vote. this is a situation you are worried about, but there are other issues on the table. ..

thanks to the crises in the south china sea and in ukraine but there some structural features of this and it goes back in a lot of ways to before the start of the peace outburst. one of the ways that this cooperation has manifested itself has been an increased military and military technical cooperation between the two countries. and every weather was a lot happening a decade or so ago and then dropped off for a while. it's only in the last couple of years we've really seen it resuming. and so it's been wonderful for us here in the russian eurasia program to help paul schwartz onboard as a nonresident associate to work on specifically the nuts and bolts of sino-russian military cooperation, and the first fruit of paul's affiliation with us,

first concrete good about is this report here. and so i hope you have a chance to read and i look forward to the discussion we're going to have here today. i think what we are going to do is we'll have paul discussed the report for about 15-20 minutes, go through some of the date and some of the conclusions and then we'll have a little discussion up here and in addition to paul we have my colleague thomas character was a senior fellow with the international security program and director of the missile defense project here and then zack cooper who is a fellow with the japan chair and an expert on asian security issues. tom is going to talk about some of the political aspects, particularly as it affects a tiny events that will give a little bit more of a regional perspective, how asia as a whole gives sino-russian military

cooperation. and then when they're done we'll open it up to discussion and hopefully will have a good back and forth for those of you here in the room. so with that, please turn off your wringing devices, and that going to turn the floor over to paul schwartz. >> thanks a lot, jeff. in 1996, i once again current president is up for reelection -- taiwan's then current president was of a religion. he favored greater independence for taiwan. statements that that greatly disturbed china's leaders. getting the taiwan might declare outright independence if you are reelected china's leaders decided they did to send a strong signal that he was taking taiwan doubt it very dangerous path. so in march of 1996 they being conducting a series of live fire missile at the sizes in the

taiwan strait that disrupted maritime traffic. in response the u.s. decided to act and dispatch to carrier task forces to the region. faced with such an overwhelming display of force and lacking the means to effectively counter it, china's leaders were forced to back down except a humiliating defeat. there was no accident that just a few short months later they entered into the first contract. the sole remedy been designed specifically to attack and destroy the u.s. aircraft carriers. norwood is proud to be a one time event. would you be surprised to learn since the cold war russian defense assistance has been crucial to the dealt with of china surface and at the surface warfare capabilities. nor has this been solid and historical phenomena the recently, over the last abuse in a few cases, russian defense assistance has continued to play an important role in the development of china's maritime

forces. today i'm going to lay out a case for this claim by addressing three related questions. first, what kind of russian defense assistance, connected systems have the assistance have the russians provided for china's maritime forces. second, how have those forces benefited from such assistance, and third, what has been the impact on china's antiaccess strategy. we will focus on the specific ships, sensors and weapons systems that have either been transferred out right from russia to china or developed by china using russian technology. let's first start with little background on china's anti-axis strategy. so many of you may all be fully with that, some quite clear but a brief recap of its essentials will help to set the context and explain the role in that strategy. over the past 200 years china has faced the persistent threat of attack from the sea, first

from the colonial powers, then the japanese and most recently from the u.s. navy. for most of that period china lack of effect it means to counter those threats. is needed remained underdeveloped, it's fleet was wholly incapable of matching up against an advanced naval adversary our maritime for such as the u.s. navy. nor did it's fleet possess the capabilities to defend china some interest in this in your pisces. why? until recently china's fleet has suffered from three major deficiencies. first, it lacked the maritime -- here to protect the fleet against air and missile strikes me superior adversary such as the u.s. navy. this forced the for to operate close to sure what could be protected by land-based air defense platforms. second, the fleet also like a modern anti-ship missiles needed to defend itself against well armed u.s. warships are but i

think it's fleet could have no hope of really stand up against the u.s. fleet at a force on force engagement. finally, the fleet like a robust anti-submarine warfare capability. this led the ships are vulnerable to attack by u.s. submarines even when operating close to shore. to address the threat of u.s. intervention, can develop its now famous antiaccess strategy. as its name suggests, the strategy is designed to keep u.s. forces out of contested maritime regions in time of war. it calls for dividing the western pacific into two distinct defensive tears you can send it to -- defensive tears you can see on the chart. the outer to extend the perimeter further out for total distance of 1200 nautical miles from china's coast out to what's called a second island chain. china's fleet is a scientific mission statement on the

defensive tears involved in literature the mission is to prevent u.s. forces from intervening in a future maritime conflict such as one involving taiwan. but also in that, it's fleet is passed to seek and maintain local sea control to allow for the conduct of military operations over those waters such as would be near to conduct an amphibious invasion of taiwan. in the outer care by contrast the fleet's mission is primarily to be one of seeking to put a lease for the moment although that is starting to change as we see china starting to develop its new water naval capability. but its mission, to keep u.s. forces from using that area as a base from which you can launch long range precision strikes against u.s. forces or against the mainland itself. getting the fleet to the public interest that commissions has been a long and arduous process, regarding your total overall of the fleet and remains very much a work in progress. when the new strategy was first adopted china's defense remain

technologically backward, to develop come incapable of providing the kind of advanced military weapons needed to properly upgrade the fleet china was forced to turn to external suppliers and russia soon emerged as china's principal supply. why? due to the tiananmen square crisis back in 1989, china had been placed under a comprehensive arms embargo from the west. so if you can find new sources. fortunately, for it russia defends companies finding its is cut off from state defense orders in economic chaos that followed the collapse of the soviet union had become desperate for revenues for arms sales to sustain their very existence. the net result come along and sustained artist relationship between russia and china to continue to this day. you can see this on the chart. according -- russia's transferred over $30 billion in military equipment to china. that probably significantly

understate the true amount they can to track primarily the larger transactions. so let's take a closer look at russian contribution to start with surface warships and we'll talk about anti-ship missiles systems and they will close with air defense platforms. among the first steps taken on china's long road to modernization, the purchase of four advanced destroyers from russia. at the time of the purchase they were far and away the best worship in china's fleet and provided several important benefits. first it came equipped with russian sunburn antiship cruise missiles. these were the first truly modern ascs in china's fleet. they could fly supersonic speeds, strike targets at long range up to 240 kilometers and had great penetrating power. their proposed transfer was something of an uproar in congress.

to guide the sunburst, they came equipped with russian bandstand radar systems. these advanced systems provide over the horizon targeting capability for the sunburn and can surveil targets out of range of 450 kilometers. according to the naval expert norm friedman, it bounces signals off the troposphere. it also came equipped with advanced russian defense systems which was china's first true air to air defense platform for up to its range was limited to provide protection for china's surface action groups encompassed at a distance of up to 25 kilometers. aside from the remedy the chinese the all of the own warships domestically which is a testament to increase our sufficiency in shipbuilding industry. that doesn't mean china's fleet has become totally self-sufficient and even of russian support. marc coma. for example, according to naval analyst keith jacobs, russia's

frigate reportedly benefited significantly from russian design and development assistance provided by its design bureau. china's maritime force also rely extensively on russian technology for both long range precision strikes and maritime air defense as well. us examine these contributions closer starting with precision strike. talked about the bandstand greater system which was delivered with the remedy. the chinese have purchased dozens of these systems and their widely distributed across china's fleet included on all of its latest and most advanced destroyers and frigates. in addition to the sunburn, russia has transferred several other advanced astm to china, anti-christmas was previously the widely feared -- excuse me -- club sizzlercomposted on russian kilo class others that were previously transferred to china. like the sunburn, the club

