[applause] over the last couple weeks, i have repeatedly challenged anyone opposed to this deal to put forward a better, plausible alternative. i have yet to hear one. what i've heard instead are the same types of arguments that we heard in the run-up to the iraq war, iran cannot be dealt with diplomatically, we can take military strikes without significant consequences, we shouldn't worry about what the rest of the world thinks, because once we act, everyone will fall in line, tougher talk, more military threats will force iran into submission, we can get a better deal.

i know it's easy to play on people's fears, to magnify threats, to compare any attempt at diplomacy to munich. but none of these arguments hold up. they didn't back in 2002 and 2003, they shouldn't now. [applause] the same mindset, in many cases offered by the same people who seem to have no compunction with being repeatedly wrong, led to a war that did more to strengthen iran, more to isolate the united states than anything we have

done in the decades before or since. it's a mindset out of step with the traditions of american foreign policy, where we exhaust diplomacy before war, and debate matters of war and peace in the cold light of truth. peace is not the absence of conflict president reagan once said. it is the ability to cope with conflict by peaceful means. president kennedy warned americans, not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more than the exchange of threats. it is time to apply such wisdom. the deal before us doesn't bet

on iran changing, it doesn't require trust, it verifies and requires iran to forsake a nuclear weapon, just as we struck agreements with the soviet union at a time when they were threatening our allies, arming proxies against us, proclaiming their commitment to destroy our way of life, and had nuclear weapons pointed at all of our major cities, a genuine existential threat. we live in a complicated world, a world in which the forces unleashed by human innovation are creating opportunities for our children that were unimaginable for most of human history. it is also a world of persistent threats, a world in which mass

violence and cruelty is all too common, and human innovation risks the destruction of all that we hold dear. in this world, the united states of america remains the most powerful nation on earth, and i believe that we will remain such for decades to come. but we are one nation among many. and what separates us from the empires of old, what has made us exceptional, is not the mere fact of our military might. since world war ii, the deadliest war in human history, we have used our power to try to bind nations together in a system of international law.

we have led an evolution of those human institutions president kennedy spoke about, to prevent the spread of deadly weapons, to uphold peace and security, and promote human progress. we now have the opportunity to build on that progress. we built a coalition and held it together through sanctions and negotiations, and now we have before us a solution that prevents iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, without resorting to war. as americans, we should be proud of this achievement. and as members of congress reflect on their pending decision, i urge them to set aside political concerns, shut out the noise, consider the

stakes involved with the vote that you will cast. if congress kills this deal, we will lose more than just constraints on iran's nuclear program, or the sanctions we have painstakingly built. we will have lost something more precious, america's credibility as a leader of diplomacy, america's credibility as the anchor of the international system. john f. kennedy cautioned here, more than 50 years ago, at this university, that the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war. but it's so very important. it is surely the pursuit of peace that is most needed in this world so full of strife. my fellow americans, contact your representatives in congress.

remind them of who we are. remind them of what is best in us and what we stand for, so that we can leave behind a world that is more secure and more peaceful for our children. thank you very much. [applause] ♪ ♪ ♪ >> president obama now has 34 senators supporting the iran nuclear agreement, and that's enough to keep did you impact. the senate plans a vote when they return next week. a vote on a resolution of disapproval. the president can override that vote and have enough votes to maintain a. retiring maryland senator barbara mikulski was the one of

clinched the do. secretary of state john kerry speaking in philadelphia today made the case that the agreement makes the u.s. and its allies safer. that speech televised live in iran which the ap reports is quite ridiculous the secretary kerry's first speech tonight on c-span. now a couple of congressional hearings where secretary kerry, energy secretary mondays testified about the iran nuclear agreement and answered congressional questions about. we will begin with a one hour senate foreign relations committee and we will follow that with how support affairs committee hearing. [applause]

[applause] the committee will come to order. [inaudible conversations] >> i want to thank the witnesses for being here and for being here today and we look forward to a fulsome hearing. i want to thank all of those also who are in attendance. kind of the was a little bit of an outbreak prior to asking been. we thank you for being here. we do hope you will respect, but

now the meeting is in order, outbursts of any kind are warranted and respected democratic process that is taking place you. so again we thank you for being here. we also thank you for your courtesy as we move ahead. of kind of the witnesses have agreed to be as long as we wish. so we will start with seven minute questions. i do know based on last night's presentation, there's sometimes tendency for witnesses to want to interject. and one of its it is obviously we conduct our meetings with a lot of respect and courtesy and i would just ask the witnesses if they would to respond directly to the question from senators on both sides of the aisle as if it as, if you ask it directly to a witness, get into responder if someone else wants to interject they can indicate

they want to do so but senators should feel free to say no, i just wanted that witness, and move onto the next major we don't end up in a somewhat filibustered situation, able to fully to our questions answered. i want to start today by thinking our committee. we would not be here today and we would not have the information that we have today if we had not passed the iran nuclear agreement review act. this would not be taking place. i think the american people now understand what this debate was all about. when congress put in place sanctions to bring iran successfully to the table, as we did, we granted the executive branch something called a national security waiver. and what that meant was the executive branch had the ability to waive our congressionally-mandated sanctions, to suspend them until such a time as we permanently

waive them down the road. and as you know, unfortunately, over the objections of senator cardin and myself, the executive branch went directly to the united nations on monday morning-something that certainly was not in the spirit of this but this is what was always intended. i do want to say that while secretary kerry has often said, well, congress will have the ability to weigh in at some point in time prior to this law being passed, which caused this hearing to happen today, we now read the agreement and realize that what he meant was eight years from now we would have the opportunity to weigh in because that's what is stated in the agreement. so, i want to thank everybody, all 19 members, for coming together unanimously making that happen and giving us a role. it's a heavy lift as we know, but a role that did not exist

prior to that passing. i have to say we had a briefing last night, and i left there i talked to members on both sides of the aisle. i was fairly depressed after last night's presentation. with every detail of the deal that was laid out, our witnesses successfully batted them away with the hyperbole that it's either this deal or war. and, therefore, we were never able to appropriately question or get into any of the details because every time we did it was either this du or war. i believe that to be hyperbole. i know the secretary last night pulled out a letter that was written in 2008 by the prior administration. i don't know if you'll refer to it today. as i thought about it last night lying in bed, what he was really pointing out with that letter

