>> i don't think that conflict is inevitable. i think the world that we're in today is probably a different one that we've been in before when our great power rose. the movement of people, the interconnectedness of banks, of

industry, of all these things that you know very well about, i think, have made it imperative that we understand the rise of china and that we, to some degree, accommodate the rise of china where we can to attempt to shape the rise of china. i've said on many occasions that a china that would, a china with a military that would come forward as a net provider of security rather than a net user of security would be beneficial to not only the region but would be beneficial to us as well. and i think that's an achievable goal. i think that has to be looked at at how do we deal with china globally and global institutions from their role in the united nations to how they're behaving and conducting themselves in other regions of the world and how we interact with them there. i also think it will require us to have a pinpoint focus on how we see their influence in this

region that we've been talking about today which is primarily southeast asia and northeast asia. and to understand we have to try to understand what their side of the equation is. and to be honest with you, some of the things they've done aren't really clear today. so, you know, we always get in a debate about whether wished continue mil to -- whether we should continue mil to mil. i am an proponent of continuing to take rusk there -- risk there. to try to establish those types of frameworks that allow us to communicate with each other in crisis we've had some good work with the prc lately of building confidence-building measures that help us understand how to operate with each other in these constrained waterways so we don't have a bunch of captains and commanders of ships out there making bad decisions that

might escalate us into something that -- that escalate us into a -- [inaudible] trap. i think we need to continue to keep engaging them but i think we need to be forthright and what the position is on u.s. behavior and it doesn't match what our allies and partners and value systems support. >> well clearly, in recent years the thrust of the chinese has been economic. and even more recent years it's been military as you have testified today. tremendous growth and subsurface, everything else. what do you make of these actions which can only be characterized as aggressive building islands off the shore and increased patrols in the south china sea? what to you read into that in -- what do you read into that in terms of china's military or expansionist intentions? >> yes sir. well, i think the chinese communicate to us pretty clearly what they're doing.

they see themselves as a renewing power. they have the assets to build a military. they're building particularly in the army -- i mean the navy and the air force because they understand the importance of protection of the global areas. and you start to see them operate globally in different places which they didn't operate years ago. they told us over and over again that they believe that the nine dash line in the south china sea is their historic her to have y'all waters. they have, as far as i understand they have refused to participate in that. and so what they were doing is through what they articulate is peaceful means they're building these land reclamations, establishing their position in

the south china a sea which opens their options for down the road as this thing as this situation continues to unfold. >> i'm out of time. a one-word answer, do you believe it would be beneficial to the united states to accede to the law of the sea treaty? >> yes. thank you. thank you, mr. chair. >> thank you, mr. chairman. gentlemen, thanks for your testimony, your service. add mural locklear, thank you for -- admiral lock roar, thank you for hosting me a couple of weeks ago, appreciate the time. please, send my regards to your staff. three hours on a saturday is well above and beyond the call of duty for anybody, so let 'em know how much i appreciate that. you know, identify been critical of -- i've been critical of many aspects of the president's national security strategy in part because i think we've lacked credibility. when we say something that we're going to do as a country we need to do it, and i think in certain areas of the world we haven't done that, and i think it undermines our national security when we do that.

one area of the president's strategy that i have been supportive both militarily and economically is the chairman stated about tpp is the rebalance to the asia-pacific. you know i believe we need to make sure this rebalance and optimization of our military forces in the region is credible. we're saying that we're going to rebalance, we need to actually do it. do you agree with that? >> yes sir i do. and i think that the rebalance is goes far beyond just military though. >> right. >> i think we have to also get our economic house in order as well otherwise all the military rebalancing we do will not have the effect that we want it to have. >> i agree with that. i appreciate the map, the aor map. wanted to talk briefly, you know alaska's no longer in your aor, but as we discussed the troops -- which are significant both in terms of army bcts and

a very robust air force presence -- those troops are still op con to you in the event of p contingencies aren't they? >> that's correct sir. >> and how critical do you see these troops and general please comment, in the region in terms of not only shaping but also contingency forces with regard to your op plans? >> well, senator the forces in alaska, you know, if you take a look at the globe, they're as far west or maybe even farther west in some cases than hawaii is. so the response time that those forces would have to any significant contingency in northeast or southeast asia is quite good and important. that's why those forces i think, have been op come to me -- op com to me more a long time. there's a variety of forces up there that are important to us,

the fighter squadrons that are there, the bcts that are there, including the ranges. the range complexes are very important because that's where we get our high end training for some of our hardest types of environments our aviators -- >> general, how about you in terms of just the korean contingency issues? >> i agree with admiral locklear. we rely on those forces as part of our quick response which we'll need in crisis. we also train with them regularly, and wal send force toss train there too. >> do you think if we removed one or two bcts from alaska that would show that we're committed to a rebalance or undermine our rebalance commitment? again, this goes to credibility. >> well, i think that from the perspective of, you know, what the other outcomes were of that, from a regional perspective there'd be questions about the loss of troops -- >> and the credibility of our rebalance strategy?

