see the initiative where there is agreement, get congress to pass a narrow will it will allow the nation to move forward, under understanding the open internet has been protected by those, and engage in other public policy debates we think are important. >> i think it is clear that the real struggle and the conflict is over broader authority of the fcc. not the net neutrality rules. we have agreement those rules are good. so it just shows that it is important we have these rules in place why congress and policy policymakers and the fcc look at the challenging topics. this is why you are getting push back from the broadband providers. they are worried about how title ii impacts their broader services. not potential violations to net

neutrality which by and large with a few exexceptions they have lived under for the last decade. it is really important we have the broader discussion about broadband policy and we have it soon. let's not get rid of net neutrality protection in order to have it. >> mr. lewis walter mccormick, thank you so much for joining us. cspan created by america's cable companies 35 years ago and brought to you as a local service by your cable or satellite provider. >> coming up on c-span2, discussion on the iran nuclear agreement, then turkey's foreign affair's minister talks about his country's role in the middle east and the iran nuclear

negotiation negotiations. and then we will bring you several protential presidential candidate speeches. gl coming up on the next washington journal linda dempsey joins us to discuss legislation that would give the president fast track authority in negotiating the transatlantic partnership deal. and then we talk about the role in bolstering protection for the lgbt committee. and jennifer lawless talks about her new book on why young americans are turned off to politics. you can join the conversation with your calls and comments on facebook and twitter. >> she was called ms. president

by her detractors and outspoken about views on slavery and women's write. one of the most prolific writers of any first lady she provided a look into colonial america and her person life. abigale adams. examining the public and private lives of women who filled the role of first lady from martha washington to michele obama. as a compliment to the series, c-span's new book is available. first ladies and the lives of 45 iconic american women providing lively stories of thes fascinating women -- these. it is available as a hard cover or e-book through your favorite bookstore or online book seller. >> next former iranian and u.s.

officials outline iran nuclear agreement nugaucheegotiationnegotiations they discuss the status the deal and what a final agreement means for the united states and iran. this runs 90 minutes. >> good morning. i am steve hadly, chairman of the board of institutes. we have received there is power outages and metro slowdowns and chaos. people will be joining us as they are able to get here.

we are glad you are all here. this is the fourth event in the iran forum which is a series that has been cosponsored by eight washington think tanks. the institute of peace, woodrow wilson center the rand corporation, the arms control association, the center for a new american security the stem son center, file share fund and the partnership for secure america which i think is really an unprecedented collaboration and i want to say special thanks to robin wright who put this together. this event is brought to you by the iran primmer which is usip's comprehensive website with resources on every iran related subject you can think of and analysis from every angle. i will urge you to look at the

site. we provided a copy on the home page on every seat. if you don't have one you can get one in the back. we have the panel involving former american and iranian officials who understand the challenges of foreign policy and particularly u.s.-iranian relations. on april 2nd, the six major powers and iran announced the frame framework for what could be a historical deal. the terms are controversial and disputed in both capitals and our goal is to explore the challenges ahead. let me introduce the panelist. you should have the full bio of the candidates at your seat. starting from the right, former member of the iranian parliament from 2000-2004.

he was arrested while demonstrating to support equal rights between men and women in june of 2006 and was released 130 days later moving to the united states in 2009 and he is a visiting fellow at virginia tech and a human rights and digital freedom advocate. welcome. next is jim slatry. a former congressman from 1983-1985 and a partner at rilely ron llc. he is the first former congressman to visit iran since the revolution and attended a conference in terrain in december of this year. he has been involved in interface dialogue with iran for ten years. welcome. next is michael thing, former director for middle east affairs

at the national security council from 2005-2008 and a senior fellow at the washington institute currently. michael was responsible for coordinating national security policy toward the middle east including emphasis on iran's nuclear activity and as national security advisor i did whatever he said. >> not how i remember it. >> next is howard berman a former congressman from california from 1983-2013 and currently a senior advisor at burlington. as chairman of the house foreign affairs committee, he was one of congress' leading experts on international relations. howard great to have you with us. we are going to begin and

probably go until 10:30-10:35 or so with a conversation among us up here. at that point we will open it up to questions. the will be microphones, please wait for one to come to you, identify yourself, ask a question, and you can direct it to any or all of the panelist as you seek fit. so let me begin, there seems to be varhazardous versions about what has been agreed so far in the negotiations. we have heard from iran's supreme leader about the objectives we has in the nugaucheotiation nugotiations about relief and no access to military sites and a couple other details which are not fully consistent with what the u.s. side has said. in light of the disarray about

what has been agreed so far let me ask the panel two questions. first, how close are we to an agreement? and how likely are we to get a final signed document by june 30th? and let me begin with you. >> thank you for having me. i would like to thank the organizers of this event for convening this timely event. and i would like to emphasis i am not in the position and other i mean people or group of people and just for a member of the

parliament. i think we are very close to a histor historic moment and achievement in solving the big international crisis peacefully and diplomatically. i evan imagine i could see this such rate of progress. i remember two years ago, we sent a letter with former members of parliament two or three letters, president obama and all of them, proposed it in january 7th 2013. we had a lot of difficulties to even initiative and talk about

and convince people in washington, d.c. i remember that there would have been some colleagues and i sat in such a panel discussion to propose and convene spectics in washington to even know there. this great administration is coming we said. but we just heard something from rumors that intentions are going on between talking and behind

the scenes between the two administrations. the obama administration and the iran. at that time we have a lot of difficulties to even talk about that. but right now, i sat here and thank you for having me here again, you want to convince. we can finalize a comprehensive deal. we are very optimistic and i hope the united states officially won't use this opportunity because i think the

u.s. lost an opportunity in 2003 2003. and the access of evil i think it damaged the deal. i think this moment -- i hope you won't lose the opportunity and it could lead this bill could lead to iran and the region to a peace too piece and stability in the near future. >> howard how do you see it? what are the prospects of it getting done and getting done by june 30th? >> i am a little more nervous about you are about the likelihood of the agreement being reached. seems clear to me this american

administration wants to reach an agreement. i think there are some limitations beyond which it won't go but it wants to reach the agreement. the question raised more recently is does the supreme leader want to reach the agreement. he made statements among the recent days regarding the timing of sanctions relief regarding the security and military sights on which no inspectors can ever go he made other statements which look like he is thinking of a very different agreement than i think the p-5 could every sign. and then the question comes up why is he talking like this? and the fact is he made statements like that before. he talked about a $190,000

centrifuges at one point. he talked about a large number of reactors and enrichment facilities. and in the end, the one area of the administration's relief parameters that they have not challenged is the reference to the number of centrifuges and facilities. they don't seem to be arguing about those assertians. in the end, i think a lot depends. we have heard for a long time and i believe that there is a tension inside iran between elements of the irgc and the "hardliners" and the current president and foreign minister. we have always thought where does the supreme leader come

down in that conflict and that to me will be a big part of answering the question of whether there is a likelihood of reaching an agreement by june 30th. >> let me ask you, if you want to comment, i think one of the questions we all have is how should we read the supreme leader's statements? do you have any advice for us on that one? and then i will turn it over to michael. >> i will say i don't agree with your comment about iran's situation. i think i have a lot of confidence mostly about the u.s. side. in iran we have an agreement between the supreme leader the administration, the parliament, and the vast majority of this unprecedented, unt one very very important issue.

i agree with that. how about congress and the many influence and pressure. and the new legislation, but still, it is really great. it is more sustainable to implement a long term agreement.

