the heads starting to turn red from that kind of attitude, which clearly indicated the trend is going to treat russia just like they treated any other country in the russell walker this same status, subsidy. a couple years later in 2005, and i assumed my post at nato, it's hard to believe now but in actual fact we are served to talk with nato, i mean russia becoming a member of nato. ..

lo and behold when i showed up at the university, there is about 150, 250 people there protesting and i couldn't figure it out. so i walk up to this elderly gentleman who had some ribbons on his blast and i said why are you protesting my presence here to talk about great relationship we have with russia this answer was because my pension is too low. that took me a while to figure that out for what he was essentially saying is all the problems internal within russia is not our fault. it is because of you guys. that kind of continued to

resonate and i think has resonated and what we see now and what putin plays up to with his audience company still has an 80% or better approval rating by people in russia. as i said, i just want to put that this kind of some interesting anecdotes. i was also at an assistant secretary in august when russia invaded georgia and it was really, really hard to get the ambassadors back from their vacation even within invasion. it's one of the most sacrosanct things you don't want attached is an august holiday by european colleagues. i wanted to speak a little bit about nato. one of the things i ask you to keep in mind is the nato

alliance, the nato allies are continually concerned and interested in the russia u.s. bilateral dialogue. we've made it clear and even though i'm no longer a member of the nato staff, i still sometimes say we because i think of myself as trying to reflect the alliance views on many things and as you've indicated it is true we have endorsed in our strategic concepts 2010 and other documents and statements during summits that we will remain in the current situation in nuclear lines but more importantly the political dimension steve alluded to and that is the real desire to be a part of that nuclear deterrence posture and even more important the consultative aspects of it, that the united states will

consult if it ever contemplates using nuclear weapons under any situation and this goes way back to the early 60s. this political linkage is incredibly important. i can't emphasize that enough in the physical presence of the u.s. nuclear deterrent dissuades any fear the united states may eventually abandoned those that are members of the alliance with participation reflected in the alliance looks to actively participate. we said a committee with the friday forum with the u.s. to keep the alliance informed about bilateral u.s. aggression relations and particularly the arms control round. their concern is whatever dialogue goes on between the united states and russia should

not lead to a weakening of the transatlantic link in nato and instead it should be based on the assumption of reciprocity between the allies, not just the united states, the allies and russia. this inclusion of what i call the european footprint in any of these arms control processes needs to be subject to these consultative process in the alliance. it is also firmly based on the principle of the indivisibility of security and every document that nato puts out and some statements we talk about this again and again about the indivisibility of security. saying all that, the alliance still goes to great lengths to endorse and support arms control

and the reciprocity aspect of that. even the most diehard official within the alliance that we should eliminate all nuclear weapons they talk about it only in the official context of reciprocity in a quid pro quo that we would not eliminate nuclear weapons, reduce nuclear posture except in a process of discussion and negotiation with russia. in the last summit, the alliance again stated they look forward to developing various transparency and confidence building ideas of the russian federation in the context of the nato council with the goal of developing detailed proposals and increasing mutual understanding. they continue to believe the partnership between nato and

russia based on the respect of international law is a strategic value continues to inspire to a cooperative, construct a relationship. but one that is reciprocal. the flipside of that as they've said no while summit is current conditions do not exist to allow that to continue in the alliance decided enough since to suspend all discussions within the context of the nato council. while i was very chaired something called the nuclear group and the nuclear group developed a series of confidence and security building measures that were short-term, midterm ahmad term. it included discussions on nato and russia in nuclear doctrine.

those discussions were very open. a very constructive dialogue. nato was pushing to have russia provide information on their tactical or not strategic nuclear weapons which they refuse to do that they were still willing to talk about doctrine and do it in a classified environment. we had three of those meetings. we also dealt with safety and security of nuclear weapons and that process each nuclear weapons state which therefore the united kingdom, the united states and russia conducted very specific safety and security exercises at a location in each one of those countries. they were very successful in

their eye openers for the nato alliance is to how these countries would conduct respond to situations where a nuclear weapon might have stolen, there might have been an accident, there might've been a detonation of some sort. the follow-on exercise was to be a nuclear weapon or nuclear device in a country that wasn't a nuclear weapons state and russia decided they wanted it to be one of the states that had the dual capable aircraft mission. none of those states came forward to have this exercise. another country did and the russians refuse to participate. this is all happening in 2010 and 2011 and at that point there

is no longer in a discussion on transparent tape. so i will close up because it's good to have discussions, but again as far as nato is concerned, they are very interested on having a continuing dialogue on confidence and security building measures. that is not happening and given the continued animosity and difficulties and challenges of the various accusations that is not happening in the near future. i can finish up by telling a story that aptly captures our challenges and that is the story about two hunters hunting for bears in alaska and they get up there in the pilot says to let you know i can only take you two guys and one bear.

three days later the pilot flies back in theirs to hunters to bears and they start arguing. he says they can't do it. finally says i'll give you an extra $1000 if you take all of us including the two bears. below the two bears in the plane and they take off and gets about five miles and crashes and miracle both hunters survived. one staggers up, looks around and says where are we peered the other says two miles further than we were last year. so we continue to go down that path and what not i will close and take your questions. thank you. >> thank you, guy. we do certain lay half -- was it the same pilot? >> we certainly have enough time for questions and while you are all gathering your thought,

limit just pick up on a few points. the agenda listed me as an additional speaker. what i'm going to do is moderate a discussion and take your questions. on the nato russia council, even if nato were inclined to resume some of those activities, do you think the russians would fight? >> i don't think so. part of the reason surprisingly for an alliance exactly a year from last year, there's some very, very strong language that made it quite clear there is no business as usual at the alliance. for example, russia has breached

its commitment as well as violated international law and that's a very big thing for europeans, thus breaking the core of our cooperation and they lamented the fact for two decades nato has gone to extraordinary lengths to embrace this relationship. talking seriously about them becoming a member of nato. as a result of crimea in the activities in eastern ukraine but also the things they have done and threatened to do in georgia, moldova and just a whole litany. in fact, if you go on the nato website, they have listed 25 years of mythical crimes that nato has committed against the russian federation and responded to that and it's a long, long list. everything from the nato

promised we would never deploy forces in eastern europe to a violated the non-proliferation treaty by training pilots to fly the nuclear mission and it goes on and on. it is really going to be hard to go back to a relationship, as i said at the beginning of very disappointed in some respects we should have been a little bit more forceful. the alliance should've been more more forceful in trying to reengage and say where can we as stephen nandi pointed out, where are the areas we can start talking again and start building trust and confidence. that is why today it is going to pay huge dividends in israeli import. >> i think guy is right. just a little ray of op to miss them. i went through the early 1990s

and you had the soviet walkout from the negotiations at the end of 1983 you have a freeze in u.s. soviet relations and the soviets said we'll resume the negotiations msn two and a half years he had the inf treaty on start. the current state but we also want to nod it nor that there may be an opportunity to turn things around. probably being pessimistic is the more realistic course now. things can change very quickly. that's been demonstrated between washington and moscow. >> one other thing, steve, that