>> i think you'd is to look at that -- you'd have to look at that holistically. i'd prefer not to take it from just one perspective. i'd have to understand the remainder of the changes that were taking place if, in fact, that were to happen. >> admiral lock roar, do you think that would undermine our rebalance of credibility two bcts in the region leaving? >> i would answer interms, i think that any significant force structure moves out of my aor in the middle of a rebalance would have to be understood and have to be explained because it would be counterintuitive to a rebalance to move significant forces in another direction. >> i agree with that, and i think it's a really important eshoo as we look at the rebalance as a successful rebalance. it's credible. can i turn to, i want to also commend you for what you stated and senator wicker on the strategic lift issue. i think that that was certainly something i saw on my recent trip that was a concern. we're moving forces to different

parts of the region, but the strategic lift seems to be lacking. both air force and our capacity. but to get there, we need to have a successful laydown. are you confident that the realignment of forces from okinawa to guam and other places is going to be on schedule in terms of cost and timelines that the the president has laid out? -- the department has laid out? that's something i know this committee, as you know, has been very focused on. >> yes sir. well, in the last three years i've had a lot of time to take a look at this and work through it and my overall assessment is that we're on plan at this point in time. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> admiral, in march the gao published a report on optional contract support, and i'm nerdy enough about operational contracts that i pay close attention to this stuff.

as you know, we wasted billions of dollars in iraq and afghanistan because we had not embraced training on contracting as a core capacity of our commands engaged in the contingency. in that report it indicated that your command is the furthest behind in incorporating operational contract support in its joint training exercises and operation plans. now, i know that gao noted that you have taken some recent positive steps to address this, but i'd like you to lay out if you would briefly, the steps you're taking to include operational contract support in your command's joint training exercises. >> well, thank you. not to make excuses, but i think the reason we're probably behind is because we haven't had the demand signal that was put on the commanders in the middle east in the last several wars, and we haven't had that type of

a massive, rapid build-up to support a war effort anywhere. that said, we did recognize it after that report as a deficiency. and we're looking hard at where are those contracting decisions made, how is the commander, how does the commander have visibility to those decisions during the execution of a crisis or campaign because, you know when a crisis occurs, stuff just starts coming. and that's good. that's what makes us strong. but when it starts coming at some point in time you have to decide what's enough and what's not enough and then who's going to be the steward of it down the road. so we're trying to understand the command and control of those contractors and how much the leadership knows and what they need to know and when. >> well, i think it's so critical that we never lose sight of this contracting oversight and planning and training as a core capacity because we're never going to go back to the day -- um, my father peeled potatoes in world war ii.

we're not going to have our trained war fighters peeling potatoes ever again. all we have to do is look at the lock, ugly saga -- long, ugly saga to realize what happens when contracting is not considered a huge priority. so i appreciate your attention to that. on another note, i know that you are the primary jammer provider in the navy for dod. could you speak about the role of airborne lek p tronic attacks -- electronic attacks and how critical they are and how critical is the asset of our really only electronic warfare capability that is provided by the growler? >> i've been a huge supporter of growler for my entire navy career. the transition of the prowler squadrons which were so significant in many of our conflicts and provide us what i thought was an asymmetric

advantage in our air space because of their capabilities. i was glad to see those capabilities and jammer types of capabilities transitioned to, you know basically a fourth generation plus aircraft that can operate effectively in denied air spaces. so in any campaign that i would end vision that would be of a higher end warfare in my aor, electronic warfare attack provides me battle space that i may have to go fight for. and those growlers and to some degree the other higher end capabilities that we have are critical to allowing us to have that access. >> i finally i want to touch on the stresses that we're feeling on remote piloted aircraft. as you know whiteman is the home to the 20th reconnaissance squadron, and those pilots and those sensor operators and those intelligence personnel along with the airmen who are operating the predator and the

