. . based on proximity to the oval office the homeland security advisor never achieve the status of that of the national security advisor. the both had an office in the west wing the homeland security advisor office was in the basement while the

national security advisor was located just a few doors down. this is a clear indication of the prestige and access to push that would be aren't and not granted outright. if you know anything about west wing real estate you know how important it is to have an office as close as possible to the oval office. in terms of creating the department of homeland security on june 5 the bush administration kind of shocked the political establishment by unveiling its plan for knew executive branch department. and bush announced this on a nationally televised address. the plan was developed in secret. many people had no idea that the administration was even going down that road. and of course the proposed

government reorganization require the administration walk back to the denials for the need for new organization because they had denied it for several months. the legislation took just over five months to wait -- to make its way through congress which is rapid for such an incredibly large and massive restructuring of the federal government. we're talking 22 existing agencies, 200,000+ employees that were taken from other agencies, some created and mashed together in this created and mashed together in this new organization but began functioning march 1 of 2,003. left left his position as ohs director and immediately became the 1st director of the department of homeland security. very quickly title ix of that legislation, homeland security act made permanent the homeland security council and institutionalized that it is a council that exists today in the white house and is still functioning. ohs no longer exists.

it you know his 1st year fiscal year $2227,000,000 roughly 130 individuals. two years later ohs no longer existed. it's functions absorbed by the homeland security council. a number of employees 35 in the budget shrinks. i will handed over to my colleague will bring it home >> i keep this brief. needless to say it was pretty much strictly about terrorism. prevent terrorist attacks within the united states reduce the vulnerability of the united states to terrorism and minimize the damage. and obviously as we all no hurricane katrina in 2005 katrina four years later was a tremendous difficulty. one of the things we do is

to chronicle the position of fema federal emergency management agency and the fact that it had as its former director. it had become a stepchild. important to note that even after katrina the terrorism mandate remain that the floor and to this day remains of the four in the department of homeland security even though there is an expansion of the natural disaster mandate. the attention that existed in the white house apparatus and continues we argue to be essentially a.of contention. but the dhs subsequent obama administration change in which the staff of the homeland security council was put under the national security council. it has become -- it has been evident that national

security terrorism mandate is still largely at the four there are some questions as we start to discuss in the conclusion about whether there should be more of an institutional, particularly the leadership role that deals with these natural disasters this drawing sets of natural disasters. as we all no natural disasters are increasingly a problem. tremendous. over $1 million. it's on the rise as we saw this last winter. the question about homeland security continues to be an ongoing issue. briefly the lessons learned i think among, among the many that we don't have a chance to get into is that it is very clear the rich discussions we have had with our interviewees that the flexibility and the adaptability of the small

team the people many of whom have worked together in other agencies the department of transportation otherwise was key to being able to burn through a lot of the red tape in the beginning. the people were essentially able to subvert the nature of the national security council which was the big kahuna since 1947. many of the other bureaucratic you know, issues and problems with rebuilding especially flexibly and adaptively. they rebel became the more normalized, institutionalized department of homeland security as the case maybe more integrated agency. so i think it's going to be

an interesting discussion. these people as they say, larger project. among other things we are hoping to find out soon the details about how people saw some of these transitions in the later stages especially the obama administration. but it is evident that the small team from the leadership perspective was able to help corral agencies and people that might not otherwise have been willing and able to do so to respond quickly. participants said multiple times. in 1840s -- national security council did not have. [inaudible] basically and standing up the whole apparatus the threat of terrorism additional terrorism is like

trying to change a tire on a truck where it's going down the highway at 60 miles per hour. they didn't amazing job in adapting to the circumstances of the time and cutting through red tape and setting the stage for the normalization and the reorganization of government [applause] >> thank you. thank you for that presentation. we will move we will move on to the next paper which is strategic staffing after september 11. george w. bush's national security. >> thank you. i am honored to be here. as dave acknowledged this conference series has extraordinary reputation. i am delighted to be a part of this. before i get started thanks to the center and hofstra

for putting us on in putting together such a great program. as the program indicates the title of my paper is strategic staffing after september 11 and focuses on the utilization of what are often called presidential policies ours. particularly how bush use these policies ours to manage key aspects of the war on terror at various times and in different ways in the years following the terrorist attacks. the research that i presented my paper and that i will talk about briefly comes from a broader project about the czars in general. my partner on that project are publishing a book this summer with the university of michigan press that focuses on the evolution and rise of presidential policies ours as a managerial tool.

for those for those of you who are starting christmas shopping early it comes out june. it will fit in a stocking especially if you are celebrating holidays in july i am happy to autograph the. we can talk after the panel about that. in in the meantime the research that went into that book was motivated by the hullabaloo that president obama's allegedly over reliance on czars cost during his transition and office and in the early months and even years of his presidency. we found this development and phenomenon to be fascinating and mysterious and spent a good number of years learning more about that. before i discuss what we learned in particularly how early the president i might clarify exactly what we mean when we use the words are. in our research we defined

czars has members of an administration tasked with coordination or responsibility over a particular policy problem that said administration is intent on either solving or at least appearing to solve. what i want to talk about this afternoon is where czars come from what the pressures are that lead administration is to create them and what they are able to accomplish. i will talk about that a little bit particularly with respect to the experiences of george w. bush's post 911 czars. presidents use czars when knew complex problems facing the nation become salient creating a political and policy need for action. for example richard nixon used colorado governor and later william simon and his administration's response to the energy crisis of the 1970s. i noticed was sitting in the audience earlier the franks

our school of business. franks are was also and energies are. more recently barack obama has used ron plane to coordinate the inner agency response to the ebola epidemic. both of these cases nixon's use of energy czars and obama's use of ebola czars presidents appointed these czars of their own initiative. the policy problems are solved. there were political reasons to be seen as solving them. the presidents on the development of this phenomenon. other times such as the case with george hw bush and the institutionalization of the drugs are in the late 1980s the development of azar is actually spurred by congressional action and not surprisingly by the

preferences or incentives facing the president. following september 11 to a george w. bush administration created at different moments three districts arms. there was the homeland security czar which dave talked about at length. the national intelligence czar which we have the fortune of having as a featured attendee of this conference and you will be in the panel in this from following this one and then the so-called wars are. between these three we see examples of both presidential initiatives and institutional response to congressional pressures. one one of the ways that i like to refer to the difference between us to causes for the development is an offense or defense of approach to creating czars. so when presidents are doing things on their own volition