you brought up this question talking about doctrine and the russians are quite interested in talking about new technologies, whether it's precision guided munitions or other things that i quite clearly remember a question from one of the participants to the russians where i was asked how you'd feel about a cyberattack? does the cyberattack constitute an existential threat and the answer was well, that depends how successful it is. so that seems to be a very risky situation for us to be in and i fully understand these talks with everybody else on

cybersecurity on any kind of limits are difficult. the ones who introduced the notion of a nuclear response and it stands to me we need some kind of forum for at least discussing these issues. nato may not be the right place. iges welcome your thoughts on that. >> one of the things that came out of the discussion was on the nato side, my guess is the alliance has to be prepared to talk about questions other than nonstrategic nuclear weapons. that would include questions like missile defense, conventional straight and might even include issues like conventional forces because i believe that he is now while the russians are in the process of modernizing forces, there is a

perception that still reflects the reality you would get nato forces and russian forces with some significant quantitative and qualitative it manages. you have to have the broader discussion. where cyberfits into that, i don't know. i am not sure yet that the united states and russia separately have a fixed enough.renowned diapers to have that conversation. you could argue maybe it is better to start the conversation before, but for all the attention it's talked about here in the cyberworld, i'm not sure what american doctrines i've read. i'll give you an example because i do think when the u.s. government asked about labor, how do you deter cyberattacks about four or five years ago i was out at strategic command

with a deterrent seminar in august or they talk about deterrence questions. they had an interesting panel on cyberdeterrence. i'm not sure i received a good answer when i look at deterrence in the strategic nuclear area, i understand what we're talking about because i can say how many strategic bombers the united states have, we periodically exercise them. it is very clear to the world what backs up american strategic deterrence in terms of forces and doctrines. if you look at the cyberside it's a pretty okay world. we don't know how much the u.s. military put sand and what sorts of capability. i don't know how deterrence works in the world when you're not communicating either side. if you conduct a cyberattack, here is what might happen and we may have to get around thinking

before we have a useful conversation with the russians. >> at nato we have a cybercenter of excellence and a massive cyberattack from unknown sources. and as a result at nato headquarters they created a cyberdivision, very small but one is again not wholly endorse the other members of the alliance that is again recognizing the challenges and difficulties of what is an attack and so on and so forth and coming to grips to deal with it and have a forum for discussion on that. there was talk about having a working group like that in the russian council like i shared for example a theater missile

defense which we have very good cooperation with the russians up until 2008. again, they've instructed themselves to do with it but there's a long way to go. >> banks. steve put his finger on the central question and you kind of rephrase that. does russia want to reduce the risk? when they look at him and stands and that doesn't give great optimism with a massive trust destroyer. but me off her a ray of optimism i think for us to participate in a track to billy is a track to

do but don't really need to think about necessarily or i certainly don't need to think about whether the u.s. government endorses this or not. the russian system doesn't work that way. just the very fact we are able to hold these discussions and to have the level of representation we had from the russian federation said something that at least some areas of the russian government are supportive of continuing these types of discussion right now but in this context it emphasizes the point that guy is making that what we are doing us all that much more important. >> thank you. it is time to take questions from you. we have some roving microphone

and i ask you introduce yourself and your affiliation and i will try and go in order. can you come up? >> thanks. i am a russian reporter and my question and what you've been discussing. first i think it's an important discussion. thank you. second, it's hard to even cover the event because i do not understand is practical significance. i have a group of experts who seem to be agreed from what i am hearing from all of you, you are for dialogue on the confidence building, all of them. on the russian side that is

probably thinks in some way but what about the american side. so what does it mean? you also seem to be all agreed with the u.s. i am not willing at this point to restart the dialogue. that is my question. what does it mean? what does your opinion matter? >> let me try briefly and then i will let the diplomats take over. yes, this is track two, the rooms are also our sponsor for this dialogue was the u.s. government. and there is definitely interest

in the u.s. government. we have government speakers that did not participate formally in the dialogue, but did attend a luncheon and dinner notes. i note in the notably, not on an official level that there is great interest in what was said. i don't know that the u.s. government has plans to follow-up on this. that is beyond my kin. but i don't know if i was a list totally track one and a half. i think steve put it quite well. both sides has a big interest in reducing some of the risks that were currently not entirely nuclear, but the risks of the

escalation and to the extent this may contribute to helping mitigate misunderstandings. >> that's a great question, andrea. on the value of the event, this event is being streamed live on the internet and i believe that c-span is also broadcasting the event. so i think there is a value simply in the role of public education that we are talking about this and the knowledgeable people and we think there is a problem and maybe have some influence outside of the

building and a multitude of ways. >> i just had two points. anytime i had a conversation with somebody involved in the u.s. and they keep the dialogue going. the second point i would make is that in the aftermath of russia's military seizure of crimea and russian military action in eastern ukraine, it was appropriate for the nato to ratchet down the relationship. there has to be consequences to egregious bad behavior. i think probably the feeling that most of the participants in the workshop is a might make sense for nato to relax that an open up the way for a nato russian military to military dialogue particularly on the

issue of how you avoid accidents and miscalculation when you have been increased tempo of nato and russian military forces operating in close proximity. let's open to the door to that. i think in my own mind i'm not sure whether the russians want to have the dialogue but i would argue would be worthwhile for nato to try to do that because neither side should have an interest in a conflict that begins by miscalculation or accident. >> thank you. i saw a question. first this young woman. >> thank you. university of maryland. i told the story from allies for spec is. my question has to do with their follow-up on the idea of nato is not prepared to reaffirm its commitment. coincidentally, during a

significant divide among the allies, especially when it comes to the reluctance to host the nuclear weapons versus the ones who are eager to receive the warhead of the next generation of the aircraft. how much longer can nato continue its policy of talking about the three notes. are we going to see it in eastern europe? >> great question. >> i don't think -- that's a very good question. it's complicated. clearly right now, nato is re-looking at its nuclear policy and they are going to somewhat of a process if anything needs to be changed.

the fact that the matter is nato conducts nuclear exercise so they don't announce them. it is not public. if you look at the handout and i commend that to you with several really good papers including mine. i have a slide in their bed shows that they nuclear mission for nato was never required that the 16 different nations would be participating in the forward deployment again to send a political message of the solidarity of the alliance and part of the burden sharing ongoing process today is all the other nations are looking for ways in which they would participate in holding the annual nuclear policies and how they can actively participate. given the current circumstances, there's been a lot of talk about the possibility of forward

deployment. as far as i've seen in my discussions with people at nato and nobody is talking about a move they nuclear weapon and having them be permanently stationed. but there is discussion about what more can we do and how can they go back to the messaging part of that. solidarity by doing exercises up as many nations as possible actively participating. one thing people forget is at the end of the sentence based on the current policy situation, the policy situation has changed. you get some people talking the situation has changed, particularly eastern european allies. we need to re-examine it. but from an overarching alliance

standpoint i don't see any changes in a movement movement of the senate would move from a technical standpoint have any relevance anyway. again, that is not to say we are continuing exercises. arms control association did a good job of announcing those that we try to keep secret. >> just a little bit of history. the three dose for nato in 1997 when it was in the russia founding act but it was nato policy as a result of enlargement there is no intention, no plan, no requirement to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of nato members. i agree with everything about the importance of nato complications of burden sharing but i would also argue and i miss the start of the discussion

