dynamics of foreign fighters are seeing small numbers of their citizens, of the residents, going to syria, going to irremarks. at this point also going to libya and other places to join isis and isis affiliated groups. this is not the first time. it is not a new phenomenon. dates back to the early '80s at least but the numbers are the difference. if we look comparative point we're here to talk about the u.s. and european perspective. the numbers are arguably the first big difference between the two sides of the ocean. european number of foreign fighters, the problems really empireally determining numbers and finding correct numbers, peter has don't ground breaking work to determine that. extremely complicated effort, law enforcement intelligence agencies have a problem in doing that. unquestionably the number of

european foreign fighters, than number of american foreign fighters. the size of problem is completely different. european setting france, estimated 1200 individuals. germany, the u.k., in the six, 700s. even smaller countries like belgium with staggering 400 individuals. eastern european countries, kosovo, very tiny country, 3, 400 individuals. these are completely different numbers from the u.s. where the latest numbers given by the government, the fbi, talking about 200 individuals traveled or attempted to travel to syria. so, we're talking about a much, much smaller number. a lot of people have actually been intercepted. people that went and fought there, that 200 number should be further reduced. i think numbers are deceiving from another perspective, here in the u.s., there are legal

tools, more general a certain attitude from law enforcement which is significantly moring a agressive than in most european countries. a lot of very effective tactics that the fbi use, sting operation, so on, are not really used in europe. i say they skew the numbers significantly. i would probably suspect if any european law enforcement agency were to use tactics, the numbers of people arrested in every country would skyrocket, completely different. so why are the numbers so different between the europe and u.s. i don't think there is just one explanation. i think it is a combination of factors. the first one is logistical difficulties arguesably. from europe it is very easy to reach turkey and then eventually syria. some people have called it easyjet jihad from the low-cost airline. takes 100 euros. leave in the morning. many country, you don't need

passport. you need identity card and reach turkish border with syria. it is slightly more complicated and more expensive from the united states. the second reason has to do with the fact in the u.s. we do not see the recruiting networks that we see in europe. i'm not saying they are completely nonexistent in the u.s. but in europe we have significantly more established and sophisticated structures of recruiting networks that do not exist in the united states. even both internet, social media to some degree, substitute itself, recruiting networks, a lot of people argue it doesn't completely substitute face-to-face interaction. you don't join isis just with a online interaction with somebody. the vast majority of the cases you join isis and other groups you have some personal connection to somebody who has connections there. the third reason, which is more

of a macrolevel, has to do with very different levels of radicalization, between european and american muslim communities. i do not want to overstate the problem in europe. i think periodically when we see analysis, for example, in the post-"charlie hebdo" environment i think some of the analysis of the social situation of the integration of muslim communities and radicalization of segments of it were exaggerated but unquestionably there are problems of radicalization in europe that are significantly higher than in the united states. we do not see in the united states the groups like sharia four, all these groups that have been instrumental in european setting in radicalizing and mobilizing a lot of people for syria. we barely see them in the united states or we actually do not see them in many cases. so the numbers are the first big

difference between the u.s. and europe. i would argue that there are a lot of differences also in terms of dynamics between the two sides of the ocean. in europe, i'm simplifying things a lot and generalizing i think we see a lot of clusters and a lot of peer-to-peer radicalization and mobilization. as i said the online propaganda, social media, has a huge role to play here but the personal relations that people have are unquestionable. people who radicalize and eventually leave for syria and iraq. if you look at maps where individuals who go to syria and iraq from different european countries come from, you will see they are not evenly divided in any country but they come from certain towns, certain cities and actually certain neighborhoods in both cities and generally bears a human factor there, there is a connection.

there are two or three guys that go first. then they call friends, cousins, classmates. they talk to them through social media. social media is the conduit, the means which they reach out to people back home but it is that personal connection that predates the contact on social media. that is a different dynamic many cases from the united states where you see more scattered individuals here and there. less clusters and greater role of the internet but again i think in the united states we should be a little bit more nuanced. there is a spectrum. on one hand we do see quite a few cases of individuals that have no physical connection whatsoever to isis. they radicalize online. they decide to mobilize because of interactions they have online. if you read some of the very good journal list i can reporting been down in some cases in the united states, there was excellent

"new york times" article some two or three weeks ago about this girl in rural washington state. was completely groomed, that is the right term being used often, online. this is somebody with no human, no personal interaction with any cluster. we also see in the united states several cases of small clusters. not on the size what we see in europe but we see groups of people that radicalize together, mobilize together. there has been attention on this, as frank was saying that is a problem that dates back to 2006, 2007, somalis in minneapolis. we see the same sort of clusters of somalis, mobilizing for syria now. but small clusters throughout the countries have been dismantled. bosnians centered in st. louis. recently in the last few weeks a group of young individuals in

the new york-new jersey area. some smaller group in the boston area. a group of central asians in brooklyn. so we have seen these small clusters. again nothing of the size and sophistication of the european dynamics but we have a spectrum also in the united states. it is a bit of a misconception to just see the american foreign fighters seen as scattered individuals here and there just radicalized on social media. i think that is an oversimplification. it is indeed more difficult, as i said, to travel to syria and we do not see the clusters we see in the u.s. i think that's one of the reasons that explains why in the states we have seen in comparative terms, compared to europe disprognat number

of -- disproportionate numbers of small attacks, some of them linked to isis. i'm talking about garland and shooting, attempted attack on the cartoon attack in garland, texas. but also other acts are difficult to categorize. it is difficult to find a clear jihad it footprint. i'm thinking about chattanooga. i'm thinking about the hatchet attack in new york. think about the beheading in oklahoma. very strange cases which, very difficult to categorize. clearly there is some inkling of jihad it ideology there but there are a lot of other issues having to do with mental health, personality disorders and so on. one could argue, again this is purely on the hypothetical level, that a lot of these individuals in europe would find it much easier to mobilize in the direction of syria and iraq. here for one reason or the other, they can not find that

outlet that easy and they might basically let that anger and that radicalization out in a different, in a different way. the final point, i'm going to wrap it up here, i think most interesting part here is the q&a part for sure. it is the different approach from the government's point of view on the two sides of the ocean. on both sides, particularly those on the european side there has been a strengthening of the harder part of the counterterrorism spectrum. legislations have been enhanced on both sides of the ocean but i would argue particularly in some european countries major efforts have been made. so if the europeans felt they need to catch up a bit in tightening some screws and being a bit harder on the traditional counterterrorism side of things. on the u.s. perspective where there is a legal framework that

is generally speaking much tougher than in most european countries, what has been somewhat lacking on the u.s. side is the cb side of things, counter balance side which is increasingly seen not only in europe but in the united states as crucially important and program, i apologize for the shameless pitch here. we've been focusing on this aspect. we issued a report when we launched last june about the status of counter imbalance extremeism in america. basically what we eggerred the united states lacks behind most european countries when it comes to cbe for a variety of reasons. there is a strategy, poorly implemented, disjointed, severely underfunded. and it is clear, and this is something that was said in testimony in congress by a

