the key question on the apology, a poll show if you agree people like what you said it. for thought as many to mention apology, 66%. i think he aimed for the center and generally with japan hit the

target. for those who were not happy with the statement, let's not assume they were all liberals. that includes right wing and conservative people who were not happy with the prime minister's expression of remorse. i think he hit the center. as recent as a month ago, the word inside the prime minister's office was the state would be more or less what the prime ministers had to the joint session of euros congress which was less than what we heard on august 14. so things shift. i'm speculative i think there's several reasons for that. one was the prime minister's own intellectual journey. he spent a lot of time talking to scholars, multiple sessions with his drafters. he redrafted most of the time told by his speech writer. that's one factor. second factor is the pacifist leaning coalition partner.

this is not abe's statement. this is a cabinet statement. and he needed and wanted to get komato on board and to give. i think i was important for his political stand and for his legislation which i'll come to in a moment. the third factor think was he was i believe taken by many of the debates within the special commission established to look at how japan should vote the seventh anniversary. examples on that commissions are mostly centrist, center right. these are not right-wingers. they are not liberals in the senate but there center said director there was maybe one person on this list you would consider more to the right. this group explored multiple dimensions if you saw the report

on this issue. when i think that the biggest influence was the idea that japan enormous mistakes, the enormous suffering caused in asia and to the japanese people did not happen because of some original sin. to happen in the context of global history. in germany the recent historiography is increasingly critical that tournament treatment of the past focus on the idea that some of it was an original sin in germany, these horrible things happened in a germany is in the postwar period put that original sin in a box. and i think prime minister abe was keen not to perpetuate america's that japan is a permanent out nation, a permanent center. frankly, for some good reasons geopolitically. so this global history context mattered. and as a matter of history, accurate history, the structural

factors is what happened in the international system can't be ignored, particularly if you're going to learn something about how to prevent that from happening again in future. and, of course, it makes it a natural segue to describe what japan has been over the last seven years to make the international system or just. i thought it was historically accurate and made it possible for the prime minister to be more forthcoming in terms of the reflection than previous prime ministers had the upper we did not office a personal apology. the u.s. and australia would within about two hours to issue statements are the nsc spokesman welcomed the student or of the press to be a caveat welcome but it wasn't. the white house clearly put out the signal early to set the tone that i welcome this and wanted forward movement. so did prime minister tony

abbott spokesman. i don't know this for fact but i'll bet you anything that was coordinated. both u.s. and australian have an interest in moving forward. not ignore the past, not freeing japan from the need to continue working on this issue, particularly with kariba to make sure it didn't set the tone for japan's position in asia at a special for japan's relations with other democracies. i thought, frankly, the statements were very influenti influential, and probably had an impact on seoul to which is of course a democracy and a and a f euros and a friend of australia. the administration has been confused and all over the map on this issue but i think that was an effective way to set the tone. in china people said the response was harsh but default with the chinese say about this issue it was fairly moderate or

some of you may have noticed that the english language chinese statements that japan should have apologized and should have done this and should have done that, worst the chinese davis said japan must apologize, must. i don't think this is an accident. i think the chinese appointed multiple audiences. so the washington response in particular. since november last year when xi jinping and abe had their telecom both leaders can is continuing rivalry between japan and china. both leaders have tried to stabilize this for the own reasons. i thought the foreign ministers and officials to become something it isn't initially from the actions are more born in words was will but i thought it was appropriate. today the japan-korea context come at a to think the foreign minister expected probably the would be an apology and probably was ready for this into the quickly and said that actually n

managed that i think is appropriate because that piece of this, the japan-korea peace has not been resolved or i thought president talks state that was also well-crafted -- president parks statement was well-crafted. from u.s. national interest perspective this is the toughest not, those important piece of this. in japan in some folds, gallup for example, over 80% of japanese don't trust korea. from my own frequent discussion with japanese politicians and business leaders we're not just a right wing politicians, not just talking about conservatives. we're talking about liberals in japan who are frustrated with the korean actions with respect to court cases opened up to 1965 normalization treaty, and another statement. that doesn't mean japan should in any way be absolved from its