was, unless we give iran what they want, x. i mean that's what really that letter was used for last night. so, let me just walk through that. we've been through an incredible journey. we began 20 months or so ago with a country that was a rogue nation that had a boot on its neck, and our goal was to dismantle their program. we've ended up in a situation where the deal that's on the table basically codifies the industrialization of their nuclear program. it's an amazing, amazing transition that has occurred. and yet, everyone here, there's not a person in this room, including our witnesses, everyone here knows there's not one practical need for the program that they're building. not one. not one. we have not had a single scientist, not a single witness

can lay out reasoning, not a single reason for iran to be developing this program from the standpoint of what it means to them from a civil standpoint. not one. nine months after this agreement goes into effect, we realize that after monday's u.n. adoption, unless congress intervenes, in 90 days, this will be implemented. and then six months after that, so a total of nine months from now, all the sanctions that exist against iran will be lifted. incredible. now, there will be a few remaining sanctions, but the big ones that matter will be lifted. so they'll have access to

billions and billions of dollars. what they have if we ever try to apply that is what's called a nuclear snap back. the way to give the structure they can immediately just begin, they can say to get sanctions that were out of the deal, they can immediately snap back. so the leverage shifts to gain. the notion mentioned i think most of the college the previous military dimensions because we know they were involved in that basically that has no bearing, no bearing per the agreement. now, i know our witness will say, well, if they don't deal with this properly, we won't implement. but according to the agreement, it has no bearing whatsoever on whether the sanctions are removed or not. and yet that was such an important piece for everyone to know. anytime, anywhere inspections. last night, we had witnesses saying, i never said that. it's been a part of their mantra from day one.

it's been a part of their mantra from day one, anytime, anywhere inspections. now we have a process that they're declaring 24 days, but we all know that's not right. twenty-four days begins after, by the way, the iaea has found violations that they're concerned about, and then you give iran time to respond to that, and then by the time it kicks in, there is a 24-day process, but it could be months. and as we know, in laboratories, when you're developing a nuclear warhead that is about this big, it's very easy to cover things up like that. and all the focus has been on finding uranium. there are other aspects of this that are very difficult to find. i know they said this is the most comprehensive inspections regime that we've ever had. that's not true. that is not true. i've talked to secretaries of state and others. we had a far more comprehensive and rapid inspection program in iraq.

far more. that certainly didn't serve us particularly well. ben and i have written a letter asking for additional materials that we do not yet have. one of the items we don't have is regarding the agreement between iran and the iaea, and my sense is, we're never going to get that. so the inspection entity that we're relying upon to find out whether iran is cheating, we're not even going to have access to that agreement. but let me just say this. we do know one of the characteristics is very interesting. we have a professional athlete in chattanooga that spends about a month there.

he's an incredible role model. he has got incredible integrity. he's a role model to the world. and i was talking to him a couple of weeks ago about the program that professional athletes go through for drug testing. it's incredible. that is anytime, anywhere. there are qualities to this that, unfortunately, i'm told i cannot get into. but there are qualities to this program that would not be unlike causing athletes to just mail in their own urine specimens in the mail and us believing that's where it -- that it came from them. so look, i've got some questions. i want to talk a little bit about who we're dealing with here. most of us have been to iraq many times, and i'll never forget visiting general odierno in baghdad. and every time we visited

general odierno in baghdad he'd have on his coffee table the ieds that were used to maim and kill americans. they were lying on the coffee table-every single one of them was made by iran. once we developed the technology, by the way, to counter that, what they did next was develop an explosively formed penetrator. what they do is, they have an explosion that heats up copper to go through a piece of machinery to maim and dismember americans. this was all iran. every single bit of it. we've all been out to walter reed and we've visited these incredible heroes that have lost in some cases two arms and a leg or in some cases two legs and

two arms. we see them all over the country. they're living with this today. this is the country we're dealing with; the country that created some of the most disturbing types of methods to maim americans that have ever been seen. they tried to kill an ambassador here in washington, d.c. not long ago. i mean, we know that. ben and i went over with others to the see something that the holocaust museum had put together. a young man named caesar had taken photographs of the syrian prisons, syrian prisons which, by the way, iran supports. syria's bashar al-assad would not even be in office today if it weren't for iran.

we went over and visioned the torture that's happening. it's been photographed and chronicled. many of you have seen it on the internet. it's an amazing thing. it's happening right now, by the way, as we sit here. people's genitals right now being amputated. people think electrocuted. this is happening this very second with the support of iran. do you understand that? some would say we haven't done as much as we could to stop it because of these negotiations. when i was in college, i wasn't a particularly good student. first part, i was interested in sports, latter part, i was interested in working. i learned one thing, i learned about the critical path method, and i ended up building

buildings all over our country. and i learned that you start with something like this and you lay out a vision and you build it out. you begin with the end in mind and you put first things first. that's sort of the critical path. so, what i've seen, our secretary, i know he's developed tremendous warmth with iran's foreign minister zarif and he talks about it often, but what i think you've actually done in these negotiations is codify a perfectly aligned pathway for iran to get a nuclear weapon just by abiding by this agreement. i look at the things that they need to do, the way it's laid out and i don't think you could more perfectly lay it out. from my perspective, mr. secretary, i'm sorry, but it's not unlike a hotel guest who leaves only with a hotel

bathrobe on his back. i believe you've been fleeced. in the process of being fleeced, what you've really done here is you have turned iran from being a pariah to now congress being a pariah. a few weeks ago you were saying that no deal is better than a bad deal. and i know that there's no way you could have possibly been thinking about war a few weeks ago. no way. and yet what you say to us now, and you said it over and over yesterday, and i've seen you say it over and over on television, you say if congress were to turn this down, the only option is war. whereas, a few weeks ago for you to turn it down, the only option

is war. i don't think you can have it both ways. let me just say this, if congress were to say these sanctions cannot be lifted it wouldn't be any different from the snapback that we now have where, in essence, the united states on its own can implement snapback. but my guess is the other countries, as you've stated before, wouldn't come along. so, we've got to decide which way it is. i know you speak with a degree of disdain about our regional partners when you describe their reaction to this deal. well, one of the things that we have to remember is if we actually dealt with dismantling their nuclear program, they wouldn't be responding in the way that they have. not only has this not occurred,

but in addition, we are lifting the ballistic missile embargo in eight years. i have no idea how that even entered into the equation at the end, but it did. we are lifting the conventional weapons embargo in five years and in a very cute way with hortatory language in the agreement, unbelievably, we are immediately lifting the ballistic missile testing program. so, i'd have to say that, based on my reading, i believe that you have crossed a new threshold in u.s. foreign policy where now it is the policy of the united states to enable a state sponsor of terror to obtain an industrialized nuclear development program that has, as we know, only one real need. that is what you're here today