reaper are very important. we're putting incredibly high demands on these folks. i mean they're not getting normal rest, they are not getting time for training. we can't even rotate some of them into a training capacity because the demand is so high. could you briefly talk about what steps can be taken to alleviate what i think is a critical problem? i mean, i -- these guys are, they're working around the clock and getting very little break. i don't know that we would do this to a traditional war fighter, but we're doing it to these rpas. >> well, the advent of these systems and in the past couple of decades and the obvious benefit that they've brought to the battle space has put pressure, i think, on the our force to be able to produce the tubes of people and to be able to man them. but, unfortunately the demand signal just goes up and up and up. one of the asymmetric strengths

of the united states is our ability to sense and understand what's going op. we have the best irs in the world, but it's way -- isr in the world, but it's way overtaxed, and that's when it's showing, is in faces and the at working hours of these young people. so we need to rationalize what are the platforms we're going to invest in the future and bulled a structure of man, train and equip underneath it that's sustainable. >> yeah, i particularly worry i think we tend to think of these asthma chiens and don't realize the human components of this and the stresses they have. these guys are manning these things for 10 12 hours and then going home to their families for supper and homework and getting up quickly and going back out. it's a unique kind of role and certainly nontraditional as we look at the history of our military. and i just want you to share with your colleagues that talking to some of these folks, you know it's clear to me that we need to be thinking about

their well being and whether or not we are overutilizing them and what kind of stresses we're going to see in that personnel. thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you mr. chair. thank you admiral locklear and general salve rotty for being here today and for your men and women that serve as well. i appreciate it very much. as you know, the dod is planning to transfer operational control or op con of south korea forces to the south korean government in the event of another conflict on the peninsula. and this op con transfer has been discussed for many, many years. it was originally supposed to take place in 2007, it's been delayed many, many times in the past number of years and it does appear to be currently and definitely postponed. so can you describe some of those challenges that we're being faced with and those that the south koreans are facing in

their efforts to create conditions which would allow us to successfully do the op con transfer? >> yes ma'am, thank you. as you know this past october the secretary of defense and the min def agreed on a traditional approach to op con transition. in the past it had been focused on a date with capabilities. so in short i agreed with the change that we made to focus on capabilities and conditions as opposed to shooting for a date. three general conditions. the first is that south korea developed the command and control capacity to be able to lead a combined and multi-national force in a high intendty conflict. intensity conflict. the second is that they have the capabilities to respond to the growing nuclear and missile threat in north korea, and the third general condition that

this transition talk time take time take place at a time that is conducive to a transition. now, there's specific capabilities i mentioned that are listed in details. a part of this a part of the agreement. i'll cover generally the main areas. the first was c4 command and control computers. in terms of their capability there, which i mentioned earlier. ballistic missile defense generally in their capability there. the munitions that they have to have on hand for us to to conduct a high intensity conflict, and then finally the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets necessary in an environment that is very challenging for isr and particularly with the assets is and the asymmetric assets that north korea's developing. so in a nutshell, those are the

things that are the challenges that we have as an alliance, and the republic of korea's focused on enhancing. >> thank you. add mural, do you have -- admiral, do you have any thoughts? >> i think the dynamic that's most changing is the behavior of kim jong un. and so that has to be wrought in the claus as well -- brought in the calculation as well. >> thank you. and, general, i do agree absolutely, it's capabilities versus calendar. we have to look at those capabilities. so realistically, do you think moving forward with op con transfer is that in the foreseeable future? and if it is, what are the benefits to us then of doing the op to con transfer? >> well, i think i think it is foreseeable. i don't think it's in the short term. and i i think it's a benefit in terms of, you know our presence

in the alliance that we have with republic of korea, i think, is very important for regional security. it plays into global security as well because they've been a very good partner of ours for a number of years, and they're developing the capability, and they've actually employed forces around the world. and they've deployed in support of us as well. in some of the conflicts that we've been involved in. so i think in the long term the alliance and its development in this regard is good for both countries. >> very good. i do know the south koreans were end engaged -- engaged at the air force base when my trucks were rolling through that area, and we do appreciate their support. i have very little time left but i to want to thank you yes men for being here as well as the service of your men and women. thank you, mr. chair. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and to the witnesses for your

testimony today. mr. chair, i appreciate the way you're doing these hearings. i now see the med in the madness, to have the strategic hearing a couple of days ago with we had a wonderful hearing with some topics that actually makes this work really well. admiral lock roar, as our military lead in pay com describe why u.s. support for the -- [inaudible] treaty is something you support. you gave the one-word answer to senator king, and i'm asking the why question. >> well, i'll speak about it from the military side or from the seaside. >> air additional elements as well. >> i won't comment on because it's not my area to do. first of all, it's widely accepted after a lot of years by deliberation by many, many countries, most countries in my aor. it provides a framework that we,

