yesterday, a road to nowhere we need members of congress to come together as they've done in the past -- including in 2013 -- and agree to a multiyear budget agreement that provides the stability dod needs and the resources our troops deserve. fourth and to change gears a bit, i want to commend seven former secretaries of defense and ten retired four-star general and flag officers for releasing a letter today encouraging congress to pass the trade promotion authority or tpa so that the president can finalize two critical trade agreements; the trans-pacific partnership, tpp and the transatlantic trade and investment partnership ttip. this important letter builds on what i said last month at arizona state university, and i encourage every member of congress and all of you to read it. as the letter says, quote: the

stakes are clear, end quote. while

>> the chairman has made our country and the world safer he's also made sitting before congress and all of you a little more comfortable. he and deanny are great friends to me and stephanie. we came into this building, the building's leadership at the same time. elle really miss him and -- i'll really miss him and the same goes for sandy winnefeld as well. but like them i have absolute and complete confidence in their successors general dunford, general salva met all the criteria that we wanted in our next chairman and vice. we saw in them the same strategic perspective, operational experience, sound judgment and total candor. we value every day in our current leadership. much as we'll miss chairman dempsey, vice chairman winnefeld, i know their great responsibilities to the

president and me will remain in excellent hands. with that, i'll turn it over -- and i think we ought to give our chairman a round of applause, if you don't mind. [applause] >> thank you. thanks. that's a first from this group i'll tell ya that. [laughter] no thanks, mr. secretary, for the very kind words. i, too, welcome the nominations of general joe dunford as the next chairman of the joint chiefs and general paul sal v.a. a as vice chairman. i, too have great and complete confidence and trust in them. our nation will be well served by these two phenomenal leaders and i appreciate the fact that both of them and their families have agreed to continue to serve their country at this important time in our history. as the secretary said, there's plenty to do in the months ahead for me. yesterday i i appeared with the secretary before the congress of the united states in what may have been my last budget hearing to briefly recap where we've

been with the budget since i became chairman. when i came into the job, i knew we'd be facing significant consistents after ten years of -- cuts after ten years of incredible support through those periods of highest activity in iraq and afghanistan a. and we have faced significant cuts. in fact, over the last five years we've cut three-quarters of a trillion dollars from the defense budget. now that in itself is significant, but combine with the the lack of long-term budget certainty and the lack of support to make the internal reforms that we think are necessary, we are eroding our technological edge and our military readiness is declining. america's sons and daughters in uniform serving faithfully across the globe deserve better. our allies and partners are watching what we're imposing on ourselves through our budget process. our adversaries are paying attention too while we lurch from budget cycle and budget cycle and one year at a tame,

our adversaries are investing and adapting. if the trajectory that i just described continues -- especially if sequestration returns -- we'll be looking at dramatic changes to how we protect our nation and promote our national interests. on the syrian train and equip mission as the secretary noted we've started the program and will grow it in a measured way. this training program is very complex. i won't be easy, but i'd emphasize that it's one part, one component of a much broader approach. and finally tomorrow as you know marks a significant day in our history 70 years since victory in europe day. the end of the second world war in europe. we know that we are a better nation for the courage and sacrifice of the brave men and women who served in that conflict, and with that i'll be glad to take your questions. >> we'll start with -- [inaudible] >> mr. chairman, you talked last month about beijing and its

strategic importance in iraq. i'm wondering if there's apparently lost ground there fairly significantly. can you just talk a little bit about are things more difficult because of the unwillingness to destroy maybe large segments of thew3 oil infrastructure, and what does this say about the goal of retaking mosul? is this making it far more difficult? and a quick question for the secretary. you said a company size. can you be a little more specific about how many trainers you expect and if you have any concerns about the safety of the trainers? because of -- [inaudible] >> obviously, it's a part of the, iraq's critical oil infrastructure. it sits on the corridor that runs from baghdad to kirkuk --

correction beiji kirkuk and over to mosul. it actually also sits on a corridor that runs from the tigris to the euphrates, so it's geographically significant as well as economically. so it's a very important place. the iraqis are under pressure there and have lost some control of the perimeter and some of the road network that leads to it through the 'em placement of, especially ieds. we've been working with them, we've conducted 26 airstrikes since the 5th of may. we've been working with we call it a mobile training team in baghdad airport to assist them in rigging air drops and just recently they conducted an air drop to resupply the force that's at beiji and very successfully, by the way 18 of 18 pallets landed on the intended target. so the iraqis understand the significance and are working to

insure they retain control of the beiji oil refinery. >> the, there are about 90 of the trainees in this company-sized tranche, first tranche that i referred to. you asked about green on blue possibility. first of all these are highly vetted individuals. that's an important part of the program. second, the training takes place in a secure location. and third, of course, our people who are participating in the training are very experienced in this kind of training, including in security procedures. >> we'll go next to ms. barb star from cnn. >> i'd like to start with mr. secretary. general dempsey, in the last couple of days we've seen the moderate opposition in syria and other groups make some gains against assad and assad came out yesterday and, in fact,

publicly acknowledged that he had suffered some losses. but what concerns do you have if the battlefield in -- [inaudible] looks like assad could be getting shaky like the status quo is changing for him that isis and al-nusra might be, again, gaining strength and destabilize the situation? what risk does that pose in and, mr. secretary, on a completely different subject for you one has to ask about -- [inaudible] in texas just to get you on the record if i may. your response to the governor of texas who expressed his concern that the united states military could risk the civil liberties of the people of texas. >> why don't i just take that one first barbara, just on your second question. we have given information to

authorities in texas any information that they've requested. we're very open and up front about our training activities in the united states, and i should say that we're very grateful for the support of communities around the united states for in all of our training facilities. we count upon people's, the support of americans in our training areas and around our training areas and around our bases and are very grateful for the hospitality that we receive -- >> but your message to him would you refute his concerns that this could be an issue? would you refute the concerns of those on the internet who believe -- [inaudible] >> we are very responsive to any local officials who want to know about our training. we are very transparent. we've tried to be very transparent in this case and answer all questions, give all

information about what we're doing, about the need for it. and once again i just want to express the appreciation that we have to communities across the country who host our troops. it's very important. and with respect to your first question -- >> the destabilization, you know, do you believe if assad gets shakier does that pose a new set of challenges here? >> well yeah, it would. and if you recall two years ago assad was at a point where we thought that he was at a disadvantage and that the opposition was on the rise. and then that situation reversed itself for a period of time. so we've been through the intellectual rigor of what this might mean. so what it might mean for the nation of syria is further instability, you know, were this to suddenly were power to suddenly transfer precipitously. and it could mean an even increased humanitarian crisis. for us and our counter-isil

