the representative of lithuania. >> thank you mr. president. lithuania welcomes the unanimous adoption of the resolution on the joint comprehensive plan of action agreed by the e-3, e! you plus three and iran on the 14th of july. we believe this deal of based on iran's implement implementation of sengal areas of nuclear program with lifting sanctions offers a viefiable path to resolve a dispute spanning over a decade. it mark as victory for multilate rattism and international diplomacy. pressure by international community and u.n. sanctions and full implementation by u.n. member-states can create conditions that bring parties to the negotiation table and keep them engaged in good faith and in the first of come promize. lathe wayne yaw applauds the

determination of those involved in this extraordinary diplomatic endeavor. in particular we acknowledge the instrumental coordinating role played by both former and current e.u. high representatives for foreign affairs and security policy. since the core objective of this deal to insure the international community trust peaceful nature of rare an's nuclear program full implementation of verification measures will be indispensable insuring its success. iran's agreement to implement the additional protocol to the comprehensive safeguard agreement and and further measures foreseen in the plan of action will provide the international atomic energy agency with powerful tools for continuous monitoring and grant the agency extensive access to iran's nuclear sites. we also welcome the road map agreed by the iaea and iran on the 14th of july that provides a specific time frame to clarify past and present

outstanding issues by the end of this year. in addition to the rigorous verification measures, iran will remain under legally binding charter-based obligations to comply with the arms embargo and refrain from ballistic missile related activities. travel ban and asset freeze will also remain in place while this council will continue to be actively engaged in monitoring the implementation of the plan of action. finally all current sanctions will be reinstated in the event of a significant non-performance by iran of its jcpoa commitments. in conclusion, mr. president, lithuania is convinced that if implemented fully and in good faith the joint comprehensive plan of action will become a crucial element in building trust between iran and the international community, open the door to a steady improvement of relations with iran and postively contribute to regional and international peace and stability. i thank you, mr. president. >> i thank the representative of

lithuania for her statement. i give the floor to the representative of chad. >> translator: thankthank you mr. president. chad would like to join those who spoke before me to salute the signature of the agreement between the islamic republic of iran, the p5 plus one countries and the european union, an agreement regarding the joint comprehensive plan of action regarding the iranian nuclear program. chad takes note of the joint statement of the parties involved aiming at promoting transparent and creating an at moss fire that is conducive to the implementation of the aforementioned plan of action and chad encourages them to implement this fully their commitments fully and in good

faith. it is important to recall that the plan of action that the security council has just approved is the outcome of a long process. the volume of the, the text of the agreement which is over 100 pages including five annexes, the complexity and the length of the negotiations clearly proves the, that openness of mind and perseverance of the parties overcame the doubts and the difficulties of the process. chad would like to congratulate all of the leaders, the politicians, the diplomats and the experts from all the parties for the courage the determination, the tactfulness and wisdom that they have demonstrated in reaching a negotiated solution to the iranian nuclear program. we share their satisfaction over

having managed to reach an agreement that could not be reached for over two years. it we support the future efforts in implementing the agreement reached on the 14th of july and chad convinces of the virtues of dialogue and peace which is why we voted in favor of resolution 2231 we just adopted. the adoption of this resolution, unanimously clearly symbolizes a diplomacy and noble principles in the u.n. charter that calls on peaceful resolution of differences without the use of threats or the use of force. the framework of this approach we welcome the leadership of the united states and the new approach of its leaders which focus on dialogue, peace stability around the world.

on this point we we completely agree with what president obama said when he received the nobel peace prize on the 10th of december 2009, he said, and i quote, sanctions and condemnations without discussions are will ultimately fail. mr. president, chad hopes the iaea will in monitor respect the agreement that has been signed and including the road map for verification of past and current issues that are outstanding. with this in mind chad encourages the iaea and iran to cooperate fully to insure the complete successful

implementation of the jcpoa. we also hope that the sanctions measures implemented pursuant to the relevant provisions of the various resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2015 pertaining to iran will be completely lifted once the security council receives the a report of the iaea that confirms the adoption by iran implementation of all the measures outlined in the jcpoa. mr. president, we would like to repeat that all of the other parties to the npt. iran is entitled to develop, conduct research and produce nuclear energy for its civilian peaceful purposes and we hope the agreement signed on the 14th of july will make it possible for iran to join the community of nations and to

insure its contribution in strengthening international cooperation in a world threatened by conflict, no contribution, every contribution should be will come in tape takenning -- maintaining international peace and security. mr. president, in conclusion we repeat our encouragement and support of all parties of 14th of july agreement and call on implementation of the commitments undertaken as well as continued dialogue until the end of implementation of the joint comprehensive plan much action. chad signed and ratified the agreement which makes africa an area free of nuclear weapons. chad dreams of a world that has been rid of these weapons of mass destruction where the use of nuclear science nuclear research is done only for peaceful purposes. hence we would like to sign on

to the slogan that is very relevant and very relevant. energy nuclear energy for all nuclear weapons for no one. thank you very much. >> i thank the representative of chad for his statement. i shall now make a statement in my capacity as the minister of foreign affairs of new zealand. today the permanent members, the european union, germany and iran have presented us an agreement which is fully implemented. provided come hens sieve and long-term solution to the iran nuclear issue. the truly historic agreement reached in vienna represents a triumph of diplomacy and cooperation over confrontation and mistrust. new zealand commends all the parties staying the course

through the conflicts and challenging negotiations. it is now crucial to insure the agreement is fully and swiftly implemented and that small missteps and misunderstanding are not allowed to derail the process. we urge all parties to approach this task with the same constructive intent that has led to this agreement and we encourage iran to act swiftly to implement all transparency measures and allow the iaea access to the relevant sites. by the adoption of this resolution, we give the international, we give international legal force to the agreement reached in vienna and ex-to the extent its obligations it contains across the u.n. membership. new zealand endorses comments of

high representative margarini that this is a good deal for everyone. for the parties that signed up to it and the rest of the international community. there are sadly too few days on which we can say constructive and patient diplomacy has succeeded in bridging the differences in overcoming the mistrust that contain the seeds of conflict. today we mark an opportunity to change the nature of the relationship between iran and the international community. and we remind ourselves that with the right approach and with the commitment of key stakeholders, even seemingly intractable issues can be resolved through diplomacy and dialogue. for this council, as we confront the extraordinary difficult challenges in relation to the middle east peace process, syria, iraq yemen and libya, this is a message we should

reflect upon today. i resume my function as president of the council. i now give the floor to the representative of the islamic republic of iran. >> resolution 2231 that the council just adopted represent a significant development and marks a fundamental shift in the consideration of iran's peaceful nuclear program by the council in the past 10 years. the jcpoa is the result of a series of extensive and collective efforts that sought to for close to two years to give diplomacy a chance and end resort to pressure coercion and threats. the fundamentally different

approach which was departure from the past several years and preceding years help all of us hope for the best possible way out to put an end to unnecessary crisis and accomplish major achievement for all of the parties involved and the whole international community. the resolution that was adopted and in the jcpoa that was endorsed today provided also for the termination of the security council resolution that unjustifiably placed sanctions on iran for its universities to exercise its rights. they were grounded on nothing but baseless and pure speculation and hearsay. nobody has ever presented any proof indicating that iran's program has been anything but peaceful. the iaea that put iran's facilities under record inspection has consistently reported that iran has dutifully

stood by every single commitment. by example in terms of inspection frequency only japan has been subject to greater scrutiny than iran while japan has much more extensive nuclear facilities. last year iran even surpassed japan in the number of inspections. therefore the involvement of the security council was not caused by a suspicious nuclear weapons program but by driven by the stated objective in scr 1696 to compel iran to suspend its lawful enrichment program. that demand was also unnecessary and uncalled for but in fact, iran counter to the unanimous conclusions of 2000, and 2010, npt conferences which stipulate the choices of member-states with regard to the fuel cycle

activities must being respected. it also neglected the repeated demands of majority of the international community represented. sanctions imposed against iran in scr 1737, 1929. were all punishment for refusal of iranian people to accept that demand. in engaging with with the plus three we had foresight to move forward without losing sight of the past. therefore while we hope the security council will open a new chapter in its relations with iran we can not accept, we can not accept or forget its previous treatment of iran starting from its inaction in the face of saddam's aggression and the use of chemical weapons to its more recent treatment of iranian peaceful nuclear program.

