we are looking for to the ntsb but we do know the ntsb for the 1969 propose that we should move forward with positive train control. is something called the most

wanted list in 1990 the first edition of the most wanted list said we needed positive train control. and since that time quite a number of people have died in preventable accidents around the country because of the lack of positive thinking for. yes, human error, that's what positive train control is designed to prevent human error. this was probably human error. we still don't know that there was a mechanical malfunction. it's a relatively new train set but we don't know yet. the point is ptc could prevent accidents like this. if there prevented many other accidents over the last two decades since it was first recommended by ntsb. we need to move forward with all new dispatch inside of it on passenger or other passenger

railroads and on the entire amtrak system, and on those required critical franklin particularly those caring hazards materials particularly to urban areas. so i'm pleased we are today to try and understand better what the cause of this accident, we might do to prevent them in the future. i don't think we'll get to any definitive point, but for me bottom line is we can no longer ignore a $21 billion backlog. we can't ignore we're running trains over 100 year old bridges of dubious stability. we can't ignore that we are running trains through 140 year-old tunnels that nato rehabilitation. we can't any longer ignore the fact that we have civilization systems that are pre-vacuum tube era that are being trying to link into more modern sophistication system.

so there's much to be done and i wish that all our colleagues in congress shared our commitment to infrastructure investment. with that idea back the balance of my time spent thank the gentleman and with the concurrence of the ranking member we will not recognize the subcommittee chairman on railroads, mr. denham for an opening statement. >> thank you and good morning. first let me thank you for holding this hearing. very important. i also want to thank ranking member capuano for quickly put up to philadelphia and really serving the situation with me. it was important to see first in anderson specifically some of the things that were happening. but let me talk a little bit about my frustration. we went up there to meet of the assess the situation to ntsb was already making definite statements, and now three weeks

later while we have a brand-new locomotive we still can't confirm was not there was a malfunction with that locomotion locomotion. even the ntsb make definitive statements, still cannot defend whether not there was an operator error. cannot identify whether or not there was an engineer that bypassed the system. the engineer has been working with ntsb but still cannot verify that the cell phone that was in use whether it was texting or using cell phone service during that time. it's my understanding the engineer has given his passport and yet we still can't identify whether not there's an issue. my concern is ntsb came out and made an immediate statement a couple hours after the accident but three weeks later this unable to identify any of these issues around it. i think this committee expects answers. i think these families are owed answers. i think the american public is looking to make sure that rail

is safe across our entire nation. we are also looking for solutions. i'm looking forward to seeing ptc implemented in a very very quick manner but i would ask you take a look at this emergency proclamation that was put out emergency order that was put out by fra. my concern is a year and a half ago when we had metro-north, one of the worst accidents this country has ever seen almost the exact same emergency order was put out a year and a half ago, saying ttc was important. and yet we still don't have ptc on that area of track either. so now a new emergency order saying that we will have amtrak on the northeast corridor by the end of the year. obviously with concerns. we are looking for solutions. i think the families deserve to hear what the solutions are, but more importantly, the solutions

are actually put into place. and with that and to i yield back. >> not recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, mr. capuano spectrum on. welcome to the members of the board. am looking forward to your testimony. we want answers and more than anything else they need to be right and not speculation. i also want to just comment that i know many people along the northeast corridor, particularly those in philadelphia my friend congressman brady is watching closely everyone interest as well. they will be keeping a close eye on this. i guess i'm looking forward to the specific lessons we learned i also think we need to look at the lessons that congress should learn. what should our priorities be? we talk a good game but we are the funders. are we going to fund this or are we not going to fund this? we talk a good game but ptc is not yet it is not limited just

amtrak. positive train control issued across the country on every rail line across this country. are we going to require it or not? everybody who knows he don't want to talk about it but there are proposals floating around congress to delay even further. we all understand the realities of the costs involved but those are questions we need to ask in a series basis how much responsibility will be as a member of congress take on our shoulders next time an accident happens. have we done everything we can reasonably do? reasonably do to prevent it. and i think i'm not looking for scapegoats. i am looking for answers as we all are, and i have full faith that the ntsb a long with the fra and amtrak will find those answers and i again, i want to quickly but more important i want them right. again i appreciate you being here and i appreciate that chairman calling this hearing very much. thank you.

