strategic plan in the coming weeks which will provide greater focus for the uscp's efforts and allow our workforce to more clearly understand their role in achieving our mission responsibilities. finally, i plan to continue to work with the fop to address the remaining issues related to contract negotiations. my long-term focus over the next several years includes the plan to focus the department's energy in several areas which tie to our new strategic plan which includes smart policing, deploying more effective law enforcement services through collaboration, adaptability and innovation, and focusing on workforce efficiency and effectiveness through improved communications. to successfully achieve these goals, i am committed to taking leadership actions necessary to build a managing team who shares my vision and will actively engage in all levels of the workforce. given the huge responsibilities of this department and our entire workforce, i realize the department's failure is not an option. i will continue to involve --

evolve my leadership style to ensure our success with meeting the mission, the needs of the workforce and the community. once again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. i would be very happy to answer any questions the committee may have at this time. >> thank you very much, chief. i appreciate that. i think i'll just start off about the unattended firearms which was probably, if anything, one of the bigger concerns, since i've been here on the hill. you were just outlining what you would normally do in a case like that. i think you said five days' suspension. something like that. i'm sure that depends on the personnel record of that particular individual, if there had been incidents in the past or not, et cetera. but it's also my understanding that some of these incidents happened with members of the force that were on sort of special detail with leadership. and is there any -- do you give that consideration? or what do you do in a case like that? >> yes, ma'am. first of all, obviously each and

every one of those is or will be -- or is in the process of being fully investigated. that is step one. then we have a very good disciplinary process which actually prior to promoting assistant chief vertirosa, i asked him to look at re-engineering the discipline process to make sure it was effective and efficient and fast moving as possible. one of the changes while we had an excellent system i found that it was somewhat fragmented and for an agency our size of the importance in terms of the disciplinary process, i believe that a centralized disciplinary process was necessary. so the assistant chief has put together a process which essentially centralizes the review process which i think is better for all of the members of the agency. makes for a better system. that being said, the process includes, as you mentioned, looking at the douglas factors which come out of douglas versus

veterans administration case. as you may be aware. our collective bargaining agreement ensures that at least four of those are considered. which include the member's record, whether the act as willful or on purpose or not. those kinds of things. so the member's record is taken into consideration. how long they've been on the department, their disciplinary record, what kind of act took place, its impact on the agency's ability to perform its mission, and those kinds of things. and then punishment is given out. we've been very diligent in both investigating not only these matters but other matters and meting out appropriate punishment. >> you know, just reading these media reports. obviously we're all biological human beings so everyone has to go to the bad room. some of these incidents happened in a bathroom. so i don't know. maybe this isn't right question, do you have a lockbox? are you going through a process -- is that already in place?

>> yes, ma'am. >> or happens whether it's in a bathroom or wherever they are that they have to take off their firearm for some short period of time and how it's accounted for safely. >> that is a great question. we do provide lockboxes to our officers. those are generally kept in their homes. there are lockboxes around in various office locations so if someone has time they may have the ability to go secure their weapon before they go to the bathroom. but as i mentioned in my opening testimony, we are now providing additional training on what to do when you have to go to the bathroom. obviously while these acts were not done on purpose they are unacceptable. one cannot leave your weapon anywhere. it has to be secured at all times. so those acts will be dealt with firmly and effectively. but we've enhanced the training but we've made that now additional training as part of our biannual certification process and we're creating online training that everyone

will go through once a year as well. we've enhanced and reinforced the whole discussion of weapons safety because that's extremely critical, obviously. >> okay. my second question then would be about the gyrocopter incident. again, you and i have talked about this. we've had a brief about it. we've talked about it at length. but as i continue to sort of contemplate what could have happened, what it meant, et cetera, what it could mean in the future, et cetera, i guess i do have a couple of questions. in regards to the officers that actually did respond -- as i said, in my opinion, from a layman -- i don't understand your business but it certainly looked as though the capitol police that responded did everything they were supposed to do flawlessly once the gyrocopter landed. so did you have -- i'm wondering how much advance notice that the capitol police had, again, understanding that the restricted airspace is not your responsibility. i'm not trying to throw some other agency under the bus. but i would like to know to the extent that you can enlighten us

how much advance notice capitol police had that this gyrocopter was coming. if boots on the ground understood that it was coming or what exactly happened there and the critical moments before this gyrocopter did land. thank god, it was nobody that really meant us harm. but who knows. >> yes, ma'am. >> as you know chief, i also serve as vice chair of the homeland security security. so from a homeland security standpoint, put my other hat on here for a moment, what in the world. and the after-action reports perhaps that you did with your -- with the men and women that did respond. >> yes, ma'am. lot of great questions right there. let me first say from the outset let me touch on notification process so i can tell you once again. we fixed that the next day. working with the deputy chief, we directed that notifications be given out immediately. so we apologize for that. that's not acceptable for you to find out --

>> actually that was not my question. i appreciate that. i'm talking about how much notification the capitol police had about the gyrocopter coming. >> yes, ma'am. the notification to the gyrocopter, that day at i believe 12:59 hours we received an e-mail from someone claiming to be a reporter asking questions did we have any knowledge about a gyrocopter landing. the information did not provide a time or date or indicate that landing was imminent or anything like that. it was more about, are you aware that this might be happening, and does the person have permission to do that? that e-mail went to our public information officer, lieutenant kimberly snyder, who sent it to our investigations division. about a minute later we got a call in our command center apparently from the same individual asking generic type questions, does somebody have a permit to land? again, did not give a date or time or indicate that a landing was imminent. that information was also forwarded then to our investigations division.

as those things were -- began to be looked into, minutes later, frankly, the gyrocopter landed. now while on the west front about a minute before it landed one of our officers was approached by someone who was apparently a reporter who knew that the gyrocopter was going to be landing and asked the officer are you aware of anybody -- any airspace issues, anybody landing? forgot the exact language. the officer didn't know anything about it. he asked another officer. they went over the air. they made some notifications. essentially at that time they observed the gyrocopter over the grant statue and it landed on the west front. so that was about a 20, 25-minute time lapse from the time we got these generic pieces of information. as you know, we get hundreds and hundreds of calls every day and e-mails about different permits, different activities. >> i understand.

the last thing i will say, because i know that everybody else wants to ask a question. it's my understanding you did get that e-mail about a half an hour before the gyrocopter landed, along with a website for a live stream, that this guy was live streaming his flight. so maybe somebody else wants to follow up on that, but it would seem as though somebody would tune in. >> well, we attempted to tune in. we had no luck immediately. we ultimately did -- that investigation continued which allowed us -- i'd like to echo your praise of the officers' actions on the scene immediately. i think the officers acted promptly, heroically, swiftly, efficiently. the continued investigation actually allowed us to determine what we were dealing with. because as the canine officers swept the gyrocopter and then eod folks approached it to continue to clear it, we were pulling up information about the person, who he was, and what kind of potential threat he was

or was not. so that investigative effort kind of aided our whole overall effort and fit in to our overall response. as you mentioned, it is not our role to patrol the airspace. that's a dod/norad responsibility. but we work very closely with them. we are working with the department of homeland security on an after-action report from a larger sense. we're also doing an internal one as well. i actually -- during police week last week i had the opportunity to speak with secretary johnson about the matter actually twice, which i was pleased about being able to do that. >> very good. thank you, chief. the chair recognizes my ranking member. >> thank you, madam chair. chief, far be it from me to sit here and make you feel uncomfortable, or even to question you. but we're friendlies here. we're not the enemy here. my dad was in the police force. mr. nugent has many, many years of experience in law enforcement.

