abroad to the public service by your local cable or satellite providers. >> saturday august 29 marks the 10th anniversary of hurricane katrina would've applied deadliest storms in u.s. history. c-span specia special coverage s by today at 10 a.m. eastern atlantic magazines conference in new orleans and all that event featuring officials, offers and leaders. tuesday night at eight see spence 2062 or, at 9:30 p.m. at 2005 housing featuring new orleans citizens describe their experiences during and after the storm spent they told to take us the children would we get good help and get the seniors to help. they loaded us up on these military trucks, then they declared the city of new orleans, a war zone and it still

didn't sink in that we were the prisoners of war spent wednesday, c-span's tour of recovery at st. bernard parish in louisiana speak you can't describe it. your whole life is gone, completely. nothing but rubble. not on your house but a whole community for all your friends, family, everybody is going. now it's going to be a year later and you still coming at them and friends, they don't see anymore that you used to see. hell of a feeling. you will never forget the rest of your life. >> followed at nine with a town hall meeting in new orleans. >> i am relying on you. i know august is state level, federal level at all difficult to i don't care. i voted for you to represent me

on the local level. i don't know where else to go. i don't know what else to do. >> thursday night startin startt eight more from the conference in new orleans with craig fugate and others. and nine bush of president obama's trip to the region as well as remarks for the recovery effort 10 years after katrina. hurricane katrina anniversary in which all this week on c-span. >> a panel discussion recently took place at the international law center in washington. ..

>> i'll introduce yonah in one moment. first, the topic of this ram, terrorism -- of this program, terrorism captives. those of you who have come to other programs of the potomac institute will know that yonah invariably says we shouldn't forget the victims of terrorism, and this is a program about victims in a way. maybe the first one we've had. one of my colleagues pointed out that, i think it's isis, the affiliate of isis this egypt has just, apparently, killed a croatian -- i think he was just working in egypt. tactics and strategy. and i think yonah mentions in this little write-up, the chap

poe, best practices. one of our colleagues who you'll hear, has written a book which i happen to have realize by sheer coincidence at this time, and he makes the point that we're not very good on strategy. and i suppose it's a real test, it seems to me n this area. what might be the strategy for dealing with this extraordinary sort of array of victims who are -- of terrorism? we've heard a lot recently about ransom negotiations, etc., and i'm imagining that we will deal with all of these things. but at this point i will turn everything over to yonah, and he will introduce the speakers and the program. thank you very much. [inaudible conversations]

>> thank you very much, don, for your great introduction, but i know more is coming. since you did not speak on, in terms of substantive issues of law related to that particular topic, i'm not going to present to you -- i'm now going to present to you some books. one is al gray, general gray, sitting next to you -- >> yes, i did this -- >> the only thing since you did say a few words, i'm going to present to you a smaller version

of general grey's wisdom right there, okay? >> great isms. >> right, exactly. secondly, i'm now going to present to you another book which just was released yesterday. this is my only copy. yours is coming on nato, because nato plays a very key role, as you know, in terms of piracy and counterterrorism strategy also related to hostages and so on. we'll go into this issue later on. what i would like to do very briefly because we have a very distinguished panel is to provide some context, perhaps a road map to what we are going to discuss today.

as moderator, i'm taking the liberty to do that. and first of all, i would like to introduce our panel. you do have the program in front of you, i'm sure, the program itself. and, first of all, i would like to introduce very briefly the panel. you met professor don wallace. next to him is general al gray, the 29th commandant of the united states marine corps and currently senior fellow and chairman of the board of regents of the potomac institute for policy studies. he always requests to have the last word. he can have the last word and the first word, but i'm going to leave it to him to decide when to jump into it at any rate,

we're going to have first ambassador -- retired, i will say -- ed marks. fortunately for me, i had the opportunity to meet him for many, many years when he was at the counterterrorism office of the state department and academically contributed to our work. next to him on the left, not politically -- [laughter] but at any rate, my friend and colleague, dr. wayne zaideman, a true academic scholar and former fbi attache in the middle east, etc., etc. then next to him is ifat reshef who is a minister in middle east counterterrorism affairs at the embassy of israel. and then next to him -- next to

her, i'm sorry, dr. harlan ullman, also friend and colleague going all the way back to csis and is currently a senior adviser of the atlantic council, and we're fortunate to have his wisdom in articles, basically, every week. now, i would like to acknowledge the contribution of the c-span that is recording our event and bringing the discussion to a a much wider audience in the united states and around the world. and to our cosponsors in addition to the international law institute, the potomac institute for policy studies and the university of virginia law

school cooperating with us many of this discussion. let me be very, very, very brief at this point. i will have, ultimately, something to say later, later on. first of all, what we are going to discuss today are basically two challenges that the international society is facing for many, many years. one is or change of mother nature, of course, that we know that sometimes we have no control over. but then what is of security, grave security concern is man made, i think, challenges first on the technological disasters that we see, what's happening now with these several

explosions, i think, in china injuring and killing many people, devastating. which has to do with some chemical, apparently, explosion. and the reason why i'm mentioning this is because we have to think about the future in terms of the worst is yet to come, in terms of hostage taking -- and i will come back to it in a minute. then today, of course, the report about the croatian hostage allegedly was killed by the islamic state this sinai -- in sinai. i later say because we need the evidence in terms of that particular event, but i believe that whatever the situation is,

at least the message came through loud and clear to intimidate the international community. so it's not only the hostage himself who was slaughtered and killed, but the wider audience around the world and, basically, the entire society is a potential victim of terrorism. so we have that particular situation and in addition to that, of course, we know and we're going to discuss today is the role of isis, the islamic state in this particular area. the hostages that we know that we have seen and intimidated not only the families, but the united states and their friends and allies abroad all the way from the journalists who were beheaded, the united states, the

u.k., the japanese, jordanian and so forth. so i think we would have to talk about islamic state, but also let me mention that the islamic state we have to the define hostages of kidnapping in a broader context as well that's in the strategic thinking of the isis. they are taking slaves as a major target and that particular practice not only individuals, but entire communities and ethnic, racial and religious, i think, members and so on. in terms of the hostage situation, the media recently, as you know, focused attention on the u.s. citizens who are so-called prisoners in iran.

