in fact all of these cases we have been talking about where the court recognize the fundamental right to marriage there were other laws that prohibited -- >> what does that have to do with prisoners? >> if the state interest is in

fostering procreation between natural parents it seems to me that the prisoner at issue did that but it said you can't get married if there's a child on the way. that would foster or promote the interests. we instead said that is not enough. the fundamental right to marry -- an important connection. we can't deprive the prisoner even if the prisoner at least at the moment and presumably those serving life sentences had no chance of procreation. >> this court decided two prisoner cases, one was tailored, you referred to the other as but there. even someone in prison with an expectation of getting out sunday has a right to consummate their marriage, someone serving a life sentence it is appropriate to deny them the opportunity to marry because

they never had the opportunity so the state interest we are asserting here to mary joy. let's take away all laws regarding application and intimacy outside marriage so there is no criminal conduct for all those things. if the state decided to have no marriage, that wouldn't violate a fundamental right. the fundamental right in those cases was the right to be left alone, not the right as chief justice roberts intimated in the first part of the argument to force the government to come to your home and recognize something and give the benefits. does this lead to different things change you can draw the analogy is to the abortion context. in roe vs. wade the court said the government cannot interfere in the private choice, that is a fundamental right. the court says 01 cannot force the government to participate in that. likewise here, the government

cannot interfere in private entombment conflict. our position is, you can force the state into these relationships. and give benefits, the fundamental rights action would. to get back to your point about how the constitution puts limits there haven't been any identifiable limits here that defeat the state's interests. you would have to change one of those doctrines, fundamental rights doctrine, change equal protection doctrine and when you change those you change the balance between federal courts and the people voting in a democratic process. >> you are doing something very different we have never done before which is you are defining constitution, and a constitutional right, we have not assigned it by these people

to exercise it but especially in a case where claimants are both right space and equality based. it would be like saying in lawrence there's only a right to intimate activity for heterosexual people and not a right to intimate sexual activity for gays and lesbians and of course we didn't do that. the right to engage in intimate activity was a right for everybody. >> that is the point. we are not trying distinctions based on the identity, orientation or choices of anyone. the way the government has always done to solve a specific problem. not to mention to take away dignity. >> based on sexual orientation. >> the state is not care about sexual orientation. >> asking about your reasons,

whether you have any or not, whether you have anyone not you are drawing distinctions based on sexual orientation. that is what they do. >> a statute classified based on sexual orientation would look different. the statues have disparate impact and you would have to demonstrate them but there's some animus that motivates this. >> leading the group out altogether. >> as we said in roe vs. alexandria, 100% impact does not mean animus. does not mean discriminatory. >> if you prevent people from wearing yarmulkess, you know it is discrimination against jews, isn't that what we said? same thing here? >> the case i miss talking about affect the abortion and the

ability to have that. >> i said what i said. >> i will go back and certainly go and read blacksburg. i recall this is generally and any cases, basic liberty, right to be married at a rate that extends only to opposite sex couples. i am surprised if the court wrote that but if it did, you can immediately called that page to mind. i doubt it is there. >> apologize for not having the page right. >> the majority said the limitation of marriage to opposite sex barrel-- what we are

talking about is -- >> it is a fundamental right to marry. >> to inspired an opinion. >> context matters. >> it was clearly decided. >> very emotional issues. this court never assumed with the democratic process the states, generally michigan's his typically have no animus and doesn't intend to take away dignity from anyone, we respect all parents and of they love their children but this court taking this important issue away from the people will have dramatic impact on the democratic process and we ask that you of term.