sizzler is a long rant sea skimming and the ship cruise missile. for most of its flight path that travels at sub sonic speed to conserve fuel but as it approaches a target come acceleration to my supersonic speeds of up to mach iii taking a difficult to intercept. regular duties forces have limited and data with the u.s. has effective means to intercept this missile in flight. the russians also transferred sophisticated air launch cruise missile such as the cage 31 shown here. this is a long range supersonic missile perfect for launching attacks from the air against massive u.s. warships. according to sipri, they have purchased over 900 continued to produce them under license from russia. more recently beijing has begun to develop a whole new generation of supersonic antiship cruise missiles of its own. according to experts, such as richard fisher the false appeal

a very close to, they all appeared to be based on formally transferred russian cruise missiles. the first is the why jv team but this is clearly a copy of the russian klub sizzler want to just talk about come and voice the same two-stage sub sonic supersonic like profile which is a strong indicator of its russian heritage. according to the office of naval intelligence this is not just been employed in 2014 on china's destroyer which is latest and most advanced the story. continuing testament to russia's ongoing influence. the second is the why jv team. this could be an extended version of russia's kh-31, the otherness i just spoke about. it is a air launch cruise moscow high supersonic speed speed and other similar flight characteristics. it will be deployed on china's bomber which is a long range strategic bomber giving appeal lake naval air force extended reach well out into the forest

these are the second island chain -- pla. the emergence of a new generation of chinese antiship cruise missiles all based on russian technology is an ominous new development for the western pacific. because this china start to substitute these new missiles for some of its existing interior missiles it will result in significantly increased striking power for the fleet. what about russia's cultivation to the fleet air defense capability? that has been equally impressive. in addition -- mosque was transferred to other air defense platforms. the first, an upgraded version of assault remedies gadfly commentary and of the missile system which is the same system that had been used to down malaysian airliners flight 17 over ukraine in 2014. it's installed on china's destroyer. but more importantly russia also transferred the gargoyle which is installed on china's class

district this is china's first true long range naval air defense platform able to strike targets out of 150 kilometers. is by far the longest range air defense platform in china's fleet and is quite given a gift of writing up aerial targets. more recently china's begun producing its own naval air defense systems but again the most important of these are based on russian technology. the hq nine is china's first indigenous develop long range air defense system. it has a range of 100 kilometers from 120-foot upgraded hq 90 which was late, although short of the range of the gargoyle. but is reportedly cause held on russian is 300 air defense technology. these powerful new air defense system are installed on both china's -- recently china's also develop hq 60 which is a medium-range naval air defense system but not only does a lot

on russian technology, but it's also the product of a joint development project between russia and china. it is installed on china's latest frigate. accidentally sunday may have been thinking isn't some of his the product of a chinese reverse engineering? probably. still i consider this to be the direct result of russian defense assistance were a couple of reasons. personal it's not possible to tell when a system has been produced under license or produced illicitly. as the two don't always talk about the situation in public. more important russia's willingness to sell china advanced military equipment despite his past record of reverse engineering, strong indicator of russians pass it acceptance of such activities considered part of their working relationship expect part of doing business. now having examined and surveyed the field of technology that's

been transferred, let's take a look at how this technology is impact on china and to access capability. starting with precision strike. prior to russian defense assistance that is antiship cruise missiles in china's fleet was the why jk, subsonic missile with a limited range of just 65 nautical miles. today the fleet striking out has been radically improved and russian defense assistance has been crucial. russian technology has given china a major boost in its ability strike u.s. warships at sea that lies at the very heart of china's anti-access strategy. according to an expert wayne, analysis of -- go back to the battle of midway demonstrates aside and starts effective the first usually prevails. why? because the initial salvo will significant reduce the size of the enemy fleet and all the attacker has to do is sustain its in a superior firepower

against the danish fleet of the enemy until it either withdraws or is destroyed. the best way to strike first if of weapons that at least those of the enemy. that we the attacker can launch standoff strikes outside of the defensive umbrella with npd tickets like bring a gun to a knife fight. this advantage is precisely russia has given the chinese. as you see from the chart, chinese antiship cruise missiles, like the sunburn which is little pale but you can see the outer circle on the left, have much greater range than comparable use systems like the harpoon on the right which is the largest range you is antiship cruise missiles today. russian defense assistance has been crucial to the chinese overcome the first of three major deficiencies i spoke about earlier. it's just dirty and anti-ship striking power. russian defense assistance that is a large impact on china's naval air defense capabilities. as late as 2000 according to the

department of defense china's fleet was ill-equipped for air defense, this is a handful of surface-to-air missiles and all of those having very limited range. today the story is quite different. according to 2000 office of naval intelligence report, for example, russian air defense radar platform such as -- have been key to improving the plans naval air defense capability. at the same time russian air defense platforms and the new chinese of derivatives has greatly increased the capabilities and range of china's naval air defense platforms. having capable long range air defense system is crucial because it complicates the task of u.s. pilots seeking to strike chinese warships at sea. therefore, supposed to make the kind of decision they haven't had to make since vietnam. from the chart you can see that china has been catching up

rapidly to the u.s. in terms of naval air defense capability. while the u.s. maintains the advantage, china has narrowed the ga gap considerably. keeping my prior to russian defense assistance, the longest range legacy chinese naval air defense platform would barely have shown up on the chart. russian defense of citizens has been crucial to china to overcome the second of three major deficiencies, its weakness, its inability to defend itself adequate against long range air and missile strikes. having surveyed the situation so let's re-examine my original claims. if i did my job correctly it should be evident russian defense assistance have been crucial to development of china's service and at the surface warfare capabilities. the transfer of advanced remedy destroyers and ascs like the sunburn of the two major china's precision strike capability. at the same time provision in advance russian air defense

platforms such as the gargoyle give china its first true long range naval air defense command of the to represent the great leap forward for china's maritime forces. the development of new chinese supersonic antiship cruise missiles all based on russian techno to represent further large gains for th this please precision strike capability. -- the fleet's precision strike capability. these systems are now making a real difference in the competition for naval supremacy in the western pacific. i don't mean to imply that the chinese remain totally dependent on russia, far from it, no one would disagree the chinese have made a considerable grant increasing business efficiency especially in certain areas. i would contend the chinese to have a ways to go and their fleet could still benefit from additional russian defense

assistance. for example, china's anti-submarine war to depose remain deficient. another example to china results agree to purchase the as/400 from russia. russia's latest and longest range air defense platform. the chinese purchased a naval nl great which they can do when to air defense platforms. that could result in doubling of the range of china's fleet air defense system. finally, russia's not standing still i can just upgrade its existing platforms, developing new systems all the time. rush is reportedly developing a high supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, a third missile which was reportedly transferred to

the chinese. capable of achieving speeds of up to mach four-point iv. the chinese would be very gratefully -- yogi berra once famously said it's tough to make predictions especially about the future. but if it passes in a chair i would predict much of this new russian technology will find its way to china's maritime forces. thank you. [applause] >> thanks a lot, paul. now let's move over to discussion of some of the water strategic context so i will turn the floor over to to thomas kar. >> very thoughtful and detailed analysis really of an important problem. including by the way intentions of these hardware manager i think it's very easy to just

