the united states. this was in the 70s. the almost eliminated that crime in america not by telling families they couldn't pay the divide going after kidnappers very vigorously identifying and prosecuting and putting them in jail at very high rates. this essentially forced the criminals to say i am going to go into another line of work so it is very rare to have a kick at fort ransom. it's in the countries that are dysfunctional where they have corrupt law enforcement and judicial systems and there is no punishment to the kidnappers. mexico city today is the kidnap capital of the world and you

will see how that fares out in the way the matters are handled better so that's the equation we have to try to pursue, not dean i family paying ransom but support them after we safely secure the victim. i know if it was one of my children i would do anything in my power to get them out. >> this is not in my skill set. they've made me happy to be just a mom. i have four boys three girls and a precious granddaughter and i am so blessed to be the mother of seven people i admire. austin is the oldest a physician because the privilege and responsibility. he's the protector of the

sisters and i consider the advisor to his brothers. he can leave the younger. he's always been interested and he's he is a national merit finalist and entered college one week after his 16th birthday. in 2004 after graduating from the georgetown school during the first semester he joined the marine corps where he served for three tours and completed. he's still a student at georgetown law and was slated to finally graduate. however the summer before graduation instead of taking an internship he made the decision to go to syria where he became an award-winning journalist. unfortunately that's also where his plans were interrupted when he was taken captive to retire

with love to tell you about his amazing brothers and sisters and my granddaughter but since austin was taken captive over two and a half years ago and our lives were turned inside out and upside down was terrific kids are now commonly referred to as the other children and i'm known as the mother of a hostage. now my life is defined by efforts to determine who is holding my son and how to bring him safely home. in these efforts my husband and i have been determined to lead to the leave no stone unturned. we have worked with our government we have reached out to foreign governments and we have worked with amazing ngos like reporters without borders. we worked closely with news organizations especially the clutch e-news with the boston has earned his journalism award. we've been supported in amazing ways by the huge circle of

friends and colleagues and countless other brilliant and generous people. we have learned more than we ever wanted to know about the united states government and its response to international hostage crisis. we were told early on by the departing assistant director at the fbi that it's our responsibility to make sure information is effectively shared. in spite of the fact that information isn't shared with us as most of you may know this was a discussion in his time. when a friend in dc tells us about this discussion i sent him e-mail introducing myself.

his response was quite unexpected. he invited me to ask the questions myself. when i accepted the invitation he sent me a few questions such as giving the review of the hostage policy, what is your assessment of the policy come how might it be improved. they make a letter in the defense department stating president obama directed a review of the state government hostage policy. we were completely unaware that such a policy even existed. though it has informed every moment of our lives for the past 966 days, we still have never seen this policy because it is a classified residential directive

and we do not have clearance. we have been told by a high-ranking government official that policy is doubled the group. it's overly broad to have no consistent interpretations. this leads us to conclude that the policy can only be improved by creating something entirely new. while we are gratified that the white house has positively responded to an insistence from the families that we be included along with former hostages in the review process we are dismayed that the classification may prevent us from ever seeing the final result. we strongly suggest it must address three main issues. primarily the soonest and safest return of a hostage.

secondly, communications within the government entities, among the government entities and certainly between the government and the hostages families. last but certainly not least the protection of the hostage. it is critical to understand that every hostage situation is unique. instead of an established protocol which often developed over time into the reaction our government must be prepared to drop existing resources to qualified teams to cross thoughtful measured response on a case-by-case basis. they are sufficient in effectiveness.

as he said efforts should first and foremost of the hostage. there is no one, not anyone in the government whose singular mission is the welfare return of the hostage. every government agency has its own mission agenda. the fbi is pursuing a criminal investigation. the state is concerned with matters of foreign policy and the white house focuses on national security. all of these entities are inherently and intrinsically reversed. largely because of these issues it is only recently after more than two years our government is in direct discussion.

our hope is that the captors are identified and that this will soon become negotiation negotiations for the release and safe return. to avoid this delay we support the idea of a single point of accountability with reports to the president who may have hostage recovery toward the nader. in every case this individual will have a singular mission of securing the safest return of the hostage. all will be coordinated and shared through this entity. this individual should be the first for every last bit of information intelligence relevant to the hostage situation. join from every agency resource

available and after a careful evaluation this individual will designate the appropriate lead agency. there should be no aspect of our government response which falls into the default mode. so how does the family fit into the communication and what is our position from our experience we can only guess this is not at all addressed in what is considered to be the current policy. we have asked and asked so we can have unfettered access to all available information about our funds. a similar we have agreement from individuals at the highest level

that this is a reasonable request. but we haven't been able to overcome are the obstacles to the particle and culture. no entity or agency is willing to take the risk of doing something so new and different. in spite of all of our efforts we are not valued as contributing members. the fbi especially still considers us a part of the problem and a risk. we find this both offensive and absurd. we continue to ask for security

clearance. we feel that it's an essential and critical part of the team. as things are now it is quite likely that we would be the only member with an objective of the soonest return. of course no discussion would be complete without a mention of the ransom. since we do not know who is was holding him, we have had no opportunity for the request for ransom. i'm sure they will speak to it more. i will say that we agree with gary that we should not let our desire to publish kidnappers and cloud our judgment and restraint our option.

our efforts should first and foremost be focused on the safe release of the hostage. we need to use them appropriately. i appreciate the opportunity to speak today. it's receiving the attention that it deserves tons of his experience may be less for others. nonetheless our absolute rarity remains the return of our son austin. we are inside and outside of our government that has helped with our case. if you haven't done so go to the website and sign the petition to the president urging him to do all he can to bring him home.

also if you have connections that can help us receive security clearance, we can be fully informed about our sense. please talk to me after the program. thank you. i think that she said most of the things that were pertinent to the case that i want to touch on a couple of things. first i was very involved in the cases and one of the things i learned that it's very important they don't have the right information and that's important. when you come to a situation like this and especially for me

we don't have any experience in this other is a learning curve. we get more experience and one thing that we learned very early on as the bureaucracy is an impediment to the facilitating process and its reactionary and they built up the new prince. every four years or eight years the administration comes in with lots of ideas and the bureaucracy knows that it has to hunker down for a couple of years and the initiatives will die out and that is the same thing for people like us. we go in there and have ideas and we want answers and the fbi and the state department they've been doing these things for years and they are not going

to shake trees just because we are not meant to do it. the fbi is very cautious and we are going to work very slowly. when there is an opportunity for something to happen, we get an e-mail from the kidnapper discussing your income in the kitchen with them and it's going to work very consciously it is not going to want you to have as much hope and optimism and see some type of her eyes and as the families will. they have a cultural understanding. they just didn't understand what they were dealing with in the region. ..