>> if i can switch gears to iran. me commend our discussion. i know it's the middle east we're talking about, but iran is part of this. recently the iaea spoke to some congressmen and said and he knows more about iran in nuclear negotiations than anyone in the world. he said you have to have two things for a deal to work on iran will get a nuclear weapon,

that there be able to the unannounced inspections by us or our designee him and that those have to be able to go anyplace including military installations. without those two elements at the of is simply not going to work. we choose to agree with his assessment or not? >> i certainly think a good deal and go back to what the president said which is absolutely true, which is no deal is better than a bad deal but a good deal has to be verifiable. i want to add with respect to iran, he raised the question, iran is up with isil, the two big challenges to the stability of the middle east and the u.s. interest associated with the middle east. our role in the nuclear negotiations is were not part of an negotiations per se.

we don't set the table. i have the responsibility make sure the military option israel. and believe me we were combat to make that real. second, we have the responsibility to have a posture in the region that we do to check iranian influence. and then last we are very committed to the defense of israel. so we have a big role in this picture in defense. it's not part of the negotiation but it's a very big role and taken very seriously. >> the only thing i would add as we had these discussions with regional partners and most recently my israeli counterpart if there's a deal i've got work to do with them. and if there's not a deal, i've got work to do with them. we are committed to doing that work. >> thank you both. >> ms. tsongas. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank both of you for being

here today. it's great to have you. i think it's particularly important for us on this committee and in this body to hear from both of you this week as the house will consider a resolution regarding ongoing operations in iraq and syria. i imagine you are aware of it it has been nearly one year since the president outlined his plan to counter the threat posed by isil a war he is waging based on authorities have not been debated by congress in 13 years. since the president announced his plan to defeat isil the united states has been nearly $9 million the day, or nearly $3 billion overall, at this rate it will continue. meanwhile, regional partners are pursuing efforts in iraq and syria that may or may not be in concert with those of the united states. all of this has happened without a robust debate in congress about the use strategy, although we are starting to have that here today. the costs which would not yet

addressed, and in state in iraq and agreed region. i believe it's a debate that is long overdue. i appreciate very much that you are here today, and general dempsey, we will miss you. i've always appreciated how forthright, how very thoughtful you been in our discussions about not just what we're doing in the middle east but more broadly across the globe. i have a question for you that really, i would ask you to think back a bit. because 10 years ago this fall you've assumed responsibility for a time for training, equipping and sustained the iraqis to get forces. but after a decade of training mostly iraqi army remains a hollow force and we are still challenged with it. with 450 american advisers being sent to iraq and with your unique perspective in mind how is today's american trained strategy adapting to make sure that we are not against an app a force that will fold in the face

of stiff resistance? is it just enough that we are going to to seek to recruit sunnis into the? i think it's much more complicated than that. what are the lessons learned that give you confidence that these efforts will prove successful as you leave your very unique place in the american military effort? >> thank you congresswoman. i have a couple thoughts. when his in terms of the strategy in general. i think our strategy, it matches the complexity with which we are dealing. if you don't remember anything else i said today, i think you should remember that the strategy matches the complexity. this is not a simple environment in any sense of the word. and to transfer this point earlier way would seem inconceivable to us that the sunni would coalesce around -- ranking member smith's point -- the reality is we are worried about the shia and iranian pajon

in an hour about isil. and so that's the environment first. second i mentioned were trying to build a network and that network which will include all the stakeholders i described earlier will be somewhat fungible from plan a to plan b if necessary. i think that's an important point to remember as well. reaching out to the sunni tribes is a very prudent -- we're we are doing at the request of prime minister abadi. accidentally to some discussion that this was a knee-jerk reaction to the fall of her money. we've been planning this for months. we are looking at other locations as well will begin continue to build his network which will be applicable to plant a and in support of plant a but also accessible to us if plan b becomes necessary. >> you mentioned you don't see this being resolved very quickly. any words of advice again as you

were leaving as to how we adapt over time to the fungible changing environment? any thoughts? >> that's the thought actually. you articulate it which i think increasingly we've got as us a mention an hour session we talked about risk, we've got for the first time in my 41 years we've got states' capabilities i don't know about their intent but i know that capabilities that could threaten us. we have to deal with that. we have nonstate actors who, their intent is clear. or capabilities are less clear and we better find a way forward. by the way some of the includes budget uncertainties of the can build ourselves a military that can do with both kinds of threats and then be adapted when we get it wrong. the key to adapting his leaderobody does that on the planet but we do. >> thank you. i wish you the best of luck. >> mr. franks. >> well, thank you, mr. chairman chairman. and thank you, secretary carter,

