expect recommend you want to explore the second is a good are critical for maintaining a robust nuclear industry. the enormous growth in china's nuclear power generation represents a major opportunity for u.s. business and one that have already taken advantage of. the reactors the united states is building in china already creating high quality jobs in the united states come including in my home state of maryland. ..

remain problematic. multiple state department reports document chinese companies and individuals to continue export dual use goods relevant to nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs in and around north korea. year after year individuals have been sanctioned related to efforts to proliferate weapons of mass destruction. what is preventing the chinese in taking action against the come to me if and individuals identified to them. i would like to hear whether the proliferation record was addressed during negotiations. this agreement presents us with a golden opportunity to place pressure on china to hold these dangerous activities.

the second set of concerns focused on plans to export nuclear power plant based upon technology provided by westinghouse under a deal signed 2007. to transfer to china. then kris exporting reactors with the markets the united states used to have. the transfer of the most advanced u.s. technologies may provide china the keys were dominated the world nuclear power industry. that could cost jobs. i'd be interested in the witness his analysis as to what the future holds in regard to the u.s. company's ability to dominate the international market on reactors. china's decision to continue building power react is in pakistan. pakistan does not have safeguarded actions by the international agency and has not

been approved as a recipient saved by the nuclear suppliers group. china argues its contracts in pakistan when placed a agreed to abide by the rules of the nuclear suppliers group. however china makes plans to export nuclear reactors, reactors based upon u.s. technologies to other countries, one has to wonder about the commitment to non-proliferation standards. all of concerns about safety. safety and the chinese nuclear plants. i know we've worked extensively in the regulatory safety regimes but i'm concerned nothing in the agreement squarely addresses the issue of the next fukushima or chernobyl happening in china. china is building a fleet bigger than any other in the world. china is an authoritarian country which has a history of problems and regulatory structure. although we can never make nuclear power 100% safe commotion started to make them as resilient as possible to

natural vulnerability for national security threats. these are all issues that need to be addressed so we can weigh the pluses and minuses. but the risk that there is into such an agreement with china. >> senator trained to commit thank you your leadership. last night we had an extensive classified briefing that i know we still want to hear the comments made. why don't we just adjourn vote and come back and then finish wherefore art review not another issue. i think that would be best. if you want an object sorry for start a few minutes late but that is best for you. okay. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> thank you for your patience. i know we have a very good and extensive briefing last evening and i know a number of members are here. i will introduce you to let you begin your public statements. i apologize for the late start in a direction. our first witness is at witness is that the honorable thomas m. countryman who serves as assistant secretary for international security and non-proliferation. in this capacity, mr. countryman leads the bureau at the head of the u.s. suffered to prevent the spread of nuclear chemical and biological weapons. and related materials and

delivery systems that we appreciate many appearances both here but also on the phone and other places. a second witness lieutenant general frank klotz, u.s. air force retired currently serves as undersecretary of energy for nuclear security administrator at the national nuclear security administration. this capacity is responsible for the judgment and operation of an essay as well as minors across the department of energy and nsa with president about ms. nuclear agenda appeared prior to his service at the department of energy, general klotz serves 38 years on a variety of national security relevant to today's discussion. thank you both for being here and sharing your thoughts. your false statements will be entered into the record without objection. be as brief as you wish and we look forward to answering our questions and again appreciate

you being here. >> chairman corker, ranking member cardin members said the committee. thank you for the opportunity to continue in open session the briefings and consultations have had with members and staff from these negotiations began continuing through the initially right up to the signature in admission of this agreement to the senate. this agreement advances the primary goal we have been every one to three agreement which is strengthening the law standing non-proliferation policy of successive administrations. and also has important commercial and diplomatic benefits that i will talk to only briefly since you have my prepared statement. the u.s. relationship with china is one of the most important and complex relationships in the

world. this administration's approach to china combines building high-quality cooperation on a range of bilateral regional and global issues constructively managing differences. he sold nuclear cooperation is a key example of that type of cooperation and this agreement is in the best interest of the united states. this agreement is not a favor that we gave to china by that china gets to us. it is in the mutual interest of both countries. like all 123 agreement that is a framework within which decisions on exported to knowledge and materials are made. screen that contains all the u.s. non-proliferation guarantees required by the atomic energy act peaceful use assurances can the physical protection assurances come a u.s. storage retransfer enrichment and reprocessing on u.s. obligated serial. it contains enhanced features beyond those contained in the

curry u.s.-china 123 agreement. china's non-proliferation record has improved markedly since 198-5123 agreement. they can do better than we expect it to do better in the non-proliferation field. implementing this agreement will better position the united states took an indian to influence the government in a positive direction on non-proliferation objectives. the current agreement has allowed in this agreement will continue to facilitate deepened cooperation on prayer production export control border security, nuclear safety in nuclear security norms. this agreement also as economic benefits. china has the fastest-growing nuclear energy program in the world. it constitutes one third of the global market in civilian nuclear energy.

suppliers are there now and they are keen to play an even larger role in the chinese market appeared these opportunities could support 10 of thousands of high-paying american jobs in the u.s. nuclear industry strongly supports this agreement. senator cardin noted committee agreed that can help both of us to deploy non-fossil-based energy sources to address global climate change. last year president obama as president she announced their respective post 2020 climate targets. china believes the large-scale development of civilian nuclear power is key to meeting these targets of their commitments reinforced opportunities for u.s. suppliers chinese market appeared on the other hand of civil nuclear cooperation with china lapses are influence on

chinese practices in non-proliferation and other fields will be placed in serious jeopardy. who lives inside it to the civil program. vacuum of cooperation will be fielded by other suppliers who do not have the same approach as the united states of non-proliferation and technology transfer concerns. china would do such a lapses evidence that the u.s. is less willing will engage china on a high level of important commercial, energy and security related issues. we believe that the strategic non-proliferation economic and environmental benefits of this agreement crews continue nuclear cooperation is in our best interest. we have no illusions about the challenges of working with china in nuclear energy or any other field but we must remain

engaged. i must constructively manage our difference and work collaboratively to advance the numerous objectives we have in common. the passage of the agreement is the best way to continue to influence and benefit from the world's largest nuclear market. thank you, mr. chairman. >> general. >> chairman corker, ranking member cardin and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the department of energy on the proposed agreement for peaceful nuclear agreement. i'm pleased to join tom countryman. i have provided a written statement so i will be brief and summarizing what is enough. first let me note the secretary of energy mummies and i share the thoughts expressed by tom countryman this morning and share their view the proposed agreement provides a comprehensive framework for nuclear cooperation with china

while fully protecting and advancing u.s. interests and policy objectives with respect to nuclear non-proliferation peaceful uses of nuclear energy. as the department of energy supports wars of the agreement following requisite congressional review period. this agreement is fully consistent with the law and incorporates all the terms required by section 123 of the atomic energy act. moreover it reflects advances over the current agreement several of which we discussed during classified briefings to both members and staff of this committee. specifically the success agreement and the provisions under which we allow china to enrich process nuclear obligated material by requiring such enrichment and reprocessing take place only at facilities in china that fallen her their international atomic energy agency safeguards agreement. it also provides controls in the

export of nuclear technology to china can convince both sides, the united states and china to deliver export control training to u.s. and chinese entities under the 123 agreement. taken together these elements not included in 1985 agreement provide an unprecedented level of insight into commercial transactions. since the preceding 123 agreement was signed 30 years @transactions. since the preceding 123 agreement was signed 30 years ago, we've witnessed china makes strides in the program. as secretary countryman pointed out, china has 20 nuclear power plants and operations, over 20 under construction in dozens more are planned. is currently under construction. chat free excerpt news technology and equipment from the u.s. and other foreign