responsibility for making progress in building trust with korea on the most sensitive issues including -- but it is a bad dynamic. it's a bad dynamic and i saw this statement, the first part was the japanese public, second target was used to illustrate a like-minded democracies, the third card was china and korea was lost. -- class. i agree with evans. this was a strategic mistake for japan. korea is critical. other leaders going back centuries understood that the korean peninsula is a dagger aimed at the heart of japan. i think that we'll have a more rational debate in japan now because of this, i hope. so now what happens? i would just end with a few predictions and if i'm wrong just don't invite me back. i don't think japanese prime

ministers will apologize anymore. it is possible you have a liberal centerleft politician come back in, but i wouldn't expect in the next three, four, five years. i don't think anyone in the ldp, the 75th anniversary or other occasion is going to personally apologize. i think abe probably succeed in putting that in the past as he wanted. i think that abe did himself a favor in terms of the legislation on security, which is it's a lot more headwind in the public than the government expected. in part because of a sprained and explained poorly, in part because of the 70th anniversary. the fact that the coalition partner signed onto this statement, the fact that the support rate has gone up since the statement i think will help them now past the security related legislation duplicate talk about that in q&a.

i put it at 80-90% now. a good 20% bump in my prediction comes from this statement. i agree with evans if i understood correctly that this adds momentum, not a lot but some momentum at least reduces the headwind for progress toward trilateral meeting. i agree with sheila. if they could do trilateral meeting on the margins of the september commemoration not on the date the pla parades its quote-unquote shot and intimidation of japan weaponry -- [inaudible] >> they been in exporting a trilateral would be very effective, may be the only way invite you abe goes. i would bet against it. 20, 30% chance of us. we think there's a very good chance before aipac in november there is a trilateral summit.

and i think there will be a little bit more momentum. to be all of it more momentum towards addressing by the japan rok issues. will those be resolved? i don't know. there should be progress on them but i take with an overall dynamics and reaction that this issue will not defy japan-korea relations anymore, whether we important but based on relations, cooperation there will be momentum toward trilateral summit. but i hope from the perspective of japan's own edges, just interested in korea's interest that there's some progress on this issue going forward. thanks. spent under the audience is a good to get into questions but i want to exercise my prerogative and toss one or two out. i think generally we had a positive response with a lot of

caveats and things that he could have done but i think generally a positive response from that which it reflects sort of the overall u.s. expert community. but are we grading them on a curve and should we in the sense given the expectation and even a week ago as you pointed out especially a year ago, and then predictions whether they were always wrong or only one recently, he will never say a politic of you will never embrace a statement, et cetera. so is it like a student that you have no expectations but you give him a higher grade because of good effort, it is that right? and then conversely, are the critics grading them on perhaps a reverse curve? had that same text been issued by a dpj prime minister during their tenure or someone else

quick sort of the curve and the reverse curve. sheila? >> it's a great question. i think we are grading them on the curb, to be fair. but i think there's two pieces of the puzzle which i think all of us to talk about wha but i wd just put it back together again. is tested now reflects national policy court decision to make up a cabinet decision, i think the intellectual journey mike talked about, the debate inside japan, which language, i think we're not just grading prime minister abe. i think we're looking deeply into our opinion in japan is changing the site wouldn't underestimate across generational impact your, and we can talk about that i'm sure the south korean side as well, so how we grading them is one piece but if they equipped to recognize that underneath it is not just grading abe's performance but walking --

ruggedness as a with trans from in japan. it is simply a generational transmission look at the way in which this question can just be part of japan's diplomacy. the reverse curve, to the critics, i was neither credit nor praising this data but i think what to take on solid turns, frankly. i was not a fan of tweeting the semantics. he should've said that this would go that way. i think the semantic debate really sidestep the court issue, which is how does reconciliation take place in today's asia come and take between seoul and tokyo? and his domestic leadership in both countries going to be able to overcome some of the domestic differences now that are emerging in both societies? not a direct answer to your question. >> i think sheila has taken this is pretty much my own. i think implicit in my analysis of the abe statement that i provided earlier is the fact

that yes, i was grading them on the curb but more importantly it's to create analysis that we have to look at. i think, my sense is, my take away from president park's statement over the weekend is that somehow he is past an important test, a minimal level test. i thought you going to ask me what grade would i give them. >> i could do that. that could be may follow one. >> i would give him decent marks for effort but an incomplete and sentinel to do a bit more homework editing that's essentially what president park has suggested that he do. reading between the lines of what she had said. i think the jury is still out but i'm very, very cautiously optimistic that the door has been open just a crack to a better relationship between the

