ues go after you with words that i am going to repeat. you were fleeced. one said. the other said you have been bamboozled. so putting aside the fact that i think that's disrespectful and insulting, that's their right to do. there are other ways to express your disagreement, but that goes to your core as a human being and your intelligence, and i think you are highly intelligent. let me ask you, and if you could answer yes or no and i know it's hard for you, secretary kerry for you to do so because we're senators and it's not our way and then i can get through the rest of my list. so my colleagues think you were fleeced and bamboozled and that means everybody was fleeced and bamboozled, everybody, almost everybody in the world. i want to ask you does the

united kingdom, our strong ally support this? >> yes. >> does australia, one of our strongest allies support this accord? >> yes. >> does germany support this accord tphao yes. >> does france support this accord? >> yes. >> does new zealand support this accord? >> i have not seen their statement. >> they are on the security council, and they voted for it. >> oh, in the vote, yes. >> either by voice support or a vote. did jordan voice its support in their vote? >> yes. >> did spain, did nigeria and lithuania? >> yes. >> you get the drift. if you were bamboozled, the world has been bamboozled. that's ridiculous and unfair and wrong. you can disagree for sure with

aspects of this agreement but i think we need to stay away from that kind of rhetoric. now, i have the agreement right here and i have read it and one thing that i was surprised as i sat down to read it i thought you know, will i be able to understand this document. it's very understandable. i want to say -- cite a couple things in here. iran reaffirms under no circumstances will iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons. that's one phrase. another one is and -- that's -- this one is number 16. iran will not engage in activities including at the rnd level that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device including uranium or plutonium and that's in this accord. so one of the things i want to do is send out a message to

iran. not to the people of iran, who i think are really good people, but to those folks there that are so dangerous, and that is you said it real clearly, and if you don't live up to it, i guarantee you the consequences will not be pretty and i think that's an important message that has to go out, because they signed it and they said it and the whole world is watching them. secretary kerry i authored the u.s. israel strategic partnership act, and president obama signed both. it means that we stand shoulder to shoulder with our closest ally and we know israel does not like this agreement. i am very glad you read those

comments of the paper. i would hope as somebody who has stood so -- i was going to say tall, but it's hard for me to say that. stood so tall for this relationship with israel. at the end of the day, i think this relationship is going to be even more strengthened. i want to get your view on that, because i know that ash carter went to israel. do you have anything to report about that meeting and how that went? >> well secretary carter went with the intention of laying out and beginning a dialogue in great detail, which he did with the defense minister of israel. they had, i think, almost a day-long meeting in which they discussed the many ways in which we are prepared to work with israel understanding the

obviously understanding the very dangerous dynamics of the region right now. and secretary carter, in fact, went up to review with them what the threat is currently from isil, daesh, and so forth. these are all things we are prepared to push back on in any number of ways, and we also believe there's the potential of a kind of new alignment in the region, and i will be going to speak speak. >> i want to press you on that, because we were reading about saudi arabia's words today in the press and i just -- i don't -- i have not had time to check it out and i wanted to ask you, do you believe the saudis are supportive now despite the fact they review iran as aversaryadversary.

>> i met with the foreign minister a few days ago and he indicated to me they were prepared to support it if certain things are going to happen. those things i believe are going to happen. i anticipate that. senator, sorry to divert but i forgot the quote and i don't want to be accused of being a person saying the choice is military or otherwise. anybody who followed the events in iran has to admit truthfully that he never believed iran would ever agree to discuss these issues let alone agree to the measures imposed on them by the world powers. the alternative would be military strikes which would plunge the region into deeper insecurity and would likely not be successful he said. so we're not alone in describing

that. this does not end the possibility of a confrontation with iran, obviously, depending on the choices they make. >> i want to say, thank wendy sherman for me personally. donald trump said something why don't you bring women into the negotiations, it would go much better. she is fantastic and wish she was here. >> she is absolutely spectacular. she did an extraordinary job. we would not be where we are without wendy and jack and an incredible team, a team, by the way, all across the government of the united states experts whose life is spent analyzing iran and analyzing nuclear prolive nation that came from the energy department and intelligence community and from

the state department elsewhere, all who worked together, and believe me they're a savvy group of people and nobody pulled any wool over their eyes. >> thank you. senator rubio. >> thank you, thank you all for being here today. secretary kerry the administration publicly stated that you expect this deal is going to be rejected by majorities in both houses of congress, and you said while winning approval of congress would be nice your goal is to basically convince enough democrats so you can override a detail so as far as the administration is concerned this is a done deal. as far as american sanctions are concerned this is a deal whose survival is not guaranteed beyond the term of the president, and i hope the next president is somebody that will remove the national security waiver and reempose the congressional sanctions passed

by congress because this deal is fundamentally flawed. i believe it weakens our national security and makes the world a more dangerous place and throughout the process by the way, this administration in my opinion repeatedly capitulated on important items and the examples are endless, and it allows what we were pressing about inspections. i understand all the disputes about the terms but clearly there was a perception created among my colleagues and both sides of the i will that we were pressing for anytime anywhere inspections, and then the snapback sanctions are also hollow. we have a complicated 24-day iran will test and exploit over and over again. they know that once the international sanctions are gone they will be impossible to snap back. quote, once the sanctions

collapse it will be impossible to reconstruct it and he bragged earlier this week that violations of the agreement would not be prosecuted. no matter what happens iran will keep the more than billions of dollars its going to receive up front as a signing bonus, and iran will be allowed to continue to develop long-range ballistic weapons for nuclear warfare. all of these promises that they are making about never pursuing a weapon and they are all revealed as lies when they are looking at making a long-range rocket to put a nuclear war head on them. and it allows the arms embargo to end. on terrorism, this deal provides possibly hundreds of billions to a regime that directly threatens the interests of the united states and our allies and

nothing holds iran to account for human rights. quite the opposite. the regime is being rewarded for its atrocious human rights record. i know you said you brought up the american hostages in every negotiation, and we thank you for that, but this deal brought no new information regarding loved ones' whereabouts. and in fact, you personally met and negotiated with an iranian official who impressed on jason's case and lied to the world and lied to the world by saying we don't jail people for their opinions. this deal does nothing for the marine corps charge who dictated a letter from the prison that said, quote, secretary kerry sits politely with the iranians and shaking hands to save them from economic meltdown, unquote as iran adds hostages and does

nothing for the pastor whose only crime was practicing his religion. the only people this deal does anything for directly are the iranian officials that want to continue to jail and execute their people and who hate israel and hope to wipe them from the has not planet and want to help assad slaughter people. secretary kerry i do not fault you for trying to strike a deal for iran, i don't. i do fault the president for striking a terrible deal with iran. i hope enough of my democratic colleagues can be persuaded to vote against this deal. the iranian regime and the world should know this deal is your deal with iran i mean yours meaning this administration and the next president is under no legal or moral obligation to live up to it.

the iranian regime and the world who know the majority of the members of this congress do not support this deal and the deal could go away on the day that president obama leaves office. in that realm, i wanted to ask about this. if you today, are a company that after this deal is signed and go into iran and build a manufacturing facility and the next president of the united states lifts the security waiver or iran violates the deal do the sanctions supply against that facility going forward? if a company goes into iran after this deal and builds a manufacturing facility of any kind, car batteries, and iran violates the deal and the sanctions kick back in, will that facility be able to continue to operate without facing sanctions? >> senator if a company acts to go in and do business with iran while the sanctions are lifting that would be permitted.

if iran violates the deal and the sanctions snap back they would be able to continue to -- >> the reason why it's important, it's important for companies anywhere in the world to know that whatever investment they make in iran they risking it, and they are betting on the hope that iran never violates the deal and they are also hoping that the next president of the united states does not reimpose u.s. congressional sanctions by which they would become a sanction entity. one more specific question about the deal. there's a document that states those that negotiated the deal are prepared to cooperate with iran on the implementation on nuclear security guidelines and best practices and 10.2 reads cooperation through training and workshops to strengthen iran's ability to protect against and respond to nuclear security threats including sabotage and physical protection systems. here is my question.