variety of top law enforcement officials recently, we in united states, where legislation is tougher, we can not arrest our way out of this problem. there are cases in which it is very difficult to operate with a traditional law enforcement tools which are in many cases extremely effective, don't get me wrong, but in some cases are inadequate. i'm thinking about increasing number of minors that are involved in mobilizing for isis. sometimes very difficult to use from a legal, and from aeth challenge point of view traditional law enforcement tactics with them. there is lack of evidence in many cases, i'm thinking about all the cases of returning foreign fighters. this is a european problem but also an american problem where it is sometimes very difficult to bring charges from people that come back from syria where it is clear from an intelligence point of view that person went to syria and did not go there to do sightseeing. but nonetheless bringing charges

in a court of law, obviously it is much more difficult and we have seen cases obviously where that was very difficult. one case was very interesting of this convert in california who went to fight in syria. was with isis and nusra but there was no evidence to charge him with. came back to the united states and no evidence to charge him with. he was approached through the traditional fbi sting operation and convinced to join al qaeda in pakistan. he was arrested for that. so you have the paradox of something not arrests what he did, fighting in syria but he was planning to do and going to pakistan to join to fight with al qaeda. that worked out. the system one way or the other worked but it is clear that in some cases there is a problem with evidence of returning foreign fighters and the cbe aspect is not obviously the silver bullet. it doesn't work in all cases but obviously it is something in the united states that need to be

strengthened. there is a lot of talk about it and a lot of constructive dialogue within the administration about it but probably some more tangible resources should be put to it. i will leave it at that. >> thank you, lorenzo and one of the things, peter and fernando i hope you pick up on, if not during your comments in the q&a, the returning foreign fighter phenomena is an issue. i think the public numbers approximately 40 returned to the united states. how does europe handle this since the scale and dope of numbers are much greater. can you turn some around to be defectors and part of the counter narrative? also they should be criminally prosecuted. i would be curious in how europe is addressing this and. peter over to you. >> thank you, frank and lorenzo. happy to be here. the reason we're talking about

this my team and i discovered about 2 1/2 years ago that brits were going to syria to fight there and not only were they doing that, they went there and they maintained their on line social media profiles. maintained twitter accounts, tumblr and became possible to follow them. we found exciting and interesting because they were almost like posting a diary from the battlefields. we started broadening that out. we do have a database containing 700 online social media profiles of fighters in syria and iraq. we have communicated with 100 of them and we've done field work in the border, on the border with syria. so we have a pretty good and pretty comprehensive idea of this population and what i'm saying now is, you know, greatly, you know, is to a large extent based on what we have

learned from this. on the numbers first, lorenzo is absolutely right. this is a phenomenon that exceeds and surpasses everything that we have seen before and in the case of europe which represent perhaps about 20% of the overall foreign fighter population in syria and iraq, i.e., approximately, 4 to 5,000 people, what is particularly interesting is that smaller european countries are disproportionately affected. so if you look at the distribution of foreign fighters across european countries, of course the largest european countries are producing the greatest numbers but it is particularly the smaller countries that are heavily affected. countries like belgium, denmark and holland, norway, sweden. so that's worth keeping in mind. there are really three points that i want to talk about.

the first is motivation. the second is the idea of online recruitment. thirdly i want to hit on what frank was asking me to talk about in terms of how they have been -- returnees, and how they have been dealt with. first on the motivation and it is very important to make the point there is no monolithic foreign fighter at least not in western europe, at least not among the people we have looked at. there are a number of different motivations and they have changed over time. it is perfectly fair to say that the people went to syria and iraq in 2012, early 2013, were not necessarily all committed extremists. they all had a very strong sunni muslim identity. they went there because they feared that what was going on in syria was essentially a genocide of the sunni population of syria carried out by a conspiracy led by bashar al-assad, supported by

iran, supported by hezbollah. and they were being told by radical preachers on the internet being muslim means anything to you at all you now have to come and defend your brothers and sisters because america is not helping. the arabs are not helping. we are on our own and we need you now. that was the principle recruitment narrative in the early phase of the conflict and indeed, if you look at the literature on foreign fighters, you will see throughout history and throughout different idealogical movements, the defense against existential threat has always been a great mobilizer. however of course in 2013-14 the narrative shifted and that of course can be linked with the rise of the so-called islamic state and a second peak of recruitment happen ad year ago in the summer of 2014 when the

islamic state declared its caliphate and a string of literally successes which motivated people who were really interested in building the caliphate. they were thinking, it is coming now. it is real. we have to go there and be part of it and that second wave of recruits arguably was more extreme in orientation and intent than the first wave of recruits that i described before. in addition to that what we've also seen since last year, since about august, the start of the western air campaign, we have also seen a reemergence of the west versus islam narrative that had not been as dominant even a year ago when we were doing field work in border towns, meeting with fighters. you almost had to remind them that they were also hating the united states and its western allies which was an ironic experience for someone who has been interviewing these people

for 10 or 15 years. what is also right what lorenzo said, especially for europeans geographic proximity makes it easy for people to travel, however, i should also point out, and this is particularly topical considering what is happening over the last few days, it has been very easy for them to cross the border from turkey into syria. i can tell you we were doing field work there in april 2014 in border towns like kilis and every taxi driver could tell you where the foreign fighters were staying, were praying. in takia, there are three or four uniform shops. one guy asks you what group you are with. he says isis. they give you the isis uniform. this is happening almost totally in the open. it is almost inconceivable

turkish authorities were not knowing about this. it is perfectly plausible they were not wanting to crack down on this, out of fear that there may be a retaliation against them. i hope something is changing about this now but my fear is the infrastructure of these groups is so embedded within that sanctuary, it becomes very, very hard for the turks to really do something about this in a substantive way. my second point is about online recruitment. online recruitment is something that has featured very prominently. we know isis has a massive social media campaign but in our experience at least, as far as western europeans are concerned, really online recruitment assecond is not the most important one. what is new about what isis is doing on line? it is not slick videos. we had slick videos from

jihadist organizations for many, many years. also it is not beheads. we had beheadings from al qaeda in iraq 10 years ago as i'm sure you all remember. what is new that is something not directly orchestrated by isis central. it is something that is more organic and comes more from the bottom up. what is new, that is a fact that is often neglected and forgotten and not appreciated correctly is that it is possible now for wannabe fighters in places like europe to talk to actual fighters on the ground in the battle zone. that is, in our experience, and from our observation the most powerful aspect of the isis social media campaign. remember, omami. that guy from alabama who was going to somalia and joined al-shabaab. four or five years ago there was excitement among people like us because it was possible to tweet

this guy who was in somalia. he would tweet back at you. that was a complete novelty at the time. now what you now have are 600, 700, 800 mohammed amai, talking to people in paris, london, brussels every day, it is their output and not isis central's output that gets people most excited and it is easy to see way. those personal communications from isis make it personal for wannabe recruits. on one hand they create identification. imagine you are a 20-year-old muslim in a deprived suburb of paris and you know that you don't really have a lot of opportunities in french society. you look at these pictures of fighters with guns amongst the brothers being heroes in that new society. you look at these pictures and

what do you see? you see yourself. you see someone like yourself. you see someone who is now a hero in that society. who is incredibly successful and empowered and admired, yet who six months ago was someone exactly like you with no prospects in european societies with no hope and probably a life of petty crime ahead of themselves. that is incredibly powerful moment where people see these pictures and start identifying and then are able to actually communicate with these people. that is the second point. it makes it personal because it creates personal ties. we know from social movement theory that high-risk activism require as lot of personal ties. that is one of the core insights. the more risky, the more dangerous your endeavor, the more ties you have, you need to have devolved to in order to get the commitment, the loyalty and to create social obligation.