i talk with him every day. we are a community of oversight. this is the first time i met you. chief morris was a friend. we were on oversight committee. he was friendly toward us. walked by. any time he walked by the office, pop in, how are you, how you doing. that's good relationships. you know philadelphia is known for cheese steaks. we have one of the biggest cheese steak restaurants in philadelphia, most famous nationwide. they collect patches. and they wanted a patch from capitol police. i went to chief morris. i said, you know, i'd like to get a patch. he said, no, i'll go down, bring it to them. i want to have that great relationship and good pr and he did that. you know? and, again, we're not -- we're not -- we don't want to be -- we don't want to be reactive. we want to act. if there's a problem, if there's an issue, your contract -- i deal with your officers, with your unions all the time. you meet with them a lot. meet with us a lot. walk by our office, say hello. i know you're busy, but we're

busy, too. we're not going to not say hello to you. that's my issue. that's my problem. i know you could be overwhelmed and i do appreciate that. but you know, if you -- you could get a little more closer to us. we want to be closer to you. i've been involved in more contracts than anybody you know, including two of yours previously. you know? i do a lot of that in the city of philadelphia when there's always a problem, i'm the one they go to many, many times. we're ready to help you. we've had discussions with me and the chairman all the time. you know? and little bit of wonder why haven't we got like more involved. we're not here to criticize you. i can't do your job. you can probably do mine but i can't do yours. you can learn mine quickly enough, isn't rocket science to be a congressman. a little tough to be a police officer. we want to be helpful. but i really wish that you would take that in consideration. no request nothing just you

know. if you have requested, we're supposed to be here to help you. i wish you would take into consideration and get a little more friendly with all of us. >> yes, sir. >> thank you. thank you, madam chair. >> i can guarantee we will do that and i appreciate your comments. >> chair recognizes mr. harper. >> thank you madam chair. chief dine, you said there were two notifications that went into the capitol police prior to the landing of the gyro copter. one went into the command center and the other went to the public information officer is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> so the times of each of those, again, in advance of the landing? >> i believe it was -- one was 12:59, one was a minute later, where they made contact with us. i don't know that i'd classify it as notification. it was more of a question, were we aware of anything like this happening? but i think 12:59 and 1:00. >> then the landing was at 1:23,

as i understand? >> yes, sir. >> so were you notified yourself personally before it landed as based upon either of those contacts? >> i was -- i don't believe i was notified before it landed. >> okay. were there any weapons in place on behalf of the capitol police to protect the capitol that could have shot down the gyro copter? >> yes, sir. weapons were in place. without getting too deeply into it we have various weapons deployed around the capitol. so the short answer is yes. as with any use of force then you get into an issue of whether the officer is threatened or the lives of anyone else is potentially threatened. and that whole decision-making process that police officers engage in every day not only here the at the capitol but across the country.

yes, sir, we have officers with weapons. >> chief my concern is that most criminals don't telegraph the date and time of a criminal activity that they're going to engage in. this gentleman came as close to doing that as you can. i understand he was not charged with any criminal offense, is that correct? >> no, sir, he was charges with several criminal offenses. >> was he? >> yes, sir, yes, sir. and i've actually discussed with several members on both the house and senate side about looking at the sanctions of those offenses as well. >> as far as your -- and i understand you can't review every social media post or tweet or facebook account that might be out there. on a regular basis is that being done just to try to monitor that to see if anything shows up? i'm sure that's part what was you're doing. >> yes, sir, it is. i'd be remiss if i didn't also fill in the rest of this picture. this particular gentleman actually had been under

investigation several years before by the u.s. secret service who shared information with us about potential potentially coming either to the white house and/or the capitol. that was investigated by the secret service. it was investigated by our agency. we shared information. at that time he was deemed to not be a threat. but we do engage in the activity you mentioned. and then determinations have to be made. and i think it was alluded to earlier in the beginning of this hearing, we do receive thousands of pieces of information on various types of threats. what we have to do is determine the level of threat. >> and i understand multiple agencies are obviously involved in this process. they're sharing between those agencies many of these things you don't have any advance warning of potential. while we're reviewing this looking at ways we can improve the reaction reaction time is our concern is what happens the next time?

if there's a next time. we worry about someone else duplicating this, you know. a drone threat. obviously we've had some concerns of that in the area. so how we address this is a great concern. we look forward to engaging more with you on what we can do, what you're doing how we can assist you, and we are first of all very appreciative of the job that the men and women do to protect the capitol complex and we thank you. >> thank you very much. and as it relates to drones if i might add, we've been working to take a leadership position in that in the national capital region. several months ago we held a meeting with about 20 other law enforcement agencies and the u.s. attorney and the attorney general for the district of columbia to talk about drones, the challenges that they create for state, federal and hol police agencies the ways to combat drones, the types of charges that may be placed. and it was a very far and

wide-ranging discussion. we're part of a task force that meets twice a month multi agencies, to talk about uavs and how to address those issues. we're working with a number of agencies in that regard. and actually we're one of the leading agencies. we just recently put out training for all of our officers that some other agencies are mirroring in terms of drone education, frankly. >> thank you. i yield back madam chair. >> thank the gentleman. the chair recognizes miss lofgren. >> well thank you madam chair and mr. brady and chief. i've been here, i'm working on my 21st year, and i think this is the first time we've ever had the police before us. and i think it's long overdue. i do thank you for your testimony and certainly the men and women of the department who work so hard to protect the capitol and the people who are here. like some of the other members of the committee, i served for a

long time in local government. and a lot of what i know about policing really comes from my experience in local government, overseeing law enforcement agencies. and it seems to me that a lot fof the trick of being successful is communication, clear lines of command, clear policies that officers not only understand the policies but the reasons for the policies. and so i'm interested in hearing some of that from you. i remember in terms of communication, i understand we're not -- the capitol police are not in charge of the air space. but that's a communication issue. i remember after 9/11 obviously the capitol was a target. there was disarray. many weeks later, we had an all hands briefing in the capitol with bipartisan meeting.

i can say this now because it's all been changed. but one member asked the sergeant at arms, when did the secret service call the capitol police? when did that call come in? the answer was, we're still waiting for that call. i mean, so i think the communication between other agencies needs -- there needs to be a protocol for that so that everybody knows what they're supposed to do. so i'm interested. some of that may be something you want to do in a private setting, i don't know. but i would like to know what those protocols are, whether the other parties are aware of the protocols, and whether there's any monitoring of those protocols. in terms of policies we had the naval yard a tragic situation. but one of the things that i thought was of concern was officers who left their station for the best reasons in the world i am sure, to help in a very dire situation. but it raised the question in my

mind, which is whether the clear policy which is you don't leave the capitol. and why, it's not because we're so wonderful, it's that if the congress is destroyed, the united states government is destroyed. and if we had terrorists do a diversion, that might be a good way to leave the congress, a legislative branch vulnerable and a way to decapitate the american government. so i think that officers if they knew what the clear policy was, you know, that would -- everybody would get that. but i'm not sure that policy is in place or whether it's been communicated. so i guess -- i don't want to overdue my welcome. but i am just concerned that -- about the policies the command structure, the communications with other agencies. and i'm wondering madam chair, if we might have an opportunity in a confidential setting to get reports on those subjects. and i see that my time is up so i would yield back.

>> i thank the gentle lady very much and i certainly look forward to continuing our discussion about information that we need to have in a confidential setting, certainly. the chair recognizes the gentleman from florida, mr. nugent who as mentioned has spent many, many years as a law enforcement agent. we appreciate you being on our committee here today. >> well, i appreciate your kind words, miss chairman. it's very important to me to hear from the chief, and chief once again i think mr. brady hit it on the head. we're not here in adversarial position. but we certainly have a lot of questions, at least i do. you know, i read through everything that the capitol police provided. i've tabbed it looked at it. and i agree with mr. brady. this is the first time in two and a half years that i've seen you, which is troubling at least. to have that kind of open dialogue. but when we talk about and the

chairman brought it up in reference to the guns. that's like rule number one that you i'm sure teach at the academy, you talk about handgun retention all the time. you do those things in a way that obviously has to impress upon the rank and file guys and gals about how important it is. and they understand it trust me. i mean, you know this from your times, my time as a patrol officer. we understand how important that is. but the question i have is, one, is it seems that there's not a lot of transparency in disciplinary process within the capitol police. secondly when the members that the protective details are there to protect weren't even notified by the supervisor and at one point in time it took somebody from your command staff, after they were notified by one of the -- i won't say victim of it

but one of the folks that had knowledge of it you never even notified the protectee. which is troubling to me. so, you know, i understand that one has already been -- well, has been forwarded, six-day suspension, but is still at the bureau level before it's implemented, is that true? >> yes, sir. it's still in the process. but close to being fully adjudicated. >> let me ask you a simple question about the three folks or at least the two that are on protective detail. are they removed from the detail? >> they haven't been yet but we will certainly be looking at their assignment. in fact, we're looking in terms of policy ands and procedures, one of the things we are looking at is rotation of personnel throughout the agency. >> i understand. but in your policy, i read that you do have the ability for disciplinary reasons to remove somebody from an assignment because that's pretty gross --

that's a gross problem, if you leave a gun, particularly when a child sees it. >> absolutely. there's literally no excuse for it. >> you know, i would think from the rest of the folks that work protecting all of us that they would expect that you know, that type of violation of the rules would be held pretty high. and the discipline would be pretty quick. so everybody understands. because, you know, putting a policy, hey don't leave your gun in the bathroom, that's common sense 101. right, chief? so to press that point, though, to all the other rank and file folks that, hey, listen this isn't going to be accepted. particularly somebody on a protective detail. because that's quite a responsibility. to have that position.