and in the context of the nuclear deal with the iranians, the question really arose why did not the united states try to pressure iran to release the hostages and prisoners in iran? i really think that in addition to what we traditionally talk about hostages and kidnapping -- and i will come back to it this a minute -- i think we have to look also at the pirates and piracy. whether it is a criminal act or also related to some ideological and political goal as well. and piracy, again, is as old as israel itself and so is terrorism. now, this terms of the kidnapping -- in terms of the kidnapping, as we know and i'm raising this again, i think we

talk about kidnapping for ransom, for example. and the old issue relates to policies of government that we would have to deal with, whether governments have a clear policy related to paying ransom by families, for example, or institutions and so on. so we'll have to deal with that. and, of course, the old area, you cannot isolate the terrorism political, let's say -- [inaudible] from organized crime. for example, the old issue of that narco-trafficking, we see what's happening in central america, we see what's happening in mexico, in latin america and, again, latin america used to be the capital of kidnapping this the

world in the 1980s and '90s, but still we find a great deal of kidnapping in latin america as well, about 23% during the year. and then, of course, we have to look at some other regions around the world like in africa. the boko haram kidnapping, abduction of the schoolgirls that that particular challenge still continues, and it has many implications regionally and globally. now, one or two other things that i think we also discuss today. one is the so-called historical lessons, because we're dealing really with anniversary dates. for example, what kind of lessons can we learn. today, august the 13th, is the fourth anniversary of the

kidnapping or the abduction of warren weinstein, an old u.s. contractor who was kidnapped by al-qaeda in pakistan. and as you know, the united states tried to rescue him and another hostage there italy. unfortunately, they were killed. so this actually happened 2011. in other words, about four years ago. and what kind of lessons can we learn from that. and also i would like to mention that elsewhere, for example, this spain on august -- in spain on august 13, 1997, this is the 18th anniversary that a spanish politician blanco -- and we do have some people here who are expert on spain -- he was kidnapped and shot by the eta,

and i think we have to remember this as well. it's not only the americans, but there are many, many others. we will have to deal with that. so the point i'm making is that we really need a new approach, so to speak, to deal with hostages this terms of placing priority rather than statistics to save lives. and there is a saying, as you know, in judaism and islam and christianity that if you save one life, it is as if you saved the entire world. and, after all, i do hope that we learn from history. thus far we learned from history, as many of you know, we don't learn from history.

what really concerns me is much of the generation of the holocaust, because my family was killed during the second world war. seventy years later, now, of that particular period. and also one has to take into account some other atrocities all the way from the middle east , perhaps 100 years. it's debatable, but what is really clear that in the post-world war entire communities were held hostage if we look at the situation this cambodia or in the balkans or in rwanda, burundi and so forth. so, again, what i'm trying to suggest, that we must look at the case studies of terrorism, of hostages, and there is a very long list. i just would mention two or three because it really provides

some sort of a trend that's happened since 1970. and the first one is 1972 when the u.s. embassy in tehran was taken over. and that time not only the 52 american hostages, but the united states for 444 days was held hostage. actually, i'm talking about 1979, i think. in 1972 we had the earlier episode and tragedy in munich when the 11 israeli athletes were taken hostage and then killed by the plo, and the entire world was watching and watching and did not actually lift a finger. later on in order to do something about the terrorist threat. and finally, also in 1979, takeover of the mecca mosque by

terrorists in saudi arabia that sent a signal that the threat within islam, the divide between the sunni and the shiite is also critical to take into account. with this, i think, context, i would like to invite our speakers to discuss whatever they think is important. we'll adopt a dialogue later on -- we'll develop a dialogue later on. general gray, would you like to say a few words now or later on? >> later. >> okay. ed, it's all yours. here we have someone who has a very extensive diplomatic background and also academic background, and he dealt with many of these issues. and we'll present to you later on the books, okay? >> thank you. >> okay. >> thank you, yonah. thank you, don. these working all right?

it's good to be back here. thank you again for inviting me back here. this time a little different for me because i'm leading off which enables me to make the broad, general statements. last time i was the last speaker, and i spent most of the time lining out stuff as everybody said anything, and i ended up with notes that looked like a cia-redacted document. [laughter] but we'll talk today, yonah said about hostage taking and terrorism, hostage policy, and i'm going to focus mostly on the united states. it's always good to start with a definition, so the seizure or detention of a person with the threat to kill, injure or continue to detain that person in order to compel a third person or governmental organization to do or to abstain from doing an act as an explicit

or implicit condition for the release of the person detained. that's from the u.s. code, that's the u.s. government's official definition. in a sense, modern political hostage taking arises from two historical precedents, traditions. one, which yonah referred to, is the long history of the political and military use of hostages as guarantees of good faith and the observance of obligations between states, monarchies, etc. but the practice of taking hostages as security for the carrying out of a treaty between civilized states is now pretty much obsolete. the 1949 geneva conventions and the international convention against taking of hostages both prohibit hostage taking as a crime or an act of terrorism. the criminal version of kidnapping is also historical, lots of historical precedent to

that. that continues, of course. in fact, in some countries hostage taking for profit has become almost an industry. ransom being the only demand for what is, basically, a purely criminal activity. a major problem, therefore, facing governments this dealing with this situation -- this dealing with this situation is determining whether a specific threat or event is actually political intent or only pretends to be political. because for some reason, some criminals appear to be claiming that a political motivation in some ways is more respectable. so you've got this problem facing governments of deciding what it is they're actually facing. but the modern subject we will be talking about is about political hostage taking, something intended to make a political statement, challenge an existing government or further the influence of a particular movement or group. so i leave the question of criminal kidnapping to the fbi.

this is their turf. they've been doing it for a long time, they know how to do it. now, modern terrorism, hostage taking began to some degree in the 1960s. we had the monday modern, the marxist terrorist groups in latin america, europe, japan. centers of training and orientation where marxist militants learned trade craft from the kgb, the east germans and from each other. then we had the afghanistan situation, i guess we'll call it, which spawned al-qaeda and other global jihadist movements where training was done by the cia and pakistan's intelligence director in particular. and, of course, we have, some of us remember now it seems like the innocent days, of the red brigades group, the children of the bourgeoisie.