if israel decides it doesn't like this deal and it wants to sabotage an iranian nuclear program or facility, does this deal that we have just signed obligate us to help iran defend itself against israeli sabotage or the sabotage of any other country in the world? >> the -- i believe that refers to things like physical security and safeguards all of our options and those of our allies and friends will remain in place. >> well, i guess that's my point. if israel conducts an air strike against the physical facility does this deal, the way i read it, does it require us to help iran protect and respond to that threat? >> no. >> it does not? >> no. >> the purpose of that is to be able to have longer-term guarantees as we enter a world in which cyber warfare is

increasingly a concern for everybody that if you are going to have a nuclear capacity, you clearly want to be able to make sure that those are adequately protected. but i can assure you, we will coordinate in every possible way with israel with respect to israel's concern. >> if israel conducts a cyber attack against the iranian nuclear program are we obligated to help defend them? >> no, i assure you that people will be coordinating closely with israel as we do on every aspect. >> that's not how i read that. >> i don't see any way it's possible we'll be in con confluctuate with sbralisrael with what we want to do there. i listened to your long list of objections about it, but there's

no alternative that you or anyone else has proposed. >> i sure have. i have secretary kerry. >> i'm confident the next president of the united states will have enough common sense if this is being applied prop ir lyerproperly, they're not going to arbitrarily -- they might want to engage and if there's a way to strengthen or do something. i can't imagine someone arbitrarily deciding let's go back to where we are where they are free to do whatever they want, without any inspections without any restraint or insight. i don't think any president would do that. >> before you signed this deal, iran was already in violation of existing mandates and restrictions, including things they signed on to. >> and this deal brings them back into compliance. if they don't live up to it, every option we have today is on the table.

so we don't lose anything here. the way we lose is by rejecting the deal because then you have no restraints no sanctions, no insight, no inspectors, no reduction of their stockpile. if you want to conveniently forget the fact they had enough fissile material to build 10 to 12 bombs, that's the threat to israel. if you go back to that without any alternative other than what you know, most people think is going to be the alternative, which is confrontation. nobody has a plan that's articulated and reasonable as to how you're going to strengthen this do something more when the supreme leader of iran and president of iran and others think they've signed an agreement with the world. the rest of the world thinks it's a good agreement. if you think the ayatollah will come back and negotiate again with an american, that's

fantasy. you're never going to see that. we will have proven we're not trustworthy. we have 535 secretaryies of state. you can't deal with anybody. that's going to do a whole lot to people that matter in the world. that's what's at stake here. >> mr. secretary just to ensure that i have appropriately addressed the situation i want to refrain and say we have been fleeced and not make that thing that's directed at an individual. one of the way we brought them into compliance is that we have agreed to let them do what they are doing and actually agreed to let them do it on an industrialized basis. so i will have to say that's how we brought them into compliance. >> senator this is a very important point. we're not alone in this.

the bush administration proposed the exact same thing. this is not something that president obama just sort of dreamed up and thought was a good idea. june 12th 2008 president bush, through condoleezza rice, who signed the memorandum with the p5+1ed so said that in return here's what we were ready to do. recognize iran's right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. treat iran's nuclear program in the same way as any nuclear state in the npt once the peaceful nature is restored. protect financial assistance for peaceful nuclear energy, including state of the art power reactor, support for r&d and legally binding fuel guarantees. improve relations with iran and support iran in playing a constructive role in international affairs. think about that.

work with iran and others in the region on confidence-building measures and regional security. reaffirmation of the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force. cooperation on afghanistan. steps toward normalization of trade. civilian projects civil aviation cooperation. assistance in iran's social and economic development. all of that was offered by president george w. bush june 12th 2008 but didn't happen because iran was not -- >> the one element that you left out that they did not agree to was -- >> enriching. >> allowing them to enrich. senator menendez? >> thank you mr. chairman. let me start off by saying that i appreciate the enormous work and arduous quest that you have been in pursuit of. and i think that no one would

want to be applauding you more than i who has been following iran since my days in the house international committee nearly 20 years ago. as one of the authors of the sanctions regime that are recognized to bring iran to the negotiating table. however, i am concerned that the deal enshrines for iran and in fact commits the international community over time to assisting iran in developing an industrial scale nuclear power program complete with enrich. while i understand the program will be subject to iran's npt, it fails to look at iran's history of deception in its nuclear program and its violations of the npt and it will in the long run make it harder to demonstrate iran's program is not being used for peaceful purpose because iran will have legitimate reasons to

have advanced centrifuges and enrichment program. we'll have to demonstrate if, in fact, that's the case, that its intention is dual use and not justified by the nuclear power program. that's a much more difficult burden. mr. secretary, you've always been skeptical about sanctions. when you were chairman of this committee in a hearing on sanctions legislation that i was authoring, when the administration was vigorously arguing against it your comment was to wendy sherman and david cohen, so what you are really saying is this is a very blunt instrument which risks adverse reaction as opposed to a calculated effort. in that hearing i remember i had to come back because i didn't expect that even the question of the amendment was going to come up. and they were there trying to

excoriate the effort. it passed 99-0 and subsequently was embraced as the reason iran has come back to the negotiating table. so let me ask under the sanctions heading paragraph 26 says, and i quote the united states administration acting consistent with the respected roles of the president and the congress will refrain from reintroducing or reimposing sanctions specified in annex to, the sanctions this committees and congress passed, that has ceased applying. so secretary lew, i read that to mean we cannot reintroduce or reimpose the existing sanctions that congress passed into law. is that right? >> senator, we have been very clear that we retain our right

and we will if we need to reimpose sanctions for reasons that are not nuclear if they live with the nuclear agreement and violate -- >> i'm talking about existing nuclear sanctions. if snap-back provisions of the sanctions are to be an effective deterrent as the administration has suggested of iranians breaking the agreement, will the administration agree to support the reauthorization of the existing sanctions that passed the senate 99-0, and which expire next year. yes or no? >> let me be clear that the sanctions that are being lifted if iran complies if they comply, we said we would not reimpose nuclear sanctions if they live with the nuclear agreement. >> my point is this. if you're going to snap back, you have to snap back to something. if you aren't snapping back -- >> senator, let me --

>> mr. secretary -- >> don't eat up my time. i'm sorry with all due respect. don't eat up my time. if the sanctions which exist that you all heralded and said brought iran to the table expire next year 2016, and we don't reauthorize it, there is nothing in that context to snap back to. so why won't you simply say that the administration supports under all the same provisions including the prltesident's waivers, the reauthorization of those sanctions so the iranians know if they violate that the snap back will also include snap back to what the congress passed. >> what i said earlier was that right now the sanctions remain in effect. we have a regime in effect. if iran complies, we will lift sanctions and it's premature to talk about extending a law -- >> this expires next year.

iran's obligations go out at least eight years before the rat ratification of the new protocol and that's only if congress lifts the sanctions. i don't understand how we have a credible belief that snap-back means something if in fact you'll not have the ability to have those sanctions in place. let me ask this to the secretary. is the president willing to make a clear and unequivocal statement, not nat all options are all the table because iran does not believe that's a credible military threat. under no circumstances will iran be permitted to acquire a nuclear weapon. secretary kerry? did you hear my question? >> i apologize. >> is president obama willing to make a clear and unequivocal statement, not that all options

are on the table because they'll say iran does not believe there's a credible military threat that iran under no circumstances will be permitted to acquire a nuclear weapon. >> absolutely. he has said that. >> he said all options are on the table. >> the president has said very clearly under no circumstances will they be allowed to get a nuclear weapon and, in fact ash carter reiterated publicly very specifically. can i just -- >> no, i'm sorry -- i have limited time. you've been with the iranians two years. i have seven minutes. >> it's worthy. >> mr. secretary i'm seriously concerned about the lifting of the arms embarringgring -- embargo that creeped its way into this. the ban on iranian missiles has been lifted. the new security council resolution is clear. iran is not prohibited from carrying out ballistic missile

work. the resolution says iran is called upon not to undertake such activity. now previously in security council resolution 1929, the council used mandatory language where it said, quote, besides that iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. why would we accept inferior language that changes the mandatory shall to a permissive call upon. we often call upon a lot of countries to do or stop certain action in the u.n. but it doesn't have the force of shall not which has consequences if you do. can you answer simply is iran banned from ballistic missile work for the next eight years? >> they are -- >> no. >> do you want to answer it

senator? >> i will. >> that is not accurate. the exact same language in the embargo is in the agreement with respect to launches. and that is under article 25 of the u.n. and that is exactly where it is today in the language. but in addition to that iran did not want it and we insisted on it. they are restrained from any sharing of missile technology, purchase of missile technology exchange of missile technology. work on missiles. they cannot do that under article 41, which is chapter 7 and mandatory. and it does have the language still. >> it seems -- i'm reading to you from the security council resolution that was adopted codifying the -- >> the security council resolution. >> and that security council resolution -- i'm reading you explicit