speaking to a fighter enables exactly that. if you speak to a fighter on the battlefield for a month every day, you develop a relationship, you develop trust. he makes time for you. you feel like honored by the fact that he makes so much time for you. after a month, he asks you, now you have to come over. it is completely different from watching a video where anonymous person says, i want you to come over. so these things are important about the online campaign and they explain for example, what lorenz he sew said, across europe we're seeing clusters. if it was all all about the intt that wouldn't make sense at all because the internet is everywhere. if it was all about the internet, the distribution of cases would be equal or even across countries yet in fact of course we do see a lot of recruitment from relatively small towns and that is not because of the interin. that is because you have groups

of people who knew each other, played football together, went to school together. the pattern across europe is everywhere is the same. one or two of them going over. staying in touch with the people still back home and successfully bringing over the rest. that is being replicated in portsmouth, harding, everywhere in europe, you find the same pattern. it is still about peer-to-peer networks which are of course powered by the internet but it is not the internet that radicalizes people. >> for american viewers, football would not be american football, but soccer. >> the actual football. >> i don't know too many american soccer players. >> my final point is about returnees. i think that is really important that we get this right. when i gave you the numbers at beginning i should say, you know, these are not numbers people currently on the ground

in syria and iraq. these are aggregate figures for everyone who has gone over the past 3 1/2 years. 10% of these people are dead. they have died in battle. but 25 to 40% of the numbers for each of these european countries that i talked about, 25 to 40%, depending on country, have already returned to their european home countries. so the current foreign fighter population of britain, for example, is not 700. 700 is the aggregate figure for the last 3 1/2 years. on the ground say in syria and iraq, probably on the ground is between 200 and 250. but 250 already have returned to the country. the question is of course what to do with them. in our observation, again this is informed by empirical research on this issue, there are three principle groups. i call them the three ds.

there are those who are disturbed. they are people who are not necessarily fully-eyed logically motivated but who have been brutalized and traumaized by the conflict in syria and may pose a risk to western societies even if they're not necessarily part of a terrorist network or motivated idealogically. there are the so-called dangerous. those are people coming back, established with military training, equipped with military training, international networks and perhaps the motivation to carry out attacks in the west. depending what study you believe, the percentage for that will be perhaps 10 to 25% based on precedent. the third group are the so-called disillusioned and here it is important to keep in mind what i said at the beginning. that a lot of people, especially

at beginning thought they were joining a different kind of conflict. a lot of people have become disillusioned because of how the conflict turned out. a lot of people went there long before the islamic state was established. these people right now are probably dominating amongst the people who have returned to european countries. i think for these people, there need to be options other than going to prison for 20, 30, 40 years. so i have always been, my center, my colleagues and i have always been very forthright in pushing european countries to establish reintegration programs for people who are genuinely disillusioned. who believe they made a mistake. who have not committed major crimes. it is not amnesty. it is something that can be very tough but actually allows for the reintegration of people back into their societies. so you have these three different groups. disillusioned, disturbed, and

dangerous. i think right now by far largest group is the fourth group which i call the undecided. a lot of people have returned and it is not clear at all yet what kinds of things they will do in the long term and this shouldn't surprise us. this threat and this is my final remark now, this threat will play out over a long period of time. if afghanistan in 1980s is the correct analogy, then you have to accept that this will be a threat as president obama said that will be with us for probably a generation to come. 9/11 happened in 2001 as you all know. it can be traced back to the 1980s in afghanistan yet it happened over a decade after the end of the conflict there. i think there will be stuff happening in a decade's time that goes back to what is happening right now in syria and

iraq. osama bin laden started his career in international terrorism as a foreign fighter. at the end of the afghanistan conflict he had not decided yet, i will become the international terrorist. it took him a few years to figure out. he tried to reconcile with the saudi government for a bit. he offered his services in 1990. he had not exactly figured out the gameplan for the next 10, 20 years in 1989. so i think it is the same for a lot of the foreign fighters who have now returned toe their own countries. they haven't decided what they are going to do but they're keeping their options open. the final, final remark is that the huge problem for a lot of european countries, given all of what i have said now, is precisely what lorenzo pointed out, namely capacity. a lot of these smaller european countries are completely overwhelmed by numbers about people who have gone, by the numbers of people who have come

back and they need these reintegration and cbe programs and they're among the strongest advocates because they say that a pure security response is not going to be able to do the trick because they can not build up the necessary capacity in order to deal with this. so cbe is not about being nice to terrorists. it is actually essential in order to enable the security authorities to do their job and to do it right. >> peter, thank you. a lot of food for thought there and a lot of items you raised that i think warrant some good discussion among the panel. i will save my questions because i have quite a few along those lines for afterwards. but, fernando, maybe you can take us case study, look at spain a little bit and what those implications may or may not mean more broadly for europe and for the united states and others. so, thank you. >> thank you very much indeed, frank. yes, i will say something.

i will provide some data with respect to the case of spain but also a few compliments, complimenting those that were already made by my dear colleague peter neumann. first of all thank you very much for having me here today on behalf of myself and also on behalf of the etcano royal institution where we work on these particular issues. it is just a pleasure to join you frank and peter but also today to. pleasure and opportunity to congratulate the george washington university for having you and you and you for starting this new program on extremism here.

now the year before it all started in syria, that is the year 2010, the number of muslims in the world was estimated at 1,600,000,000. you would say, -- 1.6 billion, you see here in the u.s. around, around 20 million were living in the in western europe. that means 1.25%. 1.25%. and yet, using the data provided by the previous institute early this year, so these can be easily updated but due to have a precise reference, no less than

40,000 individuals, nationals or living in western europe made the trip or tried to make the trip from their countries to syria and iraq. that means, that means on the one hand we have about 25, 20%, of europeans among all those who mobilized us, foreign terrorist fighters in syria and iraq. on the other hand, that figure means that europeans are at least 16 times overrepresented among foreign terrorist fighters with he respect to those coming from other regions in the world. so to some extent we have a

problem there in syria and iraq but a territorial problem inside of western europe, connected with accommodation of muslims in our societies. one can say, yes, it is relatively easy to reach the middle east from western europe but it is not that difficult from northern africa or other countries around in the middle east. so this percent is not the explanation of these amazing overrepresentation of europeans. something serious is happening within our societies and the phenomena of foreign terrorist fighters is just one expression. i prefer to, lorenz he sew

already knows about this, i prefer to use the term jihadist mobilization which included the phenomena of foreign terrorist fighters plus those who have been in our societies iraq and syria conflict including individuals, arrested, detained and so on and so for the. so the foreign terrorist fighters are just part of the amazing, extraordinary present phenomena of jihadist mobilization which is taking place now in western europe since 2011. now, western europe is not uniformly affected by this fa phenomenon. the biggest countries are not providing the largest contingent