two. on your question of whether the reverse curve exists and was a dpj government would issue such a statement, i think putting to together side-by-side, i think it was a much more intense level of -- what's the right word -- emotion and sincerity, which is not to criticize what abe has done. i think he's come a long way and deserves credit for that to spite the incomplete grade that i've given him and homework that he needs to do. >> so abe said everything but the apology part, and more. so the person matters. i think those who agreed on the curb, edit we expected. i think those who say it's not enough, is not sincere parsing

that because o of his past statements if he did about extreme as to what this wasn't abe, when they had the statement issued by -- also some potential prime ministers -- [inaudible] any of those guys, all of them who could be prime minister andn any of those guys that issued the same save with the yeah, that's about right. that's pretty much it at the center. in 1955 posts war socials bipolar cold war context. there are no more of him. i don't think it's just generational. i think it's structure of politics and geopolitics, but i think the statement could have been issued but almost any perspective prime minister in japan who is on the horizon. unless i can think of a few exceptions but most of the names, people, if abe was abducted by space aliens tomorrow, what are these guys and mentioned would be prime minister in the same statement

from them would've been completely expected and natural i think. think. >> but would it have gotten the same, positive grade or harsh criticism, if they had given it? >> less so in both cases i said because prime minister abe's past. than once passed statement on its when a context by a statement of a socialist prime minister who in 1995 but all the back of the socialist party to the statement. including opposition to the defense street that gives the click that. political context sent prime minister abe generation of politicians against the komeito insignificant sum about korea or china becomes about the ideological battle over whether japan is right to be a normal mission or not. those politics colored the way that many in the current cabinet viewed as those apology. because of not just the words in the apology the goes all the

ideological baggage of the socialist party brought with it. that's history. that's the past. it's a different context i think his statement is pretty much what mainstream prime minister would have said. >> i'm going to open the floor to questions but i will start with the usual housekeeping of about the recognition please wait for the microphone to, do you. state your name and your affiliation. and keep it short, have it as a question rather than a speech. but even more so given these issues which are very highly controversial, highly emotional in both japan and korea, if you could sort of pleased keep your questions in the context of another questions as opposed to very strong remarks these and if you're going to throw something, throw it at him. [laughter] >> i.c. chris had his and at first.

spent thanks for continuing what i think that a really rich discussion on all these things since late last week. i really enjoyed printing i think about 50 pages of comments so far and now we have some more. some of the feedback i've been getting that was not principle of request, don't print them is a lot our korean friends are feeling they been sandbagged on this. that we made very clear in advance we want to move things forward. we want to -- so that would be good if you did, too. president park certainly came through, sadly, we all agree on that. this undercurrent is a worrisome. doesn't they keep the onus on those do not just have the sort of neutral we have a good -- we leaned on them to be positive. don't we need to get on prime

minister abe to take up president park's offer and specifically what do you think they prime minister should be doing? went to the things them a report last from an anonymous contributor was abe absolutely must reach out to her undercover women and when several resolve this and that's what he took out of what he heard on saturday the do you agree with that was the agreed the assessment occurred an additional burden but they need on ro our okay to be posit, and if so, how does this all play out? thanks. >> does anyone want to jump in? >> i think there's a lot of leaning by washington of direction of lots going on in the background of words whispered in the appropriate years and concerns expressed in those directions while a lot of us may not be public but i think behind the scenes there's been a lot of very helpful, wouldn't call it leaning uprising or

cajoling. i think there's been some good advice offered including from those of us on the dais here. i would take issue with the notion that the koreans somehow feel sandbagged by all of us. if you look at various statements that up and coming out of seoul about what seoul wanted and needed, one of the fundamental requirements that the koreans made clear was a reaffirmation by abe of all previous japanese government statements. there have been plenty of editorials written into korea press that he was trying to rewrite them. he's done quite the opposite. he is reaffirmed, associate himself with them and they are now of his legacy as well since he signed on to do so think it's a little unfair to suggest that somehow sold was sandbagged in all of this. i think there's been, as i

suggested in my opening remarks, some very interesting and helpful dialogue going on for the last several months between seoul and tokyo at a number of levels that kind of teed up viae environment that the two countries now find themselves in. that has been a gradual turning down of the acerbic rhetoric we've heard, and turning up the volume of hopeful, hope oriented, future oriented remarks. and so i'm a little cynical than some of your unnamed correspondence are about where things are and how they've come to this point. i think it's important for the united states to continue to do quietly but it has been doing, which is to continue this quiet dialogue with seoul and tokyo, and encourage them to do precisely what i think is going on right now, move things in a better direction and take advantage of this opening.