>> three minutes remaining. >> the idea is that the ideas of marriage will change different sex couples can choose to marry and bear children, 70 or 90 because of their commitment to one another. lyonnais both marriages, only same-sex couples foreclose for marion under either of mission. these restrictions are in fact raise funds to generous social classification linked in an additional evan jenne at the is about a proper relationship for unman to have the real man or a woman, obviously the person of the same sex. and adoption, intensely vulnerable children with petitioners, when you look at financial healthy childhood. tradition began in either marriage because they didn't conceive those children to get

there, and adoptive parents different 6 couple married. if it does not approve of the adult relationship no matter what the crustaceans they follow. it is not disrespectful because it is wrong based on biology. end the marriage, an impoverished to view of marriage and the role of biological procreation, the state's entire premises a same-sex couple's marriage, different sex couples won't and have children in the marriage, those two could not be further apart. people make their own decisions beyond attenuated. the idea also there are other people who raise children and good for them. i hope policymakers support but the relationships we are talking about at the foundation here, different adult relationships so with same-sex couples have committed to raising children

comment and i that point the only way to talk about procreation and biology and so on is page 41 of their brief and they say what they care about, people who have children to get a staying together and providing long-term stable situations for their children that interest applies full force in this context because the ninth marriage is in 6 couples denying protection for the adults which is independently important, the 9 protections, securities that would come from having that. with that, thank you. >> thank you, counsel. court will take a brief break and return into the bench in five minute for argument on the

second question presented. we will not hear argument on the second question presented on this case. douglas hallward-driemeier. >> may it please the court the question to petitioners who are already married, they have established enduring relationships and have a liberty interest, a fundamental importance to these couples and their children. the state should not be allowed to dissolve that marriage without sufficiently important justification to do so. these petitioners build their lives around their marriages including bringing children into it their families just as opposite sex couples have done but the nonrecognition laws undermine stability of these families though the state's purport to support such stability.

>> i was surprised by the arguments made in your brief because they are largely a repetition of the arguments we just heard with respect to question 1. i thought the point of question 2 was in weather and there would be an obligation to recognize the same-sex marriage entered into in another state where that is lawful even if the state itself constitutionally does not recognize same-sex marriage. >> that is the question. am i wrong? >> it is question. this court's decision established there is not only a right to be married but a right to remain married, a protected liberty interest in the status of one's marriage once established. >> even if that marriage is not lawful under the receiving state's law. >> there is --

>> suppose -- >> let's say someone gets married in a country that permits polygamy. does the state have to acknowledge that marriage? >> this state could insert justifications, and there would be justification, not recognizing -- >> it would be contrary to state public policy. >> i think the justification would be the state doesn't have such an institution. a polygamous relationship would raise all kinds of questions. >> don't have such an institution. marriage in this 8 constitutionally can have because the second question assumes the first question comes out the way the united states does not wanted to come out but the state says we only have the institution of heterosexual marriage. we don't have the institution of

same-sex marriage. >> the institution is the institution of marriage. >> the state doesn't the only institution we have is a heterosexual marriage. >> the point i am making is demonstrated by what has happened in those states where by court order states have had to permit same-sex couples to mary. all that has happened under their lot is removed gender specific language and substitute it with gender neutral language. >> to finish answering. >> the plural relationships raise all manner of questions that are not addressed. >> what if one state says individuals and mary at the age of puberty, a 12-year-old female can mary. with another state obligated to recognize that marriage. >> probably not. the state would have in that

instance a sufficiently important interest in protecting the true consent of the married person what is the issue here states do recognize marriages of persons mumbai age would not have been able to marry in their own state. that is the longstanding practice of all the states precisely because of the abomination as it was referred to as the notion that a person could have a different marital state in some jurisdictions than others. >> how about the consequences of the situations? virtually all states would recognize -- getting married.

that thing is -- >> the constitutional test is one of the court set forth, does the state have a sufficiently important interest not to recognize it? in the case of incest the state does have sufficient the important -- >> they are not biologically -- >> the states that i am aware of that have the rules against cousin marriages do so under their incest statute, simply defining it in a broadway to encompass cousins to mary. at some point certainly the relationship is too extenuate it. i don't think the state would have sufficiently important -- >> the question the assumption, hypothetical, the way these cases i presented is the state does have a sufficient interest so that need not allow the

marriages in that state so there is a sufficient interest to say this is not a fundamental right. why should states have to yield? >> you would have to analyze differently the interest that the state might a search for not allowing couples to enter marriage versus the interested answer as related to couple that is already married. for example, a kentucky has asserted that its interests in only permitting opposite sex couples to marry is to increase the birthrate. by that theory to same-sex couples who are already married they are married in states where they weren't married, they are married in half the states of the country. kentucky would have the court and believe it was sufficiently important interest to have that to disregard their resisting