still we have lots of problems. i cannot serve what would predict the decision of congress after the final negotiations and agreement. >> this is a bill that was passed last week that gives the congress 30 days to consider a nuclear deal. the option of legislation at the end of that time and suspends any suspension of sanction during the period of that consideration. so there is no some agreement on the united states side for a process of consideration between the whitehouse and the congress. there seems to be less agreement on what the substance should be.

a bad agreement is worse than no agreement, but there seems to be no real agreement on what a bad agreement would look like. secretary of state baker in an opt-ed last friday suggested one of the steps we ought to do is get our own house in order and identify the three or four things that really make a reasonable agreement from this u.s. stand point and be clear about them in the same way someone would say the supreme leader would be clear about what he needs. is that a good course of action? >> when you ask the question is this a good deal or bad deal i think it is really two questions in a sense. the first is does the deal do what we need to do. is it valuable to our interest and advance the objects we set out which in this case non-proliferation and the threat we see iran poses in the middle east. there is a second question as

well. it is highlighted by the president. watt are the alternatives? a good delta what alternative course of action that would better advance our interest? and both of them are controversial. second of state baker, and his opt-ed in the wall street journal said what we have gotten is the right track, but it needs to be improved and here are three or four ways he would suggest not just improving but saying we have to insist on these things and get the other p-5 members to insist on them. that gets the first question. trying to make the deal more valuable. a better deal. i think all of this suggestions are the right suggestions in a sense of getting iran to sort of lay out for inspectors its past weaponization work and the individuals involved in that getting to this question of military sites which can be

nuclear sites as we have seen in the past as well as this question of sanctions, relief of sanctions and the so-called snap attack sanctions which may be a myth in a sense. but it is important we look at approaching the next period the substance of the bill and the alternatives, we need to focus on improving our own alternatives if there is no deal. we will get no deal even if we want one. it is important we look past the failure making sure we are positioneded if that happens. and worsening iran's alternatives. we are not the only party looking at this deal. if iran accepts their own faith worse it might accept the keel. i think red lines can be useful in you should know the bottom

line in egotiationnegotiations and what you are looking for. one way to read it is he is setting these red lines to get us to give more as you would in any negotiation in about anything. the red lines are incredible. you have to believe in them. there is an internal process you have to go through and i worry especially with american negotiators who are more transparent we don't believe if they are good bottom lines to have privately trying to project them publically will back fire like it did in syria. we should have bottom lines and figure out internally what they are and how to project them tactfull- tactfully.

this is the thesis. the deal isn't where it needs to be, but it is the right track we need the fix it. i worry the deal can't be fixed and the design of it deal is conceptually flawed in several ways. one way for example, even if we get the deal it will require any president, president obama and his successor, to be waving sanctions everything six months. it is unstable because anything can intervene in that. some of the hardest decisions are left for the future saving it for when the negotiators are not around anymore. second, we have not required iran to dismantle anything. its entire nuclear program is remaining in tact. even if you have positive change in iran even if iran sort of changes the regional strategy and becomes friendlier to the

united states, having that nuclear program in tact will ultimately be a negative for the security of the region. nuclear programs grow in groups or pairs as many know and i think even a different sort of iran with that very robust nuclear program, is perceived as a threat by neighbors and any future iranian government may have a hard time for reasons of national pride and absence the pressure of sanction. the other flaw we have separated from the nuclear and regional issues. there are instruments of power. it gets to the question of how will be deter iranian support for terrorism or iran's activity in the region following the deal without the tools being available? it leads to less effective tools or less direct action leading to

more complex action in the region. i worry secretary baker has good red lines but the deal as conceived can't be successful even if we reach it. >> jim what your view? from the u.s. standpoint what do we do to get our own house in order to proceed with the negotiation negotiations? >> in december i had an opportunity to visit with the key people in the government, leading clerics that are friends of the supreme leader, and every place i went, i heard one question and that was can president obama implement the deal? they really wanted to know this. and this was of course after our elections, after the fact that the senate was taken over by republicans and of course the house continued to be in republican hands. so they were raising this

question because they wanted me to understand that if we expected them to put their best offer on the table, they wanted to know that that best deal could be accepted and would not be scudled by our congress. i think we need to be mindful as these questions arise, it undermines our negotiators capacity to get the best deal at the table. that hasn't been focused on adequately. the iranians are fearful, those commit to a deal, and i believe they have bet their political future and careers on getting a deal with the united states. their worse nightmare is they go out on the limb so to speak and put the best deal on the table they can get and have the united states congress scuttle the deal. that politically destroys them

and may do more than that to them. i don't think we have as americans fully understood that dimension of what is going on in the negotiations. you know i am a kansas democrat. so kansas is the most republican state in the union probably. so optimism is hard wired into by dna. you know i think that we have this historic moment and the great tragedy would be our domestic political forces prevented us from really getting a historic break through in this relationship with iran. so all-americans really need to be in this debate. and we really need to be focused on some of the very tough details. as far as i am concerned, verification is going to be the key in all of the dimensions of

verification. ... >> or flipping it around. two or three things that are really required if an agreement is going to be reached.; howard

let me start with you. >> i think the answer to that has changed. i can certainly understand why one could look at washington and think the administration's trying to do one thing that congress is instingtively and adamantly against what atrying to do. how do we count on an agreement with the administration? the equation changed tremendously in the context of this agreement that was worked out between senator corker and senator carden and the white house, because it turned everything around. one, the congress will not act on the agreement before there's an agreement.>8yv secondly while the congress won't, there's no way in the world that congress will ever

approve this group. the only way the agreement doesn't go into effect -- and by that i mean the president loses his ability to waive the sanctions he will need to waive to the american part of the deal is if two-thirds of both houses disapprove of the agreement and then vote to override the president's veto. so the debate has changed from not wanting to do any deal with iran particularly a deal that didn't dismantle their entire nuclear infrastructure. and michael is right about that. this deal doesn't do that. it changed from that debate to a debate about issues like is this a good deal and, more than that, is it a good deal on the issue of giving significant

comfort for a significant period of time that iran will not get a nuclear weapon. because michael raised other issues, which are very legitimate issues to raise. but i don't think iran's support for terrorism, iran's hegemonic tendency. the sanction evident that brought the international community together was about iran's nuclear program and if we try to bring in every issue into this we will lose the support of the international community. so i actually think we now are at is it a bad agreement in the context that michael asked? is this the least worst option? and that will be the question

that 34 senators if they think it is the least worst option, the deal goes into effect. divide one third into 435 congressmen, and the same equation. that's very much changed the balance of power here now, and so i think the parts i don't know about this agreement the level of verification the -- what is truth, just exactly what is going to be the centrifuges pulled out. what are the consequences when iran says no to a particular desire by the inspectors to go to a certain site? those things that hopefully will get filled out as part -- in the next two and a half months. those will decide how the congress reacts. so i think it's a much less bleak situation than it was last december in terms of the talking

with folks you talked to in tehran. >> i agree with you, howard, that the congressional action last week has fundamentally changed the equation here and i think that if iranians look at this -- the bottom line is, will the white house be able to hold one-third plus one in the house? and -- >> probably not for a bad agreement. >> probably not for a bad agreement. you're absolutely correct. i think the beside agreement ultimately will be defined by the issues of sheriff's. nobody trusts anybody in this deal and all the stuff about you can't trust the iranians they don't trust us we don't trust them. that's a given. let's quit talking about that. we have to have adequate verification procedures, and that is what i think the congress is going to be looking at. when you look at the context of the agreement, perhaps michael and i would disagree -- i think given the status quo, compared