. . obligations with the honor regimes including npt sustained rights could also be no threat to sanction of war could help sustain the npt in the long run with one or all of the three pillars including total nuclear

disarmament and rights of all to use issues. and now they are rewarded. looking ahead to the future the 20 to 31 are all the new chapters in the organizations between iran with the council and participants. iran is also in a position to comply with its commitment because it is already committed to the supreme leader who has declared all weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear defense and also sequoias. we hope that our partners as well as councils do the same with regard to commitment under

the same gesture meant. they built a new relationship with iran. it is encouraging all member states to operate with iran in the framework and the peaceful use of nuclear energy and related projects and realize its emphasis is conducive to promoting and participate in the development of the normal economy and trade contracts and cooperation with iran are all encouragement. mr. president, why is there so focused on the nuclear issue to have a wider positive implications for our region and the whole international community. first, it is on the basis of

mutual respect and understanding is an important achievement for diplomacy or pressure and could produce nothing with regard to iran in the past 57 years. the forces and diplomacy is the most rational way to be interconnected more and show diplomacy is therefore a clear message to build and still believe they can achieve everything. second they have the potential to help in this region towards more cooperation and coordination with the real issue at him. vastly earnestly hope that we helped turn the page in our region, enabling countries to close the ranks and fight against violent extremism and to

move towards more cooperation throughout the region and the whole faith. why are the countries in our region have very high stakes in defeating terrorism violent extremism and sectarianism that participants facing similar challenges in the security from this phenomenon. with the dark settled over the nuclear issue, we are now ready to focus on real issues and benefits around the better environment conducive to a wider cooperation among all lectures. third and a major development in the region we are called to her neighbors and friends and the wider region that iran is ready to engage in good faith with all of them based on mutual respect and brotherhood.

we have many common challenges in our region to address than many common opportunities to benefit from. this is the time to start working together against our most common and important challenges which includes above all violent extremism. fourth following the policy in the region has done whatever it is in its power to defeat any effort for resolving the standup over the nuclear energy program. in so doing it does not see peace in our region and its interests and consider an existential threat to itself. they try to spread in the region and beyond to serve dennis will

our friends and neighbors not to fall into the trap. in this context, it is also not surprising the regime is the only obstacle with the nuclear weapons in the middle east, that my country indicate 14 years ago and has never seen promoted. it believes that nuclear war by the israeli regime constitutes a grave threat to peace and security in our unstable region and the security council should give up to its primary sponsor ability and take action to naturalize peace. mr. president let me recall that iran is a nation with the rich culture are missing the lives of sewers won't be instead

pass and preserving its independent identity. we have not been acquired through our pricing of their commitments. the steadfastness of our delegation showed during the negotiations and stems from the fact we only accept commitment that we can abide by as iran is resolute in completing its obligations we expect that our counterparts may also face this. only the commitments displaying good faith and adopting the right approach can prevail over conflict and more with violent suffering and in this context or the solid foundation for further

and more effective diplomacy interaction. before i conclude let me think those ambassadors who supported and also those countries who help still have it. also some accusations and some members said previous speakers. the distinguished ambassador of the united states accused the government of destabilizing the region. the country that waited to countries in our region and the ground for the goals of terrorism and extremism is not to raise such accusation against my country. reckless acts of the united nations is a mistake.

for so many years are at the root of many challenges that we are now facing. iran is a stable country in a stable region. as we want our stability to process we promote the stability in the region and we help our neighbors stabilized and cooperate towards dissent. in conclusion mr. president let me also an army that my delegation under instruction from my government is ordering a statement of the islamic public of iran following the action taken today is a document of the security council. thank you, mr. president. >> i think the representative of the islamic republic of iran for his statements.

i now give the floor to mr. thomas may harding. >> thank you mr. president. the high sensitive european union for foreign affairs and security policy has asked me to convey the following message to the u.n. security council. the agreement reached in vienna on the 14th of july, 2015 between iran and china france, germany russia united kingdom united states of america with the support of the high representative of the union before the security policy and join a comprehensive plan of action is historic in nature. the agreement once implemented marks the conclusion to the long-running diplomatic difference to reach a comprehensive long-lasting and peaceful solution to the iranian nuclear issue. one that will provide the necessary assurance is in the exclusively peaceful nature of

iran's nuclear program on one hand and lifting of sanctions on the other. as such, it represents a significant achievement in a tribute to the marriott the nation's diplomacy from all sides. it is appropriate to deal will strike in vienna when all this began 12 years ago when the international atomic energy agency started looking to possibly iranian declared nuclear committees. and then, there have been many not in years of at times difficult negotiations. a key milestone in the process was the geneva agreement in 2013 from the smooth implementation which provided necessary time and space for the complex negotiation process which follows. this resided in april 2015 which set the parameters for the final deals. the e.u. plus three son that was especially affect this.

we feel that the european union in particular through the high representative was a role throughout the whole process the european union has been facilitated moderator and the final stages at the jc tax. it's hard to imagine another. a key element of success was maintaining unity of the group and focus on the shared goal. it is so the credit of all those who participated to restate to reaching a mutually beneficial deal. the fact that the self-imposed deadline was overrun several times are witnessed that they shared view that a quality agreement was vastly superior to a quick market. the agreement is good. iran has agreed to make changes to its nuclear program.

the international atomic energy agency would have been asked if needs to determine what iran has completed those actions and to detect any future violations of the agreement. iran will receive sanctions lifting in return. they set out in detail what is required by all sides providing clarity to facilitate the implementation of the agreement. together with the conclusion to be made by the international atomic energy agency in that regard and the full implementation by ran of its commitment under the jcp o. eight will constitute to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the iranian nuclear program. it will be necessary for all sides to work towards implementing this giant comprehensive program of action. the security council resolution adopted today is a key element in this process.

the european union will endorse the security council resolution and conclusion of the foreign affairs council which is in session as we are peaking. the european union will also endorse the jcp and commit to abide and follow the agreed implementation plan. in effect european union commitments under the jcp08 related to the lifting of sanctions will be carried out in accordance with the timeline and modalities in the jcp08 and god is stipulated for termination of implementation of financial sanctions would in effect once the international atomic energy agency has verified iran has implemented all of its nuclear related commitments. for the time being provisions of

the joint plan of action in geneva 2013 have been extended a further six months. however the international atomic energy agency has verified iran has carried out at commitment. i have possessive union for foreign affairs policy will continue supporting and coordinating during the entire implementation phase of the jcp08. i representative hope the next asked the positive development will open the door to his steady improvement in relations between the european union, member states and iran as well as improved iranian regional and international relations and will constitute the basis of a more stable secure region of the longer-term. it is essential this opportunity is seized by all. the mac i thank mr. thomas

mayr-harting for his statement. >> mr. president the agreement reached and the endure is an important historic step towards ending the declaration surrounding iran's nuclear program. as such it has the potential to ease concerns regarding peace and security in the region and beyond. allow me mr. prez and to briefly examine significant than three different angles. firstly, germany firmly believes the agreement does in fact reduce the risk of a nuclear arms race. after long and demanding negotiations, the e.u. have achieved an incredible framework

that will prevent iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. iran has committed itself to comprehensive tech of restrictions and unprecedented transparency regime that will allow us to rule out any covert nuclear activity. the agreement is not merely built on trust. we have established a huge need and long-term set of confidence building measures. everything we agreed on will be strictly monitored. a powerful snap back mechanism will serve an additional incentive for iran to abide by its obligations. it will now be crucial to implement the agreement. the international atomic energy agency will have an important role in this regard. in exchange for new restrictions, iran will profit from early comprehensive sanctions relief. the resolution which has been

adopted today is a step in the right direction. second, the agreement also offers ample political opportunities for iran. it reflects a fundamental charge but the iranian government an expression of intent to be a constructive part of the international community. it is up to iran to deliver on its commitment. we express our hope that in fulfilling the agreement iran will see the potential to bring about improvements in other fields as well from civil liberties to human rights in the accommodation of regional security concerns. finally, we hope that the agreement reached in vienna will also have a positive effect on relations between iran, the european union and its member states and will improve iran's regional and international relations. we also hope that will open the