in october because we probably could reaffirm. there have been suggestions in the last five or six month here in washington. not in the government but outside about a response to russian bad behavior in ukraine to move nuclear weapons to a place like poland. that would be unwise on three accounts. first of all, declined weapons to a place like poland makes them much more vulnerable to russian preemptive strike in a crisis. it can cover about two thirds of polish territory. second, i don't mind in the current circumstances being provocative towards russia for putting american nuclear weapons to poland would be really provocative. think 1962 in the cuban missile crisis. i think if the united states were to go say who want to move rb 61 bombs from the current

locations to poland, my guess is you would have a large number of allies say are you out of your mind. an idea that makes weapons more vulnerable kicks off the russians and causes dissonance and disruption that the alliance doesn't strike me as a particularly smart policy. i think in make sense in parallel, nato all sorts of times that in the current and foreseeable security circumstances there would be no requirement for permanent station and substantial conventional combat forces on the territory. i think there's a discussion to be had about that question but it seems i don't think it buys you anything in military terms and lots of problems. >> we still don't need to do that. take away all those others, but will it give an added benefit

and make it more capable and the answer is no. >> a question right back there. >> share and raised the question of what to the russians think about suspension of all these working groups. i was at a conference several months ago which ambassador casey act spoken he was lamenting the suspension of the groups and the groups and he said we russia would like to resume them but we are not going to date. i think that is your answer. >> other questions? >> thank you. the peer research center of these interesting results of the poll admin several nato countries, ukraine and russia. one of the thing the poll showed

is a sharp divide in nato on article v commitment and what do you think, how does that affect further progress on the knitting more strategic nuclear weapons. >> yeah, i saw that poll. my guess is i could go back to the 1970s and 1980s and find similar polls. i think nato governments very seriously understand what article v is about and i think they understand supporting each other in article v is essential to maintaining alliance. i see that is totally separate questions on the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

>> high. and the retired army officer by trade here to work for a small consulting company. my question because we talk nonstrategic nuclear weapons, they are hard to find so i wanted hopefully somebody to expand and the second thing would be the operational level who has launched sort of capability if that's even something you guys can share or understand or believe from russia. in terms of authorization, what level? down the tactical division, army commanders in terms of executing because i'm always worried about mistakes because the army and everybody makes mistakes all the time. >> if there is a scenario would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons and there is a process.

is that we are talking about? [inaudible] >> on the issue of remote sensing, the challenge you face and arms control the closer you get to the warhead to more intrusive the monitoring is going to be. you can talk about nonintrusive monitoring and remote monitoring. we did talk about -- i'm trying to remember the technology. the radiography. we are at a bit of a loss. they think we're all political scientist. i'm not sure up here on this

panel. [inaudible] >> you need to ask them those questions. our national labs have been involved in the technology development for decades in the issue they are as if you were to sign an agreement in 10 or 15 years, you would already need to be starting that development today. so there are long leap times for some of this stuff. not giving you a very specific answer, but there are described in detail in the paper are available to our website. you all have by and into particular techniques and approaches.

>> one of the u.s. labs give a briefing on this radiography. they showed a slide that said with the technology, one thing away as you could tell a nuclear warhead or not. please tell me that is one mile and that is one meter. we are still talking about the new technology. pretty much everybody agreed on the american of russian site that there would be value in having a dialogue right now between american russians and others and how you develop your dictation technologies. how would she do, for example, i nuclear weapons in storage, what would the technology you would need. so what political circumstances reached the point, the treaty was in holiday because he didn't have the verification techniques. to the extent that those

technologies and techniques in a cooperative manner from an american mother russian lab and that might be more acceptable on both sides. the state department in december of last year announced enough for to promote further technologies in the area verification and encourage universities to make controversial. how much funding went to bat. you have things on the shelf and the absence of a particular technology would not going to force. >> thank you. richard fieldhouse, former senate armed service committee staffer now doing consultant

work. i want to provide a context and a question and unix vendor the current circumstances at the ukrainian crisis left unresolved in the risk since the vermont and so many official dialogs have come down. there is wide agreement when there's going to be any progress on the issue and maybe if there's some political resolution that would change dramatically. there is an avenue i want to explore and i know some of you have thought about this. they will come to an end at some point and there may be an interest both in the united states and russia in continuing and so there are restraints on both sides in their strategic nuclear forces. i would point out from the senate standpoint when the senate considers the new

s.t.a.r.t. treaty and sends it has been a there an official part of the senate perspective that any future arms control russia would have to include nonstrategic nuclear weapons and that is into the resolution of ratification and requires them to make an official at church to russia to begin a dialogue on the nonstrategic nuclear weapons. the russians were in intrastate, et cetera. can you foresee a time when that might be the avenue to having serious official dialogue on the issue. >> i try to be optimistic about these things. i believe now that you have a difficult situation between washington and moscow that at some point maybe it's 28 team or 2019 the russians will have an

interest in having a dialogue about what happens with new start. the s.t.a.r.t. treaty entered in 2011 by its terms it expires in february 2021. although the sites can extend the treaty by up to five years. while the russians have shown little readiness in the last four years to go beyond new start, they would want a continuation of some cap on america's strategic forces and transparency talking about the timeframe of 2021 when the u.s. modernization programs with the ohio class ballistic missile serving a replacement with a new strategic bomber, possibly online when the russians would want to have some kind of cap. the question then becomes what an american administration and negotiators used the russian interest essay now we have two

go beyond strategic and nonstrategic and bad days a judgment at the time whether that gives leverage to force the russian i would personally like to see the next step in u.s.-russia arms control move beyond to strategic into a treaty where one aspect would be a limit on the total number of nuclear weapons deployed, not deployed, strategic, nonstrategic. we won't know from a number of years whether the russian interested in having the leverage to get them to broaden the number of systems covered beyond strategic. >> it is an excellent question and my honest answer is maybe.

russia is prone to nonlinear events in development so extrapolating where we are today in 2015 and assuming the in 2018 or 2020 is risky. i would say one key positive step in the seems obvious to get to the point where we would like to be is a resolution of the situation in ukraine resolution then has to include a broader discussion about european security. then if there is progress on that, then i think this could be more possible. there has to be facilitating conditions before that is able to happen. >> we have a question appear.

>> international center for terrorism studies. you mentioned in your workshops there were some provocative ideas presented in connection with the safety and security of nonstrategic weapons. were the ideas presented by the americans substantially different from those presented at the russians in their originality? would you contrast these? >> sure. actually it was our european. but that's okay. this was the topic i assign. what i meant by provocative was

just at a time when you're even struggling to find venues to talk to russians, the notion you could talk to them or have joint exercises or anything else about safety and security of tactical nuclear weapons is a little counterintuitive. best buy said it was provocative. the recommendations are the ideas of all of our buyer -- i. forget what you call it. the peace research firmly with arms control and the association. these build on things we've done with the russians already in terms of exercises that tried to push a little bit more. so there were six items and you

can read about them in the report. briefly joined assessment of the risk and you know if anybody's been following the nuclear security summit context, any discussion of risk assessments are very taboo. we certainly won't do that with the russians now because they are not attending the nuclear security summit in 2016. you could also flip that around and talk about site security improvements. you can share best practices in a generic sense you could have exercises focused on accidents or incidents. and so for example you could consider tabletop in joint exercises to develop procedures

for responding to different crisis scenarios. some of these are borrowed from the nuclear security world. you can set the u.n. security council resolution joint working group to explore challenges specific to supporting nonstrategic nuclear weapons by nonstate actors. this is really a holdover to the the other area initiated dialogue on measures to avoid unintended excavation and military encounters. i wouldn't call this necessarily provocative. the question is do you have what is the hook to initiate a resume some of the things done under the nato russia council.