to this outline as described by the state department, and i underline that because there's clearly a disparity between what the state department has outlined and what -- but begin the state department outline, compared to the status quo a number of centrifuges being dropped from 19,000 to 560 operational, a volume of low and rich uranium being dropped, and the other provisions in this, and the basically fundamentally changing the plutonium operation and fundmentally changing what is going on these are significant concessions made by the other side and given the status quo issue think it's a major step forward. again, it all depends on verification. >> michael, let me go to you and

put you on the spot a bit. is this deal as outlined in the state department fact sheet, the least bad outcome and if it isn't what is required to make it in your view the least bad outcome, and then i'll ask you to comment briefly on what you have heard. >> so my answer to the first one is no, i don't think it is the least bad outcome. i do worry that the deal as outlined in the u.s. fact sheet -- first of all, it's not a deal. there's clearly unresolved issues so it's hard to evaluate that because after the unresolved issues. i do think there are some big holes in what we have agreed to, and i think some of those are what secretary baker outlined. its critical that the wees we call possible military dimensions will those be answered up front? i don't see how you can have a sufficient verification regime without those questions having

been answered. it's not matter -- people say why do you need iran to confess? it's about the information not confession what are the sites they need to check the people they need to talk to, what progress has iran made to date? i don't need to verify without those means. there are other issues. the questions how are sanctions relieved and when its. it's important we main link in the event of iranian noncompliance but i think there will inevitably be questions about compliance. there's also this question about -- i don't think civilian nuclear sites and military sites, given the clear military nature of iran's past nuclear activities. so within the context of what has been outlined, think those things need to be addressed to make this a deal worth supporting. worth making. then there's -- again, getting back to the question of alternatives. i think one thing we next here

in our debate is that, again, it's not just about what are the united states' concerns. it's what are iran's alternatives. i think this raises the question of time because we could really afford to negotiate for another six months if we had to. it's great to set deadlines and diplomacy if you're quitted to the deadlines and their credible if i don't know if deadlines set at there is time are credible. we can negotiate for another six months. the iranians, -- i think we need bear in mind that iran's own alternatives are not fantastic, and so we need to, i think for the sake of having a sustainable deal, deal that actually survives past 21 months or 24 months, i think it's important that we get what we need here. will it then be a great deal? it wouldn't be because of the conceptual flaws and i worry the deal would not survive then years of the initial period.

but it probably at this stage of the game the best we can hope for. >> thank you. i want to go back to the issue of what happens if by june 30 we don't have an agreement. but let me ask you this. given your hopes for this agreement, as you expressed in your opening comments, and given what you have heard here, does it reassure you about some of the questions you had about the u.s. side? >> reassured me at first, say at this point, we have more -- much more problem in u.s. side. please accept this idea. than in iran. sometimes i'm joking with the -- especially when you have problems that congress have shut down the government. i was joking to some americans that saying that you don't have supreme leader here. if you had supreme leader it's a bad idea don't do that but i'm just joking, but -- so now

i'm just comparing the current two systems political system in iran. the current parliament don't have problems. they are already agreement and the supreme leader if the supreme leader decides something, especially this current government -- the parliament would approve it definitely and right now, they approve. the supreme leader has created a new term which was very very new for us at least in here also for you. the term is called -- so-called flexibility. so, that is finished. and all in the same page. but in here we don't have such a system.

more democratic system. we have here within here, and between administration and the congress, we have lots lots of difficulties. so let me ask you, please accept from the panel, accept this idea that about the comprehensive deal. we have much more problem in here than iran. but the secondly, i don't agree -- let me express my idea about your idea that we can extent six months or 12 months again to negotiate and negotiate and negotiate. because two important elections is coming and there's going to be escalated in here, the next presidential election, and in iran, two important elections at the same day and same time in february 2016. election for parliament and expert assembly, which is very

important this important, second one. so i think if you extend the negotiations, six months or 12 months especially, the domestic policy would affect much more the negotiations and you cannot get out of the negotiations when you extend for too long. maybe you can imagine for ten days or 20 days, one month, like you in the last bill got an agreement between the administration and congress it's fine, but more than that, i can imagine that it would certainly put this agreement -- i mean the comprehensive deal in jeopardy. so this is the second opinion and my last point about the -- what you mentioned previously, is that i don't think the

verification would be major problem because we had the same issue in the past, then president rouhani was of the national security council and president -- was in power i was in parliament. i remember you had the situation, the problem and iran voluntarily gave you to access the iaea to access many places, including some -- like on some military places and so it has a lot of -- it has its own process, technical problem, not my expertise. and iaea when they want to ask to have access to certain military places, but when they

accept to execute additional protocol, i think it would assure you and everybody if they have any problem, security problem. for example israel security if they have concern about that it would assure you it should assure you and everybody, to saying that it won't have problem about that. but about the second problem that's right now both sides are talking each other. in iran especially. about sanction. it's much more tougher than the first one, i think because the first one about the executing or implementation about the protocol is already accepted in geneva. i believe i heard and -- but

about sanctions i think we have two different idea and the opposing each other, and i think it's also practical and resolvable and you can resolve it as well during this two months or so. >> what i hear is i think it's going to come down to these two issues, this verification and monitoring issue, which has a number of aspect wes talked about, and the relaxation of sanctions. those seem to be the two crunch issues. we have heard now michael suggest that we have more time. we have heard the suggestion not much more time because it gets politically complicated. let me bring you, jim and howard in, saying if at june 30 we have not bridged the apparent differences on these two issues, two critical issues, what do we do? what's plan b or what is the

plan for a soft landing so that this does not badly damage the situation in the region. >> well, first of all, i feel very strongly that we shouldn't be budging on this june 30th june 30th deadline. >> interesting. >> i think we have to dig in on this. both sides have to recognize the clock is running out for both of us for different reasons. let me just observe if this gets kicked down the road for months, we're into heavy political campaign season soon be into the iowa caucuses, and i think it's important for all of us to understand that the political pressure, domestically, is going to be so intense especially on the republican side. let let me explain why. in the republican primary the christian fundamentalist vote is

vitally important to the republicans. they're appeals to the christian fundamentalists. on the east coast it's not the awareness of the rising influence of christian zionism in this country. so we have a reality in the heartland where the strongest supports over israel are christian zionists who are now in the christian fundamental list camp basically, and these are voters that are vitally important to these republicans running for president. and so what this is going to do coupled with the fact that we have literally hundreds of millions of dollars moving in the american political process based on this issue. it's a staggering amount of money. and all of this is going to put enormous pressure especially on the republican candidates for president. why am i saying this? it's going to solidify republican opposition to any deal, and it's going to make this whole process much more political than it otherwise would be. and so this deadline of

june 30th has to be hard for both sides. if i was in iran if i was looking at this from the iranian perspective, i would say, my goodness, we have to get a deal and get it now, and we better be flexible in how we get there because the clock is not on our side of the table. and i think that the iranians that i've had an opportunity to visit with they understand the historic moment. for the first time in maybe 35 years, we have high-ranking leadership in tehran and high-ranging leadership in the united states that are together wanting a deal. and i think this makes this a historic moment, and think we better be smart enough to take advantage of it. >> howard, how too you see if we get to june 30 and don't have a deal? >> i share jim's nervousness, perhaps for some different reasons.