of foreign terrorist fighters. now, it is true that those european countries having the largest proportion of muslims with respect to the total amount of population are those more affected. i was recently visiting bulgaria and cypress for this particular member, two european member-states where you have largest proportion of muslims with respect to the total population. you have cases, transit cases of radicalization, perhaps bulgaria and -- turkish population lives but those communities are centuries-old communities, centuries-old community. we don't have a problem with those. where is it that we have a problem? we have a problem mainly in belgium, france, germany, the netherlands, u.k. you might also

add norway, sweden. so what, i didn't mention italy. i didn't mention spain. big countries but not with large continuing gets. so what about those countries i just mentioned besides spain and italy? what is it that they have in common of interests for our analysis today? what those countries have in common and different from italy, spain, poland, you name it, is that the vast majority of muslims living in those countries are second generations. in my country, in lorenzo's country of origin, although now i have to say he comes from milan but not a fan of any of

the milan soccer teams. [laughing] once i went to see this much. he was happy about the milan loseing against fiorentino. >> [inaudible]. >> sorry. so those countries have populations. gaysally of second generations. not the case in spain. they now emerging, going to university. i'm teaching students with second generation. one or two. nothing to do with other countries. so this is a very important

issue to take into account. and if we, if we connect this fact, by the way how interesting. this association between jihad it mobilization and section generations can even be corroborated in the case of spain surprisingly. you say, spain is not among those countries more affected but, but, have a look at over 100 individuals arrested since 2012 in connections with radicalizing and recruited networks, related to the syria

iraq conflict we find that already more than half are spanish, spaniards. this is a sharp contrast with the previous period between 199and 2012 -- 1996 and 2012 where the number of individuals born in spain and convicted for jihadist terrorism offenses was less than 5%. now it is over half. you know, 77% of all of those coming from only two cities in spain where we have a sizable, a large muslim community, made out of mainly second generations, two spanish enclaves in northern africa, surrounded by moroccan territory. so this is an interesting issue. of course we are seeing now in

spain, and this is of particular interest when we compare these with the situations in other countries, we're seeing in spain, some in italy as far as i know, i recently read a previous article from lorenzo where the hypothesis seems to be that, although you have not access to the data yet on all the individuals that you will need to be more precise, that in spain we are now facing explosion of homegrown jihadist terrorism. even in the case of the madrid bombings, there was only one individual raised in spain. all the others were individuals who came to spain or and they were over 21. that was, when they were suspecting homegrown big one, the big one that we got came

from not homegrown jihadists but different type of jihad it. now, if we, if we have this in mind, this association between jihadist mobilization and second generations, and, at same time, at same time, we we look at the economic diversity of social yo economic grounds of jihadist fighters arrested in europe over the past years, they are from all sorts of socioeconomic backgrounds and if at all the differences when we use national

aggregate data, what differences tend to show are simply differences with respect to the place the muslim communities have in the national social structure and france is not the same as the united kingdom in that particular sense. not denmark is the same as the netherlands or belgium. even in the case of spain we have among all those arrest and went to syria we have university, college educated people, we have individuals who are businessmen, owned their own small business. it is not that they were marginal people excluded and came out of poverty and decided to have a better life in this new society. this is not as simple as that. and, certainly the evolution of

this phenomenon as we see in the case of spain is providing, providing important transformation, taking place, taking place in european union, western european union countries where the second generation is now emerging, is now emerging. see, for instance, between 1996 and 2012 in spain we had not a single woman convicted for jihadist terrorism offenses. now since 2013, 13.5% of all those arrested are women. in the previous period, the vast majority of individuals were arrested at a age between 25 and 39. now between 20 and 34.

more interesting perhaps, and this is peculiar if you want to compare with the case of italy, between 1996 and 2012 in spain we have only 1.5% cases of converts among all those convicted for jihad it terrorism offenses. i'm speaking about people having three -- [inaudible]. now we have, now we have 13% of converts among all of those over 100 individuals arrested in connection with radicalization and networks linked to syria and iraq. so, what all this is suggesting of this connection with project send race, this diversity, we can not explain things out of

the social position or educational level and so on but we still have a particular issue with problems or areas where second generation are pretty dominant. this is interesting to us from purely, we have, we have a generalized identity conflict affecting important segments of our second generation muslim people living in europe and it is known, immigration studies have known that how descendants, leaving technically speaking a diaspora situation can be, can be in a situation that more likely than not permits the

formation of unambiguous identities. in the cases of all the diaspora people that we might resolve these conflicts depends heavily on social norms and educational background. it is within those, within that framework a viable routes are provided to the individual, but those muslims having this identity conflict see as one possible way out the. >> hawed it offer of muslim -- jihadist offer of muslim identity. this offer coming from al qaeda, coming from the islamic state is

associated with violence and identity. it is not only, it is not only making making muslim identity an excuse live one, it is also associating violence with identity. see i'm telling you about people, when you interview them, say, well, you know, i wasn't feeling part of france. i was born there or my parents brought me to italy when i was 10 but i wasn't feeling french or italian. there are effectively tied to the country my parents came from, pakistan or, you know, one day, one day, these this man came to my circle, to my circle, i mean these are the problems, i was exposed to someone, not to a boy scout leader. i spoke to someone who told me,

no, you your nation, france is t your nation. the nation of islam. and it is not this way. the nation of islam is not, is not promoted now adays by the islamic conference or arab league not by a single state. it is promoted worldwide so the media and so on by the islamic state and al qaeda but al qaeda is asking people, just come to join us in the underground. better if you don't come, your family to become a member of an organization who is facing difficulties in the hindu kush, in the, maybe you think about coming to germany where the situation -- these are the people that, hey, come and join us. you want to fight. do so. you want to join our hospital? come to join our new society,

our new sharia-based new society. so this, we have a problem with these people. these people are in this oddball lance between two cultures and societies and your families are often, families are often the immediate circle where all of these leading people, making people vulnerable to radicalization. we speak often about prisons. we speak often about schools. we speak often about mosques. we are families, we are families where little help is provideed to these people to solve the conflict between the identity

and the cultural norms that parents, particularly the father tries to maintain within the family. and the norms outside of the house, the school, the university, with peer groups and so on. >> fernando, i hate to do this but i want to insure we have some time for q&a. >> yeah. i just, my very last point about this issue about networks, critically important one. a lot of people is now out there speaking about the social media, the lone actors. you know i'm going to give you data concerning all those individuals, arrested in spain since 2012 for involvement with radicalization and recruitment linked to syria and iraq.

