ng a firefight. the next day may 17, they took iraq and they took the ancient city and ruins. .. with that let me begin by asking both of you since we last met in july of 2014 what has surprised

you the most about how events have unfolded in iraq, syria and the broader anti-isis effort? >> let me begin by looking back at what we said in july of last year. i think of steve and i had a pretty we saw that as an alarmist view warning about the danger that was ahead. the two biggest surprises to me in the years since then have been the resilience strange combination of resilience, brutality and creativity operational creativity, of the islamic state. they are agile. they concentrate force to achieve their objectives. they send as and the capture of ramadi five to eight suicide

bombs one after the other and they terrify and intimidate their opponents. so they have been stronger tougher, smarter than i would have thought. i had hoped a year ago that like al qaeda and iraq zarqawi's group would burn so hot that they would burn themselves out. that hasn't happened yet. the second surprise in this year to be honest is the lack of effectiveness and clarity of u.s. policy, u.s.-led policy in response. i wrote a column around june 11, noting that this week to manifestoes about this conflict. one was an isis video called the

year after the conquest. i don't invite anybody to look at it on line because it's so horrifying that it shows with the assorted video style there are people have developed, the overwhelming force and brutality of their conquest of mosul, how they routed the iraqi security forces from mosul the seeming jubilation of sunnis in this city after their victory and the other manifesto was the obama administration announced he would send an incremental careful new force, 450 trained and advised special operations forces in eastern anbar province who would generally as far as we could tell not gets outside the wire of that days, would not go

with the iraqi forces they were training in the battle. so far as i can tell they are still -- they're still not sufficient numbers of sunni tribesmen who wants to be trained by this u.s. trained and vice force that are in place now as it been the case i think in the airbase further west. so the u.s. isis assault is that hyperspeed for an insurgency. the u.s. response i think is that slows speed as the president rations each additional piece of his response and if that formula continues without a change i think a year from now when we come back we will see isis taking deeper roots in north africa spreading

more deeply, still unchecked in iraq and syria so that is a pessimistic opening but frankly that's what i see in the past year. >> thank you david. steve and i don't want to say you agree with david by chance but where else do you see? >> i would add part of my thinking about the disappointment. last year about this time we outlined clearly at least i did what i thought was not just an aggressive violent group but also true forces of evil. there is no other way to describe people who are doing what they are doing to fellow citizens and the world in populations both in iraq and syria. i think that i would probably be surprised that they been able to fight is far -- as hard as they have bought them recover as quickly as they have from significant poundings by the united states in the air. like most of you in the audience i'm just viewing the history and we know that nothing ends from

the air alone but it is still significant wanat ordinance lands on top of you to recover. part of it as we as the united states always underestimate the ability of herbs like isis to sustain serious injuries and deaths and yet still press on because the truth of the matter is the central command does not care about the deaths and injuries to the people who work for them. they are only concerned about their small bolshevik like group of real dedicated radicals and believers in the movement. so i was surprised in that durability to recover so quickly. i also am concerned that we don't maintain all the lessons we have learned from our own 9/11 experience in terms of the interest in the willingness of these groups to press on against united states in particular. when we don't take a firm stance they fill every space of that they possibly can as quickly as

they can. when we are not prepared to lead an aggressive fashion on not talking necessarily a military fashion but overall aggressive fashion that will tell every second of that gap that they can find. as a result they position themselves with the sunnis who now in their ability to move this propaganda is quite interesting, their ability to align us with iran even what we have gone through since 1979 with iran is quite startling in the number of people that believe it is even more startling. so the ability of the middle east to build conspiracies and spread them has worked more quickly than i would have thought at this point in a year but i don't think their use of violence and evil forces that they do use has changed at all. as a result i find myself more worried this year than i was 12 months ago. >> let's move on to the strategy. do we have a strategy david and what is missing from that strategy?

>> we have a declaratory strategy and personally i would say elements of that strategy as declared are pretty much the right ones. the problem is we have not found a way to implement the strategies so let me unpack that a little bit. what president obama did a year ago through the summer in september was to refuse pleas and treaties that the united states used its military power, used its airpower in particular to take out the enemy's of the shia led government in iraq iraq and take-out isis until there were changes in the government. it was a high-stakes effort by the president insisting maliki should leave and the new prime minister new representative of

his party should take office as he did with allah body. so that part of u.s. policy i thought was correct and was handled in a disciplined way. it was necessary to get iran's acceptance of that change of shiite leadership in iraq and again i thought that was done well. the second thing that was part of the strategy was to build an international coalition. general john allen went around the world. there were meetings in the coalition was assembled and in terms of working with allies is hard for me to fall that principle. it was the right thing to do. the list is a good list. when one member of the coalition jordan was attacked in such a vicious way the jordanians responded strongly and seem to

have popular support. another part of the strategy was to find a way to mobilize the elements in iraq that would have to be part of infecting isis from sunni areas. the sunni tribes in the sunni leadership. empowering them in this badly sick terry and iraq in a way that they would be effective implementers of the strategy. you ask what is the defeat mechanism? who is going to defeat these people in mosul and amfar? the answer was the best iraqi security forces aided by the tribes immediately comment behind the clearing force. that still hasn't happened. it's amazing to me many months ago you have iraqi defense minister visiting him on talking

