this dutifully and that could not have occurred without the incredible corporation and that of the staff and i thank him for his leadership and i thank him for his willingness to seek a place where the senate can deal with this in the appropriate way and with that i yield the floor. >> the senator from maryland. >> mr. president let me first thank my friend senator corker for his leadership but more importantly thank him on behalf of the senate for standing up for i think the appropriate world in the united states senate in reviewing a major foreign-policy issue. .. its appropriate role in establishing

foreign policy. we're a country that believes that our system of democracy serves our country the best. and that's what separation of branches -- and that's with separation of branches of government. we don't have a parliamentary system of government here. we have an independent congress, a congress that is expected the congress is expected to provide independence in its reviews of the laws of our country and the policies of ourr chief executive. that is exactly exactly what we are doing. i think senator corker and i know i speak for both democrats and republican in saying that we support the independence of the senate reviewing our work. of i listen to his comments and heo is a dear friend of mine. lib we have fought together on human rights around the globe. he fought for civil liberties

here in the united states. we have worked together on so manyd important issues including in the middle east. i deeply respect his views. mr. president, members on both sides that have reached conclusions, but we are all committed to make sure t iran does not become a nuclear view is the best way for that to be accomplished. i don't don't challenge any other members decision and ihe certainly don't question their resolve against iran becoming a nuclear weapon c state or their support for our regional allies. i think each has demonstrated that throughout their career. some of us us have come to different conclusions. i strongly believe that we must prevent iran from becoming ars

nuclear weapon state. it's a game changer in the region. you have heard from my colleagues that iran is one of the r principal purveyors of terrorism in that region. it would accelerate an h arms re that already has two any arms in its region. it would make make it so much more difficult to confront iranian policy if they possess nuclear w weapons. o the president is right to say wn will not let that happen and put all options on the table to make sure that doesn't happen. congress's right is right to say that we support all options sta being on the table to make sure rand does not become a nuclear weapon state. that's a goal we all have. in this independent review some of us believe the best way toad accomplish that is to move forward with the agreement negotiated by the obama administration. others do not believe that is the case. and i want to second what senator

corker said. i was proud to be part of that bill together and getting broad support in the congress and administration. i think it put us in a stronger position in negotiating in the end. i think the fact that we had set up the right way for thei congressional review that it was going to be a transparent, critical review review and put our negotiators in the strongest position. i also think it provided the right type of review so after the agreemente was reached, information would be made available to us and there would be an open process and people could learn more about it. we would be in a better position to make our own judgment. it was clear in the review act that no action is required. i want to mention one thing that i want to disagree on with senator corker. we may not be able to come together on this issue.

i wasn't part of the original negotiation on the review act. i came into it and was able to resolve the differences between the white house and the congress or many members of congress. it was in talking to the architects of this legislation that they always anticipated there would be a threshold with this resolution. i agree with senator corker. we shouldn't have to use filibusters or procedural votes. we should vote on the merits. i thought his suggestion was the right way to go and i hope we can find a way that we can avoid the procedure battles and be able to take this issue up and let every member vote their conscious and vote the way they

want. we had two weeks to review before the recess and senator corker worked our committee unmercifully as far as what we did. we had hearings in briefings and classified briefings. we had member meetings and to the credit of the members of the committee, all 19 showed up. these meetings went on for about four hours each. we were back to back to back in our briefings and trying to understand what was in agreement during the two 1/2 weeks we were here. i went. i went back to maryland and other colleagues went back and i had a chance to talk with the people and get their views and to evaluate whether i thought it was best to go forward or not. it was a close call. i decided i cannot support the agreement. i would like to share with you why i cannot support the agreement. senator corker mention this. it puts iran, after the time

period, in a position of enrichment of uranium that is dangerously close to being able to break out to a nuclear weapon in compliance with the agreement. they can legally get to that point. at that point, they have are ready gotten sanction relief so they are in a much better financial position to be able to withstand any pressures that could be put on a iran. then we know they want to become a nuclear weapon state. we know that. that has been pretty well documented. we have no reason to believe they are going to change their intention. if they wanted to become a nuclear weapon state, and they make the calculation that we really don't have a sanction way to stop them because at that point there economic strength is strong enough and sanctions take too long to take effect, it would not be an effective deterrent to erase the breakout. here's the key point of concern to me.