commercial companies for its civil nuclear program. we believe it is in the best interest of the united states to support u.s. industries ability to compete in this fast growing and expanding market. american civil nuclear companies already have numerous joint ventures in china as well as significant assets on the ground. they are also supplying china with equipment and components as well as a broad range of services including engineering construction and training. the success or 120 agreement will facilitate nuclear cooperation with china subject to u.s. government review a specific request to transfer nuclear technology information material, equipment and components. on the other hand if the agreement lapses or is not renewed u.s. entry would essentially be cut off constituting a potentially serious commercial threat to the overall health and well-being of our civil nuclear industry. u.s. industry would also be

precluded from taking an image of future opportunities in the world's fastest growing civil or your energy market. in addition to the economic benefits the successor 123 agreement will also serve as an umbrella for other forms of u.s.-china bilateral cooperation in promoting the important u.s. policy objectives with respect to enhancing nuclear safety in nuclear security around the world which directly supports u.s. national interest as well as those of our allies and partners. u.s.-china cooperation in the realm such as the 1998 u.s. peaceful uses of nuclear technology agreement has been absolutely and knowledgeable in this regard. in fact, last week senior u.s. officials met with chinese counterparts in chengdu under the offices of the pond joint coordinating committee. they discussed issues the

ranking member discuss concerns about including not only nuclear technology of the security, safeguards, environmental concerns, waste management emergency management and security of radiological sources. the u.s. participants have reported to be they had unique and unprecedented access to a number of construction scientific and academic sites in china. this level of interaction and access is only possible because of the value china places on having a one to three agreement with the united states and the desire to cooperate with the most advanced, safest and most reliable program in the world. without force of the successor agreement with is a critical mechanism for influencing china's non-proliferation behavior appeared with a loose economic advantages and we lose the insight we have been to china's nuclear programs including its nuclear research and development. mr. chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear today.

look forward to answering any questions you are the committee members may have. >> thank you both. i appreciate what you do for our country. yesterday evening you mention y'all were going to make public comments as to why this is good for nation and certainly didn't disappoint. let me ask you a question. i know we've talked about this and other settings. end quote. china strategy involved the acquisition of foreign technology as well as a greater civil military integration of both elements how potential to decrease development and accelerate military modernization. i made that in my opening comment. there's no question that we understand going in there while we are doing here the chinese regardless of what they say are utilizing this to accelerate their military development. is that correct? >> what i would say if there is

no doubt based on historical record that china will make every attempt to benefit from technology transfer weathered the economic or commercial or military field. our job, which only begins with this 123 agreement that is actually carried out to the licensing procedure is to frustrate the effort. we have every intention of doing so is believed to have the means to do so. >> now that we've established that, in fact that this is going to happen, you mentioned our involvement with them would help cost proliferation not to occur. i would like to ask a question. are they are chemically interested destination. forget the fact enduring business we champion non-proliferation and other

issues. organically, do you believe china cares about non-proliferation and nuclear safety? >> the short answer is yes. i believe china takes far more seriously than it did 30 years ago or even 10 years ago its obligation under the non-proliferation treaty as a member of the nuclear suppliers group and other fields as well. they take it seriously. i can't say they yet have a level of political equipment that will make of them to spend the resources you need to affect only control the export from the second biggest economy in the world a very high-tech economy and one that they do not have a long track record in controlling experts as effectively as the u.s. and other nations. they believe they are trying to

make it a higher of political equipment to meet the standards to which they aspire. >> in the past when they've had these types of agreements of course we had the gold standard agreement that we like to stick to. we typically don't give advanced consent for enrichment and reprocessing. the first agree that we had an 85 that wasn't implemented until 98 didn't do that. can you explain to us and to the american people why this particular case we decided to give advanced consent? >> china is a nuclear weapons state under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. and arty processes in richmond and reprocessing facilities. there is not a logical region nor would there be a practical effect to prevent china from enrichment and reprocessing.

the >> and under the nuclear suppliers group guidelines is china upholding those? i know we had issues relative to the nuclear plant in pakistan. could you talk with us about that and whether they are pondering the msg guidelines? >> when china became a member of the nuclear suppliers group there was a consensus for the other members to grandfather construction of plants in pakistan which china has initiated. however, there was not agreement that was an open-ended clause. the problem is china has said the nun study power plant that it intends to build in pakistan and this is not consistent with the rules that the nuclear suppliers group which it joined. we raised the issue as a bilateral issue and within the context of the nuclear suppliers group.

the >> said they are not honoring the msg guidelines. we know for a fact that they will take even though these agreements they say you cannot take the simple nuclear agreement and is it to move a lot more swiftly a military development. we know they are going to do that. if you would step back. i know this is a way for a former u.s.-based country company and others through the supply chain to enhance their business and not easily create u.s. jobs. the ku sat back talk about why this is all interest question or >> yes sir. jobs are important. my responsibility is to ensure

that we promote the highest standards of non-proliferation policy in the world and modest by successive administrations have done the strong congressional support for decades. we would not have concluded this agreement if i were not satisfied this was the best way to improve china's record on non-proliferation to maintain our capabilities to have influence on iraq. that is the very short answer. frank may want to add to this. >> if i could, mr. chairman the fact that we have an agreement like this and hopefully will have a successor agreement also allows us to engage in dialogue and discussion with the chinese on a variety of different venues on a variety of different firms. for instance with discussions

of the mentioned earlier the coordinating committee on a whole host of safety, security emergency response issues. we have the opportunity to discuss issues of nuclear smuggling detection. we been involved in the business of educating and training people on export controls. we've helped in the development of a center of excellence that will be training in the area of safeguards and security. so it is the longest various avenues which we engage bad not just the insight we gain through commercial interaction that help move them along on issues associated with non-proliferation and think the security of safeguards. >> look, i know that the initial input as we are walking through the from staff is you are all dealing with bad movie drooling on the positive side. i do want to say that i

understand the desire to continue to be involved with other countries with our supreme nuclear technology. i do think there are important reasons for us to do so. i do hope as we move through the process again will realize we are dealing with a country that plans to sap all of our technology and move totally to indigenous methods of doing this as quickly as possible. that they are going to use this to develop their military. this is the third time i will say it but develop their military more quickly and that they are not honoring the 50 nuclear suppliers group guidelines. i understand it is economically driven. we have a lot of companies that have bought themselves a view towards these agreements. i hope as we move through this will take into account all of the liabilities and benefits

that come with it in a thank you for your service to our country and with that are distinguished member, senator menem does. >> thank you, mr. chairman. secretary countryman, in the last few years china's non-proliferation policies remain from my view problematic here chinese companies and individuals continue to export dual use goods relevant to nuclear and chemical weapons and ballistic missile programs to iran and north korea. numerous chinese individuals and companies have been sanctioned for those that could ease. were these issues addressed during our negotiations to renew the 123 agreement? >> i have addressed these issues constantly in the three and a half years i've been on this job. not in the context of the one to three negotiations but in the context of a number of regular

dialogue. >> i appreciate that. but in the context of the 123 agreement there were not addressed? >> no. >> is not an opportunity for china to halt these activities? >> as i said, with price for a stronger performance at all times, not just the middle of the negotiation. did this offer additional leverage? if this were a giveaway program perhaps. but it is one that provides mutual benefit to both countries and provides a foundation within which we can cooperate on difficult issues. >> clearly it is something china wants as much as we do. or do we want to bore than china wants? >> i don't know. we should have frank if he wants to comment. i think both of us recognize that failure to renew this agreement would have repercussions throughout the bilateral relationship. both countries are fully aware of that.