language. iran is called upon -- >> correct. >> -- not to undertake -- >> that's the article -- >> that's far different than shall not. >> senator, that's exactly what it is today. it's the same language as it in the embargo now. we transferred it to this and that's what it is. >> not the same language as security council resolution 1929. i don't know why you wouldn't just keep the same language which is that you shall not. because there shall not exist there are consequences if you do. mr. chairman, final question. i heard the senator -- i don't know whether that's true or not -- though whole purpose of understanding the military dimensions is not for iranians to declare culpability but to understand how far they got along in their weaponization efforts. general hayden the cia director said we have estimates, but they're just that. is it true that the iranians are

going to be able to take the sample he set because chain of custody means nothing if at the beginning what you are given is chosen and derived by the perpetrator. >> as you know senator that's a classified component of this. it's supposed to be discussed in a classified session. we're perfectly prepared to fully brief you in classified section with respect to what will happen. secretary moniz has had his team, red team that effort and he's made some additional add-ones to where we are. it's part of a confidential agreement between the iaea and iran as to how they do that. the iaea has said they are satisfied they will be able to do this in a way that does not compromise their needs and that adequately gets the answers they need. we've been briefed on it. >> my time is up. if that is true that's would be the equivalent of the fox

guarding the chicken coop. >> we're confident the iaea has the ability to be able to get the answers they need and secretary moniz may speak quickly to that. you want to say anything? >> sure. yes, as secretary kerry said, this is a road map worked out between the iaea and iran. they have -- we do not have the -- those documents that are, as is customary confidential between the country and the agency but clearly, they have -- they know that they must have and be able to articulate a process with integrity in terms of making the measurements and being able to analyze them

through their own laboratories and the network of laboratories including u.s. laboratories that do the analysis of these kinds of samples. >> let me just say burning up part of my seven minutes, you need to go down and have that meeting, and it will take about five seconds okay? you need to go down and meet with secretary moniz and get that answer. i'll also add that we as a nation don't even have a copy. senator cardin and i have asked for this. we don't even have a copy of the agreement to even understand. you'll understand this very quickly in about five seconds for the secretary, but we don't have a copy of the agreement to ascertain on behalf of the

american people whether the iaea process, which again, you should go look into this part of it, has any integrity. it's very disappointing. i know senator cardin -- >> this is a very important point. the documents in question are traditional between the country and the iaea and are kept confidential between the country, in this case iran, and iaea, but it is part of the jcpoa in regards to possible military dimensions, which are critical for us to have base line in order to deal with moving forward. so it's a very important part. and from what we can tell if we can get eyes on that document it may answer some of our questions. secretary moniz has raised questions and he's greatly respected in that regard. i think transparency could help us all better understand that. i hope in a confidential setting there would be an opportunity to

review those documents. >> we're going to move on. senator johnson, thank you. >> how can that be confidential? and why would that be classified? okay. i can see iaea having those confidential agreements with normal powers. iran is not a normal nation. largest state sponsor of terror and we rush to the united nations, had this deal approved and we don't even understand how those samples are going to be collected and the chain of custody. it's unbelievable. secretary kerry, i've heard this deal described as historic. i won't use vice president biden's full terminology but this is a big deal correct? this is a big deal? >> it's an important agreement. >> during our unfortunately limited debate on the iranian nuclear agreement, i tried to

offer a third amendment. one was to deem this a treaty. i think it's such a big deal that two-thirds of the senate should approve such an historic deal. unfortunately, that amendment failed. i never got a vote on my next step. leet deem this a congressional executive agreement where at least both chambers would have to affirmatively approve this with a simple majority vote. the third amendment i tried to offer reflected what we end up getting in this convoluted process. a congressional executive agreement with a low threshold approval of only 34 votes. the parliamentarian said that's out of order. that's very unconstitutional. yet, that's what we have. my question is if you were so confident this is such a great deal, why wouldn't you have been supportive of allowing the

american people to be involved in the decision through their elected representatives, as to whether that was by just allowing both chambers to have a simple vote of approval, rather than this convoluted process. you are quite confident you're going to win this. you've run to the united nations security council. convince me this what we're going through right now isn't just a big charade because i'm afraid that's what it is. why wasn't this administration if you are confident it's such a great deal why didn't you allow this body, this congress the ability to affirmatively vote, too prove this deal. >> it wasn't my decision. >> the administration certainly did not offer any kind of support for a more robust review process. you circumvented this congress by undermining our review process by having the security council approve this.

>> on the contrary. this is a long time honored process for several centuries of executive -- of political agreements between countries. >> this is way more than a i want to go on. secretary moniz if iran wants a peaceful nuclear program, there's no reason for them to have to enrich uranium is there? >> well i think, clearly there is uranium available on the international market. but it's also the case that's many countries support their nuclear program with enrichment. >> if they wanted a purely peaceful program there's no need to enrich uranium. in the past when south africa and libya gave up their nuclear programs to be welcomed into the world of nations in a more normal fashion like iran supposedly wants, they completely gave up their enrichment. they dismantled that.

that's what we demanded correct? >> i believe so certainly with southd africa. they had a weapons program that was dismantled. >> if i may add the documents the iaea in south africa in a full nuclear weapons dismantlement program, remained confidential. >> are you familiar with the emp commission's 2008 report? >> no, i am not sir. >> you're not? do you know what emp is? >> you'll have to explain it to me. >> etloerkal magnetic pulse. >> no, i'm not sir. i'm just not. i apologize. i can respond for the record if you have a question there. >> i'll send you a number of questions. the recommendations were for the department of homeland security and department of energy. we just held a hearing.

are you familiar with a dr. richard garwin. >> yes everyone is. >> he testified before our committee yesterday in combination with cia former director james woolsey about the threat of emp. and one of the reasons i called that hearing is what i believe -- nobody knows how this is going to game out. the inevitable conclusion is eventually iran will have aure in clearnuclear weapon. are you familiar that they've practiced ship launch using scud missiles? they've done that according to dr. peter vincent frey. an emp attack would be conducted by somebody like north korea or iran and conducted from a ship off our coast using a scud missile and the fact that you as the secretary of the department of energy were not even aware of

the 15 recommendations, basic recommendations. things like evaluating and implementing quick fixes in the threat of an emp attack. for literally $20 million to $70 million we could protect 700 critical transformers that could help us recover from something like that. i'm highly concerned. as you, secretary of energy, not even aware of these recommendations that were made public in 2008. seven years later, we have done nothing, virtually nothing to address these 15 recommendations by the commission. >> first of all, i don't know that report, and the -- clearly many of them must apply to dhs and the dod. however, on the transformer question, if you look at our quadrennial energy review published in april we identify

owe emp as a risk to transformers. >> seven years later we've done virtually nothing to protect ourselves. my point being we'll provide a number of questions on the record to take some action to provide some protection. my final comment is we've heard $50 billion to $100 billion $104 billion in our terms doesn't seem like much. but that's 13% of iran's economy. if for example the american economy had interjection of 13% of our economy that would be $2.4 trillion. this isn't chump change. we've already seen what kind of actor iran is on the world stage. i can't predict this whole thing out but what this deal does is interjects tens of billions, 13% up front of iran's economy into the economy of the largest state sponsor of terrorism.

and so when the senator said we have them right where we want them, i agree. we certainly didn't want them with centrifuges but this deal puts them in a far better position. this strengthens their hands and from that standpoint i'm highly concerned. >> can i respond to the point about the iranian assets. let's be clear what those assets are. it's not money we're giving to iran. it'su ran's money that setitscountries that were locked up to bring them to the table for a nuclear agreement. we've gone through analyzing what that is. that's not us giving them money. if there's a nuclear agreement that meets the criteria the sanctions were designed to achieve, that was the season they were locked up. there are competing demands for that, whatever it is. we think it's about $50 billion. there's at least $500 billion of

domestic demand. they can't possibly scratch the surface of that need. we've never said there isn't going to be a penny going to maligned services. they've managed to find money to put into maligned purposes. i would not exaggerate how much that's going to change things. the assessment that we have that our intelligence community has is that it will not be a change in direction. it will be on the margin not the kind of increase you're describing. >> by the way -- >> before moving to senator shaheen, while we haven't lifted our sanctions on the irgc which has the nuclear file and is the entity that carries out all of the terrorism on behalf of iran what we uniquely did was we lifted saunkss on all the financial institutions they deal with. they'll be the number one beneficiary of the sanctions

lifting. we didn't lift sanctions on them. it's looikike not lifting sanctions on a holding company but on the entityies that feed them the money. through economic growth and shipment of money and all the things they do will empower them. this is almost chump change compared to what will happen over the next decade. senator shaheen? >> could i just respond? we are not lifting sanctions on a bank that was sanctioned for reasons related to terrorism. we've retained the ability -- >> but many other banking entities and others they rely upon have. >> if they violate the terms of our sanctions and regime for sanctions on terrorism could be sanctioned. we have not said that any of those institutions are protected. and in terms of the step back, the point senator menendez concluded is not correct. we have enormous tools to snap back sanctions through the ndaa