>> i was in the nsc office for almost five years, attracted a statement out of the white house, and knowing how that office works and knowing dan and chris who would've been responsible for this, i'm very confident that the korean government was in probably daily conversations, as well as others in japan within about how this would play. i doubt the korean government was surprised. the korean press on with because it's very sensitive. it probably wasn't shared. i think that president park's statement were well-crafted but i think as it was done with poor knowledge of how this would pl play. >> japanese foreign minister phone call to his korean counterpart. >> that's right. >> also help keep this up.

>> michael marshall, global peace foundation. in many ways the abe the statement is a product of the internal debate in japanese domestic politics, how is japanese history is read. japanese history is recognizing in that debate that national is right, lost out. my question is about the 80% of the public on the polls which obviously covers the spread of political views who say they don't trust korea, and the whole business of korea fatigue. how does that play into the dynamics and the dimension of the statement at the korean response to it? and what can move that attitude in japan towards korea? it seems to me this is quite worrying that there are that many japanese who don't care much for korea.

>> i'll take a stab at that. so i think all of us are aware the polling data, but by national polling data, and again it's a great place to look at both sides and how they're drinking. i'm sure everybody on this understandpanelunderstands willd talk to friends, both sides, not just government officials and policymakers, that the attitudes toward korea are troubling, after has been i think a deepening of mistrust and antagonism and a some cases open discussion of discrimination. it's a difficult issue for both countries but i'm going to both leaders accountable for some of this because i think the diplomatic estrangement between seoul and tokyo could of been a different story in the domestic antipathies could have been much, much less harsh but i suspect on both sides, right? that's what i think, and to get

him an academic like it to like this without responsibility, but i think political leaders ought to take that to heart, that when they decide to not go to speak to each other because their publics don't like it, they are also creating political operative inside own domestic societies for the kind of antipathies worsening economic both sides, not just on the japanese site. there is responsibility here and i think that's one of the pieces of the puzzle and again i'm not singling out one leader or the other. this is a story that's been unfolding since, go back to -- so both abe and part inherited in some way this dissidence but they're the ones, billy went at the moment the trifecta. i think both leaders now have a higher hurdle in explaining to koreans and japanese why their futures are so interdependent our wider teachers should be interdependent. it's not complete entity

question about why that 80% exists. this point of reasons we can come up with in terms of more memory, et cetera come and mistreatment, right? but i think the question is how does it get fixed? i think that 80% will ship in japan and others in the me take issue with this but i think it's movable. i think that's what mr. abe's inheritance here as well. he needs a partner in seoul to do that and i think that's an important piece of the puzzle. >> just a quick additional worker i agree with all of that. there's not only korea fatigue and tokyo, there's japan fatigue in seoul, traveling back and forth between the two capitals in recent years, it's become obvious to me that you got a problem in both capitals without

they perceived the other side. it is a fact that there has been i think insufficient leadership exercised on both sides. i have tremendous wealth of respect for both countries. i served in both for many, many years. it is true that the two leaders who are in power now inherited a lot of dissidence from their predecessors, but on the other respective watches it got worse. and i think the good news coming out of office is that in recent months is becoming increasingly obvious that responsible people in both capitals right up to the top have looked at this deterioration of relations between the two countries that have so much in common in terms of assess it in my remarks shared values, shared concerns and shared threats, that things have gotten so bad that it was time to try to arrest what some of described as a freefall in

the relationship. i wouldn't point to the events over the weekend as having turned the corner in this relationship. i think we settlements ago begin to turn the corner as if it two sides recognize that something needed to be done, and the point i want to leave you with your to that is that the events of this past week and i think every firm that both sides seem to the sense that things should not be allowed to get any worse and that there is some prospect that things might get better and that might be able to get that 80% number back in their territory. >> that's a good question. i'm not sure the right wing laws. the far right lost but i thought this statement synthesize broad centerleft and center-right together and some of the words people like allow that.