about the plants, facilities for training sunni tribal fighters in jordan. you had camps set up. you had all the pieces of that assembled and yet to this moment so far as i know it still is in embryo. i would say the same thing about the regional strategy. you nominally have the coalition that was turkey jordan saudi arabia and go down the list. we have this implicit working understanding with iraq and yet those elements i don't think have been mobilized and exactly what our strategy is with turkey anyone in this audience could please inform me i would be very grateful. so i will close by saying the pieces of the strategy, the ability to implement this and in a few minutes i'd like to talk about the bureaucratic side of that, lack of unity of command

in of this government to make that strategy happen but i will leave it there for now. >> can the tribal groups be brought to bear forces once bitten twice shy? >> historically the groups have been bitten more than once not just in the last two years. it's been extremely difficult to mobilize the tribal groups if they do not send from your commitment that you are prepared to state that is difficult. to combat and into the political transition so they have some confidence they will not lose when someone walks away. those things they have earned for their own blood and treasure treasure. as a result i'm afraid that becomes a more typical piece of work that was then as a government department of defense and agency do this surge in the past decade. i would suggest it would take someone with extraordinary persuasive skills and someone with extraordinary staying power

to remain involved in maneuvering the tribes as well as integration of the iraqi government. it's my understanding that distrust between the sunni tribes in the iraqi government is in some ways almost at its highest levels. i think they remain part of the solution but distrust develops very quickly. it takes a very long time to dispel so as a result i would indicate as part of an overall strategy that i would not have the same confidence we had once before that we would be as successful or as effective. plus quite frankly every time a shia melissa -- militia start shooting to isis they whisper that to the sunni tribes. as a result of becomes a self propaganda machine in support of isis regardless of what they may think about the methods of isis. i believe it should be

intertwined with the policy. >> before gets the next question let me -- the ambassador. what about our back first policy? is there a danger in focusing so much on iraq and leaving so much in syria untouched and how do we deal with the iraqi government? it's a complicated relationship dealing with the iraqi security forces and a lot of complications. >> but may take the second part of that first. syria is such a complicated subject. i would almost like to separate that and then come back to it. thinking about the slow progress in iraq in many ways the lack of progress in this year and what to do about it i try to think about the fundamentals and to talk with people smarter than me

about this issue. one of them is sitting in the audience, the ambassador. steve hadley a number of other people in and out of government. trying to think how could you take the elements of our strategy who seek to keep iraq together in some way and seek to avoid this idea people have of the lines in the sand being scattered in the wind and let's plunge the whole region into uncertainty? how would you preserve iraq but also speak to the sunnis in the way that gives them more trust that they are the ones over time who are going to have to eradicate isis in their midst? what i came to us a sort of version for 2015 of what jim baker and lee hamilton wrote in 2006 looking at essentially the same problem.

the problem hasn't changed from back then, nine years ago. bottom up or inside out partners which is to find a way and find a formula for decentralized, maybe federal iraq to keep supporters the country and the country as a whole but lets individual groups really have the kind of local autonomy so sunnis who are fighting to get isis out of anbar have some confidence that when the isis is out they won't be given instructions from hydra alarm rate or the shia emissions -- delicious -- militias. that is a part of that strategy. it's bottom-up and inside out and there's an outside in part that involves regional allies

and for each of these conflicts iraq, syria all the other ones libya it is going to take a commitment by the united states, russia, saudi arabia, iran and somehow there's going to have to be a formula and we are going to have to live in a world where those powers can sit around the table and come up with agreements that they are prepared to back up. i think those are the two elements on how you would make this work in iraq. i think it's going to take discipline and time. it's probably the job of the next president of the united states but i think when it comes that is what it will look like. >> in a comment here steve? >> i would add that i become concerned over the last several years that we as a country have lost their ability to develop what i call a tapestry of policy policy. in other words all of us who have had children and

grandchildren know the concept of small children soccer in which there is a ball and everyone goes to it. what i'm talking about is all these things are related so you have a program which have connected the syrian question and the iraqi question the saudi question and of course you talk to the russians and chinese and the iran a's these are part of this in a way that allows united states to view it as a tapestry and what is best for us. i worry at times that we may have lost their ability to do that or we are not interested in and i'm not sure what it is. i'm afraid if we don't do that it could contribute to iraq losing its ability to be a unitary state. with all respect to the good ambassador i'm concerned and i hope i'm wrong but i'm concerned that the treasure would not remain as a unitary state. i think that would be terrible. i think that would be terrible for the citizens of iraq as well as the region and the united states. i think we have a role here to

play. i know we have been involved for over a decade of a lot of things but i don't remember who said it. someone said great powers aren't allowed to get tired. i'm afraid this is one of the sentences in we have to look at our ability to weave this tapestry in a way that helps others bind their way to this particularly allies in the middle east who are hesitant to take this on for a whole variety of reasons. >> a lot of people discuss the progress or lack of progress against isis and americans tend to focus on the military centric side of this and there was many elements that diplomatic the economic and the political. we have touched on some of those, demographic and many discussions we have had with dr. tony korda send dr. alderman we have discussed those elements that are noble, today but that's to talk specifically about the kinetic effort against isis. how were we doing on the battlefield do you think? what needs to be brought to bear