you see the presidents kind of engaged in politics whereas when they are doing it as a response to external pressures it's more of a defense of approach. for example as dave already covered president bush named governor governor tom ridge to be director of homeland security not long after the attacks. the position was initially housed in the executive office of the presidency. ridge was only officially responsible to the president that created quite a firestorm. a controversy erupted over whether or not bridge had to testify before congress. that controversy is never really satisfactorily settled and eventually they negotiated a private conversation with key members of congress that was not on the record and therefore i guess did not intrude upon the bush

administration's claims of executive prerogative. the other two czars that we will talk about today however are examples of defensive czar politics. the national intelligence are came about after the september 11 commission released its report july of 2004. the institution -- the position was created by an act of congress. the bush and ministration initially opposed the creation although it was in large supportive, but despite his opposition did implement the position in a way that was generally consistent with the preferences of congress. the pres. signed a law that created the position and among other things into law in december of 2,004. in 2005 john negroponte who had served as ambassador to the united nations and to interact was announced as the nation's 1st intelligence are. negroponte was a high-profile choice and that received a lot of kudos

when he was selected but it is also worth noting he was an individual who came to the position without prior experience in the intelligence field. the wars are who was also the result of external pressure chaired by james baker lee hamilton the bipartisan blue ribbon iraq study group issued a report in 2,006 that included suggesting the creation of a high-level position charged with coordinating action between the department of defense department of state and all the other various agencies that were involved in the ongoing war efforts of the time. the white house is pretty unenthusiastic about their suggestion to add on what they viewed as another level of bureaucracy even though they knew that the growing perception at least was that both wars were going quite

badly by that time. unsurprisingly, given the administration's lack of enthusiasm about this position when they turned to staffing it they had trouble attracting top shelf talent. many of the people that they wanted to have in this position realized that it would be a toothless role and they did not want -- they did not really relish the idea of competing against vice president cheney and other important administration elites over war and foreign-policy politics. in fact, the bush administration was rebuffed several times when they attempted to fill the slot mainly by well-known retired generals. eventually the administration settled on lieutenant general douglas lute who took the position in 2007 and held it for several years including

into the obama administration. between these three cases we see a range of causes underlying why the positions were actually created. all three -- the one thing all three had in common was they were responsive to simultaneous political and policy crises. but one was a unilateral presidential action the creation of the office of homeland security and the selection. another was the result of congressional action. there was the creation of the intelligence our position and then a 3rd was created by the administration but unenthusiastically so and that was the creation of the wars our position that douglas neufeld. so in that sense the post-september 11 post- september 11 bush administration experience tracks with what we know about the broader history in the white house. administrations just as often adopts czars under pressure congress and the public as they do in a

unilateral attempt to push their own agendas. in other words presidencies use czars just as often at the request or insistence of other branches as they do of their own volition. this is important for a couple of reasons. one, the controversy surrounding them portrays them as unilateral tools by which presidents can't can subvert the constitution en route to achieving their nefarious goals. two, it is important because the success often times depends on the source of there position. the administration's interest in the creation of a particular czar is a major factor. is not the only one one but it's important when it comes to determining how successful one we will be able to be. although presidential enthusiasm for the creation matters that is not all important. in effect there are cases when a president opposed the creation of azar but then when there hand was forced empower them.

case in point the aforementioned george hw bush and the drugs are experience. bush had campaigned and 88. the idea of creating one, but when the law was passed and president reagan signed it thus requiring the winner of the 1988 election would have a drugs are he did a 180-degree turn and said, well everyone have this position must make the most of it and began the high-level emphasis of the early years of the bush and ministration. conversely bill clinton campaigned in favor of creating azar to oversee the nation's response to the aids epidemic in 1992 but then once he became president he did virtually nothing to empower any of the individuals that held the position of the next eight years. so so whether or not the president is on board initially with the idea is a

good indicator a good indicator of how successful he will be but not a permanent indicator. in the process of writing a book we learned that on any given czars ability to lead and succeed is highly conditional. it depends on a range of factors. these factors include of course whether or not the position is the result of presidential offensive or defensive action but also the czars substantive expertise managerial experience if they are a pioneer in the position or simply replacing a previous are the extent to which they have a relationship with the president and as they pointed out with respect to their project the individuals are's proximity to the president. again the experience of george w. bush's national security czars have some central commonalities but different experiences with respect to these factors. let's quickly discuss each in turn.

the homeland security czar for about a year and then became sec. secretary of the department of homeland security in november of 2,002 and served in that capacity for two years. despite the kerfuffle over congressional testimony and a much lampooned proposed alert system notwithstanding his tenure is pretty well regarded. he had an important voice is not the most important voice at the level of other central figures and was responsible for giving shape to the department and helping develop the national security strategy that was released in 2,002. any substantive experience, but he experience but he brought with him significant managerial experience from his time as governor of pennsylvania along with the pioneering nature of his opportunity that he was given as the nation's 1st lead official on homeland security and combined with president bush's commitment to the issue enable them to

become a comparatively successful czar. ambassador negroponte had a lot in common. the creation of his position was a congressional initiative he was a well-known and valued member of the bush team. he did not possess substantive experience in the area in which he was assigned but he did have significant managerial and diplomatic credentials knew the political terrain inside of the on the white house well. and his ability to enhance his prospect for success. other leaders successfully wage turf battles allowing them to get beyond the purview of this position. eventually he would lose important conflicts and ultimately would lose the director of national intelligence position and

move to a different position, the department of state. substantively and politically we can say he was unsuccessful. he performed well. even as he lost power gradually two other key agencies and individuals within the administration. this decline would continue with subsequent czars having increasing amounts of power. finally arguably the least successful of the three national security czars. no one's 1st choice for a position that the white house was not all that excited about creating in the 1st place. as such he came into the administration facing an uphill battle. not necessarily noteworthy and it was not until the last several months of the bush and ministration that president bush took advantage of his presence. he ordered him to prepare an

exhaustive soup to nuts strategy review of what was going on in afghanistan. the report was a major effort but it was not presented to the bush administration national security council until november 26 2008. three weeks after barack obama had defeated john mccain and less than two months before the bushes were moved back to texas. the report was well-received that went nowhere. he would end up staying on in the position under the obama administration but also in a situation where he was relatively powerless. he stayed in the wars are capacity until 2013 when he became representative to nato which is a position he holds today. we cannot consider him successful because he did not do much to counteract the problem that motivated the creation of his position in the 1st place. he cannot credibly be blamed for his lack of success. the administration's lack of enthusiasm for the position along with his lack of

political capitol and nonexistent relationship with the president assured his marginalization. to summarize analyzing his national security czars interesting and useful lens through which we can view the evolution of the administrative. they experienced expressed different levels of support success but taken together they provide a reasonable approximation of the experience of presidential czars in general as we have seen over the past half-century. the stereotype is an unconstitutionally empowered super bureaucrat who operates with the president's undivided in the limited support. the reality is far more complex and far less threatening. thank you. [applause] >> thank you.