strategy, it wouldn't change the dynamic except that the meaning that we still have the fundamental challenge of finding moderate syrian opposition -- men -- to train to be a stabilizing influence over time. and from a on the side of our diplomacy and our diplomats there's the issue of finding moderate syrian opposition to establish a political structure to which the military force that we're building can be responsive. is so the challenge wouldn't change for us, but it would certainly make the situation for syria more complicated. >> and do you do you think there have been gains against assad at some of these key places in the north especially that change the dynamic for him? >> i do think that the regime's momentum has been slowed and therefore, you can certainly from that take that i do believe the situation is trending less

favorably for the regime. and if i were him, i'd find the opportunity to look to the negotiating table. >> move to radio now and try tom bowman. >> mr. secretary, i want to get back to the combat training for the syrian rebels. you talked about two companies being trained at a secure location in turkey, presumably? >> i'd rather not talk about the location. as you probably know, there are several locations and we keep that to ourselves. >> when will these trainees go operational? do you have to get to a certain level, battalion or brigade before they go operational first of all, and secondly what responsibility does the u.s. have once they do go operational? will you provide air cover for them if needed, medevac maybe advisers on the ground? >> okay. with respect to the first question, that will -- the question of the first disposition of those forces will be decided later by the commander of that training operation and by us. that decision's not been made

yet. >> are you talking months? six months? nine months? a year? >> a few months. and i'm sorry, the other part was -- of your question was -- >> what responsibility -- >> oh, yes. right. no, very good question. and, of course, we would have some responsibility to protect forces. now remember, their mission is to fight isil. so that's the combat we expect them to get involved in, and we do expect to support them in that regard. if they are contested by regime forces again we would have some responsibility to help them. we have not decided yet in detail how we would exercise that responsibility, but we have acknowledged that we'd have that responsibility. >> trouble with isis. isis -- [inaudible] will you send in -- >> we definitely would absolutely work to protect, protect them.

certainly, with that kind of isr help potentially air support help yes. not -- it depends on where they are, but again, we have some obligation to these people. now they're fighting for their own country but on the other hand, we definitely have acknowledged that we have an obligation to their safety as well as their effectiveness, and we would exercise that. >> we'll go deeper and try jim -- [inaudible] in the middle. >> thank you. mr. secretary, if i could begin with you. i interviewed the president rather, of the syrian opposition earlier this week, and his description of u.s. support typically training, too small and too slow. he talked about 5,000 over the course of the year, he said he needs 30,000 to make a battlefield difference. they want sophisticated weapons specifically anti-aircraft weapons to fight back against syrian airstrikes, and they want support if or a -- for a no-fly zone. he left washington disappointed.

i wonder if you have reaction to that criticism, and did the u.s. make any hard commitments, for instance, on sophisticated weapons or to increase the number of those -- [inaudible] and when you're done, i just have a question -- [inaudible] >> sure, jim. well, this is a complex program. it's going to have to evolve over time. i think it's fair to say to that kind of concern that it will need to prove itself. so we're starting with the people that we have that we vetted very carefully. we're figuring out what the best training is with the best initial deployment. we expect that to be successful and, transfer, to grow, but you have to start somewhere and this is where we're starting. >> and the aircraft weapons? >> in the main arms that they're provided will be small arms small unit arms and so forth. there's a limit to the kind of

sophistication of arms that troops trained in this way will be provided with. >> general dempsey, before i can ask you to sing an irish song -- [laughter] >> really good at that. extremely good at that. >> iranian activity in and around the gulf required sending a u.s. aircraft carrier required escorts. those have now stopped. this was the activity of the revolutionary guard, and i'm just curious in light of defensive negotiations that are going on right now if you have any concern that the revolutionary guard units of the navy are not under the control of the government of rouhani that they are operating freelance and that they can't control them -- [inaudible] a great deal of independence. but from the military perspective, you have to move significant assets to respond to that. do you have that concern?4xumñ@>>çó well whether i have a concern or whether it's true, it

is the government of iran who's responsible for their behavior. and so we are concerned about their behavior. as i've said frequently, there's about six things that concern me aboutç iran's behavior, one of which is the nuclear issue and i'm certainly supportive of the effort to try to resolve that one diplomatically, but we'll have other issues with iran whether it's surrogates and proxies, trafficking ballistic missile development cyber activity and on occasion their effort to threaten freedom. so we've got the -- got to work these, and the government of iran has got to, if they're going to act responsibly and engage the world as they claim they wish to do, then they have to control the irgc land forces and the irgc navy. >> we'll go local with -- [inaudible] >> two quick questions. the first one secretary carter, just going back to the syria training program, a follow-up. when exactly did it start, and

can you tell us a little bit more about who the trainees are? are they from the fsa are they trained fighters who were already in the field? and the second question is regarding drone operations. there have been some measures in congress to speed up this supposed transfer of drone operations from the intelligence community to the military. can you guys, either of you give us an update on what's happening with that, and the u.s. military has announced drone strikes in the past or alluded to drone strikes in the past in somalia. have there been military drone strikes in yemen in the recent weeks, months? >> let me do the first one first and then the second and marty, if you want to add. as far as -- the training is starting now but i just need to explain the process. the, these trainees are recruited, they're vetted, and only then are they put into training. so they've been in the program

for quite a while. and then the training takes some time and then they would be inserted into operations, and the trainees behind them -- and to get back to the previous question, we hope this to be an ever expanding program once it proves itself which i think it will. with respect to drones, i'm limited on what i can say but i will say the following: we this is the president included and especially, believe in being as transparent as we possibly can with all of the measures we take to protect america and our citizens and friends and allies around the world. and drones are no different. they're used only when it's necessary and appropriate, and there's no better way to achieve

the same objective. as you know, we have a preference to capture individuals who are terrorist threats. so it's done with the utmost care and deliberation. and i think that's the most important thing. obviously, we in the defense department stand ready to do whatever the president wants us to do and play whatever role he wants us to play in this, but i think the important impulse here is one that -- of transparency and conveying the care taken to make sure that these actions are necessary, appropriate and lawful. and i'm afraid i can't really talk about particular places because that's in the nature of things.

but that is the general philosophy behind the management questions that you're alluding to. >> [inaudible] >> mr. secretary, cuddle -- could you just take a moment to clarify? yesterday before congress you said the united states was creating a force to combat both assad's forces and the islamic state and today you're, again returning to the idea they would just be combating the islamic state. could you clarify, and tell me if they do get into a fight with assad's forces, is the question really whether or not they intentionally engage as sat's forces as as opposed to inadvertently? and general dempsey could you give us a sense of whether or not you're concerned this training session has started without all of this -- [inaudible] >> okay. no let me be very clear and if i wasn't clear yesterday i apologize of that. it was in the context to have no-fly zone discussion, but that's a different question. my imprecision.