and general dempsey. i want to add my personal gratitude on behalf of my children for your noble and lifelong commitment to the cause of human freedom and the future of it. secretary carter, it's been observed and highlighted in several different mediums recently that the kurdish strategy seems to be the one that is working in almost anyone's minds to be very effective in yesterday afternoon i had the privilege of hosting the president of the kurdistan national assembly of the city in in my office and he was very open and honest about the strength of the kurdish people, around 40-50 million spread throughout turkey, iran, iraq and syria. he estimated approximately 150,000 kurdish fighters could be ready once called but he emphasized that the greatest limitation was not the number of fighters but their equipment, ammunition, the things they need just in terms of hard support.

i guess my first question to you is, we would like to know if the reports are true that the administration lobbied against an effort in the senate and the a to drug on the kurdish peshmerga? and if so why? and what is the defense department doing to ensure the funds and equipment and weapons that we have decent will actually make it into the very committed, capable and effective fans of the peshmerga? >> thank you, congressman, and you're right. committed, capable. the kurdish forces are what we aspire to with respect to their iraqi security forces in general. they show the will to fight. they show the capability of the fight. i pointed earlier to their seizing just in the past days one of the critical lifelines of supply to isil.

so they are effective not only protecting and defending their own region but in a larger campaign to defeat isil. so we are supporting them from the air. we are supporting them with equipment, to get to your point. and i met with him a few weeks ago. we went through the various categories of weapons and it's a substantial the we providing. i shouldn't we are not the only ones. in fact, some of the ones the system that the kurds have gotten that they valued most have come from our european allies, and that's good that shows that he that is in the fight. we are committed to supporting the kurdish forces. the reason to do the angle shot so to speak to the government of iraq gets back to trying to foster and support a single of securing iraqi state. we've all discussed the challenges of that. chairman just alluded to that

but that's the policy. we turn to baghdad and said you can't slow this down to in the earlier days they were slowing down and i was getting directly to the kurds, not on our stuff at some of the stuff coming from europe and elsewhere which is very good because the sky truly defied. >> i appreciate that and understand the policy bank shot as you call it but i'm concerned maybe were not putting enough english on it. i hope you continue to work in that direction. the deadline, general dempsey for the p5+1 nuclear negotiations with iran is weeks away and the perception is you do it in into a deal with iran. it's my judgment and many others kind of have a great effect on china and russia as they watch our superpower in their minds capitulate to a lesser power. i'm afraid saudi arabia considering its nuclear future and that the u.s. appears weaker with every step forward isis

takes. i know that the supposed decisions on the administered level and not your level, but a near-term decision like this could have much greater complications across the middle east as you know better than anyone, anyone of us could almost imagine how this the administration and department ensuring we balanced the near-term isis threat with a long-term iranian threat? and what effects on the ground do you foresee this injection of the iranian economy with billions of dollars that they may continue sponsorship of terrorism? what effect is that going to have? are we doing what we need to do? >> that's not a 10-second question, congressman, but i will give you a five-second answer. it's what i deliver to order where we have state threats and we have nonstate actors.

isil's strategy is a subset of the global strategy that actually i would be happy to lay out for you. >> the gentleman's time has expired. with this many members we have to try to hold to the five minute rule. ms. duckworth. >> drumlin. mr. secretary, general dempsey, again, congratulations on your upcoming recovery. i regard myself. the water is fun. jump on him. on anywhere near your service though. i do want to address the fact i have reservations about our methods of training and equip the street forces. specifically the vetting process, audibly to properly oversee the nation and to know whether those that we are training and equipping are working in support of your schools and our mission long-term. i understand after some delay of the train the first cohort has officially begun. my reservations remain. mainly identify those who can be

trusted, who can be counted on, who will work towards achieving our goals. now that the training is underway i'm concerned about a range of issues like what happened to the u.s. trained rebels when they come under attack from isis fighters or from forces loyal to assad. also, what is our long-term commitment? if there aren't with you as weapons, have we commit to long-term supply of nato caliber bullets? they are not using ak-47s, so who's providing those nato caliber rhines? i just want to make sure we know how such a small group of rebels won't be able to tip, you know, what the objectives will become how do we measure success et cetera? mr. secretary, could you start? >> sure. that's a very excellent