door to a more constructive iranian foreign policy and a more secure and stable region. mr. president, the agreement reached in vienna july 14th has proven the complex long-standing conflict can be peacefully resolved if there is enough political will encourage. it is a victory for diplomacy and for the principles of the united nations. thank you mr. president. >> i think the representatives of germany for his statement. there are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. the meeting is adjourned. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> if you go back to earlier technology like railroads and also a monopoly they were regulated as common carriers. they set terms. and we all know what happened with the global innovation and railroad and the telephone until they were all deregulated and all the common carrier statute essentially by congress when it was so clear that innovation was

being surprised and the u.s. is falling behind in competitiveness. that was the backdrop for the bipartisan consensus that the 1990s at the end of that would be different. this is during the clinton administration a clear consensus democrats and republicans that unlike the earlier technology is the internet was going to be unregulated. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> good morning, everyone. welcome to the arms control association briefing today on the p5+1 iran nuclear deal, the outcome, implementation and verification. and the executive director of the control association and independent partisan organization. we were established in 1971 to provide information, ideas solutions to address the threat posed by the world's most dangerous weapons. we've organized this event to discuss the p5+1 and iran nuclear deal which is among the most complex and consequential of the nuclear rage, which began 70 years ago today with the first atomic bomb which was detonated in mexico. this agreement follows over two years of diplomatic intense

negotiations involving seven nations, including one time adversaries. our organization come against control association has followed iran's program and the diplomatic efforts to rein it in and with over this period of time we have sought to identify practical technical and policy solutions to address the many different challenges on this issue so that they can help arrive at the agreement that prevents a nuclear armed iran. after looking at the documents on the page is quite substantial is that they can effectively and verifiably block iran's plutonium pathways with nuclear weapons and guard again and this time weapons program for more than a generation. it is a view shared by a wide variety of non-proliferation security experts.

and we believe that will be a net plus worth nuclear non-proliferation and the stock spread of weapons and for u.s. and regional security. congress now has 60 days to review this complex agreement and we believe that each and every member is taking a serious look at this agreement to get the answers to their questions and there are many questions to consider the benefit and alternative. to contribute to this debate we've gathered three top-notch experts who are going to discuss the agreement how it works what its impact will be. we will start at the arms control association director for non-proliferation policy kelsey davenport, author of our major research report and policy briefs on the issue and she's been closely monitoring the talks for more than four years or so when i think she is still recovering from her latest tour at duty two and half weeks in vienna at the site of the final

round of talks. next-line you hear from richard nephew was former principal deputy warden at her for sanctions policy at the u.s. department of eight and director for event on the national security council's bath. one of the negotiators up until the beginning of this year. he is not a program director for economic statecraft sanctions and energy markets at the center for global energy policy at columbia university in new york and as a non-resident senior fellow at the foreign policy center at brookings. and then we'll hear from yvonne goldenberg, middle east security programs at the center for new american security and foreign policy defense expert with extensive government experience covering iran's program. after their opening comments and remarks about the agreement, we will take your questions. i want to make a final observation and it's healthy to

talk about the different elements of the agreement. like any diplomatic agreement, this one is a product of give-and-take. it's not perfect but if you look at it as a hope, we think it is strong and many way stronger than the framework that was reached in early april by the p5+1 and iran. yet it is clear already a couple days after this was concluded that many critics believe that reject the agreement in increasing fiction pressuring iran, the u.s. can somehow coerced and commenced the leaders of iran to dismantle its nuclear program and agree to better terms. i think, many people think, the president thinks this is a dangerous illusion. there isn't a better deal on the horizon of congress somehow blocks disagreement, they will be very tough negative consequences. we will have broken with

european allies the necessary international support for iran related sanctions will dissipate. iran would not be subject to limits on the program. we would lose out on enhanced inspections, the risk of a nuclear armed iran and complex to be inevitable, but it would grow. a lot is at stake and in the coming weeks we hope congress will take apart of the agreement, what it does and the alternative speared with that let me turn it over to kelsey kelsey davenport and we will most directly onto other speakers. >> thank you madero and thank you for being here this morning. at least i think it's morning. still not sure what time zone i am in. i would talk today about the nuclear elements of the deal and while it won't build a touch about 150 pages of the agreement during the question-and-answer mechanics for the areas i don't touch on it would be happy to take any questions.

this is a very strong agreement from a non-proliferation is. in many ways it exceeds the expectations of what we thought a good agreement would need to achieve to block iran's cadres to nuclear weapons and put in place an intrusive monitoring verification regime quencher quick detection of the art today. though the deal is not perfect but it is good enough enemies to u.s. non-proliferation goals safeguards national security and is good for regional security as well. to get into first the details the parameters agreed to in april particularly on the enrichment details that were strong and from our assessment with these parameters in place to retake more than 12 to produce enough material for one nuclear weapon about 25 kilograms of uranium enriched to above 90%.

that will be achieved by reducing the centrifuges from 19,000 down to 6000 of which 5000 will be operating. iran's top pile will be capped at 300 kilograms. all about my new. what we get from the final deal or a number of details that strengthen these assessments that iran cannot quickly move towards the air weapons. one of the things that become clear as all of the excess centrifuge machines will be removed. all of the infrastructure, also taken out and stored under iaea deals and days will feed directly to the agents the two have greater assurance that if i ran would've tried to machines from the iaea would immediately know. also important to note iran will be using machines to replace than repair and a broken

machines. iran will not be producing any additional centrifuges unless the stock pilot machines produces under 500. the idea they are going to use time to build up centrifuges to quickly deploy them later is false and the machines will be inventoried under the deal. these are provisions that had a greater level of confidence. we have more information about stock pile. iran agreed to reduce its stock pile of low enriched uranium for 3.67% reactor grade from the approximate 10000 kilograms it has now down to 300 kilograms. that includes uranium in all forms. iran will not be able to convert the gas into oxide. oxide converted back to gas and further enriched. this is the entire stock pile.

any scrap material that is an wretched 3.67% rep to 20% will be turned into field played for the tehran research during the material that can't be turned into shipping out of the country deluded are mixed in the form it cannot be enriched further. additional steps that iran will take to ensure enough material playing around can be enriched further providing more insurance than iran cannot obtain the materials necessary under 12 months. there's also been concerns about the effect agreement is about about a thousand centrifuges at the facility which iran began to build deep in the mountains near the city of om. now the 1000 centrifuges will be there, 350 will be used for stable isotope production.

these machines cannot be transitioned back to uranium enrichment. that is about 600 machines that are idle. the rest of the centrifuges infrastructure will be removed and it will be placed under seal back to the facility which is where the 5000 operating centers produce enriched uranium. iran can take these machines back and began operating quickly and use this ability to produce enriched uranium. the iaea would be able to detach any of those because the centrifuges are stored off-site and because the iaea will have access on a daily basis if it wants it to the facility. the facility really does not pose a threat for the duration of the limitations that are, which is 15 years. very strong facility.

one of the criticism is what will happen after 10 years. in 10 years iran committed for 10 years to operate 5060 other centrifuges. iran is not going to go over is within 10 years. this makes clear the centrifuge machines will be limited and phased it in such a way that one day after 10 years cannot deploy thousands of fiery centrifuges and obtaining materials to nuclear weapons. to look closer at the r&d, iran has about 1000 advanced centrifuge machine in various stages and the pilot production facilities. iran will have a few months to finish up with some of those

cascade and then it will remove nearly all of the advanced machines and store them under seal. during the duration, iran will be allowed to operate one machine, one ir five machine one ir six machine and one ir eight machine for eight years. it can test these machines with uranium but it cannot use these machines to accumulate enriched uranium. so again, we are not going to see a proliferation of advanced centrifuge machines that iran can quickly use to breakout. after eight and a half years iran will be able to cast 30 ir six machines and 30 ir eight machines. at that point they can begin producing 200 of each of these models per year, but they will not reproducing their machines. around your times when iran

begins to transitioned its machines, it is important to note that capacity also will remain relatively stable for the next three years. so smith capacity as a the measure of the patient to the centrifuge machine. so that made a capacity of iran's 560 centrifuges will remain constant as the machines are introduced. so if an ir six machine has 10 times the capacity of an ir one machine. they have to remove 10 ir ones. so this insured that we won't be around up in iran's nuclear capacity immediately after their tenure restrictions on just using ir wants to enrich uranium

expire. it is also important to know that we start to view any elements in isolation. in addition to restrictions on the number of machines, iran's procurement of materials can be used will also be monitored which was set up through the deal and any changes that iran wants to make will also have to be approved by the joint commission. so if iran starts to move or move away from the r&d plan and will submit as part of the protocol. it will become clear very quickly it is to the joint commission. one of the other areas where there has been a lot of questions relating to the trans-parents in the monitoring and verification elements of the deal. this is something the armed control association were very concerned about.