obviously they did a great job at whatever position they had i would think to get elevated to that. >> right. >> and so the question has been, at least raised in the press that is we only find out about this stuff if it's somehow leaked. are you going to do something different with capitol police in regards to violations of policy? so i think this committee at least should be aware of those types of problems. so we can assist you in doing the things that you need to do whether it's in funding or it's placing, like the chairman mentioned, lock boxes. when you went into court or you went somewhere there's a prisoner, i know you sure have those at the office that you have those in strategic areas within where the protector? yes, sir. i need to do a better job briefing you and spending time

with you so you're fully aware of how the department operates and our practices so you feel confident in those issues and the things that do exist. then of course we have to continue to take these things seriously and do something about them. >> or the people that these officers were protecting, were they notified? were the speaker of the house and them, others notified of the violation of policy with the weapon unattended? >> at some point, the chain of command was notified in terms of that side. yes, sir. when that happened, if that happened as soon as it should have -- i don't know the answer to that. but obviously people need to know. and personnel practices are generally, obviously discussed in the media but i would like for you to hear about these kinds of things from me -- >> you're hitting it on the head. that's the last place -- i can remember as sheriff i didn't want to read about it in the newspaper. >> exactly. >> when somebody hasn't told me. one last question on the gun issue.

i don't want to beat this to death. but the supervisor that was aware of the officer leaving his firearm or her firearm unattended didn't notify the chain of command in reference to that vice. what is happening to that supervisor? >> that will be addressed as well. because as you mentioned, there has to be a notification process of that supervisor. that's part of the role of being a supervisor is taking action, yes, sir. >> once again, and i know that investigations take awhile. but i would suggest that this is a pretty simple investigation as compared to some that we've had to investigate over the course of our careers that need an extension. like you said, you have a 60-day ruling you can extend to 120, i get it i had to do it too. but these types of actions need to be pretty swift i would think, just for your rank and file, so they know people are held accountable. >> absolutely. i think that's the key to good

discipline is that it be swift and sure and effective. and change the behavior. that's the whole purpose for it, right. >> that's what discipline's all about. >> exactly. >> you try to coach and counsel and do all those things. ultimately they have to know there is a -- there's a penalty if you do that. and my last question if you'd indulge me, is really about the e-mail that was sent referenced the gyro cop testify, the e-mail you referenced that came in at 12:59 p.m. on april 15th.er, the e-mail you referenced that came in at 12:59 p.m. on april 15th. "a man flying gyro copter toward state capitol." that's pretty succinct, i would say. a man in protest is flying a gyro copter and trying to land on the lawn of the capitol. he's tried to notify all relevant authorities.

his name is doug hughes." and more, they give the address. because my staff went on there and was watching it as it occurred as he live streamed his flight from gettysburg. and it goes on to say to the capitol police have they okayed this flight? and land? and please call me phone number. here's my concern. is that's pretty specific. and that, "a," it took how long before you were notified and those at the capitol and those that possibly -- who knows what the intent of this guy is and that's the problem. when the guy climbs the fence at the white house, you don't know what his intent is. we don't want to wait to find out what their intent is because then we're in a mode -- our guys and gal dozen a great job of making the arrest. but we'd rather not be there. so my question is,s do a great job of making the arrest. but we'd rather not be there. so my question is, when were you notified there was a threat to

the capitol? >> i was notified i believe essentially immediately as it happened. >> as what happened? >> as he landed. >> to me it just seems like it would be all hands on deck when you get an e-mail like this and you have the website to go to, that bells should be ringing sirens should be blaring, within your chain of command as to, this is pretty damn important. excuse my language. but it is. and so what i worry about is that whoever got this information just said ah you know, we get this stuff all time. well, this is fairly specific. would you not agree? >> fairly specific. and obviously unique in that regard. obviously didn't say -- the time that it was happening but one could reason that -- >> you read it, fairly obvious in the report it gives his phone number so you can contact

me, wasn't like he was just you know leaving something. because when was -- let me ask you this. the sergeant in arms. when was he notified of this e-mail? >> we made notifications to the sergeant in arms immediately. i don't recall. i can go back and check. when he was -- when they were appraised of the e-mail and the phone call. because we gave them a timeline of what happened. within -- very quickly after the event i gave them a timeline of all the things that happened -- >> chief, did he get a copy of this e-mail? >> did the sergeant at arms get a copy? i know i gave them a timeline. i don't know that the e-mail itself was attached. but we xaf them a synopsis report very close to the event -- >> we had the sergeant at arms in here and asked him questions about this. obviously we're concerned and we don't want to get into any of the classified portion of it. >> right. >> that i would hope we could do at a later date.

i sat on armed services so we have a lot of classified sessions afterwards. but my question -- the sergeant at arms was very -- i don't think he was vague on purpose, but based upon what you're saying is he didn't relate any of this like it's in this e-mail to us. and so i'm concerned about that. and that's why if you didn't notice him with this e-mail, i think that's problematic, at least for the sergeant at arms. and i can't speak for him. so i yield back. i see i'm out of time. thank you. >> i thank the gentleman. we can have a second round of questions. i'd like to now recognize mr. davis. >> thank you, madam chairman. before i go into the questions i had, i just want to piggy back on something that my colleague mr. nugent was talking about with this e-mail. you know we're concerned. that e-mail was very very specific. how many, on average e-mails like that do you get a day?

>> about gyro copters? >> about threats. >> not many gyro copter e-mails -- >> you don't get specific e-mails like that -- >> we get a lot of letters calls, various types of threats or matters of direction is what we call them. if they're not -- they all fall under the threat category. we get probably a couple thousand of those a year. >> a year? >> from all, you know -- of all types, shapes and sizes. >> but chief, you don't get a lot of specific ones like doug hughes is flying a gyro copter today on the capitol lawn, right? >> we don't get many about gyro copters landing on the capitol lawn, no sir. >> that's the first time i've seen that e-mail in our packets and it is specific enough to i think warrant issues. that went to the public information officer? is that a generic account? >> no, it went to our lieutenant who's in charge of that office, and then as i mentioned we got a call -- >> is that lieutenant -- did that lieutenant immediately turn that information around?

>> she sent it i think within five or six or seven minutes to our investigators. >> but still you mention in your testimony, you mention here today in the questions, that you didn't learn about this until it was happening. >> yes. >> we did miss a little bit of the timeline. has that pio been notified that you may want to act a little more quickly on such specific information? >> we've discussed the matter, yes. >> is that pio going to be disciplined? >> she won't be disciplined but we have discussed the matter. >> it gets to my main point. look we understand -- i will bet you common sense will prevail and no officer will ever leave a firearm in a toilet-covered dispenser again in the capitol complex. we will likely not see any gyro copters try and land on the lawn. because we're reactive. and i know -- hopefully you didn't have to put a specific provision in your training manual about not leaving firearms in toilet cover

dispensers. but that's a reaction. what is the capitol police doing to be more proactive? what can we do to simplify the contact process so that all of us capitol hill understand what's actually happening? what can we do, what can you do as capitol police, to simplify the notification process when you get a specific e-mail like my colleague mr. nugent just read to the committee? how do we make things more simple so that we don't just have you come in to react to a certain situation or in this case, multiple situations? >> the notification process was something that needed to be fixed and resolved. i guess never letting a good crisis go to waste. the next day, the deputy chief and i met and we directed that immediate notifications go out to you about incidents up here. there was a fairly antiquated bureaucratic, overly complicated notification process. we've bypassed that and directed