well we have two really interesting papers by some of the best experts in the world of these issues. now we move on to some great discussions as well. our 1st discussion will be >> thank you. i want to get onto the q&a as quickly as possible but as long as we are doing shameless advertising i encourage you to go on amazon and get my book beyond the storms which talks about this issue in the context of the current historic and consequential events in the war on terror homeland security command the need for resilience. the enemy is persistent patient and, and among us. this idea of pushing our borders further and further out and trying to avoid that which is inevitable is what we're facing now. this this generation here, the students are going to have to be prepared whether it is as our who lacks a budget lacks authority and jurisdiction or it's a structure that is uncertain we're going to need you to

be versatile, adaptive, and critical thinkers. so i. so i am encouraged to see this younger group out here and for hofstra to host us. looking at the papers i really like this one. i was one of the co-authors i must say. i appreciate this. the analysis of ambassador negroponte's position if he were here he might have some reactions to what he said. i listened to some things and having been there when we stood up very interesting. i think everything we here and read and listen to right now needs to be taken in the strategic context of the post september 11 environment with the war on terror and this conflict that continues with the current version of al qaeda. there is a timeline of history. these these are historic times we're trying to get a handle on things. we learn as we go.

the other factor the other factor i take from these papers is personalities matter. individuals again trust and had a a habitual relationship with some of these leaders all of a sudden find themselves thrust and do an opportunity to lead and an opportunity when governor ridge is sitting in harrisburg, pennsylvania and a certain not from the coast guard shows up in a begin talking about what a future department of homeland security look like, those conversations started in forums like this among classrooms and among your experience. my encouragement from the papers and from the experience with these individuals is go out and get operational experience and learn something that you can integrate your academic experience with so you will be the ones they come to the set up the next -- the future department's the future czars. you will be the ones we look to the sort of these problems. this is not a stagnant a stagnant discussion frozen in time but rather part of an ongoing context. when i worked for doctor

rice and steve hadley in the national security council i was there about three months and was asked if i wanted to shift to a position in the homeland security council. a little poking around, looked at one of the new guys on the staff 106 a senior officer from each branch of the military and quickly came to the conclusion i wanted to hit my wagner something like the national security council. when you look the enterprise and was about to be formed really was designed to be integrated into the national security. if you read the book from the council on foreign relations he writes that all national security, all force projection, all international influence begins at home. national security and homeland security lines blurred. we still of the northern command in colorado springs. we told the four-star combatant commander to figure homeland defense and homeland security.

as difficult because this issue is a broad enterprise designed in 1947 by the national security act but when you say looking at the threats opportunities and moving parts of foreign threats in sri lanka or jakarta i wonder because of globalization in the issues of today are really in the homeland as well. we have to look at how we get structures that best suit that. again there will be future changes to the us government structures. but we are going to have to be versatile, adaptive asymmetric, nonlinear leaders were able to think on there feet and bring your experience your approach your personality to get solutions to quantify and help leaders make better decisions. gravitas and reputation will only get you so far.

you you are eventually going to have to put together a team and show the viability, the nonredundant unique contribution that that agency or organization you formed is contributing to the us government. leaders like doctor rice fran townsend, the 1st homeland security advisor, steve hadley will ensure you and your organization find a place if your contributing in a way to the current issues du jour, the threats does your. the last comment i would make and again all these are stimulated as i listened to both papers here these -- be circumspect, critical thoughtful as you read papers like this because we did our best to chronicle what happened. the fact is we look back at it and see gaps. in the obama in the obama administration presidential policy directive number

eight, unpreparedness. presidential policy directive number one deal with preparedness in a way that would kind of address some of kerry's concerns. we focus have a fixation in a post-september 11 world on counterterrorism and security to the exclusion of these rising emerging, persistent natural disasters and so the context of a lot of the work that you have to have a habitual ongoing posture of readiness for that which is inevitable. as they do in israel and many other countries if we shut down the economy, if we are not prepared command this direction whether it's as our or any other structure we have to be adaptive scalable, and flexible to that which is inevitable. from natural disaster man-made disaster or any disruptive event including extreme weather. resilience weather. resilience does not care what the disaster is. it will make us better. the solutions for this just

like the example of the homeland security council they are attempts by leaders to face vexing problems with creative solutions. that is where i draw encouragement from the young audience the students that are out here and the creative minds. we have we have got to figure this out. right now as someone who is still inside the beltway, we need beltway, we need your help. we need conferences like this papers to help us think -- to help us think through this issue. >> thank you. [applause] >> let's move on. >> thank you. thank you professor. thank you fellow panelists for great presentations. presentations. i will be very quick as well because i want to get to the audience questions. i i am looking at an organization like the department of homeland security very much in the outside. i would be interested in all of your responses to what

i'm about to say. again, take this from somebody very much in the outside. president bush was initially against this legislation before he was for it. and i have often wondered the extent to which elect oral or political pressures were responsible for the switch. i believe that occurred in 2,000 if i'm not mistaken. an important off year election. my impression looking at dhs. i wish president bush had stuck with his initial position. it seems to me there was some tinkering that needed to be done, but not the sort of wholesale massive merging of 22 existing agencies and the one that was done relatively hastily as was pointed out. looking at it from the outside it looks to me like what dhs did the effect of it has been to create more bureaucracy more red tape

more layers arguably less presidential discretion due to the fact that there is more congressional oversight involved, more testimony. that has been a big complaint. there is just this constant calling officials up to the hill. so again looking at it from the outside it seems to me that you could make the case the department of homeland security is exhibit a of a federal government that is simply too big too cumbersome and in an arena involving security is strikes me as something we should all be concerned about. in other words, has or is dhs become too important to fail? it seems to me the track record over the past ten ten or 12 years has not been an encouraging one. and if you look at the damage done to fema and arguably the damage done to the secret service there