collide over the details and this is the kind of analysis that i think there needs to be to be a lot more up. as i was listening to paul making historical references of the 1990s, i was thinking anyway even larger scale. these are the kinds of systems, the lower end of some tight ranges that just don't get a lot of attention. i think that's what of the things that makes this report relatively unique is that they're not quite as exotic as talking about the df 41 or the latest dfi or something like that but they matter. one sense in which they matter is just a technological commercial and geopolitical trends that have conspired and i think this report points in that direction, conspired for increased global supply and demand of high precision, high velocity missile based strike

delivery systems and that counters thereunto, right? in 1959, bernard brodie wrote the buk strategy in the missile age. and i think it's the proliferation of thes these thi. but with the proliferation as a matter of policy in this case, the proliferation of these systems in the wake of shooting to a new missile age. so let me, paul had a number of these systems in particular if you follow the footnotes you recognize that there just are not that many folks out there talking about these things, which isn't part of the problem. so let me give some context and some comments about systems at the edges which in a way go beyond the self-conscious scope of the report. first, the context. zach will give more to the regional but i think the

questions up what exactly russia's intentions are, is there a stopping point on is there a tipping point for russia goes too far? or is it impact the case and again the scope of this report to surface warfare for the navy, or chinese navy, does that already point in the way to russia's self-conscious limitations since it's not really to divide the door. these are precisely the capabilities that they don't mind china having to help counter the u.s. navy. so in a way russia is selling china the rope to help hang the u.s. navy. some assistance of course that rush is also working on to make the news are the one of the artist 26 for the land-based concerns, we think about those in terms of nato but, of course, if you are russia looking to your pc or think about those in terms of china. i think the question does russia

just need the money that bad. paul, d.c., this is irresponsible and shortsighted sales, or is it a strategic partnership, admittedly limited one for these kinds of systems by the i think another take away from this report is that we talk so much about and that acts as a no, but going back to my larger trends, this is going to be a missile rich environment. so much of what goes into a2 ag is missile base. china is a lot of these things and using masks to challenge us. it appears they're doing so for three reasons. one, targeting a u.s. fleet, want i think they able to target our u.s. allies and three, u.s.-based. this is again until he is

getting beyond the scope of this report. and i think it's worth raising the question okay, now what? what do we do about this? the kind of systems pull it again for air defense as 300 perhaps more means of course he is going to have to invest in more standoff and penetration weapons. both sophisticated and presumably enough of them to saturate. this means, for example, the conversation about alice r. o. and alice are being the next budget cycle. a second would be to china's anti-sick -- anti-ship missiles mean, ship missiles mean come on the scene where our mouth is that we'll have to continue to invest breast a lot more for fleet and point missile defenses. missile defense versus chinese

threats your this is not necessarily the most exotic long range strategic systems of course i think it's notable by the way that i think about the report, paul, you didn't mention the word nuclear. what we are talking about is the conventional threats. but i think been going to the conversation, to pursue is a matter of part to have the defenses against chinese missiles mr. i think that's something we should hear more about. you see that navy already deploying and continued to test for the standard missile six, having both cruise missile defense and terminal ballistic missile defense capabilities. that is a piece of it. you hear a lot of interest in directed energy, especially for the fleet, for example, you know, looking at the master talking about, paul. you need a lot of shops and

quick shots. one thing faster than the supersonic sea skimming cruise missiles is a laser. but those are probably not the whole solution, and again although i would say that everything to talk about this bright shiny object a directed energy. a couple of weeks ago in alabama ahead of north, said for the foreseeable future will probably still going to need rockets to kill rockets driving probably thinking about directed edge or rail guns as the replacement for those probably isn't the right way to think about the other a mix. another thing that is at the edges of this of course is a chinese investment in missile base, missile boosted hypersonic. the u.s. is testing views about once every three years or so. we've had mixed success. the chinese are testing about every three months. that's pretty remarkable.

that's going to require some kind of counter, right, and probably different kinds of counters, a late account for those kinds of threats. the navy's concept of distributed comes to my. peace of that i think will be distributed defense. the idea that you going to be able to hit these things or you would want to plant on striking these things left of launch involves a lot of us. and i think really to do this for our allies and for our partners in the region. we need to proliferate counters to these things. anti-ship cruise missiles much less sophisticated ones than they called sosa which by the has great commercials on youtube. proliferating counters to those we've seen these real life use

against israel in 2006 as well as on other occasions. doing so is not merely to build on part of capacity for the own sake but, of course, to alleviate strain on our forces. i think the degree to which the u.s. navy and the u.s. army is stretched in terms of missile defense capability in particular in the area is only going to get worse. the navy's requirements are here and what we have right now or down here. likewise, the number of bad batters disappear, nine, and we are at war right now. didn't have any lengths to get beyond some. that kind of tension is not going to get better unless we encourage our allies to do more of this on their own as the. i think i will turn it over to zach. >> first, paul, let me join in congratulating you on what i think is are important report on

a subject that does get as much attention as it should. i think it's wonderful work and i will look forward to seeing the air version of the land version within the next couple of months i hope. i wanted to pull bit about the political aspect. tom talked about the military once and i think we all like to delve into those, those shiny objects as times have on the political side there's some real difficult questions to be asked and i don't think we quite know the answers to many of them. i want to pose the question and hopefully we can answer them during the panel discussion. the first is that we've seen growing evidence of chinese and russian ties quite some time. it's in arms sales which paul talked about. that's the military exercises in the pacific and even the

mediterranean billy budd passionate between the two militaries recently. reports that russia and china might be to betray some sort date under and join a database. there's clear evidence that there are growing ties between russia and china did has been evident to the region. it's a great concern to many asian military. the question many are asking is if this isn't of a larger strategic choice by the two countries to come together over the long term, or is this a short-term marriage of convenience? i think that's a really poor question for how we deal on a policy side with both countries. the strategic logic of the long-term logic is fairly clear. of states that. dissatisfied with existence status quo. europe has seen witness to this with russian efforts to alter eastern europe's borders, and certainly we're seeing this with ivan construction in the south china sea on the chinese side.

both states appear dissatisfied with the least elements of the status quo. historically dissatisfied states often work together, they clump together in fact oppose the existing hegemon. this is nothing new and it shouldn't be an entire surprise that two autocratic states are funny differences with a large democratic attorney as many democratic allies in therefore region. both in europe and in asia. both russian and chinese leaders have openly cal called for an eo u.s. alliances in those regions in recent years. so on the strategic side the alignment makes a great deal of sense. but on the other hand, we also see great long-term differences in the outlooks for russia and china. china is a growing country and despite the economic troubles we've seen recently i think most people would expect the growth rates to continue whereas russia

struggled with its economic problems and the future demographically on the energy side is even more troubling. so it's going to be a big challenge but so, too, are more focused regional issues. how russia and china work together in the cooperation organization, an issue that just hasn't quite a bit -- jeff has done quite a lot of research on. how have they worked together in the russian far east where moscow is increasingly worried about beijing's influence of? in addition as paul has shown is the quickly growing tension as china tries to steal russian military technology? will eventually create a bit of a break or will it just continue? in talking to policymakers not just in washington but in asia more broadly there's this. russia and china using similar techniques of hybrid warfare, trying to avoid u.s. treaty commitments by escalating just below those levels.