that notifications go out and i'll apologize in advance if you get too many notifications now. but i would rather you be notified than not be notified and that your complaint is that you got too much information than not. so we immediately fixed that literally the next day in terms of that notification process. >> so you fixed those certain situations to react to the gyro copter incidents and leaving a firearm at certain facilities incidents. are there any other issues you're looking at overall within the capitol police to be more proactive to maybe look at simplifying your protocols and your training methods to ensure that we don't even have these situations again? >> well i can tell you from 40 years of doing this, i hate to say this, there's probably going to be some other incident of somebody doing something. but what we have done is i mentioned we've clarified the training. we've added more training to make sure we're discussing it every time officers qualify,

which is twice a year. then we've added online training. as it relates to gyro copters and uavs and those kinds of things we have new training we just put online. i think we're one of the few agencies that did that. as i mentioned we have other agencies mirroring that training to make them aware of those kinds of things. that's an awareness piece of what to do when you see a uav or drone or those kinds of things. that's kind of a fairly unique episode. >> well, chief, it looks like my time's expired. let me end by saying this. i hope you understand that all of us around this committee, we want to work with you. i'm brand new to the committee. unlike my colleagues who mentioned earlier that they haven't had a chance to really work with you. but we're all here to be an asset to what you're trying to do. the men and women who protect this capitol complex and the tourists who come and visit on a regular basis do a great job. we want to help you help them and help you succeed in your

job. so use us to be helpful. use us to help create more proactive procedures and policies. and i look forward to working with you. thank you. >> yes, sir, thank you. >> thank the gentleman. the chair now recognizes mr. walker. >> thank you, madam chairman. chief dine. i believe this is the third hearing i've been part of on the house oversight and homeland security, maybe we've even had a classified hearing or two. i do want to zero in and basically two questions today. and i want to start with going back to your notes on page 5. it says, february 2014, the department fully implemented its new digital encrypted radio system without issues or communications service interruptions. it also says, this new radio system provides coverage to the capitol complex and is now available in areas that previously did not relieve radio communications. i'm on page 5. here's the important part. it says, it also has allowed for

greater interoperability. to date the department has ability to conduct interoperative communication radio bridges with over a dozen other agencies. this allows both parties to communicate directly on each other's radio systems in order to broadcast critical information if a timely manner. according to my timeline it looks to be about 23 24 months. can you tell me was that radio system in play and were these agencies interacting as far as when they first found out over those 24 minutes? >> we did interact, i believe. but we did not use the radio system for this particular incident. it is interoperable. we have interob ra bit with the d.c. police, u.s. park police, secret service. fbi, s.w.a.t. team. a number of other agencies. >> can you tell me did you use telephone? what -- this looks like it's a state-of-the-art, realtime --

>> it was. as i think we discussed in some of the other hearings, if i recall correctly an officer from park police saw the gyrocopter and i believe a secret service officer may have. they made their notifications. they also made notifications to the people that oversee the nrrcc -- >> sure. right. >> we actually were not notified till we saw -- >> with my colleague, mr. davis was just talking about it. if we have this kind of technology, i don't understand when there's not kind of an all points bulletin going on throughout all these agencies. i'm assuming these are two-way radios. >> yes, sir. >> all right. let me move to my next question here. you also talked about -- i guess you've been here about two and a half years. from what i've read and heard you're doing a fine job. there is a communication concern. and you said your goal was to provide i believe "better communication." i admire and i appreciate that goal. but can you give me some of the action steps that you might say,

this is how we can implement better communication from our department to yours, and after you finish that response, i'll yield back to the chairwoman, thank you. >> first of all, as i mentioned we're going to do a better job communicating with you of notifications. i am personally going to do a better job meeting with and communicating with you. and i look forward to that. internally, though, it is really important that we communicate with our whole department. and i was talking to a young officer a month or so ago one night in the evening around kind of all hours of the day and night. and the officer said something that was pretty brilliant. because things get -- go out in the media there's discussion. and he said to me, he said, chief, sometimes then all we know is what we read because we don't hear what the whole other side is or what the department's side is. and, you know, sometimes you learn the best things from the officers on the ground. and i've never forgotten that having been a police officer for now -- in a couple of weeks it will be 40 years.

so we need to get our message out to our people when there's a story to tell about what happened and what happened right and what happened wrong and what the actual story is. so we are going to be putting out more messages on that regard. and having more interactions with our people at all levels. >> thank you, chief. madam speaker, yield back. >> i thank the gentleman. chief, i have a couple other questions i think as well before we conclude here. one is, going packback to my homeland security, mr. walker and i both sit on that committee also. when you go to the southern border you're looking at rheostats there, eye in the sky very sophisticated technology. they're utilizing it. in many cases it's already surplus stuff from the department of defense. things that -- equipment that has had -- been extremely effective in theater, whether you're trying to, say secure a border between afghanistan and pakistan or the rio grande or what have you. it's the eye in the sky. and so just the ability to be

looking at like that is, i think, publicly looking at this chopper, it is difficult for radar to pick up various kinds of things, right? technology is exploding every day, whether it's uavs, drones, i mean, they will be using drones to deliver your taco pretty soon. this is what's coming. how can you be able to assess using technology that's available as quickly as you can? this kind of equipment is very expensive as well. although, again, it's expensive that it's something you have to take into consideration, but ask us. we're the ones who have to get the money, make priorities of what we do and spend money on to to keep the capital and campus here secure, but, really much of this equipment is already got most of the good stuff, but it is something that you may want to take a look at that's effective. i've been in the station the ground stations and it's

unbelievable how clearly you can see from the high distances. everything that's going on and the ability, then, to immediately using the communications to tell the -- again, the boots on the ground look, this is happening. you don't just have to patrol looking for something, this is happening here now, go there. it's unbelievable technology that, again, i'm a layman, but it seems to me that's something you can utilize here. >> yes, ma'am we are looking at that. we had a briefing this morning, and i look forward to briefing you in a confidential setting about some of the things we're looking at, and you already know what they do for you, but there's a lot of technology we're working on at every level with pretty much every agency in the country. we're part of that effort to make sure that we are in on what's needed. the gap frankly, where the gap needs to be closed is once you -- once the vehicle is

identified, then what do you do about it? that's essentially what happened here. even if we knew it was coming, then do you determine you know, what's the action take once you've identified it? clearly, earlier we know about it the better plans we make for evaluations, how we make the systems now, and whether any use of force by us or dod plays a main role is appropriate. you're right. early identification is critical. >> and i don't think i'm speaking out of turn here obviously, the bad guys know we have the equipment. it's not like it's a secret, right? we utilize it. the other question i would ask you, because this is something that's been talked about quite a bit. i said in the opening statement that, obviously, we all recognize the challenges faced by the police departments across the country.

for a number of incidents that happened recently. what's your thought about body cameras? there's been a lot of talk about whether or not it's a good thing, whether it's an expenditure of funds that is worthwhile or it's not to help the police. is it not? does it help the -- does it help all the way around to be able to demonstrate what happens there? i think the capital police that do not use them now and i don't know there's been some thought given to whether or not you're interested in pursuing that. what's your thought about the body cameras? i know there's talk about that. >> there is a lot of talk about it. i want the committee to know we are oppressed by that. i'm communicating with chiefs around the country regularly, conferences, forum, police executive research firm located here in washington, d.c., they take a leadership role in that. they put out, basically, i think one of the reports on the use of body cameras, thousand they are

implemented worksing with chiefs, implemented them, and i think they are a good tool. i would opine that like any piece of technology, they are not a panacea. what's concerning a little is we think future to some next piece of technology, are we going to get to the point where a police officer without a body camera police officer's testimony is worthless? that's concerning to me, frankly. having done this for so long, but do i think it's a potentially useful tool? yes. we are monitoring that very closely to see if it's something that would be appropriately utilized here. there's questions about what happens to the information, how it's protected, and those kinds of things that while there's a best practice opinions about that, are not fully determined.

that's a debate going on here in washington, d.c. what happens to the videos. do they end up on youtube? those kinds of things, but we are closely monitoring. i've read the report, so i'm up to date on, i think, you know, where things are relating to the technology. >> okay. i would just say in regards to that, if you come to the cop collusion or recommendation that that's something you do want to pursue, again you can make a proposal to us and, i mean we want to be your advocate if we can, and in agreement with what you are looking for. the last question, and i'm not sure that if you don't want to answer the question, you don't have to. but i do want to -- i mentioned in my opening statement, i personally have some question, consternation about the current wiring diagram for your management structure. i don't care whether it's you or who the next person will be. just because the way the capital police board is -- the construct of it, as i said it's been in existence for a very long time

and i think it probably has worked well. on the other hand, the largest room is always room for improvement, and it is 2015 so we have to think about whether or not having the sergeant of arms in the senate the house, and architect of the capital deciding who is going -- i mean, hiring firing disciplining, whatever. you have three bosses. you know, i have 750,000 bosses. you have three. i mean, that's got to be a very difficult thing. i'm just not sure it receivers us as well as it could. i'm not sure if i'm really asking you to ask your bosses what to think of the structure, but i throw it out to the committee members as well to digest it all a bit, and i think we may want to think about if that's adequate or whether or not we could i'll prove that. if you'd like to comment, you can. if you don't want to, you don't have to.