question. and the city train and equip program -- syria -- is even more challenging than the iraq train and equip program for the reason she decided. mainly come we're trying to recruit and identify people that, as you put it, can be counted on, that is to fight to have the right mindset and ideology, not be aligned with groups like isil on the one hand. and on the other hand, as she put it work towards our goals. our goal being for them to find isil in the first instance. it turns out to be very hard to identify people who meet both of those criteria. the general is trying very hard to identify such people and you raise yet another question which is when we equip them and set them loose, what

responsibility do we have for them there after? i believe we have some obligation to support them and to protect them, including supply them. but then they would be questions raised, i'm sure by members of this committee where it any other stuff we give them get diverted. if we're getting with iraqi security forces working with the governments of three forces. we have more extremes keep control over their equipment and so forth. these people are trying to recruit in syria, it's going to be it's much trickier. these constraints we put ourselves which are perfectly understandable due progressively limit the number of inductees into the program. that's proving the thing that limits the growth of the program. we have enough training sites and so forth. for now we don't have enough trainees to fill them. >> thank you for your service or whenever i talk to veterans they consider then those

fortunate to have you here, so thank you. i share your reservations. this is challenging. as the secretary said, this is more challenging than iraq but it's the necessary step to cut up some credible grand bargain. we have some experience on the syrian and turkish border. the kind of support that's under consideration is kinetic control, logistics, intelligence and close air support the no decisions me because we haven't reached the point where we are about to deploy sender we have had challenges recruiting and retaining. we are trying to work through those. and as i said we have a template that we have applied elsewhere that we think is applicable, and particularly if you want to keep them in the fight. and those decisions will be made sometime within the next couple of months. >> so at what point is there diminished returns? if you so few recruits that commit all this criteria to

commit is a great is it worth it to continue this policy of training and equipping the syrian rebels? >> i think for now we are just literally at the first iteration or tranche of this. so it's too soon to give up on it. the alternative is to try to find groups within syria which is it's a challenge to part with. we have to partner with somebody. >> mr. wittman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. secretary carter general dempsey, thank you for your service. i want to go to your comments she made about the lack of success, overall success of iraqi forces against isis. he talked about the shortcomings of iraqi forces whether it's command-and-control, their capability they will to fight. let me ask there's been suggestions there are more things we can do with our forces from operational perspective from additional enablers, things like flying more air cover, special operation forces in

targeted areas more forward air controllers, better isr intelligence surveillance reconnaissance, training and advising at the battalion level. and even if the assertion that it may be better for us to put in certain ways more of our troops on the ground in addition to other arab nations that have interests along with this, countries like jordan, saudi arabia egypt integrated combined force on the ground to give me your perspective. we heard about what the shortcomings of iraqi forces are. is there more we could do from an operational and support aspect with our efforts to? >> thank you. to get to the first part of your question, how is the isf perform to the honest truth is it's mixed. some units like the counterterrorism forces have

fought admirably and relentlessly, almost to the point of exhaustion over the past month. others have collapsed as i indicated. and furthermore the iraqi security forces have increasingly become the shia force rather than a sunni force which is precisely what the people of the sunni part of iraq didn't feel like they were protecting him and that it was an army, and they need to come back into that if we will have digested the multi-sector in state. to get to your question, when we have capable iraqis ground forces like the kinds were kind of build, your question is what kind of support we provide them. we are committed to providing intelligence support and advice and assist support. with respect to introducing more forces on the ground with them

that is something that we will i think need to revisit as those forces are actually produced. once we have a capable motivated force can what can we do to enable unsupported? i like your idea not just involving us in that our role is to be an enabler a motivator. the chairman use the word leadership, not a substitute for a capable ground force but an enabler of the ground force. as we would like to get to. >> thank you. >> chairman dempsey speak with the words to keep in mind is our strategy besides matched to the complexity is also trans regional. we're talking to be mostly about iraq in syria but as you isil has tentacles out in other areas. it's got to be sustainable over time and that's i think the point to carry away. let's take isr for exhibitor we have about 50% almost 50% of

the global come of the global resource in isr unmanned committed into iraq, syria sector. that's a heavy lift. so to suggest, and by the with the rest of the is reacting to european security issues related to iranian's aggressiveness industry and over in yemen to asia and the pacific. and afghanistan of course will still have 10,000 troops committed. we're trying to find a way to make it a sustainable effort. returned to provide a unique capability. that which no one else can provide. but we, of course, are looking at points, discrete moments for limited objections for offensive operations will be may provide an additional boost to the iraqi security forces. but i would be very reluctant that's probably not the right word. i get accused of being reluctant often.