so there's an effort, a desire to respond to both russia and china and eastern europe and in the south china, and east china sea. but at the same time efforts to lump our response together to both state risk pushing them closer together. there's been reports recently of the potential to washington may use economic sanctions as a response to economic espionage in the cyber domain. not just against china but also against russia. with that pushed the two states together, forced them to work together to develop countermeasures? that's a tough question and it's not a question that is only applicable to the united states. many of my japanese friends have been struggling with this. how does japan manage russia when it still looks to engage in many ways without trying to allow the europeans deeply it's sort of walking away from its commitment to upholding the

status quo? if japan doesn't stand up from enough to a rush is doing and eastern europe, would that have any affect on the european commitment to opposing chinese efforts to change the status quo and the south china sea for the east china sea? i think is a big question and i don't think we know the answers, but we are reaching an important inflection point, which is as paul is managing come at some point the chinese technological proficiency will start to outpace the russian proficiency in some areas. and if these continue and continue to go i think we'll see how you can only believe that will mean, they think there's a strong strategic rationale for the relationship. if we see the tide start to add an tension start ago i think that probably means this is more of a short-term marriage of convenience which, frankly, for many of us in washington would be what our preference would be. so i don't know the answers to

thesthis question but i think they're important questions to ask and i look forward to having a robust discussion about the thanks again, paul, for starting the debate. >> that was a terrific. we've gone from very deep dive on some the technical aspects of cooperation to a very wide angle focus on what some of the bigger strategic questions that this cooperation entails for the region and for the united states. at that than by the best thing to do is opened the floor up to discussion. if you have a question please raise your hand. i will acknowledge it. i've to request. please identify yourself and please do ask a question. >> we have microphones. sorry. >> peter hohmann free, former

diplomat and current intel analyst. in addition to reverse-engineer, certainly china is hacking the hell out of russian design bureaus, no doubt about it no doubt about the image of the two motives for russia. one thing simple capitalist greed and the other press larger geopolitical strategy i wonder perhaps if there's a third motivation and china made itself already have created technologies of interest to russia. things like these coastal ballistic cruise missiles may show up in the russian arsenal. so either quid pro quo going from china to russia in addition to the intel exchange that you mentioned? >> perhaps i can take that one. the short answer is yes, you are starting to see signs of a shift where for the first time chinese military equipment and technology may be flowing toward russia. recently the chinese have

attempted to sell russia their latest record, bu the one i spoe about in the presentation, which is quite a capable system with advanced missile and air defense systems on board as will. part of the problem is russia has been struggling to build new ships because of the decisions of its shipbuilding industry, also the cutoff of new ship engines from ukraine as a result of the ukraine crisis where russia was dependent for the buildup of its navy. recently the chinese appear that took one of the shift over to the black sea to demonstrate for the russians we don't know yet if they're going to buy. partly the decision to buy could be political as well as military to go to a really but to also did some quid pro quo to strengthen the bilateral arms trading relationship between the two. but you see potential cooperation affairs as well.

the chinese are ahead of the russians in some areas drone technology for example, is a big area. i.t., information technology, the chinese have embraced principles more than the russians have and have a number of quite capable command-and-control systems, combat management system so you could see the russians transferring some of those as well. the final thing which is recent emerge, not the first time but seems to gain a new impetus, is for joint research, development and production between russia and china. petit reportedly initiated a project to codevelop air independent propulsion systems. these are submarine-based systems which allow a nonnuclear submarine to stay submerged for extended periods of time by regenerating its battery can recharge his batteries through

chemical processes. if you've already been introduced into western navies from the german separate advance in this particular area. the chinese also use it for one of their new diesel subs but they are not satisfied with it. the russians haven't yet been able to crack the code after trying for some period of time. we could very well see joint deployment projects to develop new systems in this regard. [inaudible] spent the chinese require the russian ships -- [inaudible] using them in the same way. the russians are very highly developed tactics defeat the u.s. navy. is there any evidence that chinese are doing that,

certainly the engines but a lot that ships with missiles from russia and they don't tend to use it in the same way. have you seen anything -- how are they going to do with? >> yes. as a matter of fact, they've studied the russian doctrine approach that would develop throughout the cold war to a very substantial level. looking at especially how the soviets were come when faced with the same problem which is why they are stimulating the subs to some extent, this was the same problem they wanted to study how others have tried to overcome that problem so that looked at the soviet method of using long range land-based strike aircraft armed with highly powerful supersonic cruise missiles, coupled with submarines and surface warships to lesser degree but submissively. try to launch massive strikes it

views care task force of some significant range of way from china's come from russia's coastline to prevent the u.s. from the point from launching nuclear weapons strikes against the soviet mainland. so you see the chinese immigrant is a significant extent but also deviated from that to some extent as well. they have developed air launched cruise missiles, submarines launch cruise missile but they also developed a much greater extent land based missile systems able to supplement and complement the evidence of my blog systems that the soviets relied upon. you see medium-range and intermediate range ballistic missile systems in china they can hit naval bases, replenishment sides to try to impact the navy's ability to sustain operations. many senior weapons like this 21 t. at the ship ballistic missile which extends the reach of a

ground-based missile all the way out to 1214 nautical miles as i understand. that is a very novel approach that the chinese have added to his capable. then you also seem using a variety of systems income is with one another to be able to stress u.s. missile defense system from constituents command and control system. the catamaran with the small missile boat veterans to develop, to produce about a become a thing to produce a lot more than, many people think that this will be used primarily for operations that close to the coast but they have the ability to move further out into a lease in your cities region were you could have vast numbers of these launching multiaccess coupled to the attacks against u.s. or other allied warships by firing missiles were all kinds of different direction from given altitude come to this piece,

complemented with a submarine launched missiles to overwhelm euros missile defense system. they are taking it a step further and soviets ever did. >> doug sanderson, i run a small consulting company in northern virginia. feeding on this last question in response, maybe they are not playing the same game where you stupid westerners as the -- talk about just the asians when asked what came the symbols for talk about go, where the objective is not connected against detainees spread of influence over a broad area. that might be became the indians are playing as well as the chinese are getting technology from the russians but also sharing technology with the north koreans. can you talk more about the non-kinetic aspects of strategy that might be involved with?

>> i think that's a wonderful point. the national coalition that missing both with russia and china, is that fundies and the access area denial kinds of capability. it's from much lower level, limited power projection types of capabilities. so when the china context, the construction on tuesday featured a south china sea, et cetera parking and access area to build it at all. that capability has not been used. maybe it's been threatened and maybe it's increased risk to u.s. forces and made a somewhat less likely that the united states or its allies and partners would operate in the region but i think the real challenge here for the chinese is at some point if they want to change the status quo to have to change the kind of military posture they have toured the power projection sort of posture. at least within the first island chain.