>> well, i would just say that i think that the board the board wears several hats and i work with them in both of those arenas. they wear their hats in individual role as individual house or senate or architect. we work with them, their staffs, individually, each and every day in terms of all the issues we deal with individually for their entity. and while i'm at it we also work closely with you and your staffs and while -- we appreciate the oversight that you and your staffs and all the committees provide to us, and i rely on the outstanding people i have that have done that, but that's no excuse for me personally not meeting with you, which i look forward to doing. we have interaction with the staff, and often they are buffers. as a police -- then they they

wear a police board hat where extensively they come together as cohesive entity to give guidance and direction and oversight, so we work with them i guess on several level, and i'll leave it at that. >> very well. any other questions? mr. ranking member? >> yeah, just quickly, madam chairman. thank you for having the hearing because i get the opportunity to meet the chief of police of capitol hill. i do need to get to know you better for a lot of reasons. i work here. i'm worried for the people who visit here but you come to my city? 2016. coming to philadelphia for a convention there, and i want to get to know you better. there's logistics there, field officers, a unique place, everybody's in charge everybody's smarter than everybody else, so i want to fill you in on that and make sure you don't step on land mines while you're there. i do need to get to know you better, and you need to get to know me and the committee betterment thank you for the

hearing, and i yield back the balance of my time. >> thank you very much. i'm certain you'll have the chief bring in a patch to the cheese burger -- cheese -- >> well i feel the same. this person is also the biggest around so this will make your law enforcement supporter closes down the shop three or four times a year for two days. he keeps it open, but all the proceeds goes to the police officers, up to a couple million dollars. >> wow. >> it was worth it. i was proud to bring the chief of police down there, the patch on the wall, put it in the middle of the many, many other patches. come down, and i'll fatten you up with a cheese steak. >> i appreciate that. >> gentleman from florida. >> i have a comment about philadelphia and casting navy-army games there's a couple places with great cheese steak, but i know the one you're talking about.

chief, i would just say that, you know, in reading your response and all that, i think, if you follow through with those things, that'll be a good thing but you hit on something, though, that's near and dear to my heart, you talked to one of your guys on the street. i found, you know, and i'm sure you did too, management by walking around, you do -- it's nothing against the command staff, but i used to have my command staff say, boss, how do you know that? and it's amazing things that you'll hear from those folks that actually do the job. command staff is great but you know, they have their reasons to do whatever to i understand late you -- insulate you, and it's important it you're not having town hall meetings with the folks you ought to. it's a great opportunity. the unions you know i had theupthe union for my sworn patrol officers and below sergeant, and

they were actually my best ally in dealing with issues with benefits and salaries. that's something you can really, really encourage. so, with that i yield back. >> thank you gentleman. >> this is helpful and hopeful to have a follow-up meeting soon for the other issues to discuss confidentially in a less public setting because of security reasons. i would like to, at that time, to discuss with the chief efforts to security outside the capital, the district offices, how we use security to sort through the incoming. if you get, you know a thousand

e-mails a day, that's a way to mind that, of using technology to sort through what's likely to be a problem, what is not, and i don't know if that's done at this point, but that's something i want to explore further. with that i'll yield back. >> i thank the gentle lady and the committee members. pardon me? second that? very good. i think all the committee members, obviously, chief, we had excellent attendance here with an engaged group of members with questions and concerns, and everyone asked them very well, and your testimony was good and your answers as well, although, i think some of us are still scratching our head a little bit about some of the things, but i will say if there's a take away from the hearing that you can see very clearly the members of congress just have the utmost respect for the united states capital police and the jobs that you're here representing, your force of 2,000 folks here. some of your staff and your

folks are here today, and we tell you that in and sincerity, we thank you each and every day. there are so many incidents as i mentioned in the opening statement that we never hear about. you never hear about these things, but they are just handle. they are handled. we are very, very appreciative of the willingness and everybody comes to work willingly each and every day to protect this campus, and as i said, most importantly, all the americans here and we do as a committee, stand ready to continue to work shoulder to shoulder with you and your entire force on our common goal, just keeping ourselves secure and keeping this campus secure and protecting democracy and freedom and liberty all of those things. i thank you very much, and without objection i will also mention that all members will have five legislative days to submit to the chair additional written questions for the witness, which we'll forward and ask him to respond promptly as he could so that that answer is

made part of the record as well. without objection, the hearing is adjourned, thank you.

is two hours. >> terrorism financing combat will come to order. the task force is dangerous nexus terrorism crime and corruption. and to declare recess of the task force at any time. and those that would have five legislative days for

materials to the chair. in the record. without objection the members of the full committee may participate in the day's hearing for the purpose of making an open statement and questioning the witness. and for three minutes and an opening statement. and i would like to rank members for those in establishing and reaffirming the committee's commitment to using the role of the threat of terrorism as well as colleagues here today that will work tone sure the success. in the last hearing that demonstrated the scope of terrorism arm the world and evolved in the face avenue strong american response. the united states has seen some success in shutting the groups out of the international financial system, like squeezing a balloon, this is lent itself to the creation of more suffocate and diverse fudged for terrorist organizations,

groups have become entwined with the trans-national syndicates and involving into the role themselves and engaging in criminal activities that yield more profits and relying on the state sponsorship and great pocket donors, ranking from. and not limited to corruption. and drug trafficking. human smuggling. and extortion. place the methods on top of the other nontraditional means discussed in the last hearing it. is easy to see that the terrorist organizations are better financed than predecessor as decade ago. the day's terrorist groups and trans-national syndicates thrive in insecure regions of the world and the terror organization left side contribute to the regional instability and internal conflict and organized crime exploits environment force financial gain and corruptive influence. to witness the impact of the dangerous union, the united states has to simply look to

the tri border area this. is relatively lawless region along the fronties of argentina, brazil. paraguay. and it has become a base for hizbollah's ill usity activities to fund terrorist operations in the middle east and around the world. hizbollah has engaged in several activities mention and though through them has succeeded in raising a substantial amount of money to bankroll their actions. in fact according to the 2009 rand corporation reports had hizbollah has netted around $20,000,000 a year in this area alone. it is this type of connection that the intersection between terrorism. crime. corruption that the day's hearing will focus on including current techniques that are used by the groups effectiveness of the current u.s. policy and combating them and where the tactics will be improved. groups like hizbollah, and islamic state and boko haram to no longer simply be considered terrorist groups

and they have evolved into suffocated global criminal conglomerates and in order to combat such a volume tile threat. the u.s. policy will evolve as well. that is the purpose for the formation of the bipartisan task force. this is my hope that the day's dialogue with the diverse group of members and the expert panel of the witnesses joining us leads to us the better understanding of the challenges facing us and shapes our discussion of long-term solutions moving forward. this time, would i like to recognize the task force as ranking member and my colleague mr. lynch from massachusetts. thank you mr. chairman. i want to thank the chairman and miss water force their work on this as well as their own and vice chairman. and of course. our panelist this is morning. thank you for helping the committee for the work. the day's task force on the terrorism finance hearing will exam initial the nexus with terrorism, crime and