i acknowledge all my colleagues that i don't know what is going to happen in the future. this is a close call. but i think there is a higher risk of potential military operation if we go forward with this agreement because we don't have effective sanctions what they've been removed. that that concerns me because mr. president, i don't think a military option is a good option i don't believe it will eliminate the threat and it has a lot of collateral issues involved with the military operation. i acknowledge if we do not go forward with this agreement there is a risk. there's no question about it. there is high is high risk either direction. but if we choose to reject the agreement, what would happen? no one can tell for sure. there is a risk factor. in my conversations with our european allies they want us to approve this agreement, don't get me

wrong. but they know they have to work with the united states. they know that the united states and europe needs to be together and for the companies to be able to get access to a iran they have to work with the u.s. on the sanction regime. they also know if we reject this agreement and they were to rush out and try to develop a nuclear weapon it might ignite unity against iran. they have have to make that calculation. iran also wants sanction relief from the united states. so, i, i can't predict the future, but i believe all parties want a diplomatic solution. i understand that will not be easy and maybe we will have to mix it up a bit and put some mixtures on the table. we have issues with iran and it may give us an opportunity. my point my point is, no one can predict the future. i came to that conclusion and i

understand others came to different conclusions. the other concerns concerns i have including the 24 day delay, that concerns me on undeclared sites. whether or not that will be adequate based on our intelligence information. im concerned with the military dimension that there really isn't any consequence as i see it in the agreement if there is not an accurate account of what happened in the past. i wish that was a little clearer. i don't think the embargo release should be in this agreement. i'm going to tell you, i am concerned with the language in the agreement that talks about the united states and iran with mutual respect and normalization. i don't know how you can have a mutual respect for a country that actively promotes destruction and killed innocent people. mr. pres., i came i came to the conclusion that i couldn't support the agreement.

each of us did what we thought was best and i respect this is a vote of conscience. i did want to point out one comment from earlier about the iraq war. i voted against the iraq war. it was not a hard vote for me because quite frankly, i didn't see the intelligence information that would have justified the authorization for the use of military force, but it was a controversial vote. in my congressional district, congressional district, it was an extremely unpopular vote. the reactions were not too different than the reactions were getting today in regard to this particular agreement with iran. i voted against that. along with one of my colleagues in that boat was over and it was a done deal. we pursued our military operations in iraq and i joined

with all my colleagues and the administration to give us the best possible chance for america to succeed because that is our responsibility. that's our system. our system is independent review. when the review is over it's time for us to come together. yes i have been talking to my republican colleagues in my colleagues who are voting for the agreement and those were voting against the agreement as to how we can work together in response to the matter when this debate is over so the united states can be in a stronger position working with the administration for in preventing iran from becoming a nuclear state. i think we can have a stronger position. administration has said we can underscore that all options are on the table to make sure iran will not become a nuclear weapon power. the administration has said and we can understand or the need for a strategy so they

know about our commitment to the region against whatever happens with iran. the administration has suggested and we can reinforce that our closest ally in the region, israel, will have the security they need if they partner with united states. the administration has stated we can reinforce then we will be active in pursue terrorism by iran if they increase their terrorism attempt terrorism against the united states. we can speak to that. we can we can make sure that we are better informed. we can make sure we have the information we need to see where iran is using their sanction relief so we can act timely with the administration to protect u.s. interests. i think we can speak with a strong voice when this debate is over. i hope during the next two weeks that the debate that takes place

reflects the best tradition of the congress and our independent review. and our strong commitment to work on behalf of america. we must prevent iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. we must agree to counter terrorism and ballistic missiles , and enforce human right. together we must find a functional, bipartisan bipartisan approach to iran. i stand ready to work with my colleagues and the administration to achieve such a resolve. president, i yield the floor. >> mr. president i want to thank the senator from maryland for his comments and for his tremendous leadership on this issue. i know with senator collins is here to speak in my

understanding that she will speak for approximately 30 minutes. i do want to say again i know some people refer to the fact that it's only those who wanted to go to war with iraq that are supporting that but not only did the ranking member not support going to war with iraq, neither did senator menendez from new jersey. he again opposes this agreement. that type that type of characterization certainly is not the way this is. the two most knowledgeable democrats in the senate but on this issue by far both oppose it. with that i yield the floor to the distinguished senator from maine and i recognize her for her accomplishments.

>> thank thank you. mr. president, i want to thank the chairman of the formulation committee for his leadership on this issue, for briefing us and arranging for briefings and his very thorough analysis. i also want to commend the senator from maryland for his vote of conviction, for doing what he believes is correct, for showing the courage to cast a vote of true conscience and i was honored to be here on the senate floor to listen to his comments today. mr. pres., president obama's agreement with the iranian government, with respect to the nuclear program is one of the most important foreign policy decisions ever to face the united states senate.

the vote that we cast will not be an easy one. the security of our nation and the stability of the middle east, as well as americans leadership in the world, are affected by this agreement known as the joint comprehensive plan of action or the jcp on. let me begin by making clear that i supported the administration undertaking these negotiations with iran. indeed i was hardened when president obama initially said in october of 2012 that quote, our goal is to get iran to recognize it needs to give up its nuclear program and abide by

the un resolutions that have been in place. he went on to say, the deal will accept is they and their nuclear program. it's very straightforward.". i was optimistic i was optimistic that the administration would produce an agreement that would accomplish the goal that the president laid out. along with six others of my republican colleagues, i did not sign a letter to the leaders of the iranian government sent in the mist of the negotiations because i wanted to give the administration every opportunity to complete an agreement that would have accomplished the goals that the president himself originally set forth as the purpose of these negotiations.