>> paul mentioned in the report and i think it's one of the interesting elements of the report as the chinese try and shift, turns out a lot of the russian capabilities, some of them are suited for this but a lot of them are not. i kind of reconnaissance strike complex the russians, the soviet created in the '80s just isn't applicable in this long distance power projection that the chinese are going to increasingly try and do. and i think that's a real challenge for the chinese at the high-end but i do think that the low-end the reality is i think most folks in washington have been surprised by the risk-taking on the part of beijing, and that the administration has been challenged to take the same level of risk to respond and deter those types of action both in a south china sea and east china sea. were the united states has pushed back with allies and partners like in april when the president obama said that they fell under article nine.

actions the chinese that tended to pull back but for the u.s. stood back and allowed the chinese to push out, the chinese have seen a lot of disgust. >> one could say the same thing about the russians. okay, richard. >> thank you, richard weitz, hudson institute. lab the previous question, have you seen any evidence of increased actual concrete interoperability between the two forces you to these transfers, as opposed to just physical interoperability, either in the bilateral exercises or on the multilateral exercise is? >> to a certain limited degree of starting to see a little more interoperability between russia and chinese forces. ec is primarily in two areas. both are members of the shanghai cooperation organization which

is a cause of mr. security alliance but i wouldn't quite call it an allies but it's a workstation responsible for providing some level of security in central asia. every two years since about 2005 it can take it was called the peace mission exercises which has allowed generally been fairly small-scale exercises, battalion level typically due to counterterrorism or stability operations to shore up a favorite regime that has been some naval exercise as well. you see that you did it together to find this out to some degree to coordinate their activity but it's nothing like the u.s. does with their nato allies to a joint command and control and to enter operable systems of the level that we have grown accustomed to. recently you've also seen in the far east, the chinese and the russians have conducted a system

military exercises every year. and because of the large influx of russian technology into the chinese navy, especially on systems like the bandstand radar system, many of the chinese warships use the same data links and data networks and combat management systems that the russians do. during one exercise, russian and chinese naval ships paired off. goes like an action group of a few russian ships along with the chinese ship and get a few chinese ships along with the russian ship. they paired off to conduct anti-service and at the air war for exercises but they're able to reconnect and networks that together fairly quickly to be able to interoperate. we haven't really seen that level of effort just to try to come up with to jointness. >> hello, good afternoon,

everybody. probably provide you with comic relief because it's my first time for this defense system the. [inaudible] focus on house. my question is this. this is apparently all defense agency systems. my simple question is, i represent those who are interested socioeconomic sustainable development, energy and stuff like that. and i am the student council if i could go back home and report more general who understands these things. my question is it broke my heart for having one classmate died in the first -- another one -- sundeck i -- >> is there going to be a questions because that's the question. now, how do we now match around the philippines, that the ordinary filipino told me from

where ever i go, at least they provide the chinese provides food on the table. and in the countryside you have the leninist ideology that is like their everyday of my life. how do you match that with the ordinary -- >> okay, we need to -- >> it's like more of comic relief. for everybody. >> thank you. any other questions? >> the asean forum. my question is do we see signs of sino-russian cooperation on any strategic front? there was an article i just saw by an indian author who says they are beginning to see the signs of this in pakistan with some ships in russia's policy toward the indian ocean

cooperation with china. do we see it, for instance, towards japan anyway or towards north korea? in other words, is beyond the arms arrangement, are there signs that there are plans to work together to deal with various challenges? >> welcome professor cobb that's a great question and i would like to turn the response but over to you because you're probably one of the real experts on this issue. i will just note that i think people are looking for those types of connections, for example. the japanese have released data that shows a number of air scrambles in response to russian aircraft has risen dramatically over recent years. at the same time the scrambles against chinese aircraft had risen and it's a real operational challenge for the japanese to meet all of these requirements to scramble aircraft rapidly to meet threats

both to the north with the russians and to the southeast along the island chamber i think one question is whether there's actually any coincidences and tonic about when the russians and chinese happen to do these types of operations are under folks are looking at this but it don't think we have answers yet on those types of issues. i don't know if anyone else wants to -- >> maybe i can add just a little bit. you see some level of cooperation in certain areas like the shanghai cooperation organization, russia and china, although that many conflicting interests in central asia. they both came together in recent years to try to use their influence to get some of the central asian countries to call for the ending of basing rights to use military force is located in the region. in other words, they did join together to try to limit the u.s. footprint in that area so

to that extent you see the two having a cooperative arrangement having some real impact on the strategic situation. more generally, that you share a number of views on world politics or geopolitical issues. they both attend to want to see u.s. power limited constraint which is why they tend to support the role of the u.n. enforcing u.n. to put its imprimatur on potential u.s. military activity. they tend to also oppose activities, actions of the u.s. which seemed to come which tend to promote u.s. power comforts them to develop a holistic to missile defense system, russia and china share opposition to the systems because they both tend to see those as working counter to the interests and also working to benefit the

military capacity of the u.s. itself. for that reason also china has tended to pose nato expansion. not necessarily for any alignment of interests, any desire to see russia circa rick assert its hegemony in the near abroad the primary because they do not want to see the u.s. military outlines gets stronger. you see those sorts of exercises ask strategic influence. >> since we're talking about coercion and political, political warfare at the u.s. alliance system in the region, zack and mentioned earlier that the u.s. taking a strong stance on the secaucus is a good thing. since we're talking at the ship missiles and talking about other missile base ways in which china is bullying its neighbors, i'll suggest, perhaps in the hope of

a softer outcome, success to a softer outcome. i think one of those things that china continue to say to its neighbors, you know, you're not goingoing to get involved in the franchise on missile defense, are you? i think the question is, why not? and the information sharing agreement, a trilateral information sharing agreement from i think last december for the u.s.-rok and japan, and by the way, that also reflects to other nations in the asia-pacific, that kind of stuff ought to be expanded further. ..

of their vision of what international orders should look like, the role of the u.s. and allies. that gets to the point that you are making. are they going to be able to overcome to fairly different approaches to a number of security challenges in central asia, southeast asia, indian ocean. until we have answers to those questions, we're not really going to be able to answer the bigger questions, which is exactly kind of temporary alliance of convenience based on the fact that both beijing and

moscow are under prosecution of the united states or is leading to cooperation. those are the places you really want to look in the next several years to see where that question is going to go. can they overcomedies -- --overcome, well, does russia pull back, that would be a big issue to watch going forward. i have time for one more

question. okay. get the microphone. >> i'm going to have to take the bait for cyber-related activity and ask the clear question that you put forward, is this going to move russia and china closer together and is it creating even more between the u.s., russia and china? >> you know, it's a tough question and part of what's hard is that the authorities actually already exist to take action against companies that are engaged in cyber, they haven't exercised them.

what i find interesting in the debate is that my assumption heading up to present issues here at washington would have been a fairly quiet period in u.s.-chinese relations. a lot of talk about collaboration and certainly not a lot of talk that might seem to spoil -- i was quite surprised the last couple of days, you see major articles which had weaved that they would put sanctions before the visit. it really shows that at least some people in the white house that are clear frustrated with chinese action and cyber space and feel a need to respond. do i think that there could be a negative effect in the relationship? i just know because the u.s.

doesn't do at a government level, it's not clear vulnerable to sanctions and moreover they can't be sanctioned by russian or chinese government like u.s. does. so the sanctions challenge is one where u.s. has asymmetric advantage. when they feel that they are getting pushed by the russian, chinese and cyber realms and can't push back, sanctions give them an asymmetric edge and that's something that's going to be talked about in the next months. >> i don't think that the cyber sanctions is going to be the straw the broke the camel's

back. it will be managed because we managed similar kinds of disputes in the past over trade and otherwise. i think in order for the two to really decide they want to -- to give t to share strategic alliance, i think something else has to happen. i think the russians are clear close having gone through the ukraine crisis, we really see an end to the postcold war between russia and nato to try to come up with some peaceful crisis as demonstrated that that are interests and driven russia to be much closer to china to try to hedge against what is now deteriorating relationships with

the west. china still isn't there yet. they're still clear integrated with the west. their trade with the u.s. six times their trade with china. their economic integration, manufacturing, all of that clear tightly connected with the west. the financial relations in terms of buying u.s. debt, for those to come together, there would some kind of a shock in the western pacific, in my view, some kind of comparable event, some taiwan crisis or something like that. something else that would cause a real break between china and the west. >> you know i've had two.

i think there's been a more active strategy in russia over the last year or so, but it also states level of limitation, technological financial or otherwise, and the rest of them are discovering, for example, with some of the energy deals that are trying to sign with the chinese. they are not going to give them a discount and, in fact, are going to negotiate clear hard and the leverage is in beijing right now, and that chinese is not endless found of technology or money, specially now with the economy going down, it looks like there's going to be less chinese money available than i think the russians had

anticipated in the investment projects. that's not only going to be an issue in the energy sector, an issue elsewhere too. they are going to insist on getting a clear good deal both in financial and nonfinancial terms. and on the technological side, you know, again in the energy side where u.s. and western companies have been sanctioned specially, you know, looking at the offshore arctic projects, the chinese don't have comparable technology, it's not like simply being caught off from western, russia can go to china. it's not as if the west and china are equivalent in that sense and russia gives something off if it cuts off from western technology, western capabilities and western capital.