to ask us to support. i look forward to your testimony and the appropriate questions afterwards. senator cotton? >> first, mr. chairman, thank you for convening this thing. i want to thank secretary kerry, secretary moniz and secretary lew and your entire negotiating team, wendy sherman, and many others who are devoted the last two years to negotiating with iran come incredible service to our country, incredible sacrifice to their families. and we thank you very much for your dedicated service, your hard work and what you have come your service to america. the iranian nuclear agreement review act that senator corker refer to passed earlier this year was an effort by the members of congress to set up the appropriate review for

potential deal with iran. we are extremely pleased that after very difficult negotiations we were able to get unanimous vote of this committee to get the support of the white house, and we believe we accomplished two major objectives in passing that statute. first, of course we set up the appropriate review for congress. it allows us to take action, or we don't have to take action. it recognizes the fact that the sanction regime was passed by congress and that we have a role to play in regards as we now see in the jcpoa that congress has a role to play. so it set up in orderly process, and this hearing is part of that process. it took you two years to negotiate this agreement. it took a two month in vienna to

get to the final details. we are on day four of our review of 60 days. i have not reached a conclusion. i would hope that most members can come to that members of the congress would want to get all the information, allow those who were directly involved to make their case. we have hearing set up next week and the following week and we will get outside experts, many of us have taken advantage of that opportunity in the past, and i would hope that we were all used that opportunity before drawing a conclusion. this is a very important agreement from the point of view of u.s. foreign policy. iran and the region is critically important to the united states security. but there's a second objective to the iran nuclear review act. ..

>> i want to applaud these negotiators of taking our strength and returning them into resul

results. the objective is to prevent iran from becoming a nuclear power. that is our simple objective. we know who we are dealing with. this is a state-sponsored of terrorism. this is a country that abuses human rights and violates the ballistic missile area. we know all of that. but we singular are trying to prevent iran from becoming a nuclear weapon power holder because it is a game-changer in the region. the standard we have to use because there is no trust in iran. the supreme leader said on friday we will trample on america. we don't trust iran. we have to leave emotion out and look at the agreements and

determine whether the compliance with the agreement by the united states will put us on a path that make us less or more likely to become a nuclear weapon power. that has to to be the test we use. mr. chairman, i have many questions i hope we will get answers today. i hope the answers to the vote and debate. since there is no trust, inspection regime is important. do we have significant time to see if they are violating the agreement.

chairman, you raised the 24-hour window. i think all of us recognize there is going to be a protcall for inspection. we need to know if the 24-hour delay, knowing what iran is likely to do, does it compromise our ability to have inspections. we need to know the answer to that.

they are great credibility in this area. these are questions we are going to ask. we have read the agreement. will this agreement provide us, iaea, with sufficient access to documents so we know the prior

dimensions. is the snapbacks put in place if we have a change? is this going to be adequate to prevent iran? do we have sufficient breakout time so there is sufficient tools to becoming a nuclear power. i want to be reassured the united states still has the ability to impose sanctions for

support of terrorism, human rights issues and against the ballistic program. no one expects iran's bad behavior to change. will be be able to use the powers we have used in the past and build upon them and can congress build the tools without violating the negotiation. i want to know how they update against nefarious activities and how we will work with allies. the chairman mentioned the lifting of the international arms embargo. that is a great concern how it would impact partners and arms

race in the region of the world. this is information we need to make the best decision we can. let me mention this, what are our options if the united states wa walks away. how will we be received internationally. will be remain the effective enforcement of sanctions with our international partners and will iran come back to the negotiating table with a country that walked away from the agreement? these questions we need to understand. we need to know the option of going forward and what are the consequences if we don't go forward. mr. chairman, we have a full plate and i look forward to hearing from our witnesses and i hope the members of this committee use the information we get to debate the issue, take the time we have, and do what is right for the american people and ultimately make the decision we think is best to prevent iran

from becoming a fnuclear weapon power. >> thank you, senator cardin, i appreciate the way we worked together on so many issues. with that, i know our witnesses here today need no introduction. they are well known here and around the world and in spite of our policy that make this, i think each of us deeply appreciate the tremendous effort you put out on behalf of our country. we thank you for being here and willing to be here as long as it takes for everybody to get their answers. with that, i would like to introduce collectively secretary john kerry who served with us, ernie moniz who has been incredibly helpful to understand

the technical aspects of the deal, and secretary lew who served in multiple positions here has been affirmed by commit several times. i think you all understand the drill. take five minutes or so to explain, as i looked at your testimony, i know it is brief, just to warn people in advance i will defer my questions then and move to you immediately therefore and use my time to interject as things move along. with that, secretary kerry. thank you, mr. chairman, ranking member cardin, members of the committee, friends and former colleagues. we really appreciate the chance to discuss the comprehensive plan we and a our p-5 plus 1 partners developed with iran

regarding the future of the nuclear program. and let me emphasize this isn't just the united states of america. this is france, britain, russia, china and they have a pretty good understanding of this field and of the challenges and i appreciate the way in which they and germany, which was the plus one, all came together, all contributed and all were part of the debate. this is not just what this table negotiated but the national community and the plus-5 plus one negotiated. and they are not dumb. they are experts in nuclear technology, ratification, and in verification, and they are smart people who spent a life time that this and signed off on this agreement. i am joined by two cabinet

secretary members whose help was valuable in reaching this deal. i was privilege to be the chairman of the committee when we passed the iran sanctions effort. we remember the debate, passed it unanimously, and it played is significant role to bring iran to the table to bring about a serious, productive negotiation with iran. we were crystal clear we would not expect anything less than a good deal from the day the talks again. we defined the deal as a deal that closed off the four pathways to a ball. the two uranium, and one plutonium and the others. we achieved that standard and after two years of intensive talks the facts are crystal

clear. the plan announced last week in viena is a deal that shuts off the pathways and provides us with guarantees through the life time of the participation of iran we will know what they are doing. the chairman mentioned in his opening comments some phrase about giving iran what they want. folks, they already have what they want. they got it ten years ago or more. iran had enough missile material for 10-12 bombs we began the talks. 190 centrifuges, up from the 163 they had in 2003 when the prior administration was engaged with them on this very topic.

so this isn't a question of giving them what they want but a question of how do you hold their are program back. how do you dismantle their weapons program. not their whole program. let's understand what was on the table here. we sat out to dismantle their ability to build a nuclear weapon. and we have achieved that. no body has talked about dismantling the entire program because that is when they went with the increase in centrifuges. everybody knows what will stop that. it is called military action because they are not going to stop it otherwise. they proved it already during all those years. under the terms of this agreement, iran has agreed now to remove 98% of its stockfile.