but on the question of japan-korea, i think we come it's about leadership and i don't think it was about malicious intent. prime minister abe made his first speech as prime minister the second time in 2013 at csis come and i moderated a discussion. we told our friends in the prime minister's office i was going to call an victor cha, my colleague to talk about the relationship so they could be ready. transoms unclench ask the question that he sent my grandfather was very close to his father and said he was the most pro-japanese leader in korean history, which was sincere and positive and not the right message. press in the park also did they particularly with xi jinping and

harboring with statues to the assassin of -- that a don't think we're done necessary with the japan message in mind over and played by the chinese. so both sides had failures in leadership, not moral, not malicious intent but just too much similarity, frankly. like evans i've had a number of conversations with president park before she was president i don't think -- she's quite pragmatic. and abe famously did very well with korea his first time as prime minister. his wife learned korean watching midnight dramas. i think it was just unfortunate consequence is in part because they thought their so good with conservatives comes with each other. i once was an exchange student comic of from time to time to the hot springs. there's a hill was the first korean woman pilot to cross the

ocean tha does not be named betn japan and korea, and crashed into this field and there was a memorial there. in 2000 come they went and built a korean dish is beautiful. they built a korean bill and put up a huge stone for after pledging more relations between the people of korea and japan. you don't see that now. you don't see that. part of this because it's about leadership in setting the right tone. little gestures like wendy prime minister went to the korean embassy, right, on the 50th anniversary of the 1965 treaty back in june. going to the embassy, that's not very can it's good but it's not gripping, it's not an agenda. i think part of this will be to get past the grumpiness and start thinking really

creatively. i think the statement, although it wasn't homer necessary, will make it possible to think of it kind of gestures that will create an environment which in my view, has to proceed to some extent a real addressing of the comfort issue. i do think it addressed. it will have to be iterative and hopefully they'll be some of the poor imaginative, creative thinking that both capitals to do. >> thank you very much for the great discussion. i'd like to ask about the chinese victory day ceremony december 3 that's been discussed already. i am sorry, i can't offer any insight and whether or not prime minister abe is going. and i thought the speculation by

dr. green that he might go it is a trilateral meeting, made after the ceremony. very interesting. my question is what do you think president park we do? because there has been a report that chinese government is pushing her to go, to come, and the u.s. government is expressing some reservations. so i'd like to hear your prediction for speculation. also, how would the u.s. government treat this? >> let me take the first crack at that. i met with become anymore, that's what i smile so much lately. and i'm not going to speak for what washington may or may not be doing. i have no knowledge of it. i think it's important to

separate the visit to beijing by either president park board prime minister abe from the military parade, point mike made earlier. these are very different things. i think if prime minister abe is to visit, i see no problem with a visit by president park to beijing, but the military parade i think is very different issue, quite frankly. and if i were advising one side or the other, not that anybody has asked me to provide advice, but if it were it would be a number of factors i would want to consider before approving the notion of a visit to beijing, one of which would be the notion, is my counterpart from tokyo or seoul going? that's an important factor right there because i think it legitimizes the entire thing if both could go. but reflecting on the rok

government position on a number of issues dealing with peace and stability in the future of northeast asia, if the goal is peace and cooperation and reconciliation northeast asia which is the goal of president park and her government, does her present at a military parade further that goal? personally i think not. so that would be one factor that i would consider. speaking very frankly, how appropriate would it be for a korean president to be at a military parade come if that's an option, that is hosted by the less country to have invaded korea? speaking very broadly. the participation in the military parade, once again this is separate and apart from a visit debate to beijing to bring

their in the military parade risks by into the chinese communist party's mythology about world war ii, assistance to japan, that the borne the brunt about in the fighting et cetera, et cetera. and i think that's problematic, and also, i do need to make anybody in this room, the government and beijing now did not come into existence until four years after the end of the war. so why are they celebrating? what a day commemorating? and then there's also the symbology of tanks and troops went on the streets of china. burden but who remembers tiananmen come if i were an adviser to either come up with a let's take twice before the state but once again let's keep the issues of possible visit to beijing, especially if they can be done by both leaders, separate from the whole parade