>> over here. >> for mr. cooper primarily, one thing that wasn't address at all was the japanese naval capabilities, vis-a-vis the chinese and one thing that could be addressed is commander control, officer trading, leadership skills, et cetera, the japonés have a navy with considerable experience and the chinese don't have a level as the the -- americans would have. thank you. >> i think that actually

explains part of why we are seeing the chinese actions so focused on coast guards rather than navies. so when the chinese operate typically send perhaps three coast guard ships out around and the japanese with four or five. it's escalated to the navy level. specially if you actually got into any kind of crisis or conflict. part of why you are seeing the chinese trying to ensure that any time the japanese or the united states uses military forces in what was previously a coast guard encounter that the chinese will claim that it's militarization, that's the first thing they bring up.

it's an effort to keep down as a coast guard level giving the rapid size of the chinese coast guard is building ten thousands coast guard ships. these are giant ships and they are building lots of them and they are going to do it faster than the japanese can do it. they will have an edge to that low-level military level and they are going to push until the united u.s. is pushing with military vessels. the good thing is our navy and japanese is highly proficient. it's not going to change any time soon but it's not going to solve the coast-to coast challenge.

>> yeah, you're right. the japanese do have a quite navy and it is something much on the mind of chai -- chinese naval leaders. 40 highly capable destroyers than the chinese currently have, some clear capable submarines and so the chinese do not focus exclusively in the u.s. threat, they have to focus on threats throughout the region, south korea, taiwanese navy still developing the capability to try to at least survive the early faces of an engagement with china for quite sometime, you see what constitutes an arms, modernization in southeast asia,

vietnam, malaysia. the vietnam's but at lot recently. the chinese were not happy with the transaction. they do are still deficient in antisubmarine warfare. in terms of watching -- matching western, they have a ways to go and they know it. they are not up to the u.s. standard by any stretch. part of the reason they want to engage with the russians to learn from their big brother in that particular aspect. they are only starting to develop a mid-level nco for their force. the kind of experience lower

commander who can make decisions so that the officers aren't controlling all of the activity from above too far away from the battle front. they are getting there and conscious to move forward. not entirely they can benefit from the russians because the russians suffer from some of the same problems. >> i think in russia also to vietnam. >> yes, coastal batteries, aircraft. >> japan, are okay, for example, you know, both of those navies have ships, but the ability to tie them together and talk to each other and talk to us better, it also has the capabilities to not nearly look but defend themselves that can be done more. also in terms of the capabilities against this stuff,

it's the strike and it's not nearly taiwan -- taiwanese, 150-500 to 1000 kill -- they embraced the chain. building up a lot of offensive missiles themselves. this goes back and i think paul's point about not really contending with the united states but all these other folks, offensive missile strike among those several folks. >> okay. one more question.

>> if you sort of extrapolate and in the back i of -- back of my mind, do you see naval clash in the pacific or do you see some minds prevail, working out some kind of security frameworks, we are going to security and reassurance measures and regimeses and stuff like that and walk away from it at some point, thank you? >> it's really difficult to see which way it goes. it's a rather close call, i will say. the chinese if they continue to build their naval capacity as they are doing, they're probably

about 15-20 years of being able -- filling capable force that can match uch -- match up against the u.s. navy. they still have deficient. land base missiles, submarine. it's only recently that they put money to their fleet. they're going to take detours. they are start to go deploy an aircraft carrier. aircraft carrier they acquired from the russians, they are using to learn from and they plan to develop three more aircraft carriers going forward. but to do that it's going to take money away from building their surface fleet and in addition as zach had indicated

the competition with the coast guard because they see -- they're going to get a lot more mileage from this white vessel fleet, great colored fleet because the coast guard, what they deploy to handle all the smaller scale disputes that they have. ultimately they'll get over the hump on building three aircraft carriers, they'll develop capability and they're going to be able to eventually fill a true blue water navy force able to operate at significance distance from their shores and maybe in open oceans. maybe then there's a clash, our allies are going to be less clear to them that they can rely on u.s. security commitments because china will have the real visible capability to prevent us from potentially moving forces

up to fulfill those commitments. >> just one quick comment. i'm going to try and keep this brief. i think if you look at the preworld ward naval competition, there's really two countries to look at, germany and the united states and the u.k. they do almost exactly the same thing the chinese are doing now. it takes them two to three decades. at the end of the day, they probably couldn't have competed with the british, the germans make one major for it in the world war and they go back home and all the money was wasted. i don't think that lesson tells you how the chinese are going to act on the political side, on the military side it will take a long time to catch up, a really

long time and despite the strength and the amount of money that he's been able to amass, there's going to be a lot of bureaucratic competitions to funding the navy and will need to be a real match for the u.s. navy even for the next one or two decades. >> somebody else who wrote about the first world war. so, yes, there's this larger naval dynamic going on but, you know, if there's going to be some kind of a clash, there are a lot of other factors that might go into it and, again, it's hard to predict specially the future. thank you all for coming, please grab a copy of the report on your way out. [applause]

[inaudible conversations] >> you can find this online c-span.org. presentation of washington journal shares every weekend morning at 7:00 o'clock eastern time. tonight a discussion on

transgender rights followed by journalist on her new article on paid family leave. again, congress returning from its summer recess next week, resolution on disapproval on the obama agreement with iran. senator is a member of the senate foreign relations committee, he made the announcement this afternoon in delaware. new york times report, puts president obama one vote from winning the iran deal. a critical foreign relations voice. senator is more than just one vote, others will follow. and when congress returns next week considering a resolution of disapproval. tonight we will be bringing in reaction and reviews of the agreement that were negotiated by president obama. in july the president explains a plan at an american university. here is some of what he said.