that most cubs that look at it believe -- most countries that look at it believe is useful for determining who particularly in these sea spaces and these eezs and things that aren't quite clear provides a proper framework for how to go about dealing with those disputes. so it's a rule of law, a rule of process that's a good thing. by not being -- and to be honest with you, on the military side we've been direct directed by numerous presidents to comply with the law of the sea at least as it reflects the way we interact with other countries and our partners. that said, when we're not a signatory, it reduces our overall credibility when we bring it up as a choice of how you might solve a dispute of any kind. >> second question to the trap, you indicated we should do can what the u.s. can reasonably

that is in our interest to accommodate the rise of china within the n of global institutions, and i think you hate out a pretty good rationale. the more they are engaged in the global institutions, they can have a pro-stability effect. one current matter that is pending before congress is reforms to the imf that would enable china to have more of a role, more voting power but also a financial obligation in terms of the work of the imf. i don't want you to comment if that's not your lane and you don't have an opinion but that is the kind of thing wouldn't you agree, that we ought to be taking a look at? if we're going to try to accommodate china's growing influence, having them more engaged and play for -- play more of a leadership role in global institutions like the imf is one way to accomplish that integration that can be, ultimately, a pro-stability

move. would you not agree? >> yes, i absolutely agree. i mean, you know, if china's inevitable rise to be a world power in the many different venues they inevitably have to participate and be part of those institutions, and they have to take some responsibility for these things. >> kind of the common sense, you know, the law firms that get founded by strong partners they often run aground when the next generation of young excited partners want leadership roles. and, you know, law firms that don't make room for the young leaders as they come up find they split away, and they end up being arch competitors. if they find a way to accommodate them in, it often holds it together. just seems like that's kind of a basic analogy that we see a lot in human situations. well, i would hope that both on law of the sea and imf reform that we would take it seriously here. because while they have nonmilitary dimensions i do think they bear directly upon

some of the military issues that we may have. last thing i'd like to which happened you on and ask you one final question. i like the fact that you in your written testimony -- and i like the fact that some of our witnesses the other day talked about indo-asia-pacific. india has had an interesting history militarily with the united states and more generally the congress party kind of had a long non-aligned tradition that made them slant a little bit toward russia in terms of purchasing material. but now they are significantly engaged with the u.s. and u.s. companies. they do more military exercises with the united states than they do with any other nation. i think there is an opportunity under prime minister mothi, i know the chair has spent tomb with him and others have too. just as i conclude cold you share your -- could you share your thought on the u.s./india military thought at this moment? >> yes, sir. part of the rebalance was to develop a strategy for a longer

term security relationship with india. we're doing that. we have i think a tremendous opportunity here. as the leadership changes in india and the world changes for them to be a growing partner with the united states not necessarily an aligned partner, but a growing partner. i believe that some of the defense trade initiatives that we have with them will help bring us together in a more productive way for many years to come. >> thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much. and thank both of you for your work. we general scam rotty i do believe that the work in south korea is important, and we've been able to draw down our numbers, and i know the south korean military is more effective in many ways than they have been. but i think it is an important relationship. they've been good allies, as have the japanese and others in the pacific, and that long-term

umbrella relationship partnership that we've had remains important, i think, to the world and to the united states' interest. so i appreciate the work that you're doing, i appreciate the importance of the pacific. it's just undeniable, it seems to me. our strategic subcommittee has dealt a good bit with nuclear weapons. our relationship with russia, the drawdown of our treaty under the treaty, our nuclear weapons system admiral locklear but we don't talk enough about china's position. they built a nuclear weapon capability, and i assume they have the ability to surge that at any point they choose to. they have the finances and the technology and the capability of downing that is that is

that -- of doing that is that correct? >> yes, sir. we've observed them pursuing a deliberate modernization of their nuclear forces, both those that are land-based and the ones that are subsurface-based. they now have, i believe three optional sub b ma reaps in the pacific, ballistic missile sub ma reaps. that could grow, i think, to four or five in the future, and we know that they're pursuing missile systems missiles to be able to put on there that will extend their ability for a nuclear, second strike nuclear tack is what they what they explained, how they explained it. but it is growing, and i think that it will be a continued consideration for us as war planners. >> we in congress and policymakers in washington need to understand the reality of a nuclear armed submarine.