my military judgment would be introduction of those resources should not be done on a habitual basis because we want them to understand this is a verified. but rather from almost what it would be strategically significant, potentially for example, an assault on mosul. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> thank you. mr. o'rourke? >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. secretary, in the nine lines of effort that comprise our strategy, the first one to decide his political and you said that every other line of effort follows from that. we must be successful politically difficult to be successful at all. the other line for strategy and difficult achieve our goals in the region. you gave an example in your opening test on building government. can you tell us where we have built governors in that region successfully? and a follow-up question to that

is how long will that take since everything follows the success of that first one of the? >> that's a very good question, a very complicated task. in iraq it will mean when helping the iraqis, helping them when they recover territory from isil to build a system of governance, people who live there support and are willing to support and defend in the long-term for you say where have we had success. my own view is we've had considerable success in afghanistan. i was just thinking to president ghani yesterday morning. is reporting the results of the campaign their. again, the afghan security forces which we are enabling which we trained and equipped and are enabling. a national unity government of president ghani and ceo abdullah abdullah, which is a

multi-sectarian government holding together. this in afghanistan, which i think if you'll go back 15 years would say a very unlikely place for that to be done. so we have assisted and enabled that. our people are very good that. we are not at that stage yet in iraq, but when we get to that stage i think that we will participate in an international effort to help these places that are tragically demolished to rebuild themselves and govern themselves. >> for 15 years in afghanistan to get to a successful example of building governance in this region, and including the fact that we've been in iraq in one form or another since 2003 invested tens of billions of dollars to assist in building governance, trained and equipped an army that melted in the face of the enemy. i have serious reservations about the potential to achieve success on this first one of effort. the third line of effort you

mentioned is helping to produce a capable, committed local ground force. you admitted we had budgeted to train and equip 24000, have only been able to recruit 7000. you add to that that the only ground forces apart from the iraqi army by the shia militias funded and led and armed by iran. is it is a serious proposal? is this a serious line of effort that we can seriously expect to succeed, given the most recent failures in your admission that the iraqis national army lacks the will to fight the? >> well, it's a serious effort but it hinges upon sunni fighters coming into the iraqi security forces, being trained and equipped by us and the coalition, enabled by us but

fighting for their homeland. that's the essential ingredient. that was absent last starting last summer. it was quite good as and. not everywhere. earlier we talked about the peshmerga. i mentioned the cgs and other units of the iraqi security forces that did fight. and as you indicate you are shia militias and which we don't support. we only support those that fall under the government of iraq as part of our overall strategy of supporting a multi-securing government. so that is a strategy. it's difficult. i think the gap between 7,024,000, the whole point is to try to close that gap because were going to close that with sunni fighters. that's the essential ingredient and i think we're going to get

on track to close that gap and that's important. >> in an exchange earlier one of my colleagues and you had agreed that one of our primary missions is to support soldiers and families. i can think of no greater way of supporting them that ensuring that we have a strategy that can succeed when the going to place them in harm's way and acknowledged that many will lose their lives or have their lives changed upon return. i hope there's a plan b from the administration. with the i yield back. >> on in tibet. .gif -- amen to that. that's another reason why they deserve a quick finish up with you trying to accomplish. >> mr. finn. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you, gentlemen, for your service. secretary carter and general dempsey, thank you for your service to our beloved nation. i do have some questions about what's happening in iraq.

your nine points or nine lines that you talk about, secretary carter most of them are nonkinetic, such things, intel and messaging and messaging and that sort of thing. but general dempsey, you said the other day that with regard to ramadi that the city itself is not symbolic in any way. so the question is what factors on the ground would change? and this is a question for both of you. you can volunteer each other on this, but what would change on the ground in iraq that would change our strategy, particularly anymore genetically genetically? >> -- in a more connected way.