the whole threat of this -- thread of this is the pressure that came from international sanctions. on the iranian economy. >> and the election of rouhani. we tend to blow by that. >> but everything is wrapped together. it's related. >> agreed. >> for the first administration -- the administration has been sanctioned -- u.s. government has been sanctioning iran since 1979. with the exception for a brief period of time of some pistachios and carpets an american company could not do business with iran. in the late 90s we decided to go extra territorial and impose sanctions on investment in iran's energy sector of more than $20 million. neither the clinton administration nor the bush administration ever imposed a

sanction on there because of the international pushback that they feared would come. from extra-territorial sanctions on foreign companies that made investments. whatever you think of the president of the united states he undertook a strategy that developed an international coalition. i don't think the ahmadinejad presidency, the supreme lead we're extend its hand in the first year of the obama administration and unclench their fist but i thought it was necessary for the administration and the president to be willing to do that to build up the international coalition that would come down. i remember oil for food, and i watched on iraq consensus on sanctions that started to wither and wither away, and i fear the same thing happens here.

all i'm saying is i think we should get a good deal done by june 30th. the extension of the jpoa is -- it's interesting because people thought it was terrible mistake and provides limited sanctions relief. not going to take the pressure off the iranian economy, not going to make the people of iran -- again, it's more time for the unity of the p-5 to sever, and this is a very different time than 2009 and 2010 when this coalition was put together. russia is taking a very different approach. generally on issues -- all kinds of potential chinks here that i'm concerned about. so, i'd like to see it done now.

>> let me ask one more question and then we'll go to audience for questions and that is this. if we -- we talked about what happens if we don't get a deal. if we do get a deal, and -- i'd like to start with you on this -- what are the likelihood that a nuclear agreement would lead to some kind of breakthrough in relations between iran and the united states between iran and its sunni neighbors and what impact might it have on iranian behavior on other issues of concern like syria and yemen and the like, and i'd like to hear from you and then just go down quickly down the line and then go to the audience for questions. >> first of all, would like to emphasize on that point that president obama mentioned, and they finally got an agreement with congress that it's a big fault to tie any other issues

other than nuclear in this negotiation, or bring inside this comprehensive deal that is mixed, almost impossible the deal. but other than that, if you take a look at the last speech of the supreme leader in iran before yesterday, the last one almost ten days ago, he mentioned something that i think it was for the first time. that mentioned that if we got an agreement with the united states and the western countries and we could implement it and -- i mean the -- we got this deal, we may allow the negotiators to negotiate about other problems that we have maybe with the international community, especially in the united states.

so, it was for the first time that he mentioned. so right after that i would imagine that this deal would lead negotiators to talk about especially at first regional issues, like isis, yemen, iraq afghanistan, many regional problem that we have right now, and the war combat and getting agreement like now like the agreement that we are close to get about the nuclear issue, and lastly i think it may lead to even broad conversation and negotiation to normalize the relationship between the united states and iran and after that maybe even it may lead to

negotiate about some internal problem that we have about human rights and many other issues. so i'm pretty optimistic about that is going to happen very soon if we got this agreement and put it away from the face between the international community and iran. >> bottom line based on ten years of interaction with iranians from the business community, from the religious communities, from the political communities in iran, i am totally convinced that iran wants a reset with the united states, with some limitations, and i think that this nuclear agreement from the standpoint of just u.s. national security interests, is extremely important to get this nuclear issue solved and it's extremely important, obviously, for israel as well. if we can do this, and make

progress there, it is a platform from which we can move to a lot of other discussions, and we can do so focusing on those areas where there is common interest. there are issues in the region that the united states and iran share and need to address. isis. isis hates iranians as much as it does jews and christians and americans. we can work together iran and the united states dealing with isis itch also believe there's an opportunity to deal with the issue of hezbollah in lebanon. all of this stuff can be on the table, and the first step is to get this terrible nuclear question resolved and use the confidence maybe a little bit of trust we can build in dealing with this to build a better future together. >> i michael?

>> prospects? >> i think it's deem to get a deal. we have already talked to the iranians many times over the years about regional issues. we have talked them to about iraq, about afghanistan, some well before we had serious nuclear negotiations we were doing these things. and i think that we should maintain -- i think one thing that is critical for us to maintain is flexibility on our tactics. i think when we are conducting foreign policy we need -- we can't be dog mat tick when it comes to tactics. we shouldn't regard it as terrible to use, tactic of engagement, for example. we need to be quite unrelenting when it comes to our objectives in defending our interest. here's where the difficult at the between the u.s. and iran lies elm think it's far more divergent between american some iranian interests and strategies importantly, too, because we may share, for example, a view that isis is bad for the region, but the way that iran goes about dealing with that problem is

itself -- to american interests. we have seen it playing out in tikrit. i think it's important to bear that in mind. i don't think we're ripe for that type of breakthrough but don't think we have seen the broader shift by iran we have been looking for. if the agreement, if we get it will be very narrow and technical. it's not going to deliver the what we have so long talked about. so whether iran actually wants that think is very much in question. the supreme leader hasn't moderated his language about the united states. we're still accused daily of having created isis, just yesterday the iranian general said that isis were american proteges and soing for. so we're far away from -- that. on american side this undertone that democracy is a liability. certainly not. it's a tremendous source of strength diplomatically in the world and it's soft power.

it's true as an american leader you can't decide your own policy and forming ahead. you have to have your people behind you. you have to have constituencies behind you. one danger is the president needs to make sure he has people behind him he has public opinionband him. one thing you see is that americans would like to see a negotiated agreement. polls are clear about that. they're also very uncomfortable with this broader set of issues. they're very suspicious about whether in fact the agreement will be successful in delivering. so in a democracy you have to deliver other a deal which has buy-in of your own people. you have to deliver a deal which is therefore, sustainable over the course of election cycles, and i think we just can't see that as a bad thing. we have to see that as a source of strength for our country. >> howard? >> i won wonder in at least assuming there is a deal and it is from american perspective a good deal, and does not get

disapproved by the congress i think there's a potential for going in the other direction, because it's not just evan gel -- evan gel -- evangelicals, but there's concern in the gulf there's concern in israel and my own sense, a little bit of the message i heard when the president announced what he was going to -- the framework agreement and -- a very strength announcement. he announced one thing and the and the p-5 plus one and iranians announced another. but he made a point of emphasizing the efforts, both with israel and with our traditional arab allies to

demonstrate that we are going to be there for them. in many ways. and yesterday morning's "new york times" had an article about the level of weaponry we are in the process of sending to our traditional allies, the saudis, the uea and our once in a while, sometimes traditional ally, qatar. maybe not a traditional. nothing traditional there. but mutual defense agreements things to deal with the belief that iran has hegemonic interests. and america's willingness to stand with these allies in the region against those interests. to what extent does that -- i guess what i'm saying is i think there be an embassy in havana before there's one in tehran. >> let me go to the audience and you'll have a chance to jump in.