>> i wanted to add something to the previous question. but maybe a little poor frank. i've been pessimistic about having a discussion about the nonstrategic nuclear weapons. even if the conditions that i talk about happen, the structural security situation that russia faces in the asymmetry and importance of nuclear weapons for russia will not go within five years. so i think from their common make the discussion even harder to make progress on. we weren't able to meet progress on that in 25 years when it was a much more political environment. to think in five years on the structure or the core problem in the asymmetry of the strategic mismatch will be worse. >> overwhelmingly after these two dialogs, what i come away

with is it's buried difficult to just put these nuclear issues in a box. when we said you need to have a new dialogue for participants said you need a new dialogue under security. how do you get there? who do you include, you need to talk about issues or concerns from both sides. i don't say this to be a pollyanna. i spent most of my career in the u.s. government, not outside arms control. there are some russian concerns or issues that are not going to go away. they pretend like it doesn't matter whether or issues of concern. we have our own security

adventurist obviously. if you can't get anywhere on nonstrategic nuclear avenue, are there other things for a broader discussion where you might make progress on that. this is not simply you will trade for a ballistic missile defenses. obviously nobody is recommending that. you have to at least have the discussions not in the press that face-to-face. >> there is an antecedent if you go back to 1985 when the united states and soviet union nuclear space starts and the russians or the soviets said in order to talk about reducing forces about

things like american missile defenses. in the end they did not release an agreement with the context of the discussion where you can get the inf treaty or the start one treaty. >> in 2011, the obama administration with missile defense. that failed and i think it failed primarily because we weren't ready to talk about missile defense and the broader context of stability where you bring in strategic offensive weapons, position guided munitions, missile defense, and it was my hope in 2013 when the above administration was trying again to engage that if they

used the success of those in the spring and summer of 2013 to me if we had agreed to a framework for discussion about strategic stability for a broader framework, if we are not able to do that, i don't think we can make progress simply look at nonstrategic nuclear weapons off to the side. >> i saw one last hand up. >> icon i made kelley here at csis. i was hoping you could speak further specifically about china and other factors in the willingness to move forward with positive dialogue or possibly arms reduction. >> the form of russian position

has been articulated by foreign minister and the next eight to nuclear arms limitation talks should not be u.s.-russia. it should include at least britain, france and china. i agree in principle the dialogue has to be a multilateral one, but i would argue and hear nbc numbers so correct me if i get it wrong. if you look at the total american and russian nuclear arsenals, and these are about 4500 total nuclear weapons including strategic a nonstrategic. france and china would be the next largest country of 300 weapons apiece. ultimately have to get into a multilateral dialogue but it does seem to be significant room for one more bilateral u.s.-russia negotiation. if washington and moscow agreed to cut their arsenals in half they would still be 67 times larger to the nearest third country.

so far publicly the next negotiation has to bring an air countries. there might be a half step you could do because i don't believe they will be fair to say we are going to make a commitment in the treaty. could you ask the chinese to position the french to undertake unilateral commitment as a matter of our policy will not increase nuclear weapons as long as the united states and russia are reducing. >> it's a great question. there's no question the russians were concerned about what china is doing and could possibly do in modernization and possibly expansion of nuclear weapons capability. over the years they've been frustrated at least in

discussions with me about a lack of transparency in chinese programs. the china russia relationship is some of the listed but box for us. you can answer the questions with any certainty appeared it was significant in 2006 or 2007 the russians approached the bush administration to multilateral as the treaty in the bush administration's response was sure, try, good luck. that would be great. but it was not really met with any interest. it's the concerns principally about china that was motivating russians at the time. >> raises an interesting question that sometimes especially if nato you forget the rest of the world also has

the interest and that was brought home to me when i had a visit by the japanese by the ambassador and the discussion with various ideas which is why did you take them last in the east and that prompted the visit saying that would upset the whole ballot in this part of the world and that isn't such a good idea. we should be talking about elimination although one of the ideas floating around was to take a minute and said they would be less of a so-called threat to nato. so there is a concern there you need to take into account. the broader strategic outlook needs to be addressed when dealing with this so i'll issue of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

>> panelists, do you have any last comments? thank you all for your time and attention to this important topic. even though -- the fact that everyone showed up on friday before labor day means we are ready to come back from our strategic holiday and work on these important issues. let me think or external relations staff, my staff. ..

i was happy to join the board and that is why i am landing in front of you today. we're focusing today on the iran

deal and i have been asked to not only introduce our chairman or moderator, jim fallows, but to make a few brief remarks and i promise they will be brief given my background as a negotiator. i thought i would make these remarks in the context of maybe these are issues the six panelists could explore in one way or another in their remarks. the first point i would make is in my experience arms control agreements are never as good as the advocates make out and they are never as bad as critics complain. this is because arms control agreements do not fundamentally change facts on the ground. they tend to ratify or reflect

those facts. and the context the iranian deal had her one reason or another the united states moved more quick way with the europeans and others say in 2003 for 2004 to negotiate a deal with iran. the deal would've been a very different io and would have probably been a deal that would not be as controversial as the current deal is because the iranians were clearly a much greater distance away from the nuclear weapons capability than they are today. so sometimes delay and arms control can be disadvantageous if you don't like trends are changing balance of power. a good example was in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the united states in negotiations with the soviet union was

focused on the soviet abm program. with the russian offense in her forces grew during the course of those negotiation, limiting soviet offense of power became more important in those negotiations. so the agreements themselves are not going to fundamentally change the realities of where iran is and that to be clearly understood. secondly, there is something different about the agreement and other arms control agreement because in the past we haven't had a tremendous pressure brought about by sanctions which actually played an role in bringing the iranians to the negotiating table and this leads to a real difference in how the

supporters and critics of the agreement interpret the agreement. supporters see it as a traditional arms control agreement and they see and recognize both side interests have to be served, adobe criticism from both sides about features or facets of the agreement. many critics saw the negotiation not so much as diplomacy as getting redder for a surrender ceremony on the battleship missouri. in other words, they saw as as a form of coercive diplomacy designed to disarm iran and it is because of the different interpretation of what the negotiation was all about that i think the agreement itself is so controversial. my final point is to me the most

interesting thing about the agreement is not its arms control element. the most interesting thing about the agreement is the one thing people are in some ways afraid to really discuss the matters the long-run political and strategic implications of potential iranian verbalization internationally and specifically in the middle east. no one predicts the agreement would lead to a normalized u.s. iranian relationship or a normalization of iran's relationship with arab states, many arab states. but it is certainly the possibility and given the fact that a central problem in the middle east today is the 30 years war underway between shia and sunni.