>> me ask you a different question if the congress were to play certification condition on licenses for the export of new reactors beyond the four already licensed to the effect that the government of china is fully and completely cooperating with u.s. requests to halt and prosecute the actions by chinese companies to export technology and equipment for ballistic missiles to iran and north korea. with the administration makes the certifications? >> it is the first time i've heard of the idea. i have to look at the back details. the chinese government is making an offer. i don't believe the effort is yet sufficient. >> you said before that you have raised these questions come at these issues a series of times outside of the 123. it would seem to me that you would be deeply engaged in the knowledge as to whether or not the administration could go

ahead and certify the u.s. requests to halt and prosecute actions by chinese companies to export technology and equipment for ballistic missiles to iran and north korea would be able to be made. so from the knowledge you have from all the time you've raised this with the chinese do you believe that we could do such a provision that the certification could be made to that effect? >> i'd have to look at the exact language. but i could say now sue and certify an improving trend that the chinese have been responsive to us on a number of cases they've raised but i could not certify 100% satisfaction. >> so we have your words an improving trend, but we don't have what we needed. why wouldn't such a certification requirement be

useful for the administration's efforts to persuade china to halt these activities? >> he would not be useful if there were absolute. neither china nor a number of other countries with whom we work intensively on such issues are 100% efficient in effect given one-person efforts. if the standard were absolute i'm not sure which country would be able to meet it. >> well, you know, i understand some countries where there is a strong private sector that develops its own technology and proliferate in that respect. china is a command and control country. it is not like you raised your hand they want to go a different way. seems to me that this is a real concern. let me ask you this. curtiss wright corporation

produces the pumps that cool the reactors which propel u.s. naval submarine. they also produce a scaled up version for the ap 1000 reactors westinghouse is selling to china. could china reverse engineer the pumps they are receiving from westinghouse for their own nuclear submarine program as the chinese military seeking to divert the civilian nuclear technologies to its naval reactor program? do you have any problems on that? >> i do they discussed it in my next briefing is. >> sleeping on the response that in in a classified setting. >> i would be wiser, yes. >> weiser is necessary. >> weiser is one thing. necessary is another. >> not only necessary, but someone more expert than me on the topic. >> will have to go through that. one last question.

what measures have been built into the agreement to prevent china from exporting nuclear technology to countries that are proliferation risk because china says it will abide by the nuclear suppliers group's rules for exporters but it's already violating these rules through its continuing work on pakistani reactors. >> the agreement prohibits the transfer of any u.s. provided technology to another country without u.s. consent. but it is already violating these rules through its continuing work on pakistani reactors. there is a difference between violating nsg rules in the chinese to say their action as a matter of interpretation rather than violation. the difference between night and violating a one to three agreement by this agreement unlike the agreement replaces

has a specific clause that calls for temporary suspension or permanent suspension in case of violation. >> in your testimony dermot testimony you talk about appearance in our global non-proliferation objective. i begin to wonder what exactly does far and can they be mitigated as we wish them to be instead of having a clear active. of course i am concerned about the wii are doing with their brand but i am concerned we seem to be able to look the other way when we want to. i'm trying to figure out what our nuclear non-proliferation objectives are and how much of a standard we are truly setting in the world. i was always an admirer that it was about actually stopping nuclear proliferation not managing it.

increasingly when i see a testimony like this, i get the sense we move away from stopping it, preventing it to managing it and not the will of the world. thank you, mr. chairman. >> you bring an interesting point when they know they will violate the civil military peace. are they going to violate this other piece? senator johnson. >> secretary countryman, to the chairman's question you did say china was committed to non-proliferation. is that correct? >> that is the short answer. >> it sounds like not a real accurate one. >> and fall short answers are, yes, sir. >> he said they are not controlling exports of nuclear technology. is that because they are unable or unwilling? >> verse i have to disagree that china is a command-and-control economy. it has a vibrant private dirt.

it is something of a wild western term of being free from government regulation and government control and in particular the high spec your does aggressively seek other markets in a number and chinese businessmen seek the opportunity to be brokers between north korea or iran and producers in china and elsewhere in there are/brokers and other countries besides china. fsr assessment the chinese government simply does not have currently the bureaucratic capability and does not have all the legislation it out to have in order to adequately controlled dual exports. >> so your answer is they are unable to control the export. >> my answer is they have not yet committed the resources that would be necessary for an economy of that size and sophistication.

>> how difficult would it be and how many resources would it take? >> sorry, i don't have a short answer to that problem. >> you seem to indicate in your testimony if we don't move forward in provide technology delegate it someplace else and we will be on the out of the cunanan was whatever influence they have. what are the alternatives in terms of supply? >> senator, there are a number of different countries which are in this market space. countries that immediately come to mind are russia, france south korea japan, all of which are looking for opportunities to pick up on the growing interest in using nuclear energy to solve energy demands in a number of countries but also as has been pointed out to move to cleaner types of energy to do with concerns about global climate change. so we are one of the most

sophisticated, one of the most effective in terms of civil nuclear industry, but there are other competitors out there. >> how advanced our technology compared to other competitors? are we above? is it comparable? >> i think we are a cut above the sophisticated in terms of technology and the french, russians are succeeding in making sales of not only full reactors but also important components and services for civil industry around the world. >> are we a cut above significantly and has that kind of that significance is it significant from a standpoint of military conversion? >> in terms of military conversion, one of the things we look carefully at under the existing one to three agreement and one of the things that will

be strengthened is to look very carefully at the information, the technology, materials, components which we as a government will review it before we give approval for that to be transferred to china. one of the other things that comes up in a successor agreement is the fact that both sides sit down annually review the inventory they shared a newest technologies and determine whether or not that odd to be renewed. we go into the with eyes wide open and understanding the potential risk but also balancing the potential benefit of being in this important and expanding market. >> from the private sector participating 30 years, exporting china whether we should have started an operation in china. i witnessed repeatedly chinese

come means reverse engineer takeover manufacturers themselves to i would assume that would be at risk. how quickly do you believe china could become self-sufficient? >> i don't have a good answer on that senator. there's a lot of variables involved in the process in terms moving forward. our assumption is even a day eventually start to manufacture more and more capability indigenously, there will still be able for u.s. industry in the history of other countries to participate in producing particular component that are necessary to provide an after sales services both domestically in china and in those countries to which china might export reactor technology. >> changing the direction a

little bit secretary countryman can you tell me what china's attitude is for the advancement of north korea for their capabilities? >> very briefly, china says and i think his worn out by their actions that they do not support north korea tested nuclear weapons state and they wish to see the entire korean peninsula denuclearized good i don't know about long-ago history, but in recent years no indication that china is assisting the north korean nuclear weapons program. >> i have no further questions. >> senator mark d. who is no stranger to this issue. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you are having this hearing. back in 1985 i was chairman of

the energy subcommittee in charge of the regulatory committee and the nuclear regulatory commission department of energy so that they played a role in the construction of the 1995 agreement. but i work for is the imposition of two conditions before implementation. first is the preparation of reports examining alliteration risks in second presidential certification that china was following non-proliferation policies and practices. during the consideration might argue the agreement carried high risk of the condition were in fact not as strong as they could have been, but at least minimal medication standards for non-proliferation concerns. the reagan administration efforts to comply with the agreement commission revealed substantial chinese proliferation risk.

the agreement was shelved until 1978 ministrations certified china was not proliferating technology in the photo to implement the agreement. again i disagree because of concern about chinese proliferation to pakistan and iran at the time to gather with the bipartisan group of members of congress i attempted to prevent the agreement going forward and here we are today as there were in 1985 and 89 and 96 97 98. i.t. concerns whether china is complied with the current 123 agreement and other non-proliferation commitments. concerns have been raised that china may be diverting u.s. nuclear power technology to its nuclear naval program. for such a transfer violated the peaceful use provisionprovision s of the 1985 nuclear cooperation agreement?