i yield back. >> and with that i would like to welcome our panel of witnesses. thank you for being here today. first, the honorable crystal heart -- christopher hart is a chairman of the national transportation safety board. next is joseph boardman the president and chief executive officer of entry. next ms. sarah feinberg for federal railroad administration to just been nominated and congratulations as you go through that process. the blood. and dennis pierce, president of local -- brotherhood of locomotive engineers and trainmen. your complete written test will be in the record we would ask you to keep it about five minutes, your statement. with that we will start with mr. hart, please proceed. >> thank you and good morning. chairman shuster ranking member defazio and members of the committee, thank you for

inviting me the ntsb to appear before you today. this morning released a limited report, a summation of fax that were released at this point and i would like to review these briefly with you. at approximately 9:21 p.m. on tuesday may 12 amtrak regional train 188 derailed north of philadelphia's 30th street station. >> can you pull your mic close to speak with yes, sorry. as the chairman mentioned the ntsb is determined that second before the development the train was traveling at 106 miles an hour heading into a 50-mile per hour crew. emergency braking was applied by the train slowed to only 102 miles per hour before the data recording into. sadly these people were killed and more than 200 people were injured as a result of this accident the other half of the ntsb i would like to offer my sincerest condolences to those who lost loved ones and our thoughts remain with those still recovering from injuries. briefly, areas we will explore in this investigation include

track, recorded, mechanical, signals, operations, human performance, survival factors and medical. much work remains but the effects i can report to you today. we know that a properly installed and functional positive train control, or ptc would have prevented this accident. etcs technology that is designed to prevent overspeed derailment as well as train to train collisions. the accident we have investigated has shown is that we need technology that can step in when humans fail due to distraction, medical conditions or other factors. as a result of the ntsb is called for train control technology for decades as was mentioned, since 1959. present law requires implementation of ptc by the end of this year, seven years after the mandate was signed by congress into law. we know that most railroad will

not comply with this law. build railroads and make the difficult decisions and invested in proven safety proven safety enhancement should be commended for their leadership. any extension of the deadline much have a transparent accounting of the steps that indicative into deadline. regulators and policymakers need that to make important policy decisions. railcar crashworthiness as another area we will investigate. as you can see from the picture, the survival space and the first passenger car was severely compromised. we will fully document and analyze the damage to his car and other cars and make recommendations that the ntsb determines are necessary to improve crashworthiness and approve on recommendations in this area. we have received full cooperation from the crew and the interviews and follow conversations. we are evaluating the engineered cell phone records to correlate the timing of the date and voice

activity on may 12 with accident timeline. this process involves region at timestamps from the phone records which are from different time zones with the data from other information such as the locomotive event recorder, radio commissions and surveillance via. when we have clarity on this timeline we will release this information to you into the public. additionally the ntsb has called for inward and outward facing video on training since 2007. amtrak is outward facing cameras they were not using inward facing cameras at the time of of his accident. they can provide critical information as we work to determine ways to prevent future accidents. in this case engineer means you states he has no memory of the events leading up to the derailed. video can fill in those gaps. i'm encouraged by amtrak's announcement of intent to sell inward facing cameras but we also recommend stalling -- installing audio recordings as well. we look forward to learning more about amtrak's initiatives and

help the fra will pursue with the inward facing video cameras and locomotive audio recorders throughout the u.s. fleet. as i stated what much work ahead of us and broken keep you informed as this investigate proceeds. i appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and i'm available to answer your questions. thank you. >> mr. boardman, please proceed. >> thank you. i'm going to start this one by offering my heartfelt regret for the recent development that frankfort junction. it was amtrak's trains au naturel world and that we are responsible for the incident and its consequences. i regretted deeply based on the conversations i've had over the last three weeks that sentiment is shared by everyone in our company. everything we've done since the accident has been driven by sincere hope that we could do something, however small, to mitigate the suffering and loss that ago endured as a result of this terrible accident. we've been grateful help in that effort by the people of

philadelphia and i'd like to thank all of them but particularly mayor nutter, the police, fire and the emergency services and the staff at the hospitals are received and treated the injured. think of anything you did on have of our passengers and our employees. i should also take this opportunity know that we will do everything we can to support the ntsb's investigation. i will refrain from addressing matters that are still under investigation will be working closely with ntsb and the regulators and fra to ensure we address the root causes of this accident. ntu ladies and gentlemen, of the committee come into our passengers and employees, we run a safe railroad and safety will continue to be our top priority. the northeast corridor in particular has an excellent safety record and i can is so shocking because it's so unexpected. in no other place in the country is the comparable volume of traffic move with such a solid

record. allows previous derailment federal accident on the northeast corridor occurred 20 years ago. the northeast corridors safety systems are the best in the country. would operate a late signal system to provide trains with multiple levels of protection. as a trackside signal system, as an alert to ensure engineers are a way, there's a cab to the system, and automatic train control system. and finally in places this advanced civil speed amtrak's positive train control system. system. system. to stop the transit and just go with authorized speed limits. access in service from new haven to boston and a point between washington and new york where trains exceed 125 miles an hour. it's installed and the rest of the amtrak zones that operate the northeast corridor and should be operational in time to comply with the federal steps of december 31, 2015.