has been a real costs to some of these agencies in terms of losing their autonomy. i just want to be the naysayer here and ask you to respond to this notion that what happened in the significant piece of legislation was not necessarily good for the security interest of the united states. thank you. [applause] >> no need. [laughter] >> sure. i can go 1st. a a slight correction on the timeline. >> sure. >> after september 11 the administration was definitely against a large-scale reorganization in terms of creating an department of homeland security. something changed at the beginning of 2,002. and you know bush himself decides to rethink his position against it. i believe it was around april 2002 that secret

negotiations take place within the administration. administration. i counsel everyone to read peter baker's book because he has a nice description of the secret negotiations they go on as part of the small group. gonzales, the white house counsel, roberto gonzalez command he car in the immediate deputies are in the room. they actually meet in the room and the white house presidential emergency operation center. i believe i believe it is about three to four weeks of secretly meeting. it's essentially the white house bunker. it was built during fdr's term when they were concerned that there was no bunker to protect the president.

the surprise attack. in fact the puerto rico front is the one that became famous on september 11 the one 11th the warmer dick cheney was essentially lifted by secret service and carry down the hall into the room underneath the driveway near the east wing. and so on the negotiations take place for a few weeks and then they unveil a plan which was a complete surprise to just about everyone in the administration. took everybody off guard. congress did did not know. and highest level people in the white house did not know except for those immediately involved. dhs has had some serious missteps. we talked about hurricane katrina. putting fema and the dhs and downgrading the fema director's position from one of being a cabinet level position which it was during the clinton administration to where it became dhs was a grave mistake and predated dhs. when the bush and ministration came in and he put his former chief of staff when he was governor

of texas and is fema director that began an immediate process of downgrading that agency and that position. and that brings me to something that was mentioned earlier which i believe you i believe you said personalities matter. i think that is something that is often overlooked. especially in social science organizations matter command vigils don't. i think that's a terrible mistake an incredibly shortsighted and really not very sophisticated and unrealistic. personalities absolutely matter. i think they i think they certainly did in the case of the people that were put in to direct fema. your.is well taken about the secret service. we can see some that our current today. the problem the secret

service has which predates dhs as well. >> if i could add really quickly i think the argument is in many ways the early structure was lean and mean and flexible. by replacing it with this 22 agency structure in many ways and validated the leadership part of it. one of the problems is it has the lowest morale. the the reason is all these great people with great ideas and potential are basically -- not all of them, but many of them are swallowed up by the structural leadership that continues. >> you know, the mission the natural progress of the mission has continued to be downplayed. >> thank you. >> yeah.

dave you did a great job telling the story of how this 180 degrees change happened in secret. i think it was motivated by couple of things and i agree with your assessment of the consequences. one, as colin egli and o'sullivan papers indicate there was a lack of comfort with how well they were able to proceed with the limits on authority and spending that the rich and these otherwise on institutionalized individuals were able to have. and then they saw -- your going to need congressional support to do anything bigger and more effective. they saw the option coming down the road at them which

is still the transplant. i think they just 71 a do a better job. if we want congressional participation in this which we would need to do a better job our choice will be joe lieberman's proposal all we can get together and quietly come up with our own. and that's what they did. so. so i think it was motivated by politics but also policy desires. and then you know unfortunately by making that massive reform and creating this unwieldy organization that lost the kind of sense of mission ended up undermining the very purpose of the initial development itself. >> i see the lack of morale. i see the damage. i see the challenges. i'll take the contrarian view self-serving because i help standup dhs.

career coast guard. leadership matters. leadership matters. it is not necessarily the structure of the organization although that has some hurdles and difficulties but secretary chertoff showed us there were some high points. the revolving door, people just coming and going is a symptom of a problem not the problem. i think if you look at the current administrator for fema he would tell you there are good things that have happened. notwithstanding the challenges that have been well articulated be careful with some of the leadership we have out here and some of the things that are coming to my have four kids are revealed as was an air force pilot. the war is not over. we have some sharp people coming up through the ranks some experience we have learned from making mistakes and experience we bring to the forefront. my secret service friends i'm not sure they would say they were damaged. it was a significant challenge. no question about it. but that is why we do things

like this. it's going this. it's going to take courage. is going to take uncommon leadership. my father's and will -- my father's a world war ii marine. their generation was faced with nasty problems. that generation is called the greatest for a reason. not to get patriotic or preachy but i think i am encouraged when i see this current generation looking at this with an eye that i don't think we're going to need -- will leave on a encouraging out because these departments are waiting for young people were educated and come out and say we are not so willing to believe all the kool-aid that other. >> thank you very much. a quick question if anyone wants to respond to it. a 10,000-foot question. if you think about what happened with homeland security a change in the government structure at the agency level. and the only thing is

university bureaucracy. and i'm just wondering if it serves as a model for this issue that the professor spoke about. do we need to be more adaptive and scalable? if you consider issues on energy really have a department of energy but issues that relate to security issues that relate to the military is the largest user, was happening in venezuela and the middle east. i wonder if you think it serves as a model for which radical change in the organization of the executive branch. >> academic. >> pardon? no the presidential level, in the executive branch of government if you think the reorganization of homeland security serves as a model for other agencies. >> i think there is some lessons that can be learned on both sides positive and negative. what i see emerging is a

unique approach which is public-private academic partnership. the money is not there. no matter how much we put our policy, policy proliferation of doctrine, guidance papers so forth the needs of our nation are dwarfed budgets are dwarfed we can no longer throw large amounts of federal dollars at it. what are you left with? how do we incentivize the venture capitalists a private investors and the private sector who will own and operate the majority of our national infrastructure? and then academia i think, represents a non- conflicted independent review honest broker who can look at it without the agenda the tour examples of some of these. a refreshing thing to me whether i agree or disagree is that it is stimulating the kind of thinking and solutions and ideas. i think there are lessons there. >> and i thank you. >> i also think secretly

negotiating the biggest transformation since world war ii over just a few weeks in a basement and the white house is probably not the model going forward for creating a brand-new entity. i think it was just a unique time. i think part of it was political as justin said, but also i think part of it was the administration did not -- they wanted it to be their blueprint. by doing it in secret and shutting basically the whole world out they can make sure that whatever got some in the congress was exactly what they had in mind as opposed to having congress and other interest groups muddy the waters. >> the usa patriot act the same thing. >> all right. thank you. questions from the audience. questions from hofstra students. students. there is a question from our student body will start with you.