93% of all of them initiated the process in the company of others and completed the process throughout a series of stages involving face-to-face interaction. it is often the case that they changed the living place to complete the process. lone actors as such are less than 10%. now something very important that lorenzo already pointed out. in six out of every 10 cases they became involved in a network where, which was activated by individuals who in the past were already jihadists, who were individuals in guantanamo who were charged coin

vicked or the police know, there was no evidence with the legislation in those days. now with the legislation we have now, for instance in those days it was not an offense to go to afghanistan to be trained by al qaeda in my country. still in some european countries this is not an offense. in my country it is now an offense to be a foreign terrorist fighter, not all european member-states. and not all the european member-states are being equally aggressive towards jihadists. in some cases, such as spain or italy, not necessarily those affected. the forces have been more aggressive in other countries. how long, for belgium to consider they have a huge problem? just look at the figures that the from interpol is offering

most recent report. and my very last point is, maybe, maybe, instead of thinking that all that much about countering isis narrative and so on, we have to, we have to think about actions that are positive, to make sure that, to facilitate muslims in europe, to understand that their identity is compatible with other identities. national identities, gender identities, what every the case. if that case we have to counter islamic estate and jihadist narrative but we have to also counter the salafist narratives. those are not allied groups but the challenge they pose to the social order of our societies of

a different kind than the violent is in my opinion equally serious. >> fernando, thank you very much. for not only a sobering figure of statistics you left with a very important point. while we have a number of statis tis i cans -- statistics, while numbers don't tell the full story they give scale and scope contextually how we describe the problem to describing solution is one i think all of our countries are still grappling with. i think you heard from all three speakers here it is not as simple as finding a single profile. i would argue that the single common denominator, to paraphrase bill clinton, ideology, stupid.

we have to look at underpinnings of the adversary's narrative. where i may be a little more hawkish, i feel we almost have to go to negative political campaigning, expose the hypocrisy of their narrative than necessarily -- i think we need to some of the solution, lorenzo, i don't want to disagree with your point, you're doing phenomenal research but the u.s. numbers are hitting a up tempo that we have not seen at any other time since 9/11. this year alone we're talking 60. 60 individuals plotting attacks on the united states or attempting to travel overseas to join up with isis or its ilk, other jihadi organizations. i think you are sieving a clear conflation of jihadis, so i think we sometimes overcomely kate matters trying to figure out group to group to group.

it matters in terms of facilitation, but again at the end of the day it is the narrative. 60 may seem small numbers. it is high numberss highest we've seen in some time. i would curious what our group here thinks in terms of prescribing solutions? how do we take this from understanding the challenge. how do we learn, for example, the u.k. done about face. they have done about 180 degrees in terms how they were addressing these issues in terms of what we refer to as countering violent extremism or count iring violent islamist extremism, however you want to refer to it? what lessons can we be gleaning from here? there is big difference enabling law enforcement and insuring that they have the tools to get the job done and they do need those tools but that is always going to be reactive, that is always going to be defensive.

what are some of the steps we can take to try to get ahead of the curve? we'll start with speaking order. we'll start with you lorenzo. go to peter and fernando. i want to discuss the salafist piece. i want to open up, at end of the day. even if a group doesn't espouse violence, some underpinning of story is same. should we be addresses those? start with you. . .

and it was this embolism in syria strategically located, not the periphery of the muslim world like somalia and so on, it's a very geopolitical peace there and not mislead there. the second aspect is the capacity building and obviously an issue in the smaller countries in belgium and the netherlands in small law enforcement agencies and sometimes nonexistent intelligence agencies. even in larger countries it's a matter of capacity when the

french government introduced a series of solutions, some of them were to some degree politically motivated quite haphazard. one was very to the point which is hiring 3000 agent to strengthen the law enforcement intelligence apparatus of what is already one of the largest counterterrorism forces in europe and western world which his friends. it's a matter of capacity building. the dynamic we see after every single attack in all western countries as the perpetrator known to law enforcement. london 2004, 2005 and almost every single effect is the person was known but they're obviously some legal issues be known as radical that doesn't warrant a criminal action and

then shouldn't in society but it's also a matter of capacity. and the tier one and tier two subject. some flavor deemed to be one of them back from yemen not a priority. manpower is what it is. therefore most judgment calls are very difficult to make. sometimes correct and sometimes incorrect and it's very unfair to put the burden on law-enforcement. i would say that is the second most important thing. i think all three of us discussed the importance of both measures even when resources are not stretched for a variety of reasons as to why we talk about rehabilitation and foreign fighters are the interventions

now being called off frame or targeted intervention. so what do you do with the 18-year-old. you can monitor. you can also use traditional law enforcement tactics that there is some introducing a subject in the equation that is the mentor to sway the person away from the radical is a shame very having embarked on. there is obviously very under defined term that everybody gives the meaning that's different from the next person but there is a part that is the counter narrative whether we are talking about a positive narrative are what we stand for or undermining the narrative i don't think it's an either/or proposition . both messages work well

together. it's a matter of undermining the positive and negative way. we all indirectly touched on the argument of what many british setting would be defined as mood music and in the u.k. we have a major shift where from 10 years ago seen as almost part of the solution from a philosophy and muslim brotherhood groups these days i seem larger part of the problem in a major shift we prevent and is largely adopt in most european countries. >> if i can ask our panel to be as brief as they can simply because they want to make sure we have time for the audience to ask questions as well. >> here is the bucket list. a lot of the measures needed are outlined in u.n. security council resolution 2178 which i

had the privilege to work on. those are mostly punitive measures which are necessary. also got information exchange. what i want to expand on a little bit is the cbe aspect. of course a lot of projects and smaller things need to be done from a reintegration can exit programs are often underfunded intervention programs, reintegration programs. every country there should be a hotline parents can call that is not answered by police. 99% of parents do not want their kids to go to syria and died but they are often not calling police because as much as they don't want their kids to die, they also don't want him to go

to prison so they do crazy things to prevent their kids from going. sometimes things that prompt them and it would be useful to have a case where people can call and get the best professional ice in order to handle the case without necessarily immediately causing a security issue. that would be one concrete thing that could be done. we need to work not necessarily creating more government led narratives. that is already existing com drop in the bucket. four times that will be for drops in the bucket. we have to think about it differently and how we can galvanize a movement that confirms the grass-roots bottom-up movement that is the islamic state. this gets me to the final two points. there are some things as important as counter narrative sarcoma it is essentially pr.

there are substantial issues underlying the phenomenon. the first issue is the islamic state for a long time seemed to be winning at one of my colleagues told me the secret of success is success. as long as the islamic state has momentum, as long as this seems to be representing some new caliphate, people will be excited about it. the past few months the islamic state has not been able to expand territory as much as last summer has had an effect on recruit them. they do influence perception by people so that's important. the other aspect hinted at by fernando is in europe the unfortunate truth is is we have not been successful in

establishing inclusive national identity in a way in which for example it is possible to be a hyphenated american and be perfectly content and happy b. part of the nation and committed to the nation yet at the same time being proud of their ethnic and religious origins and identity. we have succeeded in europe and much more needs to happen through both sides. in willingness to integrate minorities, but also the majority population and offer to be except dead which is not always the case. it is precisely that lack a feeling of longing that facilitates inclusion in jihadist movement but also to

travel abroad. >> one point you raised they just want to recognize kerry lomax who is leading families of 9/11 but also a number of documentaries that have a very significant role ironically on zarqawi himself in terms of the attack on the jordanian wedding and that is the thing we need to multiply. thank you for joining us. fernando briefly because i want to make sure we have time for questions. >> the quote from their recent issue of which is the islamic state magazine. they have the editorial saying the revival of the caliphate gave each individual muslim a

complete entity to satisfy his natural desire for belonging. they know what they have to do when thinking about people. absolutely that peter has been talking about because i've indicated i know that the families end up calling the police when they are already on their way to syria and iraq. do we have any stigma to do this before so this is a great idea in my opinion.