that produced government policy. we bring terrorists to justice, isolate state sponsors of terrorism, improve allies' counterterrorism capability, and with respect to hostages, no concessions, no deals. after 9/11 that policy was somewhat expanded with the global war on terrorism, a much more aggressive policy at least rhetorically, and especially more of a role for the military. a hard line for others, you're with us or against us. and then we got afghanistan, iraq, followed by the united states' patriot act, creation of the department of homeland security, etc. part of ct policy is always the question of dealing with hostages. and i was much taken by a recent discussion of the background of

this policy by rand corporation's brian jenkins who you all know. his basic thesis is that many people erroneously believe that negotiations with terrorists are prohibited in all circumstances. at least for the u.s. government. but there is no law against negotiating with terrorists. the existing u.s. no-negotiation policy was intended to apply only to hostage situations, and even there was exaggerated. as i said to begin with, there's no legislation, no statute in the criminal books, no explicit directive prohibiting negotiations with terrorists. the only guidance is in the form of policy statements that pertain to negotiations. this development began in the early 1970s when terrorists began seizing diplomats and other government officials, professional diplomats resent this enormously, you know? the traditional rule of the international community is that

thou shalt not attack nuns, children and dip lo malts. -- diplomats. but that rule is gone in a world that has currently lost all sense of decency. the united states took the decision the host country was responsible to the safety of diplomats. yielding to terrorist demands seemed only to encourage the possibility of more occurring. the united states worried that if it were seen to intervene in the negotiations, it might attract more can kidnappings of american officials, invite direct demands on the united states, not to the host government, and, thereby resolve local governments of their responsibilityings. the policy was sealed in march 1973 when a terrorist group took two american diplomats hostage in khartoum. the hostages demanded the release of palestinian prisoners in israel and sirhan sirhan.

responding to a question during the crisis, president nixon stated, quote: as far as the united states has a government giving in to blackmail demands, we cannot do so, and we will not do so, end quote. shortly after the statement went public, the terrorists murdered the two diplomats, plus a belgian colleague, and a few days later a directive was issued using the president's language. therefore, an unscripted response to a specific question in a specific circumstance became general policy. it was used often in subsequent iterations over the year as not giving in to blackmail demands became no concessions which then was exanded to include no negotiations -- expanded to include no negotiations. this was widely interpreted as a ban on all discussions.

this approach became a mantra for the u.s. government repeated this numerous situations from the twa airliner hijacking in 1985 to secretary of state donald please sa rice stating in -- condoleezza rice state anything 2004 that, quote, the president of the united states does not negotiate with terrorists, end quote. but policy statements are not allow. history and current law, including the patriot act, make it clear that the no-negotiations policy was never intended to interfere with the authority of the executive branch to conduct foreign policy or to pursue negotiations with anybody. in addition, the reported threat by a u.s. official in 2014 to persecute the family of a hostage for providing material support to a terrorist organization, if they paid ransom, would have gone nowhere in a u.s. court. there are too many contrary examples. u.s. policy does not preclude

the fbi from assisting families faced with ransom kidnappings, and it would not be able to hold to that policy in a court. not only the united states, the united kingdom adopted a no-concessions policy for dealing with hostages long before us; yet, that policy did not preclude, did not prevent them from communicating and eventually negotiating with the ira, nor did american policy against negotiation prevent the u.s. from using its influence on both sides in that issue. so we negotiated and dealt with the ira as well. i won't mention the peace accords in vietnam which involved the viet cong or, despite the promise we made to the israelis we would never talk to the plo, we, in fact, have talked to the plo many times and negotiated with them. and some, despite the situation, and i'll quote brian jenkins here because he's pretty good, quote: absurd interpretations by cautious bureaucrats and

contorted portrayals by unknowledgeable officials, unquote, led to the adoption of a policy which comes from, essentially, short-term responses. policy guidance, in other words, is just that, it's guidance. it may be the right way to go, it may be the policy you want to follow. but you have to always let circumstances determine when the guidance makes no sense. it must be ignored. and we and others have done that and will do that in the future. when the u.s. government recently came under severe pressure, criticism for what appeared to be a very callous policy, a lot of press comment, a lot of criticism, and in response president obama invoked a special review which issued a new presidential policy directive, pdd-30. u.s. nationals taken hostage abroad and personal recovery effects.

pdd-30 reaffirmed the traditional no-concessions policy, but, but for the first time no concessions does not mean no communications. u.s. government may communicate with hostage takers and others. the u.s. government may also assist private efforts to communicate with hostage takers to secure the safe recovery of a hostage. and, this is interesting, the u.s. department of justice will no longer imply, hint or warn that families could face criminal prosecution. and then also in the best tradition of washington, we have new administrative arrangements as now a hostage response group, an issue manager, a family engagement team and a new presidential envoy, special presidential envoy for hostage affairs. presumably, the this special presidential envoy will join the 40 or 50 other envoys who swarm

up and down the halls of the state department. a fact sheet on the new policies was released just last june on the 24th, and it makes two very explicit points. this is in the fact sheet. the new executive order is intended to, quote: insure or that the u.s. government is doing all that it can to safely recover americans taken hostage overseas and is being responsive to the needs of their families, end quote. and, second, therefore, quote: a shift in focus from providing social services to families to a new paradigm that emphasizes continual cooperation between the government and families in the safe recovery of their loved ones. the fact sheet says the u.s. government must now earn these families' trust and confidence. so now we've seen maybe not a change, but certainly a isn't

reorientation in how we're doing. now, this was all part of a change of u.s. ct policy over the last few years since 9/11. we had, first, an intensification of ct policy, a militarization of it. we've been over the last few years trying to move from the jihad to the long war, the acceptance of a more complicated conflict. hasn't had too much effect really on hostage policy except of the stuff i just talked about, and that's all been on a tactical level. however, many of the practitioners of hostages, particularly this a transnational character as yonah talked about, exacerbating this transnational political development is the intermingling of terrorist and insurgent activities with other kinds of transnational crime; piracy, weapons of mass destruction, and on and on. criminal organizations as well as terrorist groups have gone

global, presenting a new challenge to governments. some of whom are overmatched and outgunned. the result is a global transnational nexus of political and criminal threats. the evolution of insurgency movements utilizing terrorist tactics into networks refers to what is happening to other organizations and is preventing -- providing a situation where more or less, even more or less solid nation-states now come under attack by actors representing self-proclaimed racial, ethnic, religious and class entities. as borders have become more open, all this legal trafficking, all this illegal activity is increasing expo then cially. the threat to a larger number of more fragile states in today's world is obvious. more broadly put, it is the wes fail january state system it which is now under attack.