marriage vows and obligations to each other to marry someone else in kentucky in order to procreate biologically even though the couple may already have children together. that i dare say is not a rational -- >> what was said was the long-term effects of having same-sex couples in kentucky, which you didn't agree with is council responded, argued in the prior case will be a reduction in heterosexual marriages and reduction in the -- >> as a basis for drawing these distinction, the state and loving it was too soon to know what the effect of interracial

marriage is. >> it assumes we come out. >> the stability is that marriage provides for children. that interest does not justify extinguishing what exists. >> in the first case, the argument is. . >> that is absolutely -- >> supposing it to be the situation where the plaintiffs, they can retain -- directing

that. whether there is a ban on same-sex marriage. >> none of those states, as the court subserve when in windsor. nonrecognition, stock the departure for recognizing whether they could have been at precisely that circumstance where the laws diverge where it arises. between them and five instances more like they would recognize

outside the state. the state would have important justification to recognize the bonds, the court would want to rely in this instance such as the rule, a divorced person to remarry. the most recent, in 1970. to effectively marriages exist around which people have begun to build their lives is less applied than the federal government's authority to 95. >> you are avoiding the presumption on which we are starting on the assumption which is the state's's policy for supporting same-sex marriage is

sufficiently strong that they can as a matter of public policy prohibited that in their own state in you are saying it is so much weaker when you are talking about marriage from other states. >> there are a couple points i would like to make to distinguish the situation, in the first case it was significant that respondents council was emphasizing the rational basis of scrutiny that would apply, that was the question with the people should be allowed to marry in the first instance. petition is in question are already married. we know through windsor because the court held that once married, a couple has a constitutionally protected liberty in their marriage. we also know from windsor where a sovereign disregard that marriage and a way that would be extraordinary and out of character with tradition that

requires at the least care for consideration. that is what we have here. >> undermine state interest that we would assume innuendo in the first case to say they must welcome people who have been married elsewhere, simply a matter of time that they would in effect be recognizing that within the state. in that very mobile society people move all the time. and kind of, one state would set the policy for the entire nation. >> there would be many fewer such couples raising children within their borders than heterosexual couples who are raising children who are not biologically linked to them. the argument the state has made are so over and underinclusive at the same time that they leave the feeling that it can only be pretext and we know that is true

because the state not only can't draw the lines but they don't draw the lines they would suggest and they would never drive lines -- >> what lines are you talking about? >> which limits marriage to those couples who are able to procreate biologically with out in the assistance. the states don't draw those lines. the states have laws that treat adoptive relationships with the same legal effect as biological ones, they have laws that further support and give greater stability. >> different, i thought that for states never categorically passed a law declaring that a particular kind of marriage was against public policy. >> that is another way. >> none of the four states had ever done that. >> they have never done that. >> these laws are out of

character, unprecedented in the language in many respects. >> you are saying was in some states, states you are referring to that recognize -- >> they are nonrecognition loss yes because the longstanding practice of these states is to recognize marriages that are valid the celebrated elsewhere. >> we have a distinction between same-sex marriage and opposite sex marriage. what is the most dramatic variation that exists in marriage laws of the state. >> at the time certainly it is a racial marriage. >> the next most dramatic difference. >> if i could, the anti miscegenation laws of the closest analogy but what is different between them if i

could. >> the simple question. at the present time what is the next most dramatic variation in marriage laws of the states. >> it probably is age. >> what is the range? >> it goes from 13 to 8 king. as i said before the tradition of the state, the issue did not come up that much of the tradition of the states is to recognize a marriage entered into by someone of an age that could not have been entered within the state because of the nature of the marriage once it is established recognizing that the fundamental nature of that relationship is not one that the states should put us under. >> you entered me earlier that a state could refuse to recognize a marriage contract didn't another state where the minimum age was puberty. >> they could and i do believe