these systems backstop the people who are responsible for safe movement of our trains. we operate a thorough training oversight and coaching system for our cruise to our engineers and conductors are required to pass an extensive and 48 approved any program and to develop a very high level of familiarity with the root. probably millions of train governments negotiated a carved up frankford junction safely since amtrak took over the northeast corridor in 1976. the system works because generally speaking we've put together a series of layered nets each guarding the previously. we rely on these systems are we've never been able to completely eliminate the risk of human error. there's always the risk of a gap in even the most tightly woven net. a train 188 derailment rebuild one such role in our safety net and in the weeks since the drill mud many people embrace a seemingly simple question to why didn't the tracks with the accident occurred at some kind of safety feature installed to

trip the sickness and force the engineered to slow the train? this is the right question at going to address it directly while providing you the necessary background information to understand the answer. in 1990, and amtrak train derailment on a sharp curve in boston and collided with an oncoming train. that derailment was caused by an engineer failing to slow before curve. shortly thereafter, industry regulated and operators reviewed the nec and look for other places where the approach speed of the train was greater than the speed of which the train might derail in the curve. if an engineer failed to slow down. at those points we modified the system by installing the code if an engineer, code change but to force engineers who slow down. the southbound tracks at frankford junction one such place. derailments speed at frankford junction is 98 miles an hour.

northbound trains approach that curve at 80 miles an hour while the southbound train approaches at 110 miles an hour. so in short when a train approaches one direction but doesn't slow down there's no risk of derailing. but if a train comes from the other direction and doesn't slow down for whatever reason there is a risk of development. we, therefore, applied the modification to the southbound tracks so that trains approaching from the north at speeds of 110 would receive a signal indication in the cab just before the curve forcing them to slow to 45 miles per hour so they can pass through the curve safely at 50 miles north. a northbound trek didn't have the same protections installed because the approach speed was 80 miles an hour which was slow enough that a train good round of the curve that speed without derailing if the engineer failed to slow down. at that time the notion that an engineer might actually accelerate into the northbound

curb was not a circumstance we anticipated and thus we didn't mitigate forgoes every single decision reached a reasonable experts under reasonable circumstances, and since this and similar change points were installed in 1991 the application of this policy successfully prevented overspeed the relevant throughout the northeast corridor for about 25 years. that clearly changed on may 12. the proper response now is for us to figure out what happened engineering or eliminate the cap so that this accident cannot happen again. the full implication of ptc later this you will be a major step forward in this regard. until it is folded in service we are working now with the fra template the nation called for an emergency order to ensure the safety of our trains and passengers. the most important thing we can do is to implement ptc.

amtrak is the nation's leader in ptc. we were the first railroad to secure regulatory approval for rpg system in the 1990s, the first to put into operation and the only company to have a system approved for use for speeds up to 150 miles an hour. know what the class one railroads in the united states, not one is this for a long installing pvcs amtrak is. my belief in the importance of ptc predates my arrival at amtrak. as the federal railroad administrator i worked hard to secure the passage of the law requiring ttc installation on the railroads. i stipulated that the single greatest contribution that my generations can make to the industry is to have aptc as rapidly as possible. and i promise you that by the end of this year the system which will dramatically enhance safety would be complete and

operational on the nec. thank you. >> ms. feinberg, please proceed. >> chairman shuster, ranking member defazio, neighbors of the committee thank you for the opportunity to discuss issues related to me 12 amtrak accident in philadelphia, pennsylvania and the safety of passenger rail. we extend our deepest sympathies to victims of this accident and to their loved ones. i can assure them that will take every step we can to ensure an accident like this cannot happen again. i also want to thank the city of philadelphia, it's a mayor in its first responders for their heroic an incredible response to this accident their leadership was truly remarkable. let me say at the outset all of us at the fra are heartbroken about this tragic accident. the driving mission of our organization is to keep the public safe, and so while every accident matters to us this

accident in particular which appears to have been preventable and which took so many lives and left so many injured is truly painful for our fra family. we continue to investigate the circumstances surrounding the accident, while it will take time to complete the investigation we have not and will not wait to take actions that will improve the safety of amtrak as well as other passenger rail operations. on may 16 4 days after the accident, i directed amtrak to take civil action before allowing its operations through them north philadelphia. i followed those directives within for emergency order on may 21 amtrak has complied with those directives thus far in the fra will ensure that amtrak follows through to fully implement them. when we release the may 21 emergency order we also stated we were considering taking additional steps to drag similar orders at other passenger rail roads that may have similar curves and speed issues to put into our work on those