because of iran's illicit nuclear reason the path we fill the intrusive monitoring and verification which produced under the agreement will provide the highest degree of confidence that iran cannot pursue nuclear weapons either it is declared as though it is her birthday. first at the declared facilities, iran will have to expand its nuclear.the ration under the additional protocols which iran has agreed to implement and eight years of the agreement. the additional protocol is an agreement between iran and the iaea that expands upon iran's comprehensive safeguards agreement and expands the number of declared site. it gives inspectors greater access and access on short notice to inspect the sites. on top of this committee agreement based on a number of provisions that allows for continuous monitoring across

iran's entire yolk supply chain and that is 25 years of the arabian mills in 20 years the centrifuge production and then the continuous monitoring at the time for dough as well. essentially, this means if iran wanted to covertly pursue nuclear weapons, they would need to replicate the entire supply. he would need to find a new source of uranium ore. they would need to convert that to gas and then they would need to enrich it. these are large programs. you are not able to hike is in the basement buried in a warehouse at a military facility. now another step again the concern about a covert nuclear weapons program comes with the increased access that will be granted to expect or is under the protocol and it is very clear in the deal that is concerns arise about illicit nuclear activities, the iaea

will be committed in its access to sites of concern including military sites. it means that iran can save the conditions to protect information is to realize it would iaea suspicion about whether or not it is a sign that says the average and if the iaea field are not adequate, there is an adjudication that can then plays that will decide if the iaea should be given expanded access. if iran and the iaea cannot come to a decision within 14 days about that is the joint commission which includes members of the p5+1 countries, the european union and iran will have seven days to decide on access. and that is decided by consensus though. that means iran, china and

russia together can't block access. and then iran will have an additional three days to comply with the joint commission recommendation. in total, if the iaea wants to access the site they can only be blocked from doing that for 24 days. 24 days may be time for iran to remove any equipment put in place but it isn't enough time for iran to eradicate any indication that elicits nuclear committees taken place. that is in part due to the sophisticated environmental sampling the iaea can conduct. these layers demonstrate the strength of the monitoring verification. i think it is worth noting that we consider monitoring and verification in this deal by looking at the iaea. it isn't just the iaea that will have its eyes on iran's nuclear program. the national intelligence organization of the united

states, european countries and israel will continue to watch iran closely. in short, i think the director of national intelligence said this is a solid verification regime. that element is going to provide you a 100% guaranteed. it provides a degree of certainty not pursuing nuclear weapons. also it is important to know iran's nuclear decision-making has generally been guided to a cost-benefit analysis. with a deal in place the cost of cheating because i couldn't actually higher. this is an agreement that iran voluntarily signed on to end with the agreement there are further commitments by iran not to undertake any experiments related to nuclear weapons development. they are voluntarily extremely

strong reaction by the international community. it also changes the cost-benefit analysis. there's a few additional elements important and worth noting that i don't think i've gotten much coverage so far. there are conditions for iran can not export any nuclear material or technology unless it's approved by the joint commission and that is important when we think about the spread of containing the spread of these technologies. it will be joint work on the application of feel element which provides iran the ability to field the iraq reactor using the domestic feel that it produces. and also if there are concerns about noncompliance there will be a time bound 35 day period that consist of review by the joint commission administers it

necessary that ensures any party is not satisfied with the breach they can move on and take the case to the world. there are a number of other provisions in this deal to add to the strength and amplify the non-proliferation value. finally moving forward, congress now has the opportunity to weigh in on this deal. the power the congress has to go comes a great deal of responsibility. if they cause or prevent the deal are being implemented they need to buy the consequences which will likely lead to escalation on the part of iran sanctions from the u.s. side and an increase for the chances of the military conflict. looking at this deal on the merits. it puts in place monitoring verification. does it provide recourse in

violation. and also considered the alternative there is no better deal out there. we have heard about the need for anytime anywhere inspections. those are necessary. the international agency can do its job granted under the additional protocol. we have heard more pressure what perhaps induce iran to make greater concessions. i think a deal like this deal that allows iran to save many strategic active of retaining limited civilian nuclear programs and receiving sanctions against iran greater buy-in to the agreement and make them more sustainable because it sees incentives to comply. i think this idea that more concessions were necessary would not produce necessarily a stronger deal. ..

>> richard, thanks for being here. >> thanks for being here today. i wish is going to touch on three-point to do with the sanctions relief issue. first i wanted to touch on the contents and the timeline and sequence of it will all be rolled out. second i want to touch on what's left. i think while there is a sense

out there that this means the entire u.s. or international sanctions she has been taken away, that's simply not too. some of the sanctions remain in place frankly will continue to hamper iran's ability to even take offense to some of the relief which may be in and of itself the future problem. lastly i want to touch on the impact of sanctions relief that the iranian economy, the iranian population and all their security apparatus may use the benefits of sanctions relief. first off i can say in terms of the contents i have a much easier job than kelsey because the sanctions relief package is fairly straightforward. it's fairly direct and it's fairly broad. the decision was made very clearly by the negotiating partners to make this an issue of the nuclear problem and how to get resolution of the nuclear problem by incentivizing rapid iranian action. and so the timeline that's been established for implementation of relief is configured as such.

the iranians have to complete all of the nuclear modifications that kelsey was outlining with a few things that just by their very nature going to have to continue on for eight 10 years some instances going out to 25 before any new sanctions relief will be given. all this talk about signing bonuses and billions of dollars flooding into a rant for a centerpiece has been dismantled is wrong. the way the deal puts it in place, the iranians are not going to see anything beyond the joint plan of action continuing really until they have done their part. now, when they have done their part the relief they're going to get is going to be substantial. and in the judgment of myself i do think of the administration and was worthwhile in order to get the kinds of nuclear concessions that kelsey is laid out what's in play? first off all of the use of sanctions that are going to be discussed here are second or in

nature. they do not include the use primary embargo which is off the table with the exception of a few very specific licenses. what the united states has offered to do is provide relief from the sanctions that it imposed on foreign companies interactions with iran. if you're bp if you're a number of other companies that reside out there in the world, you are now going to be able to do business with iran year after the iranians have done a nuclear steps that are supposed to be. it's going to be across a wide range of sectors energy sector in terms of the sale and purchase a product investment financial services, financial transactions insurance transportation it is going to get wide range of economic activity the iranians will have to do. again with foreign companies and foreign actors subject to their own laws. this will not take place until after the nuclear steps have been taken which is going to

take a long time as well. the way the timeline has been set up we are now in a period that you could loosely call phase one. building up to adoption day. it's in this 90 day to do much every single one -- every single country that is part of p5+1 has to go through procedures they have and to get buy-in for the deal. upon the expiration of this 90 day clock or soon as the parties agree, and front that i don't think that's possible given our own 60 to clock in the united states, then the iranians will start to take their steps. this willful removal of centrifuges, modification of the arak reactor as well as a variety of other nuclear things that kills who was describing. for the united states, european union, there is required to have in place the waivers and legal modifications to sanctions that will start upon iaea verification of the iranians have what they're supposed to do. so there will be promulgation of new regulations and executive

orders and waivers and things along those lines but they will be tied to a trigger and that is report by the iaea director general of things the iranians are supposed to do have, in fact, been done. their argubright of estimates as to how long this could potentially take the own estimate we can talk about this in questions is it would be easily four to six months before the iranians will be able to have achieved primary the removal of centrifuges. it's theoretically possible that could go faster but it wouldn't bet on that. i think four to six months is a good online. if you had 90 days plus 46 months we are really talking about april, maybe march when iranians are actually going to be able to achieve sanctions relief and when they will start to see new business start to flow. that's important because that basically means for the time being the iranians are highly incentivized to do all things they're supposed to do. we are going to see the iranians take all the steps they required to do in order to see a dollar of additional relief they're