corruption. and hearing is particularly timely and the director of the national intelligence james clapper. identified terrorism and trans-national organized crime as among the top eight global threats to security when you testified this past february for the u.s. senate committee of armed services. according to director clapper. the transe national criminal groups thrive in the highly insecure regions of the world where terrorist groups that contribute to instability and conflict. while trans-national organized crime groups exploit the environments for financial gain and corruptive influence. and one example of this can be found in venezuela. earlier this week the "wall street journal" reported that the u.s. drug enforcement agency. and prosecutors in new york and miami are investigating the multiple many high level venezuela officials including venezuela's national assembly president on suspicion that they may have turned the country into a global hub of cocaine, and

trafficking and money launder, the investigation is the response to the explosion of the drug trafficking and that oil rich country. u.s. officials say. and i bring up the example of venezuela. douglas has prepared remarks for the day's hearing to discuss how a block of countries will operate jointly as a political project with the under lying goal of harming the united states and as a joint criminal enterprise. the countries are creating a liances across the globe and hizbollah and the drug trade seems to be a huge source of the revenue propelling this. the u.s. department of treasury's asset control sank shonled the corrupt venezuela government officials pursuant to the kingpin designation act. for acting for and on behalf of the revolutionary armed forces of columbia. and that is the narco terrorist organization that

is often a direct support of the narcotics and arms trafficking activities. this crime and terrorism. may not only play out in venezuela but another part of the world. and reported by the state department april 2014. and country reports on terrorism. and the region that the chairman has identified is reflectivive the interrelationship of criminal activity. terrorism and financing. according to the report. the tribe border area of argentine ark brazil and paraguay continued to be an important regional nexus of arms and narcotics and human trafficking counterfeiting the pirated goods and money laundering. social for terrorist organizations. i hope that the hearing will shed light on the pervasive nests threats that i look forward to hearing for witnesses so that we can exam initial the issues and potential solutions further. i thank you for kurt see.

i yield to the balance of my time. >> i would like to rob the committee remember thank you thank you. for the leadership and the vision and the task force for ranking members. clear leadership. and this would be very important and meaningful hearing. understanding the link between terrorism and crime understanding the efforts to deter the terrorism financing. and with drug lords and the benefits. how they are working with the trans-national criminals to move through the financial system. and the same routes for the day. that were used for years in the past. not means previously. but cyber warfare. should we be preparing for, for today.

and the bigger question is what are we going to do to stop it? there are strong concerns that we do not have the capabilities in the intelligence and effective in the goals. the kush effective nests cooperation of the flow of money to terrorists. and i look forward to hearing from the witnesses on the issues and continuing a task force to counterterrorism financialing. thank you mr. chairman. i yield back there. is arranging member of the committee for one minute. thank you very much. mr. chairman. i applaud the bipartisan efforts surrounding the task force and they will serve well to guard against key threats to the national security. today the task force will explore the dangerous new trends. the growing convergence of terrorism and crime. as terrorist organizations motivated and criminal enterprises generally by

greed have been thought to operate from the testimony from witnesses for the day. this is no longer the normal. criminal groups means that the ill usity network. is a local and regional concern have global security. and i'mcations. while all of them approach and necessary. certainly necessary to tackle the issues. effectively. i am hopeful that this task force can serve as a catalyst for these issue that's fall squarely into our jurisdiction. and for the careful review of the current and money laundering. and terrorism by regime to start out i yield back the balance of my time. the chairman from arkansas for one minute. i am honored to be apart of the task force, and the

thanks to the leadership for the thanes national profit number one. how they interact with foreign terrorist organizations and driven by the ideology. when you combine them you have toxic soup. squary examples as note this had morning of the relationship of criminal activity and terrorist organizations and interact throughout the world. i am looking forward to the morning with the fine panel of witnesses to learning more about that and finding out how we can interject that process and stop it. i appreciate it. i yield back mrchlt chairman. thank you. the chair will recognize the woman from arizona. for one minute. ranking member lynch and and security and global security. and the terrorist networks have developed new ways for deadly operations and to threaten america. and terrorists leverage criminal network to keep the

country safe to be a step ahead of them cutting funding off and stopping their efforts. the state is one of the most well financed terrorist groups. 2014 they generated a million dollars per day predominantly into the sale of smuggled oil that is why recently there is an amendment that is was accent today direct the secretary of defense and coordination with the secretary of state and the sectretary of the treasury to pursue efforts for the oil are revenues and necessary efforts. andal the same archeological sites raising the possibility that they will destroy or sell priceless artifacts to fund militant violence. i look forward to my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to find solution that's will strengthen america's security. i yield back. >> we now welcome our witnesses selena who is professor of practice at the william jay perry center for hells fear defense studies in the national defense

study. and professional is a former u.s. dip machlt and international bank we are goldman sachs. and u.s. foreign policy adviser under the clinton and the bush administration. and professor of international security affairs. in the national defense georgetown. george washington. and joint special operations universities. as the state department director of counterterrorism finance programs professor realio managed a foreign assistance programch to safeguard against terrorist financing. the professor is a graduate of the harvard business school. john hopkins of advanced studies and georgetown university school of foreign service. dr. david asher is a junction senior fellow for the center of the new american security and serves on the board of advisers on sanctions and finance in the defensive democracy.

dr. asher has centcom and dea. and and injustice. and the top counter threat. and dr. asher conceived up and the highest profile and money lawnering. and dr. asher organized and ran to noekt national security council and department of state. he received his doctorate in international relations from the university of oxford. a senior vice president of the group and fellow in the new american foundation in washington. royal united services for london and studies of islamabad. from march 2004. the coordinator of the

monitoring team in the united nations in new york. in 2005 he helped to establish what became the united nations counterterrorism implementation task force following the adoption of the global strategy to counterterrorism for 2006. before joining the united nations he worked for the british government both at home and overseas. douglas is currently president of the llc. senior nonresident associate in the center of the strat egyptic and interest national studies. assessment and strategy center. it is a security challenge. and for the two decades before consoling. a foreign correspondent and investigative reporter for the "washington post." and covering the civil wars

and central america. and ellisity diamond trade by charles taylor. radical islam and terrorism financing and the witnesses will be recognized for five minutes to give the oral presentation of their testimony without objection the witnesses written statements will be made apart of the record and following their oral remarks. when they finish their testimony. each of the task forces will have five minutes of which to have asked their questions. on the table, for the witness there's are three lights green go. yellow out of time. red means stop. and the microphone we are told is sensitive. please make sure you are speaking into it with that you are now recognized for five minutes. we thank you for your attention here. members of the task force for the opportunity to appear before you today. and to testify on the dangerous nexus of the terrorism crime and corruption that threatens

the u.s. national security at home and abroad. and actively capitalizing on the weak governments and corrupt shonl. the town the security. prosperity around the world. terrorism crime and corruption. ellisity networks threatened four key missiones to provide security. promote prosperity. and safeguard the rule of law and makes sure that the government will represent the rival the people. and enableres to realize the revenue objectives. leadership, and personnel. and ellisity activities. logistics and communications, weapons and technology. corruption and financing.

and following the money trail this is instrumental to disrupt and dismantle the networks. and law enforcement operations. like the iraq and afghan threat bills. public designations in capacity building programs. as a result of the efforts the al-qaeda operatives complained about the lack of funding for terrorism operatives that they could no longer lawner profits through banks. and measures to combat the terrorism and crime have unexpectedly rooted out corruption at the highest level of government. terrorism crime and corruption have existed since the dawn of time and have gone global with records of profits and violence. in many cases terrorist and games are better arm and funded than the government services and security force that's are responsible for confronting them. we are witnessing a

dangerous convergence of terrorism and crime that threatens our national security. convergence is the process of coming together to have one interest purpose or goal. certain groups are demonstrating a hybrid terror crime behavior like the network of afghanistan. farc in colombia. and isil. all eyes are with isis and brutal beheadings and advances. and foreign fighter. and an example of convergence with the profit seeking criminal activity. and and the agenda. and as you know it will derive income from oil sales and additional fund from extortion kidnapping and stolen antiquities and human trafficking. one of the nine efforts of the u.s. strategies is to disrupt finances. it is focus on the revenue

streams and financial systems. and targeting the leaders and fascilitators with sanctions and they have conducted airstrikes and supply networks in syria and iraq. and as of may 8th. 1 52 tarring vets been damaged or destroyed according to the u.s. central command. s have conduct a daring raid against kristy siefkin and the senior leader in the chief financial officer of ice ill. that illustrates the growing importance of the isis finances and how valuable intelligence collected in the target site could be to attack the networks. to counter we will further leverage that international power and i propose a five following measures. in you can one. increase the resources to the government agencies to having and prosecute terrorism crime and corruption. and number two, retain the