directives and we plan to release additional information about network in the coming days. while the cost of this accident has not been officially determined, we do know that speed was a significant factor. and speed, simply put is what we refer to as a human factor factor based on human behavior. human factors remain the leading cause of all rail accidents. they are also the most difficult to address. but today i want to announce fra is preparing a package of actions we will finalize in the coming weeks and months aimed at addressing just these kinds of factors, human factors factors such as speed, distraction entering. these actions may include additional emergency order from safety by juries will makings agreements or other initiatives. and again beyond just those next steps i want to assure you that the fra is firmly committed to continue taking additional actions, as many as it takes, that will mitigate the risks and

hazards identified in the ongoing investigation. now there's there has been significant amount of public discussion about what specifically would've prevented this accident, which specific technology and which new regulation. but the reality is if we believe that this because of this accident was speed, it would've been prevented by positive train control. as this committee is well aware, positive train control is the single most important railroad safety technological development in more than a century and it is absolutely necessary to ensuring the kind of safety that we expect on our rail system. or the congress' mandate railroads are required to install ptc on all passenger routes and certain fragrance by december 31 2015, 7 months from now. -- certain freight routes.

we have urged the submission of ptc safety and implementation plans. we have inquired with individual railroads and with the aar about their progress. we've worked with the fec to resolve issues related spectrum have also urged year after year for more funding to be directed at commuter railroads and amtrak to implement positive train control. for the past two years as part of the grow america act, fra has requested $825 million to assist commuter railroads with the implementation of ptc as well as additional funding to aid with amtrak's implementation of ptc. grow america act has proposed fra be granted authority to review, approve, and certified ptc safety plans on a railroad by railroad aces the fra asked for this authority under to ensure that railroads would be forced to work with safety regulators to take other or

equivalent actions to raise the bar in safety even prior to full ptc implementation. we believe it is important that even those railroads have failed to meet the congressionally mandated deadline be required to improve safety in the interim. despite the many challenges facing full implementation of ptc, the fra's role is to carry out enforcement of the deadline that is mandated by the congress and to ensure that railroads implement ptc as quickly safely and efficiently as possible. so on january 1, 2016, the fra will be prepared to take necessary enforcement actions against railroads have failed to meet the deadline. safety will always be the fra's first priority. we appreciate this committee's attention and focus to issues related to tragic passenger train accident in philadelphia. i cannot want to express our deepest sorrow to the victims and their families. we look forward to working with this committee to improve our program and make the american rail networks essays, reliable

and as sufficient as possible. >> and now mr. pierce you may proceed. >> good morning chairman shuster, ranking member defazio, and committee members. the membership of the conference better represent thank you -- >> can you pull the microphone closer? >> nt for the invitation to speak today. offers want to express our sincerest condolences to the victims of amtrak 188 and to the family. this is sadly familiar territory for me because i've had to convey the sorrow to the families of 11 members killed in light of duty since i became national president five years ago. i think this will happen many more times to get it more tragic when technology could've prevented the death and positive train control could've saved five of those lives. the ntsb is confirmed exists speed contribute to the amtrak

in this accident was ptc printable. effects of several core elements of federal oversight of the railroad industry of ptc mandate, cruised size fatigue inward facing cameras and our expectations for amtrak. a small percentage of americans are working locomotive engineers and already were operating in place are among the most highly skilled, highly trained and highly regulated professionals in the nation. but today's workforce or workplace often creates task overload for engineers, and went to which is expected of any system, man or machine, a breakdown is inevitable. one of the question before us now is what level of risk you are willing to accept. most of the industry but that amtrak or bnsf seeks a blanket five to seven extension of the december 31 ptc deadline. although not on the nec there have been peripheral problems with the spectrum and fcc raided our approvals and those must be addressed by the dinner just like a blanket delight and

nurtured did not be stampeded into granting one. that would dishonor the memory of those who perished on may 12. we must remember that ptc is no silver bullet. it's not designed to prevent every accident, and any kind of ptc renders a second crew member unnecessary isn't just money but not to the ptc cannot replace a second crew member because it doesn't do the work of a second crew member. it isn't a second set of eyes and ears trained on the road ahead to monitor the left side of the train for defects stuck brakes or through the left side of the highway rail process for highway rail grade incidents. or to separate the trains went with first responders need to get access. we urge you to take a h.r. and 7063 addressing those concerns and we also think the time it come to reconsider the 1981 languages that eliminate the second crew member on northeast corridor locomotives. while we do not know whether fatigue played a part on amtrak 188, fatigue should be a major

concern to all of us. to be frank the 2008 overhaul of the rail hours of service has produced very little progress for its mitigating 50. work schedules are still far too variable and unpredictable especially on freight railroads. instead of dealing with all issues contributing to fatigue some have settle on single issues like sleep apnea. i did today that cpap machines will not address fatigue caused by verbal and unpredictable work schedules because you have to know when to sleep in order to get the benefit. we must redouble our efforts to limit the systemic fatigue in the railroad industry. i would also like to address the call for inward facing cameras because it gets louder by the day. we have said this for over two years. cameras can be an accident investigation tool, but they create a false sense of security is more than that is expected. cameras to slow or stop trains. positive train control does and that's the place where to put