>> yes, both the current agreement and the successor agreement would be a violation. >> during the 1990s china supply iran with uranium and both the intelligence community and state department has expressed continuing concern the chinese government and private entities have proliferated technologies concerning an related to nuclear weapons to countries of concern. a glaring example of private-sector proliferation is in the spotlight, also known as coral lee who has been designated, sanctioned and intended by the united states as a serial proliferator nuclear weapons related to lg. china has given repeated assurances they are investigating but reportedly have not taken enforcement action in this case. my question is can you confirm the united states government including the state department

no longer believe entities in china sell dual use technologies are technologies that could assist its nuclear weapons development for delivery systems to north korea or other countries. >> no. >> you cannot. >> second, in light of the case, do you believe china versus non-proliferation requirements on public and private chinese factories to the same standard as the u.s. does? >> no. >> in may 2014, 5 members of the chinese military were indicted on charges of hacking u.s. company systems and stealing trade secrets. the stats occurred in 2010 and 2011 and included information related to the westinghouse ap 1000 nuclear reactor during the identical time frame that tests were taking place the nuclear regulatory commission optimized dozens of chinese nationals to have honest guarded access to five years in power plants for

two months unescorted access to five u.s. nuclear power plants. i've been told by the commission that the matter remains by the department of justice. can you tell me whether any chinese nationals who were placed at u.s. nuclear reactors on escort had assisted her attempted to assist the members of the chinese military who were indicted. >> i am unable to answer a question on the connection between the two. i do know in terms of chinese visitors who were allowed access to operating nuclear power plants in the same way american experts are allowed access to chinese nuclear power plants, the nrc has corresponded several times on this and noted is essentially essentially not a matter of approval.

>> do you know if the investigation has been closed? >> i do not know that. >> can you give the committee a report on the status of the investigation and when they intent on closing the investigation? it is direct irrelevant to the treaty we are now considering. >> i want ever to get more information. >> i think it's very important. in 2013 dod reported to congress china is using computer network exploitation capability to support intelligence collection against the united states diplomatic economic and defense industrial base factors that support u.s. national defense programs. out like you tell me whether the chinese government entities have attempted to hack into the department of energy are the department of state. >> as discussed last night, we will give you information on that soon.

>> general. >> i agree we will provide you the information we have. >> i think it is very important so we understand whether or not they try to access nuclear weapons information from the department of energy are a paramilitary information that would need both energy and state, but also defense and other related agencies. so my concern here, mr. chairman, is that it is quite clear they are entities within china who continue to sell materials that could have dual use application into this international nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles marketplace the same way a.q. khan was doing amount of

pakistan. the gentleman who i referred to in others inside of china continue to do the same thing today. i think it is preposterous to conclude that the chinese government is incapable of shutting this down. i think it exists at the severance of the chinese government. i think it is absolutely critical safeguards be put in place to make sure that there are conditions attached to this agreement that ensure there is not a continued recurrence of dangerous activity that will come back to haunt our country and the world because of china's unwillingness to actually police the export of these dangerous to knowledge is into the hands of those we know will endanger the world if they gain access to it. i am not confident that i can support this agreement. i think it needs additional string name if we are going to be calm and in that the policy

we have right now it doesn't help china more than double hard to want certain nuclear missile non-proliferation agenda, which we put at the highest pinnacle of american public policy. thank you, mr. chairman. >> we look forward to your input in that regard and it is fascinating that our witness is clearly state china is in violation of the existing agreement and yet we are extending that agreement. senator perdue. >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you on the general and mr. secretary for your lifelong dedication and service to this country in thank you for your testimony last night in a classified environment. i will be very brief mr. chairman. i agree with senator markey. i've done business in china and if that is consistent with their strategic initiatives and check is, i believe they could lose

this. you have touched on several proliferation questions already so i won't belabor the point. in 97 china points, china points to the u.s. that it would not begin new nuclear projects in iran. 2011 worldwide threat assessment by the director of national intelligence listed national proliferation is a concern at that point. and 2011 the same threat assessment said north korea and entities in russia and china continue to sell technologies and component the middle east south asia buyer julia simkins for wmd and missile programs. the 2015th statement did not include similar language. could you give us again a highlight of your perception outcome in your assessment on the current proliferation activity in the region china is initiated between iran specifically north korea. >> that is just not an area that also the purview of the retail with. the issue in terms of chinese

sec committees and other parts of the world were properly falls under the state department. >> thank you here mr. secretary. >> i guess that is me. first to be clear, in 1997 agreement was about official chinese government support to the kiddies, research and development and activities in iran that could have contributed to a nuclear weapons program in iran in keeping with the terms of its pledge in 1997 china terminated those activities. the separate question of whether every entity in every crooked business in china has stopped attempting to sell dual use in north korea is a very different question. i agree that it requires

additional resources and additional political will in china in order to put a stop to such a disease. such a question from direct chinese government assistance to a nuclear per? not the question behind what we do here. or do business at babson proliferator do business with someone else and proliferate the engagement is a higher objective here. i get that. before we get to that point, is it not possible to enhance their detection capability? >> that's an extraordinarily important question, senator. i may give you one vignette. the department of energy and the nsa has had an export outreach program that relies upon the 123

agreement and upon framework i mentioned earlier that has been working since 2007 in china to train over 100 government officials each year from six different chinese agencies that have the various role to play in export control comment turtle compliance responsibilities. was also trained dozens of industry personnel and expert control comment turnout compliance and best practices and provide this access or 123 agreement comes into force, we expect to expand significantly the number of industry officials engaged in the trainer approach to drive home the non-diversion to peaceful and military purposes as outlined under the 123 agreement are issues the chinese have to focus on. again, if we are going to engage if we are going to

continue the journey of bringing the chinese morning to be considered to be the international norms and standards related to non-proliferation related to nuclear security and nuclear safety standards, it involves us in iraq to at the level technician in the plant managers and the scientist that actually have to carry out the work. we can't do that unless we have the legal framework that allows us to engage in those types of discussions. >> i understand. i have supported engagement over the last 40 years personally i agree with you technically that is a better way to go if in fact we influence the engagement. specifically naca p. 1400 react to her, this is one the chinese might reverse engineer off of one of our reactors. is there anyway -- what we

consider that a u.s. designed even though it was reverse engineered off of our design and with that, under the restrictions we have on our product? >> without talking about the specifics of that, it is ultimately up to industry to decide which of its technology, patents, trademarks it is willing to part with an essentially a commercial business deal. they have to make the business case for what makes the most sense in terms of immediate sale for in terms of what they expect to gather from the sale of spare parts or services down the road. what happens at the u.s. government level is all of the request to transfer a particular type of technology component material, know-how has to go through the department of

energy. we consult with the rest of government to take an eyes wide open and try to understand what the implications of that hour from our national security non-proliferation first active before that goes forward. under the new agreement any decisions along those lines will be published in the federal register and will take a waiting period to make sure we have dotted all the eyes and crossed the teeth with respect to technology transfer. >> on that one point, with respect to violation what can we do to bring them back into compliance if anything at all. >> within the terms of the new framework agreement, we have the right to raise it with the other party and to ultimately suspend the agreement if they are not satisfied with the response. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