sanctions on oil and financial sanctions. >> i would just like to move to senator shaheen by saying they disagree with that. great britain disagrees, germany disagrees, france disagrees. the eu disagrees. the tools that we have through the nuclear file are not available to be applied. senator menendez tried to pursue that. most of the most accurate assessment of this deal from what i've been able to read has been coming from oohiran. >> if iran violates it could come back on nuclear and if they violate sankss we have the ability to sanction on other grounds. it's not a fair conclusion that institutions that's continue to engage in funding terrorism or regional destabilization are im immune from those kinds of sanctions. it's just not correct. >> i stand by assessment as do

the other countries who negotiated the deal with you. >> the other cannotountries -- >> senator shaheen. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and ranking member cardin. thank you to our witnesses for your testimony today and to the negotiating team for the tremendous effort that it took to get us to this point. before i ask my questions, and i do have questions. i just want to say that i don't think it's to the benefit of this committee this congress or the american people for any of us to impugn the motives or intellect of anybody involved in this discussion. i think people have strong views about how they feel, and it's appropriate to express those views, but to -- because someone disagrees with you to suggest that their motives are not in

the best interest of this country or that their intellect is questionable i think does not advance the debate in a way that it should be advanced. so, mr. chairman, i appreciate you and the ranking member and hope that we will keep this debate in a civil discussion. i also want to point out for the record that everybody voted for the nuclear review act of 2015. was unanimous. while all of us had concerns about everything, some of the provisions that were in it it was voted for by the committee unanimously. now to go to my questions, i want to -- secretary moniz follow up on the issues raised with respect to the possible military dimensions of the past iranian nuclear activities. because that's an area where i certainly am not clear about,

how we can be confident the iaea is going to be able to get the information that it needs to complete its investigation. can you speak to that a little bit and talk about why you believe that we're going to have the information that we need? >> again, senator all i can say is the iaea is very strong technically. i might add every inspector since like 1980 has been trained at los alamos national laboratory. they have a very strong reputation, which frankly, they need to guard to make sure that they have a process with integrity. it is their responsibility. there's nothing unusual here. there's no cite agreement. this is the way it works. the iaea negotiates with the country. we have achieved in the negotiation to get iran to the table with them because without

satisfying their requirements by october 15th to satisfy the agency, they will not be any agreement going forward. that's very clear. so after years of stiffing them, to be perfectly -- to use a technical term -- we've forced them to the table. they went to tehran not just the director general but the senior people who do safeguards et cetera and they came back and feel they have a process with integrity. in this environment i can only say the -- and i will say flat out, i personally have not seen those documents the chairman referred to. had something of an oral briefing, general one. with that we have assembled a national lab team to think through the kinds of process that we anticipate and to

recommend steps that might mitigate any risks. but again, ultimately, we rely upon the iaea. they will make a report. the director general has committed to trying to get that out this year this calendar year. and that report is then where one will see that what their conclusions are and what the basis for their conclusions are. >> and -- >> can i get this to you somehow? this is the iaea board of governors road map. it's a letter we've submitted with all the documents that lays out the agreement between iran and -- betweenu ran and the iaea as to what they are going to do and when and how. >> that would be helpful. could we have it introduced for the record? >> i would like that very much. >> once either before or after that report is produced will the intelligence community either hear or our other partner countries weigh in and assess

whether they believe that that report reflects an accurate discussion of iran's past activities? >> well, i would have to defer to the intelligence community for their reaction. i can assure you that our d.o.e. experts are going to be looking over this very very carefully. >> thank you. secretary lew, can you commit there will be no sanctions relieved -- i think you've said this, but to be clear again -- until iran has provided the iaea with this information and the access that's required? >> absolutely. untilu iran has completed all of its obligations we'll not be relieving any of the united states sanctions or the international sanctions. >> i don't know who wants to respond to this but at the time we began negotiations, what was the best estimate of our intelligence community about the

time for iran to break out with a nuclear weapon? >> the best estimate was two to three months. >> was there agreement among our intelligence agencies about that estimate? >> by -- yes pretty much. there was a disagreement with a couple of other countries but not disagreement inner intel community. >> and as we look at -- if this agreement goes into effect, is there an estimate from our intelligence community about how long it might take to get to a nuclear weapon at the end of this agreement if iran decides to pursue that option at the end of -- >> there's a distinction senator. the breakout time as it is used in this negotiation is a hybrid of the traditional understanding of broadcasteakout time. breakout time in arms control is the time it takes to get a weapon. we have been dealing only with

the amount of time it takes to get enough fissile material to produce one weapon. you still have to produce the weapon and most people don't guesstimate that a country is going to be satisfied with only one weapon and enough fissile material for one. there's a lot of time beyond that. we've been operating with a huge safety cushion here, and we'll have one year of broadcasteakout time for one fissile weapon for at least ten years and then it begins to tail down, but not as a cliff. it begins to tail down as we go through the next five years and thn we're arriving at a point where iran has, hopefully, achieved normal status in the npt. i say hopefully because if they haven't, the agreement hasn't worked in the sense they've violated it and we go back to snapback and have the sanctions back in place. >> can you answer whether all of

our intelligence agencies are agreed on that particular breakout period? or is there a difference of opinion? >> our intelligence community and the energy department and everybody worked this very, very hard. and it's a very precise formula which feeds in the most rapid possible rate by looking at the numbers of centrifuges. the amount of enrichment, the capacity for enrichment. all of the many factors that come into it. it's a complicated formula. and everybody is in agreement as to where we are. >> it also includes capacity to rebuild all the infrastructure they are taking out. i might just add beyond the 15 years where there are very severe constraints in terms of visibility, for 20 years there is still the containment and surveillance activities for any centrifuge sensitive parts manufacturing. they'll all be tracked, labeled,

tracked, et cetera. and for 25 years the iranian transparencey transparency. it's like follow the iranian and the centrifuges. >> thank you. my time has expired. >> the president was really clear in year 13 there's zero brack breakout and begin industrialization at -- >> i never heard that carc characterization, mr. chairman. >> i hope you'll take these questions in the spirit they are given. i've been supportive of these negotiations. i commendio all for the hard work that's been done. there's some disagreement here with the text of the agreement as we read it and the explanation that's given. let me just cover a couple of these points. number airteight, on adoption date in the annex for the

implementation plan, iran will inform the iaea that iran will apply the additional protocol pending its ratification by the parliament. the iranian parliament and will fully implement the code 3.1. we tacklked about the agreement, although it's voluntary to live by the additional protocol. what is the time table that's required for the parliament to address the additional protocol? >> they have, senator they have to live by the additional protocol for -- >> rndunderstood, but going forward -- >> they have eight years to adopt it formally. but they are in material breach as of adoption day if they do not live by it. and it is fully understood by everybody that would be a material breach. >> but there is no time table

where the parliament -- >> they have to do it within the eight years. >> that's the time table. >> which is before the sanctions are lifted. so you have the snapback capacity as a result of them not doing it or living by it. >> understood. december 2011 the president signed into law the ndaa that included sanctions on iran's central bank. these sankss penalized foreign financial institutions that were doing business with iran's central bank. these sanctions will ultimately be suspended because of the jcpoa. what i'm trying to understand, and this keys off a question asked by senator cardin and others, we -- according to the agreement, the u.s. administration acting consistent with the respective roles of the president and congress will refrain from reintroducing the

imposinge inginge inging saunkse inging sanctions in annex two. this is what a lot of us are having trouble reconciling here. what would constitute reintroduce, reimposing sanctions specified existing sanctions, if because iran didn't violate the nuclear part of the agreement but, for other reasons, committed edted terrorism abroad abducted citizens. could we impose sanksctions on iran's central bank because that would mimic or be similar to what was done before but in a different context. would that be allowed or would that lead to some violation on our part of the agreement? secretary lew. >> i'm going to take a stab at this because we've been going around on it and i want to, if i

can, answer it. first of all, we will not violate the jcpoa if we use our authorities to impose sanctions on iran for terrorism, human rights missiles or any other non-nuclear reason. and the jcpoa does not provide iran any relief from the u.s. sanctions rnd any of those authorities or other authorities. and i'll go through some of those other authorities. what we have committed to do is quite specific. iran was fearful that having witnessed the hot desire in congress for more sanksctions, that even if we cut an agreement you folks might just turn around the day after and say, too bad. we're coming back with all the sanctions and then the president is in veto status or over ride

status. we're not going to reimpose the specific nuclear related sanction provisions as specified in annex two to the jcpoa contingent on them abiding by the commitments of the agreement. so it's really simply a clarification to them that we're not going to come back and just slap a bun again. that doesn't mean we're precluded from sanctioning iranian actors sectors or any actions if circumstances warrant. so all of our other sanctions remain in place. and iran only said if you read what it says that they would treat the imposition of nuclear-related sanctions as the grounds to cease performing. but they are clear, and we are clear that we have all other kinds of authorities.