in the case of the train and equip forces, they are being trained and equipped to fight isil. that is the purpose and that is the basis upon which they're being vetted and trained. the question was raised earlier about what happens if -- and they have, they are not being asked by us, and it's not part of our program to have them engage the forces assad's forces. so the question arises if assad's forces undertake to engage them, would we have some responsibility towards them? and as i indicated, we would. but they're not being fielded for that purpose. they're being fielded for the purpose of engaging isil. that'll be their principal mission. and that's one of the bases on which they would join our program in the first place. >> [inaudible] >> clear it's not clear exactly what response is it, or is it totally determine their? >> no, as i said, we have some

responsibility. we have not determined yet all of the rules of engagement under those circumstances but i think we have acknowledged that we'd have some responsibility towards, to support them. >> we'll go back to broadcast with jen griffin. >> two quick follow-ups, mr. secretary. in terms of aqap in yemen, there are reports that a top leader was taken out by a drone strike. the leader was involved in the charlie help doe attack. can you -- hebdo attack? can you confirm that? can you say clearly is the u.s. military planning to overtake texas as is being asserted by certain presidential candidates? [laughter] >> okay. well, i'll take the second one first. no. [laughter] with respect to the first one we -- i'm afraid i cannot give you a specific response on this particular strike.

if -- we just don't talk about those and, certainly, not from this podium. i will say, though that to the general question of aqap in yemen, we continue to apply pressure there. obviously, the circumstances have changed in yemen and i said earlier it's more when you have a stable government in a country, it gives you more opportunities fordown terrorism operations -- for counterterrorism operations. but we do have other ways of doing that and we're keeping up the pressure on aq, and we continue to do so. >> and general dempsey in term of iran and the tigris, do you believe that iran took the mass tigris hostage, if you will n a tit for tat because of the uss teddy roosevelt's involvement in following their weapons convoy? and did you stop accompanying

the u.s. and british ships through the strait of hormuz because the -- [inaudible] tigris was going to be released today? >> so to the first part of your question whether we believe it was a tit for tat for turning their weapons convoy around through the deterrent value that the carrier provided, i don't think so. as you know, the government of iran stated that it was to resolve a longstanding financial dispute. there is reason to believe that was true. now, the way they did it was certainly, in our view a violation of international law which is to say by force. but we don't think it was, as you said, a tit for tat for our activities to turn that convoy around. and in terms of the accompanying mission that the secretary approved, we have put a sunset clause on it from the beginning in order to determine whether the threat would be persistent or whether it was episodic. doesn't appear that it's persistent right now, but we've certainly got the resources in place should we need to quickly turn it back on.

>> we'll go deep to tom vannedden brook from "usa today." >> will the united states be paying salaries for these people and then secondly, what is our responsibility if they commit war crimes? if they do something and we have a responsibility in that regard? >> okay. with respect to the first one they do receive some compensation as well as training and training and equipment. and as i said support. secondly a explicit part of their training is how to conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with international law. that's an explicit part of our training andst also, by the way -- and it's also by the way, an explicit part of our vetting. and, of course, any continued support for them would be strongly conditioned upon their continued good conduct in that regard. >> can you characterize the compensation that they'll be receiving? >> i can't, but, you know, we

can get that for you, tom. >> we'll end with a major network -- [inaudible] >> you've talked about your respondent to support -- your respondent to support these opposition fighters. what's your ability to control them once they go back in other than just pulling sport and -- [inaudible] >> well, i think one way of addressing that is through their training and through the missions they're given and where they're located. you -- in many cases remember as part of the vetting process there's a dialogue that goes along, that goes on about their motivation in the first place. many are motivated by the fact that isil has taken over and mistreated the places from which

they came, and so their commitment is something that we have a very good idea of as part of the vetting process. >> the u.s. be -- will the u.s. be giving them specific mission as in sort of exercising tactical control over these units? >> i would put it a little bit differently than that. i would say that that's, again part of the dialogue. remember, these are people who in general, come from a particular place and so they have commitments to the country of syria as a whole but they also have a commitment to the part of the country from which they have come and so forth. and so they clearly have a voice in what -- where they're going to fight at least initially and first, and that's part of the dialogue that'll go on. first things first though, we first have to get them trained having gotten them vetted. >> [inaudible conversations] >> one more on isil? sw we're done. one last? go ahead. >> on recent days there's been a

number, there's been quite a bit of propaganda reportedly from isil taking credit for the attack in texas and threatening future attacks against the u.s. homeland. can you help americans understand how to serious that threat is from are -- from isil in this country? and i would welcome response from both of you. >> okay. well, i think we have to take it seriously, and i think our law enforcement and our homeland security folks have been saying the same. the i think again, our understanding from the investigations that are going on was that these were inspired by isil, not directed by isil which is an important distinction. ..

[inaudible conversations] >> we are live on this monday morning at the brookings institution for discussion on the sunni role in the future of iraq the two iraqis will be discussing the organization and leadership difficulties among sunni arab communities and that

they can improve their status in a post-saddam iraq. also the role the u.s. conflict in this entire process. some of the speakers are former iraqi deputy prime minister and the deputy of an iraqi province. is it is expected to get underway in just a couple of minutes. live coverage here on c-span2. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> we are live at the brookings institution as we await the start of the discussion on the single in the future of iraq. they should get underway in just a moment. very quickly here's what's going on this week in congress. the senate is back today for general speeches. later they will vote on a resolution stating the government's policy on the release of u.s. citizens in iraq. on tuesday at about 2:30 p.m. eastern senators will take a vote on whether to advance trade promotion authority legislation. live coverage on c-span2. the senate comes in at 3 p.m. eastern today. the house is back tomorrow. they have a full agenda come expecting work on a measure to ban abortions beyond 20 weeks and then they will start on the 2016 defense program. by wednesday possibly consider

reauthorization of provisions of the patriot act the with the nsa's bulk collection up american phone records. live coverage of the house coming in tomorrow on c-span. c-span. >> good morning. welcome to the brookings institution. i am ken pollack. i am a senior to the center for middle east policy here at the brookings institution, and i'm absolutely delighted to bring this program to you this morning. all of you know in the last few months washington has seen two extremely distinguished visitors from iraq prime minister al-badi was here in march, and

just recently, in april and just recently we had the president of the krg. as you all know there are many different communities in iraq. all of them in great tension at the moment. some of them virtue and more with one another. and as we all know at the heart of iraq's communal differences like it's sunni community. we all now know that it was the alienation of the sunni community that began after the 2003 american invasion which drove the sunnis of iraq out of the political system and drove into opposition and help usher in iraq's civil war. we all know that it was 2008- 2008-2009 that with help from the united states the sunnis were brought back into the fold. a new power-sharing arrangement was forged in baghdad. the sunnis were once again given

their rightful place, given political power and economic benefit commensurate with the demographic weight. and i was a critical element in resolving the civil war pacifying the country, including it on a direction towards real progress. we also are well aware after the painful events of last year that it was the unraveling of that agreement and the actions by the prior iraq he government that alienated the sunni community once again and that opened the door for -- or isis or isil whatever you prefer to call it to go back into iraq. today one of the critical questions facing iraq and when the critical questions for the united states and every country in the world that cares about iraq to seize iraq's future as tight as the interest is what the future of iraq will be. what kind of an iraqi will bring all of these communities together again, help them to live in peace and tranquility?