apart from most other elements to be successful in that battle? >> i think that's a difficult one for me to answer because i'm not seeing the daily take but on the other hand i would offer in many ways this is similar to the old discussions of post world war ii insurgencies where the larger power is not clearly winning than they are actually losing. in this case even though we have an ability to bring to bear significant power there are some things that aren't on the ground at the moment which i think when you talk to those who are the most experience and those who are currently involved are quite significant. for example the absence of forward air comptrollers reduces the capability significance and efficiency of airstrikes. the lack of a logistics capability on the ground in iraq is essentially because the iraqi simina cases they do not have

the logistics skills in the united states and they find themselves in isolated situations too quickly to often. we cannot reinforce, if you think getting shot at takes the heart out of a soldier try putting -- letting them realize they're completely alone without a chance for -- as a result there are fundamental to military conflict which you cannot necessarily carry out from afar or from the sky. many of these people in the broom i know you have read the stories of world war ii and realize germany was not vanished with the ending of the firebombings. we did not end any part of the vietnam war with b-52 bombers. people who are determined to survive will survive. as a result i'm not an advocate of simply cutting loose military forces and all of its impact and its force. i have children in the military. my point is there are some laws of physics that you can't get

close to the target they will withstand your attack. i refer people to the japanese who would hunker down and undergo 20 or 30 days of extraordinary bombardment and still be there when the marines showed up. they're things like that they can't be denied in terms of military combat. war as we know is a political action but we may have to address that more honestly as the people and i'm afraid the only person i can address that would be the president of the united states, not a secretary, now the senior policy person. if it becomes necessary where the decision is made that we have to be more effective i think the president would take that one on. >> david year from now do you expect to see large deployments of u.s. forces in iraq and potentially syria? >> no i don't. i don't think as long as barack obama as president present will see large military deployment. it's possible they could see the

additional steps that steve has urged that i agree with evaluable allowing art visors to go forward to go forward with iraqi forces whether they are sunni tribal fighters, iraqi security forces and bolster them in combat target for more effective air support. i can see those things happening happening. we have to be honest looking at this. we have a president that we also have a country that in many ways is allergic to iraq. we lived through such a painful. back after the eighth 2003 invasion. i think it's widely shared whatever jeb bush may say when he is asked about it is the widely shared view that it was a mistake to have done that. beyond the mistake of invasion there were so many mistakes made and how was carried out during

the occupation. the american people not unreasonably are very reluctant to get into the kind of large-scale involvement that you are asking about. the president more than most americans and that thing that reluctance just comes through in every moment of policy and then translates into the military. the military says if we don't have a strategy all in for victory i don't want to send my guys back home in wooden boxes. the military likes decisive wars with congress to support where they can have a conclusive ending. we don't live in a period in which that's possible and i agree sometimes the military is seeking something that is impossible. let me say one more thing that concerns me special in his period were the president i

called him allergic to iraq and that may be overstated that certainly is reluctant here. he has made a commitment in his words to degrade and ultimately destroy this adversary. what he needs above all more than anything else, more than any particular decision to send advisers forward he needs some one person who will take responsibility for this campaign and every day, every morning when he asks the question how are we doing in our battle against isis we will say mr. president in the last 24 hours, here are my biggest problems and here is what we can ask you to focus on today. john allen thought he had been given that job when he was made special representative for the president to build a coalition to fight isis. that job despite strenuous

arguments to obama was not through the white house as many people thought it should be. it was to the state department and from that moment roughly september or october of last year you have had a series of interagency fights infusions, false starts where you have the centcom commander lloyd austin asking the president mr. president and my running this war and the answer is yes you are but then you have former four-star general who has been given the job by the president of running the coalition and the strategy so it's not surprising that with these competing authorities you have the kind of policy infusion that hurts our effort and i think confuses our allies. if there is one thing in this next year where will we be in a year i think the president is

not going to put tens of thousands of u.s. troops in. he doesn't have to. if you will put one person in that has a decisive commander on this effort the military pieces, the strategic pieces the diplomatic and political pieces so i think that is doable for this administration. >> i'm a great believer in ambassadors. i've had the opportunity my career to work with people who are brilliant ambassadors. frank pickering ryan crocker and patterson and others who are destined by the law and their confirmation to be the president's representative. when they have worked effectively with the senior military presence in those countries rank rocker david petraeus is one example that's an extraordinarily effective team for the united states of america that answers only the present of the united states. we have all the tools in place to do the things we need to do

and have used them before effectively. i'm eyes a is amazed and somewhat surprised in our ability to create new rings that don't work as well as the things we left behind so as a result i think if we return to that so the ambassador who has a letter that says he or she is the president represented in the present of the essays can speak to them directly and say what is going on? what do you recommend it focuses that ability makes it easier for the president to actually respond to this in a way that is not getting his agencies are agencies, departments or departments. they will compete over who has what access to who and it does not work at the moment as effectively as i can with some of the past. john negroponte and others you may know of men and women for extraordinary representatives of u.s. strategy and policy. they can effectively manage the tools on the ground. now no one can manage the tools and united states, and stand up and talking about on the forward end of this to the president has the ability to know as best as

possible what's happening and never make decisions in the best interest of the united states people. that is what i worry about in terms of our unwillingness to look at those things in a way that is open and honest. >> david the one of our nation's leading journalists and about the social media. you see how robust that field is. you understand messaging. how can we counter 90,000 messages a day that are disseminated by supporters that stimulate and invigorate this worldwide movement? ..