it's specific for this whole debate to be clear. even with the lifting of sanctions after eight years of missiles or the u.n. sanctions it's only the u.n. sanctions. we still have sanctions. our primary embargo is still in place. we are still sanctioning them. and for those things that we want to deal with in terms of their behavior. hezbollah. there is a u.n. resolution 1701 that prevents the transfer of any weapons to hezbollah. that will continue and what we need to do is make sure we're enforcing it. >> i think we've got that. i want to make sure if we say, all right what was effective on iran. what's brought them to the table are these sanctions on the central bank because it's more difficult for rshussia, china and other actors to help them evade

these sanksctions. if we impose sanctions on their central bank that that won't be a material breach of the accord. >> it will not. >> one other question on a broader topic. assuming this goes into effect we're going to desperately need a regional security framework that you have touched on and some discussions are already going on. i would just encourage you that i understand the problem with 535 secretaries of state. can't have that. but i'd encourage you to reach out to the relative committees as the fromwork is put in place to make sure it can endure longer than just the first couple of years of the agreement. to have the international fortitude to move ahead, it's best to have congress involved. and there's -- there are many points between 535 secretaries of state and proper consultation

with the relevant committees, at least, of jurisdiction here. >> i couldn't concur more. i think you're dead on. we agree. and, by the way i think in the course of this negotiation prior to the passage of the requirement for the 60 days which we understand, and joined in with working with the chairman, and we're grateful to the chairman for the cooperation on that. but there were a huge number of briefings and hearings and telephone calls n meetings and so forth literally in the hundreds. i couldn't agree more about this new arrangement. we're tacking about arms transfers, special operations training, about counterterrorism counterin counterinsurgency. we have a need to build capacity in many of those countries. the gulf states spend about $130

billion a year on their defense. iran spends $15 billion. yet you see a disparity in terms of what's happening in that region. that has to be addressed, and that's the purpose of our initiative. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you senator. i appreciate you joining in about an hour and a half before that vote on our agreement. senator udall. >> let me echo what everyone said. i appreciate the negotiators and the team and especially give a shoutdout to wendy sherman. i'd also like to recognize our colleague senator angus king who has been sitting here from the beginning. back in their office or here to stay involved in this designation. this is a very important deal, one based on verification and

sound science. those two areas are what i'd like to focus on today. the national labs in tennessee new mexico and california have played an important role, and i think it's important we do the best job we can to explain to the american people why this meets the scientific rigors for preventing iran from developing a bomb. secretary moniz, can you say what the half life of uranium and plutonium are and what this means about how long we can detect its signature in nature and why that's important. >> you are creating the need for a 50-minute lecture. the half life of uranium is roughly the age of the earth 5 billion years. and that's why we still have it in the ground,ranium 235 is a

factor of maybe ten less which is why it's a major isotope now. plutonium is much shorter. 20,000 years probably. which is why we don't have any of it naturally and have to make it in reactors. >> iran cannot create a facility or enrich uranium or plutonium out of the thin air. the laws of physics are clear. energy and math must be conserved and through the iaea we'll bible to detect illicit use due to extensive monitoring. do both of you believe that's correct? >> yes. >> yes. >> and with regard to the 24-day for undeclared sites. given the half life of uranium and plutonium and a parallel enrichment capability, is it possible to hide such work

within 24 days and do you believe we have the technical capabilities to determine if enrichment is being done outside the jcpoa? >> we have the historical example of 2003 of precisely that happening after six months, easily finding uranium despite efforts to disguise it. we'll have all the containment of all the sensitive parts of every machine they make. >> so people that have used the analogy in a drug crime you flush it down the toilet and it's gone and won't be able to find it, that has in fact been proven out? >> if they try that, we'll find it out. >> our experts at oak origin, los alamos lawrence livermore have given technical support throughout these negotiations. are they confident these verification measures, both

enhanced measures and those in the additional protocol will enable the iaea to detect and attempt to break out in time for the international community to react. >> the international lab scientists, they were heroic, on constant call for hours turn around in the negotiating sessions. i've alaudluded to the fact that los alamos played a huge role in the detection arena. those people have invented many of the safeguard technologies that will be employed here. >> so it sonds to me like iran could break the rules of this agreement but cannot break the rules of physics. the international community has the know-how and expertise to determine whether iran is abiding by this deal and the nonproliferation treaty but

into perpetuity under the nonproliferation treaty. would you agree with this assessment and would the panel agree if necessary the u.s. and p5+1 would have the ability to snap back sanctions and deal with the violations as appropriate in order to prevent them from acquiring a nuclear weapon? >> yes. again, we'll have much greater transparency from day one to forever than we would have without the agreement. that's a fact. and then the sanctions i'll venture the answer is yes. >> thank you. and then just finally secretary kerry, one of the keys. implementation. how are we going to do implementation. i ask in the broadest possible way, how is it going to be done? who is going to be in charge?

how are we going to make sure that we really do what needs to be done to make sure this is a success? >> we already have created an implementation office. and we have somebody managing that at this point. it's teamed up. but will be even more so as we go forward. this will be a full-time operation. it's not going to be left to a normal bureau. there will be a full-time iran agreement implementation effort with experienced and competent personnel staffing it. >> and i would just add that under that umbrella of the administration, we will have our own implementation team and there will be some major jobs. in annex one you'll see alluded to a working group of the p5+1 on theu iraq reactor redesign. we anticipate obviously playing

a leading role in that group and making sure that the new reactor does only what we have laid out. and the parameters are in the material you have. >> good. and i just -- i can't emphasize enough in terms of the national laboratories especially the two in new mexico but all of them, that they have worked on this these kinds of activities and studied nuclear issues since the creation of the atomic bomb. and that's why they are in such a position to be able to give the technical advice to make -- >> if i could just reinforce that, it's very important. this is a pitch for the national labs. this is not the capability you invent overnight. it has to be a consistent investment in our core capability. >> people like me who obviously

don't have that background, understood our limitations and there isn't any decision made in this agreement, none, where we didn't go to our teams. in fact there were days we were delayed because we had to go back to the laboratories. get the laboratories' inpult, our experts input and make a judgment as to, whether whatever judgment we made would result in what we were seeking and be sustainable. there isn't one technical decision within this agreement that hasn't been worked through the entire system in that regard. >> thank you. >> senator, i can be proud of your outstanding labs. i've visited them and they are playing a huge role in this. senator gardner. >> thank you, mr. chairman and to the secretaries today for your time and testimony. i wanted to start with the secretary lew talking about a number of individuals who will, by 2023, and companies removed

from the u.s. saunksnctions list. what can you tell about mr. fakerzadi. is it correct to describe him as the father of the iranian nuclear program? >> i'd defer to secretary moniz who is the father of the iranian nuclear program. >> that term certainly has been applied to him. >> what about mr. abassi? they blacklisted him for allegedly being an aid to fakerzadi and working onu ran's nuclear and missile programs? >> senator without commenting on each individual if you go through the names of people involved in iran's nuclear program, any step to remove sanctions that are related to the nuclear program will involve individuals and organizations that had been involved in iran's nuclear program.