how many missiles would that those submarines, chinese submarines be able to handle and launch, and how many warheads could they launch? >> to give you an accurate answer, let me respond to that for the record if you don't mind. multiple. >> would it compete with our capabilities? or if you're able to say. if not, that's all right. >> i wouldn't say sir. >> all right. one of the strategies that china has used has been to create a zone outside the nation to make it difficult for our ships to inhabit and put them at risk. does that continue? is that part of the df-21 missile plan and do they have other plans that are designed to

make it more difficult for our ships to be within hundreds of miles of the shore? >> across the board the chinese have improved their, greatly improved their ability to build missiles of all kinds, cruise missiles ballistic missile defense, air defense missiles, so they do have, i think a quite credible technology. the df-21 missile that you're talking about is a missile that they're fielding and -- building and testing and producing that could potentially if built properly, it would put u.s. forces at sea at risk at greater and greater distances but it's one of those things that we are dealing with and trying to answer. >> i think you're correct and i think the navy's thinking clearly about that in a wise way. what about the capabilities we have? army has some potential land-based missiles that could

create also a zone around our interest, our country, our territories that could protect us. has any thought been given as i believe secretary hagel mentioned of using some of those capabilities to -- from a land to provide a better safe zone around our bases and territories? >> i wouldn't know senator exactly what secretary hagel was talking about that time a but i'd be glad to get specifics and to answer it. >> all right. well, thank you both for your service, and i believe we have a fabulously-capable military, well led bial respected leaders, and we -- by talented leaders and we thank you for that. >> senator donnelly. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you both for your service. admiral locklear, what would you say -- and i apologize, i

haven't been here the entire time -- when you look, the two biggest challenges you look at in your in your command? >> well, the biggest challenge is making sure that we can respond effectively to what i think is the most dangerous situation, the north korea peninsula. so i have a huge responsibility for helping north com with the defense of homeland, defense of hawaii, defense of guam. and then to to follow on forces and things that flow in to support the general on what could be a very short line problem in korea. so -- north korea. so that's kind of number one problem. >> okay. >> the second i think, is just insuring that the rebalance does what it needs to to insure that u.s. is properly positioned in the asia-pacific for the rest of this century. and under that fall a lot of things; insuring that the alliances are as strong as they

can be, building new partnerships and in some cases insuring that the rise of china doesn't turn into a lucidities trap. >> when you look at the decision making process that kim jong un uses, and i don't know that the appropriate word is random, but would you say is there like a chain of command or a general structured way that decisions are made, or is it pretty much you're not usually certain as to which way something's going to go with him? >> yes sir, thank you. we don't know a lot about the decision making process inside of that regime. if you look at just the three years he's been the leader, he's changed his senior leadership more than his father and his grandfather put together. and so from one perspective the use of carrot and stick the use of brutality in many cases in order to insure absolute loyalty to him i think, upside cuts and

leaves -- undercuts and leaves concern with me that, one he's got a group around him that will be frank with him that won't only tell him what he wants to hear. so i think that's a dynamic welcome back that decision making process -- dynamic within that decision making process that gives me concern. >> where as you look at the way decision making is going on right now it appears there is somewhat of a move toward russia, toward creating an additional strengthening of bonds between them. do you think that provides any more stability for them or do you think it just makes them more dangerous? >> well, i think you can see not only the outreach to russia but others in the last year as an attempt by them to get around the sanctions which are having an effect. and to develop others that would provide trade and funds to them which, you know, their economy they're very tight. particularly given the percentage of it that he puts into his military. so i think that's his attempt there. we don't see a lot of return on

those efforts at this point. >> add mural when -- admiral when the north koreans start to saber rattle and start to make a lot of noise oft times your command brungs a presence into -- brings a presence into the area there and helps to change the discussion. do you have fears or concerns about any plans they might have to come after your fleet in particular? >> well, certainly we're talking in the context of the north koreans. you can't rule out any unpredictable type of activity. >> right. >> so we know that they also pursue a pretty significant sea, you know, missile program whether -- how good it is sometimes we're not sure but that's not just a ballistic missile capability, but a cruise missile capability that would

have to be considered when forces were put in the area. but -- and they also have a submarine force that's if it's operational, could be quite unpredictable, moneyny subs and things -- mini subs and things like that. they're generally locally contained, not far reaching, but at this point in time i'm not concerned about our ability to project power should we have to support a contingency in north korea. >> general, what is the one thing in your command that you're most concerned about? >> sir i'm most concerned about a provocation which north korea commits two or three every year, and one of those provocations escalating into conflict. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> admiral locklear are, general, thank you both for your time and for your service and, more importantly, for the service of all the men and women in uniform that you represent in your command. add mural locklear, do you believe that china's increasing