it should be part of a security approach that has to be adopted to the new expressions of global jihadist some and has to be complemented with cooperation. the second to in this particular mistake is a strong cooperation with france and morocco to the south and the spanish moroccan cooperation has never been so good to the point that when the moroccan authorities are going to conduct an operation and if they have -- if they think there might be a direct or indirect spanish connection, ahead of the

bridge goes to revive and join the command of the moroccan police to follow the event and to be updated from the very first moment someone is going on. not all countries within the european union complained more about the cooperation with other european member states and in cooperation with morocco if only because not only to the member states have the same legal framework and not create trouble

>> i know i'm being unfair to you but i want to make sure the one thing i want to table because it is important is i think we need to think creatively about some of these initiatives. the flipside is there is a law and order and there is a deterrent effect. deal saying don't do the crime if you can't do the time. at the end of the day we've got to think creatively but we also need to recognize that terrorist activity in the u.s. case in boston where police officer turned in his own son which must be one of the most difficult dilemmas to go through. i've got lots of hands here. please be quick and the questions. identify yourself to move a rap than into the nano lightning round. here, dare.

favoritism. we will get four or five. these identify yourself. audio mark [inaudible] >> -- i'm a retired naval intelligence officer and i'm all for effective use of military law enforcement. there's another dimension i haven't heard mentioned here and that is diplomacy, particularly diplomacy involving countries that are falsely involved in the problem. this could be generalized that turkey is almost all muslims. the turks know muslim identity is probably better than anybody

else. and like any other country including ours, they are mainly concerned with more security and self-defense. in the past week they have increased border security. but what they have in turk is any mention of of cooperation between our groups and turkish authority. >> that's a great question and we talked a lot about that in terms to expanding beyond my but i think i honestly was just they haven't hooked up with nato obligations yet but that's a great question and i would like to hear what others think. we'll do this quickly. we'll save questions until the end.

[inaudible] i would like to address my question to dr. neumann in the case of germany have had one significant attack. whether that's indicative of anything or if that is a fluke or something we should consider. >> race here and then we have a question there. >> my question is not withstanding your very accurate statement about not really needed more government led initiatives, there are still roles for government. looking at the u.s. government in particular, how can the u.s. government help a spontaneous community uprising carries the better go this far as counting.

>> one more here and then we have to wrap it up. >> thank you. ron taylor, senior fellow at the human frank center. my question i don't know if it is simple or not. nothing exists in isolation these days and that is certainly true in europe. it was a great presentation among all of you and capacity building the lead described to you at so many good solutions. double money affect the solutions? he talked about grassroots and peter your suggestion was a lot about will and grassroots. today with the situation in greece and the e.u., can you muster the will to take on something like this and can you muster the money and how is the

situation with muslims migrating from different countries across the mediterranean into the coastal states in the last couple of years picking out. how is that changing the dynamic? connect the tyranny of time required be a tirade. this is a lightning round. a bunch of questions. then to the rents out and then to fernando. i promise to get us out of here in three minutes. [laughter] >> because of that, i'm going to answer that question. ideally that would be what needs to happen. in reality it's been very clear that i don't want to exaggerate but has been somewhat ambiguous

to be allies. if you put yourself into the shoes you understand why. it's very obvious. the first consideration on his mind is the fact a lot of the infrastructure of all of these groups is inside of its territory. if he starts cracking down on all of this, there'll be consequences for turkey and he wants to protect the country understandably but this has led to a situation where in many cases we witnessed with their own eyes they have turned a blind eye to the activity of groups within their territory. if they are now closing the border more effectively and that remains to be saying, that would make a big difference. the second consideration very briefly is the islamic state is

not the only enemy. he has a second enemy which are the kurds. from his perspective that the more urgent threat than the islamic state because they claim a third of the territory. he if he is now bombing positions the best possible outcome would be for both sides because he is bombing the kurds as well as the islamic state with both sides weakened equally, which would put us back to square one. the worst possible outcome with the kurds being weak and more than the islamic state which indirectly means the islamic state is going to be strengthened by the turkish intervention. >> while history or not repeat itself this sounds similar to the saudi miscalculation in their own kingdom to address it on pakistan --

>> the role of the u.s. government and the migration issue. what can be done if the debate we've had good one of the authors of the report every and put out in 2003 in 2004 which was building muscle moderate networks which advocate the cold war strategy of the u.s. government had been building up indigenous voices against communism in a variety of countries and re-creating in a different way the narrative coming from al qaeda 10 years ago. there have been a lot of efforts made at the state department throughout the u.s. government that were mixed results. not the same enthusiasm that existed 40, 50 years ago. domestically it's even more complicated. as i said earlier pointing to

the report last june they underfunded after fear there is a lot of engagement taking place but little follow-through, little resources at the grassroots level. migration is humongous issues particularly the southern european countries with almost 2000 people on a daily basis from libya with problems from a financial point of view and the ability to check the back of the people. one of the alleged perpetrators was arrested and came illegally through ships. it is a major issue and there is a gap in the resources in the european level with the burton left to the southern european

countries, to the border countries and germany and u.k. and that's a big internal e.u. picture. >> you have the last word. >> very quickly or at least i'll try. the cooperation with turkey has been affect to buy the calculation towards the sod regime. only when they are no longer there, they have this amazing nebulous object bodies and philosophy group when they change their mind a little bit. turkey has been since the 90s the gateway for south asia. from the 90s to join an al

qaeda camp for istanbul and 10 years ago it was fine into turkey and syria and then iraq. turkey has had an interesting project jury and tradition towards the movement that is worth remembering. istanbul with the meeting point when the fighting group laws in afghanistan and i can tell you a bit more about our report last by this time how authorities a long time before the report arrived march 10, 2004, the day

before and that report was about an individual who was part of the poppies network who was arrested by the turkish police on his way to afghanistan to al qaeda camp in the least on minor immigration laws. the families to remember not just must love enabled to the appeal of other identities. we have the same problem with veneration diaspora individuals

who solve the conflicts by joining latino gangs. we have to act emphasizing proactive interventions. but in the case of europe, families are segregated. those who come from morocco tend to live together so it is not all that difficult and not all that expensive. >> fernando, let me thank you. before we depart, please take a moment to thank our fascinating panelists. we could have gone on for many more hours. [applause] them a say in a personal note, stay tuned. you'll see more group work coming out of the rents are his team. thank you for joining us today.

>> if detroit had taken $1.5 billion in 2005, 2006 when the stock market went down to 6700 invested in index funds, dow jones industrial index, trading 18,000 almost three times what it was that not only would've tripled money, they couldn't pay the pensions in full and gotten back to the practice of giving pensioners a check at the end of the year in addition to the total they are due. it could have fixed itself that there had been some sober management going forward like any organization. if you had strong leadership, you can resolve problems but it

takes a lot of effort.