this means that in terms of terrorist policy, we have to focus on the strategic level, the tactical level, in fact, is relatively simple. it is at the strategic level. and now with the latest development with the rise of isis or dash, we have a self-proclaimed hostage-taking state. so, in effect, we're returning to the older tradition, at least in the eyes of isis. the geneva convention's become relevant again. but how do you apply them? how to westphalian nation-states defend themselves? well, the obvious answer is effective mobilization of the nation-state system. in addition to the necessary national response by governments, there must be a coordinated response by the community, the international community at several levels; governments, governments acting as groups, governments as coalitions, governments as international organizations. much easier said than done, of

course, as the current situation in the middle east demonstrates. the arab middle east is in political and social collapse. this is an essential anarchy. the major regional players that are standing on this scene with the ability to act to any degree -- turkey, iran, saudi arabia and israel -- are hardly a homogeneous group, and all but one is arab. they have a common enemy in isis, but all engage in cross-cutting competition among each other. in the end, as in the beginning, it's all about politics. you can deploy special operation force teams from now until doomsday, and you will not solve the problem. what challenges us now about dealing with hostage taking in the middle east particularly is what challenges us in dealing with the middle east period. how to sort out our enemies from

our friends. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much. your book, meanwhile -- [inaudible conversations] >> for the time being. >> is this a political commentary? i get the small book? >> yes. well, you know -- >> it was designed by potomac institute to be the size of an iphone 6. >> okay. we'll, we have to continue. by the way, i think we have to discuss not only groups the islamic state and al-qaeda, efa and the others, but -- and states, of course, but also the lone wolfs. meaning that particularly now as we're seeing the people who came to watch a movie, opened fire

and all that. honestly, we have to think about, also, the future in terms of the environment of the so-called lone wolf now to weaponize, let's say, ebola and take over, you know, entire communities hostage. let me move on to our friend and colleague, dr. wayne zaideman. as i mentioned, with his experience for decades at the fbi but also academically, he has a doctorate from nyu on iran, and i asked him to share with us his experiences in the middle east and elsewhere. >> thank you, professor yonah.

when i took a crisis hostage negotiations course in the fbi in the early '90s, it was focused basically on criminal hostages. and when i asked the instructor, well, what about terror situations, he said you would handle it the same way. i'm going to go through this and show how i believe that was incorrect at that time, and it is incorrect now. they said, they taught us that when you have a hostage negotiation or a barricade situation where a crime has gone wrong and they've taken hostages or there's a domestic dispute and there's a feeling of desperation by the people or somebody who wants to commit suicide by cop by having a policeman shoot 'em and there's hostages involved, they said the

first thing that people tend to want to do is work on problem solving and then the behavioral change. hopefully, the behavioral change is hands up, and they leave. but that rarely works unless you precede it with three other things to do. the first is active listening. they basically mirror what the hostage taker is saying and, in effect, letting them tell their side of the story. then you bring empathy into it. you want to determine how they feel, what their feelings are. and then you want to gain rapport and gain their trust. once this process gains momentum, then you get into the influence part which is working on problem solving with the hostage takers and bringing about the behavioral change. however, this has very little relation to modern-day hostage

taking when you're dealing with islamic extremist terrorism. let me go into a little bit of history before i go into the islamic extremist ideology. in 1980, around 1986, president ronald reagan transferred arms for seven hostages in lebanon, and he finally in 1996 admitted that, but said that it wasn't to gain the hostage release, it was to tosser better relations -- to foster better relations with iran. but in effect, what this proved was it became a revolving door. you pay for hostages. they release some, then they get more hostages. and that was what was going on in lebanon at the time. in 2002 president bush had a policy that ransom can be paid if officials believe doing so would help gain intelligence about the terrorist group osar the individual terrorists --

groups or the individual terrorists but not for the sole purpose of freeing american hostages. because you don't want to encourage terror, and you don't want to materially support terrorism. but this did allow for negotiations, and it did allow for using the rationale of helping to gain intelligence about the terrorist groups or the terrorists. as ambassador marks mentioned, there is a statute, u.s. statute 18, u.s. code 1203, about the seizing or detaining of u.s. citizens outside the united states. and, basically, as he mentioned, the policy this some ways remained -- in some ways remained the same. you can negotiate, but no concessions, no ransom, no change in u.s. policies to reward the hostage takers. however, as he mentioned, the one change is that we can -- while we urge the american

citizens not to pay ransom -- if they want to do it anyway, we provide basic logistical support and help with contacts with the host governments. it should be noted that the department of justice has never, and i repeat never, prosecuted anyone for paying a ransom. now, recently president obama swapped five top taliban commanders in exchange for army sergeant bowe bergdahl. now, the rationale that he used was that for our own soldiers we do not leave anyone behind once a conflict is over. however, in my opinion, sergeant bergdahl lost this covenant owed to our troops when he deserted and when he collaborated with the enemy. in that case, i think that he lost the right to have the united states release five top

taliban commanders for his release. in 2002 the national criminal justice reference service pointed out that hamas' modus operandi is to can kidnap israeli soldiers or civilians to bargain for release of their prisoners. now, my colleague, ifat, will go into this in further detail, but it should be noted that their policy was no concessions and that they relied on hostage rescue operations. however, due to public pressure, israel is a small country and people tend to know each other, and as a result, israel began releasing prisoners. and some, there was some criticism of government officials for releasing those who have blood on their hands. in return for releasing hostages. now, getting on to the hostage

negotiations for islamic extremists, i must note that terrorists, islamic -- radical islamic terrorists are not concerned about public opinion. they are not concerned. their audience is not what the public says, their audience is only god. their validation comes from god. so as a result, there's no need to minimize casualties. in fact, it's fine for them to maximize casualties. it's fine for them to do barbaric things like beheadings, burnings, drownings, crucifixions. the leadership believes to know what god wants of them. for example, in iran the religious scholars rule on behalf of the hidden imam until his return. so they are tied this with god, basically. and once the citizens of a country empower the clergy to speak on behalf of god, they are