>> very good question senator. ranking member trade to come in thank you so much. >> thank you. i thank you both are not only been here, but the important public service you provide people of the country. these are extremely important issues. i am somewhat troubled by why there was not an effort made in the negotiations to deal with cooperation from china in regards to proliferation to iran and north korea by chinese companies. we all acknowledge that there are chinese companies that are violating the international norms on transfer of material and equipment to north korea and iran. we spent a great deal of effort to prevent a man from a nuclear weapons state. it would seem to me we would use every opportunity we could. why wasn't there a greater

effort made to use the 123 agreement which admittedly benefits both sides. don't get me wrong. but to use this as an opportunity to advance the goal of non-proliferation. >> that's a very good question senator. let me talk about a first in the past tense of the current agreement and the negotiation of a successor agreement. in the 1990s when the one to three within the fact that before any exports were approved as a consequence of the standards that the congress asked us to certify, china made a number of specific commitment on nuclear non-proliferation and export control which they fulfilled and they included joining the nuclear suppliers group in adhering to the standards. it included them in the cooperation they had initiated with iran.

it included an insert forms of cooperation with pakistan and crucially included them publishing the first time the list of nuclear material and dual use materials that were controlled under their national legislation. ..

as well as concrete offers of cooperation of training in customs enforcement, of training in border security, a discussion of ways to change legislation and to change national control to make them more effective. and as a consequence we see more and more cases in which chinese authorities have taken action on specific dates of information, not only from the united states but that they have developed themselves in order to prevent transfer of dual use material. more importantly over the last 15 years or 20 years if you prefer what we've seen is that chinese state-owned enterprises are out of the business of proliferating technology to north korea and iran. it is rather a very dynamic, very high-tech private sector in

china which the state has not yet shown the capability and come as senator markey, i would agree, not yet shown the political will to control adequately. >> but is it your view that the successful completion of the 123 agreement will end up making china more sensitive and more effective in blocking the export of dual use technology to? >> yes, and i think history will also contribute. >> thank you. appreciate that. i would like to talk a little bit about what one of the selling points of the 123 agreement to jobs here in the united states. because a lot of the reactor work is done by americans and we had to companies located here, but the technology will be absorbed in china. china is interested in introducing reactors for export. and there is some fear we are accelerating the international competition from china, which

may end up costing american jobs come in knowing the way that chinese use of their trade practices in the international marketplace. can you give us any assurances that this agreement, this one to three agreement, will not end up costing us our domestic jobs in this area because of the exhilarating the chinese ability to compete internationally? using american technology. >> thank you senator. our sense is again, the decision as to what specific aspects of what is u.s. origin technology patented trademark that u.s. companies decide and their engagement in the chinese market, or working with the chinese in export market is a decision which -- >> not to interrupt the part of the entry into china is very

much negotiated with the private companies which could very well affect china's ability to use technology, we did not? >> but even if -- it doesn't but even if the chinese are engaged in building reactors within the own country indigenously or if they're making for export reactors, there is to you as content and comes still specialist component that the united states has a comparative advantage and a technological lead in providing after sales services, consulting engineering. there's just a whole range of things which use industry not just the major manufacturers of reactors but a whole range of some vendors will benefit from by being involved in this expanding and growing market. >> makes me a little nervous. i hear what you're saying. one final question if i might on safety issues which is something

we haven't touched on, and that is what type of assessment can you give us that the use of nuclear power in china will be the highest safety standards recognizing the uncertainty of climate conditions as well as national security issues? >> well, for us the department of energy and nnsa safety and secured are paramount in all our engagements both with our own laboratories and production plants and facilities in the states but also in china. as i sit in the opening oral statement we just had the meeting under the punt joint committee in china in which a whole range of safety and security related to safeguard issues come environmental concern, waste management concerns were raised.

and, indeed, this is one of the reasons why we think it's important as the department of energy and nnsa to be involved in this process is to ensure that we communicate with other countries, including china, best practices in the safety and security area. including lessons learned from the fukushima accident several years ago. there were a lot of things we are to -- implement domestically can a lot of powerplants overshoot implementing that draw from the. but again he gets back to the comment made earlier that engagement of the nuclear safety expert, technicians, the labrador experts in giving with very, very complex and technical issues associated with outcome that helps promote safety and security across the globe. >> thank you. >> thank you very much. senator gardner. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks for holding this hearing today and thank you to the

witnesses for bringing part of briefing last night as well. this is obviously a very important strategic discussion that would have been, securing peaceful cooperation with china to create significant business opportunity for u.s. exporters. china has right now but 26 nuclear reactors come is that correct, with an additional 23 under construction, plans to build up to about 100 more by 2030. for comparison that are only 99 nuclear reactors currently in the united states. china announced in december of last year it would spend $11.2 billion on construction in the next 10 years come and accountable amount of money to spend to invest in nuclear technology and for u.s. businesses to plan that activity activity. but i think you've heard concern from others on this panel and the like to echo that concerned about the past proliferation record of certain entities in china in what may portend a china's nuclear and ballistic programs grow. we need an ironclad commitment

from china to sensitive use technology will be secure for the duration of this agreement not to be used for nefarious purposes by the that the chinese government or third parties. so as we look at the strategic implications of this agreement we must also use it as an opportunity to race with china pressing need to curb north korea's growing north korea program. at the dissent of kim jong-un as north korea's leader to seize the significant cooling in beijing towards pyongyang of a fundamental policy has remained the same. most recently referred from chinese nuclear scientists at north korea has us in as 20 nuclear warheads which could double by next year. it's a much more aggressive estimate and what we end up on intelligent humor tested. perhaps a sign beijing may have finally had enough of pyongyang's antics. american diplomats unofficial continue american diplomats unofficial continuous to exploit this potential opening at every

level. and so to assist in secretary countryman, 2011 has discussed, director of national intelligence worldwide threat assessment report stated north korea and, indeed, in russia and china continue to sell technologies in the middle east, south asia producing could -- but as we discussed on the panel 2015 report made no mention of these concerns. i think is the answer to the question of whether or not the chinese entities are truly engage in these types of activities. so i guess i would ask a specific question of you come at a don't think i've heard this answer today which chinese individuals and companies remain under u.s. sanctions related to proliferation of missile proliferation or missile technology? >> it's a good question and it's ridiculous as rapidly as possible. they are primarily not state-owned enterprises not rather individual brokers and technology firms that are not under direct state control. >> and you'll get that list to

us. in talking about the terms of the agreement entered into, if we don't enforce the terms of the bargain, doesn't that lead to conditions willingness to ignore the plain letter of the agreement? >> absolutely. that's why we enforce it strictly. >> the message that the president sent to congress stated this it does not this is again from the message the president sent on to denounce an agreement for cooperation, and i quote, it does not permit transfers of any restricted data, transfer the sum to technology facilities and components such facilities may only occur if the agreement is amended to cover such transfers. this conversation we're having today it sounds like this is not, this statement is at odds with your testimony. we agree with that? >> no, senator. sensitive nuclear technology has a particular meaning in the article of nonproliferation, and

it is defined elsewhere in the text. it is done refer for example to the major component of a reactor since its reactors we are selling company could refer to other kinds of technology with non-civilian applications. >> the state department's 2014 report on adherence to and compliance with arms control and nonproliferation and disarmament agreements state adequate in 2013 chinese entities continued to supply missile programs in countries of concern. in this opens in can you share more information of the type of missile programs in countries of concern? >> yes. as has already been mentioned and just been named lead to use of the name karl lee as well has been a primary procurement agent for iran's nuclear ballistic missile program and has provided a variety of dual use equipment

from china and from other destinations to the iranian ballistic missile program. so that would be the number one individual that we be concerned with in that category. >> any countries, countries including north korea, conversations? >> our other procurement agents in china who work knowingly or unknowingly on behalf of north korea to acquire technology in china. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much for that question. just to follow up on that. what is china specifically doing passions we are all aware of the coral the situation to what are they doing to get back to some of senator perdue's questioning to end of that? >> we are in gauge in an intensive dialogue dialogue, well, long-standing dialogue about karl lee that has intensified recently in which we are seeking to understand better

each other's information and the capabilities in our legal system. for example, why we are able to indict him in the united states and whether the chinese would be able to do something similar in china. i will be happy to come back to produce some meaningful results. >> and again in question with senator perdue you mentioned the agreement being suspended if they violate it. is that really real? i mean, i sit here and it is going to add to that question, with another question. first of all y'all have been great witnesses. fewer very transparent, all the things that you know, even more so last night that we have concerns about obviously in a different setting. but, so we have u.s. interests that want to do business.