>> you know, we can talk about the college basketball tournament. >> all right. >> it will take a question right here. the microphone. >> world war ii being the greatest generation. what we really need now is another greatest generation. millennial's only 5 percent voted in this last election. how do we get this reverse? >> well i will take the 1st one. i was the optimist. you know i can't address the percentage that voted. what i can address is what i see by the resumes i look at the individuals, the enters i have my own for teenagers. i have four members of my family serving on active duty right now for more as

an air force pilot the just came back for the region the other is an apache longboat helicopter pilot the other one is a marine in the otherwise air force special forces. young kids that grew up playing computer grains and the rest of us got the left. they are leaving us in the dust. a generation is patriotic, motivated, incredibly ready to take on the threat and answer the call to duty. so i think in some ways the voting will take care of itself. i went through a season in my life were was not as responsible as i should have been in all of a sudden something happened in my late 20s early 30s by american had kids. i think our generation is in better shape than we read about. so that is just my perspective. there are positive things. i look look at this conference and a man escorting me today i think our country is in pretty good hands. i have young men and women working for me for 30 years. 30 years. they saved my bacon more

than once and i learned a lot from the. i have no doubt i really don't. this young man escorting me around today gave me a few suggestions that have served me well in a short time of not. i think the statistics bear out his anecdotal experience so we know that millennial's like many young cohorts are voting at the levels of older cohorts, but we also know it is an extraordinarily engaged generation. they participate in civic life and a variety of ways at far greater rates than any of the predecessor generations. they volunteer more. they get involved in protests. they travel to help refugees in response to flooding and

hurricane in new orleans and so on and so on. there there is no shortage of academic work looking at the differences and how this particular generation approaches the idea of being a good citizen and a different way than there parents or grandparents are great-grandparents. the manifest and voting for a variety of reasons. maybe most notably a growing distrust of major institutions. but it manifests and lots of other ways. >> one of the things i think to some extent counterpoint, i appreciate his enthusiasm and optimism but i think the polls indicate that millennial's in many ways are disaffected by government. they are fed a message to the government does not work and is bad and they see the dysfunction in congress command it is a dysfunctional system

probably the worst it has been in many generations which is part of the problem. there is this mixed message. i was there or more messages like dean's that government can be a good thing, but this antigovernment trend and the fact that the us government is pulling out of funding the crumbling infrastructure especially the public infrastructure has led millennial's to feel as though their votes don't count. recent political scientists have also demonstrated in many ways the system is devolving toward oligarchy. citizens united in the role of the rich has become increasingly empirically analytically possible. that is part of the problem. i would say part of what we need to do is to reassure millennial's that their votes will count in them being part of government is going to be useful thing because we have strayed away from that considerably. >> right there.

sorry. we will come back to you. we seem to have coming from the panel a description of the dilemma. homeland security on the one hand basically two ways you can go when you have to do something in a policy area. one find is our, our given that is our staff try to get that sort of pull everything together. did not work out that well because those are do not have enough power, budget. ultimately something more was deemed needed. something more turns out to be a bureaucratic nightmare. i think steve get it right. the department of homeland security has not been highly successful and is not a model. a model. okay. optimists, what else can we do? why have done?

a 3rd model is there some other approach that somehow transcends the limitations of both of these? >> that is a great glass half-full question for the panel. i think dhs is an extreme bad example. the example i would like to talk about is the creation of the department of energy. the department of energy pretty much started as the energies are in the early 70s and in over the course of several years the position gradually became more institutionalized. for a variety of reasons congress and president next and were not able to work together to institutionalize a position in the early 70s. gerald ford and jimmy carter became president. the need for leadership was seen across the different

branches. they were able to come up with a model that works for everybody. that led -- and so he was the last because i believe the next person who would have had that position would have been secretary schlesinger it was the 1st secretary of the department of energy. and so it takes time to do that negotiation and to work out what needs to be done. as probably not eight months or whatever i would have been the case always the case going from tom ridge is homeland security czar to the department -- to the secretary department of homeland security. i think that evolution can happen. this one was a really fast and not well thought out one

>> the next question and try to get the questions in. >> do you think that the government would profit by helping graduates in school now that have very high loans to encourage them to come to the government with some kind of a program to help them pay their loans off? >> i mean, i think so. since i still have, you know, lots and lots of loans to pay back. >> in the back there was a question. >> a common name that we hear is you know security is intrusive to the american public and the threat to the individual. yet when we compare

presidential powers over time from lincoln to wilson to roosevelt and others others command doesn't seem like it is particularly intrusive in our current era i just wonder what the panelists think about the general idea that having a security apparatus is a threat to the american individual kind of a historical perspective positive or negative and security of threatens individual liberty. >> i i would like to jump in on this. first of all, you make a great. there are ample historical examples the president's engaging and what the american civil liberties union would call intrusive violations of privacy and so forth. there is a very long history of that activity. in fact george washington was an advocate of mail opening. i don't know what he would think of today's national

security agency, but he had no problem instructing his agents during the american revolution to open up the mail or suspected tories or americans who were suspect for some reason. in fact, not only did he favorite he provided instructions as to how to do it without being detected. and so you go on from there. lincoln, woodrow wilson roosevelt harry truman and so forth. all of these guys had a security apparatus i was extremely intrusive. thank you for raising that question is i think we lose sight of that. now, that does not necessarily make it right. we have certainly had pieces of legislation enacted in the post-watergate post- watergate years that have changed the way we think about these kinds of things. but but to historical roots of this kind of activity a very deep. i often think there is a double standard applied particularly to this presidency, the bush

presidency. >> temper that perspective a little bit. ..