voluntarily they will destroy 90% of the enriched uranium, and dismantled two thirds of the centrifuges and take out the existing core of the existing water reactor and fill it with concrete. iran has agreed to refrain from producing uranium and weapon grade plutonium for at least 15 years. if they began to do that, ernie moniz will tell you we will know it immediately. iran has agreed to accept the additional protocol and that is an outgrowth of the failure of the north korea experience which put in additional access requirements precisely so we know what iran is doing and they have to ratify it before the sanctions are lifted at the end of the process.

they have to pass the test. they have agreed to live by it from day one. there are additional transparent measures. if iran fails to comply, we will know it and we will know it quickly and be able to respond accordingly. many of the measures are in this agreement are there not just 10, 15, 25 years of which there are measures for each of those periods of time, but they are for life forever as long as iran is in the npt.

north korea pulled out of the npt. iran has not pulled out of the npt. remember two years ago when the negotiations began we faced an iran that was enriching uranium at a facility up to 10% at a facility under ground and secret. they had installed nearly 20,000 nuclear centrifuges, building a heavy water reactor that could produce weapon-grade plutonium at the rate of enough to produce one or two bombs a year, and experts assessed the breakout time as a result then, the interval required to produce enough missile material for one nuclear weapon was about two or three months. if this deal is rejected we return immediately to this reality except that the diplomatic support we built with other countries, and accumulated, would disappear overnight.

let me underscore, the alternative to the deal that we have reached is not what i have seen adds on tv suggesting diseng disengen. it is not some unicorn arrangement. that is a fantasy and our own intelligence tells us that. every department of the intelligence community reinforces that. the chase we face is between an agreement that will insure iran's nuclear program is limited, rigorously scrutinized, and peaceful or no deal at all. that is the choice. the fact is there are 189 nations that live by the npt. five of them are as we know the main nuclear powers of the un. and 184 of them are non-nuclear

in power but they live by it. and we have lived by what the iae does with respect to the 184 nations including 12 that enrich. the result is going to be the united states of america walking away from everyone of the restrictions that we have achieved. and a great big green light for iran to double the pace of its uranium enrichment proceed ahead with a water reactor and install more centrifuges and do it with without the inspections and transparency measures we secured. everything we have prevented will then start taking place and all of the voluntarily rollbacks of their programs are undone.

moreover, if the united states were to walk away from the partners, we are on our own. our partners will not walk away. we will have squandered the best chance we had to solve this through peaceful means. president obama made it crystal clear we will never accept a nuclear armed iran. he is the only president who has developed a weapon capable of guaranteeing that and he developed it as well as deployed it. but the fact is iran now has, we all don't like it, but whether we like it or not, iran has developed experience with the nuclear fuel cycle. they have developed the ability to produce thistle material for

bombs. we cannot bomb that knowledge away. nor can we sanction the knowledge away. by the way, they didn't chose to produce them unlike north korea that created a weapon and exploded one and pulled out of the npt. the plan will provide a stronger, comprehensive, and lasting means of limiting iran's nuclear program than any alternative that has been spoken for. because of those opposing the deal because of what happens in '15, '16 or '20, if we walk away year 15 or 20 starts tomorrow.

without any of the long term verification of the transparency safeguards we have put in place. over the past week, i spoke at length about what exactly this deal is. i also want to make clear what this deal was never intended to be. first of all, as the chief negotiator, i can tell you i never uttered the words anywhere, any time nor was that part of the discussion we had with the iranians. this plan is designed to address the nuclear issue and the nuclear issue alone. we knew if we got up with the other issues we would never get to where we needed to be to stop the nuclear program. it would be staying there forever negotiating one aspect or the other. and the highest priority of president obama is to make sure iran cannot get a nuclear weapon so we were disciplined in that. we didn't set out, even though

we don't like it, and i have extensive plans i will lay out if you want them, about how we will push back against iran's other activities, against terrorism support and contribution to secular violence in the middle east, all of those things are unacceptable and as unacceptable to us as they are to you. but i have news, pushing back against an iran with a nuclear weapon is very different than pushing from against an iran without one and we are guaranteeing they will not have one. so, we are working very closely with the states and ash carter was there yesterday. the foreign minister said the deal seems to have all of the provisions necessary to curtail iran's ability to get a nuclear. that is saudi arabia, the foreign minister of iran is

going to be in the emirates this weekend. i would suggest we are going to continue to press iran about the missing americans, about the immediate release of americans who have been unjustly held, and there is not a challenge in the entire region that we will not push back against if iran is involved in it. but i will tell you none of those challenges will be enhanced if iran gets a nuclear weapon. so the outcome cannot be guaranteed by sanctions alone. our own military tells us this. the only option is the resolution of the type reached here and that we believe will be shown to you today and in the days ahead.

we believe this is good deal for america, for our friends and allies in the region and we will it deserves your support. >> secretary moniz. >> thank you for coming here to discuss the deal reached. it prevents iran from getting a nuclear weapon, strong verification measures that gives us time to respond and takes

none of the options off the table. i want to stress that america's leading experts at the department of emergency were involved throughout the negotiations. argon, livermore, pacific northwest, savannah river, the y12 national security complex and the kansas city plant all played important roles. the nuclear experts were essential to evaluating support of the u.s. delegation. as a result of their work, i am confidant the technical underpinning of this job is solid and the department of energy is ready to assist implementation. the deal is exclusively peaceful and sufficient lead time if is proves otherwise. the jcpoa would take ten years, about just the time it would

take to produce the explosive, and one year from two or three months. the deal addresses the uranium and plutonium enrichment. the first step around the parameter, the ranking member, mentioned are maintained and strengthened in the deal. this means restricting the number, type and location of centrifuges, dialing back the r rnd program and increasing the stock pile of floride and preventing any material. excess infrastructure is removed from the towns as well. all of these reasons taken together establish the one-year breakout timeline for accumulating highly enriched uranium. and something we have not stressed but i want to add at the end of the ten years, iran

will have far fewer than 19,000 centrifuges because they acknowledge the breakage rate and they will not have a large replacement capacity because of the agreement. in addition, iran will have no source of weapon grade plutonium. the iraq reactor is transformed under international oversight and participation to produce far less plutonium than their current design and no weapon grade plutonium in normal operation and essentia essentia recognition if they try to devia deviate, and the plutonium fuel goes out of the country for life. this deal goes beyond the parameter in a number of ways. one area is iran will not engage in several activities that could