we have a country like china that is not honoring the spirit of the law. they are not honoring previous agreements with the nuclear group. we know they're going to take this information and use for military purposes. we know that come even on the agreement says they will not do it. it. so we have companies that want to do business with them us-based ambassador technology. and we also know they're going to use that technology in ways that they shouldn't. so talking a little bit about the dynamics. you have, you know westinghouse, division of toshiba, pressing you to do business, rising you to allow this agreement to go forward. with other companies that want to do business. you also have our national interest, if you will your queue have a country that let's face

it doesn't honor agreements. talk to is a little about the internal dynamics to give us a flavor of the various pressures that you are dealing with. because it does feel a little bit like mercantilism is a trumping the specifics agreement mean honored relative non-pashtun relative to nonproliferation. >> let me repeat. i will ask general klotz if you want to comment on economic and commercial issues but my job is to look after the nonproliferation policy of the u.s. that's been consistent across administrations supported by congresses, and that's why negotiation of these treaties falls within my bureau. and i repeat we would still be negotiating if i were not satisfied that this is in the best interest of promoting our strong nonproliferation policy. jobs are important, relationship

china is important. but my job, entrusted with him from by the senate come is to look after nonproliferation policy. as we breathe a year ago on our general 123 policy, that is the primary topic in all of our negotiations. >> i guess, senator i would look at it this way is about our well being as a nation rests on a number of different colors of foundations. it rests on our national security and defense capabilities. it also rests on our economic strength as a country, both domestically and in the international market. and it depends upon our scientific technical and engineering infrastructure that underlies about. and so the difficult challenge we face is decision-makers with within the executive branch or the legislative branch is to strike the right balance between all of those competing interests. i think what is the agreement

does is up a mechanism by which licensing goes through the nuclear regulatory commission the approval to transfer various and sundry information and materials and components pursue the department of energy in consultation with the rest of the government. i know for a fact having spent 38 years in the military and the defense department that our colleagues over there will look very carefully and very closely as with the intelligence community with the issues of licenses and issues of approval for transfer come up. and as they are reviewed, as they will under this new agreement on an annual basis in terms of what has than transferred and what's on the inventory list. >> senator cardin? >> thank you, mr. chairman, very much. a little bit on karl lee wanted by the department of justice as a contributor to the iranian

ballistic missile programs. recent years of sanctions have confiscated $8.6 million in funds from chinese bank accounts linked to manufacturing and exporting missile guidance components as extensive network of shell companies inside and outside of china to hide his activity. what they have done over time is every time we catch him they change the name of the firm so he's had a relationship with 1226 firms many of which were just shell companies and again it's in ballistic missile technology to iran he said 16 aliases, multiple bank accounts come but he's kind of running this nuclear ebay out of china, selling into countries in

the world that we do not want to access to these materials. we have $5 million reward for information leading to his arrest. in april 2014 he was charged with conspiring to commit fraud and bank, wire fraud and bank fraud and money laundering in manhattan. he has a large network of industrial companies based in eastern china. so the chinese government says they can't figure this out. they can't figure out how to shut them down or guys like you. that good news is the configure of the things in china. they figured out how to arrest eyed women who gallantly feminist organization last year. they figured out how to deal 44 journalists last year. they figured out how to put 27,000 muslim minorities in the uighur region in prison last year. they could figure that out. that they can do but they can't

figure out karl lee. just too hard for them. maybe it's too much evidence, too many shell companies, too many times. on the other hand, maybe china has just subcontracted this out to the private sector. for cost-cutting reasons, maybe china has done this in order to protect the guilty you know, the chinese government, the people's liberation army. they can do the favors for iran or pakistan. that's what i think is going on. it's pretty clear it's going on but they want to crack downon an attractive and want to crack facebook, they want to crack down it would they do it. it's shut down overnight. they shut the site down. they moving. they've got military all over, all over these other areas of chinese, like they believe threats to the regime. but when it comes to threats to

nuclear nonproliferation regime, they just shrug their shoulders. they can't figure it out. it's just too hard. the reason it's too hard is that they have subcontracted this out to karl lee. he would be in prison right now. even be paying a big price to the pakistanis couldn't figure out with a.q. khan for like 25 years. we know why. we know why he is living in a nice private residence in pakistan, not under arrest. he's a hero not a felon in the eyes of these bushmen. that's how we are going to get in trouble here. china it's a lot out of this. china, nuclear power is a lot like the japanese were in the automotive industry in the 1950s. we were laughing at them, but i've had the honor very few of us can say this, i've had the honor of bailing out chrysler twice with votes in congress. 1979 and then again in 2009.

the japanese just kept coming. so they want this technology. they want to reverse-engineer it. they want to be a marketer of nuclear plants. we are going to pay a big price in the long term. so got to start out now where we want to wind up in the long run because it will be prettier that way from a policy perspective much prettier. if we insist on very tough standards now on the chinese before we finalize anything else they have to prove to us that they are serious about this. the people who violate nuclear nonproliferation policy ballistic missile policy pay a price. and if we pretend that they can't do it, if we pretend that they don't have an authoritarian government come if we pretend that they are capitalist and not

a communist nation to which they are, state control over everything at a certain level then we're just going to pretend the way our nuclear nonproliferation policy. so this is a big moment for us. we have to attach conditions to this. that don't allow them to derive the benefits to our top of the line nuclear technology while simultaneously turning a blind eye to what we know is the simultaneous geopolitical agenda which they have and which is a constant throughout the last four or five decades impacts been undermanned and other places. so i guess what i will say to you is that, from my perspective we have a big responsibility here to condition this in the tightest possible way come to expect action from china and not words, do not allow the

commercial interest of any administration to trump the long-term nonproliferation goals which we all say are at the highest level. we are here today because we shocked change policy. that's why you had to do such a great job on this iran revolution. we just turn a blind eye to the we were some six nuclear power plants to the shah of iran in 1977 70 79 to thank god we didn't transfer it before he felt the so in each iteration so far we have kind of dodged the big bullet, but each year that goes by every compromise of the policy especially working with pakistan and iran, we are running a big risk. and so all i can say here is i'm going to work very hard to make sure the conditions that are attached to this reflect the

seriousness with which we should take a lack of seriousness that the chinese government has entered nuclear nonproliferation policy. and i thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. if i can remember, i think we have an outstanding commit and it's interesting on different topics that different input that members went in with come and i really appreciate senator markey's contribution, as i do every one here today. icier light on. i don't know if you speed i just want to point out this is the second day of arguing. the first day was in a closed session and think the information we have received will be helpful to is added to appreciate the participation of all members, particularly senator markey's history on this and the work he did when you were in the house of representatives. >> just to follow up on his question before he closes out

on the carl lead issue with china, do you think it's a lack of opacity or lack of desire to enter that particular situation? >> i think is so bit of both. i think the quibbles i would have with senator markey's description is first come is not a nuclear ebay. these more a primary agent for the iranian ballistic missile program rather than all kinds of programs in all kinds of places. he's got a primary sponsor. second point, i don't think it's so much a question of subcontracting government functions to a private facility you're right, that happens in a lot of countries. i think it's a different problem that they can is not unique to china. mr. lee has money and lawyers and the uighurs and the women's ngos and others do not.