when you speak to iraqis in baghdad, and all the parts of the country what you often hear from them come almost invariably when you talk about the course of the fighting so far and what it will take to defeat dash and bring peace to iraq in which inevitably here is what will matter is what the future iraqi government looks like. for the sunni community that is an intense interest. many sunnis do they were badly betrayed in particular by the events of 2010 and 11 and 12 and 13. when they bought back into of iraqi political system only to find that political system used against them by a prime ministers on many of their most important members as his enemies. if iraq is going to be safe secure peaceful, unified the real question is not how fast can we defeat daesh and how fast

can we drive them out of the country. the real question is whether that is a political solution to be had, a political solution that will allow the sunnis to once again failed that they are full members of iraq's political system. that once again they have the political strength and economic benefit commensurate with the demographic weight and that they are not enemies of the state government that they are not objects of persecution by the government at full partners in that government. when you talk to iraqis you often hear this is a paraphrasing of something i heard directly from one person in particular, i'm going to put a slight twist on it so it's not a direct quote. what you often hear is you're asking me to fight for the future of iraq. until you tell me what the future looks like i can't tell you whether i'm willing to fight for it. for that reason i ask today to

very important, very well known and very highly regarded leaders of the sunni community to come to washington to help us to understand the perspective of their community on these critical issues. i know that for many people in this room both of these figures are well known to you, but i also know that for some they're not particularly well acquainted with them so let me give them quick introduction. to my far this right, do your farthest left is doctor rafe al-issawi. he was born in anbar in fallujah, trained as an orthopedic surgeon and rose to become the head of the fallujah hospital including most famously during the november 2004 battle for fallujah. he was elected to the council of representatives in 2005. in 2006 became minister of state for foreign affairs. in 2008 deputy prime minister of iraq and 2010 finance minister. in 2012 and 13 rafe came under

attack by the previous government. his bodyguards were arrested. he was the target of an assassination attempt and he was forced to resign from the government. he is the personification of the events that led to the alienation of the sunni community in 2012-13. to my immediate right a rafe's left and your immediate left is governor atheel al-nujayfi. governor al-nujayfi was born in mosul are just degrees in engineering and law i also found out looking over your bio that you are an engineer into iraqi air force during the iran-iraq war, just something i did not know. in 2009 governor al-nujayfi became the governor of ninewah province and at that time come excuse to come it was a tremendously important event in iraq and i can remember some of the early adventures when you first took over the governorship which i think were critical in

broaching or breaching the differences between sunni and kurds in no one province. in addition governor al-nujayfi is still the governor of ninewah and his brother was the speaker of the iraqi council of representatives from 2010-2014. now, as again i think many in this audience already know, if there's one thing the previous government in iraq was successful at it was fragmenting the sunni community. there are many different voices in the sunni community these days and there is no question that there are other people who claim to be this or that was big for this or that community. the reason we brought you doctor governor, is these two men have long-standing come excuse me histories of acting as eloquent voices or their community as being committed to the peace and stability of a

future iraq came in being committed to u.s.-iraqi partnership moving forward. for those reasons i can think of no two better voices to help us understand the situation and iraq and with the sunni community that dr. rafe and governor atheel. we will begin with some prepared remarks by both of them. dr. rafe has a bit of a powerpoint presentation to give you a sense of what's going on and then they will come join me and we'll have some questions talk show style but i'll ask users of questions, and then finally we will open things up to you in the audience to ask you, ask them your questions. so first please join me in welcoming dr. rafe al-issawi and governor atheel al-nujayfi. [applause] >> good morning, everybody. i would like first to thank my

friend ken for this invitation and thank you all for your attendance. and if i would especially to thank my colleague and my old friend. when i was director of the fallujah hospital. please raise your hand, thank you very much. the only cause i make my comments on powerpoint is to make it easier for you on specific topics on the situation in iraq. i agree with mr. ken in order to talk about five things to defeat extremism in iraq to start building back, we have to describe exactly what's going on in the ground on iraq now on political, security and others. so now i'll talk about defeating extremism and building back

because you're talking about almost fragile damage state in iraq. both on the isis site on daesh are on the malicious site. simply i put this up to give the impression what it looks like the indirect. in order not to repeat -- [inaudible] we have to do the exact defense and the causes that led to that situation. i would like you to just focus on the next community which is about one minute. it divided the screen into two sides. one for the militia or other rights that is the flex of emotion and the website is daesh isis. many illegal militias in iraq. and this is one of the militia

leaders, and that one is from isis. threatening neighboring countries of their identical on this site, this is a brutal dealing of the militias and some of the iraqi security forces. isis are doing with the shia. i would like to give the impression this is an identical criminal groups who are now planning in the fate of iraq. the same thing is going on the left side isis is killing someone, very, very offensive. on this site also the militia are killing sunnis. and on the left side you see that the daesh isis are killing the shia. so this is a situation in iraq right now. in order to change they will come to the practical points on

governance like him on american site, how to end this tragedy in iraq. it such an identical effect on the left side -- killing one of the shia come and on the side the militia -- [inaudible] that is why we want to focus yes, i'm short term, the real threat is isis. it is damaging to the country and it is threatening the region and international community. but on the long run you cannot do with a country filled with militia which is illegal and which is nonstate violent after. now the question, very rapid i'm afraid this may give you not exact picture of the situation so my answer to your question can cover in the talks. back in 2003 and 2004 when sunni and arabs divide into two

groups. i and other colleagues of mine participate in 2005. [inaudible] all of them are in exile now. so now sunnis are looking benefit of participation. second, i'm talking about some legal steps taken by sunni and other partners can build the first one is participation or second it is difficult to achieve their goals. they want a demonstration here before demonstration they want to declare regions.

in order to get some sort of authority to decrease the grasp of the subject of a. what happened since 2011 militia into a government building, occupied the office of the governor, and the governor was, for six months is not capable of coming back to his office. [inaudible] we move into a third step, which is the workings. are working is to fight al-qaeda. this was back in 2006 and seven. what's happened also almost all the leaders of the tribes who bought al-qaeda have been assassinated. after that sunnis said let's go to the street for demonstration. more than one year.

the former government attack event and killed people who were demonstrating legally. and when sunnis into okay let us talk to the government to find some sort of recruiting sunni people for local national guard and/or to participate in the security forces, and defeating isis, until this moment, and fortunately the drop of the national guard, national guard has no intent. and when it come to sunnis who stood no for control for the control of isis over mosul and some other big cities, tribes want to fight them and until this moment thousands of people are not record official by the government. keep in mind we're talking about the official legal recruitment not warlords. we don't need to see sunni armed

groups and the shia armed groups because it would add an conflict. we're talking about institutionalization of the security forces. so when they stood up to the isis, they didn't receive their ministerial orders. we're talking about almost 600,000 families displaced. we're talking more than 3 million people outside of of the house appeared all of them are sunnis also. this is because of isis i mean. this also put a real challenge overhead went including central government how to deal with these sunni people. this wave of displacement was from anbar. dealt with them. we had to be accepted. some of them came back to very risky, very dangerous situations in anbar.