>> the u.s. senate about to sub for him to start the day. the chamber will return to the social security the social security built about the legislation forward as possible today and would require 60 votes. now live to the senate floor here on c-span2. the president pro tempore: the senate will come to order. the chaplain, dr. barry black, will lead the senate in prayer. the chaplain: let us pray. immortal, invisible, god only wise, continue to lead our lawmakers like a great shepherd. may they be watchful among the unwatchful and awake among those who sleep. give them the wisdom to speak

and act with such pure minds that joy will follow them like gentle winds. lord, guide their consciences so tha our senators may faithfully serve our nation and uphold your values and truth. as we near the august break, may our lawmakers appreciate that substantive things have been accomplished, but much remains to be done. thank you that the illumination of your wisdom enables us to more clearly see your truth. we pray in your sacred name.

amen. the president pro tempore: pleae join me in reciting the pledge f allegiance to our flag. i pledge allegiance to the flag of the united states of america and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under god, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

mr. mcconnell: mr. president? the presiding officer: the majority leader is recognized. mr. mcconnell: as the administration's agreement with iran comes under greater scrutiny, there's growing bipartisan concern. it's widespread and it's well-founded. the leading house democrat on the foreign affairs committee recently said the deal troubled him because it doesn't prevent iran from having a nuclear weapon. it just postpones it.

yet another house democrat said the deal lacks sufficient safeguards and could lead to a dangerous regional weapons race. she warned that the agreement would leave the international community with limited options to prevent iran's nuclear breakout. these are strong words, and they're from congressional democrats otherwise supportive of the president. it's clear that deal is making members of both parties uneasy, and with good reason. america's role in the world, its commitment to global allies, and the kind of future we leave our children are all tied up in this issue. that's why i've called for a debate worthy of the importance of the agreement when the senate takes it up in september. i hope the president will echo this tone of seriousness in his remarks later today. i hope he'll avoid tired, obviously untrue talkingpoints about this being some choice between a bad deal and war. of course, it isn't. he knows it isn't.

he himself has said that no deal is better than a bad deal. there's also no need to insult the men who negotiated this agreement, themen who negotiated this agreement and the man who stood by his side. now is the time to aim higher. now is the time to dig deeper. what i'm asking is for president obama to join us in rising to the moment. senators and the american people are being asked to weigh the consequences of what it would mean to allow iran to become a nuclear threshold state with the power to dominate its neighbors, spread its influence, and threaten our allies. this is a serious decision to make. with serious consequences for our country. america deserves a debate worthy of it. i imagine the many democrats

with serious reservations about this deal feel the very same way. nearly every member of both parties voted to have this debate when they passed the iran nuclear agreement review act this spring. given the widespread bipartisan concern about this deal, it's clear that a serious and proper debate followed by a vote on the agreement is now just exactly what our country needs. so, mr. president, now on another matter, the cyber attack can feel like a very person a tack on your -- attack on your prief sivment a criminal with your medical records, credit cards, a stranger texts pictures of your kids. it is personally violating. it is financially crippling and can be just plain creepy. but with effective cybersecurity legislation, we can help protect america's privacy.

it seems the white house agrees, too. we're glad to see sufficient a strong statement of support yesterday for the strong, bipartisan, and transparent cybersecurity bill before the senate. the president president's spokesman said the senate should take up this bill as soon as possible and pass it so that the president's spokesman said just yesterday about the bill that's currently on the floor. it's easy to see why. this bipartisan legislation would help the public and private sectors protect america's most private and personal information by defeating cyber attacks. it contains important measures to protect individual privacy and civil liberties, as the top democrat on this issue put it. and it's been scrutinized and supported overwhelmingly 14-1 by parties -- by both parties in the intelligence committee. our colleagues said they'd be happy to consider the bill in a timely fashion -- a couple of days at the most is what the democratic leader told us, if

allowed to offer some amendments. that seemed reasonable enough to me. that's why i offered a fair proposal yesterday that would have ensured at least 10 relevant amendments to the pending -- to be pending and debated for each party. that's actually more than what democrats have been asking for, so i think everyone was a little a taken aback when they chose to block the proposal anyway. i'm still determined to find a solution. i'm asking colleagues to join me in opening debate on it today. with a little cooperation, we can pass a strong bipartisan cybersecurity bill this week. now, mr. president, on one final matter, i know my friend from texas will have some words to say about the man who's been helping him run the whip operation so effectively the last few years, and i know

senator cornyn won't mind if i share a few thoughts first. russ thomasson is preparing to bid farewell to the senate. he's one of the most approachable and good-humored staffers around here. he's also incredibly effective. this former intelligence officer has always got his ear to the ground. when he takes the pulse of the senate, it's with uncommon precision. russ loves a good nail-biter, too, and in a more open, more freewheeling and unpredictable senate, you're inevitably going to have a few of those as well. but what's important is that with russ' help, we almost seem to push through. russ has all the qualities you'd look for in a highly successful member of our leadership team: always with willing to take on the difficult but necessary tasks, unafraid to offer his candid advice, working each vote

until the gavel falls, defined by loyalty and integrity. this is someone whose judgment i value greatly. i'm glad russ' son austin got to see him in action. hayes a front-row seat as a -- he's had a front-row seat as a page here in the senate. we hope austin will be seeing more of his dad, soon. the same with his sister sasha and his wife cindy. thank you, russ, for your service to the senate. you've been an invaluable member of our teernlings and you'll be truly -- of our team, and you'll be truly missed. mr. reid: mr. president? the presiding officer: the democratic is recognized. mr. reid: the iranian -- pardon me, i got hung up on thinking about russ leaving.

mr. president, the iran accord is the result of many years of hard work by lots of people. congressional committees are conductings hearings to listen to the administration's case, and others. fofor example, this evening, inn all-senators classified briefing, at that meeting we'll hear from dr. moniz, the secretary of energy, a man eminently qualified as a scientist, m.i.t. physics professor who is really actually world-famous for his scientific prowess, and wendy sherman, one of mechanic's truly great -- america's truly great diplomats. we've yet to see the language of the legislative response to the accord that's been negotiated. i know that senator corker and senator cornyn are working on it, but it is not out yet. it is incumbent on congress to review this agreement, with a

thoughtful, level-headed process. an agreement of this magnitude deserves it. now let's hopefully remember that we all agree, now the world agrees, that a nuclear-armed iran is unacceptable, a threat to our national security. the safety of israel and the stability of the middle east. mr. president, like many senators, i'm continuing to consider this matter. i'm looking forward to the briefing tonight. it's altogether appropriate for senators to consider this deliberately and with the understanding that this is really important. and i also admire those senators on both sides who have come to the conclusion how they feel about this. a number of us have not and are looking for more information to better understand this very important time in the history of the world. mr. president, on another

matter, unless congress acts, there'll be a government shutdown on october 1. that's a short time away, less than two months. every day that passes we're another day closer to the crisis on unfunded federal government. for months we've been warning republican leaders that there's a need to find a solution to these budget problems. we've offered to meet with them. we've urged them to negotiate. the answer is always no answer. the republican leader knows he must negotiate. here's what he said yesterday -- and i quote -- "different parties control the congress and control the white house and at some point we'll negotiate the way forward." i'm sure that didn't come out exactly the way he wanted, but i think i get the picture. he believes we have two houses of congress that are different than the white house. i am quite certain that's what he meant to say. regardless, the question remains: why does the republican

