book is end of cold war which is the subject of today's conversation. >> down it was too heavy for me. okay. >> anyway you can see the cover. our history makers george schultz distinguished fellow, hoover institution secretary schultz is a distinguished public servant having served as budget director, today's discussion focuses on his years as secretary of state under ronald reagan. a professor service will begin with some short remarks after which he and secretary schultz will engage in a conversationing the end of the cold war. this event is being filmed for later broadcast so we should finish up around 1:10.

... >> >> i thought i ought to start by emphasizing how

dangerous the cold war was. nowadays we tend to regard the ussr as a pack of cards that was ready to fall over. and yet we forget just how dangerous it was. the and capable to take a number of options to the future other there of the reform program from mchale gorbachev and. the cold war was dangerous from the cuban missile crisis and it could have happened again 1983 because of the archer that moscow ms. read as a cover for a

nuclear assault on moscow. so with mutual fear with misunderstanding and very fragile atmosphere had risen by the middle of the 1980's. reagin and moscow were seen as a warmonger across though full range of the soviet political elite. and when the possibility of this leading to international complications and catastrophe are to be spelled out. a of the gorbachev reform program was very unclear

what it was always changing it changed from 1985 through the end of the soviet union. it was not a fixed reform program. again the possibilities for argument and discussion was going on were eagerness. when various stages have to be itemized in the progress toward the peace that ended the cold war. there was the extraordinary january 1986 nuclear arms declaration of gorbachev which flummoxed american policy makers to a great extent. certainly causing a great deal of further mistrust but then came the rate of six

summit in a lot of soviet concessions were offered at the end snatched back then 1986 into 1987, the gorbachev pressed on him the need to undo the package of the nuclear arms disarmament with the proposals that he had had which president reagan refused to except as a total package and ironically the peacemaking gorbachev was the one who held up the progress to the idea to unravel the package. i have to say at this point how useful it is to be able to use both the american and soviet archives and that agency over there with the

hoover institution archives. the most remarkable treasure trove and of materials about the end of the cold war is though whole of the world title think anywhere like it that has a bilateral facility where you can study both the american responses and the soviet responses then tied them together to see the interaction between the two sides. eventually ronald reagan stepped down from office and president bush took over to ring gauge in which he reviewed policy and eventually adopted. is essentially ronald reagan's policy of engagement with the u.s.s.r. particularly after gorbachev declined to intervene in the

east revolutions and the achievements of this process cannot be understated. the arms reduction treaty became possible and was signed in 1988. eastern europe was evacuated with by the red army and the non-communist governments were far -- formed in the largely peaceful way. the world communist movement fell apart it had been any way but with the world movement people of -- people in russia in those republics had new freedoms to communicate with each other other, a travel abroad, listen to tv and radio from foreign countries

, the agreements were made from conventional weaponry in europe and in that short space of time time, half a decade the end of the '80s, extraordinary decisions were taken to bring an end to the most terrifying nonmoral is in human history. there have been hundreds of cold war's but the british and the french specialized in the cold war and having engaged in many hot war as well but no cold war before the cold war had the capacity to threaten human and other animal life universally around the planet. it was an extraordinarily dangerous phenomenon.

now while i have the opportunity today is to focus on an aspect of the undoing of the cold war because we have one of the principles with us on the platform here. i do think one aspect the ending of the cold war to be underplayed by most scholars is a relationship between the state department in the soviet ministry of foreign affairs with secretary shultz who is with us today and foreign minister. you only have to think for two seconds about this to see why this was a crucial factor. president reagan had many other things to think about

n mchale gorbachev had more things to think about because the use of governance was much more extensive than the grasp of government for an american president in the u.s. said was engaged on a massive transformation of his country so with fell to the foreign policy managers this secretary of state and the foreign affairs minister to cope with the consequences generally agreed policy of the american government and the soviet bureau for reasons that the cold war was altogether too dangerous

the u.s.s.r. had the additional reason without ending it would be very difficult to hold onto the remaining fragments of the declining soviet economy. they had a very practical reason as well to end the cold war. one oversight was constant by reagan and gorbachev coming to men had the task to make the objectives of the two leaders of the day, operational a practical biddies two men included george shultz and with an extraordinarily dynamic environment where no day was

predictable one day before it happened. we all remember the of bewildering rapidity of change so the to foreign policy establishments had to be held together with their great sophistication and determination. so we have a deal maker over here in the u.s. through secretary shultz and a radical reformer and both belonged to administrations that were not lacking of internal division. anyone who read his memoirs is well aware he had to struggle for the lion that

was prescribed for the administration by the president himself. the same was true in the soviet bureau the end gorbachev general objective wise and and deepened but even before that there was opposition and resistance from people who were not so keen on the reform of gorbachev. so both the secretary and the minister had to do what they could and did what they could to emboldened the president and the general secretary would never the commitment seemed to waver. this is one of a crucial elements often missed, in

the accounts. how did they do that? if you read the soviet diaries of the deputy foreign minister, it is obvious that one thing happened when very early on was the partnership of secretary shultz and a the minister. i was very impressed how impressed the soviets were in the soviet ministry at the secretary's decision to also a fight the secretary's

wife for that first encounter in helsinki in the summer of 1985. that touched him. he knew he would be meeting a real human being and so was his wife so there was a social aspect and the second example which i think it is also in mr. shultz's memoirs but i read in the soviet account with their wetback year georgia in 1987 and chairman put on a huge banquet for the american delegation headed by mr. shultz said that some point in the meal shultz arranged for the singing of georgia on my mind. [laughter] it may seem a small thing but it was big for a the

secretary. he was a great georgann patriot who came from a small nation inside the u.s.s.r. that was kicked around by the russians. the word for georgia is not georgia but the chairman new justin of the english to know the word in english was georgia in so he was very touched by this and so was his entourage. >> let me interrupt you. that is an interesting little story. but that actually happened in moscow. the fourth ministry had a big house we negotiate in the morning and then we went back to negotiations. we with each give a toast

but it was such that i thought we have to listen -- lucinda's up some house so i got the sheet music from a georgia on my mind knowing that background and then i had a recording of the singer singing dash and i had three guys you spoke russian to sing it and i saying it. [laughter] a and it did break the i.c.e. and it was a big hit. men they were more relaxed so after we all left the office there was a party for the president down in los angeles said he asked me to come and tell the story. my partner that i was dinosaurs' she asked what i would do and i told her and i tell the story i am leaving and here comes dina and she says to me mr.