supposed to get. during the joint plan of action i remember vividly a lot of suggestion the iranians were some ugly to stop and limiting their obligations before the deal. i think frankly that scope and scale of this suggests that would not, in fact, be the case. there is then basically a hiatus in terms of additional sanctions relief. for eight years or the iab is reaching a broader conclusion of the nature of iran's nuclear program, whichever one comes first. during this time relief will continue to exist on their rings can take advantage of it but there will also be under restriction. kelsey describes some of these but one of the important ones on what to touch on his departure but channel and to relate to the sanctions that still remain. under this eight year time period the iranians are going to have to go to the procurement channel establishment of the joint commission that for any nuclear related item. that's because the nuclear related secure details restrictions will remain in place. they will remain in place and

require iran to describe what it intends to do with these items and to submit itself to end user verification checks and other checks to ensure they are going where they're supposed to be going. in this instance is both the restriction on the iranians as well as still being utilized part of the sanctions in place. it will extend another two years beyond its adoption until the u.n. security council required are canceled in 10 years time. there will be at this year a period modification to other parts of the security council infrastructure and other legal instruments. including the united states and the eu. these primarily deal with proliferation related items and potential sources of concern. it's notable if you look at the

text, what put in is not iran to get into whatever it wants to import from anyone who wants to import. rather, certainly from the u.s. perspective, iran from the platform will be treated like anybody else which means they will still be subject to export controls and subject to your sanctions if we were to find there were things going on that we had concerns about. that's basically it in terms of the sanctions relief the iranians to get anything until after they've implemented their obligation. that will take between four to six months after this 90 day period, around april the 2016 nothing again for a number of years thereafter. the question becomes what's left. as i said the number of specific restrictions that remain in place with regard iran's that the to acquire nuclear items so when a so forth. that's not the limit of it. u.s. sanctions with respect to terrorism and human rights will remain in place. the u.s. primary embargo will remain in place. with the exception of some very

specific license to transactions involving the sale of commercial planes. however, even in that provision it's only stated that they have to be used for simple uses. so if the united states where to find all of a sudden that a brand-new boeing that arrived in tehran was now funneling arms to assad come we're talking about assad still empowered many years from now, then that would because to terminate the licensing as clarice did in the text. it also means, therefore, the iranians will have to be on their best behavior with respect to these plans because they are quite obvious. as we discovered the train as the ability to detect what kind of lives are being used for what kind of purposes and then identify them back to the international community. the iranians will have to do with a continued sanctioning of a number of people who could loosely described as bad guys including the a revolutionary guard corps which remained unused sanctions, the quds force which remains under sanction.

there's been a lot of talk about this i'll take a brief moment to describe it about what is contained in the actual do. he will, in fact, be delisted by the written by the eu and as is because he was designated for nuclear record reasons. in the united states on the other hand, he was designated for terrorism. in the united states that means these days in place as a sentient individual until such time as he stopped engaging in things considered to be terrorists and i don't think it is a likely event. this is also important because the united states is not removing the infrastructure it uses to make these residual sanctions impactful and that includes the burt neuborne two of a comprehensive iran sanctions accountability investment act section 104. it's in this provision that the united states is exerted a lot of pressure on international financial system with respect to designate entities that basically when you boil it right

down, the law provides for the united states to sanction those who conduct transactions on behalf of u.s. designated people. the list of u.s. designated people is going to go down when the nuclear related targets are removed but you will not go away particularly for these areas of human rights and other related targets. the iranians are still going to be under the pressure of having to face financial sector cutoffs for all those entities from individuals to remain on the list. which means institutions u.s. designated bank for terrorism related activities, going to remain and the financial impact on the bank will remain as well. by the way this means any additional targets and u.s. identifiedidentify being involved in terrorism or human rights related violation also potentially subject to the same sort of caustic iranians are so going to have to work about what the potential happened to the

financial sector if, in fact, thatthe and of introducing the banks that we are delisting of for different purposes. i think it's important at this juncture to note that the sanctions relief will not be this end all and be all restoration and renaissance for iran. it will do a lot but the very point that some sanctions remain and the fact that there's going to be reputational and business risk attached to doing business in iran means that the sanctions relief will take a long time to mature. from one perspective this is really good because that means for those of us who are concerned about iran's ability to do awful things in the region, it means that there is a way of facing a controlling and modifying iranian behavior. because if we continue to identify individual entities involved in terrorism in every newsletter do with the consequences of that.

this is not u.s. unilateral sanctions disarmament. this is a step to provide iran palpable useful relief but you'll be under the same threat with respect to these institutions that they were yesterday, the day before 10 years, not 10 years, five years ago. when you add that to the fact a lot of businesses are going to be concerned about the possibility of snapback i think you can see that is going to take a long time for there to be a resurgence and a lot of really long-term trades and director my own expectation is that the iranians will see a lot of short-term this is the deal purchases of their oil insignificant and then get out of the rent if they need to for the initial couple of years. this is simple prudence on the part of international businesses. it does make a whole pot of sense to do multi-billion dollars worth of investment in the country when you have the risk of snapback, or some of the concern that could get you in

hot water, both in washington as well as with your stockholders. there may be some businesses that are willing to do this but i would bet they will build clauses into the contracts allow them to get out of a rendered very quickly if, in fact, there were to be a but for somesome sanctions. the business operating in five and iran will be different that it will be another countries in the middle east. this would frankly be not twisting the presence of sanctions because i ran is still a good place to do business disappeared the bureaucratic red tape in tehran this is cumbersome and difficult to do with as anyone else in the world. it's notable a number of international oil companies said that they don't find the current contract with iranians are starting to beat about with respect oil services is all that attractive. the are looking for better terms. this speech is that it will take time for the iranians to get through the own bureaucratic process, overcome resistance on the part of companies generally don't you back in.

but iran's going to get a benefit, and the real threat to i think the longevity of the deal that this benefit is too slow in coming on. it is i think they're significant risk that the iranians at some point say we're not getting what we need. it's at that point you could see them say we need to reconsider the terms of this deal. so i think basically the sanctions relief pitcher in iran is favorable to the p5+1 favorable to the united states. it will provide iran some advantages but it is not something that is going to overnight change the iranian economy. it's going to take time and our ways to control it still further. thanks. >> thanks a lot, richard. very couple. now we will turn to ilan goldenberg who will talk about the regional security dynamics related to this agreement. >> thank you daryl and thanks everybody for being here and the arms control association for having me. i thought what it would is talk about the three major actors in

the region who are reacting to this grid was going to happen. the first being iran second saudi arabia and the gulf states around it, and the third being israel. i should start from the position that because of the nonproliferation benefits of the agreement, i very much agree with my colleagues that this is something that is in the nation interest of the united states and we need to be pursuing but the regional ramifications are going to be much more competent and mixed and to be negative downsides that will have to manage the specialists of our traditional partners over the next few years. that doesn't mean we should be letting the tail wag the dog. this is something we're going to have to deal with. starting with how we expect to get to sheikh out and went over the next few years can be sorted these two schools of thought and theories. one is president rouhani for minister zarif, these are the pragmatist inside the iranian system. they are not democrats.

the onion of the revolution and looking for liberalism and western-style the breakup tomorrow in tehran. but they are more pragmatic when they way economic benefits and the benefits of international engagement versus support for terrorism and things like the nuclear program and are more interested in the first set of interest for iran. are they going to gain more influence and be able to reflect into it more pragmatic iranian foreign policy? there's a strong case to be made that's the case. rouhani was elected based on the fact that allowed to come to power also by the supreme leader based on the fact that he would get the sanctions relief, that he would get this nuclear agreement. he will have tremendous credibility and leverage. we have parliamentary elections in iran next march and interest on entrance of sanctions relief calendar that richard just laid out and see if the pragmatic faction can pick up more seats inside the iranian system. and we will have to see, i do

think rouhani and zarif could have more influence in other areas of foreign policy would have not had as much. on the other hand, you can make the argument the hardliners are going to double down. that they're going to want to batten down the hatches, not want to see this deal lead to more liberalization inside of iran. they will take a harder line use some of that money that comes in to increase their support for some of the activities in syria and iraq and yemen and elsewhere in the region that's going to happen and i would argue that most likely scenario is both of these things are going to happen at the same time. what you're going to end up in iran very likely for the next few years is a very intense political competition amongst the very factions around the supreme leader who ultimately how many makes the decision. how many is someone who leans towards the hardliners respected. very skeptical of the united states, not let iran in years

but he's also somebody rules by consensus at all the people come to him about the key fashions commitments at boss, this is what we should do he usually goes that direction. i don't see him pursuing a major -- with the united states in the years ahead. but he's going to pass from the sense of what i think before the expiration of this document itself and his age and at the moment we were really going to see okay, what has this agreement and what has aftermath in terms of political debate inside of a random? who is his successor? what kind of system comes after? we haven't had a transition in our enemy since 1989. it's been a long time. this is going to be a major moment to indicate if we're going to see a fundamental shift in iran's foreign policy. whether the funding to shift happens or not you still implemented. this is a potential huge benefit that we're going to have to watch over the next few years.