contribute the development of an ex plosive device including systems and special neutron sources. these commitments are in definitely. to be clear, the deal is not built on trust. it is hard nosed requirements that will limit iran's activities and insure inspections, transparency, and verification. i can assure you this is not what iran wanted. this is dialing back of the program. inspectors have unprecedented access to facilities, we could make an exception if they are

military occupation but that is not the case here and at other sites of concern. as well as the the entire nuclear supply chain from the centrifuge manufacturing and operation, this access comes with a 25 year commitment and even after a quarter century of compliance with a peaceful program, assuming we get there, we have additional protocol in place to monitor iran's nuclear activities. but another thing we have also in perpetuity is their adherence to modified code 3.1 meaning they must notify before they start building a nuclear facility. this eliminates a loophole where one could do something and say we were planning to notify

before bringing in the material. they must do it in the planning stage now. the iaea is permitted to use advance technology including things like real-time enrichment monitoring when i might say a technology developed by our due laboratories and oak ridge played a major role in this. if the international community thinks iran is cheating we can make request for access. inspectors can be getting access within 24 hours. unlike secretary kerry i did say the words any time anywhere. but the full sentence was any time, any where in the sense of a well defined process with a

well defined end time. the iaea can request access to any sus suspicious location with 24 hours notice under the protocol. the deal doesn't change that baseline. the issue is if there is agreement not reached, then when the iaea request access, the 24-day clock starts. and this is a new tool of finighttime for dissolving disputes and it is declined because of the confidence in environmental sampling we will have to implement to defect microsopic traces of nuclear material even after attempts are made to remove the evidence of activities with nuclear material. in fact, iran's history provides a good example. in february of 2003, the iaea

requested access to a facility in terrain and was denied and negotiations dragged out for six months. after the long delay, environmental samples taken revealed nuclear activity even though iran made a substantial effort to remove and cover up the evidence. we have conducted long experience to verify the ability to detect very, very small traces of urranium. the agreement is implemented in phases as has been said. 10 years, 15, 20-25 years, and the key transparency measures that stay beyond 25 years i described, of course as long as iran is in the npt and if they were not in the npt every alarm bell would go off all over the place and appropriate actions would be taken. in closing, i want to

acknowledge the tireless work of the negotiating team led my by colleague, secretary kerry, the u.s. multi agency delegation worked together, and the eu-3 plus 3 displayed remarkable cohesion throughout the complex endeavor. the continued collaboration and cooperation among the leading nations, in particular with p-5, is really crucial in insuring at iran welcome -- comply. i want to say again, the deal is based on science and analysis, because of its deep grounding and technical analysis carried out largely by our scientist and engineers i am confidant this is a good deal for america, allies and global security. iran will be fathered from a

nuclear weapon capability all of the time with rather than without this agreement. thank you for the opportunity to be here again. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much. secretary lew. >> thank you, mr. chairman. chairman corker, ranking member cardin and members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to speak about the joint comprehensive plan of action. a joint policy of this significance deserves review. i am confidant a debate on the deal will make it clear this will strengthen our allies and our protection. this is the most effective restriction on regime in history. we cut them off from the market and crippled them. the iranian economy is 20% smaller than it would have been

had pre-2012 growth continued. the administration stood behind this with the bipartisan support of this committee. we established a web of far reaching international sanctions that persuaded iran's leadership to come to the table prepared to roll back their nuclear program. international agreement and cooperation to achieve this pressure is vital. the word's major power have been and remain united to prevent a nuclear armed iran. we had national level sanctions in many countries and secured adherance by countries around the world. the point of the sanctions was to change iran's nuclear behavior. accordingingly once the iaea veri verify that iran extended bre

breakout time to one year sanctions come into affect. there is no signing bonus. to be clear, there is no immediate changes to u.n., eu, or u.s. sanctions only if iran full fills the condition will the second sanction be removed. sanction that target third party companies doing business with iran. we must regard the possibility of iran not up holding the deal. that is why we will be able to snap back both u.s. and un sanctions. and the united states has the ability to eeffectively force the reposition of those sanctions. even as we phase in nuclear related sanctions relief, we maintain sanction that fall

outside of the scope of the nuclear deal including our primary trade embargo. iran will continued to be denied access to the largest market and maintain sanction for terrorist groups like hezbollah and destabilize the role in yemen, its missile program and human rights abuses as home. just this week, treasusanctione hezbollah leaders and well-not be relieving sanctions on the guard core, kurds force or senior officials. some argue that sanctions relief is premature until iran seizes the activities and the funds iran recovered could be used on terrorist. i understand. but iran's ties to terrorist groups are why we must keep them

from getting a nuclear weapon. a nuclear armed iran is a far more menacing threat. if we cannot solve more concerns at once we need to address them. jcpoa will address the nuclear damage and free us to check iran's activities more aggressively. walking away from the deal leaves the world leader of terrorism with a short and decreasing breakout time. iran's $100 million in restricted farm reserve, which mean fear will be used for wrong purposes are the country's savings. we estimate after sanctions relief, iran will only be able to access half of the reserves or about $50 billion and that is because $20 billion is committed

to projects with china and tens of billions are non-performing loans to iran's energy and banking sector. iran can't simply spend the usable resources as they will likely be needed to make international payment obligations like financing for imports and external debts. moreover, the president was enacted on revitalization and faces a peril to meet the promises. he faces half a trillion in pressing requirements and government obligations. iran is in a massive economic hole which it will take years to climb out. we will aggressively target any attempts by iran to finance hezbollah or used funds gained by sanction relief and including enhancing cooperation with israel and partners in the gump

gulf. backing away from this deal would be a mistake. even if one believes extending sanction pressure was a better plan that choice is not available. our partners agreed to impose costly sanction on iran to put a stop to the elicit nuclear program. if we change our terms and insist the countries escalate the countries and apply them to all of iran's objectionable activities they would buckle we would be left without a nuclear deal or sanctions. it is impractical to believe we could marshall a global coalition of partners to impose such pressure after turning down a deal our partners believe is good. the joint comprehensive plan of action is strong with phase relief over after iran rolls

back the program and a powerful snapback if they don't. it is plubrocking iran's path t nuclear bomb. this shouldn't be put at risk when the prospect of an unrestrained nuclear program in iran is such a threat to the world. >> thank you for your testimony. it has been stated many times that the united states maintains its ability to impose sanctions relative to support terrorism, human rights violations, and ballistic missile issues. i read the jcpoa and there are several grabs.

secretary lew, i want to get your assurance that we have full ability to use the tools of sanctions against iran for the support of terrorism, human rights and non nuclear type of activities which include congressional action congress might want to take. >> senator cardin, it was a matter of discussions and we maintain we will keep in place the sanctions on terrorism, human rights violations. we are not lifting the sanctions based on those authorities

congress has authority. i know there is legislation pending regarding hezbollah and we would work with you on legislation. the thing we cannot do is put right back in place everything that was part of the nuclear sanction and put a new label on it. we reserved our rights to put sanction in place that trysaddr the line acts. this is a period of time where snapbacks are viable.