>> okay. and so a german engineer gerard weiser. he supplied to the aku khan black market? >> i'm reluctant to get into individual names. >> why they are listed in there. why would you be have the same characteristic. >> which is what? >> which is they were designate the because of nuclear activities. >> and now they have their sanctions relief by 2023? >> to the extent that iran keeps its agreement, we will be relieving nuclear sanctions, if they don't keep their agreement, we won't be relieving nuclear sanctions what messages do you see to end proliferators around the world? >> i think the message is, if you violate the rules and develop nuclear weapons and we and the world take action against you, we'll have significant consequence.

but if you reach an agreement and you unwind your nuclear program, that will also have consequence. >> so, cue please provide a list or names of americans who have been released as -- from sanctions or imprisonment as a result of these negotiations? there are none. >> we're happy to follow up with you on lists you might want. >> thank you. so secretary lew again, following up on, i believe senator menendez's questions if that act were simply to be extended, the date changed to 2018 the national security waivers would still be in place by the president. is that something that congress would pass changing the date to 2016, 2018? is that acceptable under the jcpoa? >> we've gone back on that a few times. the reimposition of nuclear sanctions is if they comply with the nuclear agreement, has a

very different character than if they don't comply. right now they've agreed to take serious actions. we need to work toward the implementation of the agreement. what i was trying to say after the back and forth with senator menendez we have a host of very powerful sanctions. we have tools that are not just -- >> i heard you explain that to secretary menendez -- or senator menendez. if you don't mind, we're running out of time. if congress were to pass an extension to 2018 obviously the national security waivers under this deal would still be in place. would the president veto that legislation? >> i think this is not appropriate time to be discussing extending a law before we've even had the implementation period begin on this agreement. >> do you think that makes the snapback provisions weaker or stronger -- >> that's what i was trying to get at. i think the snap-back provisions are extremely powerful. our oil sanctions, financial

sanctions, have independent -- >> you're prepared to have a snap back without the iran sanctions in place? >> i think the snapback would be very powerful with or without it. >> secretary kerry n your testimony, you stated that u.s. sanctions related to human rights terrorism, ballistic missiles will remain in place. how do our sanctions slow down their ballistic missiles program. >> regrettably they've been pure suing things without recourse and one of our determinations is to up -- i think the president said this in the east room during his press conference the other day, for instance, they've been transferring weapons for 20 years to lebanon, to hezbollah, and there may be as many as 70,000 to 80,000 rockets. now, we all know that are a threat to israel.

we need to, all of us be engaged in a stronger effort to prevent the movement of these weapons. >> by lifting -- >> no no. >> is israel safer under this with the ballistic embargo lifted? >> absolutely no question that israel is safer -- >> with the embargo lifted, israel is sacher? >> with the -- we're not lifting -- >> i can read you -- >> well, we still have the -- see, what you're not looking at, senator, and what everybody needs to take note of it is, we have separate u.n. resolutions that apply to all those other activities, and we have separate regimes that on reply to them. the security proliferation -- >> i understand. i'm running out of time. >> i know. if you want a question without an answer -- >> with the united nations language, do you believe israel is safer eight years of the

embargo lifted -- >> no question in my mind because we have the ability to put all kinds of other sanctions in place as well as enforce existing u.n. resolutions that apply to missiles and other things. >> you mentioned an article in the washington post, how the iran deal is good for israel. do you believe prime minister netanyahu is highly critical of this deal, knows what he's talking about? >> prime minister -- look i respect and know prime minister netanyahu very well. i consider him a friend. and he and i talk regularly. we're still talking even in the midst of this disagreement because we have a lot of things to talk about. i completely understand the prime minister of a state like israel which has been under siege and existentially threatened all of its life that this is also a big challenge. i understand the expressions of concern he has voiced. we just happen to disagree about the impact of what is going to happen here.

and our ability to be able to safeguard israel going forward through the mechanisms that have been put in place. there is absolutely no question, whatsoever, indisputable, you can't argue, that taking a breakout time from two months to a year, taking a 12,000 kilogram stockpile to zero -- >> secretary so you -- you did not include him in this list -- >> i mean, you've got look at that. maybe you have -- >> you believe prime minister netanyahu knows what he's talking about? >> i slumgts -- i disagree -- >> but he knows what he's talking about. >> he knows as prime minister the fear he's expressing, absolutely. >> secretary moniz, aillialihunanan, we have talked about the agreement aiea has entered into the agreement not disclosed to the committee or the public with iran, he stated in "the new york

times," quote, a 24-day adjudicateda adjudicate indicated timeline detecting undeclared facilities and materials. is he wrong? well the 24-day thing is explicitly for undeclared territories. i expressed use of nuclear materials in those facilities. we have to know where to look. that's the traditional role of intelligence, ours and those of our allies and friends. >> thank you. >> senator murphy. >> thank you very much chairman. thank you for spending time with us here today. one comment on this issue of nonnuclear sanctions and then two questions. the iranians are worried we're going to reimpose nuclear sanctions under the cover of some other excuse. thus your discussion about the

sensitivity of when we may reauthorize the iran sanctions act. i just note that what we're talking about here is motive. whether or not we are genuine in imposing sanctions for a nonnuclear reeld activity or whether we are doing it under the cover of trying to get around the agreement. i don't think there's any way to avoid the fuzziness of that section of the agreement. but i think we all have to understand there is going to be a lack of clarity on that question, given the fact that the dispute ultimately is not going to be about the letter of the law that we pass, but about the motive that stands behind it. i think that we can certainly defend instituting new sanctions on nonnuclear activity. but there's going to be a difficulty in trying to define that motive. my question, though, is -- first

question is continuing on this subject of inspections. iranians made a commitment they're not going to engage in any research and development that quote under item 16 could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device. we've talked about the eyes on ft. natan, the eyes on the full supply chain, but there are a host of nuclear-related research activities that could kir at other research sites that don't involve material that runs through the supply chain. how dough do we have an assurance there are no r&d activities occurring given the fact there are going to be sites that we won't even be asking about, frankly, and there are research activities potentially that can happen that don't

involve that nuclear material we see in the supply chain inspections? >> well, as i said, there are a number of activities that are listed there, which are out of bounds that will not involve nuclear materials. clearly, again, almost by definition for any undeclared site, it becomes a question of intelligence acquired in one way or another. and we have obviously nationally a lot of means as do others. once we have the right pointer, then it's a question of getting in there and there can be some smoking guns, in some cases. for example, around neutron initiators that we would detect. other cases it will be more in the context of the declared activities don't kind of make sense with what we see in there. these all become additional indicators for our intelligence. but, you know i think our

intelligence people will say very straight forwardly that clearly in the end these nonnuclear activities will be more of a challenge than the nuclear materials activities over which we'll have very, very strong handle. >> i want to ask secretary lew and secretary kerry about the consequences of congress voting down this deal. i heard senator risch's frustration the frustration made by the administration there's no choice. in fact, i hear you to say the very opposite. i hear to you say this is not, in fact, a referendum on this deal. this is a choice between two set of consequences. a set of consequences that flow forward if we approve the deal and then a different set of consequences that flow forward if congress rejects this deal. so as i look at that second set of consequence we have to be fully cognizant of if the u.s. congress reject this is deal i

see it in five parts. i want to give this analysis to you and then ask you both to tell me where i'm wrong or where i might be right. first, the sanctions are going to fray initially. russians and chinese likely won't continue to sign on, and likely will in substance fall apart. iran will resume its nuclear program as it gets closer and closer to the breakout time. three, the inspections we have disappear. we go blind again. inside iran. fourth, this administration's ability to do nuclear diplomacy frankly, ends for the next year and a half. there's no legitimacy with the clear indication that congress won't support any agreements that this administration enters into. and, fifth, the potential internally this rejection of the deal will be a major victory for the hard liners, making it much less likely the moderates will win in the next election,

meaning there may not be anyone to deal with should we get back to the table in the next administration. that's a pretty severe set of consequences but this isn't ultimately a referendum. this is a choice. if you reject this deal, then you've got to be pretty apocalyptic about how badly this deal will go down if you accept those broad parameters as the alternative. tell me if this is how you read the consequences of congress rejecting this deal. >> senator, i think you've hit the nail on the head with a series of absolutely clearly acceptable consequences. i would agree with what you have said. this is not a case of no choices. there's a choice. as senator murphy said, each person can make the judgment about the consequences of their choice.

but the choice is really between the assurances we have that come with this agreement, the certainty that comes with 98% reduction of the stack pile, the certainty that comes from the limitation of 3.6% enrichment for 15 yeeshgsz you can't make a bomb with just those two items. let alone the reduction of centrifuges, the limitation on what's spinning the intrusive inspections. all that goes away. i urge colleagues who haven't done it to spend time with our intel community and ask for the analysis of the supreme leader and state of politics in iran. the supreme leader highly distrusts us. we highly distrust in return. there's nothing in agreement built on distrust. it's all a matter of verification. the supreme leader felt in the

very beginning i can't deal with the west because i can't trugs them. i tried it before and nothing happened. and then there were some small discussions that took place in afrg a number of years ago with ambassadors. nothing came out of it. i can give you -- i'm not going to go through the whole history but there's a long history of mistrust and much deeper than that, the whole context of the revolution out of which the regime comes. so, if we say no after saying in good faith, we're here to negotiate and we can come to an agreement, but we walk away from it not because we chose to but you choose to, they won't know who to deal with. we certainly aren't going to be dealt with. a lot of other people won't be dealt with. more importantly, he's not coming back. there's no way people who say, get a better deal. no way. when they believe they've given up things in good faith and made proclamations about no nuclear weapon forever and they're willing to be subject to the