second challenge is israel. what happens there. obviously, the israelis are close partners of ours and i spent years at the pentagon working on iran were one of our primary interest was ended with israel and we assuring israel and talking to them about the nuclear program, especially the time or speculation was much more right that they might consider taking things into their own hands. what i found from those exchanges was a couple of things. one, the israelis small countries run by a lot of unfriendly neighbors in a very tough part of the world. the approach that they take is they assume the absolute worst-case scenario, sort of like the joe, americans for policy makers can we do our contingency plan based on worst-case scenario setup policy based on most likely scenarios. where's israelis have contingency planning based on worst-case scenario and the policy based on worst-case scenario. that's we get this difference is what i think the break we've got

to with israel. it's unfortunate that we have this break anything part of it is personal between president obama and prime minister netanyahu and their personal styles. part of it is this policy we had with israel and giving risk perceptions. i think that going forward one thing i will say one of the unfortunate side effects of it has been that i always found engage with the israelis is quite useful when doing things like negotiate with iran because they would come in with a group of very smart people who spent all of them working on this and they would eat all the worst-case scenarios. they would read team in for you. really effective at something she gets a i devotedly that's credible, we don't believe that is credible but sometimes you to say that something we haven't thought about. it helps to improve american policy. policy. it's unfortunate we had. it's unfortunate we had to split which is limited that over the next few months. what happens next? prime minister has made very

clear that he's going to post this untried underminded in congress. i think that is a big mistake. because i think at because i think that the incident i don't i don't think it's very likely he will succeed. by doing that he's taking a bipartisan issue and turning it into a wedge issue inside u.s. congress which i think is very damaging for israel's long-term interest. there's a lot of people the political establishment in israel is against the agreement because prime minister netanyahu have set the conditions were as possible to be for the agreement or even his critics will say i don't like your approach to how you're dealing with the americans but i hate this deal. the security establishment is different, much more subtle. because they also take a lower risk perception they are uncomfortable with elements of the agreement but they don't see it as an existential threat as the prime minister does. what we're likely to see there is what they do also are very

concerned about is the way the prime minister has decided to handle himself which is the republic confrontation with the president going directly into the america media, go directly to congress on this and try to circumvent the executive branch and that's something i think cause a lot of anxiety for israelis because iran might come in many of their views can be an existential threat but frank of u.s.-israel relationship is an existential threat and more important to israel's long-term security. for many of them. i think the big question is what happens after the 60 days, what happens after this aggression for speedy israelis finally say, does the prime minister she's being encouraged to become a going to take my disagreement quietly and will go back and start quietly engaging with the administration, seeing as if the united states can find ways to fill his security gap that we now feel through american reassurances which will what we have typically done or does he decide to bite off this

president and spend the next year and have publicly confronting and. i would really hope he chooses the former and not the latter. i know there's a lot of people in the security establishment in israel that would hope to see that but we'll have to wait and see. the president has reached out. president obama reached out to prime minister netanyahu in a pointer to bring it back into the fold and said let's take our conversations quietly. back to the back channels would often consult in those close friends as opposed to public spat. he was rejected at the time and later tried to do that again earlier this week and was rejected let's see if the prime minister's views change. we'll have to wait and see. finally, there's a third element which is saudi arabia in the gulf states. a few things different than the israelis. they have some overlap but the difference is whereas israel really is focused on the nuclear program and cares about iran's regional behavior. saudi arabia really is focused on the regional question.

they care about iran's supporting terrorism. that you happening right now in the region as iran picking up influence in syria and iraq and yemen and elsewhere and that's the major anxiety. people state that saudi arabia will respond to this by storing to build its own nuclear infrastructure but i don't believe that's the problem. i think that's unlikely. it's expensive, takes time costs that come to them in terms of international reactions and in terms of their relationship with the united states. i think the real concern is that they are feeling to have a concern that the united states is pivoting to iran and rearranging its allies dynamics in middle milk is what you don't think it would the obama evisceration is intended to do. we have a lot of things we disagree with the iranians. feeling that concern facilities start you lash out in some destabilizing waste and take steps that we think are against our interest and against their

interest in the region and i think the best example might be what they've done in yemen with this intervention without really a clear strategic point about what happens after you start bombing pretty much putting a blockade on human with really no end in sight. so that i think is more fundamental question for the saudis and one that the united states is going to have to wrestle with so this president and the next, because it's going to be hard for this president to do, any president be one of its do with iran what you think we needed to do is going to take a big hit in the gulf and an issue as president obama has done. done. it's almost an ex-president us to come in and start to really do that big hug with some of our partners. what do we do going forward to try to address these challenges? three or four things. first, take advantage of the fact we have this channel of communications with iranians for the first time in 35 years. that is meaningful and the poor.

they had e-mail addresses, phone numbers. can't tell you how many times when we were at the pentagon can't find ways to committed to the iranians, whether it was let's avoid a conflict. or knock it off from your about to disappear going to regret if you go in that direction. so having those channels i think is important. talking is always better than not talking. seeing as our ways to survive because on some issues are of interest in afghanistan. maritime security and avoiding potential escalation in the gulf, inadvertent escalation in the gulf are two areas for early pursued. there's other things more people to people things, like the. even as we do that especially dissension coming off, it makes sense to push back more forceful and some of iran's destabilizing activities in the region. through joint efforts with our partners showing up in saudi arabia, for example, with a high level delegation may be led by

ash carter and john brennan saying we are here to talk not about the nuclear program not about how we deal with isis we are here to of a serious conversation with you about how we're going to do with iran in the region. let's talk about steps, more aggressive interdiction more potentially more serious efforts to train sunni opposition in syria and in iraq supporters we can work with in both those countries. things like that will signal to our partners that we mean it when you they say we will push back on this behavior that we don't find acceptable in a rented and seconds to the iranians that we are going the nuclear deal doesn't give you free reign over the region to pursue all these activities. one thing i will tell you is when the united states pushes back against iran iran backs off. iran has no interest in in the drug

fight with the united states and sometimes you do need to flex your muscles to show some deterrence. i think that's another key thing that we have to keep doing. third element needs to be just reassurance of other forms beyond those do. which for our partners i don't think we need to be selling the saudis f-35s. they already outspend the iranians dramatically there is not about big weaponry. it's about the small stuff about training them, to counter some low-end asymmetric work but security assurances to some extent. there's things like that we can be doing with our partners instead of activities also with the israelis that can signal to them that we're sticking around, but this isn't the fundamental strategic pivot, that we're going to push that even as we engage. we can do both just i would say, close by saying, it's a very complicated balancing act to pull something like that off. it sends mixed messages. we just spent the last i've, 10

years using a combination of pressure and engagement to get the iran's to the give and get this deal. one on its own would not abort. take that basic philosophy and applied to iran and abilities and problems facing without borders. i think you can get there with the combination of tools. i will stop there. >> thank you very much, ilan. as i said at the beginning of this agreement, this process is complex. it's consequential and i think we've given you quite a bit to contemplate. is now your turn to ask us if you questions and we'll try to answer i want to start out with some of the journalists who are here. virginia. there's a question up here in front. rina mic up and identify yourself and tell us who you would like to answer the question. spent michael, "new york times." i have a question on the sequencing of sanctions relief.

technical question. the broad conclusion to be issued by the iaea is not going to come for a period of years, but director-general amano on the date the agreement was promulgated presented a roadmap to lead to an assessment by december 15. he articulated a number of steps that ought to be taken. as you understand the agreement, what sanctions relief can be provided prior to this december 15 assessment of where iran stands and possible military dimensions? and what sanctions relief can only be provided after this assessment is completed, and if it is a favorable resolution? >> richard?