talking about sunni -- on top of that security institution. we are talking about 16 agencies, both civilian and security. the 16 agencies in a sunni dominated province, all the 16 that are shia leaders. what type of partnership are we talking about? really sunni -- tens of thousands of people are arrested in jails coming to an agreement with the previous government and with this government about reconciliation and amnesty law. salafis environment makes this aside and sunnis ask the question, is it justifiable? if the answer is yes, but you should be inclusive government for all iraqis. this is one. anjo to be accepted into two

forces. you have to fight even when you come to fight against isis, being sunni no support you. let's talk with the government can do if the government fails to me partnership with those were fighting a global threat which is isis. everyone knows very well that isis was in the western part of iraq, and some good signals from governors, governor of anbar the isis is there and get to deal with them. question who left isis to enter ramadi? those are crucial questions. the central government and the iraqi central security forces which control the security failed to do with the control of isis over our provinces. the question we keep saying the iraqi security forces were not built on professional model and this is the end.

you as the isis controlling our provinces. many are being defeated in mosul. isis presented itself as -- putting in the minds even with a government. marginalization of sunni. [inaudible] people are killed now by the by bombing or by criminals of isis. suny also come infrastructure including hospitals, houses everything bombarded in the sunni provinces. later on it is a threat to all iraqis, the region, and is really a global threat rather than a regional one. and now talking about -- why i

put this, i highlighted this point, because talking about sending sectarian forces with a militia or anyone else with really complicated the situation. we are encouraging everyone to keep the momentum of the people who are ready to fight a isis in our province, i meet sunni. that is sunni fighting isis. we don't need to lose that moment and change into sunni-shia fighting because of the beat of some of the militias which i presented at the beginning. very similar set of crimes like that. militia involvement actually competent the situation. some in the militia bombarded houses, killed people, slaughtered like isis. so we were very frank with our colleagues in iraq is look at why are you sending our -- to fight on behalf of mosul were

anbar? sunnis can fight isis. [inaudible] why don't you send your guys to be killed and at the same time some sectarian. to place a gift reverse action. all of us will lose, sunni and shia because the battle will be different from fighting daesh and fighting a civil brother civil war. talking about thousands of people in anbar in mosul and some other provinces come of thousands of them. they are coming to the council training. this will come later on. so fighting isis is a very three-pronged a coach. not only security when. the other side should be political, talk about what

political it means government programs that the prime minister comments himself this is my government program to be of limited with all other political partners. that includes reconciliation national guard, sunni recruitment and training and armed forces. all these things are really not a new topic. the government put a timetable three-month, six-month, one year. on the other side the other threat is the militia. we talk about the men between iraq and the region all fight isis. now talking about militia, talking about militia working illegally outside the structure of the security force. this will reach the point of security forces, all of them to

negotiate, coptic, christian to all these groups will find warlords who are fighting inside iraq between 10. post daesh post-isis. some sectarian that the changes come including two days ago come the attacked one of the jails released some of the criminals belong to the militia and to more than 52000. they were executed rather than killed in front of the jail. all these criminals sectarian crimes were really not only prolong the life of ice is because it would give them the justification that they are protecting some groups and they're really not protecting. and i say that militia --

[inaudible] militia on the short term to fight isis is exactly like -- to fight daesh. let us assume that isis laid on divided into groups. each one fights the of the. we have to fight isis legally, by legal constitutional security forces the that includes all iraqis. on the short term come all the resources should be focused on isis and defeating isis, but we cannot close the icon a militia because it will complicate the situation and this will result in civil war. and when i present this short video on the right side, one of the leaders of a militia threatening anybody in the

country we're coming, we will fight you. on the other side is just putting the possibility of egypt and jordan same will occupy you. that's why said it is not only one threat and iraq. now post-isis defeat, without having without institutionalizing security forces you will find sunni sunni warlords sunni-shia warlords and everyone who is carrying weapons with -- now some of the militias are out of their, total control of the central government. so without institutionalization of acidity forces to trust people who come to fight isis and to bring back our state of law, there will be much more

discussion. institutionalization i talk about. people they do look at it understand and comprehend. you know the iraq icon is not that good. is possible on the american sideline we will talk about international compact on national fund. that can help people. reconciliation is needed. iraq constitution, i mentioned that when they declared a region on the provincial level, occupied by the militia. so sunni as know what's the solution? but participation is not pashtun fighting daesh not accept. where should we go? national guard, national guard is important.

rebuilding iraq army armed forces, second model of mosul withdrawing iraqi army. the only way is to rebuild restructure the iraqi army on a national background. and here mission not yet accomplished. after u.s. withdrawal from iraq is in fragile both security and political situation. by using politicized victim. and agreed upon government program is presented by

mr. al-badi or by the way i'm not talking about abadi himself that he was the head of the financial comedy when i was minister of finance. i think he is trying but trying is a very bad situation. need to stand united together to defeat the violate dictator governors. undermined by militia and by isis. so now the vision, i think we need to adjust a new council. modify. when he created a model of awakening because the prison was huge. it's different but they are still there. a modification means creating a

joint comity, local people local government or whom else to supervise the story of recruiting sunnis and arming them rapidly. army been without -- [inaudible] this joint comity would be about supplying endorsing the training. americans would supervise everything. center government with it when not attending. local people who keep complaining that government didn't accept them and didn't armed them would also be in that company. they will be equipped, recruited officially begin by isis. now after this as i mentioned i'm sorry, i don't mean to confuse you but i hope the answer can put you much more

aware. we have the center government. local people, what to do. central government what to do, and american having the international coalition fighting, what to do. on the political side the program for the government, including reconciliation, all these things need to be implemented you can buy the what i'm talking about debaathification i mean. all these topics that you see a great upon. we're not talking about new conditions for agreement. all agreed upon the problems. on the security side, talking about isis or resources should be directed toward unifying all iraqis to fight isis to defeat isis. with a full coordination.