secretary let me show you how to sing that song. [laughter] i said where were you when i needed you in moscow? [laughter] excuse me for interrupting. >> that is a great story. >> not only did they get on very well that they've learned from each other and secretary shultz made a point of taking economic pie charts to moscow on his visit so the soviet leaders would begin to understand what a mess they were headed into with their economic system. so we aren't just talking about negotiators but people who are acquainting each other through the nature of their own respective systems as a learning experience

that is very important the other thing that i think is common to both secretary shultz in and the minister in this period it is the unwillingness to automatically accept what the respective intelligence agencies were telling them. this is true the secretary certainly of gorbachev as well. and inside the soviet leadership there was huge disrespect for the kgb reports. there was a lot of reliance on what the soviet leader

saw with their own eyes in america. john on the american side side, the state department under mr. shultz leadership was quite abrasive at times with its attitude to the cia reporters. direct negotiating experience and observation of the other country by the leaders was very important to how things turned out her callable sides there was a recognition as well that the u.s.s.r. was really changing so the soviet leadership constantly said can't you see we are changing as fast as we can?

the americans did not let up of the pressure if the soviet union wanted to bargain to give their breathing space to conduct its own internal transformation, and that was the whole point of the rapprochement of america fell whole point was to get to a breathing space in order to renovate communism to preserve and conserve communism. that was their objective. they didn't understand they're actually introducing the solvent of communism by boosting the system culturally and politically in and economically they didn't understand the architecture and chemistry of communism but it played into the american position very nicely with this judgment to be the

consequence to bad for the soviets didn't need to survive any longer than it needed to. so they got together the secretary and a the minister. the minister fought his way through 1990 me but by then most of the hard work had been done secretary shultz of course, stood down with the exit from office of president reagan and in the process the two of them conducted an enormous number of agreements not just nuclear arms but conventional arms the demilitarization of the superpower in africa they made progress on the queue

but a and they kept pushing at the door of internally reforming the u.s.s.r.. the americans were very insistent there would be no deal on nuclear arms if the u.s.s.r. did not transform itself into a reliable partner. this would mean it had to become a different sort of country. the u.s.s.r. did said about the internal transformation but in foreign policy it was not completely obsessed with america but very nearly abscessed to the extent to ignore the rest of the world with its relationship with america but it tried to refashion in the ties with

client states like bareback and libya. it also of a disengaged from leftist and and moreover sought to a new relationship with the republic people's republic of china as a counterweight to so there was a lot happening in this period. i think we must never underestimate the historical importance of the entire process is and should never underestimate the importance of the intelligent management that took place between president reagan and general secretary gorbachev but also involving secretary of state shultz and minister

of foreign affairs. these are the big four who evade foundations for the peace that followed for which we all need to be grateful. in the bush years with europe liberated eventually the soviet union imploded. for 10 years or more it imploded largely peacefully we're now in the era where wars are breaking out in parts of the old u.s.s.r. but we ought to be grateful that at the point of the initial implosion went into history not with the bank by november. now what i thought i would end with is a few questions

we have a chance to hear from secretary shultz answers. i would really like to know whether if there was any point in the process when he relieved feared it could all go badly wrong. it doesn't seem to me to have been entirely smooth process but was there any point that you felt this is going the wrong way and could really be catastrophic ? and also a related point, how crucial do think it was with president reagan in the general secretary at the helm? how much importance to you give to those two men? would it have happened differently if reagan or

gorbachev were in power? this is a bit cheeky. was there anything you would have done differently if you had your time began? would you have tackled anything with the knowledge that you have now how's things turned out the you would have done differently? a and class lee, what more could american leaders have done in the early '90s to settle the first post cold war peace better than yan what they did? what situation and you feel most were done for the better it very difficult situation and soared to you

think it was of mass? also thanks very much for giving me the opportunity to put these questions. thank you very much. >> economic remember why in question. [laughter] but i will start with the story that gets at all of them. after he left office, said gorbachev came here to stanford we were standing around in my backyard on campus and i said to him we were both in office when the cold war was as cold as it could get what was the turning point? he said without a hesitation was rick effect, iceland because they got together to talk about every subject so

we understood each other. i said wedgie think the turning point was? i said when we deploy it nuclear ballistic missiles in germany. because that show the strength of our alliance and the soviets had to see that to realize that we were strong and the diplomacy was based on strength. there are lots of things that happened before gorbachev came along and that was one of them. i will recount a few that i think had significance. first of all, it was a mindset. president reagan thought that the soviet union was not all that was november

going to communist countries they're going to the free country. and i had my own experiences when i was secretary of the treasury. the big brouhaha about a bake sale so i got the cia to help me and they did a great job we knew more than they do. and i talk to the aicher cultural people who were appalled because we could track how much juice spent my a wife was a nurse she could hardly get out fast enough.