>> well, my sense is that as we move ahead there may be a series of conditions that the senate may want to place on this particular agreement. and i would encourage members and staffs who are here to work with us to see if, indeed that isn't the case. but again i want to thank you both for your transparency always come in answering questions in a way that you do. i want to thank you for being here. the information, the record will be open until thursday afternoon, so if you receive additional questions please answer them probably. thank you for your service to our country. and with that the committee will be adjourned. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> this sunday night at eight eastern on "first ladies" come we will look into the personal lives of 31st ladies, rachel jackson emily donelson and angelica van buren. rachel jackson was called a bigamist and older during andrew jackson 1820 presidential campaign and died of an apparent heart attack before he took office. his niece becomes the white house hostess but is later dismissed as fallout from a scandal. and when widower martin van buren becomes president his daughter-in-law is the white

house hostess. rachel jackson emily donelson and angelica van buren sunday night at 8 p.m. eastern on c-span's original series first ladies influenced an image comics and make a public and private lives of the women who fill the position of first lady and her influence on the presidency washington to michelle obama "sundays at eight" p.m. eastern on american history tv on c-span3. as a compliment, c-span 10:00 is now available. "first ladies." presidential stored on the lives of 45 iconic american women providing lively stories of these fascinating women creating an illuminating, entertaining and inspiring read. it's available as a hardcover or an e-book for your favorite bookstore or online bookseller. >> the u.s. senate is about to gavels in. politico has a story this week by the story this week about the story this week by the trait afford to go to town yesterday. senate minority leader harry

reid to rally his caucus to reject fast-track measure on a procedural vote has already floated a plan to find a way out of the npas by offering a drop in the currency manipulation and accountants bill from his party's list of demented the initial of which are likely will not settle the issue. top republican said they were skeptical of the proposal. democrats wish to return to the bargaining table suggests that trade measure may not be dead. we do care more about this today as work continues off the floor.t pr live coverage and out of the th u.s.e senate. the chaplain: let us pray. holy one we desire to do your will. may we acknowledge you as the source of all that is worthy.

thank you for your gracious righteousness that is the same yesterday today and forever. lord help us to find rest and contentment in you. remind our lawmakers to not seek security apart from you. may they not forget that righteousness exalts a nation and that you are our shelter and shield. equip them with everything good for doing your will. give them steadfast hearts which no unworthy affection may drag downward. teach them to serve you as you

deserve. and lord, sustain those who are dealing with the trauma of the amtrak train derailment in philadelphia. we pray in your mighty name. amen. the president pro tempore: please join me in reciting the pledge of allegiance to our flag. i pledge allegiance to the flag of the united states of america and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under god, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

mr. mcconnell: mr. president. the presiding officer: the majority leader. mr. mcconnell: many of us awoke to terrible news this morning. we're still awaiting more information about what happened outside of philadelphia, but we know this tragedy will touch the lives of many. the senate sends its condolence to the victims those who were injured and their families and loved ones. we also reaffirm our gratitude to the nation's first responders. now, mr. president, on an entirely different matter, it was really quite something to

watch president obama's party vote to filibuster his top domestic legislative priority yesterday. that's what we saw right here in the senate. it left pretty much everyone scratching their heads. the democratic leader made clear yesterday that he was not interested in debating -- quote -- the merits of the bill, end quote. in other words he told us that this filibuster is for political reasons only. it makes sense considering that this filibuster's all about apiecing a -- appeasing a facts-optional crowd on the left that hasn't been able to marshall much of a serious fact-based argument to support its opposition to more american exports and more american trade jobs. you don't have to take my word for it. president obama says the far left's arguments don't -- quote -- stand the test of fact and scrutiny end quote.

it's president obama who says the far left is just -- quote -- making stuff up, end quote. and it's president obama who warns the far left about -- quote -- ignoring realities -- end quote. in other words hardly anyone believes this there is a serious policy leg for these folks to stand on. not that there's a viable process excuse for this filibuster either. the senior democrat and leadership essentially rebutted the latest process argument yesterday. he said -- quote -- "no one disputed in committee that we would get a vote separately, separately on the customs bill bill" -- end quote -- because it contains a provision that he said would bring down t.p.a. what we can infer from this is that the demand to merge four separate trade bills including a customs bill into one trade bill isn't a strategy designed

to pass better trade legislation but a poison pill designed to kill it. so we certainly won't be doing that. because our goal here should be to score a serious policy win for the american people, not claim a symbolic scalp for the extreme left. that's why republicans have chosen to work closely with president obama to advance a serious trade and economic growth agenda. it's not a natural position for us i assure you. or for the president. but we agree that strengthening the middle class by knocking down unfair trade restrictions is a good idea. since we agree on the policy, i think we have a duty to the american people to cooperate responsibly to pursue it. and that's just what we've done. not a single republican, not one, voted yesterday against at

least opening the debate on this 21st century american trade agenda. now, all that's needed to move forward is for our democratic friends who tell the public that they support trade to withdraw support for a filibuster they know is wrong on the merits. yes, i understand it may be uncomfortable for our democratic colleagues to cross loud factions in their party but republicans proved yesterday that it's possible to put good policy over easy politics. so democrats have to choose. will they allow themselves to keep being led around by the most extreme elements of their party, even when it runs counter to the needs of their constituents or will they take a stand and lead? the american people are counting on them to make the right choice when they do, they will find the same willing partners who have

always been there. they'll find they are ready to continue working up across the aisle in good faith to move forward. recall that we have only gotten as far as we have already because of a significant bipartisan compromise on chairman hatch's part. he worked very closely with senator wyden to hammer out a trade package that garnered an astonishing 20 votes in the finance committee with just six senators opposed just six. that huge level of bipartisan support is -- has really, really surprised everybody. we've seen some unfortunate partisan rear guard action since then that's designed to sink these american trade jobs, but we can rise above it. that's why republicans remain committed to carrying forward the kind of bipartisan momentum we saw over in the finance committee just as we have been all along on other issues.

we're happy to work with any senator in a serious way. the door's open. i have made clear it would be an open amendment process. i have made clear that senators would receive fair consideration once we proceed to debating the bill. and the bipartisan path forward i offered yesterday morning is still on the table. i remain committed to significant concession -- excuse me. i remain committed to the significant concession my party already made about processing t.p.a. and t.a.a. i must say mr. president i don't like t.a.a. i think it's a program very hard to defend. but i understand that if we're going to get t.p.a., our friends on the other side need t.a.a. if chairman hatch and senator wyden can agree to other policies we can consider those too. what we won't be doing is

pursuing poison pill strategies like the one i mentioned already. let's also agree that no senator is in a position to guarantee that some bill can clear both houses of congress, receive a sixth from the president secure the blessings of the supreme court and whatever else our friends might demand. this wouldn't be much of a democracy if senators could actually make such an impossible guarantee. so look, we want to have a serious discussion. we want to actually get a good policy outcome. that's always been our goal. i hope more will now join us to allow debate on the trade discussion our constituents deserve. mr. reid: mr. president. the presiding officer: the democratic leader. mr. reid: i join with the majority leader in extending my thoughts to the terrible situation in pennsylvania.