>> so that's a great question and it is especially complicated because we not to possibilities working simultaneous. i don't see any sanctions relief happening before pmd has been laid to rest. that's in part because the obligation on iran is somewhat different than the obligation that the iaea has taken on itself. the timing of the obligation that the iaea has accepted is that it gets iran's compliance iran's cooperation by the 15th of october. based upon the structure of the implementation phase of the deal there is zero chance that sanctions would can happen before that cooperation has been given. it's written into the document as an obligation of the iranians to have done this by adoption day. answer as a consequence of that if they didn't provide the cooperation, the united states

and p5+1 partners would be in a position to say we will have to fill in the terms of the deal. they could walk away. you could go to dispute resolution process so when it's of what. because the went iran has to take its steps, i don't think there's any chance of any additional relief to be given. there is potentially a theoretical world in which adoption has taken place, the iranians speak his recommendation and the director-general has been issued his report by the 15th of december. i can see that as a theoretical possibility. i think that is highly unlikely. i put almost as impossible because of how long it would take them to do, things like remained rebuilding centrifuges by the soviet theoretical could happen. this goes to the question of what a going to get up at a report from the director-general the there are two conclusions. iran had a weapons program, iran didn't have a weapons program. in either circumstance we take

when of the edge to the first ever think it is the first. so there's nothing that is going to change the timing of relief and the timing of what goes forward because we already know the answer to it. so i don't see in reading the documents that is an explicit sanction started explicit pmd. i think the way this sequence works and what the requirements are on each part of this means that there will be annually until iran has done its part in the report itself a kind of the -- son. >> let me ask you to clarify one aspect which is when they say iran does its part with respect to the iaea investigation, that means what? as i understand and i'm reading it that means the iranians need to provide the cooperation come information, access out the iaea believes is necessary for it to

close its investigation, right? but not necessarily the time it would take for the agency which could take a long time to draw conclusions from that. is that correct, or what is your -- am i wrong on this? >> according to the roadmap iran has to provide the international atomic energy agency with information access to answer all of the concerns that the agency laid out and annexed of november 2011 report. and it needs to provide that information august 15. then the iaea will evaluate that information, and by september 15, if they want to ask iran any follow-up questions, then that information can then be, that iran can have the time to follow up with that information. and ideally this process is all concluded by october 15. then by december 15 the iaea has

said it will issue its assessment about sort of the full system of iran's past pmd work. so that's according to the separate roadmap that the iaea and iran agreed upon and announced the same as the deal which was tuesday. >> thanks for the clarification. all right. other journalist with questions? yes, ma'am. thank you. >> "huffington post." this is mostly for richard. is there any concern about kind of contradiction if congress imposes new sanctions, kind of immediate after the deal? there's some efforts before the deal was reached to expand the 1996 for 10 years that i thought part of that was addressed in the nuclear agreement.

what kind of message would it send to extend sanctions under the guise it being related to terrorism or human rights violations? >> i would say there's always the risk of mixed messages and i think there's a risk that acting to some degree precipitously with respect to imposing new sanctions is a real problem. that said let's be clear that the iranians are not occurring anywhere in this that they will not engage in things to look like to ask terrorism are violations of human rights or other actions that we have problems with. they are not changing the fundamental behaviors either. what i think will have to happen frankly is navigating a tension between the iranians doing that acts in the region without pursuing nuclear related backpacks that give us cause to walk away from the deal. addressing iranian backpacks including the use of sanctions by not doing so to such a degree that a renewed site forget it, going to get our nuclear weapons

program back in effective because we think that the deal is coming unhinged end the backdoor. i think attacks, interest, tried to do with us a couple of different ways the parties agree not to do things that are at variance with the purposes of the jcpoa, but the parties agreed not to try backdoor things through regulation, that were listed as part of the deal. so i think there's a tension. i think it would be better to let the deal government itself and get started before anybody on any site starts trying to rock the boat. but ultimately the true test would is a deal with the can we keep it going, can we keep this arms-control arrangement in this nonproliferation arrangement together, now a sense of act with all these other problems? we were able to do so with the soviet union, have been able to does with the npt in a broader sense. i think we can do that but i think we all have to be careful about what we do. >> other questions please. why do don't we go over here on

this side? >> senate foreign relations minority site. this question is mostly for you, kelsey. like you said this is not a perfect to but i'm wondering are there significant loopholes in the modern regime, in your opinion, maybe they said with regard to secret facilities our past undeclared nuclear efforts to export under no significant loopholes? >> i don't see any significant loopholes in terms of the marketing and verification. that's in part because of the flexibility granted to the international atomic energy agency under the additional protocols. and also i think it's important to remember that with this accelerated timeline of the pmd investigation, the agency can still use the information gathered to inform its future decisions about what it mantras,

what it looks for and where it goes. because when you consider sort of the entirety of iran's nuclear program with the expanded declaration and under the additional protocol, the iaea one to have much more regular access to every element of iran's nuclear program that are far expand from what it has access to now. that includes mines and mills, the centrifuge production side, the heavy water production plans for the arak reactor are all areas of the iaea has had very little access to in the past. there also was an element that we put in place called modified code 3.1 to the iaea safeguards agreement and that ensures early notification for the iaea of design changes to u.s. -- or if iran wants to build any new nuclear facilities.

so when you consider early notification, consider the expanded declaration and short notice access to all of the facilities and the declaration come when you consider the flexibility to allow the iaea inspectors to access sites is concerned arise within 24 days, then you layer on top of that the continuous monitoring, the use of these advanced technologies to check enrichment levels on a regular basis to use review fields and then you add on top of that u.s. intelligence, the intelligence of other countries, including israel, i think you have a system that is so layered and even if know one element is 100% guarantee, and a lot of elbow trip at some point because iran would need to re-create the entirety of its process in order

to covertly pursued nuclear weapons. i really think that this regime is passed off as it needs to be to provide sort of the highest guarantee that there will be no illicit activities. or if there are that they will be detected very quickly. and then the international committee will have the time to respond. >> a very good explanation. it's a reminder of one of the fundamentals of monitoring and verification that i think people lose track of the. there's no such thing as 100% certainty of compliance with an agreement. and one of the major purposes is to increase our confidence into the high 90s that we can detect a militarily significant noncompliant activity. what does that mean for the cheater quickly means the potential cheaters looking at a high 90% chance they're going to

get caught and that means that got away the benefits and the costs. so in that sense it can serve as a deterrent. especially when you factor in what the losses are. there are going to be credits were going to say this could be better here that could be better there. is maybe good criticism but as a whole, the system needs to be considered as a whole and we need to consider what monitoring and verification is designed to do. it's not 100% certainty but it is getting to the high 90s that we can catch major violations. >> i would just add, before this deal is reached, before they enter the deal was reached, james clapper, director of national intelligence said with high confidence that the trend it would be able to detect, we would be able to detect any iranian attempts to divert material for a nuclear weapon before they're able to

accumulate enough material for one bomb. so that is before all of these additional measures that are being put in place. so i think i really does speak to how much abuse could do in the past and when you add all of these other element on top of that, it provides an even stronger guarantee. spirit we have another question up front. wait for the microphone, please nancy. thank you. >> nancy gallagher from the university of maryland. one of the issues that became a public controversy into any game during negotiations but was what happened with the u.n. sanctions on ballistic missiles and conventional arms. and some people have end of exit iran kentucky kirby open something that had been settled at the very last minute, other people said no, this was an open question awful and -- all along that wasn't so. given the fact that the natanz framework wasn't a bug but both

sides said everything goes in and they had agreed not to say anything that was inconsistent with what they have actually agreed, what i would like to know was come was there actually an agreement on that issue reached as part of the framework that they're covering this country be open, or was that one of the things that was a genuinely open question at the time? >> richard, do you want to take a whack at that? >> i guess my sense would be, frankly tippy top to the negotiators themselves. i haven't been into them since december so i don't know to what degree it was agreed. i do think that there probably was a notional or provisional agreement on this point. i think the way that it erupted as a problem particularly with the russians come in as hard as they did in support of having a

position, it struck as being something that was being reopened. or if it wasn't already closed it was pretty close, people are confident is going to be closed and then it came back open. but that said, the fundamental principles of the negotiation was always that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. and so i am quite sure that the way the iranians probably both describe it to themselves and described it to the americans if, in fact, it is true to try to reopen something is that no other parts of the deal assess it as coming back at this point. in the end i come it is interesting to know the back and forth. i can look at the end results. keeping a five year embargo in place against iran when it was only adopted by the year because of nuclear related issue i think is pretty good. especially when you have accomplished reduced sanctions that will permit us to impose abortion people providing those assistance to iran going forward until whenever.