two final comments from you and jim and then the audience. i was overruled by my panel. >> i think that that's -- we already have negotiations with iran about many, many other issues other than nuclear. my question is that which negotiation, can you please tell me that was the outcome? i think you just invited iran and walked just behind the scenes. when i was in parliament to talk about the afghanistan issue that you have. iran completely cooperated with the united states but right after that, president bush mentioned and had this famous statement saying that iran is the -- one of the i think countries, axis of evil. so it damaged. when other than this time when did you have negotiation -- serious negotiation? when did you -- i mean the

u.s. -- recognize iran as a partner, as a stakeholder. iran is a regional power. no doubt. i think you agree with me. you didn't invite -- even about syria, you one time unites nations had the geneva meeting, and ban ki-moon invited iran right after that because of the pressure of the united states. they cancelled the invitation. so but behind this thing you have other cooperation recently about isis. iran already incorporated about tikrit. but you didn't have coordination or officially saying that iran is at least one stakeholder in the region and invite them and respect them, talk to them like now you are talking with iran. i think it's almost two years -- about just nuclear. you didn't have this

opportunity. we didn't have this opportunity to invite and recognize iran as a partner not as enemy. i think you should answer this question. >> i will answer that. i want to come back to something howard mentioned which i think is very important and that is that i know that our sunni allies in the region particularly saudi arabia and jordan, are very fearful of a reproachment between the united states and iran and they see them as losing influence and israel has similar concerns and you're absolutely spot on in the need for us to make sure our sunni allies and israel understand that just because we have an improved relationship between the united states and iran does not dim minimum -- diminish our obligation to defense of israel and our friends and ally thursday the region and there's going to need to be tremendous diplomatic

effort made to re-affirm those historic obligations and commitments. >> we'll go to questions. i need to say one thing. one of the things that seems to be lost in history is that there was an agreement with iran on the nuclear issue in 2003 and 2004 between the eu-3, britain, uk -- uk, france germany, and iran and it involved the suspension of enrichment and a negotiation to eliminate that program. that agreement broke down in the implementation, heavily because of the election of ahmadinejad as president of iran in 2005. spring of 2005. on a very different agenda, and he walked away from the agreement and restarted the nuclear program. i raise that because the implementation and execution of these kinds of agreements is very difficult and it's going to require a lot of commitment on both sides which is why it is so important that if there is an agreement, it has bipartisan

support in the congress of the united states and bipartisan support of the american people so that there can be the sustained implementation of that agreement, because we have seen on the north korean agreement in 1994 and in the 2003-2004 agreement with iran, and the eu-3, that if you -- that young lose these agreements if you cannot have a sustained and successful implementation. questions from audience. let start right here. mic coming to you. please identify yourself. >> i am a fellow at georgetown and managing editor of iran poll i.com. my question for mr. singh. if you could expand on something, does a final nuclear deal take sanctions off the table as a major foreign policy tool on iran? the assumption being that sanks have been so tied to the nuclear issue that if the u.s. tries to do a major sanction push on another issue, that iran can

re-escalate on the nuclear issue because sanctions are the whole reason it came -- constrained its number cheer program in the first place. >> it's a complicated issue. when we talk in these agreements -- it's in the text of the agreement -- about a nuclear related sanction it's important to bear in mind there is no such thing as a nuclear related sanction in american law. so the first question is, what sanctions exactly do we have in mind? and does it match with what the iranians have in mine? i guess is the answer to that right now is no and that will be one of the things which negotiators are talking about. if you look at sanctions on the national iranian oil company, these sanctions for their association with the revolutionary guard force, which i not nuclear related. if you look at the sanctions on iran's arms experts, contained in u.n. security council resolution 1929, that is a cool which has nothing in a sense to do with the nuclear program but

is nuclear related in its implementation. then you look at sanks on iran's nuclear imports and exports. clearly nuclear related but we want to keep those in place and the question is procourage. this sanctions question is actually very complicated, far more complicated than often it's given credit for. i think what is clear is that what iran is looking for out of this agreement is to get substantial relief from sanctions, especially those which prohibit it access to the international financial system and the sanctions on its oil experts. to the stepped you think those are the only sanctions, that have really gotten iran to budge -- you can have debate about that itself -- it's obvious therefore why they want those lifted. if we lift them we're lifting them. right? we're not saying we're going to lift them on the nuclear issue and then re-impose them for some other reason. that doesn't seen sustainable. the question is what tools that are effective are you then lift with to influence iran's

behavior? when we say we're going maintain sanctions on other things the question is should be holiday will that it be effect enough the environment of slackening pressure on the most important point, giving iran tremendous amounts of revenue, "the wall street journal" suggested $15 billion -- getting to the point about not only will iran not be -- not only do we not negotiate on regional issues but iran will have much more revenue if the wish to pursue regional activities we're concerned about. so my concern is that --ous need to demonstrate your commitment to countering iran and the sanction tools are no longer available, it leads you to more involvement in the region against iranian activities than you had to begin with. unless you deliver this sort of, i think very unlikely at this stage, reproachment and there's a sense people have that this comforts them that this

agreement, built on a gamble that will happen. >> yes, sir, right here. >> daniel lincoln research consultant at the savannah initiative mitchell question is for any panelist who feels like they should answer. assuming that a deal is reached and assuming that the various timelines outwill bed -- that were outlined in the press releasees, ten years on limits in centrifuges are adhered to. there have been critics of the deal that says after ten years that part is null and void and iran can do whatever it likes. so my mind the challenge becomes, what can the u.s. and iran do in that time to change the calculus or what can the u.s. do to change the iran's calculus so that is no longer such an alarming prospect once the ten years go by? do any of you agree with that way of looking at things and what can the u.s. do towards that end? thank you.

>> anyone want to -- i'll just answer briefly. the agreement does provide that a number of provisions dealing with supply chain and inspection go beyond ten years, and in any event, even after the agreement expires, iran will be subject to the kinds of inspection provisions that come with the nonproliferation treaty and the iaea safeguards agreement and the additional protocol and the like. so there will be some things that are designed under the npt rubric to ensure that a country that is signed up to the npt to be a nonnuclear state, is not moving towards a nuclear weapon. the question that is raised is if you leave iran with a substantial nuclear infrastructure, how confident can you be that those will be adequate? the other thing i would say is

those can be reinforced by a declaration that the president has made many times, and many -- several presidents have said which is if iran moves towards a nuclear weapon, that is a line that raises the military issue. so it isn't that everything is over. the question will be, is the post agreement inspection regime and verification regime, adequate to ensure that with the nuclear infrastructure, iran is not able to covertly moved towards a nuclear weapon. >> the additional protocol continues for 15 years doesn't it? and then at least 15 years. >> additional protocol is forever. >> that's correct. >> forever. >> the problem is -- >> our version. >> there is a distinction. there's something beyond the additional protocol. the additional protocol is not quite anytime anywhere, at the moment, we get to see something

that concerns us. and that will be one of the issues on this verification issue. are there additional measures applicable to iran that would be in addition to the additional protocolses that would last in per e perpetuity for a longer period of time and how will iran respond to that? the supreme leader said that is off the table. iran is not going to be treated differently than other nonnuclear weapon states. yes, ma'am? back there. >> thank you very much. my name is pat burg and i'm the former public diplomacy and public affairs adviser at the state department for iraq, but i've spent time in iran, and the question that i keep hearing people ask is what is actually driving the u.s. foreign policy today? we have partnered with people

lime sad saddam, we have partnered with bin laden, and the question that i hear is, is it the lobbyists? the plate cat consultants? political careers? and are we going to have a balance in terms of treating all countries basically with the same -- same rules. that would be the best way to say it. >> anyone want to take that one on? >> when i look at the middle east right now over the next few years, i think isis is going to be a very very serious threat to many countries in the region and i find it very interesting and important that iran and the united states have a common interest in confronting and dealing with isis. and just think about world war