that accident occurred last night at 9:00. now we have six reported dead and many, many, many injured. there were about 300 people on that train. so i join him in commending the first responders for the work they did and are doing as we speak. mr. president, you have heard the expression red herring loss leader. all these terms that mean you're trying to focus attention some place that shouldn't be focused. that's basically what the republican leader has done this morning. of course, misconstrued what i said on the floor yesterday. i said that i'm not here to debate the intricacies of this trade bill. some can do that better than i and i have no -- i have no qualms about saying that about myself. it's a very specialized area. but i do understand that the debate was not taking place

because we were not on the bill, and i said i understand the procedure around here, and i do. the procedure is pretty simple. it's a fact that virtually all legislation that passes the senate needs a measure of bipartisan support. this year as an example nearly every bill passed by the senate has enjoyed the support of over 90% of senate democrats. it's just a reality. 114th congress will take democratic votes to get things done. many democrats don't support fast-track. i don't. a vast majority of democrats don't. but without following all the loss leaders the red herrings the republican leader threw out the finance committee reported out four bills and it's only logical we consider all four of them. i've said and i say it again it's only logical we take the republican leader's words for what they are. he said let's get on the bill and then we'll start the amendment process.

well he can't start the amendment process very well if you're not having an opportunity to amend and change the bills that aren't there. they would just be thrown to the winds. customs, very important enforcement, and of course the situation dealing with africa trade. we have put a reasonable offer on the table for senate republicans to accept. all the republican leader needs to do is say yes and we can open debate on these trade bills. mr. president, last week, there was celebrations all around the world celebrating the 70th anniversary of victory in europe day. here in our nation's capital, we celebrated the day that europe was officially liberated. just outside the capitol dozens of world war ii aircraft flew up and down the mall honoring and celebrating the end of the war that engulfed europe, over the

lincoln memorial, they flew over the world war ii monument, the washington monument, over the capitol and points in between. mr. president, i grew up in a little town and i was a little boy, but i can still remember the war ending. i don't really remember what i remember but i know it was something that was important to everybody there. it was a big deal in searchlight, as it was every place in america. the war was at an end. americans were thankful that the war was over. they were thankful that their fathers, sons, brothers, and yes, mr. president, world war ii daughters were able to come home. they had fought valiantly on battlefields across the world and they would be coming home. as i mentioned the women the waves, wacs, sparse, all these women, thousands and thousands who participated in the war in that manner. across america we were all

happy that freedom and democracy had prevailed over a regime that was fueled by hatred. i heard on the radio this morning a brief account of winston churchill. that was many years ago, 70 years ago today giving a speech. he only had been prime minister three days, and he gave one of his most famous speeches, about all he had to offer. they were engulfed in this war. they were doing it aleon. it was a stunning speech that history will always remember. but after that war was over, we were happy epg land england was happy. freedom and democracy had prevailed, a regime that was fueled by hatred. as i got older and could understand a little more, i first became really focused on

world war ii -- i'm sorry to say i didn't do it until i was in college. but, mr. president i remember as if it were five minutes ago looking at those pictures in the book "the rise and fall of the third reich." those pictures i will never forget. i can see them now in my mind's eye. there were pictures of the liberation of the concentration camps. i learned how -- i learned of the enormity of the holocaust the genocide of 6 million jews and the world saw the incredible extent to which the nazis had taken control over the jews. hard to comprehend. nothing. nothing could really describe how horrible the situation really was.

sadly, though, mr. president i look around the world today -- there are still glimpses of that same hate that we had hoped to extinctionextinguish those seven decades ago. it's still there. hate wears many masks -- violence intimidation segregation foul rhetoric and of course disenfranchisement. anti-semitism is that and more. though it assumes different identities in the end it is still hate. pains mae to say that there seems to be a resurgence of anti-semitism across the world. i look the israel, see the vicious attacks carried out against innocent jews there the slaughter of jewish worshipers in the synagogue last november, a mosque campaign of terror

indiscriminately targeting innocent israelis with their thousands and thousands of rockets. i luke at europe and see the -- i look at europe and see the heinous acts being perpetuated there against jews. in the netherlands the home of a prominent rabbi was attacked twice in one week n paris hundreds of protesters attacked synagogues smashed the windows in jewish shops cafes and set several afire. in france also the attack on a jewish grocery store following the charlie hebdo shootings. anti-semitic slogans such as "gas the jews" have been shouted at several demonstrateors throughout germany. jewish museums throughout norway were forced to close because of

fear of attacks. i look at the united nations' human rights council in geneva and am sickened by its long history of violence against israeli people. then i see what's happening on some campuses here in the united states. last sunday "the new york times" reported that in the midst of campus debates about boycotts of israel jewish students have felt increasingly intim intimidated. at several colleges, swat city cass have--swastikas have been painted on the doors of facilities and in some cases on the doors of jews -- on their rooms. some students feel the need to hide their heritage and support for israel is getting intense backlash. that's sad. the former state of the

california system, mark udolff says "jewish students and their parents are intensity apprehensive about this moment. i hear it all the time, where can i send my kids that will be safe for them as jews?" that's just stunning, mr. president. bigotry and hatred have no place in the world today especially not in a country that has long prided itself on being a beacon of freedom and acceptance. instead, it is incumbent upon all americans to not only stand up to anti-semitism wherever we see it but also to stand in solidarity with the jewish people. three things: let's stand against anti-semitism, let's stand with israel and the jews throughout the world and third let's stand against hate. mr. president, i want to say a brief word about something i mentioned as i started my

remarks. my friend, the republican leader stated that the extreme left is causing a problem with this bill. mr. president, if it's -- it's not the extreme left. it's democrats concerned about the middle class. we don't focus here on the middle class. the republicans are focused elsewhere. we've done nothing on minimum wage. we've done nothing on student debt. we've done nothing on equal pay for men and women. we've done nothing to create jobs nothing. we're here. in the matter of a week or two weeks, the authorization for highways will be gone. it is different than other authorizations we do because under the law that we passed previously when that law expires, then there's no more contract authority. and that program will come to a screeching halt. we have a few dollars left to carry on for a few more weeks but it won't be spent. it is a shame that my friend,

the republican leader, keeps referring to the extreme left -- whatever that means -- when we start talking about the middle class, and that's one reason we're concerned about this trade bill that's before us today. mr. president, would the chairatennounce the business of the day. the presiding officer: under the previous order the leadership time is reserved. under the previous order the senate will be in a period of morning business for one hour with senators permitted to speak therein for up to ten minutes each and with the time equally divided with the majority controlling the first half. mr. reid: i note the absence of a quorum. the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll. quorum call:

a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from colorado. mr. gardner: mr. president i rise to speak today about the threat from north korea to the united states to our national security that our friends and to our friends and allies -- ferthe presiding officer: the senate is in a quorum call. mr. gardner: i ask unanimous consent that the quorum call be vitiated. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. gardner: again mr. president, thank you. i rise to speak about the threat from north korea to u.s. national security and to our friends and allies in east asia. on may 9, north korea claimed that it has test-fired a ballistic missile from a submarine raising concerns across the region. if these reports are accurate, experts point out that north korea may have succeeded for the first time in installing a missile launcher of about 2,500 tons onto a submarine. if that's true, with this test,

north korea violate add series of united nations security council resolutions including resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087, and 2094. according to a more cautious assessment from south korean officials, north korea appears that they will be able to deploy a fully operational submarine capable of launching a ballistic missile and only -- in only four to five years. this launch is the latest confirmation of pyongyang's growing nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities while the obama administration seems to have fallen asleep at the switch with regard to our policy to deter the growing north korea threat. according to the director of national intelligence's 2015 worldwide threat assessment, north korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the united states and to the security environment in east asia. we should remember that north korea tested nuclear weapons on