it. our privacy concerns with cameras are what i would call america's privacy concerns. many railroads insist on having cameras on continuously even when trains are stopped on a side for hours on the time with cruz captive on a locomotive that comprises about 65 square feet of space. constant surveillance like this we do as un-american and it really does nothing to improve railroad safety. the truth is that some railroads have shown more interest in using the camera data to putatively attacked certain employees and accident investigations at it is unacceptable to us. finally, something to come down to dollars and cents a lease for amtrak which cannot continue to survive on funding that it receives. what we spent a passenger rail is embarrassing when committed china, the uk, france austria and even india, russia and turkey. we cannot expect and got to my first class railroad when it is found at third world levels.

our transportation infrastructure is crumbling around our feet including amtrak to get amtrak is a good investment, a necessary resource and shortchange amtrak creates a because those were. i strongly urge you to provide the resources mr. for amtrak to thrive and grow enough to just live a longer appreciate the opportunity to address you today. we will work to accomplish much and i look forward to working with you gentlemen lessons learned from amtrak 188. thank you again for the invitation and i will answer any questions you may have. >> thank you very much, mr. pierce. let's start with a round of questions that i would encourage all members, there's a lot of interest, i would encourage you to keep to five minutes. interest remains high we will consider doing a second round of questions. so again please respect the five minutes. there's a lot of folks are i will be quick with the gavel so watch the clock. i will start out. ms. feinberg, in december of 2013 with the metro-north commuter train derailment it

was a very similar circumstance. train was going to fast and the accident required, the fra requires metro-north to put the code into the atc system automatically so the trains going at those speeds and i just issued an emergency order that literally cuts and pastes that order from two years ago to be put on amtrak. it seems that the next logical step, i think you said this come is right now you're going to look at all the curves, but don't you think they should've done it after the metro-north derailment? should have put out an order for fra, and i know you were there at the time but wouldn't that of intellectual step at a time to sit let's look at the northeast corridor? >> what we did at the time was we put out a safety advisory urging commuter railroads to take a look at their curse and

to see if the additional steps they should take. the order that when it was aimed at northeast corridor. they cannot be particularly project they have to be legally sustainable and enforceable. at the time fra look at expanding an emergency order to many other railroads to all commuter railroads and deemed it would not be legally enforceable and that we didn't have evidence to show that we had this problem elsewhere. as you may remember metro-north had a series of fatal and nonfatal accidents. they seem to the systemic safety culture problem, and when we look beyond metro-north we did not feel this is a systemic problem with other railroads in we were not seeing the relevance to other railroads, not sing engineers at high speed. 's would leave emergency order and that metro-north would only be enforceable for metro-north spin legally they thought should have the ability to do the

northeast corridor? >> that's correct. >> what does come are you able to enforce it throughout the northeast corridor, have them look at it or identical problems of there? >> day dl with a win at last week stuck on 10 days ago was in specifically at amtrak. we are now looking beyond amtrak is if we want to take similar or other steps aimed at other community was but wanted to act quickly and our look at what else should be done beyond that. >> the only amtrak? >> to the emergency order. >> does it mean you have authority to to connecticut and massachusetts composite able to be included? >> that would not work for the emergency order that's coming out but that's what we're looking at right now. >> cd can include that, okay. mr. boardman, positive train control. you said in your statement you committed getting it by the end of the year.

can you talk all of it about the process you can put the last couple of months? we had this conversation a spectrum. virtually the last step of the equation and can you talk about the cost and the money get the money and toggle bit about the spectrum? >> we at this point in time to have positive train control installed on the northeast corridor. all sections that we don't on the northeast corridor is fine. what we learned along with freight railroads that 900 megahertz system that exists right now really wasn't providing the kind of reliability. it was having even more difficult and high density areas. so the decision was by all the roads that we need to go to a 220 megahertz kind of radio system. that really provides a much better propagation of significant much more reliable service. so what we've been doing is

making sure that we finally received approval for the 220 megahertz system within the last couple of months and we have to test it get the data radios ready and that's what we are doing now. so that's where we are. >> you learned that because you had new haven to boston covert? >> that's correct, along with ptc. >> the entire stretch washington, d.c. to boston will be under that new increased megahertz? >> for everything that we own or control. >> right. what would massachusetts and connecticut with a state owned -- >> there's a section between new york and new haven new rochelle actually to new haven that we don't own or control the own new york state and by connecticut. under control of metro-north. >> thank you very much. singh my time has expired in the five minute rule, i turned to mr. defazio. >> thank you, mr. chairman. you implied and you didn't