>>

>> what we need to do is increase security to maintain civil liberties and dari economy. this may not we well publicized or understood that the edward snowden accusation of this gathering information to stockpile and have it there with the fisa court will have to issue a search warrant later. it was tested to be found legitimate oks it was consistent with the charter's suppose nine illiberal with hatred after others american public the congress was okay was certain degradation with

economics of the impact of that. to be critical thinkers general alexander if you hear him speak he will defend a great four-star general that we will compile the information and if we have reason we will have a fisa court search warrant. with dave role of law in society. so some of this is no question there are vulnerabilities of by the same token with the american public is not willing to sleep that night with three securities simultaneously so we have to do that because we will face more fighting in the homeland the radicalize individual does not need to go to afghanistan to trade to be

radicalized they can do individually on the internet with virtual jihad park we have a country that is foldable in tweeting toward knowledge that so many to raise security and maintain our economy shot down our economy and civil liberties there is a way to do all three simultaneously. >> i remember with american activities and so forth is a double-edged sword but the brother who went to check chaff not -- chechnya and

then said bylaw we could no longer but in the old days it would have said to the state police in the local sheriff is this fair you have to follow him so i'm just saying that you do have to find a new balance somewhere. i do not know what that is by raising that point for you. >> i would agree that in response to my fellow panelists with technology expanding on us scale if george washington would come back to day but i also think since the 1970's the checks put in place those that were

involved in a surveillance decisions than they were with the nixon and ford presidency but the system has responded it is not foolproof for sure but there is margin -- more in place then used a racist. >> we will have to agree to disagree. >> dash shown to be of rubber-stamp. >> many have been shown not to have much probable content. >> there have been some good studies but is based on flimsy evidence but i would gsa it is rooted significantly for someone who is ill intention to that is the big issue and the

founding fathers were concerned about. >> but you did have presidents the use that for political purposes. >> there is the track record there is more in place today. it was secret for a reason. >> i have the question discussing the efficacy of dhs. >> have you spoke more about red tape and how that affects it? and the sharing of information between agencies and how that was changed?

>>. >>. >> with the department of homeland security in terms of red tape and leadership could you speak to sharing information between the 22 different agencies? >> i think there is some healthy things that occurred with that this functionality as we integrated to a of the 22 were left alone and not touched. 20 were integrated. there was some painful integration and a lot of bureaucrats were a happy. -- unhappy those that

criticize i would say i watched a lot of smart and dedicated people that were highly educated beyond the secret meeting in the basement if you have the better idea i think the obama administration would like to hear it because they have two years left so if you have a better idea we're really good at critiquing after duke lost to wisconsin >> we are a good bet that but as one that has the battle scars to show for it, tell me what he would do with the trauma and the crisis that swept this country. something would happen whether we agree or write

papers about it but i have to tell you something was going to happen if you have a better idea, sir the sure resonate and let's get the creative ideas we cannot be with the notion that morale is so low therefore it is bad but there is a very good things that are happening. the enterprise called teach us to go down to research any event called katrina we saw some dynamic leadership or he didn't have authority and the jazz was struggling supply and not blindly waving my hand to say that was the only option but we were looking for better ideas. one last point it took us 25 years to get us figured out

a joint military interagency environment for good dhs will take a long time to become functional. >> maybe a more scaled-down version may be dhs was the better idea in dicot -- kept >> out of this and maybe better robust secret service is to different agencies because they have a dual mission that is confusing that is monetary investigations to protect the president and other officials. they are to a related missions maybe not quite as extreme as what they have got. >> we are out of time. we had a good discussion. no doubt this is an important issue for our

country with the organization of government change as a result and you heard a challenge here today if you don't like it get involved. we appreciate everything. [applause] >> my name is bernard i. and did he know the college of liberal arts and sciences here ' is my pleasure to welcome yet the bush conference with this forum that is entitled the bush doctrine to combat terrorism with us we have to

government officials and journalists and academics who will comment on the presentations we have no formal academic papers at this particular forum but our participants will offer some remarks 10 or 12 minutes in length and there will be an opportunity to ask one another questions then there's the opportunity for the audience to ask questions as well provide one introduce everyone on this panel as quickly as i came because we're more interested in what they have to say by what the other you this is going to end probably because the ambassador will leave so they may not make a statement if they leave before it is done. serving as the 19th and last director from

september 24 through 2004 through april 212005 at that time he became the first director of the cia under the intelligence reform and terrorism prevention act and continued in that position through may 2006. previously he had served as a congressman and from southwest florida for almost 60 years house chairman on intelligence from 1997 until his nomination in 2004 he served for of a decade as a member of the committee which oversees the intelligence community and authorizes the annual budget. during the 107th congress he cochaired the terrorist acts into september 11 and

was a separate -- second director to serve in congress. mr. negroponte is a distinguished fellow in a grand strategy and a senior lecturer in global affairs at the jack stint -- jackson is to reveal university prior to joining yale embassador negroponte filled diplomacy and national security followed by a number of years in the private sector. he held government positions abroad and in washington between 1960 and 1997 and again 2001 through 2008. he has been u.s. ambassador to honduras, mexico, the philippines, united nations and iraq. he served twice of the national security council first as director of vietnam's in the nixon

administration then deputy under president reagan and held a cabinet level position as a first director of national intelligence under president george w. bush. a professor of u.s. history is in for a policy at hofstra author of a prize winning book she has written and spoken widely by u.s. policy in iraq serving as a consultant to several members of congress and chaired a task force on u.s. occupation for a bipartisan coalition for realistic foreign policy her articles have appeared internal american history, history news network a radical history review and nova. presently called never lose nixon and kissinger.

stephen not is from the united states naval war college and served as co-chair of the university of virginia oral history program to direct the ronald reagan an oral history project. he also taught at a united states air force academy and the university of virginia. he is the author of alexander hamilton and the persistence of myth and covert operations in the american presidency in examination of covert operations by early american presidents a co-author of the reagan years as the insider recollection from sacramento to the white house. his most recent book rush to judgment, was published

march 2012. amy goodman is a hosted executive producer of democracy now a national daily independent award winning program airing on 1300 public television stations worldwide she has co-authored five bestsellers her work has earned her numerous honors and awards the foundation honored her with the 2014 middle for journalistic independence lifetime achievement and is also the first to received the livelihood a whirl of -- toward known as the nobel prize for developing the innovative model of truly independent journalism that brings to millions of people the alternative voices that are often excluded by the mainstream media.

in'' a recipient of american women increase the award -- the greasy award and sugar reports in nigeria has won numerous awards including george pulled robert f. kennedy prize for national reporting and the dupont toward progress now my pleasure to introduce dr. carson for this discussion. [applause] >> thank you very much we just had a very refreshing session next door with students and other folks in the audience wrasse penetrating questions about the bush doctrine and our security and threats ltd. is very stimulating for someone like me to come back here to see if people are really interested in things that

matter today to take questions under advisement willing to tackle more controversial issues. to talk about the bush doctrine a little bit understand the changes of this century the beginning of new * new challenges in the way it requite had not expected a and natalie that dealing with some new thoughts but old machinery. with old institutions that were accustomed to doing things a certain way certainly with those that are accustomed to organizations all of a sudden things changed with

months into his presidency had to deal with it from my perspective starting out with the house to revise the president of what he needed to know that date a year not -- and they're not fully prepared that he needed to have. from the peace dividends but we have left guard down marching for a while we enjoy the peace dividend.