>> all right. we have a lot of questions. let's go here to the left. this gentleman. go ahead steve. >> steve with the u.s. conference of catholic bishops. i have a question only to make a brief comment first i think one of the things we have that's going to be in the discourse is hope versus fear. hope versus fear. as a person of faith, of course i'd like to speak for hope also that. i think we should not underestimate what implementation of the secret will do to transform international relationships, particularly the u.s. every relationship long-term to build trust, through verification. not just a good feeling. but my question is this. we keep talking about the date by which iran could rush to enough material for a bomb, and that's one year. it seems to me like the

assumption that into your they could could have a bomb and threatened their neighbor. they have to test it, they have to deploy it. presumably you would want to have more than one bump into going to become a nuclear power. because after you use the first one done your kind of out of luck, you know? [laughter] what is the realistic, i mean it seems to me we have a great deal of time even after that material is required before this becomes a genuine a threat to the u.s. or anyone else. >> just real quick on that. the reason the when you break a timeline has been used as a nation-state for the success of this, one of the reasons is that once a country has enough fissile material for one bomb from its very difficult to keep track of what they're doing with it. but you're exactly right that 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium does not make it clear are so make are there other steps that have to be taken a

passive fashion into a workable device. the current republican tested to make sure it works. there are some designs that don't have to be tested. it has to be made into a delivery vehicle deliver system. there's more time that would be necessary and, of course, one nuclear weapon doesn't do too much good as strategic weapon, maybe as a terror weapon. but it was clear is disagreement does block all the pathways to acquiring even that much material about iran can't do it in a less than one year. we mentioned at the plutonium route in the beginning but the plutonium path to the bomb is for all intents and purposes complete the blocked because the arak reactor will be modified with chinese assistance so it can't be producing sufficient amount of plutonium into spent fuel. this is very strong in terms of

preventing iran from amassing even that much material. we have a lot of questions so i will try to get to a future. we will not get to all of you. why don't we go with -- let's try the back a little bit. this gentleman on your side near the middle row. thank you. [inaudible] my question is to mr. nephew. you know, one of this earlier red lights of the rings had been, made content have been sanctions, sanctions as well as sanctions against the central bank. of course, recalled european -- [inaudible] followed by the americans. but in your view what would

happen to the entities, especially -- [inaudible] but mostly the central bank how that would work out? the second question if i make -- [inaudible] >> mr. goldenberg. what did do you make of the comments that the president made yesterday about areas,. [inaudible] perhaps example of the energy mentioned -- [inaudible] what do you make of that common? >> richard and ben ilan. >> the terms of the deal basic remove the sanctions out of the most pressing of the central bank of iran and permit iran

generally speaking, have access to this was a system with respect institutions that were previously designated. this will permit the iranians to the broader financial ties international as well as access to the back of a rant but if it is located in bank accounts around the world. again, when the iaea has verified iran has done its part. >> on the question of secret i would just i would argue probably series is not we want to start in terms of cooperation with iranians. it's probably very wary of the most tension if of the most attention if of the most tension if it touches were overcome 35 years of the taboo of not talking to each other. this isn't very where our interests are still pretty fundamentally opposed unless there's a reject bush on iran's part of want to try political solution where assad, what is an exception away from a site. i can convert to go to more to the iranians essay let's talk about three to come it would reinforce from the sounds and the rest of the regions might all the worst-case assumptions about our plan to sell out eric interest and cut a deal with

iran. i would argue probably a make sense to start at issues that are less raw. and also to think about either going to first spend time pushing back in syria and building up american leveraged investment company coming to the negotiating table. at the end of the day there's only, civil wars on in three ways. one, an outside power comes in and sits down everything. number two -- [inaudible] and three, in addition to political solution that iran will have to be part of a negotiated political solution but i think first expectations on the ground, their calculus needs to change. are sunni partners calculus need to change and we need to do something to set the table for that through a policy of pushing back against iran while finding ways to measure our partners to do that.

>> i wondered from all four of your points of view with the soft spots in this thing by which i mean the opportunities for one side or the other to fail to coordinate their obligations that will lead to the kind of model that led to the unraveling of the north korea deal, for example. you violated first though you fell short first. no, you did. we, where i would likely to get in trouble in that respect? >> that's a good question. i haven't thought about it deeply sensible could but for him to look at the agreement. but why don't you ask each of you to give your take on that good question. starting made with richard. >> i think the biggest risk is that because of the regional issues and terrorism related issues, human rights were issues with to continue an active sanctions policy.

that eventually chips away at the benefits provided in the relief. when you combine that with iranians this commission management and inability to do with their economy what they could do either because of corruption or just because they scruple because oil prices remain low our investment is a plus for us, every new government says were not getting what we're supposed to get. this might be honest that they're not getting what they're supposed to get because of some interaction of other sanctions but it may be just a front to cover what is bad economic policy of the iranian part but they could make the iranians and certainly a pompous figure like ahmadinejad who knows of an ex-president government will be, they will pull out of this deal. it's a deal causing the problem. it is rouhani that is causing the problem, even though he is not a retirement. [inaudible] >> thank you. may come after the parliamentary elections as a major problem? >> i don't see it as a major

problem, but certainly from an iranian rouhani political stance it would have been better for him and his guys had he started to have a performance but i would say this. a celebratory mood into whether such as i think he's going to get a boost anyway through the parliamentary process. frankly, it would've been worse if the relief was six months already in place and they hadn't seen real money coming back into so the timing might be okay for him. >> i very much a great that's the greatest risk of the deal but i think there is an american policy solution to me. a lot of times with multiple tools to go after terrorism. some of which are the intelligence community to post them some of which are deployed by dod or treasury. oftentimes the approach is a treasure approach, not sanction something because that's the lowest risk approach. it involves lease kinetic action from the least risk of military escalation. it might be the paradoxically, given with this nuclear

agreement, defaulting to sanctions to respond to iranian terrorism might be the riskiest approach because it undermines a broader interest that we have in perpetuity the nuclear deal. so maybe dod and intelligence committee need to be thinking more come and to schools need to be used more aggressively and some of the steps we take because there's risk associate with that obviously but it's way too compartmentalized and try to separate and protect the agreement at our nonproliferation interest or other interest in the region. >> i would agree with both were richard and ilan said come and add another concern about being the party intentionally exploiting the review process and the ability then to go to the u.n. security council with the intention of not resolving the dispute but actually trying to kill the deal. deal. because essential as a party does not think of anyone other

states does not think that any ambiguity or a concern has been resolved and the joint commission, or within 30 ministerial level are either through an arbitration panel then they can go directly to the u.n. security council, and for the permanent five members from we joint resolution to start up with these things back in place. that could be deliberately used i think to prevent the agreement from moving forward. that option will remain open surpassing this administration. them when you're so do presidential candidates explicitly talking about wanting to unravel the deal, there certainly is an opening there that gives me some concerns spee-1 other crackpot. this is not so much a big threat to the implementation of the agreement but it is something that apple needs to pay attention to including the congress and the other governments involved in the negotiation, the p5+1 which is

the iaea when it additional resources to do the added work. the iaea has a rotating team of about 50 people on the iran file. they do a good job but they wanted more people need more resources and there is a zero budget growth policy affecting all u.n. agencies and such would require voluntary contributions, additional contributions from key states, the united states to give the agency the resources they need. we probably will be hearing from director-general amano in the coming weeks about now that he knows exactly what the terms are antistatic chance to look at what they need to do we'll be hearing more from him probably about what kinds of resources he thinks he needs on an annual and on an ongoing basis. ..