swallowing the poison pill messaging that ends up limiting the message were undercutting it. i think this is an area one thing we have learned is the united states is not a credible messenger and telling muslims how to live enemies and allies are that must come to the region and be mobilized. there there are a lot of smart people but there are a lot of people who could help do this tomorrow. the pathway through them. they're getting their undercutting their efforts in the future is confiscated.

clicks we discuss the video showing the burning of the jordanian pilot and how that can resonate with people around the world. it resonates with so many young men for marginalized in every way, socially, politically, economically who see an opportunity for mobilization, a sense of purpose, mission, and a video like that which and a video like that which is awful and i believe overall this, i'm needing out -- a meeting out of justice, flu and airplane, bob civilians in their mind and that pays for it in the same way that they did which is difficult to defeat, and i agree with you to why there is no mainstream message for them to latch onto. they have already rejected that in being pushed to the margins

and i don't think there is a method that can reach a lot of them, that small number. a broader audience perhaps but when a video comes out like that and is accepted by so many people we are in tremendous trouble. >> i want to take advantage of your background and intelligence which is impressive to say the least. can you talk about the intelligence challenges? when we had a lot of troops on the ground and are not suggesting we do this again, but when you have 100,000 troops on the ground, you have a huge you have a huge active station in a place like baghdad, a lot of people forward, intelligence personnel, opportunities to network with people on the ground, citizens to develop a kind of sense and situational awareness that can enable your operations. what are the intelligence challenges and given an adversary like isys? >> let's divided into three pieces, if you pieces, if you will. two pieces, technical and human and in this type of

environment intelligence plays what i call a i call a statecraft role which is an influence role supportive of us policy with groups and others in contact with liaison purposes, but the categories, ever looking at the iraq and syria theatre it is different. there is still a significant amount of what i call forward platforms from which you can launch. the closer you can get to the target the easier it is to recruit and collect intelligence. there is some collection and its solid. i do this from my soapbox. the intelligence intelligence business, there are secrets and there are mysteries. remember the young fruit vendor who set himself on fire.

there's there's no one on the plants, no one in the universe except god and knew what was going on. so mysteries taking place in terms of what isys is trying to do their ability to close rank. once again, i use, i use my example of the bolsheviks and don't forget that espionage is still in all countries punishable by in many cases imprisonment but by isys horrific death. when you're asking people to do things that put lives in jeopardy it is not that easy to step up and say whatever you want i'm happy to help. keep that in mind when you think about intelligence collection. syria becomes even more difficult. remember al-assad's father actually constructed a stall

and like state in terms of security surfaces and the ability to control and suppress people. very skilled, effective, dangerous. this is also a country that has decided it is okay to drop barrel bombs on their own people. you highlight the difficulties. the collection problem is also compounded because you have to spend just as much time trying to stay alive as you do trying to figure out how to collect things and syria. as a syria. as a result identify the syrian challenges greater than the iraqi challenge because we still have a long-standing duration chipset are quite productive. i would offer that at the moment once again with deference to the ambassador relationships are not as easy or efficient as they were as recently as five or six or seven years ago. there must be a reliance on partners. i would like to complement the jordanians who have once again stepped up, but their people in harm's way and there on the ground and elsewhere to assist publicly and clandestinely. the clandestinely. the other services are doing

the best that they can and in some cases the best they can is not very good or certainly not good enough. the result kind i am not i am not looking for the united states to lead everything the relationships with foreign countries become important and trying to persuade them or convince them that this work is effective. now, one comment i would like to make in reference to the messaging piece, the advent of social media, the ability to put stories are quickly, the ability to spread fabrication is greater than his been. the result is becoming increasingly difficult. has what i have i have just received or heard true? i have a sense that mr. lennon's famous sentence, if you say a lie often enough it becomes a

truth is becoming more and more prevalent. the.is it is not just a matter of collecting the information in saying that this man said this because he was there but a matter of before there's a president saying is this true did this happen. it used it used to be something we used to call afghan math and which an afghan would say we just attack the soviets and killed 400 people. how many? about 200. how many people? welcome of four guys in the jeep. my.is that in the current environment these things become important. what you don't want is a president making bad judgment on that information i i call it the ruthless application of methodology. challenges are significant on the iraqi side.

more opportunity for success much more difficult and will rely a great deal on a very clear and efficient assistance. >> focused on isys of a relationship with iraq and syria and the intelligence side. a big act that we have not gotten into detail yet which is wrong. with regard to isys and syria cannot be divorced from the perspective of the iranians, is wrong playing offense or defense? on a more afraid of them coming in and creating a state inside come or are they trying to take advantage of this or both? >> i think they are being opportunistic as always. sometimes offense, sometimes defense.