aggression in the south china sea reflects their calculations that the u.s. lacks the will power and capability to challenge them in the south china sea? >> well, you'd have to ask the chinese if that's the way they feel about it. my guess is that they as they always do, i believe they listen carefully to how the u.s. feels about things globally as well as in that region. and where they have a clear understanding of u.s. position, they have is a tendency to understand it and respect it. >> do you think the balance of power is shifting to the point where they believe that they now have a military advantage over us in their regional waters inside the first island chain? >> i don't think they think they have a military advantage over us because they also recognize that we're a global power and that they're not a global power. i think that they believe that their ability to build and

produce the military they have has provided additional decision space for them in their local region. >> one point you mentioned is the importance of clarity detenderness works best -- deterrence works best whenever the lines we draw are clear and strongly enforced. i've read press reports recently that during prime minister abe's visit to washington later this month the united states may make an explicit pledge to protect the islands which are currently under administrative control of japan, but china also claims them. do you think that would be a wise step to take for the purposes of stability in the east asian theater? >> well, my understanding is we have pretty much made it clear our position in the east china sea as it relates to the sin ca coo islands. we still maintain we don't take a side on territorial disputes, so in the long run, the issue of the sovereignty is for them to figure out. but what we have said and it's

been said at numerous levels is that the islands do fall within the administrative control of japan and do fall within the mutual offense treaty with japan. and i believe that that alone has provided a level of stability to the issues in the east china sea, northeast asia. >> the press reports -- i appreciate and understand and agree with the points you've made. the press reports i've seen have suggested that we would be reducing that to writing and writing in these matters, i think, can provide some more clarity than words. could you comment briefly on your military to military relations with thailand at the time? >> well, we maintain military to military contact with thailand. we do it at a lower level post-coup. wewe run a very good glide slope.

prior to the coup, the opportunities that we were pursuing together were quite good for the region. thailand is our oldest ally. in the end, it's my expectation that we want to keep thailand. we love the thai people, they're very close to the american people and we have similar value systems. so it's important for that. but post-coup we have truncated a number of military to military activities, reduced them in scope, and we're managing those through an interagency process where we go through and decide is this one that we want to continue or not. but what we're hope is that the current -- hopeful is that the current leadership will move actively and aggressively to restore, you know, rule of law constitutional processes and civilian control of government. >> thank you. general, korea is in many ways a unique area of operations in the world calling for some unique capabilities. i want to speak briefly about cluster munitions. our stated policy is as of

january 1 2019 we will no longer use such munitions that have a greater 1% unexploded rate. can you describe the challenges it will face achieving that rate? >> yes sir. the clusterrer munitions are an important part of the munition inventory that i have. because of the effect they create for me. there are plans right now, work being done for replacement munition that would meet the requirements of hess than 1% -- less than 1% dud rate, but that's a requirement we must meet, as you said before 2019. we would use other munitions, but the munitions we have available just simply don't provide the effect of those that i have today in my inventory. >> okay. gentlemen, thank you again for all i don't your service and the service you represent and your families and theirs.

>> gentlemen, thank you both for being here this morning. admiral locklear in your testimony you point out the significance of china's military modernization efforts, and earlier this week we heard from admiral roughhead, from some other experts on east asia about china's modernization and how swiftly that has happened. what do we need to do to respond to what's happening in china can you also talk about how if we go back to level of funding that's required by sequestration, what that does to our efforts to make sure that we are technologically ahead of where the chinese are? >> well, i think, first of all we need to continue to encourage

the chinese to be more transparent and to be more forward leaning in how they respond to their neighbors, how they respond in the international commitment, to be a responsible leader in the region. if they're going to have a military and they want to use it for security, then they should be part of the global security environment participating with others, not being at odds with them. and that's a choice they have to make. we also have to make a choice to accept them into that environment. so that's something we have to always consider. and there may be some risk as we do it. because we -- as they rise as a power, it will be a collaborative on one hand and competitive on another. and though that kind of relationship resorts in friction, and it will always be friction and then friction -- some of it -- may end up happening in the south china sea or the east china sea. so managing that friction and understanding how to manage it so it doesn't escalate into a large con contingency is very very important for all of us,

particularly between the united states and china. so we're working that part of it. >> and so before you answer the sequester question how important is the effort to rebalance -- i use that testimony in parenthesis, to asia -- >> right. >> that has been set out in doing those kinds of things -- >> right. >> -- with respect to china? >> well, the rebalance is not about china. china is just one of many issues around why the u.s. should be in asia-pacific, why we should have a security posture there. but they are a big concern in that. and so the rebalance is -- and on the military side insuring that we have the right assets to be able to manage the situations, to be able to understand the environment and to be able to respond effectively are extremely critical. the readiness of those assets, the readiness of the men and women that man them are critical. so in sequestration what happens is that in general you have less