forever precluded from criticizing the clergy. it would be like criticizing god himself. so terrorism becomes an act of religious expression. now, at one time people of the book -- which would be, like, jews and christians -- were a protected status. while they were persecuted and while they had to pay exorbitant tax rates and they were second-class citizens, at least they were protected from being killed. they were people of the book. however, islamic extremists get around this too. instead of people of the book, they refer to jews, christians or fellow muslims who don't agree with them as mushrik which is a pagan or polytheist. so by changing the label of the book, anyone can become a target; christian, jew or fellow

muslim. now, lands that were once islamic are part of the islamic entity until the end of time. so it's nonnegotiable. for example, spain was andalucia, so at one time it was under islamic rule. israel at one time was under islamic rule. so they're precluded from negotiating or giving up any part of that. and it's an obligation on them to wage jihad until either the people are willing to be ruled under islam, or they become muslims. now, what's my solution? we can't win a war against terror in our time. we can't win any war if we worry about political correctness and collateral damage. it's true that we have to identify the enemy. the enemy is islamic extremist terror. and while it is important to try our best to limit civilian casualties, we cannot become

paralyzed by -- to take action for worry that there'll be some collateral damage. if we were paralyzed in this way in world war ii, we would have lost the war. we must identify the enemy and allow the military to succeed in its mission. during world war ii, if we were worried about collateral damage, we wouldn't have been bombing dresden, we wouldn't have been bombing japan, and we wouldn't have obtained an unconditional surrender. so, basically, what i'm saying is politically-fought wars end very badly. we must fight to win and obtain an unconditional surrender. if we go back to a position of military and economic strength, we can deter war. with weakness, war is inevitable. [applause] >> thank you very much.

i got a job for ya. [laughter] >> get your book now. >> thank you very much. and we'll come back to some of the issues, obviously, that you raise. our next speaker is ifat reshef who is minister and counselor, as i mentioned before, middle east counterterrorism. she is a graduate of tel aviv university, the school of law, and she served also in cairo in the israeli embassy several times, and she will deal with the israeli response to hostage taking. and incidentally, just in the past couple of days hamas, they declared that they do have some body parts of some of the israeli soldiers who were killed during the gaza campaign about a

year ago and, obviously, it raises a lot of questions. ifat? >> thank you very much, professor alexander. can everybody hear me? thank you. >> [inaudible] >> i'm here to share a little bit of our experiences, the state of israel, and i have to say from the start that i will offer more dilemmas than answers. i simply don't have, we don't have good answers for what is one of the toughest, i think, most difficult situations for decision makers anywhere and in the state of israel in particular. also another opening remark is

that i won't be discussing isil, although unfortunately we find ourself in a situation now that we border both with the affiliates of isil and al-qaeda, but we still have bigger threats and bigger problems that we face from those terrorist organizations that have been targeting israel for decades now, mostly palestinian terrorist organization and lebanese, the most famous lebanese terrorist organization that is also the most famous proxy of iran, hezbollah. and this is an ongoing challenge, an ongoing experience and one that has gone through different phases. and i think it's fair to say that we are still in the midst of the learning curve. and while we've reached several conclusions, this is probably not the end of this process, unfortunately. but i would like to begin with,

first of all, the understanding that while we, i think, we in israel face a unique aspect of the phenomenon of kidnapping for ransom which is to say we are mostly faced by a ransom which is to release prisoner, to release terrorists, and this is, this is not kidnapping for ransom that is paying money. so the families of the people who are kidnapped, be it soldiers or citizens, are not faced with this dilemma that from some of the former speakers spoke about, whether to pay out of pocket or get the money in another way. so this is an issue that the states these to deal with, and i think also the understanding in israel is that this is the responsibility of the state to deal with this issue. the families can do a lot in terms of public relation

campaign, in terms of making this issue remain very much the news, but it's not, it's not in their capability to do whatever is needed to release their loved one. so this is an important, i think, remark which is unique to our situation. but also i would like to give a little bit of background in saying that the whole issue of kidnapping for ransom is actually a very old one in our tradition or at least the tradition of the jewish people because, in fact, it has not only that it has roots this the bible, but this is one of the most important commandments that you have in the jewish religion. and it was extensively debated in the rabbinical literature,

both the mission and ther the mood, not only because it referred to a phenomena that was going on in jewish communities which were facing a situation where people became hostage or kidnapped or put in jail by hostile authorities in order to pressure the community to pay ransom. the reason for that was not just the fact that they were very vulnerable in different places and under different circumstances, but because there was such commandment, the commandment that was considered hutch more important that other commandments that dealt with helping the poor, helping the weak and the sense of solidarity, of mutual solidarity within the jewish communities that was very known to their, to their surroundings. so we have discussions that are going back almost 2,000 years ago. and what's fascinating is that the same questions and the same

dilemmas that we have today or were already discussed by our sages, by our most important rabbis from those years, and the questions are mostly how do you weigh the life of a person, the life of an individual and the better benefit of the whole community, and how do you, how do you put -- how do you put value on human life? could it even be possible? and if you are willing to give everything you have and, you know, the ransom back then was, indeed, mostly money, if the community is ready to get the funding necessary ask to pay the ransom, wouldn't that be counterproductive because it would just bring about the next incident where a person from the community would be abducted, kidnapped, so on and so forth.

so this dilemma are very ancient in our history, and the dilemmas continues. the answers, i'm afraid, have not been very successful. the answers have been given, by the way. there's even, there was even an attempt to actually say, one attempt was to say that you can pay ten times the fair value of a hostage and, again, you can ask who is to tell what is a fair value of a human being? how can you even presume to say that? but, apparently, people found ways tad -- to do that. but i have to say, those rules were not exactly maintained. there were exceptions. for example, in the case of a husband and wife, the husband has the duty to pay everything he has to release his wife at least for the first time. in the case of important jewish scholars, for example, some of the rabbis thought that, again, there are no limit toss what you need to pay because these people, their value for the community is much higher and so on and so forth.