if in the individual case it was shown that it was because of -- >> the court could decide not to recognize the marriage. with respect to the categorical nature. >> somewhere in age 15. >> age 13 probably right. 15 instead of 16 the courts probably would recognize it especially if reliance on their marriage the couple had already conceived of but chiles it would do no one any good to destroy that marriage and the stable environment it might provide for the children just as it does no one any good, certainly doesn't advance the interest of the children of opposite sex couples to destroy the marriages that provides stability to the children of same-sex couples who are already married under the

laws of other states. >> the art images we never did this before recognize same-sex marriage now you're saying they can't not recognize same-sex marriage because they never not recognized marriages that were performed in of this states. >> we got to decide one or the other. >> i think that what is essential and common between us is but we recognize that the marriage that our petitioners have entered into is a marriage. it is that same institution, the most important relationship that this court has held out. >> we only get to the second question if you have lost on that point already. if we said states do not have to recognize same-sex marriage as a marriage. assuming we lost on that i don't see how your argument, you can't

say are not treating emerge as a marriage when they don't have to do that in the first place. >> that highlights one of the problems of trying to decide the case is different because deciding against petitioners on question 1 even if the court decides in favor and question 2 would forever relegated those marriages to second-class status and raise all kinds of questions whether those marriages were subjected not quite to the favorable -- >> question 1 now is what you are doing? >> i am suggesting even a win and question 2 does not from the validate petitioners marriages but certainly we think the states cannot disregard them, cannot effectively dissolve existing marriages without sufficiently important reason for doing so. this court recognized in the lorenz case that marriage

procreation, family relationships, are fundamental aspects of the economy the same-sex couples can enter into for purposes of autonomy to the same extent as opposite sex couples especially when those couples have done so have established a marriage, have brought children -- i would like to give an example. married in california in 2008. in 2009 they adopted two children. reliance on the protection that is afforded by marriage, willing to give up his job to become a surprise mary care giver of their children. the primary care breadwinner, his job in an international law firm was transferred from

california to tennessee and the costs of that transfer for that job was the destruction of their family relationships, all that they relied on in support of that state's offer exactly nothing. there is no reason the state needs to disregard that marriage, no reason the state needs to destroy the reliance the state has had in giving up his career to look after their children. >> the argument made with respect to the first question, namely that the existence of same-sex marriages erodes the feeling of society regarding heterosexual marriages. >> i don't think that holds up. opposite sex couples who have no children, who may be beyond

childbearing years, when they move into these states their marriages are entitled to respect and yet they are situated precisely as our petitioners are. our couples likewise have marriages they may not be able to procreate biologically together but they are able to procreate to assisted means to adoption they bring children into their families as awesome as a sex couples joy and when in reliance on state where they live they move into these states that marriages destroyed. this court relies on federalism, the vertical kind, in when they're, up what is very unusual. horizontal federalism identify something highly unusual. as part of but federal form of government in which the states are equal the states have ceded some form of authority and one

is to recognize when another state creates an enduring relationship encouraging people to in reliance, to establish families that other states are free to disregard that which states created. in the corporate context, established under the law that corporation exists in all other states. they are entitled to the same respect. >> it is quite interesting to note that in the first argument michigan was forced to argue positions that are quite astonishing, marriage to couples capable of procreation without assistance. our clients take marriage seriously. they took vows to each other,

and brought into an institution that this court has said predates the bill of rights, the most important fundamental in their lives and states, and grounds to destroy it. >> the rationale treats outside this, treating outsiders the same way we treat insiders. >> they have offered that but what the state in the norris, everybody married. same-sex couples don't allow them to marry, to jeffrey you the same way. our clients have already formed those relationships. and distinguish between two

questions with heterosexual couples, we don't think the state could limit marriage to those couples capable of procreation or that it could preclude marriage who are at 55, but it would be a different and distinct constitutional violation for the state to dissolve the marriages of opposite sex couples, and constitutionally permissible. and essential protection against arbitrary laws that the majority could live and did the same laws they were subject the minority to. there is no chance the majority would subject themselves to such a law as that. i would like to reserve time. >> thank you, kill .counsel ..