>> i think the idea of coming out of the box is different from when it expires. there are three types of activities in violation of the jcpoa. they could use nuclear material put in violation and you already addressed that. but it could involve weaponization or it could involve research not using nuclear material. with the 24-day delay in those cases, compromise our ability to determine whether iran is in compliance with the agreement. >> senator cardin, let's put the nuclear material.

we have addressed in this quite secure is clearly showing when it goes into weaponization activities there is a spectrum. worker with uranium metal involves nuclear material, for example, and i think we would have strong tools there. when we go to other activities, without getting into too many specifics, they will still be a variety of signatures. my secretary priority on the list would be the explosive driven neutron surfaces and there are tall tale signs we would have access to what the iaea inspectors would have access to. as we get into the other areas like computer modeling, that is a divinifferent kind of detecti challenge. and in all of these cases, there

are non-nuclear signatures but it is more complicated. >> secretary kerry, i want you to elabate more on the capacity after the time limits and iran's obligations after the time limits on its nuclear enrichment toward a weapon. i understand they have obligations. can you tell us about the lead time, and what the breakout looks like and what assurance we can detect and take action before iran becomes a nuclear

state weapon after the 15 years schul. this provides the right of access and this is where it comes from and they have to respond. if we have interest shared among the p-5 plus one we will have an incredible amount of sourcing and put if they tonight -- don't

we we can revoke other actions. >> after 15 years? >> yes, and we have a 20 year component that allows us televised tracking of their centrifuges and we have a 25-year quite remarkable insight which is access and monitor tracking of their life of the urranium cycle. from the mining to the mills to the yellow production to the gasification to the centrifuge out into the the waste we will have an ability, the iaea has the ability to monitor that every step of the way. if we have x-amount of raw uranium coming out or in the middle if there is x-amount of milling and some is diverted and we don't see it going to the place it is supposed to go to we will have insight to this.

in addition to this, under the protocol and process for the civil nuclear process for programs, we, all of the facilities are declared because it is a civil program. so there is 24-7 visitation for those sights. it is only the undeclared facility if you have a suspicion you have to go through the other process. we will have insight because they are living by the npt or allegedly they will and that is what we have to make sure they are doing. i might add under the interim agreement, a number of people called a mistake and tragedy and you heard the same rhetoric you are hearing now.

iran lived up to every opponent of that over the course of the last year. they reduced the 20% uranium, undid iraq and i will not go through it all now. we will have an agreement with nothing that ends in 15 years. the size of the stockpile limitation and the enrichment and they can enrich further but we will have insight. a civil nuclear program is enri enrichment at 5%. if you start to enrich around the 20% you are talking about the research reactor or a few other things. but there is no rational whatsoever for enrichment above that and we would have insight into the program that would note if they are beginning to go somewhere else.

red flags go off everywhere and we would be all able to respond. this could be a collateral benefit and going to the uranium supply chain safeguards this is something the iaea wants to have more broadly. this would be a first in moving toward the cradleal to -- cradle. >> there are other first we cannot talk about relative to their bridprocedures. i would say to mr. secretary, yes, people have said they would

rather keep it in place than move to something worse, it doesn't mean people like it in the first place but on comparison. >> president obama now has 34 senators supporting the iran nuk nuclear agreement and that is enough to keep the deal in plan. the senate is planning a vote when members return next week. secretary of state john kerry speaking in philadelphia today made the case the agreement makes the united states and its allies safer. you can see the entire speech tonight at 8 p.m. eastern on crick-span. more from secretary kerry as he and energy secretary ernest moniz testify about the nuclear deal in front of the house foreign affairs committee. this is an hour.

>> this hearing will come to order. today, we continue our review of the nuclear agreement with the obama administration reached with iran. this is a critical hearing, some say decades, demanding the committee's thorough review. last congress, we passed comprehensive sanctions legislation by a vote of 400-20. it would have given iran's the

ability to collapse but we blocked that. committee members will face the important decision in september, of approving or disapproving this agreement. we will have that vote only because of the iran nuclear agreement review act passed in may. which the administration didn't want. the preference has been to sideline america's representatives so i was not surprised when the administration went against bipartisan calls and gave russia, and china and others at

the security counsel a vote on the agreement before the american public. that is backedwar wards and wro. we heard concern from experts about the substance of the grid. first, iran is not required to dismantle key bomb-making technology. second, it is reversing decades of policy, does that make the region more table? and third, iran is allowed to continue its research and development to gain an industrial scale nuclear program once this agreement begins to expire in as little as ten years. ten years. that is a flash in time. and iranian obligations start unwinding. does this make the world more secure?

this deal came up short. instead, there is managed access with iran, russia and china having a say in where international inspectors can and can't go. it is a fact we have been surprised by every development with iran and iran cheated on everything agreement they signed. so i ask, has iran earned the right to be trusted? this deal guts the sanction web that is putting pressure on

iran. where does all of the money go? gone are the sanction on iran's nuclear program but also on the bad fix that supported iran's terrorism and ballistic missile development. and to our dismay, iran won a late concession to remove international restrictions on its ballistic missile program and conventional arms in periling the security of the region and our homeland. if this agreement goes through, iran gets a cash boost and a path for nuclear weapons. with sweeping sanction relief, we have lessened our ability to challenge iran's conduct across the board. as iran grows stronger, we will

be weak to respond. there are sanction iran needs relief from. sanction that continue to deter companies from investing in iran. these are about as high stakes as it gets so the committee must ask if we made the most of our pretty strong hand or are we willing to bet, as the administration has, that this is the beginning of a changed iran. i look forward to an informative hearing and turn to the ranking member. >> mr. chairman, thank you for convening this hearing and

secretary kerry, sekt moniz, and secretary lew thank you for the hearing. thank you for your service no matter what side of the issue you are on. i don't think anyone doubts your commitment to the united states and your good intention on this deal. thank you for the time you took to engage with members of congress on the proposed deal and thank you for your testimony today. congress gave itself 60 days to renew the deal and i sincerely hope my colleagues take advantage to study the agreement, ask questions, and make an informed decision when the time comes. we have had many months and hearing to discuss the different aspects of the nuclear agreement with iran. at this point, we are no longer dealing with hypethet -- hypotheticals. we have a deal on the table to decide if it advances the safety of the united states and our