one 9/11 happened it was a large recall and we found just about every covered reluctant to the hats and depletion jewish i remember as chairman of the committee to ask our intelligence people, many arab speakers to we have so the committee can understand what is going on and the answer was woefully few. the president understood we needed to ramp up capability fast he dodges hire five spies it takes time to recruit clandestine is service people and it is not done overnight. but the president did early

on to rebuild the overseas to have the greatest organization in the world with those capabilities. busway don't have is the of policies on how to use them because with the free and open society with the debate over where the line is between your privacy and protection with the ability of the government to get information is a debate that should a and will go on from russia us democratic and free and open society. we want to be safe but we don't want big brother looking over our shoulders.

president bush understood that well and tried very hard to find that balance to perpetually keep that in front of us on the hill so we stayed between the lanes with the civil-rights that we all work for and represent. >> no way that it finally came out, is the hallmark of the bush doctrine once we saw what we were up against after the horrors of 9/11 were strength, a commitment in the gauge rand. to get us energized at a time that was listening and watching i think the

president was let down somewhat. with that intelligence community as good as it is it was not as good then it was hollowed out those in the intelligence committee they're wonderful people to put up great sacrifices. he didn't have all the information he needed but what he thought was true that turned out to be wrong because of wrong information. area and that will happen we will always have victims if we do not have good intelligence. this is a shameless call for everyone to understand we need good intelligence have all times to get better decisions. my time on the hill was a review of what happened

online 11 and how it came to pass 2.zero lot of figures at institutions but the fact of the matter is with the democratic open society we just about our business we probably should have been paying more attention and not drop our guard that was a collective decision. we got back on track. we talked to the president who asked if i would be the red tci after george tenet reduced his resignation and. this is not a time when most people would say if you have is this high amount of the job. there really want to get out

of washington so i was looking for the exit and unfortunately i did not find it instead found a great challenge for the president of the united states. first of all, i was last of the d.c. i. and it a tighter rein on there. so the tci and looks like it was a short-term job. >> not all of the men don't have much of control over with very important chairman on the hill those who don't have cabinet level status has to manage.

job number two was running cia to be rebuilt in a hurry. we have a war going on. and every day we would meet him a was happening. then though whole question the agency's job is to revise the president through the presidential daily briefing that is the best information the president needs to have to have half an hour is an extraordinary honor but of a oil of a responsibility with the most important person in the world to get a right. called the worst case scenario then they walk away

but it is not the most likely scenario but we have some problems of what was likely to go wrong. it was about five hours of my day every day. in to have a new architect and the new set up that ambassador negroponte will set up as he was chief of that operation and that we had to spend some time readjusting how the agencies worked with each other. idle think there is a human being in the world who could do this job. i truly don't price said that in los angeles and was harassed for it. but other people who'd try to do those two have similar thoughts.

in the very same american way to end up on the right side of those issues the last thing i will say about the bush doctrine is given the fact at this time of change was president bush was so clearly aware of the fact we're not dealing state to state any more but with people who are outside of the conventional norms. ruthless troublemakers. in to talk about the radical fundamentalist in then we

had let our guard down the president never wanted that barred to be down again board never give them a sanctuary, a place to trade, get many, make their plans and manufacture passports with propaganda and all of that. he did that and got something about it and understood very well the radical fundamentalists understood strength strength, respected strength in now to take a fantasia of weakness and disengagement. he got that absolutely right and we owe him a great deal. thank-you. [applause]

>> good afternoon. they give for this opportunity to speak with you this afternoon about the w. bush era. before going into the principal part i will pick up on a couple of things that the director has said. one is a detail with the president's daily brief. a remake the transition there was one month when we went to see the president together. so for me that was it interesting time of transition with the pp staff

but one thing i want to say about president bush to be in office four years when any president has been in office four years they know the situation pretty well. international leaders it is hard to give them a leadership profile when they saw them at a nato meeting with the apec countries and he was a particular the good customer and it was not just

five days a week it was six days a week and he was one of the best customers that i have ever known with the dialect style. to say you wrote this why don't you tell me what it says? he much preferred but it is to read the material. sometimes it would bring people to show them every morning sixers seven articles or one page or pages that have sometimes you have the deep diving in the country of interest or a discussion of though leadership in the country which foods were most important to us and we do

this and he was really getting into that discussion and we would bring in as a young analyst at kidder from wherever to present their views directly to the president it was of good experience may be intimidating have first for the analyst but once they got used to it, they accounted for themselves very well. but not every president devotes that match the attention of concentrated schedule time to observing their daily intelligence. when i worked with colin powell as his deputy he did not even have an intelligence briefing every day repurchase his advisers

we would simply give him the president's brief the and then it was at his leisure to read over the course of the day then would give it back at the end of the day if there was an article that we should highlight we would do that so different presidents have different styles bill clinton apparently did not never reach an intelligence briefer but that is the same story of the crash of the small plane on the white house line -- yard and the director is tried to give in to see the president. [laughter] i'm sure he became an even better customer after 9/11. the second point of a bite to make -- i would like to

make but i thought others made a good point when they said you really have to think of the presidency as dynamic, evil thing and essentially you have to face is the first four years, and the second floor and they were quite different because of changing circumstances and also changing faces condoleezza rise became the secretary of state and put priority to take a more diplomatic approach of issues vice president cheney became less influential perhaps some of this had to do with issues of health provider of think he was necessarily as energetic in the second term as he was in the first. and shirley into the second

term secretary rumsfeld left office and was replaced by robert gates sold the atmospherics were different and it goes to the issue of the book, bush doctrine which i am coming to now. when i see the words bush doctrine i really think about the different justifications for the war in afghanistan and iraq. i was that the u.n. when both of these were launched the war in afghanistan in fact, was notified by a flash telegram sunday october 6th 2001 to seek out the president of the security council to ask for

a meeting this evening to inform the council will be launching attacks into afghanistan in the exercise of power self-defense under the united nations charter and we dutifully did that that evening and i don't think we really had any argument from anybody. as to the fact we were retaliating against afghanistan because of the 9/11 attacks i think that was well understood internationally and in their own country was an interesting footnote to that day for me which was a harbinger of issues to come that the second part of my instructions centcom by the way he shall also seek out