thing. i don't know how this is going to play out but once again if i were asked my advice those are the factors i would divide. >> i agree. the optics of producing in the military parade and especially for standing in tiananmen square for any democratic leader would be difficult, frankly, i think that's what the european leaders are having a difficult time making decisions about how they want to think about the move. on the other hand, there is an opportunity and it's a big one, if president park and prime minister abe want to take it. and that is that if they did show up diplomatically and separate capacity to talk to xi jinping about peace and stability in the region. i gave an opening remarks that may be too much of a dream but i think it's an option that should be fully discussed in coordinated and considered. if it's going to be difficult to do then, of course, maybe another occasion, but if it's

possible to conceive of come together for the sake of the region, for a demonstration of that ambition on the part of both the president and the prime minister i think we would applaud it. i would applaud certain. but also i think ask a xi jinping of the bit of buy-in frankly to divorce of the trilateral relationship with i think there's one danger here that i see it i don't speak for our government at all, but in one of the great advantages of that trilateral forum is it allows china, japan and south korea to build trust but also to problem solve at the sub regional level. so when they begin a trilateral december 2008 everybody thought it would be about economics or cross-border issues. it very quick to get into the conversation with is a comfort level talking about north korea, for example. the promise of the trilateral consultative venue is very important. it's even more important today and i would urge both leaders in

tokyo and seoul not to allow the relationship, again, to china at the axis of that relationship, that they must argue for defining that ownership of that trilateral is him. i think if you allow it to be separated and perhaps thinking they are the people who are thinking in seoul, if you allow it to be separated from its diplomacy from japan, then get lost in some way your own initiative over the trilateral dialogue. i think you've also weakened yourself over the long run. the same goes with tokyo. if you allow the estrangement with the sole and only focus on china, then you have weakened your latitude going forward. i hope that this trilateral application again if we could see it happen in a constructive way on september 3 or the morning of the fourth, i think all of us on this panel would be delighted. but at least don't allow the separation to continue in a way that's going to make trilateral

is a either uninformed or not possible at all. >> so many of you probably followed a summit last spring in shanghai which brought together eurasian continental eurasian leaders. china posted it last year and the chinese hosts pressed all the participating countries decide on to a joint statement opposing blocs in asia, which was an unambiguous attack on u.s. alliances, and calling for a new security system. every leader, participant signed on including u.s. allies like turkey and israel were on the other side a eurasian. kirby was the only country that refused under enormous chinese pressure korea is a very, very

good outline of the china. i was in so at the time and asked friends in the foreign ministry and blue house if they were concerned that beijing thought korea would sign off in the first place. got people thinking. i think that the korean government has been a little bit incautious about allowing present parts good relationship with xi jinping which is good thing. i think the event will put in cautious about letting china create a narrative in the region that an actual order of asia and the future is going to be a continental system that korea is moving toward. i don't believe that's true ended up with a korea's position, but i know a lot of people who do. and i think it would be disastrous for president park to go, i don't think you ago, for all the reasons evans so

adequately explain. i think it's risky for her to go. i think it's good to go after them before because they know what happened in the parade and you can put in context. i would not recommend going to the before. it's less risky as we've been saying it she does it in a trilateral. for abe is a positive thing to have a summit in china around then and to participate in the commemoration of the end of the war. extremely risky for him though because the foreign ministry which is who tokyo talks to will not control the spin on that parade. i think it's almost certain that he will be a very anti-japanese, very militarized prayed for a host of reasons in chinese decision-making of domestic politics right now but it's a lot less risky for abe. i haven't thought about this a lot but sheila got me thinking. a think about the logic of it, maybe we should all be pushing

this, and push it over 50% because it would make a lot of sense and it would have pay off for xi jinping, too. the day before is not a good idea. >> i have to question. one is sort of bureaucratic. is there any reason that the u.s. reaction came from tennessee spokesperson rather than the ambassador -- the umc spokesperson. wondering about that. the other thing is i'm struck by mike's prediction that prime ministers will not apologize anymore. i wonder if that's the case, if you look back at this as a narrative work than once put it successfully lowered the bar on what you to do, hence the grade on a curve, leonard the bar but