most of the time of the combination. should note before focusing on iran something we have not talked about is important going forward. it has had great success in working with its friends in kurdistan. the curtis platform for military and other operation is powerful. i travel in kurdistan all the way to the left and then down into the solid #are working quietly with elements of us and the coalition power have pushed isys back. and protective how their own

the main domain isys camp, collegiate to the southwest how you alive. so questions can have should you send weapons directly which is an issue for masterfile is government. their weapons weapon through that option isn't discussed anymore. the iranians think about how the kurdish forces were rocked in august and september, september, how their lines cracked, how dangerous it was. threatened, and threatened, and who was the first and? sola money and the cook force supplying ammunitions

supply untold individual people to help bolster the lines, to work with the best market to get new people and to get their command stronger. the bill was said. the us came in after and our bill was also crucial. the ukrainians. the ukrainians have a wealth of experience, contact, often the same case officers have been working the same network of sources and assets for 20 years or more. i know the terrain, they know this year landscape. tristan, meticulous detail and have good contact in the sunni world. we are fighting an adversary that made about after the iraq iran war. never again will we allow them to threaten our fundamental security, and the do everything that they can to prevent it. one more comment about that. as i have watched the iranians and their shia the

shia militias i have seen that they have an ability to start but not finish in part because the areas they are fighting are typically sunni areas where they are not sufficiently welcome. in tikrit the shia militia moved on to create and then got stalled. and us air power came in. they finished that fight. but tikrit still from what i know i know is largely impossible to move enough people back in to get the clear, get the whole -- hold and build part going. you could argue the same in the anbar province. the terrible setbacks in the

loss event or solvents. so how us and coalition operations work with iran will be shaped in a time after the nuclear deal is reached, reached, assuming that in the next couple weeks by july 9 that can be done is one of the real challenges for us and iranian officials. will it be possible to have some more effective alliance that draws in sunni countries? saudi arabia is going to have to be comfortable with that. is that going to be possible? i don't know but i but i am sure we will try to find out. >> i have been a long believer, and engaging with iran. it is essential. i do not think we can go through life and not have engagement with a country like iran. i am hopeful there is

agreement. i don't want to see a disconnection. i i am aware of the comments about dealing with the devil i would like to offer sharp criticism. he is a killer of americans responsible for the deaths of americans and is still planning to kill americans. i don't want anyone leaving the room thinking that is the robin hood of the shia population. he is a man who has opposed the united states, everything we believe in, do, and try to do. i ask you to keep in mind and separate the difference between strategic engagement with iran and how -- somehow highlighting what some people are suggesting as the most wonderful, significant wonderful, significant smartest, powerful, and contributing member of the middle east. >> the enemy of our enemy is only a temporary a temporary

partner. >> that is what mr. churchill would say. >> you have had to deal with a lot. furthering national security goals. had a hands-on policy in order to not bring about the new libya or somalia as we negotiated deal we want to keep that issue comfortable but not pull another leg from out underneath the stool there sitting on. how do we deal with the sod? quakes that is an extraordinarily difficult question, as you know. i will now i will now sound like what i am, a former cia officer. part of it was because we learned early on that if you are not engaged physically, i die yet little to no chance of influencing their behavior. i would use that as an example.

once you get engaged in unsavory or unpleasant yet the stay engaged. this the reason my intelligence agencies were built. i do not know if there is engagement with the syrians. i would hope there is some discussion being taken place to show al-assad that he has only two choices, and exit role of some kind or to die and syria. maybe like mr. qaddafi, that is his plan all along. i would think that we have to use whatever tools are available to try to engage syria, and david has a deep understanding, to engage them in a fashion that tries to prevent this from creating an even greater opening, vacuum if he is destroyed or killed because

my concern is that without some sort of assistance in shaping the future there is nothing that can help you predict what group, what other organization might take over inside syria which could be far more radical. it is so uncertain at the moment. there must be something we should think about doing to shape the future, shape the exit regardless of who we have to do it with or without. it takes a certain sort of person. it is really unpleasant work. you will be face-to-face with people that you hoped you would never meet. the.is, if you do not engage you have no chance whatsoever because they will formulate thinking based upon what they think you are thinking or saying and getting it through second and third parties. it is a very difficult task that is important. clicks

important. first dealing with our adversaries and enemies is difficult and complicated but dealing with our friends. let's think about turkey nato ally sharing a huge border with syria. this this has been a difficult relationship over the past four or five years. i've done fieldwork on the border, interviewed militants. clear evidence that clear evidence that these groups operate from the turkish side of the border. how do we deal with turkey a nation that has different strategic goals that we? >> well, that has been a puzzle that the administration has not been able to solve. we have had the confusion of the turkish parliamentary elections still not clear

how the president wants to play that in terms of what the ak party will try to govern alone or call elections soon or seek a coalition partner. it was not clear as of last night. that makes this confusing. you could argue that the turks are now living with their own inability to make good policy decisions and that one of their nightmares is happening. the pyd, the syrian kurdish militia supported by kurdish forces from both turkey and iraq is sweeping across northeastern syria, one of the most effective campaigns in this war. when i talk to people they say to me, pittsburgh argued fighters in iraq. the iraq. the pyd are good fighters, tough, tough. nobody likes to nobody likes to say so, but they are trained by the pkk which has been a a mortal enemy of the turkish government.