expand upon that you're going to look at the cars themselves, whether or not more resilient card could better protect passengers in crashes is that correct? >> that's correct. >> have you looked at the previously? >> yes. we can look at passenger car crash worthiness for several years. >> mr. boardman, i believe these cars are what era 70s? >> they started being delivered in about 1975. >> have you asked to replace than? >> we have a plan to rebuild these cars and we are replacing some pars at this point in time. the ones that were built in the '40s. >> in the '40s, okay. are you going to sum up improve their resilience in case of crash? >> our expectation is to be able to use crashed energy management which is something that the entire passenger industry is beginning to do. >> but these current cars don't meet whatever --

>> they do not. >> and what would it take? >> in terms of dollars or -- >> yes. had asked for the money speak with them as a replacement of all the quicker we had were talking 3.5-$4 billion. >> have you made a request? >> speak with we've made request rebuilding and some request for replacing. >> what happened to those requests? >> the request are replacing was a complex request because if they were long distance trains or they were not receiving enough revenue for us to be able to pay back -- >> the bottom line is we are allocated the money or not? >> no, sir. >> so congress denied you the money. >> yes sir. >> again, back to mr. hart. do you believe that we could either rehab these cars is talk about any way that would increase resilience and survivability, or do you think they need to be totally replaced? >> that's one of the things we'll be looking into and look into your just as there

currently with the ramada accident. we are looking into what it would take to improve -- >> pull your microphone closer please. >> sorry. we are looking into this both for this action as with the ramada accident in terms of the crash worthiness of the cars whether it will be new court or whether these can be fixed. >> when i look at photos, i think, the locomotive was pretty intact and, of course, that's new construction from an engineer obviously survived, yet that first car i've ever seen and heard some first responders a they have never ever done anything like that before. so i mean, are there other come in other nations or else around the world would have modern railroads, do they have more crash worthiness in their passenger cars? >> that will be part of our investigation is what other countries are doing a vicious peck because we're conditioned to about make issue with the leading edge of crash worthiness

for our passenger cars. >> ms. feinberg, on the positive train control, i appreciate what you said about you will push really hard. commuter railroads are one of the greatest laggards here and it asked for help from congress. congress has not been forthcoming. how are we going to deal with the commuter railroads? >> that's right. we've asked for $875 million to assist commuters, commuter railroads and implement ptc. we've also opened up the rift program for railroads you're looking for loans that will assist with ptc implications in which is delivered on $967 million loan that will assist with ptc application. as we approach the dilemma of the things we have asked congress authority for previously is to work with railroads who absolutely will not miss a deadline or who will

miss the deadline to work with them to raise the safety bar in the interim while they are still working to them spent about some sort of interim changes to compensate for the lack of ptc? >> and go through an approval process and work of those to make sure we are working towards ptc of the petition. >> will you look at a step process from those are trying to been delayed by the ftc or otherwise versus those who just haven't tried it all? >> i expect it would be merit-based, greg. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> committee chairman denham for the next round of questions. >> thank you, mr. chairman. esther boardman, what operational changes as amtrak made since the accident? >> could you ask -- >> in the last three weeks what

operational changes as amtrak made and will amtrak be instituting more training and other efforts to ensure engineers are falling all speed limits? >> we did that could change on the northbound section of the frankfort curve as requested by the fra. we've been evaluating the rest of the curves as required by the foia. and also checking out entire northeast corridor to ensure the speed limit signs along the way which all met the requirements of the emergency order. so we have done that. in terms of how we check on our engineers, we have a very robust and regular method that we check engineers. for example just since january 1 of the 2014 until now we've had over 16,000 speed checks of engineers along the northeast corridor. so that's like 35 times a day do we check somebody along the

northeast corridor to make sure that they are operating at the right speed. we have a recurring training program, a block and program the last for a week every year for each engineer, and have to be certified on a biannual basis. so we have we continue to do that. we continue any kinds of changes that occur, we continue to provide additional training for engineers. >> thank you. how many cars as amtrak to have after doing this audit that have a d.c., how many do you still have that don't have it that you want to implement the atc on? >> after about the accident at a consensus for what we needed to publish, they identified six kurds, one of those was the northbound section. since ever a request us to look

at under the new circumstance with identified at least four more at this point i. with a 300 curves and we're moving forward with those. >> one of the questions that has continued to come up, we've done the reauthorization bill. we funded it pulled out of this committee. what guarantees do we have that the northeast corridor profits will actually be used the ultimate new safety in ptc regulations? >> the way that we have worked with the committee on how we are developing a program is to make safety decisions on safety issues, and funding decisions are really about the larger scale of infrastructure not only for the railroads but for highways and for aviation, which i've been talking about for some readers at this point in time and the necessity for increases in that way.