afghan threat financial cell and establish those we merging threats like isis. to coordinate all agencies. and dedicate a percentage of the fines from sanctions and money lawnering to directly support the counter threat financial programs. lastly to promote the public sector to serve as eyes and ears to protect financial crimes. conclusion we have to understand our number that's confront us and denying access to enablers and the flow of funding to groups like isis. and with various proactive agencies to effectively combat crime and corruption in the world. it is a critical tool we have to take advantage of. thank you for your time and

attention. you are now recognized for five minutes. and this is an important issue. and the heart of the matter. money is the war. and and experiences that i have been involved working in terrorism and financing and doing financial operations with drug cartels and governments weapons proliferation experts. and 2007. and the drug enforcement administration that despite is an awesome organization and has done incredible well above and beyond. and united states itself has

become the largest money laundering for terrorism in the world. and the lebanese canadian bank and under the command and control of hizbollah and element within hizbollah. and it is tied to terrorism. and jihad organization. and embassy. 1980s and killed hundreds of americans. that organization is the internal security organization to control the security apparatus and that reaches into the united states of america itself. to garner profit and engage in influence. engaging in something that we would have the criminal resistance. ie using a $808 billion lebanese banking system. the third largest offshore center for dollars in the world i believe. the united states has dozens

of banks with the correspondent relationships with lebanon. three years ago. and lebanese canadian bank. and under the control. and and to advise on. and intercover informants and others to penetrate this all in the public eye. and speaking based on the classified information. and this bank was vying primarily, used cars. in the united states. and in europe. textiles of asia as part of the massive money lawnering scheme along with the outfit that pablo escobar himself set up in the 80s and 90es to run the medellin drug cartel this. is all in opec treasury department document to find

on the web. so with buying as much as a billion dollars a year. and used cars. in the united states. cars that were generating almost no profits actually. exported the cars to west africa where the money was co-mingled with the trafficking proceeds and coming out of europe and the world that we live in is complicated. drugs were flowing. and the money was couriered to the united states and used cars here. and making its way into the lebanese canadian bank the center of the hizbollah money laundering empire. it remains the largest term sports team in the world for a terrorist group. and 2010 the d.a. began to construct the take down strategy that i helped to devise on. i will not get into the details.

we organized the lebanese canadian bank. the patriot act that cut off the united states. bankrupt in three weeks. thank you very much. we designate that had before the medellin drug cartel that was in the center of the thing in virginia for lawnering for a billion dollars a year. and now indicted for the relationship. the lebanese canadian bank as well. and wanted for an arrest. that car parked in west africa and designated those. and never did that before. so it was a huge success. i am here to tell that you today, unfortunately, there are more from the united states itself. to west african car parts and had he's bowl than when we made the designation of 2011 and 2012678 the policy is a great success of

interagency cooperation. international corporation. and the bush administration and this administration has done to try to make a dent of this. unfortunately it did not succeed. we want to discuss the measure that's will help to advance that success. thank you. and thank you. can you turn your microphone on please? vice chairman lynch. and services committee. and to the issue of perennial concern. and along with other forms of violent crime lacks a profit motive. and any terrorist attack costs money. and is reasonable to assume that for the less money that the terrorist group has available.

that the less able it will be to mountain attack. and if it does so limited finances will result in limited impact. the terrorism of course. by an asymetric and suspects of all financially. and and a cheap attack and devastating impact. for example, the last al qaeda attack of the western country occurred in my country. on july 72005. four individuals associated with al-qaeda. transport system in london. and estimated that it will cost less than 8,000 pounds. and and related to terrorism

and other criminalality. for three years since the university. and a reasonable credit rating and multiple bank accounts. and contractors and a 10,000 pound personal loan. and drawn as accounts so very difficult to detect. to those the low costs and that of the financial activities associated with it. and the devastating impact of the united kingdom and beyond the cost of the u.k. economy estimate today be 2 billion pounds in the rest of 2005 alone. so even the unsuccessful attack. that can have a huge impact

and thinks of the costs that originated in the united kingdom. the 2006 plot to blow up airlines that are travelling to north america. the additional security checks are the result that costs billions of dollars. the point that i am trying to make is that terrorism is not expensive to be effective in the primary objective to make people afraid or force governmentes to react. the second point is that terrorists will fund operations into legal means and illegal means. and legal means may include the nations or the self financing of the london bombings. legal means that may include income of traditional means by terrorist groups to control taxing incomes and selling natural resources and so on. and whereas legal means of course may include kidnap for ransom and other things we have heard about.

if is my belief that though terrorists have few times to raise money there. is no preferred means. they do what ever is easiest and most effective them. will raise the money according to the tune sxichlt aiming all the while of course to minimize effort and risk while maximizing a return. and it complicates the terrorism by used by terrorists that is not criminally tainted before it collected. they will establish the bases and control territory and toot areas are ones that criminals use for their own sipments drugs and other contraband and things like that. and there is crime and criminal gang. in my view they are likely to take a cut from the the criminal gangs than to join

the raquets or to compete with them. terrorists and criminals that operate for profit are not natural bedfellows and the criminals see them as dangerous for themselves and also in that they are likely to bring attention from the authorities. and less likely to agree to turn a blind eye to terrorism. people have no sympathy and may attack or portray them if there was approve knit doing so. so there is association with terrorism and criminalality this. is not necessarily a straight forward and no even universal. thank you. thank you very much for the opportunity to testify about the dangerous nix among the terrorism crime and corruption.

i will focus my remarks on latin america where we are seeing the converge ends of three factors in new and dangerous forms. they are the core of what i believe is the significant strategic fit for the united states. i describe the emerging tier for the security to priority. as criminalized states. the states that actively other will use the organized crime that the state craft would rely on active to its fund themselves. with terrorist organizations. and venezuela. and when have you the political project the joint political project among multiple nations harming the united states as well as operating the criminal

enterprise. and in the states to impede activities. and protected terrorism for stable vierpz that businesses crave. and margins of the state. seeking to co-op small pieces of the machinery. the groups will concentrate at the state on levels. within the stable environment. options will become available from the sale of weapons and the use of the national aircraft register stories and the use of banking structures and the national airlines and shipping lines. to move the large quantities and accurate sdifgs diplomatic passports and other identification forms. and resonating that could not be confined to venezuela and concert with allies and ecuador. bolivia.

argentina set out to redefine the political landscape. latin america. and the current government are also alive with the movement. and the alliance has been successful. unfortunately what the policies have brought in internally are the massive corruption and vie rising violence and a collapse of intuitions and under the strategic level. russia and russian organized crime and mexican drug cartels and criminal organizations and revolutionary forces that would by that european union and drug trafficking organization is supported by the boulevard and nations a matter of state policy. and a relationship with the state and nonstate actors will provide numerous benefits to both. farc and hizbollah will gain access to the nations

without fear of reprisal and access to routes for exporting cocaine to the united states and europe. and using the same routes to export quantities of suffocated weapons and communications equipment. and return the government will offer state protection and republicans rewards of the financial ben fists the individuals and institutions derived from the cocaine trade. iranian banks have been bard from the western financial system. and access for the immaterial national markets of bolivia financial institution that's will act as approximate sees and moving through iranian money to originate in their own banking structures. and the significant new evidence of the criminalization of the states. the first recent investigation by the brazilian magazine showing the help of venezuela tried to help iran's nuclear program and international sanctions and the "wall street journal" has a long list of senior venezuela

administration officials being investigated for drug trafficking, recent book chavez boomerang described detail the numerous eyewitnesses cocaine dealings in the highest level of the venezuela government and contacts with hizbollah and farc operatives in angtion meetings and the highest level:.

at our 1st hearing of this task force we had testimony. it was mentioned here today the testimony i will ask a question that the professor could response to. i would like to hear the response the thoughts of each of the panel witnesses. whether or not a concept similar if replicated in latin america could that be an effective means to combat terror criminal hybrid franchises that operate their in latin america?