ntp. the ntp is at the heart of nonproliferation centers. we have 189 nations that live by it. we would be turning away from the nbt. that's what this vote would be. basically say we don't trust the ntp. there's no way iran could come under the ntp. we're not going to do this. so the consequences are even more than what you laid out, senator. and here's what happens. i know this will happen. been around politics long enough. have a pretty good sense -- i mean, a lot of people are out there opposing this agreement before it was announced. a lot of people were opposeing it before they read it. i know what we're going to hear in the context of this. if this agreement isn't passed -- isn't agreed to doesn't meet congress's approval and the sanctions are gone and iran goes back to enriching you can hear the human cry right

now. people are going to be say, what are we going to do about it? they'll enriching. the prime minister of israel calling me up, time to bomb. what are we going to do? that's why learned people who led security establishments in israel say, that's probably the alternative here. sew when they're enriching like crazy and we've passed up diplomacy and passed up the nonproliferation treaty what is left to us to enforce this? i know there are senators here who are unable with the idea they have an enrichment program. what's your plan? knock out their entire capacity? erase their memory of how to do a fuel cycle? totally go to war? i heard somebody mention iran earlier -- iraq, that we had huge ability to know what was happening in iraq. folks, that was after we completely invaded the company. that's the only place in the

world you've had it. no country in the world has anywhere any time. so, i just ask people to be reasonable. there are more consequences than those laid out by senator murphy, but each one of the ones he laid outer are pretty consequential consequential. >> i agree with you that sanctions would fray, but i think in addition, you know we've had a lot of discussion about iran's reserves. we have to remember that those reserves are not sitting in the united states. they're sitting around the world, in countries like india and china. if this agreement falls apart, our ability to keep that money from iran will also fall apart. so, i think the concern is they get their money and there's no nuclear agreement. with radar to your comment on our ability to reimpose sanctions, i totally agree with you. if it's seen as a pretext for putting nuclear sanctions back in place then that violates the agreement. but we have reserved the ability

to put sanctions back in place on terrorism and for other reasons. >> my only point on that, there's an inherent fuzziness. >> it's a matter of interpretation, which is why people can say they have different views. this was heavily discussed in the negotiation. it's not as if this was some accidental provision. >> i think the thought process you walked through was very helpful. i do want to say congress can put in place many of the sanctions that brought iran to the table. what i think is to a degree unfair about the presentation is the secretary himself afforded himself the ability to walk away from this deal and face all of these same consequences. during the negotiations you said that no deal was better than a bad deal and many times you laid

out the percentage chances of this happening. so you yourself, you yourself had to be thinking about going down the very path senator murphy put out. but what you did by going to the u.n. security council and by laying this out in the way you are, basically even though we put mandates in place that brought them to the table, you're trying to paint this picture that takes that choice away from us. i find that to be incredibly unfair. >> mr. chairman, i can just say to you, the choice would have been the same whether or not the security council voted. it's the exact same choice. the great distinction here is that when i was ready to walk away, everybody else would have come with me because they understood the walk away was the intrans intransgence of iran.

the problem is now, they won't understand why. and we won't walk away with anyone. >> i don't want to put too much emphasis on the u.n. security council, but i'll go back to the other and say, again the way you present the options you've but congress in the place of being pariah taking that away from iran being it. and i think the way you frame it, put congress in a very unfair light. >> thank you, chairman. i'll go one step further. i'm outraged. by the administration going to the united nations before we have a chance to read the document and read these discussions in a good faith, bipartisan manner, we're showing the world we don't stand together right now. that's what this is all about. that's why we fought for the last few months in this

committee. i'm encouraged we ended up to go back to the balance of power between legislative and executive branch. i'm encouraged senator king is sitting here for three hours -- four hours almost. people are involved in this senator, mr. secretary, and i appreciate what you guys have done. this is a yeoman's job you've had. a huge task. mr. secretary you've played hurt the last few months in this thing. thank you for all your effort. i personally have tried to take a very measured approach in this, to try to understand the issues. to try understand what we were trying to achieve. i heard secretary of state say our goal is to preclude iran from ever becoming a nuclear weapon state. but i'm very troubled today. i look at this somewhat skeptical because of the -- mr. lew, secretary, i'm not sure what i said was humorous, but --

this will help daushg an end to the threat of nuclear proliferation. 19 4, president bill clinton. president obama, iran will never be permitted to develop a nuclear weapon. president clinton compliance will be sortfied. president obama, what we're going to do is set up a mechanism whereby, yes iaea inspectors can go anyplace. president clib ton, this agreement represents the first step on a road to a nuclear-free korean peninsula. president obama, this framework would cut off every pathway that iran could possibly take to develop a nuclear weapon. i'm settled because we've had bad experiences dealing with bad actors. if i look at this today i hear secretary of state -- i heard

you say something i haven't heard you say before. i want to dial into this. we're guaranteeing they won't have a nuclear weapon. i know that's our goal. but i've read every page of this document. i've seen the classified documents. i'm concerned as i read this i understand our intebt, our commitment is to never allow iran to have a nuclear weapon. my question, secretary kerry does this deal actually preclude iran from becoming a nuclear weapon state? >> senator, first of all, i really appreciate your approach to this. and i very much appreciate your comments. and i know you're taking this very, very seriously, as are our other senators. i want to speak specifically to your several concerns. first of all i believe -- spent 29 years here on this committee back in mx missile debates,

s.a.l.t. and s.t.a.r.t. and so forth. this, i believe, is one of the most extensive agreements with the most extensive access provisions and accountability standards i've seen in the time that i was here. and i mrooe we have put in place a highly distinguishable set of measures from north korea. first of all, north korea during the eight years of the clinton administration, they didn't gain one ounce of plutonium capacity. what they did is they started cheating on the heu highly enriched uranium path. the framework was put in place and the administrations were changed. new administration came in with a different attitude about how to approach them but with the discovering of the cheating on the heu, they immediately shut down the diplomatic track and north korea pulled out of the

ntp. fully pulled out of the ntp. there were no inspections. nothing else was happening. yes, they blew up several nuclear weapons and they developed their nuclear capacity. that should be a warning to everybody here. unlike north korea the north korea experience is what gave birth to the additional protocol. >> senator kerry, i apologize -- >> i just want you to know senator, the additional protocol came into existence to remedy the deaf fit of what happened with nuclear. so, the access we have here, we never had in nuclear. we have unprecedented ability to hold iran accountable. i believe through the myriad 24/7 access to their declared facilities, we'll know instantaneously if they try to move -- >> i understand. i heard you say that last night. i appreciate that. if we do we'll know.

but does in deal -- this agreement preclude iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state. the deal itself? >> i believe if the agreement is fully implemented, and obviously if iran lives by it, yes. >> thank you. secretary lew, with regard to the options, what brought iran to the negotiating table recently? what's their motive for coming to negotiate in the first place? >> senator i'm not sure i could tell you the specific thing but we look at the impact of the sanctions over the last number of years. it's crushed iran's economy. it's crushed it -- >> reduced it about 20%. >> yes. the size of the economy is down, exchange rate is terrible. inflation and unemployment rates are ohio -- >> the question i have is in the very beginning when they came to the table, we ceded to them the right to enrich, to bypass 18 countries who are good ang tors on the world stage and join an

elite group of five countries that have civil nuclear programs but don't enrich. there are nine countries that actually have nuclear weapons. five in the ntp. four out of the ntp. they obviously have civil programs. but the dlination between the countries that are good players, germany, brazil afghanistan -- i'm sorry, argentina, holland, gentleman. japan. we're putting iran into that group. what option i see to this is potentially doubling down on the sanctions that got them to the table in the first place. i'd like you to respond to that. we know it was crushing their economy. we know it was having tremendous impact on their regime. my question is is that not a viable option today? as we look at alternatives to the deal itself. >> the reason i think the sanctions have had the powerful effect is they're not just u.s. sanctions. they've been international sanctions. that requires keeping an international coalition together

to impose the kinds of tough sanctions we've had. in past debates over u.s. sanctions, we've gone back and forth with the congress saying if you do more and it keeps other countries out, then we're in the end doing less. and i think we've come to a good place on each of the rounds of discussions over sanctions to grow the coalition in the world. if this deal is rejected the other partners who have helped uts to impose those sanctions will not be of like mind. >> of $115 billion you identified. and i understand the nuances of the different categories of that cache, how much is that relative to our secondary sanctions on other countries dealing with iran compared to the eu and p5plus1. >> i'm trying to make the dlination between what are the sanctions -- what percentage of the 115 is due to u.s.