force structure that's less ready, that's less technologically capable. so we get under fiscal pressure one of the first things to go is technological advances because we've got to keep what we've got, right? because nobody wants to change. the things we need to stay relative not only in that part of the world but globally in the technological arena in war fighting starts to be pushed off the table and pushed to the right. and it gets pushed into timelines that make us start to lose our technological advantages in war fighting. >> one of the things we heard from ard mill roughhead -- admiral roughhead earlier this week was the importance of continuing the carrier-launched uavs and that that program would become even more important as we look at what we need to do in the asia-pacific. do you share that view? and how do you see that, that i

affecting what we need to do in that part of the world? >> well i think in general whether they're launched off of carriers or anywhere else, in my particular area unmanned vehicles are a significant part of the future. so -- because anytime you can take man out of the loop, you operate in denied environments so much easier. there's a whole lot of benefits to it. so to the degree that a uav would be from a carrier a carrier for me is just a very flexible airfield that can operate widely through the theater. so i would see huge benefits in being able to operate long range isr, long range strike if necessary from those platforms. >> and general, is this something that would be beneficial to you in the korean theater? >> yes ma'am. absolutely.

>> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, both of you for what you're doing for the country. i wanted to ask about, follow up admiral locklear, on your written testimony where you said iran has built its robust nuclear infrastructure and advanced its ballistic missile systems with materials that have passed through u.s. pay com aor. can you help us understand how are they getting these materials, and also could you describe for us what you understand is the cooperation between iran and north korea in particular on their missile programs? >> well, i think it's pretty well known that there's been a movement of proliferation activity from north korea into iran in this case of the types of technologies that iran was looking for, and i think that's been known for some time.

>> do you think that's how they're advancing their icbm program? with advice from north korea? >> i would say i wouldn't discount that as a possibility. >> so in addition to that you've also noted that north korea comets to procure for its nuclear and ballistic missiles program, and from the region and a network of individuals and entities in the region, and as you know, that violates u.n. security council resolution 171in terms of the ability -- 1718 in terms of the ability of member states to directly or indirectly supply to north korea these types of materials. obviously, there are many u.n. resolutions that apply to iran as well. but so as i look at that testimony, what more can we do to isolate north korea in terms of those that are supplying the country of things that we don't want them to have and are

against united -- u.n. resolutions, and who do we need to be tougher on in the region in that regard? >> well, i think that primarily in terms of proliferation security we have a proliferation security initiative that's global in nature and multi-national. i think that's also an important key, because we have to bring in, we have to deal with other nations that help provide intelligence and also forces that may help us in interdick etc. interdiction. and we can continue our training in that regard, which we do. in terms of the nations that i think we have to be concerned about, i'd prefer to answer that actually for the record in a classified document as opposed to here in the open forum if i could. >> of course, general. thank you, i appreciate that.

i also wanted to follow up admiral locklear i note in your written testimony you mention taiwan, i believe, once in passing. in light of china's major military buildup what's your assessment of the curve balance of military capabilities -- of the current balance of military capabilities between the pla and taiwan, and where does taiwan have an advantage and where does the pla's advantage? so what concerns are you hearing from the taiwanese and what platforms, weapons, assistance and training has taiwan requested from the united states that we haven't yet provided? >> well, we have a robust interaction from the pay com headquarters with taiwan. in fact, we have ongoing right now over there their major annual exercise where we participate with them, we send advisers, overseers, and we go and, in fact we sent general thurmond who used to be the

general's predecessor who will be over there with them at my request advising and assisting. so that's important. i think that in general over time the capabilities of the pla, the prc will vastly i e clubs what the taiwanese could produce on their own. it's just a matter of magnitude of force size. if the prc stays on the course that it's on now. we, my task is to support the taiwan relations act and to provide my advice to the, up to the osd and up to the president for him to decide what kind of things we provide. i know that they have requested our assistance in submarine programs, and we're contemplating that at this point in time but have not committed them one way or the other. they are particularly interested in us helping them in cybersecurity areas that allow