>> i'm so glad to be able to quote a portion of the constitution that actually seems to be relevant. full faith and credit shelter given in each state to the public acts, record and judicial proceedings of every other state. why doesn't that apply? >> court's cases made clear court draws a distinction between judgments between states and the laws of each day and the reason in part the court's decisions have said that is otherwise each state would be able to legislate for every other state. it would include the act of marrying people. my understanding of the court's decisions is reference in the constitution to public acts that

each state's laws so there is nothing in the constitution that should require a state to acknowledge even those marriages in other states that are the same. >> essentials redirect that this court's decision is essentially right. with jurisprudence with regard to allstate insurance in alaska, there's minimal due process requirement to decline to apply another state. >> we can say the only marriages we acknowledge in new york our marriages concluded in new york. is it possible? >> i am sorry? >> the only marriages we acknowledge in new york are those marriages that have been made under the laws of new york. >> yes, your honor. >> really. >> what case is that? what case would you site to

support that proposition? >> if i understood the question correctly. >> i have several cases to read. i might as well get another one. >> what is the case that holds that the state of new york has the right to recognize only marriages made in new york? and if you are married in virginia and new york has the constitutional right to say we treat you as if you weren't married whoever you are. >> i did misunderstand the question. the question was whether new yorker declined to recognize and out of state marriage that did not comport with new york's law. >> it is clear it is a law that two states that the state could say we won't fly this states's law is. >> even though it is the same as

ours? mike new york, i happen to know there's a law that a federal judge from washington couldn't marry someone if you are married to your own wife but you can't marry two other people that the district of columbia has the opposite law. if i marry two people in washington d.c. and they move to new york u.s. a new york doesn't have to recognize that marriage because it doesn't comport with the marriage of new york. >> what case is that? a few people get nervous about this. [laughter] >> my answer is based on the court's decision in nevada vs. hall because the state's home law sets its own policy and the state's law would be in conflict with the state's policy but the policy would be we distrust federal judges from outside the state. even that they would get away with in your view. because i am next going to ask

what is the difference between that kind of policy and the policy that says we don't recognize the gay couples's marriage for the reason that we fear that if gay couples get married even if they have children and adopt them and if we allow people who are not gay to get married, and and they don't have children, despite all that this policy which i have trouble understanding lawrence not recognizing it. >> did you follow that question? >> i probably did not but i will try to a answer, the focus is not just that there is a policy but legitimate policy and joy as the court's question earlier indicated i proceed on the assumption that the court has decided the first question in the state's a brand is determined that indeed the state's policy to maintain a traditional manner/one definition of marriage is indeed legitimate and we obviously agree that it is and the court should so decide.

>> this has nothing to do with article iv, right? none of this has anything to do with article iv. >> full faith and credit. >> full faith and credit provides background for states to be able to assert that indeed we have the right to decline to recognize out of state marriage. >> the secret between judgments full faith and credit applies to judgments but can't reject the judgment because you finds its offensive to the policy. so full faith and credit has never been applied to the choice of law and that is the distinction. >> in essence by deciding out of state marriage, the state is deciding whether or not to recognize the law under which marriage was performed to. >> you don't see a fundamental

difference between creating a marriage and recognizing a marriage? you don't think there's any difference in terms of the rights of people? >> it states regularly, don't say the prerequisites to marriage in our state are not necessarily against public policy. they have said it for age differences, they have said it for a lot of things. why would the gay marriage issue be so fundamental that that can lead them to exclude a whole category of people from recognition? >> it goes to the essence, both questions before the court today get act the fundamental notion of what marriage is. let me answer the question this

way. comparison between our states have operated with regard to recognize it or not recognizing marriages before there was any idea of same-sex marriage can't be compared at all to house states are responding across the board with regard to the phenomenon of same-sex marriage and here is the reason. commentators have observed all states on the same page about what marriage is. that is where it evolves from. every state had the same definition, every state shares the same interest but the liberal policy of recognizing marriage from one state is the other. >> creates -- closer to laws? you think marriage decrees are closer to loss than they are to judgments? we need to get a judgment to divorce and i think in my mind