so, again, this is to say that rules were never really kept. there were attempts to sort of create some kind of logic for the community to operate according to, but the reality was always stronger than those attempt, than the rules. if i go now to our times, the modern state of israel, again, the nature of the demands have changed, and it is mostly the release of prisoner, the release of terrorists. that adds another set of complications and dilemmas, of course, to our decision makers because mostly it's, again, a question of motivation, it's a question of if you do pay this price, what happen next? wouldn't that just encourage the next abduction, the next hostage taking, the next kidnapping? but also we have to take into consideration that those people

that are released, those terrorists, they themselves have the potential and in a lot of cases, in fact, have been fulfilled in a very short period of time to go back to engage in terrorism. so the dilemma that a decision maker in israel is facing is, again, how do you weigh lives against life? if you know there is a person or persons, a citizen or a soldier that have been kidnapped, they have a face, they have a name, they have parents, they have family, they have friends. and we are, as was said here, a very small country, and everybody knows everybody. but at the same time, you are asked to release arch terrorists that once released will probably go back to terrorism, and then they might kill an indefinite number of people that you still don't know their identities and their faces and their families, but when it happens -- and it just recently happened in recent months with six israelis killed

as a result of terrorist activities that some of the people who were released during our last prisoner deal have been involved different levels. this raises a huge dilemma for the israeli society and a huge dilemma for the government. so these are questions that are very, very difficult to answer, and there are no good answers. there are -- you can think of pros and cons for each, each way that you might choose to answer it, and this is an ongoing effort that we are still, i think, very much in the midst of it. one of the famous israeli experts on this issue suggested, for example, that there have been changes in the way the terrorist organization conducted their kidnapping activities as a

result of the way that the government of israel chose to react to them. so there is a significant difference between those kid p p -- kidnapping attacks that went on in the '70s and the ones that we experienced since the '80s to these days. the main, the main difference is that in the '70s you would have these incidents where there would be a takeover by terrorists of a facility. it could have been a school, a house, a bus, a known facility, and they would take hostages, and then they would start making their demands, and the bargaining -- yes or no -- would start. that allowed for a situation where instead of actually

starting negotiation to release the hostages, the government of israel chose when it was possible to try a military option, a military takeover, taking down the terrorists and releasing the hostages without paying the ransom. so not yielding to terrorism. and that, in fact, was the policy that was put forward in the '70s by the late then-prime minister rabin. whenever there is a possibility to try and militarily take down the terrorists and release the hostages, you do not negotiate, and you do not start a negotiation. however, the second part of it was that when this possibility does not exist, you, in fact, do start negotiations, and you try to see which of their demands you can answer, and the reason is that you cannot leave people

in this situation, just abandon them completely. .. states to need to do the best to protect the lives and well being of their citizens, there is an additional commitment when it

comes to the state of israel because we have a general drafting and boys and girls when they turn 18 go to the army, especially from the jewish population in israel both boys and girls. they go to the army. they enlist. the country sense of them to defend itself and when they have taken hostages were kidnapped in this context, the country has an additional duty to get them back. this is part of what was mentioned to with respect to the u.s. you don't leave a wounded soldier behind. don't leave soldiers behind. i think it's a strong notion in israel and some would argue it's more than a construct that's a state official has with its soldiers than it is a contract the state has with the parents of the soldiers, because every mother and father in israel expected same kids at the age of 18, but also expect from the

state to do its best to make sure that there is a possibility for them to come back on. this is what the state should do. so what happened in the '80s was that since the different terrorist organizations saw that the government preferred to do everything possible in order not to conduct negotiation but is actively trying to release, by the way, with a terrible price. with cases of both hostages and soldiers that participated in the release were killed or i'm sure we are a aware of the famous case where he had an airplane that was abducted to uganda and the israelis held hostages at the airport there, and there was a very heroic release of them. actually most of the hostages got back safe and sound are there was a lady was hospitalized and she died, but

actually we took losses and the famous one was, in fact, the brother of our prime minister. so in the '80s we saw a change in the strategy and tactics of the terrorist organizations. they understood as long as they operate in a known place they would be some attempt to release the hostages. so what they tried to do from then onwards was actually kidnapped an israeli citizen, be it a soldier or a citizen, and take into somewhere unknown, preferably outside the state of israel but would be away from security, organizations to find him. and they're actually believe the statement with a chance but to start a negotiation. if, indeed, there is a moral,

religious, what have you commitment to bring our citizens out our soldiers back home. better start of what a lot of people see nowadays as a slippery slope where you had some very famous deals and you could see a trajectory where the prize goes higher and higher. the ratio between the number of hostages or the kidnapped people that were released and the number of prisoners that were released by israel to secure became bigger and bigger. and, in fact, in the last 30 years or so we released more than 7000 people and got 16 people back. so the ratio something like 450 to one. but, in fact, some of those, for example, the last deal we actually had 1027 people

released in order to get him back. having said that, there's a lot of criticism in israel on the deal on the ratio on this slippery slope. one has to say that there is, for each of you with all the criticism, there was a lot of popular support. i think in the case, something like 80%. hd was applauded by the society because no one could resist, released a picture of a young soldier going back to his father and mother. the human thing, it's a human reaction. so you have the very irrational and logical analysis that would assist with the stated assist with the stated issue and then have the emotional, personal, everybody thinks other own sons or daughter when they go to the army. you cannot compare between the two. but it is a heartbreaking issue.

we had families of victims of terrorism that try to protest. and again for the decision-makers this is a very, very difficult dilemma to make. i should add to that emphasis something that is also unique i think to the state of israel, that one of the things that you should consider when releasing prisoners to get a kidnapped person back from the persons is not just that you are encouraging or creating motivation or incentive for the next kidnapped or hostagetaking, not just that you releasing terrorists that by the way went in jail our experience shows they only get more radicalized, more experience. they get operational training from other comrades and they become much more dangerous. and by the way, when they are released they become a role model for young people in their communities. they are released actually helped recruit new members to

the terrorist organization. there's all myth that is great i read the and the impact is much more than just releasing one individual or 4000. but the fact is, an interesting question is what does it do to the deterrent of the individual against its different enemies? the problem is hostagetaking as our terrorists actions in large part of an automatic were. yoga side not adhere to any accepted rule of international law. and that please against the rules. bend the rules. this is the way of the getting more, and we as a country that defends itself against different threatthreads need to deter our enemies from continuing in this path. there is a lot of questions in

israel. when the country accept that and when released 1000 people for one person, does that, in fact, hurt and curtails arbiters? because the are lots of nonstate terrorist organization in the region. they are all watching. they are all drawing the conclusion, and the question is, if their conclusion isn't look, this is a society that is so sensitive to the life of one individual, so we should try to do our own action for our own hostagetaking and maybe get more, or make israel do this or make israel do that. and, in fact, the leader of hezbollah likes to talk about the fragile society of israel and compare us to all kinds of description.