>> one of the lessons learned unfortunately from our experiences has been that enter agency and law-enforcement collaborative fugitive cells have been successful. in terms of latin america, it depends upon the different groups. a lot of activities are drug trafficking related as well as human trafficking related and we have to figure out which would be the most suited. a concept of creating a task force. the joint the joint terrorism task force established by the fbi are a model that has been studied by many academics as well as other ways to leverage the know-how and resources.

one other one is an effective one the joint interagency task force based in florida. it's an interagency program with uniformed services. the full-time officers mother countries. the primary mission is countering illicit trafficking. they used to be just drug trafficking. they are encountering precursor chemicals as well as alien smuggling. how we can use these lessons learned and applied. >> my experience at 1st absolutely spot on. i do feel that you need

almost an untouchable approach to this stuff. stuff. you need a group of people in charge to you after the money. and have global authority of rome. and has blood today china than anywhere else. in my testimony, massive amount. we have identified. guess what? people are so accepting billions of dollars a year from places like lebanon. we need a top-down approach. we know based on over at evidence that has been presented in court that this is going on. why is it still happening? when you approach -- way you are interested in is important. threat specific.

has blocked, al qaeda, why have we not applied the rico courage -- rico charge. we have more than enough countries in the world that endorse terrorism. >> of the issue of trade -based money-laundering what is your assessment of current policy? >> ineffective. and it is not the lack of effort. everyone i have worked with that i i have had the honor and pleasure to work with. great people awareness of the issues that we never had before. the financial networks are a means to tackle the whole network. it is revolution but it is not working. more has blood money than there was in 2011.

we need to approach these things more like organized criminal rackets. terrorism almost honors these people. we need to impose opec penalties with much greater. if. >> at this time i will recognize ranking member lynch for five minutes. >> i want to i want to thank the witnesses. i've had a chance to read your testimony. for a while with the lebanese canadian bank we had great success using section 311 sanctions and identifying them as primary money-laundering concerns. not just us but the financial community. it saw them as toxic command everyone backed away.

it shut them out of the legitimate, you know, banking system especially the united states. would this work if we expanded everyone want 311 to go after, say, you know, the auto dealers and west africa that are operating? if we, you know if we continue to use that the 11 type five mechanism, would that be enough to choke off the funding? >> we need to look at imposing section 311 against the actual nation. it is a temporary measure. they are going to provide mutual support for terrorists organizations. of course we have section 311.

they can be lifted easily to protect our nation from money-laundering. there is massive money-laundering going on and definitely going to a terrorist organization and the military wing of the and are engaged in activities against our interests in the middle east. east. we do not have these laws on the books for nothing. i believe an enforcement approach is imperative. imperative. we cannot force the bank to be the enforcer of the law. we need law enforcement to get into gear. they are complicated. it can be done. >> let me stop you there. we have a problem coming up

the agreement that the administration is trying to pursue iran. we have sanctions against iran and a number of banks that have previously worked with them on nonproliferation issues and those are major sanctions. the iran sanctions act iran syrian section act and the president is negotiating taking away those sanctions dropping those sanctions in return for assurances and verification that iran is no longer pursuing -- not actively pursuing a military nuclear program. on the on the other hand we have a whole set of sanctions based upon the work that you have been doing, which is -- iran has been financing has block,

islamic jihad. they even gave money to al qaeda. sanctions of allow the economy to grow. what is to stop them from continuing that activity with respect to the work of the islamic revolutionary guard is perpetrating directly supportive of illicit activity the criminal activity. >> moral and human outrage are recent. at the end of the day the terrorism record stands -- for those of us that worked in the war in iraq we had more involvement in attacks then suddenly any other nation state. i was senior advisor to the united states government.

i worked on the dark side you side, you after their finances. we have to have a hybrid approach, but on terrorism we must draw the line. >> is it your understanding that those sanctions things that are targeted toward -- the criminal activity those should remain where they should not it should not be part of the -- >> the record stands. >> right. >> the chair now recognizes the vice chairman. >> thank you. the effectiveness of our enter into communication and coordination as it relates to stopping the financing of

terrorism, specifically u.s. customs and their full access of data would limit access. do you believe that we should be looking more seriously and better coordination particularly as it relates to trade -based financing. should we be looking and targeting this type of cooperation? >> is awesome organization. everyone everyone deserves to take a look. they do not get nearly enough credit. they try to stop more terrorism than any other organization. they are good they are good at receiving data. their ability to take data and use it would be very proper and to the greater good because so much of

trade -based money-laundering is going on these customs receipts that occur you ask for something. they are not linked together. you mentioned section 311 and how effective it was. we saw how important it was willing to north korea. do you believe that this is a central focus that we should have in terms of trying to force some of these institutions cannot be able to exist back do you think there are other institutions that clearly we are in a classified an unclassified briefing from but should that be a focus of our effort? >> the most powerful leader

in financial warfare. something that must be utiliz but periodically. it is it is an incredible course tool and nothing like cutting someone off from the united states financial system. it is not our job to offer access to terrorist groups and criminals to our financial system. 311 offers an option. >> in your testimony you talked. could you compare isis? my senses that there sense is that they are using the same routes and mechanisms and, perhaps, the same people. we have not succeeded in stopping this. not only have we dealt with this but what

should we be doing to stop it? >> it is an interesting question. of course, the program was a huge agreement by the international community through the security council and 91 with saddam hussein, with the government and did allow a certain amount of export of oil in order to be able to allow the iraqi government to fees people. that that was open to many abuses and was, indeed have used. the the scale on which saddam hussein was operating as a government is different from the scale on which this current regime operates. this program $50 billion worth of oil the islamic state is selling up to $2 million a week. a hundred million per year. also whereas the export oil under saddam hussein was authorized, it was done in a

regular way. the islamic state is done on a small scale homegrown refineries it may take it to turkey, kurdish areas even the syrian government. most of it is sold and consumed within the area controlled by the islamic state itself which makes it harder for outside powers to control the possibly turkey generally speaking. >> professor you mentioned some about the transport and sale of oil. minimize that and what else can we be doing. >> the decision specifically to target the oil infrastructure they feed the

economy as well as the movement of people away to family life. having worked on wall street this is not entering global of like minds. a lot of it is person in the turkey but it is driven by those looking for a cheaper gasoline. >> correction. thank you. >> i would like to continue discussion. i am interested in pursuing closing money-laundering

loopholes. and this is i suppose question for mrs. willow. an investigation recently conducted by the new york times confirmed the ease by which anonymous foreign billionaires can purchase real estate with you questions asked. half of residential properties in the united states and now purchased anonymously through show companies. closing as basic questions. anti- money-laundering compliance programs. the patriot act allows them to temporarily exempt entities in a requirement to

establish anti- money-laundering programs. persons involves the listed closings and settlements. the believe large cash purchases of luxury real estate -- they need to be addressed. >> that has been a question. since the wake of september 11 other businesses could be used to wander money and move funds have an illicit nature. so to actually try to enforce a broadening of the coverage who will be required to know your customer and take a look at things such as was said. i do a lot of work and in mexico is a huge issue of the photo. more importantly real estate.

notary public's were critical in order to transact purchases of sale and be required to do reporting and due diligence on the clients and do something we might feel that you should consider here. a a lot of the flow of money in real estate here is also suspected of tax evasion of their home jurisdiction which is something that we should be concerned about particularly if the money is coming from corrupt government abroad covering have coming to seek financial safe. >> several years ago i became interested in money-laundering because we discovered that one of our national banks have purchased the lot of the small banks mexico. they discovered that our banks were not following a know your customer policy.

large sums of money the same thing was true with the brothers from nigeria and well of course am interested in this real estate aspect of it you mentioned them brought up: no your customer problems. i think that given that the statute referenced a lot only temporary exemptions do you believe it is time that those involved in these types of transactions type of transactions should be required to implement us anti- money-laundering programs? >> that is what we're trying to take a look at. as new ways of moving and potentially wondering money or financing terrorism is all we need to think about

legislation that keeps up with these innovations in order to preclude dirty money from entering the system. thank you for your interest on this topic but anything that moves in terms of hiding money couples criminals and terrorists are good at trying to circumvent our measures. >> i i suppose you are aware of the extensive article that was done about the time warner center and it's absolutely startling to take a look at the purchase of those properties is buying them and have it all operates. i think that this information is very instructive. i yield back. >> the chair recognizes the gentleman from texas.