leader continue to decline our invitation to sit down and craft a bipartisan solution and do it now? why does he continue to tell us no? this should not come as a surprise, however, because republicans are in the habit of governing by manufactured crisis. we've seen that in the past seven months, and their obvious distaste, some say hatred of government generally is so deep that many take pleasure in closing it. we hear that from the statements that have been made in the last few days. so that could explain why they keep fighting to not move forward on negotiations and finding excuses to simply close the government. lately it's been women's health. they're going to close government because they don't like the way that women are getting their health care. in the 1990's the republicans shut the government to force

cuts in medicare. in 2013, they shut the government to force repeal of the affordable care act. it's clear both those times were total failures. earlier this year republicans came within hours of shutting down the department of homeland security. that's the agency that's tasked with keeping our homeland safe, came within hours of closing the whole department. put there's always a new reason. some grievance from partisans at fox news, some complaints from whiners on talk party, some complaints from radicals in the tea party. it makes you wonder what will be next. will republicans again use shutdown extortion to try to repeal obamacare or attack immigrants or cut social security or privatize medicare? now, as i've just said, there's a new one. they're targeting the health of women in america.

could it be any more obvious that the republican party doesn't care about the health of women? that's obvious from the statements that have been made. the legislation before this body says that money that goes to this organization that they dislike, other agencies will take care of it. we learn in texas alone, hundreds of thousands of people simply wouldn't be able to have the care they need. yesterday jeb bush went so far as to say this, a direct quote "i'm not sure we need a half billion dollars for women's health issues." it is only one example of the legislative riders republicans are pursuing. this isn't just talk. they've actually done it in the various bills that have come out of the house and the appropriations process over here by the republicans. these partisan riders have nothing to do with funding the government and everything to do

with ideology and special interests. for example, there's a legislative rider to block implementation of the affordable care act which would deny health coverage to millions of americans. that after almost threescore different attempts to repeal obamacare. each of them turned out the same. they were defeated overwhelmingly. there's a legislative rider on behalf of big wall street to protect institutions that are too big to fail, leaving taxpayers more vulnerable to future bailouts. there's a legislative rider to undermine the president's work to address the dangers of climate change, and the dangers of climate change exist. spread across all the news today is the fact that the forest service is going to be spending 75% of their money l fighting fires in the future. and no money left for anything

other than fighting fires. there's a fire going on in california now that's 15% or 20% contained. there are 7,000 or 8,000 firefighters there trying to stop that fire from spegd even more. -- spreading even more, one of the many fires burning as we speak. there is a legislative rider in their legislation to attack immigrants by undermining president obama's recent executive actions. there's a legislative rider to block the federal communications commission from implementing its recent net neutrality order. and let's not forget what the republican leader wanted, in fact what he promised. it was just last month he told the "lech sing told herald leader" that he and the republicans would wind the interior appropriations bill with every rider you can think of. in this instance he is a man of his word. democrats disagree with these republican attacks and were going to resist them.

we believe in standing up not for billionaires and party ideologues but for everyday working families. take sequestration, for example. republicans want relief only from the pentagon. we insist on equalollar for dollar treatment for the american middle class, for jobs, for education, for health care. we insist on strengthening social security and medicare, not cutting or privatizing them and we insist on supporting women's health, not cutting it. we know republicans disagree with us about these middle-class priorities but i hope these disagreements, serious though they are won't get in the way of keeping the government operating. whatever our differences we should act responsible, not be able to shut down the government. the republicans should not take legislative hostages to get some right-wing prize that's at their grasp. mr. president, would the chair announce the business of the

day? the presiding officer: under the previous order, the leadership time is reserved. under the previous order, the senate will resume consideration of the motion to proceed to s. 754 which the clerk will report. the clerk: motion to proceed to the consideration of calendar number 28, s. 754, a bill to improve cybersecurity in the united states through enhanced sharing of information about cybersecurity threats and for other purposes. the presiding officer: under the previous order, the time until the cloture vote will be equally divided between the bill managers or their designees.

a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from california. mrs. feinstein: thank you, mr. president. i'm sorry. mr. president, it's my understanding that although the senate has been scheduled to vote at 10:30 on a cloture motion, that that time might be changed. however, i would like to make some additional remarks additional to what i said yesterday on the cybersecurity information-sharing act. i think it's fair to say that i've been very disappointed over the past couple of days that we have not moved to this bill more quickly and that we haven't reached an agreement to take up

and begin considering amendments. there's been a lot of talk about committee jurisprudence and germaneness -- about committee jurisdictions and germaneness of amendments and process issues that the american people don't care about and which, frankly, don't make anyone safer. so i want to take a few minutes to point out what we're really talking about, and here are a few facts and figures. as i said in my remarks yesterday, cyber attacks and cyber threat is getting more and more common and more and more devastating. this isn't going to stop. it's going to get worse, and it affects everyone. that's why last night the white house had a simple message, and i hope my colleagues will hear it. a white house spokesman said yesterday -- and i quote -- "cybersecurity is an important national security issue and the senate should take up this bill as soon as possible and pass

it." end quote. now here's why this is so important. last year the cybersecurity company mcafee and the center for international studies called csis estimated the annual cost for cyber crime is more than $400 billion. that's the annual cost, and could cost the united states as many as 200,000 jobs. that's not my analysis. that's the analysis of security experts. also last year the cybersecurity company semantic reported that over 348 million identities were exposed through data breaches. 348 million people had their data exposed.

poll information out this week from the financial services round table shows that 46% of americans were directly affected by cyber crime over the last year. that's almost one half of the american population. and 66% are more concerned about cyber intrusions than they were last year. now why are people so concerned? well, here's a list of the ten of the most noteworthy cyber breaches and attacks from the past year and a half. of course we all know o.p.m., june this year. office of personnel management. the announcement that roughly 22 million government employees and security clearance applicants had massive amounts of personal information stolen from o.p.m. databases.

premier bluecross in march of this year, premiera bluecross in washington state said up to 11 million customers could have been affected by a cyber breach. anthem in february of 2015, anthem, one of the nation's largest health insurers, said that hackers breached a database that contained as many as 80 million records of current and former customers. sony pictures entertainment in november of last year north korean hackers broke into sony pictures entertainment and not only stole vast amounts of sensitive and personal data but destroyed the company's whole internal network. defense industrial base, a 2014 senate armed services committee

investigation found over 20 instances in the previous year of chinese actors penetrating the networks of defense contractors to the military's transportation command. j.p. morgan chase, in september of last year it was reported that hackers broke in to their accounts and took account information of 76 million households and 7 million small businesses. home depot, in september of last year home depot discovered that hackers had breached their network and may have accessed up to 56 million credit cards. ebay, in may of last year it was reported that up to 233 million personal records of ebay users

were breached. now, there arepeople here that d with pepperral information. look at the breach of personal information that has taken place because we haven't been able to stop it. destructive attacks on sands casino. that's in early 1914 iran launched an attack on the sands casino in las vegas that rendered their systems inoperable according to james clapper. target in december 2013, target discovered that up to 70 million customers may have had their credit card information taken by hackers. that's just the last year and a half, mr. president. i remember before this