that makes the decree much closer to a judgment than it does to a law. >> performing of a marriage is closer to a law because in essence when the marriage is performed all the rights that flow from that state's laws evolve to that couple ended is different from judgment and so does not deserve the same treatment that judgment would under the full faith and credit jurisprudence because of the reason this court has drawn. >> what is an order to the constitution? to act under the constitution that is not a judgment? >> that is the first part of your question. >> how do you separate out the terms justice scalia gave you? not all judgments. four different terms. >> records and judicial proceedings, what i would call

the net has been that refers to laws and records and judgments in other states and emerges of always been treated as conflict of law matter. for all the years it gives rise to is the entire conflict of law doctrine which petitioners rely, stories and commentaries on the conflict of law. >> outside of the present controversy when was the last time tennessee declined to recognize a marriage? >> 1970 was the last one i could point to that involved a stepfather and stepdaughter. i would hasten to add because of what i'm starting to describe with regard to how we got to this point. states were all playing along under the same definition of marriage, when they confronted in unprecedented fashion is some

states changing the rules of the game if i can extend the metaphor. >> playing along with the same definition, there have always been distinctions based on age family relationships, they were not playing along under the same definition. despite that, it quite rare for the state not to recognize out of state marriage. >> as long as we're talking about what marriage is, talking about fundamental man and woman marriage. as soon as skates were confronted with the reality, to read the fine marriage or expand definition of marriage to same-sex couples for the first time is not surprising that they determine in keeping with their own laws that they would not recognize those of the state's's marriages. >> the second question puts you and douglas hallward-driemeier in a very unusual situation

because we have to assume that the first question has been decided against the petitioner or we would not get to the second questions so we have to assume we would hold that a state has sufficient reason for the limiting marriage to opposite sex couples. douglas hallward-driemeier acknowledged that a state could refuse to recognize and out of state marriage if it has the very strong public policy against that marriage if it is a polygamous marriage, a very young individual. the question is whether there could be something in between. if there is sufficient reason for the state to say we won't know, grandees licenses ourselves but not strong enough reason for us not to recognize a marriage performed out of state, that is possible, isn't it? >> let me answer it this way and

hopefully i am answering a question in doing so. let me be clear the justifications that have grown over time and requirement for a strong public policy reason to decline a recognized marriage have grown up around a man/women definition with our position is so long as we are talking about a marriage from another state that is not a man/woman definition state interests in a coherent internal state policy with regard to marriage the justifies not recognizing what was done earlier indicated any residents of the state to go to another stage, to demand their marriage. >> people who are married in a lot of states do that. when they come back to their home states, home states follow the rule of marriage celebration.

>> again we are talking about the fundamental distinction between marriage as states see it traditional definition and same-sex marriage that was adopted. >> the prerequisites i the state's judgment about marriage what should be recognized marriage. >> difference is the landscape we find ourselves in. tennessee, ohio, kentucky, they have done nothing here but stand by. they maintain the status quo and other states made the decision they're right and prerogative to do so to expanded definition, to redefine the definition and suggest other states that of the nothing but stand by and now must recognize those marriages imposes substantial burden on

the state's ability to self govern. >> a divorce does become a decree for the nation. a divorce with jurisdiction in one state recognized by every other state, but not the act of marriage. >> i understand the point and i think it falls within the court's recognition of distinction between judgments and laws and we are dealing with laws, again it would allow one state initially, a minority of states to legislate fundamental fundamental state concern about marriage for every other state quite literally. that is an enormous imposition and intrusion upon the state's ability to decide for itself

important public policy questions and to maintain, talking about recognition there is an impact that occurs when one state recognizes and other state's same-sex marriage because of the fact that the entire domestic relations policy is built around the expectation and presumption that there is a man/woman relationship and recognize and observe marriage is the foundation of the state ability to regulate domestic relations and to give you one concrete example that comes up in this case itself one of the incidents of marriage is the presumption for parentage that comes with a marriage. for the state to be required to recognize another state's marriage where there is a child