we are making sure we provide safety decisions. >> i guess the fundamental question is when we passed a broad bill like that what types of guarantees would they be on the priorities of the spending patterns? last year and text in 350 million on new cars. it may be an important issue but the question would be is it a priority of congress? isn't a priority of amtrak? to those priorities outlined? >> we think they do, congressman. we work regularly with the staff of the committee. we work with the fra. we work with all of those who are interested both in safety and improvements along the northeast corridor. the sufficiency of funding to do all the things that we want to

do there's always scarce resources. we have to make those decisions based on those scarce resources but we don't reduce the idea that we need to a safe railroad. we make saved decisions along the way. >> thank you. my time is nearly expired but before i yield back let me just thank you for your efforts ms. feinberg, fra, ntsb as well as the philadelphia all coming together for a very, very rapid response. i appreciate not only the collaboration but certainly a time in his. and i know speaking on behalf of mr. capuano and i've been able to do it with your help to understand how we can resolve these problems in the future. thank you. i yield back. >> mr. capuano is recognized by bennett's. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank the board, the panel for the testimony event. is very thoughtful every difficult decisions on how to make prioritization.

mr. hart, has been just be taking a look i'm not sure you have have you taken a look at the decisions on prioritization of the ptc or is that beyond the scope of your normal activities? >> we would look at these specific events. investigating to determine what needs to be done to prevent that from happening again. >> you wouldn't be in the business of determining whether a by organization made by amtrak or others, atc let's assume everybody get ptc tomorrow. they can't be admitted to market every rail in the country would have to determine what do we do second, third, fourth, fifth? that were not in the normal purview of? >> that would be correct exactly how we would lead it to the implementers. >> fair enough. that's what i expected. ms. feinberg, i'm curious do you agree with mr. boardman's assessment, comments that amtrak will reach the december 2015

deadline to get ptc and the entire northeast corridor? >> we see no reason why to not meet that deadline. we believe they will. >> todo you have any estimate of timeframe for the rest of the amtrak system beyond the northeast corridor? >> got the northeast corridor, other than in michigan, the amtrak service will be dependent on freight implementing ptc, so that could take some time. >> any estimate of the cost of a? >> the cost is well into the billions. billions have been spent and a that billions further to go. >> multiple billions of dollars for the rest of the amtrak system. what about the rest of the class on freight railroads, how much would it cost to get to where it are default implementation? >> i thought that was a question you are just asking so again illusions. >> what about the short lines? are they going to become

limiting positive train control or is it just for the class once and amtrak? >> for class ones ever passenger railroads. >> so the short phrase would not be doing? >> we are working with the short lines a bit separately spent what about commuter rails speak with yes spent what about subway systems, i know they would be if he able to help the fta would be worked with you. >> we work closely with them and they were close with organization the specs of the final analysis even if some the best case scenario the government was flush with money and every private realm company was flush with money it would take multiple billions of dollars and many years to get from where we are torn want to be a positive train control across the nation and every line come is that a fair assessment? >> i would agree with the multiple billions but in terms of multiple years i worry that we are approaching that position, but we believe that

there is a congressionally mandated deadline for december 31, 2015. we intend to enforce against the. this is not a new requirement. >> mr. hart, have you taken a look at this action whether seat belts would've helped or not? >> that is part of our passenger survivability investigation. >> so that will be part of your final report when you have one? >> is. >> because i just rode the train to philadelphia and there are no seat belts on the train, yet i flew dinner today from boston. i had a seatbelt on the entire time. it would strike me, i don't know i have no idea and looking forward to your report, that seatbelt will be something that should be considered both to prevent death and injury. >> we will be looking at that as part of the survivability of the the. >> if they recommend seatbelt and passenger trains come is that something you would pursue? >> it would certainly be

something good look at. there are different opinions about the requirement of seatbelt on trains. >> different opinions? >> yeah. well, i recognize that seatbelt might seem like a good solution in the event of an accident. there are also people who tend to be up and walking around between cars during an accident. the fact that you have to harden and deceit in order to put seat belts into the seats of -- >> i understand about whether the debate put into current configuration but i suggest talk to people at the ntsb about automobiles about planes. i understand again maybe the current configuration might need to be addressed over time but the concept of seatbelts, again i was under the impression it was no longer debatable that seatbelt and an accident at high speed to any mode of transportation are preferable to no seat belt. that's the case maybe i'll take mine out of the car, to. >> we would work closely with the ntsb just as we do on every recommendation that basically

the hardening of the seats that would be required in order to put seat belts onto trains would cause more injuries and an accident. >> so we're back at it again. it's a cost-benefit analysis, how many people have to die or get injured before take the next. the same question we had with automobiles, same question with planes and now we go through trains. >> not a cost-benefit issue, but simply how do you keep the most people inside the car safe. >> thank you. with.com mr. duncan is recognized for five minutes. >> mr. chairman, thank you very much. ms. feinberg, last week secretary fox appeared to agree that this accident was not necessarily caused by a lack of funding. is exact quote was i don't think you can categorically say that more funding would've changed things that you agree with that statement? >> i think he was referring to the actual behavior of the engineer there i do think there are consequences to funding issues yes.