we are potential ally to united states of america in fighting isis but keeping it might also attempt to dismantle and decommission the militia. otherwise you see a very weak army come every week government, and the first of militia. no one will accept this country to be in a model. restructuring the iraqi army i talk a lot about iraqi army how it was defeated in mosul. army iraqi types to fight isis to be the precursor to being included later on in the national guard national guard because at the end of the day it is the local people and the national guard who control the ground. returning and compensating displaced people. on the american side the important political reconciliation, they keep support binding to start with

despite all the problems come despite all the more dilution wiki think the solution should be political. and participation can devolution of power power should come all these things. we will not accept an illegal situation. the idea is to dig deeper over there, timetable and to petition. assisting security forces, we're talking about 50000 across \mr.{-|}\mister al-badi himself. 50,000 those soldiers. so there's a defense paid for them and they're really not. now only this point the 50,000 to be compensated by 50,000 good guys would restructure the army. we can defeat these forces like ninewah we don't need to see that model in order to not see a

rocky force of the graffiti thousand and others. the number is rising. rebuilding iraqi army on a national background is mandatory, about to compete. as this develops, state of law talking state of law not prime minister maliki who damaged the state of law. the partnership and a framework agreement with america -- [inaudible] the story about arming sunnis come i think the battle isis is an international one but isis is everyone. sunnis in iraq are the potential

ally in fighting i spent i don't think anyone can live in sunni provinces without sunnis. sunnis need assistance of united states and internationally in order to fight isis. they are on the ground now fighting isis. a model of awakening and financing for american side encourage people in 2005, six and seven. let us assume arming sunni the user not to fight against isis laid on they made use of later defied the government. if it is their own government them if they're participating, if there is a reshaped why are they fighting the government? this is not excepted. the only way is to restore state of law and partnership of all iraqis. the central government cannot be

the center government cannot be a partner with the sunnis were fighting, who are fighting against isis. so who is partner in central government? this isn't a situation. this can be restored back again. it is difficult, very possible but it depends on all the partners. american side, center government side, and local people and the tribes. and thank you. [applause] >> good morning, everybody.

thank you ken for that introduction. ken, you are an expert on iraq but even more you are a friend of iraq. you may have my special thanks for the friendship with iraq and our friendship. thank you for organizing this. and i want to talk, i want to take this opportunity to thank the people of the united states, all american forces who support them the obama administration, and the congress to get united states congress for their vital assistance for our fight against daesh, or as you say isil. i will have a chance to express my view on the iraq situation as

an iraqi, as a sunni political leader as one who was born in mosul, of many generations of mosul fathers and mothers end of the elected governor of the city of mosul. mosul is the largest second largest city in iraq nearly 2 million people. now occupied by illegal murderous regime of daesh. iraq cannot be operating without mosul. it would be like the united states without chicago or without san francisco. there are a few points i want to leave with you.

these points will mean success or failure for the liberation of mosul, and for the world's fight against daesh. success in the mosul pattern and just as important what comes after is crucial. these points, very important for fighting daesh, our concrete steps to the world's national reconciliation in iraq. after 11 years of just talking about reconciliation, a but no actual steps taken, the sunni in iraq will no longer be interested in more talk. the sunni need to see actual and concrete steps.

[inaudible] i will agree and tony cut line these points so we can have your questions and a good discussion. i'm talking about mosul, but i think what i'm talking is before all the sunni areas. first, the people of mosul are the key to the reconciliation of mosul. the mosul people must be shown reconciliation is better for them than the regime of daesh. history shows that the people are the reason for succeed or failure. in a city of nearly 2 million people soldiers, how well-equipped can only do so

much. we need the people of mosul to rise up and to help the soldiers to fight daesh. when the people rise up against daesh, i believe they will. but we must give them a vision for what their life would will be like after reconciliation of mosul. in addition to the support, they need to do anything after the liberation. before i tell you what i believe that the vision should be i want to tell you the planning and work that is going on right now for the liberation of forces. we have now to training camps. in these camps americans,

canadian special forces are training thousands of forces police, and volunteers. the combat skills they need to have to be in the fight for the liberation of mosul. one of these two camps is for mosul parties. the other is for the volunteers. who are organized in a military structure commanded by officers from previous the previous army officers want to fight isis. the volunteers are ready to be part of the national guard come as soon as the law is enacted. but the volunteers are ready to

fight as soon as they did -- by now we have thousands of fighters who have graduated from these camps, and are ready to fight your but they don't have weapons. they don't have the weapons they need for the fight, for the liberation of mosul from daesh. since last january, now five months ago we are still waiting for the weapons that have been made by our government in baghdad. promises are nice but it's the weapons that our volunteers need, not the promises. the force must be trusted by the people of mosul.

that means the force must be from mosul and surrounding province. if these forces will be trusted by mosul community, the mobile people will be on the side pashtun mosul people will be on the side of liberation, and daesh cannot make a comeback into mosul. the liberation comes first, of course but it's the. after the liberation that will be decided. our people will be watching. so that people of mosul can survive. president obama last month stated $200 million in humanitarian aid. with this humanitarian aid

president obama promised the young man in mosul immediately after liberation, all it will be tied up in baghdad's your hocrisy. in addition, the training camps we have taken other steps for the liberation of mosul. we know that the liberation of mosul is not just a military fight. i organized a forum for sunni muslim scholars in cooperation with -- in egypt of which spotlighted daesh crimes in mosul. these scholars are continuing their work against the ideology of daesh in a comity established by the forum. i established a set of people inside mosul who will enjoy and

-- join the liberation if needed but they need to trust that follows also. i have good working relations with most of the arab tribes in the mosul area. these drives would be difficult in the liberation of mosul and i will come and i will say also that these drives need also to trust the force. whatever we have done, we still need to give the people of mosul a different vision that they had from the previous government in baghdad. this leads me to the second point. the people of mosul want democracy to be restored soon to elections. the people of mosul choose to elect their own, not have them

enforced from outside. not by the government in baghdad, not by the extremist shia or sunni and certainly not by iranian supported groups of any kind. i personally welcome international observers, to this election. this election must be free and without any interference. you may ask what is our vision after liberation? this will bring me to my third and final point. we need autonomy as a part of a strong federal iraq iraqi constitution spells out.

i want to be clear. i want to keep iraq as a unified and federal country. and to always follow the constitution of iraq. the articles under our constitution our 119 120 121 your these articles explain how the provinces in iraq become a region. we just want to undertake what our constitution intended the people of the province have the right to do. the autonomy must be in two states. first, geographical for ninewah province, and second, the original. remember these words of the iraq

constitution when you hear anybody or anything from anybody alleging that i want to split up iraq. i believe authority in iraq should be split up, but not iraq itself. we need to have -- which will have a double effect. i mentioned she is sunni and kurds -- shia sunni and kurds and also protect minorities. i believe this will transcend the unity of iraq, first

geographically in ninewah province. the geographic autonomy will be at least will have at least three effects. this will give the sunni community its own autonomy when with its own special prosecution. this autonomy will protect minorities within ninewah province. and autonomy will help of baghdad with the rights of the people of ninewah province. we tried in the past to follow up the constitution steps but unfortunately, prime minister

maliki adopted his position. the second stage i envisioned navy ninewah province with saddam. with the krg and other sunni provinces about their own relation under the umbrella of the iraqi constitution. in conclusion, i want the people of mosul first be involved in the creation of their city. second, to have a chance to choose their own representatives. third, to get chance to vote in the future according to the iraqi constitution. these people choose the future will be bright.