the ambassador to united nations and iraq sunday october 6, 2001. urgently and basically be to him the following talking points and they were very tough. i am paraphrasing but if you in iraq even think about taking advantage of this situation that is created by our preoccupation with afghanistan and there will be hell to pay. but it was almost threatening in its language. this is 2001 it in retrospect even though i was involved to negotiate a resolution 1441 in the fall

of 2002 that led to the reinstatement of the regime in iraq, it was clear the administration had iraq on its mind right from the beginning it if you read his bush -- his book called voluntary points he explains those operations as early as december 2001 with 12 subsequent meetings or telephone conversations through summer of 2002. i was not nearly as conscious of this when i was working on negotiating this inspection resolution i thought we had more time to allow for the inspection regime to work but as it

turned out it was more a matter of form and it would appear that decision had been made exactly when? i heard them say we don't know when we are not certain but it seems clear to me the administration's mind was made up at some point even as he went to the united nations that we were going to invade iraq and really that is the issue of the whole question of judgment of the bush doctrine and pre-emption and unilateral action. ironically it is something of an exception to the rest of george w. bush foreign policy, he certainly evolve

to a more moderate stance but it was such an important exception with such a major issue that for a long time the major foreign policy issue on which george w. bush administration is going to be judge beginning in the second term mr. bush and his advisers fell back into a tradition approach trying to avoid unilateral action if all possible. i can recall because of his deputy secretary of state at the time also director of national intelligence was rivers almost constant pressure to be on wall

street that we were going to write tax -- attack iran but from that discussion in the white house that nothing was further from our minds i don't think he wanted to add to the issues of lebanese and problems at that time but the issue was more to contain nuclear development program through diplomacy or by economic sanctions but i am not sure that military action is ever contemplated and a related point that there was talk that the time possibly israel taking sup -- some action but any kind of effort to eliminate those capabilities would involve a

major military action it is a one all saying the way the assyrian nuclear reactor like in in 2007 and a serious question as to whether if there is some distance of facilities where they are located to israel even have that capability so i am not sure i would elevate the '01 as a pre-emptive that the president took with that level of dr. and so we will have to see how history treats the issue over time.

but it was a reaction to the circumstances that arose possibly a vacancy issues with bush 41 administration by the time the president had handed off power and headed off to president obama number of examples obama felt very comfortable carrying on the policies that his predecessor decrease tim. thank you. [applause]

>> i am hoping that i can finally find a microphone that i could use. as a professor welcome to come and be here today and to except appreciation of her willingness to talk about the issues. but very few have been willing to come here to talk about these issues so i appreciate your presence. some of you may have forgotten the introduction i want to make it clear i am not now or have i ever been a member of the bush administration. i thought you may be confused i am a historian

and before that from the projects and wrote down hundreds but there thousands of hours reading top-secret government documents these other records that are declassified 30 years after the fact. ready these has in effect there seriously weird. but there are certain impressions some of them are pretty obvious and one is very often public officials say things to the public that are not true and i do have to say that sometimes there been something in these documents then i look at president nixon or secretary kissinger with the exact opposite and i am

always amazed some are not truthful. sometimes they deceive themselves sometimes they could be misled by advisers but the most important oppression -- impression that i struggle to articulate is with the deliberation at the top level to use the language to have a way for that vernacular from that human reality that day talk about. somehow that is not even enter the room. and what did happening in those places is

1 million miles away with very little sense of what is happening. one was talking about the top of his game. bush was familiar with of world leaders and that is what he needed to know. and then that we accidentally bomb and for our country but those deliberations has the effect to make that very reality obscure but that generosity is that grandiosity with a tendency to make them sound like they are profound that the ambassador says his idea of the bush doctrine.

not exactly clear what that is part by tried to look it up on line in there were a couple of ideas that were important in life united states needs to be military stronger. that we retain the right to attack any country that is not have people reconsider asia with the pressure of allies a threat does not have to be imminent breathing down to its essentials we can do what we want. echoes back to 400 b.c. in they said you know, as well as i do the only question

between equals is in power to do with they can and the weak suffer what they must. it is not what meets the eye. but that signal was a miniaturized foreign policy after an 11.

but when the momentum by

people came down the street with their candles and peace signs so there was not even a place to stay and that is the kind of thing a professor might bring up in contrast to a harsh reality of fighting terrorists and out to destroy us. but in opting for war invading iraq and afghanistan to create a secret prison in locations around the world to restore the geneva convention to torture detainees, and nothing was very realistic about how the bush administration responded to 9/11. we all think that is important. but i will make another point to talk about higher

it -- biohazards. just across the river from the world trade center. to go right from the beginning of the attacked they would rush into burning buildings to actually include one of my friends and then there was no money to not have enough money to keep them open sending millions of dollars to iraq. and then what handles this money millions disappearing into iraq to pay war lords then afghanistan and hospitals never finish but

not enough for fire hazards and frankly not enough for the veterans either what does that say about the national priority or keeping america save? but it found its culmination. it had nothing to do with 9/11. for the purpose to save us from weapons of mass destruction it is now described as a failure of intelligence. we did not know the weapons were not there or that invasion were we would spend more than $1 trillion. people make mistakes but in

this instance there are those of iraq in the military people saying you cannot run an operation like this to say over and turned over if you try to occupy this country will be a disaster. but those earnings were ignored in those kinds of people said those kinds of things it was for military realism. and so the results of this and realistic choice. from the brown university with that $490 billion to

kill 135,000 that the war killed at least 135,000. as many as 5 million iraqis taken from their home by any calculus the decision could be counted among the most disastrous of modern history. and it is a little incredible 43 from president bush in the context of a truly disastrous decision he made that was involved. one last for a on september 12th 2001 rescue workers at ground zero pulled out to know who was the last person to be saved from the devastation and though you are too young to remember her as those last

people were pulled, it was an incredible moment. somebody would say this person was saved if people would we plan that would pull out one person out. why was that? because every single person's life he is important and precious. . .

and i appreciate you all for coming today. let today. let me just begin by saying that the accusation that president bush abused his power and presided over a lawless administration which is frequently leveled against this president is certainly nothing new. proverbial displays of hypocrisy regarding presidential power tend to criticize the sitting president whether he is a member of the party are not. excuse me, on partisan grounds. putting that aside i would say that george w. bush has be