considered by the church the terrorist group. from turkey standpoint you have this man -- band south of there were increasingly controlled by a group that is trained and to some extent run by people they regard as fundamentally dangerous. turkey has some choices to make. arguably that is a good thing because they will have to make choices with us about their security and hours. i guess i would come back to the basic puzzle here with syria which is getting buy-in from all of the key players, rusher's interests are directly threatened by the collapse of the açai version. turkey, you know, which has a ragged a ragged, unstable border and newly emboldened kurdish militias overthrow

bush are no matter what. the beginning to wonder -- they need to work together acceptable figures people who are members of the opposition who are willing to sit down as part of the new government transition. allied plan leaders who have power in the mountains and northwest but are not part of the assigned clan somehow that has to be done.

it is going to happen. it is just a question of whether people come to their senses. you just don't know when people will get the political clarity and to make it happen. again, that is what i hope we will get more of from washington. to defend it build it run it, government. they want to fight but close people and provide food and be part of the effort to build the infrastructure, the state building. they want to stay there has see

this and see this is a place to live out their lives. the link have the skilled and motivated. what's more with what some of the challenges with regard to the values? quakes that's a good question. unfortunately, you have to work it from the objective backwards. young men will. obviously that is more dangerous. however there is nothing quite as dangerous as a seasoned combat veteran who has returned home with the intent of overthrowing his own government. as a result there is a new thing that must take place new evolution of counterterrorism work that

focuses on this in a way we have not had to before. the numbers of foreign fighters are unbelievable. i remember the days the early part of the iraq war we would talk about foreign fighters on a daily basis. but the numbers were only a tenth of what we are talking about now. as a result it focuses in a way that at this moment they are strapped because of the resources we have necessary to focus was brings up the other question. i don't have the answer. i have experience. let us say that the number of 20,000 foreign fighters is correct in and 10,000 of them survived the war and make their way back home. how do we find them? what do we do to find them? they change legislation to allow themselves the ability to use modern communications and the way they have not before. do we go back and revisit the question? go back and revisit the question of how we stop

people who are trying to kill us, neighbors friends, brothers, sisters, children. we will be faced with it. a a shirt moves quickly and effectively to head off terrorism attacks. skill that finding and stopping real-life terrorist on the road to the target. i'm more worried about our inability to stop working with people to fill the next wave. you know my theory jobs jobs, jobs. here and all these places overseas. as a result that is the

piece, that second tier of support that worries me as much as stopping the terrorist to set i'm on the move and i'm going to do x objective. >> a final comment. >> briefly to try to sum up. as we think about the year since the surprise overrunning of nozzle as the director of national intelligence clapper said underestimation of the capabilities of isis and there will come a year later essentially we did the same thing. we underestimated their ability with a relatively a relatively small force to roll through mady and the government forces picked up and left.

there are problems we talked about in terms of the us and coalition strategy. at the top the list with all deference to steve who understands is no way we don't have good enough intelligence. surely a part of that is that people have gone to school on our communications collection capability. somehow vast intelligence gaps will have to be made up something that something that the us did with enormous effect in power in the middle of the night and did a captcha they capture

people think of the next night in the next night in the next line this does work on the only thing of that kind we have seen from our special operations her special operations forces that we've seen. it's effective. i honestly don't see how you get that unless you have an increased operations tempo like what we have seen another conflicts clicks thank you both for those great comments. we will open it up now.

clicks i john mclachlan advisor see sas. i would like to raise what i call the problem of the conflict between the issue of the state and the amoeba that we've we been having discussions almost exclusively. the state route how -- how much that force is appropriate to use against the state and the resources. that is a legitimate discussion. pretty much the way the discussion in washington is focused. what i wonder if we are paying enough attention to is the amoeba part by that, i mean the ever increasing it seems to me, attacks that tom iterated at the beginning from australia to oklahoma.

right now for all the pain they cause people. whatever progress you make against the state the samples of the amoeba spreading out into wherever that is not a state a state and does not have borders will someday get some.where it does become a a big problem, lemon -- yemen and libya and beyond. clicks it already is a problem. the it's like to think about the other role as the states part because of ephesus about it since it's is a wonderful group of people lucier the ca calls the the igf, political instability task force currently doing brilliant work on just this question discussing the idea of how the united states must now not just like a a state adversaries but these nonstate adversaries.

obviously isis and the caliphate is one of those areas. areas. there are other places where you have bogle from and the extension of isis. it's relatively new thinking , but it is real it has interest, and there is political work being done. this is this is real. they can see how in afghanistan al qaeda had influence the beyond that the they had influence in pakistan my only answer not

a routine part of governments consideration ambassador clicks good morning, morning, gentlemen. when you see the coalition forces and all day we talk about ices and others do you feel the sense of urgency a line? or do you still think that intellectually people say it's still there clicks i would say this is of urgency surely is greater today than it was last thursday because of these attacks on three continents who have a picture of a threat that has metastasized, a threat that has to be addressed in iraq and syria because this coalition is going to have to go into a different year in terms of its activities.