the fact that i ran in a sense it's potentially could become a more normal actor in the region raises some really interesting options and choices for countries in the region. and by the way, for u.s. diplomacy. one of the big foreign-policy questions that at least maybe not this administration but a new administration has to address it seems to me is whether the united states will continue a policy of supporting sunni arab states against iran as the saturdays and people want to know whether we are able to pursue a balanced diplomatic effort which would mean inevitably closer relations with tehran. those are the issues that flow out of the agreement and i hope the panelists in one form or another will address them.

i want to turn the floor over to jim fallows. just like there are many think tanks in washington, the arguably washington has too many journalists and i can say that because i was once one of them. but i don't think of jim fallows who has been the national correspondent for the atlantic for a decade now and has done many important books, articles beginning before his turn ballistic days as president carter's speech, chief speechwriter, i do not think of jim fallows. i think of him as a writer and that in my view is a difference. journalists kind of runaround. writers actually think deeply

about what they are explaining the world to their readers. i think most import money and to follow his brilliant writing and china over the last decade. it's been a trailblazer with the chinese conundrum to western readers. we are lucky to have you with us here today and without any further ado, you have the floor. >> thank you for the gracious introduction to me in the informative setup and thanks to cgi and the chairman and for c-span two broadcast in our discussion. we have a finite amount of time and little about time for discussion among the panelists of questions for you all. what is fascinating in the last

48 hours by the terms of the iran deal had changed for its no longer a question of whether the united states will participate but what that will mean with the announcement by senator mikulski is the 34th in the three senators, the three senators, bukharin heitkamp yesterday that they will be 37. we will discuss what this means. rachel ambassador burke was saying what it means for relations with iran, potential evolution within iran. we have a great panel with a range of views to discuss the topic. i will say a word about each of them. we have a sequence of planned out carefully to expose you to some of the variety of views. we will start with ambassador thomas pickering to my my left to itself essentially every important ambassadorial role the united states has to or as ambassador to russian federation , salvador, nigeria,

united nations, every other immigrant role that her stagecraft has appeared mr. pickering has played a prominent role that over the decades that the last few and how we should think about the harebrained deal. now that this is a mistake with the congress is not enabled to block it, you should be thinking your allotted five minutes. and on from it. >> rate, i agree with most of your points. the sanctions were coupled with bad economic mismanagement and perhaps military threat to help drive towards negotiations. i think your conclusions are right. i can agree with you that there are probably too many think tanks and too many reporters, but certainly to many retired

diplomats. let me try to address your cogent and important question. if this goes through and nothing is certain because even senators can change their mind, nevertheless let's assume that it does and then let's assume the process begins and implementation begins and iran complies in the sanctions come off and people are very worried there'll be a flood of iranian money coursing through the veins of the most serious problems including syria and other places. there's even people opposed to the deal who believe that it's a mistake to deal with iran against isis. why i don't know but that is out there in one rates it from time to time. maybe they are more extreme on their views but that raises question number one. we have in a backhanded way been working against isis in iran

with iraq certainly and in a fashion one way or another in a backhanded way by bombing in syria. there will be as a result of this earth and opportunity if this is to begin to talk to iran about two issues that constitute in the view of many of us potential low-hanging fruit. one is the common view the taliban government in afghanistan would be a huge mistake. we don't have all entry shared beside him to talk about. the second is howling about way we could ordinate a more direct basis rather than informally through the iraqi government are bombing, they are training, our training. ..

>> transition government that

involves representatives of the parties as hard as it is in my view something we ought to try, but we can not try when we talk with iran and russia and turkey and saudi arabia and some others about making that happen. but iran plays rather critical role in this, and iran must know that a leaked assad is giving them absolutely nowhere. as we know that a link to the moderate syrian opposition as much as we like it is getting us nowhere, and the process of getting nowhere slow or fast in syria is now come to the point where the terrible damage to human life and the diplomat pick fatigue could harness beyond that, there are things in the history of our relationship that need cleaning up, it is a stable

of misunderstanding, mistrugs and difficulties on both sides. everything from dealing dealinge money in escrow in the united states to the question of the question of hostages are all out there, and they're very important, and the prison was right to say there's nothing in this agreement that forbids me with a tough ride with iran when it steps over the boundaries that has to be part of the process. let me leave it there and look forward to further questions. >> i think something that i note is fascinating how until the last two or three days 90% of the discussion of the united states about this deal was about the involved -- first strike nuclear potential and whether this happened or not now the discussion is moving i think properly to the long-term regional complications strategic that both of our ambassadors have mentioned. we've heard about the surplus in d.c. of retired diplomats lots

of energy experts, but we have a particularly eminent one next speaker dr. ariel cohen principal of international market analysis and most respected influential voices on broadcast media, in writing, for the heritage foundation other place within and his as we move to talking about all of these other complications of what this deal of what the new position for iran is beginning to mean tell us what you think we should be thinking about the ramifications right now? >> sure, just for the record counsel as nonresident -- before we jump into the oil and gas bonanza in iran which, of course, qowb would have been terrific just as it would be to corporate isis, afghanistan and all of these other things, i would like toe step back and evaluate the process and a the agreement, and i would say that

the united states brought a formidable coalition to security counsel and germany and whole premature of the united nations and iaea. we walked away. weakened once who were celebrated with the arabians not the americans, the american public, the majority of the public is against the agreement, it views the agreement negatively. and -- unlike what we all witnessed, i'm honored humbled to follow ambassador pickering amazing career i admired keam to know him back in the 90s when he was excellent ambassador in russia. but as we all remember, the soviet union that negotiated with us armed control agreement and changed behavior

fundamentally, and that process led to the big confirmation to the collapse of the soviet union and emergence of russia. the anti-american and anti-western tone was -- abandoned until 20 years later as we witnessed today. and russia gave up its empire soviet union gave up its empire -- far flung places like vietnam an nick nicaragua but we have the imperialism with involvement in yemen where iran is backing the hewi strengthening hezbollah which is the shock troops of the assad regime, and iraq, of course, and our sunni arab allies are really, really

insecure and frightened what the future may bring in only 15 years. we are thinking in the united states election psych psych cycles like our china friends and partners, they're thinking centuries they're thinking the glory of the preislammic of persian empire. so we gave an empties that 15 years from now iranians will be only weeks with the capacity t@ enrich uranium on unpress deputied levels, weeks from the japanese of the dutch, but iranians ladies and gentlemen, are not the japanese of the dutch. so what are the results of this agreement? the result of the nuclear race of the middle east was turkey, saudi arabia, egypt, and possibly others buying reactors.