i could also argue and i think this is something a lot of people share in israel that this is actually a sign of strength of the society that society is willing to take such big risk and knowingly, knowingly release archterrorist and the bloodiest murders you can think of -- murderers that kill babies and children knowingly and intentionally from prison to get one person back. this is a sign of strength, a sign of solidarity, a sign of commitment, and this makes the society actually stronger. and when the society is stronger, that country is also stronger. with all the vulnerabilities that this creates, i don't have, i cannot answer one of the other. this is an ongoing debate. i would say though that there has been some attempt lately in the last three years or so to try and set new rules, rules

that would in a way limit the discretion of the government and of the prime minister actually when deciding on, and such, and such sensitive and complicated cases. we are all hoping not to face this situation again. i should add by the way that this type of kidnapping, this episode that we've been experiencing since the '80s, but you should take a figures because it is so complicated to conduct this kind of negotiation that this is not an episode of days or hours like was the case when the hostagetaking took place inside of israel itself. but people can be in captivity for years. while this is going on, the family is going through, you know, unspeakable misery.

and the society, those people who know the amount of people who get closer to them in the process, they are all going through very emotional and very painful situation. and this is something that is very much, is very much present in the daily life in israel while it is taking place. every few years with such episode, so hoping not to reach a new one. there was an attempt to set new rules. the attempt started before he was released, the minister of defense formed a committee chaired by the chief justice of the supreme court of justice and this committee was charged with coming up with new rules, not just about the price but about all the relevant questions. who should be not negotiate and who should be responsible for

conducting a the negotiation and what would be the limitation and so on and so forth. the idea, a decision from the very start that this will not affect on the deal because this was an ongoing case and they didn't want to risk it. and so they did not publish but they concluded, their conclusion a short period after he returned to israel. at the conclusion was admitted to the minister of defense, and they are binding and confidential. the reason they're confident of his we did not want our enemies to understand what they're dealing with. but if they have the manual it would just make it easier for them to come up with a more efficient way for them to apply and the next incident. but a lot of people presumed that the idea is to limit the

prize into a rut that so much more reasonable ratio. so you would still have room for maneuvering for the government to conduct a negotiation. even never reached the situation where a person is taken hostage, the country just says i'm sorry, i cannot negotiate. this would be unacceptable in israel. but the government could not be extorted in the way it has been increasing years by the terrorist organizations that confront that because they know there's no limits on the numbers. at i should say here, we were asked and we paid a price also for some idea on a medical conditions of a kidnapped soldier. if he is alive or dead. we were asked to pay for corpse, or dead soldiers, for remains of corpses. there's no limit abuse of this kind of extortion. people did feel this is really a

slippery slope. i don't want to, i don't want to relate to ongoing cases actually, but it was a this was a serious offense to lay down rules. other attempts that were more public was in some legislation that was introduced that also limits the authorities before that was the presidential authority to pardon prisoners that were sentenced for life. that would be most of the terrorists, murderers people, but also some other heinous terrorists, not just about calories, about murders of this kind of large. this created a situation where, and again hopefully we will not get to another situation of this sort, but it would be a different attempt maybe in a different experience also for the government and may be diminished of defense is now,

who is getting more powers and authorities of this issue in a new set of rules, to conduct this in a way that might be more reasonable in the eyes of the society and the government. but again i have to say, no easy answers. nobody knows how that would actually work. this is an ongoing dilemma because it is a dilemma that cannot be solved. when human lives are put one against the other nobody can say that the answer is a or b. and hopefully i won't have to discuss it next time and to what was our experience and what are the lessons we've learned, but i leave you with this hope, and open to take any questions later. [applause] >> okay. now we are coming to our last

but not least speaker, smh before he is a senior advisor to the political council and also to the business executives to national security. and i think i should really mention that most recently doctor distinguished fellow, a good friend and a very distinguished journalist, so thank you. >> sound that spirit he was so damn smart they got ready then, too. [laughter] spent it's all yours. >> thank you. it's good to be here. and it's always good to be with a 20 not comment on of the

marine corps, alfred gray. i've learned a lot from him. most importantly to me on the battlefield brains rather than bullets when wars but don't discount the power of the boat. i we vertebrates cannot apologize because i got another meeting of got to go to for me to leave a little bit early. i want to provide some ideas that i hope are thought-provoking and i digitally haven't thought about. let me begin with this. i think one of the greatest dangers posed to us by osama bin laden and al-qaeda, not so much physical threat to american citizens, other citizens, but the threat to the constitution. what al-qaeda has done through terrorism has highlighted the tensions between protecting civil liberties and protecting the nation. we do not have a good response. what you see at guantánamo bay is the question of whether these captured individuals should be treated as criminals or as any combatants. we have not result of that one

way or the other. you see these dilemmas and the national security agency. how far can they go in trying to protect the nation, and yet filed a civil liberties backs this is ongoing, going to get a lot worse and it's something we tend to ignore at our peril. second, the best armies, navies, air force and marine corps, and i say that singularly, marine corps, al, are incapable of defeat an ideological enemy that has no army, navy, air force, let alone reincorporate we see that in afghanistan. we have seen in iraq and we see that in the islamic state. the third point is what we talk about resolving these things with a comprehensive approach, how many of you have not heard the term comprehensive approach, or all aspects of government? not just the department of defense but because the department of defense is the

best resourced, best organized, most functional agency in the us government of size, by default it takes on all of these issues, and you can't do that. they cannot solve the terrorism problem. unless you get to the roots of the terrorism problem but you're a combination of ideology and physical need, whether deprivation or psychological satisfaction, you're not going to be able to deal with it. we have not been very capable because our government system, the way it's organized right now, is not organized for this very, very massive comprehensive detailed series of dangers. we are still very much comfortably oriented on the cold war and a kind of bilateralism with a huge enemy such as the soviet union or nazi germany, and we have to change our mindset. i have been arguing for brains-based approach to strategy for a very, very, very long time. and perhaps as beethoven elizabeth said, i shall get into