>> there is in one's thinking the question, what if a multi-securing iraq turns out not to be possible. i think that chairman addressed that. i disagreed with what he said earlier, in response to it congressman smith asked. that is an important part of our strategy now on the ground. if that fails, if that government can't do what it's supposed to do then we will still try to enable local ground forces if they willing to partner with us to keep stability, but i will not be a single state of iraq. and at the same time we're doing that i think of the ninth lines of effort are signified that we while we're working on this challenging situation on the ground in iraq we are trying to

protect ourselves and -- >> but to be more specific in my limited time let's say that the capital of baghdad itself is in danger of falling. the entire government could be toppled. would that change on the ground strategy? would you change the extent to which we use kinetic activity? >> i will ask the chairman to comment on this as well. i don't see that, that particular scenario change on the ground as very likely for the reason that prime minister abadi, one of the steps he's taken is to surround baghdad with much of the remaining iraqi security forces. and secondly many of them as i've noted our shia in sectarian orientation. and, therefore, likely to fight fiercely for the part of iraq. therefore, i think it's

unlikely. >> that's why we are there right now. the threat to irbil is what drew us into the kinetic portion of of the site as well as the threat to baghdad and the fact that we were intimate presence there in the form of our embassy and thousand of american citizens. look come will always protect our national interests unilaterally. in fact, some of the recent special operation strikes some other kinetic strikes it seems conduct both manned and unmanned and let's not forget in terms of our kinetic action these 1650 pilots that fly in and out of iraq and syria know how dangerous it is should ever find themselves with an engine failure, not least a shot from air defense weapon. we are very active kinetically put the question is when something causes to be more kinetic quick it would be a credible intel of a threat to

the homeland or credible intel of the threat to our facilities and persons, but for the day-to-day is the fight we are relying upon coalition -- >> limited time, i think you segued into my next question and that is what is the homeland is it hard like 9/11? would that change our strategy in iraq, and in what may? >> i suspect so actually, but the fundamental strategy today is to prevent that from happening and to have an enduring outcome. if you're suggesting that could we go into a better job ourselves against isil absolutely. but we will be back to two years from now. >> thank you. >> thank you, general dempsey and secretary carter for coming today and also for your service to our country. in february the president submitted and aumf to congress

that we never put two of the applicant must have a full and open debate on the ongoing operations in the middle east. given the ever-changing situation, has been any thought to the date the changes to the aumf measure since it was submitted? for example, is there more clarity on the phrase enter an offensive ground combat operation? >> thank you. i'll answer that. the very question that the chairman and i asked ourselves about the aumf now several months ago, and actually testified about the aumf we asked ourselves two questions. one was did this give us the needed flexibility and authority to conduct the campaign that is necessary? the second is, would its passage clearly signify to our

people.com our people meaning our men and women in uniform and the other members of the department of defense that the country is behind them in this fight. those are the two things that are important about the aumf to me. the features the first question is affirmative for me in the version that the president submitted. because it was flexible or broad in its definition of isil and the enemy, so to speak. because it was not geographically limited because we know isolated geographically limited. it had a three-year peace in it which is not anything to do with the military campaign. i can't say that in three years to campaign against isil is going to be over. three years in the aumf is recognition of our constitutional system, the fact that there will be a new president and congress and the new president should revisit

this tragic scenes in reasonable to me. the only restriction within it is about long-term large-scale offensive combat operations which we judge for all the reasons we've been describing earlier today are not part of our strategy to rethink will be needed to combat isil. therefore, i'm okay with that revision in the draft the president has submitted. so those are the questions we asked ourselves, and on both of those ground i hope it will pass. i can't say whether it is legally necessary in any sense but i think it would show support for the troops there and in that sense is a good thing. >> for secretary carter, again last week an additional foreign assistance and troops were deployed. however, he had said personally that come and go we can do

nothing that we can substitute for the iraqi forces will to fight, and followed the fault fault of vermont the also made similar comments. i think you make comments as well today. i think many of us in congress are gravely concerned that the administration is considering committing a substantial american ground force to the ongoing efforts to combat isis. as it has been 10 months and we slowly seen a ramp up of u.s. forces in iraq and syria. our options being considered to be deployed a substantial ground combat force to the region to combat isis? if not, at what number with a line be drawn for american forces in iraq? i think we all want to know how does this end and where do we draw the line on american involvement in this conflict? >> the essence of the strategy is not to have u.s. forces

substitute for capable and motivated local forces, but to have u.s. and coalition forces enable those forces. and the reason for that is that that's the only way to get a lasting results. american forces, outside forces can combat but then it comes time for them to sustain the victory, and i that can only be done by local forces. that's the reason why our strategy is not to put in 100,000 american troops. it is to put in smaller and carefully selected groups that can have unusual leverage. that's the point about, it's not about the number of people there. it's the leverage they will have. the right in the middle of sunni recruiting territory and we will see these and it's right in the middle of were the anbar operations in his that we can