the saudis are buying french react force and a the korean and turks from france and korea, and russia, all of these building the nuclear know how, and skillset that will go into building the u nuclear arsenals of the future middle east multipolar nuclear environment. turkish general told me ten years ago in a private conversation that if iranians go nuclear we go nuclear. and i believe him. that turkish industrial base is stronger, bigger than the iranian. just to wrap up my 14 points i'll try to bring it in the q and a hopfully what do we need to do? we need to show that we mean business and pen force this agreement by having military power in the middle east. both naval base and land baseed. we need to make sure that any

violation of these agreement extracts a high price from the iranian regime. together with europeans as mrs. merkel said it is unacceptable l that ttis rhetoric of death to israel, america continues we need to puts pressure on iran to sees and desist genocidal rhetoric that comes out of tehran every friday. and we need to boost our diplomacy and bove and beyond the heads of the regime to the people of iran to those in jail. to those minorities, women, gays, other schools rights are violated who are hanged and tortured. we need to talk to that -- those people. and yes, if iran normalizes if iran goes the route the soviet

union wept in trying to become a part of the international community, of course, the natural gas resources are competing with russian to be seconds largest in the world you can have pipelines, you can have gas, the reserves for the oil companies that they can put on their books are are enormous and this is why we see a stampede of businesspeople two airplane in tehran to cut new deals. but i think that security has to be first priority, this administration bought it. if it breaks it, it own os it, to paraphrase and next administration as this is an executive imreement will have to re-examine the performance until 2017. thank you very much. >> great, thank you we promised you a range of views that's what we're offering you on this panel and pen gauge other panelists back and forth. i have two transitions to our

next speaker one is i don't know that enough about iran to be able l to speak with confidence. if i want when it comes to millennial long view of china it is possible to overstate that for example, we've all heard the famous, exchange between richard nixon when nixon said french revolution and said well too soon to tell. what is left out of that they were talking about the 1968 upheaval in france which was three year nghts past not that we're 200 years earlier. other transition is that many people in the audience have some connection with iran over the years and beer ton and i were talking about both are having dealt with asia the toast that jimmy carter gave to the shaw, i was there, and i think how it would feel to be the speech writer at that event where the president of the united states toasted this shaw as an island of stability. and a sea of turmoil that was a -- memorable moment. we have our next speaker, larry

who will tell us about one of the 2450e78s that was in dr. cohen presentation which is the texture of what it is like inside iran now. you were actually living in iran at the same time when jimmy carter was visiting. [laughter] and you've recently been back to iran and done a number of interesting reports to the forward assistant long time writer, been on many tv shows tell us how your recent visit to iran as the first reporter from a jewish publication in decades, what that experience that as you've seen adds to our discussion. >> sure. take one of our microphones there. >> i hope everybody can hear me now. after this yin and yang, i have nothing whatever to say about the agreement. it is not my area of exper tegs. but i was in iran, i came out about a months ago now three weeks ago, and i was the first journalist from a jewish publication they allowed in since the revolution. i --

am very interested in the timing of it. was trying to get a visa for for two years, and i finally got a visa not because of the timing but given to understand at one last spreng p spring after applying and not succeeding if i got a letter from a member, senior member of the iranian jewish community that that would make a big difference. and i got a such letter and then things started to move. i got there, and i found it was just fascinating. it was amazing to see that people were willing to criticize the government with their names attached common everyday, ordinary people and you can see some of the people even speaking to my little -- phone video tell me are you willing to speak to my cell phone video and answer the question do you wish to destroy the state of israel, and they would answer the question.

and by and large, the take away of that is that ordinary people have no interest in destroying state of israel they have many other things on their mind and this gets to an point about iran ordinary people support for the agreement is -- just almost blanket. i have a hard time finding anybody who was against agreement on the popular level. that wasn't the case all of the time request government people. that's not to say that ordinary people have any clue about what the agreement -- what's in the agreement what the agreement is about. [laughter] whether it's a good or bad for iran. what they see in the agreement is reconnection with the world and this is very interesting to me because i had done -- probably wasted a lot of time researching the economics of iran todays after a the sanctions ready to talk to if deprivation and poverty and this is not to say none of those things exist there but that's

not what they talked about. what they talked about to me was not the economic but the psychological deprivation. they felt very isolated over decades, disconnected they feel -- a palpable hunger to be met the world. people talk about how few countries to go on their passports and people tacked to me about -- , you know, going into domestic polite, security officer sayses you should come here. this is a security officer, a revolutionary guard guarding home of the two asked me what do americans think about the iranian revolutionary guard, and -- [laughter] most are frightened they said but why? [laughter] >> so there's a sense of disconnection coming from many different political angles, the iranian revolutionary guard who i had this discussion with was

discussion and suspicious with me at the beginning of our conversation. over the course of a one hour conversation siting florcht the tomb became clear he like many iranians has a love hate thing with america. he has this lively curiosity about what is going on there and baffled why a superpower with -- larger than ten countries combined would be afraid of a country like iran even the iranian revolutionary guard, and when i tried to it explain to him about the long-term impact of the hostage taking, and 1979 he said that -- [laughter] you know, kind of like the americans say about 1953 and cia. oh, that if they know about it at all there's this mutual bafflement and ignorance. there were people who were against agreement, and there are people who are hostile to america for sure. i spoke with two grand in a senior iotola i asked do you

wish to destroy the state of israel but it was a gun question to pop on people. and -- one said yeah, kind of i do. he said i think that -- israel's policies are atrocious. but i think they're atrocious because was nature zionism and israel cannot change policy because of the nature it should be destroyed but notably to me two other people said we oppose israel because of its policies not because of its existence. and that offers implication for the future right now supreme leader is because of its existence also in the hostile to america camp and deep seeded thing, and a i don't see that changing any time. but what's important to know is that underneath them there's percolating wide debate,

division among everyone the senior clerics some of the most basic takes place, and this hunger to reconnect with the world, i think for a strategist thinking about how to go forward request this agreement now all of these are pee enormously relevant factors in terms of exploiting the potential of the agreement to create greater change. >> thank you very much. so we had a fascinating unfolding of the conversation so far hearing from our two ambassador of the next changes of opportunities for the united states other players hearing from dr. cohen if views of the dangerous ramifications there, hearing from larry about the fabric of this society that is beginning to be changed one way on oh the iranian hostage. i went to vietnam about a decade after a the u.s. withdraw from there. if i was asking vietnamese people how they view the united states or they asked me there's hard feelings towards vietnam. they would say why?

the war. oh, that. you know, that was one little stage of their chinese, anti-french et cetera, war, and most americans were born after a the fall of saigon and three quarters and for the same in iran as well. >> very young. so now we're going to hear from ariaan scholar going into various aspect of this deal for quite a while now at georgetown university, and regular columnist previous at the bell presenter from king college london. tell us what you think should be added to the discussion about the ramifications of the deal. >> thank you. so you know we've been talking about all aspects of the nuclear deal, except the actual nuclear aspects of the nuclear deal i'm going to step back and dress that. the deal was to designed to

color back iran nuclear program to stop a tense country from developing a nuclear weapon. and that in violation of its international obligations under the new clear treaty, and safeguards agreements with the iaea with the atomic international agencies. it does well. it may not be a perfect deal, an you know, for a lot of people unless iraned to arrangement altogether any deal falling short of that qowld not be a good deal. but that would not be a realistic deal. in materials of realistic deal this is is a good of an agreement that we could get. it gives us eyes on virtually every aspect of iran's nuclear program. so the thing is does is well is strengthen the regime, and you know, we've had a bit of a crisis in the arena for past few years. we haven't done as much as we could on a number of aspects of it. but this deal brings a country