allies. we need to ask ourselves the alternative of the deal absent this deal. if this deal fails, how would woe get the iranians back to the table, would new sanctions have to be coupled with military action? there are a number of issues i find troublesome and hope you will address them. i continue to have concerns that international inspectors don't have immediately access to undeclared sites. iran has 14 days to grant access and if refused after that time members of the joint commission could take another week to resolve the iaea's concern and after that iran has three more days to provide access to so we are already a month after inspectors wanted access and if

iran continues to say no another month could go by and that potential length of time gives me pause. i would like to know how we can be sure iran cannot use delays to sanitize sites and get away with breaking the rules. we are seeing iran's leadership declare that military sites are off to inspectors. i am troubled also by reports about how the deal reached between iran and the acrobatiiaw things will be inspected. and i have concerns about the advanced ballistic missile weapons and unconventional weapons. i was disappointed it learn after a maximum of five and eight years respectively they will be terminated. i would like to understand why we allow this to happen and what

week -- we can do to insure it doesn't make a terrible situation worse. i am concerned what the leaders will do when sanction are phased out and new resources come flowing in. we are talking about tens of millions of dollars and i would like to see their leaders use the money to help the iranian people but with tough sanctions in place, iran bolsted hezbollah, haand the other terrorist ryg -- regyms -- after the research and development expires iran could move toward the next stage of its enrichment activities.

i would like to know what other provisions in the deal, if any, will mitigate this risk. and i have a concern that 15 years from now iran is off the hook. iran's leaders could produce weapon great highly enriched uranium without watching and they could use centrifuges to speed up the process and this amounts to iran being a legit nuclear state by the year 2030. my question is this. what happens then? back to square one? is this deal pushing the pause button for 15 years? i have trepidation barely a week after the iranians sign the deal with us the supreme leader of the tole was chanting death to america.

you would think they would keep quite for a week or two or month but it went back to business as usual. how can we trust iran when this type of thing happens? it is disconcerting. i am looking forward to hearing from the witnesses and thank you for your service and hard work and yield back to the chairman. >> this morning we are pleased to be joined by john kerry, the secretary of stitate, moans the secretary of energy and the secretary of security. kerry served as the senator from massachusetts. dr. moniz was a proteser at mit. from director of the office and management of budget to the white house staff secretary lew is now the 76 account secretary of the treasury.

gentlemen, welcome, and without objection the witnesses' full prepared statement is made part of the record and members have five days to submit statements and questions and materials for the record. before turning to the testimony, we have most of the members present here, i know we all recognize the gravity of this issue and want everyone to have a chance to question the panel and to accomplish that, i would ask everyone, members and witnesses, respect to time limit leaving adequate time for answer the questions. we will begin with the summary of secretary kerry's testimony. mr. secretary? we appreciate the community to be here to clear up a lot of the misunderstanding, some

element of has some major incorrect facts on which it bases the add. when respect to the chairman and ranking member, there are conclusions that have been drown drawn that don't match with the reality of this deal. we welcome the opportunity. we are con efficiencyed the plan with five other nations accomplish the path that memo set out which is to close off the four pathways to a bomb. as you listen to ernie moniz on the technical components and see

the deal, i believe that is a conclusion that everyone can come to. not saying they will. but can. they were both critical to our ability to do this. the treasury department's knowledge of the sanctions and application of the sanctions has been outstanding and they helped us nbunderstand the implication of the sanctions. we are not talking about $150 billion or $100 billion but actually $55 billion will go to iran. we were clear we would not accept anything less than a good deal.

one that would shut off the deal. the facts are clear the plan announced this month by six nation nationser accomplishs that. iran has agreed to remove 98% of its stockpile of enriched uranium, dismantle two thirds of its installed centrifuges, and destroy by filling it with concrete the existing core of its heavy water plutonium reactor. iran has agreed to refrain from producing or requiring uranium and plutonium for nuke patience weapons forever.

how do we enforce or verify so it is more than words? what happens is forever. iran has agreed to accept and ratify prior to the conclusion and ratify the additional protocol that requires extensive access as well as significant additional transparency measures including mining to milling through the centrifuges production through the waste for 25 years schul. if iran fails to com ply with te

terms of the agreement, our intel department, energy department are absolutely clear we will quickly know it and be able to respond with every option available to us today. there is no agreement in ten years, 15 years, not in 25 years. no sunset ever. remember, two years ago when we began the nugaucegotiationegotit of people are forgetting where we are today. people would say in 15 years iran has the ability to be a capab capable nuclear power. folks, when we began the

negotiation we had an iran enriching uranium up to 20% and had a facility build in secret underground that was rapidly stockpiling inraenriched uraniu. they had enough for 10-12 bombs at the start of the talks. they had installed 19,000 centrifuge and nearly finished building a heavy water reactor that could produce weapon-grade plutonium at a rate of 1-2 bombs per year. experts put iran's breakout time, when we began, which remember is not the old breakout time we referred to in the context of arms control which is the time to have a weapon and deploy it. breakout time as we have applied is very conservative. it is the time it takes to have enough thistle material for one

potential bomb. it is not the amount of time to the bomb. when we say there is one night of thistle material they have to go design the bomb and do other things. i think you would agree, no nation is going to consider itself nuclear capable with one bomb. so if this deal is rejected, folks, we will take it down and tailor it down. if this deal is rejected, we go back to what i described.

except the agreement will disagreer overnight. let me underscore the alternative to the deal we reached is not some kind of unicorn fantasy that thinks about iran's complete ending. i heard people talk about dismantling their program. that didn't happen under president bush with a policy of no enrichment and they had 163 centrifuges. they went up to the 19,000. our intelligence community confirms and i ask you all to sit with them, they will tell you, that is not going to happen. we have two options. we move ahead to make sure it is limited, cruet scro-- scrutiniz

and they start to enrich. to be clear, if congress rejects what was agreed to, you will reject every restriction put in place, and no one is counting the two years that iran has already complied with the interim agreement and complied completely and totally. so we rolled the back program, we reduced their 20% enriched uranium to zero and that has been accomplished. if this is rejected we go back down that road. they will do it. everything we tried to prevent will happen. what is is worse?