help the iraqis armed forces. >> thank you. thank you mr. chairman. >> mr. coffman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general dempsey, awlaki thank you so much for your decades of dedicated service to this country. and although i certainly feel you've earned retirement we will miss you. i think this country will miss your service to our country. there is i guess a position of this government of the new boots on the ground. adages want to drill down to what that means, because i agree that we shouldn't have u.s. military personnel back in iraq as a ground component maneuver element, taking the fight away from the indigenous forces there, iraqi security forces. but i also have a concern about

that definition in terms i do feel that there ought to be some u.s. military personnel forward with iraqi forces, forward air controllers to make sure that we have effective close air support. advisors, not simply behind the water but with iraqi units. i served in iraq with the marine corps and what i noticed and going out in joint patrols in the western euphrates river valley was that it will embolden the confidence of those iraqis soldiers. and so what is the position of the administration right now? because i for critics complained about the effectiveness of our close air support in terms of the number of missions and the effectiveness of those missions number of sorties in the effectiveness of those missions. general dempsey? >> thanks, congressman. on the boots on the ground

issue, i don't know what the administration's position is long-term. i can give you my military judgment here today, and that is i would not be i would not recommend that we put u.s. forces in harm's way simply to stiffen the spine of local forces. if their spine is not stiffened by the threat of isil and their way of life, nothing we do is going to stiffen their spine. on the other hand, when they become offensive, and as a military man you understand the distinction between defense and offense. when they go on the offensive and defensive strategic target ever want to ensure that they succeed in achieving the strategic target, it could be a major city, it could be an oil refinery i would take general austin's advice and go to the secretary of defense and have that conversation about how we could make the chances of success better. but not just to stiffen their

spine. in terms of success of the airpower, the airpower's limitation is not about forward air controllers or aipac's or u.s. servicemen and women forget it's about the intermingling of a significant number of groups. so in any particular place let's take ramadi. you have an intimate link of the iraqi security forces conventional, maybe counterterror forces which are special operators, some elements of the shia militia some which are working on behalf of the country of iraq some of which were very concerned about and tribes. so we have very precise and very deliberate about the use of their powers we don't actually undermine our own campaign of trying to focus this effort on isil. >> i agree with everything that chairman has said and open to the judgment in the future when we need, however, is an iraqi ground force. then we can provide leverage for

the weekend not just to stiffen the spine can not to substitute but to leverage them. the last thing i will say there are boots on the ground in iraq. we think about them every day, appreciate any of you who visited them. they are not just in baghdad. they are around the country but the job they're doing is to build this capable and motivated ground force that gets as you say we can leverage and we will revisit or visit that question when we have a ground force to enable them. >> let me make sure i understand the fear positions. if former iraqi forces -- if forward iraqi forces are in contact with isis or any elements, and close air support would be effective in terms of influence in that battle,

influencing the battlefield, shaping the battlefield then in fact he would support u.s. military personnel forward with a back units in the forward air controllers? >> we will take that one for the record congressman. >> thank you. mr. moulton? >> thank you, mr. chairman. gentlemen, thank you both for your service ever been you. general dempsey, when i walked into the office in baghdad as a lieutenant and to try to figure out how a lieutenant was supposed to report to a three-star come you proved to me that you're not only a great national leader as you demonstrate for the entire country but you're also a very good boss. i'm grateful for being able to serve with you as well as agitate our country and in so many important ways. so thank you very much. when you say mr. secretary, that putting u.s. combat troops on the ground is to substitute

for local forces because only local forces will produce interim results, my concern is a plan that we are executing out as far as training local forces does not look materially different than what we were doing some time ago. we just get a much smaller scale. i think the missing component is really an enduring political plan to ensure that the iraqi government can hold itself together because ultimately it's really a political figure in iraq today i think we all agree on that. so talking about how important this first line of effort is build a more effective, inclusive, multi-sector and government in iraq. i'm concerned by my experience on the ground there when i visited in february, because i didn't see a single american commander on the military side they knew anything about a political plan to when i talked the u.s. ambassador in baghdad his position was essentially it's up to the iraqis. it's not for us to influence.