2 -- world war ii. if we had failed to realize we needed to deal withjoe stalin would we have been able to win the war? the short answer is probably not. so, there are times when the facts on the ground demand that you deal with people you may not necessarily like to deal with. because there is a greater evil that must be confronted. i see an opportunity here for the united states and iran to cooperate in dealing with a horrible threat to the region right now in the form of isis. i am mindful that if that is not done properly the sunni friends in the region will be very fearful and will see iranian influence growing. >> let me just make a quick observation. iran is a country of 80 million people. it is three times the size overrank. it is three times the saws of saudi arabia. has the worths' fourth largest supply of oil second largest

supply of natural gas. it eggs a regional super power when its comes to energy. and the people 90% literaries rate. everybody under 45. the median age in iran is 28. people don't realize this, but 60% of the university students are female 65% of the graduate students are female. and the biggest problem i think iran is going to have in the future is what are we going to do with all these educated women? and i just think that we have to recognize that whether we like it or not, a country of that size, with that level of education and sophistication with their history, they are going to be a powerful influence in the region. whether we like it or not. it's a little bit like pretend like china isn't going have to growing influence in asia. they're going to have growing influence, and we have to deal with the new realities in these areas. >> i guess from my point of view

issue think that american foreign policy needs to be guided by a sense our national interests and a sense of our objectives. i i think if you look at american foreign policy in the mideast over the years we have not had actually that different a stance from one administration to the next of what are our interests in the region, our objectives, that we have had very significant disagreements over the strategies we should pursue and the tactics we should employ in support of those strategies. that's absolutely appropriate. this is the foreign policy debate in washington. if you look at probe's iran policy compared to president bush's iran policy, which i helped work on, when i was in the national security council the distinctions are not stark. they are distinctions that are significant to be sure. but not massive. so we have the same basie objective. prevent iran from getting nuclear weapons, preserve

nonproliferation preserve peace in the middle east to the extent we can. to do that use sanctions and diplomacy. president bush's charge was to find a way to keep iran from going to war. so we have great debates in washington and we should and it's what i think a lot of us enjoy doing in a sense but it's important not to exaggerate the fundamental differences in the foreign policy of the united states from one to the next in terms of the regimes and should i they be applied equally. the fact is you can't take a cookie cutter approach to different countries. japan has a significant nuclear weapons program -- >> i misspoke. japan has a significant nuclear program which is civilian and has abidessed by its obligation. iran violated the nonproliferation treaty, not just in 2002 but within that subsequent facility by refusing

to answer iaea ininspectors' questions. iran is in the situation it's in because its has violated the commitments which it volunteer terribly signed up to. and so i think it's -- voluntarily signed up to. so it's appropriate it is treated differently than other countries. >> one last thing. there's no doubt that special interests, lobbies, groups of people, have influence on american foreign policy. that is called democracy. and -- but in the end, i think it is that role in decisions made is quite overblown. my guess is that cold war and people's perceptions of the cold war had a lot nor do with what we did in iran in 1954 than a particular oil company. maybe i'm wrong. maybe i'm not. but that -- there is some sense

of people trying to find the national interests. pressure groups, influence? yes. but i don't think there is decisive as people want to think. >> we're running to the end of our time. i'd like to take three questions and then give the panelists a chance to respond to those questions and see how much time we have. let's take the trifecta three people right up there. ma'am, you in the back and the two gentlemen in front, this triangle right here. >> my question is for mr. michael singh. the obama administration will be hosting the gulf states in camp david next month. do you see this an as an opportunity to bridge the gap between the administration's position on the deal since we fundamentally see it differently

than our gulf partners? we see it as a way to curtail and limit the threat of iran and they see it as a way continue crease the threat of iran. second, on the sanctions they argue that a deal would not adjust iran's attitude in the region, and they don't want the sanctions to be lifted because of that. we have the sanctions now and iran did not adjust its attitude anyway. thanks. >> yes sir. >> yes i'm a research with daniel morgan example in d.c. mr. madley, what do you think the iranian missile capability says about iranian intentions? >> yes sir. >> i should -- question to the doctor. you mentioned the supreme leader. his health, we understand is it

deteriorating, and there done seem to be in the clarity as to who would come after him. i would flip the question you had brought about the consensus internally in iran and if the supreme leader were not be with us anymore, how would that change the verification and the credibility of the deal that iran would be signing? and very quickly, also to congressman burman, i'm wondering if a deal with iran would actually help with our arab allies and those within our arab allies that are still isis fan boys and whether a deal with iran would actually help stability in the region. >> let me ask if someone has a question for jim, if we do we'll take that one ask then everyone will have an opportunity to answer a question. any questions for mr. slattery?

yes, ma'am. down here in the second row. >> hi. i just wondering when you raise the issue of me the political -- the christian zionists movement as a factor in shaping the prospective success of this deal or not, do you think that if it's settled by june 30th that there might not be more efforts to derail it even after the deal goes through? >> let me take all of this and go right down the line if we can. start with you. >> i say that both sides of the

united states and the iran, we are suffering from lack of understanding each other. the culture of iran, many many proverbs and many cultural -- we have in our culture issue don't think 80% of that we understand in the united states, and vice versa. here, many politics is going on inside the united states and in iran. we don't have enough knowledge. so, i think either -- also about the supreme leader's speech and other people. i think i just heard -- i'm hearing always mr. allen here is working on iran's culture and talking with iranians and can communicate, because i think

daily he has access to some literature or talking to iranians. so we need this kind of exchange right now. we should not wait until finalized even this deal. you asked me that on u.s. what can u.s. do to help to bridge this gap. i think we should start right now expanding this sort of exchange educational tourism, many things. you are not allowing iran -- u.n. ambassador exceptionally to come here and talk directly to you to the politicians. you should allow them right away to come here and daily, talk to you and also -- and you have lots of restrictions to travel to iran. you can cancel -- obama can cancel direct flights to iran from tomorrow mr. singh, and

you can go and talk directly with iranians vice versa i talk to some members of parliament when they come here, like now. besides the -- i mean the world bank meeting last year. he was just criticizing the u.s. -- u.s. is here. you are in the united states. you should go to talk to the congress, and finally fortunately he had some kind of tour and besides that had some discussion and right after that i heard lots of words and sentence from him about new understanding about what is going on in the united states. we need both. mr. slattery, fortunately has this chance for the first time after 35 years to go to iran. we need that. and you have lots of

restrictions. i think and also -- but thick obama himself has enough courage to initiate something. what he did to call mr. rouhani. we have lots of problem in iran. even when mr. rouhani went to iran after answering his call, many people threw the shoes against him in front of him in airport. we have many problems but we have in our culture, for example, in muslim communities, just one example -- if you said salam, i have to answer you. obama call mrs. rouhani and he answer to answer. my previous boss he came here he didn't have any plans meeting with congressmen, met many american officials but some american offered him in u.n.