back into compliance, it does that wast a single shot being fired. and it does that with u.s. leadership. ariel mentioned, though, he took care of a stance on that, but that's a very important point . the u.s. was instrumental in getting this deal pmg, and essentially strengthening the regime. one of the things that has been said going back to regional activities and what is happening domestically. but these are things that were not part of the agreement. these were not things that it was designed to do, however, the agreement does also strength and a number of u.s. interest not by design. so for instance, this is empowering a team and iranian foreign ministry that is very much proengagement. this is a team that knows the u.s. well. foreign minister has spent a

decade and united states still have a number of his advisors others in the iranian government, and the government -- it is a team that has gone out of its way to try to engage with folks in the region despite getting a lot of backlash for it at home. and it has doanl that without a political capital it is going to have thanks to this deal. so not only is it willing to engage with the rest of the world, it also is willing to pay the price for it. and now, it has a political capital to do that. and we have to be careful not to overstate iran's power, and you know, the rurnl of the glory of the persian empire. face it getting yemen doesn't get you the glory of the empire. it does not. and also to the extent of which iran has always backing the extent that is successful, way to be careful not to overstate all of these things. final point i want to make is something that larry was talking about before me, that is that

iran has a very dynamic civil society. now a number of folks you know, one of the key talking points is, you know, iran's human rights track record is yes, pap pabl but holding iran to standards that we don't hold the same sunni allies that ariel was talking about. i agree iran needs to improve on the track record but is it going to do that with sanctions has the fast 35 years of sanctions improved the record. no, you know what has helped? the regime you know has stopped the regime from doing everything it has wanted to do, has been iran's dynamic of society. we saw that in 2009, i was there. i saw people my age come out and you know attack to the streets. a lot of them you know number of people got killed and number of people end up in jail and stopped from pursuing education because of that. but this dynamic opened pretty educated, young, portion of the population.

is now going to have the ability to pursue what it fire departments to pursue which is rights, engagement with the world. so far every time they came to the streets government would say look, we have this nuclear crisis wekdz get attacked tomorrow an gave them excuse to sending people back home. now with the deal done this snts as easy anymore. so for all of a these reasons i think that, you know, the deal does a very good job of doing what it was designed to do which is curb back the program, but it also l helps achieve a number of other u.s. national interests. not by design. empleg we've had engainment on long-term issues of whether this agreement will help or hurt nonproliferation aivelgts we've heard opposing views which force that is likely to strengthen within iran, we can discuss that further. regional ramifications, so that is good. also i want to --

not gings jinx it say but congratulate on keeping right to time. a record, so pressure is on to the next two of you. well that's why i'm pointing this outs. so not going to hear from michael who has a academic and political background on these topics, now lane swing senior fellow. managerring director during preeftioned a previous administration and actively involved in national security counsel and setting policy for this part of the world. tell pus how by should think about this agreement and anything misstated so far. >> let me start by saying thank you great honor to be on this panel with everybody with such fabulous experts as we have here. i've been working on this issue for ten years everybody has been hearing about it for twice that long. so i'm going to be -- try to be brief. you know, i think that when i

was present at the creation of this p5 plus one process and i have been a supporter of the negotiated outcome. and so it gives me no pleasure to say that ting this deal is a qeak deal. i don't think it is a strong deal. ening -- i think that we didn't manage skillfully as we might have. what is hamming in washington is sense we're having a debate about a congressional vote but it is more agreement than disagreement. even amongst -- sort of the opponents in the supporters on that congressional vote those were coming out like barbara and so forth have almost uniformly done so with reservations so i think that to take it beyond this sort of immediate question. next president is going to come into office, thinking that they want to strengthen this deal. and ting that charge they'll give their national security

staff regardless of whether it's a democrat or republican is how do we strentsen this deal and how do we strengthen our broader iran policy? while avoiding all of those negative consequences that have been raise inside this debate? we're not just military conflict which i don't think is eminent as a painted it out to be. but also a blowup with allies we don't want to have a break, obviously, with ally or frankly any other issue because we have iron in the fire around the world that we need to attend to. so i think that will be the charge for the next president and tough to do with the urn u.n. security counsel and we need creative thinking from experts that are currently -- thinking about this now. i think the idea that iran will fundamentally change fits policy or strategy is not much more than a gamble at this stage. i think there's an idea that -- some folks have that this deal

will now spofort clear away an obstacle to better u.s. iran relations. i think that's only a hope, and really nothing more. the way i see it, in part because i think this price event for quite some time. the way i see it, with there suspect really anything in this deal which certainly not requires certainly nothing that requires iran to change its regional policy and nothing in the deal that incentivizes iran to change its regional strategy. the strategy is not just if the united states and the nuclear diplomacy and so forth. iran has a regional strategy which is actually quite coherent, and poses sures threats to american interest. they support approximatey and places like lebanon, yemen, elsewhere they're pursuing anti-access and area denial strategy in the persian gulf there isn't much sign that they're changing.

one thing we're likely to see it iran now strengthen its external links with russia, china, which may share an interest in challenging the international order which the united states in the west have, have led for some time. obviously, that challenge is playing out if not just here flan. but it is playing out in place like ukraine and south china sea and so forth. i think iran is much more likely to try to cooperate in the sense with that broader effort than to try to u draw close to the united states which is a much more difficult lift in a sense within the iranian system. i think a lot we have to bairmd that iran has serious internal challenges this ab alludessed to. but remember lifting sanctions is helpful to iran. been one of iran's main goals but in a sense it is not the only problem that iran faces internally. i think there are significant political divisionings within

the regime a economy that iran , and i think a lot of that will start to come to the floor much more. it is hard to say that could be a phillip for a positive chain for reform or the reverse. we've seen that in plenty of other situations around the world. as far as removing this external threat i think regimes are good at crafting external left when is they need to maintain their own domestic security. so all of that to say none of that so say that we shouldn't try to improve. the situation on all of these fronts but it will be challenging we shouldn't be under any illusion. i don't think to ambassador bert's point that the u.s. is going to be the obstacle here. i don't think we have an anti-iranian ideology, in fact, you've seen obscured in this debate, but over the basically

since 1979 every u.s. president has had their efforts to reach out to iranian jimmy carter or ronald reagan, bill clinton george w. bush and president obama pursued different efforts along these lines. frankly i don't that that will be any different in the future. but one thing which i think -- is different now in a very negative way for us is that we're really officially regionally positioned for all of this. we've had -- , obviously, a difficult time in part because of regional events because of our own policy choices over the past ten or 12 years. with our alliance in the region, with support of the american people for doing ambitious things in the region, and this is a time where it is beginning to be difficult to tackle the challenges that iran poses. i think those challenges aren't going away as well as other challenges like isis and syrian civil war, that is something again next president is going to have to really think hard not just about this issue and a about the deal and what you do

with the deal but comprehensively about the region and start to rebuild some of these alliances how do we start to rebuild our credibility and power and influence in this region? >> great, thank you very much. now to wrap this up and put everything in context hear from kelly davenport director of nonprowill-- think tank background in the united states an in israel, on many of these issues you're free to either -- tell us if you like about nonproliferation aspect or concluding remarks before the questions before i ask questions of all of you. >> thank you for having me and the center for putting together this event. i don't think in five minutes i can have range of comments that we heard today. but i will offer a few thoughtses on the nonprowill-- deal this this deal leads the u.s. in a weakened position.