it's not about us influencing it over a sovereign iraq state. it's about either us influence iraq politics or iran influence in iraqi politics. it concerns me as well frankly mr. chairman, when you say that you don't know what the administrations long-term plan is. if we don't know what the long-term plan is then i'm not sure it's worth putting these troops at risk in iraq today. at a personal level for most frustrating part of going back to iraq in february was seen so much of what we thought for and achieved during the surge really gone to waste. i want to make sure we do have a long-term enduring political plan so that whatever effort is made by these or hundred 50 and others come on the ground in iraq today doesn't go to waste and we don't find ourselves sending troops back again five years from now. >> i just want to make sure because i didn't, i didn't intend to imply i don't know

what the administrations plan is. i think we tried to lay that out. what i meant to suggest was that as this military campaign has evolved, when we have approach the administration for additional resources within the context of the strategy, they've taken our advice in every case but i just haven't gone forward yet with any further recommendation. >> i want to just second that. that's kind of answer to mr. coffman's excellent question as well. with respect to your also excellent question as that reinforces the first one of effort is essential, the first one of effort being an iraqi government that will not behave the way malik is government did. and that is something we can influence. we don't directly control but we can influence, and that's why the first one of effort of the

second and third, what i am so intent and the chairman is on a line in the political with what we are trying to do. >> mr. secretary, what are we doing to influence it? what we can specifically to counter iranian political influence on the ground in iraq today? >> well, we are, made it clear to prime minister abadi and all the parties that are and if supported the point of view, that we are not going to support militias or shia forces support of iran that are not under control of the iraqi government. so the ones will go to support and the ones we are going to enable, therefore, the ones we intend to be successful as part of our strategy will be under the control of the government of iraq, and they will be the success of forces. >> i spoke with the iraqi

ambassador last week and he said the difference between american support and iran iraq as they had the house on fire, america comes with these conditions, fire insurance, and i ran to shows up with a fire extinguisher. is the is giving much more effective at leveraging iraqi politics today. >> well, we have spoken to prime minister abadi and the members of his government about precisely this point and he is asking for our help. does he speak for everybody in baghdad? know, it is asking for auto. he says he prefers our support. >> thank you both. thank you, mr. chairman. >> mr. hunter? >> thank you, mr. chairman. general, which is second to complete you for being here. you're familiar with about two years ago i asked secretary hagel to institute a hostage policy review. i asked him to appoint a hostage point person for dod. it ended up being mike lumpkin

and secretary hagel did that appointed mike lumpkin. the wife of institute a hostage college -- policy review. this was brought to my tent but a lieutenant colonel, special forces soldier who fought in afghanistan, was working on hostage policy hostage recovery for dod. he is now being investigated. these basically being drummed out of the army. you would not have it hostage policy regardless secretary hagel stored on his own put my request. i would not have requested it. you would not have had a hostage point person with mike lumpkin if it were not for the lieutenant. senator johnson wrote you a letter i think a few days ago asking you to look into secretary mchugh, his let's say investigatory policies within the army.

possible abuse by the cid within the army advocates of lieutenant amory in particular which is as different now, i would just like your commitment that you look into this? because none of this would -- would've happened, has to heidi klum whistleblower status because he helped the united states fix its botched hostage recovery policy, of which we have none. we talked about this the u.s. fbi, state, dod and other, the intelligence communities all in their own land doing on things hostages. that's going to change know the you without your own hostage policy now that that review is under way in the house and senate come in the aa was passed phishing in the age of the parameters administrations new hostage recovery policy set at the apple past inocencio have that. that would not have come about without the guy whose uninvestigated making it all

possible. >> congressman, i am familiar with the case. you have my commitment. it's under investigation now by the inspector general. i am familiar with the case. i can't comment on it because it is under investigation much of my commitment. i will keep in touch with that investigation as appropriate. and you also have, i can't speak for the history of course but you certainly have my commitment with respect to a reasonable conclusion of a hostage policy review. and since the chairman may have been present at the gratian of the review, if you'd like to comment, chairman? >> obviously congress and, we comment on the investigation we are both aware of and we are certainly enthusiastic to move ahead with the hostage rescue issue and make it more coherent across government.