if we walk away, instead, we will walk away from the sanctions that brought iran to the table in the first race and we will have squandered the best chance we have to solve this problem through peaceful means. make no mistake from the very first day in office president obama made it clear he will never except a nuclear armed

and i no well, as you do, the whole point was to bring your ran to the negotiating table. even the toughest sanctions did not stop iran from growing. and it didand it did not stop iran from accumulating a stockpile of enriched uranium. now, sanctions arenow, sanctions are not an end to themselves. they are diplomatic tool that has enabled us to do what sanctions could not without negotiation, terrain in a nucleara nuclear

program which was headed in a dangerous direction and to put limits on it like no other program has been watched before. we have secured the ability to do things. to those thinking about opposing the steel, i ask you to simply focus on this, if you walk away year 1515 or 20 starts tomorrow without any of the long-term access or verification safeguards we have put in place. what is the alternative? what are you going to do when the sanctions are not in place and cannot be reconstituted i heard critics say the vienna

agreement was somehow legitimize the nuclear program. that is nonsense. iran's leaders are permanently barred from pursuing a nuclear weapon, and there are permanent restraints and access provisions and inspection provisions to guarantee that command i,i -underscore, if they try to evade that obligation we will no it. a civil nuclear program requires full access to awful documentation command we will have the ability to track that. the iaea will be continuously monitoring your centrifuge production. for the next 25 years the iaea will be continuously monitoring the uranium so

that i cannot be diverted to another facility. for the life of this agreement however long iran stays in the npt and is living up to its obligations they must live up to the additional protocol which greatly expands capacity to have accountability. this agreement gives us a far stronger detection ability, more time to respond to any attempt to break out and much more international support in stopping it than we would have without the deal. if we walk away from the steel we will not have the united nations or the other five nations that negotiated with us because they will feel we walked away.

make no mistake, pres. obama has committed to stopping us. so in the 28 years or more that i was privileged to represent i had a 100% voting record on every issue for israel. i understand the fear and concerns, but we believe what we have laid out as a way of making laid out is a way of making the region safer. we do not lose any option that we have available to us today. we will push back against the other activities

and laid out a detailed policy for working with the gulf states and others and look forward to working with israel. this is why we have a robust military presence. mr. chairman, we will continue to push back, but the fact is, it is easier to push back against and miranda does not have a nucleara nuclear weapon. that has been our principal strategic objective. the outcome here is critical. we believe this deal makes our country and allies safer and will guarantee a iran's program is under intense scrutiny

and ensure the community is unified in backing this up and in the end it will guarantee the iranian program must be peaceful and therefore is a good deala good deal for the world, america, our allies and friends, and we believe it richly deserves your support. >> thank you, sec. you have been thorough. if you could be brief and we will get back on time,. >> thank you, chairman. thank you for the opportunity to discuss the nuclear dimensions of the iran agreement. the jcp 08 prevents iran from getting a nuclear weapon from provide strong verification measures to give us time to respond if they violate and takes none

of our options off the table. i was backed up in the negotiations by the nuclear competency build up over decades at doe and supported by this congress. america's nuclear experts were engaged throughout the negotiations, nine labs and sites in seven states took part in supporting our negotiating position. these experts were essential command i am confident the technical underpinnings of the steel are solid. the jcp la will extend for ten years time. that is this a material being reduced from 12,300 kilograms. stringent constraints on the stockpile, strong containment and surveillance measures on all centrifuge

manufacturing and the iranian supply chain for 2025. verification is forever stronger than it would be without the agreement. the iraqi reactor redesigned so so it is not a plutonium factory and furthermore the fuel is sent out of the country. thus the parameters are maintained, and all paths to a bombs worth of nuclear weapons material are addressed. materially strengthened in the vienna agreement. one important area is that iran will not engage several activities that could

contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device. these commitments are indefinite. in addition iran will not pursue plutonium or uranium ore uranium alloy metallurgy for 15 years. weaponization requirements especially for missile launch ad to the breakout timeline. i cannot agree that the agreement does not dismantle iranian technology efforts of relevance to nuclear weapons. every aspect is rolled back. returning to verification, the iaea will be permitted to use advanced technologies, be permitted to use advanced technologies, technologies that doe laboratories have developed. much is made about these sites. the iaea can request access the 24-hour24 hour notice which iran will implement under this deal.

the jcp la goes beyond that recognizing that disputes could arise and provides a crucial new tool for resolving such disputes so that the iaea gets the access it needs. most important to complement that is environmental sampling of nuclear materials even after attempts are made to remove the material and the 2003 example2,003 example found undeclared nuclear material even after and delayed access for six months. any attempt to move to nuclear weapons capability. any must earn a sharp response by all necessary means.

a steep response may be clear from the start for any violation of the agreement blocking the covert path i should emphasize will always rely on the work of the american intelligence community and those our friends and allies. the deal is based on science and analysis because of its deep grounding carried out largely. i am confident this is a good deal for america, our allies, and global security individuals dedicated to strengthening the bonds between israel and the united states and this landmark agreement removes the threat that a nuclear armed iran would pose to the region in israel specifically. we see no fatal flaws and

have not heard viable alternatives from those who oppose the implementation. as has been stated, the big gamble would come in turning away from the agreement rather than implementing the agreement. thank you for this opportunity to be here. >> thank you. sec. ofyou. secretary of the treasury. >> thank you, mr. chairman and members of the committee this is an important issue where ii think full discussion that we are having will make it clear that this will strengthen national security and that of our allies. the powerful array of sanctions constitutes the most effective sanctions regime in history. the measures have clearly demonstrated the cost of flouting international law. today the iranian economy is

20% smaller than it would have been had it remained on its pre- 2012 path. the united states government stood at the forefront of this effort across two administrations and with the bipartisan support of congress. together we established sanctions that ultimately persuaded iranian leadership after years of intransigence to come to the table prepared a rollback its program. international consensus in cooperation to achieve this was vital. the world's major powers have been and remain united. that unity of purpose produced for resolutions and sanctions and secured adherence to us sanctions by countries around the world. the point of these sanctions was always to change iran's nuclear behavior while holding out the prospect of relief if the world's concerns were addressed. accordingly once the iaea verified iran has completed key steps faced sanctions

relief will come into effect. there is no signing bonus. there will be no immediate changes to the un, eu, or us sanctions. only if iran fulfills the conditions will be live sanctions on a phase in basis, sanctions the target third-party countries. of course we must guard against the possibility that iran does not uphold that side of the deal which is why if it violates commitments we will be able to promptly snapback most us and un sanctions, and since preventing the un snapback requires a vote from the un security council the united states has the ability to effectively force the reimposition of the sanctions. we maintain significant sanctions that fall outside