them to pursue asymmetric capabilities that will improve their defense and improve their confidence that they can make decisions on their own and not be coerced. >> can thank you. >> colonel graham. >> thank you, captain. admiral, would you describe china's behavior toward their neighbors as provocative? >> i would call it aggressive and i guess provocative would be in the eyes of the beholder. but from my view it's aggressive. >> from the eyes of the japanese would you say it's provocative? >> i think they would say yes. >> okay. north korea general, would you say the regime on a good day, is unstable? >> no, sir. i'd say, i'd say the kju's in

control. we see now indicators of instability at this time. >> so you think we don't have to worry much about north korea? >> oh, no, sur that's not -- >> okay. when i say unstable, i mean unpredictable, provocative. >> unpredictable, provocative, danger -- >> yeah, that's what i meant. >> willing to, i think, willing to be provocative as well. >> so in your backyard you have got dangerous provocative, unstable with nukes in north korea, right? >> yes sir. within short distance from the capitol. >> the leader of north korea seems to be like nuts. i don't how else you describe the guy, but he seems nutty to me. so under sequestration at the end of the day how will your ability to defend the korean

peninsula and our interests in that region be affected from an army point of view? >> well from a holistic point of view, sequestration would -- as admiral locklear just said -- end up with a smaller force a less ready force -- >> well, if the army goes down to 420,000, let's say that's the number they want to hit if we don't fix sequestration -- >> yes, sir. >> -- how does your theater of operations fare in terms of threats? >> sir, in high intensity conflict that you'll have on the korean peninsula i'd be very concerned about having a force that had enough depth particularly for a sustained operation. >> so it would be seen as weakening our position in asia, right? >> yes sir. >> admiral under sequestration the navy would have approximately how many ships if it was fully implemented? >> well, i'd have to refer that

back to the navy. i don't have the exact numbers. >> how many do you have in your -- >> i have about 150 ships in my aor that are signed all the way from san diego to the theater, probably about 50 or so of those are west of the dateline at any given time. so what would be impacted by the size of the navy is our ability to rotate forces forward to augment the ones that are west of the dateline all of the time which is the problem we're having now with sustaining our numbers because of the readiness bathtub we're in. so sequestration would just drive that further into the ground. >> it would be hard to pivot to asia under sequestration. >> yes sir. >> all right. so the likelihood of a armed conflict between south korea and north korea, how would you evaluate that on a 1-10 scale? 1 being very unlikely 10 being highly likely say in the next ten years.

general? >> well, sir, i think that i caveat it by saying i think kju knows if he were to conduct a conventional attack on south korea, it'd be the end. so i don't think that's his purpose. i think it's to maintain his regime. but i think over a ten-year period it's above a 5. it's a 6 probably. >> and the more we reduce our forces the less deterrent it may go up to 7. >> sir, i think with less deterrence it becomes more likely that we'd have a conflict. >> okay. admiral, from your point of view if we reduce our forces in your theater of operations to sequestration level, do you think that encourages china to be more provocative? >> look, i think any signal that

we send that we're less interested in the asia-pacific on the security side than we currently are would be an invitation for change in the region and that china would be interested in pursuing. >> do our allies in the region, are they beginning to hem their bets -- to hedge their bets? what's their view toward our footprint and where we're headed? >> yeah, i don't think they're necessarily unsatisfied with our military footprint. i think what they're concerned about most is the growing divide between what they see as the economic center of gravity which is predominantly asia or more and more around china and their security center of gravity which is around us. so that creates a conundrum for them as they have to deal with strategic decision making. you know, they want us as a security granter because they believe -- they see us as a benever leapt power, and they like how we operate but they also see us as a diminished power in the region, and they

have to deal with that. >> admiral and general, i would appreciate it if, for the record, you would give a written estimate to this committee as to the effects of sequestration on your ability to carry out your responsibilities. and please make it as details as you wish. we're going to have this fight again on sequestration ongoing, and members of this committee are dedicated to the proposition that we have to repeal sequestration. and your testimony as to the effects of sequestration can affect that government -- that argument probably more effectively than anything that members on this side of the dais could accomplish. so i would very much appreciate it if you would give us as detailed as possible short-term

and long-term effects of sequestration on your ability to carry out your responsibilities. admiral, is this your last appearance before this committee? >> yes, sir, it is. finish. >> well, i want to take the opportunity on behalf of all of of us in this committee and in the united states senate in thanking you for your outstanding service. i think you can be very proud of the many contributions that you've made to this nation's security, and you're one of the reasons why the leaders in uniform are so highly respected and regarded by the people of this nation. so i thank you admiral. this hearing is adjourned. [inaudible conversations]

.. also on afterwards her mother of four military officers talks about what families go through during deployment. cornell west and robert george discuss bipartisanship plus the financial cos