thank you for listening. i welcome your questions and look forward to our discussion. thank you. [applause] >> you guys are getting mic up thank you, governor, thank you dr. rafe. this is a terrific presentation. in fact, he managed to cover my first four or five questions. that's actually terrific thing. i want to spend the bulk of my time with you talking about in particular, governor, what you talk about the end but also dr. rafe from what you talking about them with a future iraqi relationship, political relationship might look like. but before do that i want to go back to point the point that dr. rafe raised in his terrific presentation. you made the point come and governor, feel free to disagree

with this this dvd but i've essential agree with this, certainly the impression of what washington.com isn't that the problem is not al-badi pursued. he wants to do the right thing and that would service the impression it left here in washington, that the very much knows where iraq needs to go and wants to do it. the problem is not the what. the problem is with the help of if that is something you both agree with i would love to get her thoughts on how you believe that the united states might help them to better actually achieve those goals. rafe which are like to start? >> figured much begin to this is a very broad, very good question. look ken and ladies and gentlemen, talking about inherited avery dennison political security situation in and he's a good guy, yes, i

agree with you. he needs to be supported both americans, both sunnis and she is i agree. but until this won't the problem of the government has not implemented. some of the stores like amnesty talks about six months, for example. now nothing took place. as it comes to all of the points of consideration, said it. yes, i agree we should help president about it. americans can help to rebuild iraqi secret forces that i talk about. because without building national city forces companies iraq would -- by isis another site and this is the story of arming sunnis. web arming sunnis would defy director the question is is iraq divided now? we want to bring back united iraq by farming sunnis.

so helping him and dismantling militias on the shia side bringing back a state of law, supporting it in et cetera in the process of arming iraq and the fighters, according to our suggestion of his comity. because the centers keep saying look, what if we push there, what do we do to the sunni fighters? the question is do you see? this is not justification. you cannot keep saying putting question mark on everything. you have to trust people are fighting isis. dismantling militias, but all the resources of all iraqis supporting them in fighting isis supporting iraqis in national guard. we agreed upon local forces on

the ground in ninewah, in anbar and local. i the way on the southern provinces also. the public is national guard is not yet. these are the main problems americans can no. finally on the composition, americans can work also to support abadi. very difficult for government to cover all the huge number of displaced people. >> governor atheel? >> i believe in the unity of the stronger groups. i think iraq will not be united if we have one group. ..

does the u.s. have a role to play in fostering that process the bracket litigation? again, we see people like you people talking about the process of reconciliation. we don't see it happening. is there more can be done? should the u.s. be doing more? >> the reconciliation in iraq especially when some of the shiite get the ability, they then want to lose there. so they want the reconciliation

to keep their authority, their power in their hands and it cannot be reconciliation like that. if we are talking within a real reconciliation as i said, we need him the other groups to give them the freedom to choose their representatives so they would he in balance the others. that is what we are talking about in action. we need elections, which are getting all of this napa -- and soon he may not be involved in that election, so we would have all of the community inside the political process. >> governor, if i could just follow-up on that. do you worry if there were elections in iraq at this time that the shia militias would capture a huge number?

when we do these elections? >> it will happen in the shia conferences. but we can also use or change the law, the election law negates any part with a big list feared we can get the representative from each portion in iraq. >> at the situation keeps going the militia withdraw all the political tuition. south shia provinces and the sunni promises. the legalization institution -- it looks like for all iraqis -- let us offer an assessment of that are repaired from 2009 or

2004, the air bill agreement with the reconciliation. let us assess from 2010 until now. -- prime minister in speaker. the reconciliation also has been out that the process. so this story is not to shout. the stories to implement the agreement. i have the chops over the program for the government. it is such an excellent one presented by mr. abadi to the parliament. it is the timing. it talks about reconciliation security forces or the iraqi nationals and the control of the

government to mention the program. the question is implemented and then there is law. >> is always in iraq that is the issue. there is no shortage of the right ideas. >> there is one who is looking for a solution. they are in iraq come to listing/. >> let's move on a little bit because i want to live time for questions from the audience as well. i'd now like to come to this great issue that is looming ahead of us. it is not the issue in front of us. the expulsion of whether it is going to be on bar or mosul very spirit first is the critical nature of the future iraqi state in the future iraqi state in

which all of its communities can feel comfortable. we invited you here because we were hoping that you could as well if anyone gave us a sense of how the sunni community is thinking about that kind of problems. i cannot see to speak to six or 7 million sunnis, but i've got to ask someone to do that because i can't fit them all in this room. nor they come nor would they get these as if we invited them. i will stay with you governor because he covered in such wonderful detail in your remarks. how fast you get a sense of what you think that future iraqi state will look like. he spoke today. he spoken in the past about the importance of decentralization of authority but nevertheless within a strong federal system. that sounds exactly like the devil is in the details.

help us understand the details. what kinds of powers are you thinking about there should be devolved from the federal government, the central government to the region. how would that work? i'll ask you to do the same after the governor. please start us off. >> maybe we can get -- i think the political life there is no problems even between the enemies. now they become all of us. and they can solve their problems in side their autonomy. but maybe there is another problem with some of them. i think dividing the authorities inside a province like anbar i will not say sunni region, but maybe it will happen in the

anbar after that, after negotiation with them. but anyway, i think we can solve our problems. we can get our security. we can get our suitable political life inside that province. it would redefine over mediation. it would be that there is not any event or in a problems happening from this province to baghdad, but they can create their reconciliation between their people easily. maybe there are some problems with some parties over the shia with those in mosul. it is easier to solve the province and we can get i believe that iraq will stay in

their problems until it becomes a country which will get its autonomy, the raids to arrange their problems in side the province. >> several follow-ups, but to you first. >> the dilemma presented, is that participation -- demonstration trumps calling for a region occupation divination. all of this confidence building needs not promises to go into a

plan and details of how to restore, but no one can trust the others. all of these things on the constitutional lingo. so this is one good section on the authorities and what it would look like. in fact everyone is talking about implementing the constitution. there is a central figure of government authority. there is regional authorities and there is a shared or mix of authorities between the two. respecting the constitution is a guarantee. >> when he asked the first follow-up to start with you. i'll start with your views as well. as you are painfully in personally aware one of the

problems with the current and federal the current federal system is that we have had a corruption of the justice process and key sunni leaders present company included have been targeted by the federal government using that judicial system. how would she think about a future iraqi system that would prevent that from happening? how do we go about creating an iraq in which you and others can't be personally targeted by the system? >> all iraqis whether to select, to live together, to race back the authorities coming out for sure there is an appearance in the issues. america and everything is damaged, so you have to restructure the point.