>> mr. boardman providers the total operating revenues of amtrak have gone up from 2.4 million, the 3.1 over the last five years 20% increase in funding. on top of that the federal government has given you 1.4 billion in additional funds each year. and i'm wondering. i assume you felt that amtrak was moving fast enough in installing positive train control because you said in your testimony that you are ahead of every other railroad. is that correct speak with we are ahead of every other railroad. >> and also assuming that you were shocked by this accident because you testified that it's been 20 years since you had a

derailment caused fatalities, or fatality caused by derailment. so railroad passenger travel is still about the safest method of transportation is that correct speak what we believe that yes. >> and did you ever tell this committee or the congress that you didn't have the funds to move fast enough on installation of positive train control? >> we did not. >> all right. ms. feinberg, how do you intend what enforcement actions would you take against railroads that are not moving fast enough wrecks and would it really would be given credit, for instance if one railroad is a little bit behind in other railroad in installation but they have a better safety record, or maybe they have the best safety record of any railroad, would they be given credit for that good safety record?

>> we are having a natural conversation at fra now about how exactly we will plan to enforce against a deadline. just as we discussed previously, the are some railroads that have behaved they are better than others. and we don't want to punish railroads that are farther ahead for the behavior of railroads have not been any work on implementation it all. we are having an intro conversation. we've got discretion within the statute on how we can force against the deadline. it can include anything from very little enforcement to daily civil penalties. >> all right. thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. duncan with that mr. sears is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. you know, i find the amtrak just about every week. i ride amtrak just about every week, and this accident really hit home.

ms. feinberg and mr. boardman can you speak to the future of amtrak and passenger if congress continues to use patchwork approach to funding britain's? >> i would like to say and i've said many times, especially to the chairmen i think that my concern has been the reliability of the railroad. the reliability of what we do for our hard work on our system. the reliability of our use of tunnels, whether it is in new york or whether it's through the baltimore tunnel, but our reliability on the portal bridge that's ready to be rebuilt that doesn't always shut properly. so the funding for infrastructure on the northeast corridor is absolutely behind

the curve. in the last three authorization up our funding into pre-attack there was a commission that was established of all the states the federal government and amtrak along the northeast corridor -- pria act -- for the necessity for us to rebuild an equity investment in this corridor. we also have a requirement because of the growth of traffic on this quarter we're handling over 2000 trains a day on the quarter, amtrak does. is that we need more capacity which means we need some assets as well, some new tunnels into new york company avenue bridge going into new york especially. and we need to fix this baltimore choke point we have along the corridor. so from my perspective that's where the funding is really needed. we make safety decisions based

on safety. and infrastructure decisions were being made based on the available funds. >> thank you. >> mr. hart, i just can't understand this is 2015 and we're still analyzing whether seatbelts would have made a difference. i certainly agree with congressman capuano that all these cars, planes have shown that it works. i don't understand why in 2015 we are still analyzing this. and in terms of people walking around in the train, i mean, people get up and walk into play, too, right. but you take your life in your hands sometimes when you walk around these trains back and forth. mr. hart, can you answer that? i just don't see why we have to analyze this anymore.

>> thank you for the question we are looking at the total situation can not just a seat belt. there are several seats that can be dispatched to willa cather to tally of circumstances regarding how to protect the occupants. >> well, i've got to tell you, i mean, looking at the seats. it just seems logical to me that seatbelts would make a difference. and to wait to analyze it more and more and more i don't get it. i mean, i would be comfortable wearing a seatbelt and i go on the train mondays and tuesdays come thursdays and fridays. i don't see it. we have to wait for this. ms. feinberg, can you talk to that? >> in my experience the ntsb is not shy about recommending improvements to safety and so we will work closely with them and anything that comes out of this accident we will work very

closely in. >> will you say this is one of the cheapest accommodations that you can make? >> on seatbelts? >> no, i would not spent it's more expensive than all the other accommodations? >> it is simply making seatbelts, and again deferential to mr. hart, but in limiting seatbelts on trains would require a change of every seat which would again come expense is not the priority but we would have to hoard all of the seats. >> thank you, mr. chairman. ..