>> thank you. one of the reasons the army puts things under investigation is we can't comment on the i understand that the that's happened in the past. number two, i would just ask that this i think is bigger than one particular service. i think when you look at this case in particular, and what he's done he was in service the entire country into the constitution and who's doing his duty. i think you don't have come if you don't conduct source on the investigation itself, investigation of the investigation i think would have gone to the outcome that we should have, which is transit thing cleared and not excoriated him by being praised as of actually got something done within the system even though that you go outside of the system to us. i would hope that every single one of those gentlemen sitting behind you all in uniform knows that if they can't work within the system, that they can come to congress and that's what we are here for. because when you're in the box

you can't always picture so. that's a leader to do. so with that i yield back, mr. chairman. thank you. >> ms. gabbard. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you both for your service and for being here today. we've heard a lot of discussion about the source of of effort that you outlined in your opening remarks to address the political and security situation in iraq. i think it's important that we look at this question of what is our strategy to defeat isis. it's important operate in a world that actually exist and not the one we hope where we wished could exist or would exist in the future. it's important to recognize that while these ideals are good to have come we are operating in the world that exists today. so even as we look at this administration's policy, the previous administration's policy the billions of dollars and thousands of lives that have been spent in holding on to this unified central government policy, even as we hear rhetoric

from prime minister abadi, the reality is experts both with uniform and those who have studied the middle east for a very long time i'll say for practical purposes you have three regions in iraq. it's a fractured country with the kurds in the north, that she had the stronghold in baghdad essential and get the sunni territory largely to the west. so when you look at this question and to look at mr. secretary, your answer to mr. over its question with regards to give us an example -- mr. over -- there is a plan in place to allow for this to support governance and the ability, for example, the sunni tribes to secure themselves and you talk of how this would happen in the future. help iraqi government put a plan in place for government, but my question goes to tikrit this is

an offense that was not the owner go to a question before this occurred. what was the plan, and there was no plan at that time and we saw as a result once tikrit was taken, sunni families were terrorized by shia militia homes were burned down. businesses were looted and as a result we continue to see why the sunni people have no motivation to go and fight for those so-called iraqis agree force, is iraqi government that shuts down bridges when they're trying to run away from isis. as you say it's essential sunni fight or brought into the fold, i think we all recognize that some people need to be empowered, but this is why there is no faith by many in congress and the sunni tribes most importantly that there is a plan in place to empower them. >> i very much respect your expertise and your perspective on this.

one of my favorite sayings is hope is not a strategy. and other strategy, the particular part of a strategy which has to do with the integrity of the iraqi state is a challenging one. no question about it for all the reasons you describe. it can be achieved better than sectarianism for the iraqi people and for what we want, which is isis lasting defeat. is a difficult to achieve? yes. does it involve as an essential ingredient empowering sunnis and giving them the will to participate? absolutely. is tikrit a good example of what we're trying to achieve? no, it wasn't. that's the whole point. that was not an ordered operation under the exclusive control of the iraqi government.

it did and the kind of aftermath that exactly incentivizes us to be trying to get sunnis into the fund. so if you put she is into this the sunni fight, you know that ends. that is not lasting defeat. that's what we're trying to get the sunnis into the fight. i think you are asking exactly the right question but i think it's more than hope. i think there's some recent prospect that we can do this. we are determined to do it. there are plenty of iraqis say they will support that strategy and that we can make it succeed. >> thank you, mr. secretary. i continue to urge the administration to consider changing its policy. on supporting this government in baghdad image and sectarianism is a problem but i would argue discovered in baghdad is further adding fuel to the fire of sectarianism by allowing shia

militia, by allowing secretary and persecution and oppression to continue, which only allows further oxygen for isis to continue to exist and to continue to grow in sunni territory. thank you. >> thank you. mr. bridenstine. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'd like to thank the secretary the chairman are coming and testifying today. i think i'd like to follow up on the line of questioning that we are just going down you know, you mentioned earlier general dempsey, about general mcchrystal and you got to defeat a network with a network and his commitment to that. certainly it is also very committed to the counter insurgency strategy that was the point in afghanistan. you were the deputy commander of centcom when we employ counter surging sea -- counterinsurgency

in iraq and i think you eventually became the acting commander of centcom under the counterinsurgency policy. and my understanding is we employ that kind of strategy so that we can come to the diplomatic and political solutions that she was just talking about. the idea is that we have some space to maneuver so the parties can come together and we can come to a governing solution that is reasonable for all involved. can you share with us your time there? why was it successful? why with was the counterinsurgency strategy in iraq successful? >> well, you know, i think the counterinsurgency strategy is effective when the lines of effort that the sector outlined at the beginning are applied, not just a military instrument. and as you know in those years when there was not much else going on in the world actually we invested enormous resources into the effort. i don't think you're suggesting

i guess i should probably ask if you're suggesting whether we should make that kind of commitment again. rather, it seems to me that we're trying to accomplish the objectives of the counterinsurgency, but adapting based on what we've learned to ensure that most of that list is done by regional partners and by the government of iraq itself. ..