and it has been interesting that the prime minister prime minister went to the g-7 meeting, has been trying to be a presence among other coalition members but somehow that has to move in to something more aggressive these last few these last few weeks are demonstrating that this thread is metastasizing. the only answer is for the individual security services where they exist, libya exist, libya is a nightmare because it is falling apart as a country. the elements that the coalition will work with in all these countries need to ask for help and then do the fighting. it is fighting. it is not going to be possible for america france britain and australia to solve the problem.

we will we will help. >> that is a very important question. everyone has accepted intellectually but in many ways the pieces of the coalition can manage properly the nonmilitary pieces. what i'm talking about is the coalition allies in the region as the ones best positioned to discuss the political, economic, ideological, and demographic changes that must take place as well as dare i call it a middle east a middle east type of marshall plan where resources come to bear so that when the fighting stops you can begin in a way that is more effective. that's not taking place at the moment. i'm afraid you're correct that intellectually they are there but the part that is more practical and emotional is not yet caught up. >> third row in the middle clicks of colonel eisen

muro united states army medical officer, i served in iraq. your comments what's missing -- missing from the discussion iraqi christian originally. what is missing is the power of religion. if you look at history there's a movement and libya in 18th century, the wahhabi movement. this element of radical islamic state is not a recent issue. and elements such as radically motivated groups is nonexistent. we don't have a population -based outreach to disarm this agenda and i want to see what your comments are.

you touch bases on the political issue. we have not seen that developing and it's frustrating for people like us to see this ideology as permeating and do not have an answer to that and i want to see what they thought about that. >> i am happy to start. i think you are absolutely right. somehow -- this is a citizen the capitalist talking here. at the us government level we have become embarrassed to talk about religion. as a religion. as a result we have a tendency to drawback these questions we have this unwillingness to discuss or assist with the fact that what they're doing is not in line with their own religious beliefs and further and more importantly to encourage those people who can say that with

clarity and credibility in saudi arabia as a holy a holy place to encourage them to have those discussions. we need to cast doubt on the people who are doing this. why can't we organize ourselves in such a way as to discuss this appropriately. history is century after century of these discussions and yet somehow now we are too embarrassed to discuss it? i do i do not understand that myself, but i think you are on the mark. these are men who have molded their religion for better or worse into every element of the day. as a result, if we are serious about looking at that we have to try and see what they are thinking come how they are visualizing not simply focusing the way we hear our sectarian approach. you're onto something that is big and difficult to do. >> the lady in the front please.

clicks. >> i am the kurdistan regional government representative to the united states. one thing that has been missing from the discussion except i have to admit i didn't -- i arrived a little weight so i apologize if you touched on this of the beginning. i have heard discussion of the humanitarian crisis. 3 million iraqis displaced millions of syrians displaced. incurred a standalone we are looking at 1.8 million syrians and fellow iraqis. their education concerned about security even in the camps. you don't want them to become places where new radicals can be formed this is another crisis that where ruling for the future and i

would like to hear this touched on as well. thank you clicks thank you for bringing it up. no doubt about it. we have been to those camps. half of the population is displaced. turkey is hosting 1.8 million refugees. it is a true. it is a true humanitarian disaster. hundreds of thousands murdered. it is tremendous. lack of education, education, income distribution, housing, an incredible set of issues clicks any comments? clicks i just would say that with this, this, as other aspects of this nightmarish problem the us needs to lead its partners in the region and internationally in stepping up the effort so that it is closer to the level of the problem. i mean, we have declared policy but there is no follow-through. people make pledges they

never deliver. i've looked at camps and crew stand. i. i cap csc of tents have seen the camps in turkey. if you want think about it, think about all those young men in those camps very little to eat, very little jobs, money talking. it's a formula for not just another four or eight years of trouble a generation of nightmarish problems. he saw what happened when the palestinians were dispersed

and had radicals banging them everyday about the struggle. it is already too late to have caught that in the de- radicalization phase surely getting people back into syria you know a settlement is urgent and syria i think for the humanitarian reasons. you have got to get people back reasonable lives like his can go to school again. clicks many years away from that. that. all the way in the back in the blue shirt. clicks thank you. the us military training and advising mission simply what what success look like for both the security forces, curtis pesch marga the

milestones were metrics to show success and an separate smaller question, your thoughts on the reports that some iraqi citizens believe the us itself is funding and supporting isys to attack the counter messaging part of that? >> go-ahead quakes the benchmarks are always difficult. first of all i complement secretary carter for talking about the fact the shortage of iraqi recruits you have to have a shortage of benchmarks that are true. numbers of recruits, quality of quality of training, how many you train successfully. the the ultimate test metric is success on the battlefield. they cannot do that alone you train them from the ground up. they have to have the kind of support that only the united states can provide which is commanding

control support. we still remain the best on the planet in that sort of thing and as a result we must have those measuring sticks. i'm not suggesting anyone is not being honest but it is important to be terribly honest so you don't try to end up with a it is really going well and six months later it doesn't mean what you thought it meant. as a result train and assist is hard. another gentleman in this audience very difficult, cultural differences, training cultural differences training differences, things that we assume in the united states that are just not assumed in other parts of the planet. it requires a certain type of trainer certain person who has patients that many in this or may not enjoy requires linguistic skills and supports but it also --