[applause] >> now, because more sanctions won't produce the results that the critics want, we have to be honest, congressional rejection of this deal leads the u.s. administration that is absolutely committed to preventing iran from getting nuclear weapons with one option, another war in the middle east. i say this not to be provacative, i'm stating a fact. it's breakout time which is already fairly small, could shrink to zero. does anyone really doubt that the same voices now raised against this deal won't be

demanding that whoever is president bomb those nuclear facilities? if someone who firmly believe that iran must not get a nuclear weapon, i can tell you that i'll turn this to military action would have been exhausted once we reject a hard one diplomatic solution that the world unanimous supports. so lets not mix words. the choice we face is ultimately between diplomacy or some form of war. maybe not tomorrow, maybe not three months from now, but soon. >> president speech you can watch in its entirety at 8:00 eastern as we show

explanations of the iran every night this week leading to congress return next week. next we'll look at the history and future of civil jury trials, aspen institute with litigators and feinberg, whether to a right for a trial by jury is disappearing and right of what shall traición and -- what arbitration. >> i am jeff rossen, i have a great privilege of heading the wonderful institution, the national constitution center in philadelphia which has a mandate from congress on a nonpartisan basis and what we have an opportunity to do tonight is to delve into a provision of the

bill of rights than many of us are less aware of which is the seventh amendment of the constitution. why is it that the civil jury trial which represented 20% of all trials in 1930 now represents only 2% of federal trials and less than 1% of strait trials. it really is a disappearing act and we are going to discuss why that happened and we should do something about that. lets begin and beautiful new addition to the the constitution from the national constitution center with a completely thrilling new introduction by yours truly about the relationship that mentioned, try to explain right that is were promised in the declaration,

lets turn to the seventh amendment. i can do by heart, by the fact that i cannot do the seventh suggests that is less familiar to me, anyway, and i can find it right here. here it is. in suits of common law with value and controversy showing $20, this is one of the two places where a dollar amount is specified, exceed $20, the right of trial by jury should be preserved and no fact tried by a jury should be otherwise reexamined in any water -- court of the united states then according to to the rules of common law. to begin the discussion we have one of the great lawyers of the united states of america and one of america's most passionate defenders of the civil jury trial and that is susman, he's

represented plaintiffs and b -- defendants. he's had the greatest of all civil trials in the past generation. steve is a defender, he has created a program at nyu law school, steve, what do the framers have in mind when they wrote those words and if you were a delegate would you argue the same words should be inscribed in the constitution? >> well, it is clear that the revolution and the constitution as of bill of rights will very much bound up with this idea of trial by jury. this is the only right, not free speech, not carrying weapons, not nothing, not due process.

trial by jury is the only right that is mentioned both in the declaration of independence that the king has deprived us by trial by jury, mentioned in article 3 of the constitution and subject of three of first tin amendments known as the bill of bill of rights. amendment number five guarantees the right to a grand jury, number six to a right to a jury trial in a criminal case. and article 7 right to a jury trial to be preserved in a civil case. it was all about jury trials. if you read the debates of the constitutional convention and the federalist papers, what you find is that the reason we have a bill of rights today at all is

because our founding fathers that got together to write the constitution in 1787 did not include in the first go-around a right to civil trial and the antifederalists, the southern states in particular, were clear much opposed to even ratifying the constitution unless the federalists promised that a bill of rights would be passed, which contained the right to adjure trial. so this was a strong tradition, it goes back 800 years for anglosaxon people. they felt that juries were

necessary to protect them from an overreaching central government from corrupt or bassed judges, a lot of it was economics because the jurors were -- the idea of jurors is that they would protect debtors from having to pay -- pay their creditors. there was a lot going on. i just think that you have to have the history to know they were clear concerned about their juries. every state constitution today except two contain a right to jury trial. every state constitution written between 1776 and 1787 contain the right to a jury trial in civil cases. so before we get rid of it, we need to think about what we are

doing, and consider whether this is a right that is worthying. i think jeff that your question is fair. if you're writing a constitution today, would you insert in it a constitutional right for trial by jury, and i come out -- i very much argue beside you, of course, you would. the name of this program is true finding -- truth finding and victim compensation, so i think there's no better way to find the truth than to have a jury of 12 people across the section of the community, diverse people, 12 years, 12 lives, 12 hearts, 12 brains are better than one

and assure there are good judges and fair judges, but not all judges are good. when you keep in mind that two-thirds of the judges are elected in partisan elections, you -- you -- it becomes important that we keep the jury to protect us and to compensate victims when there's some form of wrongdoing. all the research shows that almost -- almost without exception judges who have tried jury trials think that the jury gets it right. lawyers who have lost jury trials thinks that the jury gets it right even though you lose a case, in your hart to -- in your heart you say, i deserved to

lose. the entire mock trial jury simulation industry which builds up in this country, you bring a group of citizens off the street and in a day you present a case to them, a fact pattern, that con -- con -- convinces me. you watch deliberate. you watch on individual bow -- video deliberate. they are clear conscientious. the second thing i would say that a cross section of people, you get someone expertise than anything from a law than a single judge. you get lawyers on juries, you get accountants on juries, economists, scientists, you get a clear high quality of juror,

particularly if you figure out how to make the trials shorter, which is something that the bar and the bench has got to figure out how to do. then juries are representative of the community. people are willing to accept their verdicts. a jury when you talk about truth finding, truth finding usually involves who is telling the truth. juries are much better in identifying who is credible, who is honest, who is being decent and fair and candid on the witness stand than judges are. judges maybe better to -- in applying the law, and that is the job under our system. jurors are told, you have to listen to the judge for the law but the facts you find and the

seventh amendment says, once you find the facts, no other court can second guess you. that's an important -- our founders put a lot of faith in a group of citizens to find facts, and the amendment on its face says that there's so good at doing -- juries are so good at doing it that no other court or jury can second-guess what the jury has found. there's a very important role. it's one of the highest manifestations of being a citizen. whenever any underprivileged fights for rights, blacks or women, the right begins with the right to serve on the jury.

isn't that funny. you go to youtube and jury service and you see a lot of fun made about how people try to avoid jury service with all of these excuses, but, in fact, the people who serve really do become better citizens, and i suspect in the next supreme court case on same sex -- whether you can discriminate because of sexual preference may deal with whether a lawyer can exercise a challenge against a potential juror because they are home -- homosexual, you can't do it on racial grounds. the research done on that is that people that serve on jury are much more likely to vote

than other people, they're much more likely to pay their taxes than other people. it makes them better citizens, and then the final point i say is that, you know, judges, again, think about the elected judges, we live in a citizens united world where judges can get elected by raising money and there's no limits. there have been cases in this country where big corporate interest have sought to buy supreme court justices. that doesn't cost much and it doesn't cost much to buy a trial judge. get money to themselves so when you appear before them as a litigant they remember who you are. i think to protect the average victim, you need to have a jury, you can't rely on a judge.

the founding fathers believed that judges could be corrupted, bribed. you know who the judge is in advance. you don't know who those 12 jurors are. you can't go fix the jury. for those reasons if i were writing the constitution today in this country, i would insert a right to trial by jury in certain locations. >> thank you for that superb opening statement. [applause] >> a great pleasure to introduce bert ryan. one of the most distinguished careers as a constitutional litigator and supreme court advocate of our time. he had recent victories in important cases like the shelby county case and the short has

just agree today take -- agreed to take a case fisher versus the university of texas which may decide the future of affirm ti -- affirmative action. he said at the time of the framing people relied on civil juries to enforce rights and the bill of rights like the fourth amendment that protect us against an overreaching government. they're good for the citizens who serve on it. public school of democracy. i want to ask you if you were at the constitutional convention, would you vote for the seventh amendment and if not, why. >> first just on the point of history, if you think about the way juries originated in i england, they were in the world in which the king was absolute,

he had absolute power, he appointed the officials, including the judges, there was no independent judiciary. we have sworn to ascertain the facts, familiar with members of the community with the people involved with the best ability to figure out what's true and not true. to offset the power of the king you develop it had jury, and of course, right up through the revolution, the may recollects, -- americas, the united states is under the jurisdiction of the king and the king continues with absolute power. what we have in the constitution is a separation of powers in which we have an independent judi cru