sanctions, congressional sanctions -- >> it's hard todisaggregate. we've had had for years now ongoing discussions where it's getting harder and harder to keep countries tied to the oil sanctions, for example, because it's hard on their economies. the goal of the sanctions was to get iran to the negotiating table. query, would they be willing to do it if iran came to the negotiating table and we rejected a deal that all the other countries in the have signed onto? that'sy our actions ability starts to fray. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman.

rebuilt the economy of germany after they had done two wars against the u.s. that was hard. there were objections and no votes. president kennedy, nuclear test band treaty with the soviet union, during the bay of pig they were nlgtegotiating. it was hard and there were no votes. this is a deal in my review produces a dramatically better position for about 15 years than the status quo before negotiations started. when you started the negotiations right before -- enrichment level 20% and climb, you've knocked it back to 3.67%.

a heavy water plutonium facility at iraq, they're dismantling. they were on a path where they had a huge program and it was growing for 15 years. this deal with the inspections mechanisms, et cetera, produces a dramatically better status quo for the united states, for regional allies, for the world. my questions are after your 15. secretary moniz, various provisions start to come off certain elements of the program, certain inspections began your eight, 10 15, 300 kim gram cap comes off. when you get to your 25, this is how i read the deal. the deal basically is iran commits in the first paragraph of the agreement under no circumstances will iran seek to develop, purchase or acquire nuclear weapons. they've agreed to all the ntp obligations going forward and they agreed that any income program will be completely civil in nature. they make that commitment.

the intelligence we have, the knowledge we gained through 25 years of enhanced inspections and the ongoing inspections under the ntp, especially the additional protocol. is that level of knowledge sufficient at year 25 and thereafter to detect if iran tries to violate this deal and acquire nuclear weapons? >> i think it puts us in a far better position otherwise, and i think the risks on their part would be enormous to try to break their commitment. and i think you put your finger on a very important thing, which our intelligence community would support. we should not forget the tremendous knowledge of the program, what their doing, where they're doing it, over 25 years. we will have a lot of indicators to really amplify our national

means. >> that's a good segue to the question i want to ask secretary kerry. you talked to senator murphy about them. i think those who objected to the negotiations starting in 2013. they were against that diplomatic beginning. if we could go back to that status quo, it seems the status quo was we had sanctions they were punishing iran, hurting their economy, but they were racing ahead on their nuclear program. we were hurting their economy, but the nuclear program, 19000 centrifuges and climbing, 12 tou kilograms and climbing, iraq heavy water moving ahead, if we just had lived with that status quo, it seems to me one of two things was going to happen. either they were going to eventually ka pit late. there were two othds. i'm not going to ask you to assign odds to those two things but there was significant risk. had they not start diplomacy,

they were going to get a nuclear program. you stalled that one. let me mention another alternative because it's been mentioned by members of this body. after the framework was announced on april 2, a member of this body who has been a loud and influential voice in this issue, said bombing iran to end their program would only take a few days. mr. secretary, you've been at war. do you find that to be a realistic statement? >> well, it's a -- i find it to be a factual statement in the sense it would only take a few days but i don't find it to be a realistic statement in terms of a policy because the implications of that, if you're not at the end of your rope. in other words fitz not last

resort, would be extraordinarily complicated for the united states. >> if we were to do that, that's an alternative. if we were to do that right now, would we have international support for that. >> not on your life no way. >> would we have an international legal basis for doing it? we were in israel a number of us met with israeli officials who said, they are have concluded iran is trying to get to a threshold yet iran has not yet made a decision to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons. if we were to initiate a war against iran, would they have not yet have made that decision would there be an international basis for war? >> no. furthermore, we would be proceeding without any allies, which is not a small consequence. >> let me flip it around on you. i want to talk about credible military threat. if this deal is done and if iran confirms to the entire global community in the u.n. iran confirms under no circumstances iran will seek or acquire

nuclear weapons. they pledged that to the world. then they break toward a nuclear weapon, would we be more likely to have the support of international partners if we want to take military action to stop them from doing what they pledge not to do? >> absolutely. >> would we have a greater legal basis to justify taking mill father action to stop them from doing what they have pledged not to do? >> yes. >> and would we have because of an inspections regime, plus existing intelligence, a lot more knowledge about how to target military action and increasing the threat of our military threat? >> yes. >> i don't have any other questions, mr. chairman. >> thank you. senator isaacson. >> thank you, chairman corker and senator cardin for your opening statements and thank you for the way in which you handled the beginning of this debate. i'll be brief. i'm familiar with senate hearings when they enter their fourth hour but i want to make a

couple things crystal clear on behalf of my constituents. and i speak for myself as well. secretary kerry, you said unprecedented transparency from a point of inspections and holding iran accountable. is that correct? >> with the exception of the iraq war, yes. >> do you recall the debate on the new start treaty? >> somewhat. >> we were involved in that pretty heavily -- >> that was missiles. there's a distinction between missiles and nuclear program. i know we had shorter period. that's a different deal. >> but what got the two-thirds majority that ratified the new start treaty in the senate was satisfaction to the senate that the inspection regimen was quick, decisive and united states had -- >> i understand. >> this particular agreement, the iaea is the inspector.

>> principle inspector. we are, obviously, sleuthing and all of our intelligence communities around the world would be following it but they're the principle and identified inspector. >> we pay 25% of the costs to the iaea is that correct? >> yes, it is. >> the treaty specifically says none of the inspectors can be american, is that correct? >> in this particular thing, yes, that's correct. >> those two poipts that i've raised are why people raise questions in terms of the inspections and whether they are unprecedented in their transparency. i think you really have to deal with it deeper than you have today. >> well, i'm happy to -- there are a lot of reasons not the least of which we don't have diplomatic relations with iran, which is one of the principle reasons that we can't proceed to have inspectors and so forth. the s.t.a.r.t. treaty it

specific locations identified in it, prelocations. this is for things we can't prelocate. this is for what we might suspect at some point in time or what we might have some evidence of at a point in time. every. so what the s.t.a.r.t. inspections are analogous. what's unprecedented here, senator, which we negotiated in -- i was pleased we got it, is this ability for us to be able to close out the iaea process. the reason we are all here today is that the iaea could never get it finished. they would fight. they go back and forth. the years went by. nothing closed it out. we have an aability through the joint commission to vote, go to u.n. security council and

mandate they give us access. if they haven't given us the access, they're in material breach and we get snapback of the sanctions. so there's an automaticity that doesn't agree in other. >> one second, secretary moniz. thank you for the answer pcht the second thing that concerns a lot of people and senator menendez brought it up is negotiation of the five year when the u.n. embargo on conventional arms goes away. >> correct. >> it apdz to me that that appeared late in the negotiations and was not something that was on the table originally or even thought to be talked about because this is a nuclear deal. why and when did the expiration of that embargo get into the deal? >> the discussions of the embargo actually began on almost day one of the negotiations. and they went on for two years, 2 1/2 years.

>> why in a hearing based on nuclear weapons and proceed hinting iranians get a nuclear weapon. why would that be part of the agreement to start with? >> it's a good question. let me answer it. it was solid into u.n. resolution at the last minute. frankly -- >> the arms embargo? >> arms embargo. the arms embargo specifically was last minute. >> into nuclear resolution. >> right. then susan rice helped write that or wrote a good part of it and she put it in. iranians bitterly objected to it. felt it was being rammed at them and it had no business being part of a nuclear agreement. it's conventional arms and they thought they had every world in

the right to do it. they have fundamentally ignored it for all these years. they made it clear from the get go that one of the primary red lines is they had to get all those sanctions lifted. we said, no, we're not going to lift them. we're not going to do at this -- look what you're doing in yemen hezbollah. we're not going to lift it. the problem is we had three countries out of seven that were ready to lift it all together on day one and four countries that said, no, we need tokeep it. the compromise was ultimately recognizing that we had many different ways of coming at the enforcement of activities on missiles and arms with specific resolutions from no amplz to the houthi. no arms to libya, to north korea. all these are existing resolutions we have and can enforce. we didn't think we were losing anything. in fact, we won a victory to get

the frooifive and the eight, to continue them in the context of a nuclear resolution where they believe they didn't belong in the first place. >> my time is almost up so i'm going to interrupt you. apologize for -- >> no that's fine. >> correct me on one thing. you said although the beginning it was on the table from almost the beginning? >> well, the point -- no. >> let me finish. >> their demand was on the table. we said no from the beginning. frankly, we knew this was going to come down to probably be the last issue. >> then you said quite frankly, was slid in at the end. >> at the u.n. by susan rice. when she first wrotes resolution 19-29, the arms resolution came into that at the very last minute. >> i'm sorry i'm cutting you off. the inspection and transparency of those inspections