so it means you have to build again. on the corruption side, which is in the security of the institutions the militia took money. that is why i said the challenge to restart again depends upon to rebuild iraq and everyone keep only observing over you may keep meeting or giving promises about implementation. >> governor comment anything on the judicial system? >> all the province may be solved easier if we are near the people not far away from the people. not starting everything from

baghdad they have no concern with what happened in mosul or with anbar, what the people of anbar want. they want to mosul and anbar to belong to them, not to follow the problems were the corruption in their city. that is what happened before the corruption was too much. they didn't care with that corruption. they care that the people must belong to them. so i think dividing the authorities as i said and we can see the dividing if there is a problem between some of the kurdish and baghdad. there is not real problems

inside. >> thank you. governor, i want to shift to another specific aspect of future iraq the u.n. particular raised. you said no girl several times at the k. archie should be a model. that is helpful because it's one we can really get our hands around and understand. but that's also a very big statement and i want to ask you about a couple specific aspect starting with the military and security side. do you believe as you've kind of implied that with the iraqi, sunni arabs are looking for in iraq is a situation where the military and security forces of the provinces of the regions are separate from the iraqi central army •-center-dot vision, do you think it would be able to have

army unit in the sunni province of it they have to be split just as the kr g and the patchwork of were responsible for security responses and the army of the central government is more or less out of the krg. >> maybe i will have a difference between two securities. the security for the provinces must be managed inside the province. there is no need to interfere with the local security in the province. but there is also another security, which is the iraq security and not of course we need. so we don't like that. even in our provinces we like to have the iraqi army but this must not involved in local

security and it must not involve with the people inside the province. >> perhaps tradition between the ministry of interior forces and defense forces. >> the constitution really clarifies the relationship between security forces. for anyone in 2008 only talking about the governors to call for federal forces if there is a real threat or security situation in the province. if the security situation is good, it is not enough. to send a federal army is not accepted but also the constitutions localized how to do it and the law is implemented now. they can only authorize one. so this is the way of connect to

them is very helpful. >> limited down to another level of detail. as we say here where the rubber meets the road money. do you believe that sunni arabs would envision in this future iraqi system one where the sunni provinces or individual regions would have their own budget separate from the federal budget or would they remain part of it? going back to the krg model with a separate budget is simply has a revenue-sharing arrangement with baghdad. >> i think the constitution explains that very well. we need to get our budget according to the population of the province and all of the autonomy so he can follow the

constitution. >> governor, having been governor are there specific items that right now are handled at the federal government that you think would be better handled by the provinces by the regions again thinking about a future iraq in which the sunnis felt more comfortable? >> an example of the last year according to the constitution it must skate either then% of the iraqi budget. surely we don't get more than 1%. and that is i think one of the bigger problems that make it in the province. >> also related constitution. being a former minister of

finance, part of the budget -- [inaudible] in the constitution although it is called regional development budget now that is called a regional development budget which is an investment budget. [inaudible] part of the investment they've put it in the major player name to the province. the budget is according to now as part the central government. if it is a region which is different from the province. >> to follow up with that your expectation is he would move to be there a single sunni region or to multiple regions. >> almost all sooner you start talking about regions going

geographic. >> so for different regions. >> so anbar in mosul. -- but unfortunately they didn't. >> let me ask you i'm her question and then i will open it up to the audience. i want to ask you what i think is a hard question but maybe you'll disagree. what are the obvious differences between the krg and the sunni provinces is oil. the krg has oil and it is difficult. it is very difficult, but it's conceivable and we've seen it happen for bag bad to have a negotiation with the krg over which way the revenue flows which way the oil flows. as all of you know there is not

a lot at this moment of oil in the sunni dominated provinces of iraq. how do you go to the shia dominated provinces of iraq and say to them we want you to continue to give this our share of the total budget is but we are going to be more independent. we are going to be less reliant. i understand your arguments, but i'm now asking a practical political question. you know what the reaction is on the other side. how are you going to convince them that this is worth doing for them? would you like to start? >> object be the constitution. the constitution gives the right to his own region. so on a probation model is the constitution. so it includes the right to the

region. so we change into a religious constitution. the constitution is talking about iraq is. so curtis van or pasta -- kurdistan belongs to all iraqis. not to say we are looking for independent sinuous sticking to our own oil. oil and anbar and all the investment. distribution of wealth is constitutional. it should be distributed according to population's number. not regional province. whether it be in a province from that point is the constitution. >> the idea is to respect the

constitution. for more than one partner. >> i think the same problem in the shia provinces not only with the sunni. they think that they must get more benefit -- >> is that their oil? >> on the other side, our provinces we have another benefit, which makes this united. not just living. so i believe if we in past in our benefits they know that

there's a lot of benefits to be inside iraq. even if they have will oil revenue. it is not enough to protect themselves, to have this security, to have a good relation. so it has multiple benefits that we need each other. >> okay. i would like to take some and it questions from the audience. time is short so i will take about six questions and we will put all of them to our speakers and give them the opportunity to respond collectively to all of them are whichever one they would like to speak to. i will go around the room this way. i start with the lady over there. please keep your questions brief and please keep them ask questions.

and if you could introduce yourself -- identify yourself to speakers. >> thank you from above. kelley kelley jones, refugee officer with security. there's a lot of discussion of dismantling militias and both of you spoke about problems with militias and if they are worried about other people would be voting militias in and the ways in which the militias are currently connect it to the government and could you address how to address these problems and trying to dismantle militias in the future. try to keep it brief. >> we will go back there. >> good morning. jason campbell with the rand corporation in washington. going back to the first question about prime minister abadi who is advocating for your support rather than focusing with the u.s. can do, given the political

forces currently in baghdad seem to be successful at holding their implementation, what will be the catalyst to see more support with the programs implemented in the future? >> i will take one in the back. >> i want to know the situation for your city and the christian and iraq. mr. al-issawi mentioned a little bit about. i would like to know if they are going to be safe and secure in the future or if we are gone from the region. thank you. >> right in front of me, marshall. >> i'm a resident at the atlantic council. my question is talking about militias of the group, but a big part of it is not pro-iranian and also has a very national

program. is there a way to cooperate with these groups and use them maybe to bypass the pro-iranian shabby ? >> recently prime minister said to -- but her thoughts on that in the next steps to include the sunnis in the security courses? >> one more right here in front waiting very patient. >> thank you very much. i am with the pakistani-american lake. first of all i would say the high level of turmoils i felt it i'm listening to the story of two survivors. one of your main concerns has

been the credibility gap and basically you're asking -- i wanted to ask you, is the face of iraq become more secular in nature of the democracy or is it more secular in nature before democracy? part 2 is what do you think the timeframe -- when do you anticipate iraq and the people of iraq will start with the democracy? >> excellent question. please feel free to address any or all. >> when i keep talking about dismantling militia, the constitution and talking about the previous militia and the

regime. so that model is a new creative militia would be very clear to the problem. that is when talking about dismantling. it is to offer recruitment and on a personal background. so there is hundreds or thousands headed by a beater to intervene because we keep obeying the orders. suffered tens of thousands of the militia persons. the same thing is true for the sunni and to fight outside the institution and the rule of law. so this is dismantling and accepting the local or personal labor. >> for the program of mr. abadi,

yes. he is working and he is trying to make a change and we are committed to help him. keep promising without implementation we will come again as a country. i don't need to come again. i hope the final picture presented would come later on. but none partisan security forces can be done nationwide by iraqis supported by americans. programming, training, equipment. time is important because we cannot have more time on the militia side. i am really sorry i didn't mention that simply because there's a humanitarian. i am sure as was