heaven, and perhaps i shall here in heaven. let me talk about a couple of challenges you may not have considered about terrorism and hostage. cybercrime, anyone not aware of cybercrime? anybody not read the headline, cyberthieves pistol $100 million by getting data? i've got news for you. that's going to get even better and better your what happens when i get into the records of companies and let's i want to bet the stock market. let's say i bet a price goes up again and i commended the deputy. i'm a 12 year old terrorist and living somewhere in ramadi that access to dana. what is going to prevent me or my colleagues from making huge amounts of money by cybercrime and by leveraging these things? it's happening today at the end will get a lot worse. this be the next step for terrorism. the annex is cyber blackmail. supposing either member of the

islamic state and i decide i'm going to threaten, because i can shut down electrical power grid in northern virginia and washington, d.c. what happens if i with that, and i guess that i know is valid from the terrace and about $100 million to $200 million? what do i do? and by the way, they just happen to shut down part of my power grid. this was even asked for the because i put islamic states going to be conducting cyber blackmail against individuals. let me give you a great case. this is not islamic state but is a bunch of cyberthieves the very, very, very rich woman, hugely rich, personal assistant got an e-mail from this lacing would you please send $250,000 to southern these because i just bought a, b, c and d. by coincidence this assistant happen to an intensely and said i would take of the southern speak you. the woman said, what the of? what happened was these cyber thugs were able to get into the e-mail accounts and were able to

forge this woman's way of speaking, and all sorts of access. what happens when islamic state decides it's going to now commit this kind of blackmail? it's going to call up is down and say we should do the following, we will kill your relatives, kill your family, do whatever we do get these things for which we have to prepare. the final point about hostages, what happens, god forbid, in the first american serviceperson is captured by the islamic state cracks and worse, supposing it is a woman, and supposing to three or four or five or 10 american service captives. they will say they will crucifyy them one at a time and showed up on youtube, but what's the response viable to be and how quickly react to that? or they will say we have captured and other servicemen and we will sell them back to you for $100 million to copy and every hour or every 24 hours to

execute one in the most vile way. what does the president do? this may never happen. this baby a phish of hollywood and movies but it's something we have to think about. the problem of think about it is we have such a divided government in such animosity between both parties that even if a president irrespective of party which assembled members of congress and say look, here are four or five what is it about the if any of these transpired, we have to be able to have a nonpartisan way of responding. can you imagine what happens if the next president is faced with is whether it's an american serviceperson hostage and now the president says we have to get a, b, c and d? i can guarantee you the other party will say you were the worst most cowardly president in the world. defeating whatever policies the president may have. in our solutions but those require a mature responsible government. and quite frankly, a handful of

bullets, what i argue in the book is arising from that were assorted 101 years ago, for new horsemen of the apocalypse were created. the first and most dangerous is failed and failing government. we see in washington. we see in afghanistan. we see it in syria, virtually around the world. ethic is economic disparity and the dislocation, similarly has global consequences the religious ideological extremism. that's what we're talking about, and environmental calamity. these are the greatest dangers but the biggest danger right now we're dealing with the deal of hostages is how to make a broken government work under these circumstances? i will leave you with the answers to find out how we should do that. thank you very much. [applause] >> do you have a minute or to have to leave speak with i will have to leave in about five

minutes. >> let me take the opportunity as alpert -- moderate us to question. you spoke about scenarios all the way from cyber blackmail the let me ask you this. shouldn't we actually rethink the conception and definition aspect of hostagetaking? because if the scenarios we raise the anti-and for example, that's why mentioned, for example, even the lone wolf, but we know that isis and their strategic thinking and al-qaeda as well, and by the way, it's really the anniversary of the declaration of war by the al-qaeda against the united states going all the way back, and it seems to me when we think about the future, we

cannot discuss individuals or groups of people but entire nations. that is to say the escalation to the weapons of mass destruction, biological, chemical, radiological, even a dirty bomb to hold entire nations hostage. and think of the demands. how are you going to do with the? >> i think we can exaggerate many threats. i thought taken the weapons of mass destruction argument after the end of the soviet union as a disaster that probably a is not going to happen for any number of reasons. that's one of the things i believe is really more a function of movies and literature of fiction and reality. that's one of things are not really worried about. what i'm most worried about is that we lack the strategic approach. we do not have a strategy. take for example, the islamic state, this is critical,

al-qaeda. where the coalition of 62 countries that are joined up against the islamic state, but what we've not done is put in any kind of oversight mechanism. we have not told of these countries what they are responsible to do and how they're going to do it. so you have guidelines of effort in this particular approach. two of which are military which the department of defense is doing quite well as are some of our allies. but for example, the counter narrative. we are talking about an ideology to take on the other ideology. we have not done anything about that. we are being destroyed in terms of the propaganda battle by the islamic state will look at vlad putin in ukraine. they are killing us in terms of the propaganda battle. this is what terri we have to do a lot more because got to defeat the ideology basis was one way to do it, where are all the imams and mullahs and ayatollahs? you have people like the grand

ayatollah who is on our side in iraq. why are these people not speaking out more issuing fat was? wife taking of saudi arabia or the crown prince been a lot more? i would argue the most effective way of taking these issues because you know deal with a global. in fact, this guy shot of the movie theater the other day was indeed a jihadi. can you imagine what the reaction would've been? we have to start to defeat the ideology. that is got to be step one. step two is a plan to about the islamic state and is not going to be just trying to ri get armd iraqis because quite think of it, is so corrupt i think sadly where wasting money. that would go to get the arab states engaged. the point is what to do a lot more than a source with the ideological after and was one that we can join that, all these problems have been the ability to manipulate our system and exploit our vulnerable is, that israel. is an existential?

not yet in my mind but it could be. we don't know whether the islamic state, let them go back to russia in 1970 to start the soviet union or the hoola hoop to participate in 10 years. my concern is it's far more like lenin. unless we start getting our strategy together, we may be sadly, sadly shocked in the future. >> okay. i have to agree with everything harden said, if not the mitchell me. talk about ideology is important and vital but ideology is a reflection of political reality. you have to talk about politics. let me take three interesting terrorists insurgency situation answered. the americans in the philippines. that was over but a political situation was resolved. the fight against the british in the '30s and '40s in palestine weather was insurgency and rr