right now, based on the current trajectory of iran's nuclear deal they could obtain enough material for a nuclear weapon in two to three months. under this deal, that timeline pushes back to over 12 months. it also blocks iran's path qai to nuclear weapons use plutonium and monotomb verification is most intrusive that iran has agreed toed a -- adhere to from a nonproliferation perspective this serves u.s. national security interests. but where i share the concern of those michael and dr. cohen at that point key restrictions will come off a of iran's nuclear program as doctor cohen said timeline then will decrease to a pint where iran could more quickly obtain the material for a nuclear weapon.

there will be intrusive monitoring in place to give an early warning that while iran will be prohibited pursuing weapon activities it is without question a possibility that ranl could ramp up its enrichment. but that is by no means a fore gone conclusion nor is a foregone con clues that other countries in the region will choose to follow iran down the path of obtaining domestic enrichment. i think the question becomes whether or not you agree with this deal. the question becomes what can we do to strengthen the agreement in 15 within the next 15 years. to ensure that when iran gets to that point, it does not have the incentive to ramp up its nuclear program. an that other countries in the region do not feel like he have to achieve that level of parody. there's a number of options that

the u.s. government working with its international partners in the p5 plus one and region should explore within next 15 years. for instance, iran has said it would be willing to accept a permanent cap on enrichment to reactor grade levels that's 3.67% compared to weapon levels above 90% enrichment. they said that accepts that permanently at that low level if other countries were willing to accept the similar cap. let's test that proposition and see a as region if it is possible to put that kind of resphrix in -- restriction in place. iran has agreed to far more verification from the energy than any country has ever agreed to let's see if those restrictions including monitoring at keet sites could be worked in any other country that chooses to pursue a nuclear program. these areas i think, including

certain u.s. policies like guaranteed fuel supplies for countries that want to pursue nuclear power could play a critical role in staving off a interest in any other country in the region than jordan, uae have considered nuclear power off them from pursuing enrich account by ensuring to fuel their reactors, these measures i think could be critical then in ensuring when iran reemps that 15 years it has guaranteed fuel supplies for future reactors, and has no interest in dramatically increasing its enrichment. >> great. thank you very much. i think this has been a rich discussion so far, and what has been fascinating to me is seen a number of disagreement or discussion. i like to explore a couple of those before we have time for questions from the audience. one of them that i'm going to

sunlight we not go into in much more detail is the term of the actual deal. because i think we can spend next six weeks doing. it is implemented there are, however, differing views about whether this deal now which of the u.s. is going to not impede whether it is beginning to kick off a regional arms race or not. but there's a related question of whether this deal should be part of similar to one with the soviet union where there were still very deep conflict of interest or slay with china. whether a million disagreements but not fund mental conflict of interest and ways to work together do we think that u.s. and iran have very deep ongoing conflicts or not. we've heard views about that. fascinates me people are talking about what needs to be done by next administration, five, ten years to make it happen, and also fascinatingly to me, given

parking lot prominence of this team in the u.s. political debate we've had very little discussion of the u.s. israel, iran triangle here 80% of the discussion of the u.s., smaller proportion here. let me just invite one round of discussion between thomas pickering and ariel on the question whether this is likely to produce more arms race stability in the region. you remember suggesting no -- saying yes, how what do you make the argument he was making? >> the argument was he was making has to be presumed on what he heard from the turk. and the turk said if iran goes nuclear gets a nuclear weapon we may go. and that may be true. that agreement is designed to prevent iran from getting a nuclear weapon despite the fact mr. netanyahu qowld like to have you adopt the nightmarish view that the agreement facilitates it.

but there's nothing in the agreement. i won't get into details on this but there's nothing in the agreement that facilitates that. so it is extremely important the record of nonproliferation so far is -- that what happens in nearby counties with respect to civil nuclear power, does not drive the nearby countries to a weapon's posture. the second point that's very important here michael reys kelsey raised it. ariel in his own way raised. what happens after 15, 25 years, important piece addition to what kelsey said, that iran has some interest in nuclear power. they have, in fact, bought a reactor twice. once from germany, and secondly from russia. the russian policy is -- no reactor without a strong commitment to provide fuel and take back spent fuel that ought to become the gold standard.

and anybody who is selling reactors to iran should insist on that gold standard. that takes away this wonderful idea in iran that we have to put in all kinds of low enrismed uranium and many centrifuges now iranians have a reason to have a gripe. they invested that the shaw in french enrich m now they have the enrismment nor their money back so let them have a domestic guarantee but don't let them develop it purely to pile up l terms and conditns leu in some potential. put the fuel in iran or a long-term basis under ia supervision from the fuel bank provider. it may be multinationallization of iranian and other facilities that are working in the region

and beyond should be important. why the hell the united states didn't start with gnarlizing? right now we're using black box sent piewjs that wouldn't be more multinational as a way to begin, why don't we exploit that and save the nuke old standard is old new enrichment is multinational and work our behinds off to make that happen. so in event we don't get this breakout capability. we don't get in a sense people saying well we have some justification to pile up a lot of leu. i think along with thingings that kelsey minged these are the following on things to make a real difference in this problem. >> so cohen what in that do you disagree with? >> first of all let me say that i agree if iran subscribes to a

multinational iaea supervised source of low and enriched uranium that would be best outcome for everybody. unfortunately our gorkt negotiate force agreed to something that was reachable. i can not see how if a country -- proclaims that it is committed to a civilian nuclear program it is expanding the sent centrifuge. with the opening of the low enriched uranium storage, bank, in kazakhstan, here is a nonamerican, nonwestern source of leu for everybody. including iran. why not to design in agreement or at least scale it to the

point why it doesn't look like -- at military purpose facility or facility of dual use because if that's what it is. it is a dual use facility. further more we discuss verification and colleagues said that is unpress, et cetera i'm sorry this openly and grossly violates the additional protocol by having a 24-day period in which the -- inspectors -- [inaudible] >> there's agreement on the 24-day point let's move on toe the regional arms race. >> so the inspectors for 24 days of 21 days is debate about that. let's move on. >> but no additional protocol. >> out of this bhoal -- >> you raise the prospect of the regional arms race.

>> the evidence is strong. egyptian and saudis are talking about enrichment program for themselves and by the way one thing we did not address is the platforms and delivery vehicles. iran has built and modernizing a fleet of short and medium range missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and the explanation of having the -- the system of enrichment of uranium and having the delivery vehicles promise you to one conclusion this is a military program. and it wasn't stopped. >> would you anybody like to address briefly any of this -- go ahead. >> sure, few things just by saying that evidence is strong doesn't make it strong. there's a number of technical -- legal and political challenges to a nuclear arms race in the

middle east. let's remember that we bring up the whole domino effect theory every time we're about to make a poor policy decision, and you know, we have leverage in the region. all of those countries that were mentioned turkey, saudi arabia, everybody else, egypt, depends on the united states and other suppliers for their nuclear program and beyond that. they can't do it by themselves so we have leverage over them, can't do it by themselves they need technical experts from the quest to go and help them build their program. ..