>> you are in 1787 reacting to a past with one set of characteristics which might not be true today. i don't think history commands us or counsels us to institute a seventh amendment if we didn't have one. we do have one. i think in a criminal case, because you're sanctions people, you're bringing the weight to the community against them, then i think the jury has a role. you shouldn't have to be punished unless there's a consensus that you committed an act. civil trials are different. lots of things happen in civil trials. leaving aside for a moment the fourth amendment, you do have some, but subpoena matters, the

judges decide them anyway. they're really not the protection of the jury. why should we not look at the jury trials to be all and end all, the system would break down. if you look at the number of disputes, civil war criminal that get resolved outside the province of trial, that's almost necessary element of our system. it would become our occupation. it can't happen. it won't happen because society cannot afford to the it that way. there's a cost to the civil system. what are the costs? well, you have to bring people to sit on the jury, many of these people feel leaving housing from occupation, daily lives are being disrupted and they feel that's an undue position and we bring many more people than ever to sit on a civil jury. so many people spend time,

waiting around to see if they'll be on a panel and whether they'll be empanelled in the petty jury and they don't come away with a positive feeling, lousy $30. because of that we have to have procedures to command them to come and chase them if they don't come, and all of this is not free of cost, the system is not cost free and oppose substantial cost. it's not likely that you can round of the peasants, you like a day off in the field, come be in the jury. a jury trial imposes cost on the court system. you have to have people to bring in the panels, ensure that people show up when they're called, you have to have the same judge sitting through the trial because he cannot walk off the bench and say, folks it's

all yours. you have all the same costs that you have in a civil system which is prevalent all over the world except really here, maybe a little bit in australia and canada, they have a few civil trials, but basically we are unique in this, and so that's another cause that does matter. then how about in the point of view of litigants, they are going to have discovery, but some of the mechanisms that we have developed like, you know, jury experts, sitting around, psychologists, new occupation, sitting around figuring out what clues you might have to how somebody might react, so our theory is on the one hand, cross section of community and they should bring the communities, but all trial lawyers know you move heaven and earth to get

jury that similar -- you are going to push people that are favorable. during a jury trial you have tracking, you get a group of people, you pay them to listen to the same thing. this is not cost free. that's one reason people worry about a jury trial because you build up the costs. so i think, you know, we can't run a system where a jury trial is universal. it won't work, it's impossible. the question comes if you have it, find a classifications in which the stakes are big enough and the clash over facts, what happened in the world is big enough, how do you distinguish that group of cases, how do you decide what goes to a jury, should it be in the hands of litigants or the court.

there maybe a better way to sort out of jury cases from the nonjury cases. assuming here is a case, is it better to give it to a judge or a jury. i think the sources of controversy over that are you have statistics that pretty much judges and juries see the case the same way. it's a two-way sword. why are we spending all the money and time and effort to have one. you know, an agreement. it's true in 85% of the cases. second, if you go to the key of the jury in colonial times it was a theory that was nullification. we are not doing this. we are drawing the line. these are the kings rules.

you bring them up reliable because he is -- he was insulting the king and the king's judges were about to pull him away. no, we are not going to do that. we're talking out of here and he's walking out of here. nullification when you have an independent legislature -- elected legislature and it's different from having a king. that's a tough question. you might like it, you might not like it, but it is different and it does give an opportunity that doesn't exist in a system where judges at least are sworn to and will try to apply legal rules and say the results should be dictated by the rules.

now, i think that when you try a case there are two kinds of facts that become involve and particularly because of the many new remedies, the many new laws that are not simple who done it. they are the historic facts, what happened, and there could be disputes about what happened, who said what to whom, who drove a car at what speed. these are historic, and i think, juries have common sense and probably would agree with the judges most of the time about who is saying critically, who is telling the truth, whose story holds together. but we also have many cases depending on what we call predicting facts. there are theories about the world, scientific controversies and academically we built many new techniques to evaluate those. now you are calling 12 people that may or may not have heard these techniques, folks you are going to see two economists up here, they are ph.d.

they're not lying but they don't know anything but they are going to show you the models and you're going to figure out whether the price is being charged as a result of the way the market works and good luck. do you really think you can get an evaluation of those issues? you have liability issues, is the equipment call substance capable of causing a certain kind of injury, drugs in the fda and scrutiny, expert panels. but the jury is told you have to decide one or the other. you can't say, maybe. it's a clear different kind of system and whether considering the kind of questions we bring to court, whether that makes sense to have juries decide is another question. remember at the time of the constitution, experts were not

allowed to testify in court. they were just not allowed. you had stuff like hand prints and footprints where you needed an expert. almost no case start without an expert. people use them in yiet effectively to convey expertise. they are allowed to draw conclusions, they are allowed to speak to ultimate she issues. they become clear influential. they weren't known at the time. i mean, i think that's another clear difficult question. we see judges with those kinds of expert issues and find great difficulty. and the one other thing that i think that leads to is the question of time, because when

cases are tried to a judge, this is a deficient, he can look at the transcript, exhibits he's not told you're going to be locked up until you decide. juries are told basically you have to decide if not we'll keep you locked up for a while. so the last thing i'd say is that what we are seeing a historic pull and tuck, at the time of the constitution, and what you're talking between is

the application of rules of law as a predominant way to decide controversies versus the application of human judgment, community consensus can modify the law. so when we say we are governing of laws, not men, if you have amendment is partial true because you turn over to men, men, women, whoever, the job the opportunity to modify the application of law. so i think in that situation, i wouldn't pass this with amendment as it stands today. i think clear hard as to how to determine whether it is an should be a class of cases in which it's amenable and could be allocated between judge and jury, because they are.

thank you so much for the opening statement. round of applause. [applause] >> what a pleasure to introduce kim feinberg. he's, in fact, the nation's mediator and champion of dispute resolutions. he also administered the 20 billion-dollar fund created by british petroleum in the oil spill. in short, he has had more experience than anyone else in administering huge and complex alternatives to the sifl -- civil jury system. i want to ask, first, tell us

what it was like to administer the 9/11 victim's fund and how did you put a monetary value or the vp compensation fund an alternative -- >> the last question is the easiest. for nothing. you see see them three in 15 years. the 9/11 fund 13 days after the attacks. if congress had waited two more weeks, they wouldn't have created this type of find. bp oil spill, bp walked into the white house, saw president obama, walked out and announced we will create, up front, no trials a 20-billion dollar fund. 20 billion to compensate all the victims of the oil spill.

i received a million 200 claims from 50 states. i didn't know the oil got to colorado. alaska, 35 foreign countries, swedden, norway. build them and they will come. [laughs] >> these programs are not a threat to the trials. they are not a precedent and it's important that they not be a precedent. the 9/11 victim compensation fund was absolutely the right thing to do after those attacks. sound public policy. the country wanted to show the world we take care of our own. it worked. 97% of all eligible families that lost a loved one in the world trade center, the

airplanes, pentagon came into the fund. taxpayer money, taxpayer money. don't ever do it again like that. don't ever create a fund like that again. you'll never see it again. you should have read some of the emails i got during my administration of the 9/11 fund. my son died in oklahoma city, where is my check? i don't get it. i don't get it. my daughter died in the basement of the world trade center in the original 1993 attacks by the clear same type of people, why aren't i eligible? it wasn't just terrorism, you see. you have to explain something to me. last year my wife saved three little girls from drowning in the mississippi river and then she drowned a heroin.

where is my check. bad things happen to good people in this country. there was no 9/11 fund. forest fires, earthquakes and to delegate authority, president bush, i want you to do the 9/11 fund. you decide. that's not the constitution. that's not checks and balances. ..