then was sort of a martyr for future leaders of japan, and is that a bad thing or a good thing? >> can't tell who's a smirk is bigger. [laughter] >> our shadow palace christen nelson was -- [laughter] [inaudible] >> why the nsc? [inaudible] spearing you realize you're out of him on television. [inaudible]

unified step. >> any of you want to ask a question of chris? switch positions. [laughter] spent i'm sure the japanese government wanted it to come from what has been they didn't want to come from the embassy or the state department. both unified message but because of the stature the it was not a white house statement. it was an nfc statement. now i'm being very good credit. basilica been because getting a white house statement cleared in that statement takes more than two hours, ellis is like an attack on homeland or something. so as a practical matter they needed to get it out quickly and i think nsc spokesman, believe me, easier than getting it to the political sphere on the apology question, are you asking us for our own personal opinion? i mean, i'm not big on

apologies. and international relations. i think there are times when they are appropriate but i don't think any country anywhere for anything those perpetual apologies. there have been 50 roughly. i think working on, apologies are extremely political. even in the korean and japanese language the we apologize and so forth establishes hierarchy. it places a narrative about whether asia is defined by the norms of japan, korea and the u.s. standby or things that happen 70, 80, 90 years ago. iif you want all of asia to be moving towards the norms that we in japan and korea stand by, we can't be focusing on that. fourposter this episode, not just in this case but in general, and not big on apologies, and so i think it's

appropriate. i think it's appropriate personally this is something for everybody loves own personal view. kind of like marriage, my view is i should not have to apologize but i lose that would. is i should not have to apologize but i lose that would. that's different. >> would you draw a distinction between future apologies or the lack thereof in japan and future statement that would include some of the things that the tripod touched upon on friday, remorse and regret and reflection? >> i don't think future prime ministers will apologize, but i do think that future prime ministers do, go to marco polo bridge, talk about specifics. and abe get more specific references to bad things that japan did than any present statement that any prime minister, foreigners or emperor. i hope that the trend of the future prime minister and japanese officials, ambassadors will talk more about the specific things.

that tim is much more fruitful in terms of preparing and giving them an apology, which is so political and so hierarchical and so much about power and legitimacy at a time when our focus on legitimacy should be about focusing don't make asia and more safer and more prosperous place spirit i askedd the question for a number of reasons, the most important is if you look back at the statement from prime minister abe, what are the building blocks of that statement is this notion of conveying that future generations the lessons we have learned. i think you'll probably continue to do that in the future. >> just a footnote. you use the word martyr, right, and your question. none of us are going to be, well maybe some of you will be her, i won't be here in the 80th anniversary, i certainly not the on the panel anyway, hopefully i will be about i think it's hard

to type forward what a japanese leader in what context they will be working if it diplomatic or don't. i think it speaks to how much change we've seen. look at what was going on, back it up, leaving domestic politics aside. look at the asia editor looking out at a look at where we are today. i think that context, fast-forward 10 years from now, we don't know. i think that will shape whether or not a statement of what kind of statement is given. but again, i'm not usually here supporting mr. abe, and find myself in that position today. in the press conference after his state he said something very important. first of all in a statement he said we should never forget history. that was a very clear statement. it was their obligations not to forget the ending his press conference after he said exactly what mike was alluding to which was used trying to bring the

most japanese that he could together under a statement. so he's trying to both bridge this right left difference in definition of what was right and what was on but think he's also enlisting them a little bit in the education, the future generations. that this is something we can all come together as they come person, that we can teach them we can make it possible. but they did take it on as our generation's responsibility. he was on nhk the morning after the statement. it very quickly set our generation is responsible for making this happen. it wasn't are not going to apologize anymore kind of statement. he did is in his generation, and i suspect, this generation of koreans and potentially chinese that we were going to be able to have this problem. it was a statement of ownership for this generation ipod again got glossed over a little bit and i'm not sure that's how he interprets this himself but it

wasn't a martyr, like he was doing it for the right wing cause of for the conservative cause. i think he felt more vested in making possible. just a little, i'm not a historian, but international politics after you have it work you have a treaty, right? historians to write today about the treaty that ended world war i, the treaty of for so i punitive peace at that impose on the german people -- treaty upper side. scholarship is different. it was a treaty full of reparation. generations of germans have to pay back those that did use force against. after world war ii and surface of a peace treaty discussion the cost of that heavy burden on future generations was fully discussed when it came time to think about reparations for san francisco. so i think that they would look at this other question of history, is now we don't have a treaty that is full of