can you talk directly to this congressman, this senator? and they want to say to you hello. he mentioned, yes, we have in our culture -- we should -- we have to respond if somebody says salam you should respond, and after that the congressmen ask, can we talk more and sit? they didn't have plans to talk to each other, and somebody dropped some chair and talked. so this is very, very tactical problem. very -- we have -- also the sanctions you have. right now many, many people know that i am advocating since 2009 to release the sanctions on the internet freedom and this kind of -- and we had lot of activity. rights now we have much more

difficulties to convince the administration to release the sanction to expand on internet in iran. right now mr. rouhani has the big tender is going to have -- i think it's revolutionary project called -- one of his slogans, to expand backbone of internet in iran. we couldn't even until today convince mr. cohen to release sanction and allow all u.s. company to sell this equipment to iranians, to have access to information. so, communication and this -- would be very very important and i hope that u.s. can start and initiate this initiative, and you can see what happened after that i think. >> thank you. jim? >> ignorance and fear are the enemies of peace. and president eisenhower was a

big believer in people-to-people diplomacy, i am too. we should have exchanges mealsly between members of the iran and members of the united states congress and get to know each other and tear down these walls of fear and ignorance that exist between these two countries, and the way to do that is for people to talk to each other. one thing that has been stunning to me, frankly, is that in dealing with this administration and talking to the people that are involved in these negotiations, they don't know any iranians. they don't have any acquaintances across the table. and this is for goodness sakes, 2015 and this is the fruit of isolation. and it's just ridiculous in this modern era. to your question let me just clarify that when i talked about christian zionism and the rising influence of it within the christian fundmentammist community, i'm just pointing out that this is a very significant

factor and force in republican primary politics, and i am only pointing that out because as we get deeper into the election process, these forces become more powerful and more influential, and that is why i'm suggesting it is so important for us not to move this june 30th deadline. focus on getting the job done on both sites by june 30th. >> michael. >> i just will respond to these two questions. on the last point to congressman slatyiery made the concerns people have about iran are widespread. polls suggest that 67%. i just don't thing it's a matter of a small sort of special interest which is trying to skew things. >> i'm not suggesting that. >> think frankly the christian community that those vai views they're widely shared. on the missile question, it has been a police stake on our part not to insist that the missile

question, that iran's icbm development and space launch activitieses be addressed in these negotiations. if you just recently i think the head of strategic command, u.s. strategic command, talked about north korea potentially now having the able to hit the western coast of the united states with mobile icbm launchers one of the most serious types of threats our country can face and obviously a long-range missile program is part of any nuclear weapons program. so keeping it off the table, which we did because the supreme leader refused to talk about it, was not the right strategy to take. the gcc leaders summit, which is supposed to happen at camp david, now there's a date set. if we were in the nsc, we're not premeds for submit. when you get leader together it's very important that you have -- that the meetings be successful. and i just worry we haven't done the spade work. number one to really understand

and address the concerns that our allies in the region have. in fact you have seen some statements which have gone the opposite direction, which have done the opposite sort of reassuring our allies we are on the same page when it comes to interests. second i don't think we know what our program is for countering and deterring iranian behavior after deales signed. i don't know we know what we're going to put on the table. i think it's dangerous when you have this kind of summit without doing that diplomatic and staff spadework at the lower levels to understand what ooh she's leaders be talking about and what can they come out of the summit having agreed upon? because the worst thing you can have is a submit that is considered -- a summit that is considered a failure. we need to do more work at the working level before we do it at the leader level and i don't see that yet. >> howard? last words.

>> i think the question was, if there is a deal are there opportunities for a larger u.s.-iranian area of cooperation? >> yes, specifically against isis because it seems that within our arab allies, although officially they're against it, as we have read, there's significant support, and others by the way north just isis, but -- those groups -- because they're against iranian interests, may be tolerated. >> well, i could see a situation -- it's not that could i see it -- i can conceive of it -- it would be nice so see it -- the iranian leadership decide that we should try a different approach in syria to deal with these threats than the one of simply propping up and arming asad. is there room -- assad.

there is room for an iranian role in a successor leadership that represents the elements of syrian society and that works to isolate those forces? there could be opportunities. the one thing i remember we have had this period of incredible tension with the regime in iran for many many decades. every information i've seen about polling to the extent you can do polling in iran, the iranian people are more pro west and pro american than many of the people in other countries in the middle east. i came up with a theory that more estranged we are from the government, the better the people like us. the closer we for the government the more they hate us. so i think we should always be willing to look at new opportunities, but not naively.

and i think that would be a make sense for any administration. >> i want to bring this to a close. i want to thank you all for coming. i want to say we look forward to seeing you at our next iran forum event which will focus on iran's role in the region. please join me in thank ought panelists this morning. [applause] >> coming up tomorrow on our companion network c-span3, the senate foreign relations subcommittee will hear testimony from on efficiency and effective not. live coverage at 10:00 eastern. then live at 2:30, veterans affairs secretary robert mcdonald appears before members of a senate appropriation subcommittee to present his department's 2016 budget. that is also on c-span3.

here are a few of the book fifes we're could go this spring on booktv. this weekend we'll be in maryland state capital for the annapolis book festival. in the middle of may we revisit maryland for live coverage of the gaithersburg become in festival with tom davis and advicer to president obama david ag axle rod and then close out may in new york city where the publishing industry showcases upcoming back. in the first week in june we are live for the chicago tribune printer's row litfest, including our program. and your phone calls, this spring on c-span2's booktv.

>> now the turkish for affairs minister talks about iran nuclear negotiations at this vaccine hosts by the carnegie endowment for international peace. i runs 55 minutes. >> welcome, ladies and gentlemen. i'm a vice president for studies here at the carnegie endowment for international peace. i want to thank you for joining us for this important afternoon and the opportunity to hear the remarks from the foreign minister of turkey. he will be talking about absolutely vital issues today of the middle east, turkey's relationship with nato, iranian

nuclear negotiations, all super important issues in the united states in europe, middle east, and the global implications. we are honored to have foreign minister cavusoglu here from ankara. he will be making his remarks as we spoke and then -- then we'll be taking questions and offering a discussion before he has to depart. there's no challenge, difficult issues confronting turkey, its allies and other states in the region. he will be addressing those. one of them that we have worked on here at carnegie in particular is the challenge posed by iran's nuclear program and the diplomatic effort to

deal with that. we have just published a book here with a colleague and it's available outside. if anyone is interested. turkey's nuclear future, looking forward. but as i say, the minister will speak and cover a whole range of these issues and then we'll have a discussion from thereafter. minister cavusoglu is minister since the last two years, but previously he was the minister of european union affairs and also is a dnr one of the founding leaders of the jk party in turkey. so, with no further adieu mr. minister, please. [applause] >> thank you so much. for the introduction.

distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, it's a real pleasure to be here with you all today. let me thank ambassador burns in has absence, and the carnegie endowment for the wonderful reception. i'm here in washington dc on an invitation from through good friend, sac kerry. i also -- secretary kerry i also meet with the counterpartses from the administration and have contacts on the hill. of course i value all those of meetings i'm going to have during my stay. but i'm equally pleased to address you at this centuries-old institution. over the years, carnegie endowment turn into a truly global think tank and has contributed to international peace through creative ideas ideas and strategic thinking. i am sure you know the famous

quote, every great dream begins with a dreamer. the institution has been home to the many dreamers of the peace. that eggs why i am very happy to have an opportunity to talk to you under this roof about the state of play in middle east, and turkey's role. and this is a topic on which there has been much debate here in this town. and i know that not all the comments are being -- so i appreciate the opportunity to speak about our dream our regional new and different middle east one that rises on peace, stability, and cooperation. ladies and gentlemen today the middle east is largely in a state of turmoil. but the same middle east has contributed greatly to the

cultural and scientific progress of humankind throughout history. president obama himself highlighted some of these contributions in his historic speech. and we believe that this region still has the potential toaóocj create great things. so the question is, how do we turn this potential into concrete? after decades oppression and war we witness our -- the people in the transformation process start to shake the very foundations of the century-old -- in the region. in this process we played a very supportive role. we extended our $3 billion of financial assistance and tick income cal expert -- technical