of that marriage in the same sex situation would fundamentally alter the state's definition of parentage. >> i understand it is a fundamental public policy question whether to recognize same-sex marriage or not but i don't see the difficulty in following consequences under domestic relations, treating a couple has married and the first question is a big step but after is that it seems the question of how you apply domestic relations laws are gritty straight forward. >> part of the reason i want to mention this in particular, a large part of the petitioners's focus has been on the impact on the children that are involved and it is important for the court to recognize in many states, i can tell you in tennessee the definition of parent has always been biologically based. that marital presumption of

parentage as the foundation in biology, has its foundation in the man/woman relationship. when and if the state were required to recognize same-sex marriage and therefore change the pronouns and change the terminology. >> do that for adoption what is the problem? this is a really big deal. >> it is the big deal because you are changing the way state defines a parent can in the adoption context you have to understand adoption and traditional definition of marriage work in tandem. they worked together and the objective with regard to marriage is to link children with their biological parents. when that breaks down there's adoption. there is an effort -- >> do you think estate and failed to recognize the birth certificate of a particular,

another state? >> i am not -- >> do you think the word record in the constitution includes birth certificates? california without any reason, no suspicion of fraud, no anything. could it refuse to recognize another state's birth certificate? >> i have to admit i can speak to that. >> records to me have to have a meeting. >> it does. i am hesitant because i know there is disagreement in cases of what the impact of that is, between whether that just means we have to acknowledge the evidenciary purposes or whether the effect of the record has to be acknowledged. as i stand here -- >> that is an issue but as a birth certificate to be a

record, don't you think a marriage certificate, is an official act of the state. >> the marriage certificate certifies, goes to the point, certifies that there is the marriage. i think that the laws that allow the marriage to occur when they are different fundamentally with laws of that state like tennessee for include the application of the same principle from one state to the other. with regard to the effect of requiring recognition on stage it is important to consider the fact petitioners' complained about the impact that it has when it moves from one state to the next, with regard to the rights that they enjoyed under

the marriage as defined in new york or california. federalism accommodates the situation. it gives the strength of our federal structure to accommodate the very different viewpoints, the very difference in approach that this fundamental debate we are having about same-sex marriage generates and so it makes all the since in a world with respect to that to allow the federal structured to do what it was designed to joy and accommodate those different points of view. that is why we asked the court to determine these amendments coming and disrupt that balance and impose the duty on one state to recognize the laws and the marriage of a different state because of the intrusion it

would have on that state's public policy. >> you acknowledge that if the state loses on the first question than the state also loses on the second question. >> we ask you to a firm. >> thank you. you have five minutes left. >> thank you, your honor. if i may start with the assertion that tennessee well as always differential relations in biology, that is not so. tennessee, i will quote from 36-1-1, 68-3-306 referred to and page 15 of our reply provides that a child born to unmarried woman as a result of an artificial insemination with consent of the married woman's husband, the father is deemed the legitimate child of the

husband and wife. the husband has no biological relationship with the child. tennessee in other words just as it does with adoption reinforces the bond of parent and child regardless of biology as long as the couple is of opposite sexes. the import of that for real people like dr.s kingo -- tanco a fun-loving graduate school in new york, as academic couples found a position at the same university in tennessee. they moved and dr. tanco has given birth to their daughter in tennessee. as a result of the

nonrecognition lawns with no right to visit her child or make medical decisions to thing kills a was suggesting federalism and allowing states to make different laws, if you choose to get married in your state just don't move to ours, that is the cost of federalism. they did not have a choice. the united states army moved them to tennessee and given the location of army bases in this country is almost a 70 anyone serving in the army for any length of time will be stationed at some point in the state that would dissolve their marriage as i matter of state a matter of state law. let me get back, even with anti

miscegenation laws, interracial marriages such as purposes of getting out of proceeds after a death or otherwise, the state statutes provide that a marriage shall be given no effect for any reason even husband's death certificate will not reflect the fact that he was married or the name of his has been. the state has no legitimate interest for denying them the dignity of that last factor regarding his life. the real import of the state's argument is i believe this. even when same-sex couples are married, they are not in fairview, married for constitutional purposes that the state's can discriminate

against these marriages even in ways that the constitution would not permit the states to disregard the marriages of opposite sex couples. i urge the court not to enshrine in our constitution a second-class status of these petitioners marriages. .. >> the national debt, bedbugs, the