reparations but we still have this sort of sentiment of unfinished business. a-game bilateral treaties, japan and south korea, bilateral treaties for those who are not in the san francisco peace treaty table. of basic understanding was japan would be welcomed back to the postwar peace without punishment. and he we still sit and talk about apology. i don't want to say that the answer to the question at another japanese government gets a lot of criticism, some of it justifiable, that they're being too legalistic in the thinking of what needs to happen. but you are talking of a two-tiered phenomenon, especially japan and south korea relationship, especially for the women who suffered in the battlefield brothels. those women deserve adjusted. whether the treaty needs to be renegotiate or not, i did anybody is going to want to open up that again. -taken both leaders on both

sides have they got out of their treaty language and their state to state relationship perhaps differs from what is fundamentally i think at this particular moment in time for questionable whether these women, they're still 50 of them alive, we have lost in the last several months, we've lost several more, but those women deserve attention with and without the legalism, with or without fighting it out in terms of who is more or less sort i think that's a piece of the puzzle that will be difficult politically begin to back to leadership. >> you talked about the possibility of holding bilateral summit between the two countries. i think it is informed to hold

bilateral talks. more important think is what kind of agenda should be discussed? so because even if there's a summit -- they would be a diplomatic gesture of both coaches. what did you think about? >> after everybody else has an opinion on the question. i think diplomatic disasters are part of a risk. i'm not a diplomat and evans is the leading talk about that. i think it to solve problems without risk frankly, especially difficult problems. about as interesting as you a new book about the japan-china relations, not japan and south korea relations so this is taking a step back, but many of us thought the summit what kind of condition only would suffice of the diplomats found a way around that, right? they went to beijing before the apex summit. it was hosted by beijing but

they came up with four points of agreement. with a precondition quick capsule enough. we all know they created the foundation for both leaders to be able to sit in the same room together. we also the picture, right? it was not a warm embrace. it was not a solution to the imperative of risk reduction, right? but it began the process. now, i suspect that given the body language of the hague summit in the netherlands last year but i suspect president park in prime minister abe can get all of the better body language but they did at that particular meeting but i think engaging in the conversation, whatever those points may be, that the diplomats can work through, that's the beginning of a solution to the problem. i don't think you're going to have a prepackaged comprehensive solution prior to summit, but a thing to have a good

understanding of what they want to go. >> just a quick response. i have a lot of faith in the creativity of the intelligence of korean and japanese diplomats coming up with a pretty good substantial agenda for both countries. won't be a very hard thing. in terms of the risk i think the real risk for korea and japan in an era in which come in a region where we've seen rising uncertainty and some rising threats, the risk is allowing korea-japan relations to continue to deteriorate in the face of that reality. it is the risk, and i think what we now have, thanks to some reflection on the part of the japanese leader, basically helpful comments that he is made on friday, as well as the korean president's remarks on saturday

are two leaders to recognize those risks and recognized the need to arrest what had been a freefall in bilateral relations and turn things around and move them in a better direction. so i have as i said a lot of confidence that the two leaders, having given their blessing i think is the way i would put it, to trying one more time to move relations in a good direction, having seen that happen now, having heard the leaders spoken come under conscious optimistic that perhaps we are on our way to turning a corner. >> i know we have more questions but i promised my panelists we would finish by 11:30, so please join me in thanking our very esteemed panel. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

>> today tom vilsack discusses federal child nutrition programs at the center for american progress. see his remarks live at 1 p.m. eastern on c-span. >> next from the american bar association homeland security conference a discussion on the role of lawyers in emergency preparedness. panelist discuss their shared expenses amid the 9/11 attacks at the threat of ebola in the u.s. this is one hour. >> next topic is a very serious one which is going to be reflected upon our panel and muttering that panel is the perfect person to be part of this segment is joshua filler. i know josh from a serve at the department of homeland security. is founder and president of first degree strategies in

washington, d.c. at home in security consulting firm. he served as the first director of the office of state and local coordination for the is department of homeland security. josh co-authored the homeland security presidential directive eight on national preparedness as we followed early an age of homeland security. ..