train and assist effectively requires the people and trainers to stay with it and stay with it and stay with it. that that simply does not work and is part of what makes it difficult clicks many people question and have raised conspiracy theories in the past. now now we have a question on the same lines. the problem with the theory that we helped form al qaeda is that it has elements of truth. it is a little tough to rebut that one. it is amazing to me that in the face of evidence of american inability to achieve results through a projection of power that people to can -- people

continue to believe that we are all powerful. if americans could not get the electricity grid -- going in iraq they must've the must of had a plan. the americans, of course they can't. that has been extended. twenty-two -year-olds running rampant. they captured american tanks. how could they do that? it must be an american plot. you can argue that is our last remaining element of genuine power the way the world thinks that we can accomplish anything. we have given them a decade, more than a decade of evidence that people still seem to think it.

[inaudible] is a perception in the reality offering a coalition to fight. forget the forget the conspiracy issue. is it really priority for the united states and the key allies in the coalition in the region to fight the primary danger serious danger, the priority or the potential influence of iran as a regional power in the context of what is going on the region. that's the perception to a certain degree a certain degree that is a sign of

reality about that. so, is the united states capable of advancing, fighting who has been forgotten over turkey, saudi arabia, qatar who have their priority to settle in the region or removing the regime. regime. who is driving the policy now? >> i think i think of first quick shot great question. iceland to fight. the problem of our strategy. i talked earlier about our ideas. you have identified the core not.

clicks don marx clicks thank you. this you. this is a wonderful session. you have an interesting article recently. given what has happened in the last few days in terms of the attacks overseas how comfortable are you that we have the wherewithal and understanding about what kind of recruitment is going on and what kind of actions might be taken clicks i am i am very uncomfortable and do not want to be alarmist when i asked the fbi in the last

days the specific threads in the july 4 timeframe. the answer answer has been no, no credible specific threat. if you read the messaging, the appeals go out dozens of times a day and their manifestoes about how to make weapons weapons, discuss communications, i'd, kill, it is all out there are in the fbi. effective but there's nothing more you can say. know say. know that the problem is getting worse. also waiting at some. we know it's coming. >> there are some people who have extraordinary skills and fighting terrorists in our government. sometimes the american people have the right to assume that they will be defended against the sort of

thing but they also need to understand or something we need to call the kind of counterterrorism work never letting go grind day after day working with information, and if that ever falters it would be more worrisome than now but i do think the united states is a big place. a lot of communities that i now travel through with my travels in the united states in which i see people that i have never seen before. i am not suggesting that their terrorist because i thought they were but the ability to find someone in the united states is not as easy as everyone thinks. there extraordinary important to try to contribute to what they're doing every day.

clicks we will end with judge webster. >> currently with homeland security advisory council. my question is one about perseverance and i cannot help but think back to the early days of desert shield when we had to beg for permission to land troops to help our friends, the saudi arabians who said that you land and then leave. in that highly tribal area am wondering where they stand on the sense of perseverance and when we come in to help and the piecemeal way and avoiding issues like boots on the ground and other things of this kind. we still have this problem

the engagement with people i made reference to before on she wants to we do this all the time because we do still the time. and that her how bad it gets that we have the guts to stay with. we have not been good at that. it would be my assessment is some of that was reflected in the no attendance on the presidents camp david accords. i don't think you can understate the importance of the president reassuring the

head of that nation, that king, monarch that we know this is getting bad and publicly these things may happen but we are not going away. i was asked 50 times by pakistani prime minister presidents and chief of army staff what are you leaving. i was always there to say you know i'm not going anywhere. the united states government first of all. every single army officer is the famous pressler member the new people and government, and we encourage the people to stay after it. i don't i don't -- >> how do we do that.

>> am talking about contacts and commitments of the us government level clicks the appearance of people when things are bad. we we need a favor. ..

>> and i umsue a-- assume it is an attempt to close policy. i am close by remembering something a syrian foreign minister said after president reagan, our model of a strong president, decided to pull american forces from bay root in '83-'84 and he said the americans are short of breath. and i think that is when that idea first began to settle into the minds of people in the middle east and each instance after of shortness of breath and who is more shorter breath than president obama because he doesn't want to be there. so maybe that has to idea we are more persistent than people think. i hope so.

>> i would like to thank david and steve for giving us insight on a difficult topic and i hope we can have you back. >> thank you very much. [applause] >> tomorrow on washington journal, the land of the legal discusss gay rights same-sex marriage and anti discrimination laws. and then we look at gun control efforts in america following the mass shootings in south carolina. plus phone calls, facebook comments and tweets. washington journal live at 7 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> here are a few of our featured programs for the three-day holiday weekend. friday night, radio host from

the annual talkers conference in new york. and an interview with author saltzberger and dean kay on the future of the times. and at 9:30 gary heart talks on the groundbreaking efforts to reform the intelligence community. on friday night on booktv martin ford on how the increasing use of artificial intelligence could make good jobs obsolete. carol burken talks on saturday night about why the bill of rights was created. and on in-depth the author of"

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