expertise too tunisia, and yemen and contributed to the efforts of the european union and the council of europe in all these countries. but the transformation process is currently characterized bay massive challenge. share my views for dealing with all these challenge. the conflict in syria affects turkey the most. the situation has become more complicated with the emergence of daesh, or isil you say in the united states. understand the situation in syria has become a serious nation national security concern for my country turkey. we have provided significant contributions to the international coalition as an active member. we have mobilized our ministry and other resources in its

support. so we agree on the existence of a major threat in our immediate neighborhood but the selective approach focusing just on terrorism will not remedy this situation in syria and in iraq. has the political vacuum in sear glass to by based on the aspirations of the syrian people. the only way to bring total stability in syria. the declaration identifies the necessary road map for achieve ing this kind of political solution. the parties in any negotiation to end the conflict are clear. these are the syrian nation of coalition, and the regime. the coalition is recognized by 114 countries countries and 13 international organizations as

the legitimate opposition. however, after geneva negotiations the regime thinks its has a free hand to continue its violence against its people. this has to stop. the international community must exert pressure on the regime that saw that it will sit down at the negotiation table. we have been working closely with the tattoos find a way to move forward to a political solution in syria. our efforts on implementing a program is clear testimony. this program aims to create area inside syria that are safe. also provide a foothold for syrians willing to fight daesh. ladies and gentlemen, iraq has been in continuous crisis for many years. daesh is the latest episodes in

the drama and maybe the most complicated one. the terrorist organization has occupied more than one-third of iraq, which is equal to the size of croatia in a short time. this is surprising for many. but we had been warning about this possibility for a long time. why was iraq faced with such a crisis? what is the reason behind? simply because of the sectarian and operative policies of the previous government after the departure of american troops. so, there is ad in for a policy that reaches -- reaches out to oppressed people and the regime and should regain their trust and their confidence. i mean the current administration. and new iraqi government under abadi started well on getting international support, and turkey has been fully support

this new inclusive government in iraq. but it our duty to remind the iraqi government it needs to do more for winning the others of the country. promises must turn into concrete action without further delay. in iraq, in a short term, there might be some military successes but lack of confidence between the people and the government is unfortunately continuing. successes will not be enough. there's a need for political and humanitarian steps taken at the same time. the other liberated cities should be held and run by the locals. people shouldn't feel that they have come under another term of oppression in iraq. iraq cannot be governed as

before daesh. it should evolve into the functioning federal state. this is not something new, obviously. it was also foreseen in the iraqi -- we know and we now -- know the task at hand is not easy. and we shouldn't put undue pressure on the government but the urgency is everything. that is why we are providing political, ministries and humanitarian support to iraq. and we are carrying out training program for the kurdish regional government and national guard units. we have already trained more than 1600 peshmerga. and on the humanitarian side we

are hosting nearly two million people from syria and iraq combined. our expenditure has reached almost $6 billion, whereas we receive only 300 million-dollars support from the international community. we are also doing our part to stand the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. we have taken all the necessary measures. we have -- involved more than 12,800 people, and we have captured and deported around 1,300 people in this context and about half of them we didn't have any information from the source countries thanks to the sensitive work of our security and also intelligence we have

captured and deported them to the source countries and we inform all those source countries of this foreign fighters. this is not an issue that we can -- turkey can solve on its own. we need improved information sharing and more international cooperation, particularly from the source country and the source countries should also start asking themselves the hardest questions. who is really the weakest link in this chain? in addition to syria and iraq we see sectarianism as a general set to the region in the middle east. that is a standard message we give to all actors and parties sectarian-based policies create no-win situation. all lose in sectarian struggles including first and foremost those who favor these policies.

yemen is the most recent example pointing out such dangers. in both iran and libya what we need is political dialogue, meaningful political dialogue. we anyone political solutions based on compromise and consensus in those two countries. ladies and gentlemen as a cornerstone of peace and stability, the middle east -- in the middle east egypt is another potential risk for the region. egypt is important country for the muslim world. egypt is important for middle east and egypt is very crucial country for another only northern africa but the whole continent. egyptian leadership pushes to the people they say see opposition underground and towards radicalism.

our concern is if this current trend is left unchecked a new and more violent social -- in egypt well be inevitable. egypts problems can only be solved in a liberal and efficient political environment. therefore we encourage all parties to advocate establishment of an inclusive political system in egypt, too. ladies and gentlemen, of course one cannot speak about the middle east without touching upon the palestinian issue because it remains a core challenge in this region. actually we all know of solutions. a state of israel living side-by-side with an independent and sovereign state of palestine, on 1967 borders, with

jerusalem as its capital. yet despise the evers evers of secretaries kerry, the two-state -- regarding u.n. court council resolution to initiate peace conference. such a resolution would make the israelis sit down for serious negotiations, for two state solution. unfortunately, this initiative like other, trying to open the way to peace, failed at the united nations security council. the main body responsible for protecting international peace and security once again proved incapable of performing its task. i guess, ladies and gentlemen yes, the general picture in the middle east is not very promising. but there are also reasons for

being hopeful and to be optimistic as well. look at the possible process in few nearby sham this country shows us that the legitimate political solution is possible for the problems faced by the country in transition. the -- the political understanding between the p5 plus one and iran. we always advocated diplomacy as the only possible option for a solution to the issue of iran's nuclear program. that is why we hope that the ongoing negotiations result in a comprehensive agreement by the end of june this year. as always we are ready to offer our active support to the process. we also hope that the --

finally, a constructive solution to the nuclear issue might motivate iranian neighbors and brothers to resolution of other regional problems. in short our approach in the middle east is based on finding comprehensive, political, and ininclusive solution. so let me put what we imagine into a picture. a secure and stable middle east where the energy and -- interconnected east meds -- headlines with cooperation project and success stories. doing its part to invest in a common creature in the region. we are putting a lot of feathers increasing and liberalizing trade, lifting visas expanding

investment in the region. on the humanitarian side, being the third largest in the world, we continue to extend our helping hand to our region. we are trying to ease the pains not only in syria but also in iraq and palestine. in iraq, we are among the first to come to the help by sending 750 trucks containing food kits bedding, blankets, medicine, and medical equipment. our official hugh humanitarian assistance in gaza is more than $19 million. and we will continue to work for better future for everyone in the middle east. ladies and gentlemen, dear guests, i know our topic is middle east, but speaking as the turkish foreign minister, i will not be doing my job in full if i don't mention two other issues.

two issues which have created mistrust and confrontation in our region for long time. first, cyprus. we have a window of opportunity to find the fulfillment to a problem that has been with us for more than 50 years and we believe 2015 will be an important year for the settlement of the cyprus issue. our commitment for a solution is as strong as ever. we expect negotiations to resume very soon after the elections in the north. and the turkish side is ready to go to the extra mile to make settlement possible've the end of this year but ultimately its takes two to tango and what is needed for a settlement is -- if greek strong political will there is no reason why a

settlement cannot be reached byes the of this year. as always the active involvement of the u.s. will be important in this political period ahead. second the turkish armenian relations. we have been working since 2009 to overcome the division between these two ancient peoples. two peoples who for centuries, coexisted in peace and harmony. let me underline this point. turkey shares the suffering of armenians. we try with patience and resolve to do establishment -- to establish empathy between two people. ...

and he also announced the ceremonies also held in the armenian patriarchy in his temple. another step of history. and we will continue. and we will continue to work