mr. president, i've long believed that a verifiable diplomatic agreement with iran has dismantled its nuclear infrastructure and blocked its pathways to the development of a nuclear weapon would be a major achievement, and accomplishment that would make the world a safer place. regrettably, that does not describe the agreement that the administration negotiated. the agreement is fundamentally flawed because it leaves iran as capable of building a nuclear weapon as the expiration of the agreement as it is today. indeed, at that time, iran will

be a more dangerous and stronger nuclear threshold state. exactly the opposite of what these negotiations should have produced. as the noted expert on sanctions testified before the senate foreign relations committee, even if iran doesn't violate the jcp oa, it will have patient pathways to nuclear weapons. access to heavy weaponry, and economy emmy and eyes again sanctions pressure and a more powerful regional presence. ". under under the agreement, mr. president, not a single one

of iran's 19000 centrifuges used to enrich uranium to produce a nuclear bomb will be destroyed. not a single one. iran will be able to continue its research and development on advance centrifuges used to enrich uranium more rapidly and effectively. not only will iran retain its nuclear capabilities, but also it will be a far richer nation and one that has more conventional weapons and military technology then it possesses today. the lifting of sanctions will give iran's leaders access

ultimately to more than $100 billion in the form of frozen assets and overseas accounts. iran also will once again be able to sell its abundant oils in global markets. now, the administration administration has repeatedly argued that iranian leaders will invest those billions of dollars into their own country to improve the lives of their citizens. mr. president, the record strongly suggests otherwise. iran today is the world's foremost exporter of terrorism pouring billions of dollars into terrorist groups throughout the region and into funding the murderous regime in syria.

if iran is financing, arming and equipping terrorist groups in iraq, lebanon, syria and yemen, when its own economy is in shambles and its citizens are suffering, why would anyone believe that it would invest the proceeds of sanction relief only in its own economy? i do expect that iran's leaders will invest in a few high profile projects to help their own citizens, but given their history, it is inevitable that billions more will be used to finance terrorism and strengthen iran's power and proxy throughout the middle east. it is deeply troubling that the

administration secured no concessions at all from iran designated by our government by the director of national intelligence as the number one state sponsor of terrorism to cease its support of terrorist groups. whether it is hezbollah in iraq, the foodies in yemen, iran's proxies are terrorizing the innocent civilians forcing families to flee their home and causing death and destruction. and incredibly, the jcp oa will end the embargoes on selling

intercontinental ballistic technology and conventional weapons which the russians, among others, are very eager to sell them. think about that for a moment. why would iran want to buy intercontinental ballistic missile technology? it already has the deeply troubling capacity to launch missile strike that israel which it pledged to wipe off the face of the earth. this technology proposes a direct threat to our nation from a nation whose leader continued to chant death to america. we should also remember that the

iranian forces were the forces of the most lethal and provides devices that were responsible for the deaths of hundreds of our service members in iraq. why would we ever agree to lift the embargo on the saleh,g  of conventional weapons that could be endangering our forces in the region? let me now turn to the issue of the enforcement of the agreement by posing the obvious question. will iran abide by the agreement and the corresponding un security council resolution or will it cheat?

despite being a signatory to the un charter, iran has repeatedly violated or ignored the united nation security council resolution aimed at curbing its nuclear program. in 2006, the un security council passed the resolution prohibiting iran from enriching uranium. what happened? iran cheated. it has literally thousands of centrifuges spinning to enrich uranium. multiple un security council resolutions require iran to cooperate fully with the international atomic energy agency and to come clean with what is known as the possible

military dimension of the nuclear activity to understand how far iran has progressed toward developing a nuclear device and to have a verified baseline to evaluate future nuclear related activity. what happened? iran cheated. not only did it never report to international arms control expert about the experiments at its military installation where iran is suspected of developing detonators for nuclear devices, but also iran sanitized buildings at that location in a manner that the iaea has described as likely to have undermined the agency's ability to conduct effective

verification. remarkably, according to public reporting, iran has continued the sanitation activities while congress was holding hearings on the agreement this summer. in 2010 the un security council adopted another resolution requiring iran to cease any activity related to ballistic missile activity capable of delivering nuclear weapons. what happened? iran cheated. it launched ballistic missiles in july 2012. given this history, there is no question in my mind that iran

will try to cheat on the new agreements and exploit any loophole in the text or in the implementing security council resolution that was, by the way, way, as the chairman has pointed out adopted before congress even had a chance to vote on the agreement. given iran's history of noncompliance, one would think that an ironclad inspection process would be put in place. sadly, that is far from the reality of this agreement. let me make four points about how iran can stymie the infection. first they have the authority to delay inspection upon declared sites. those are the sites where

inspectors from the iaea iaea believe suspicious activity is occurring. in addition they establish up to a 24 day delay delay between when the agency requests access to the site and when access is granted. the former deputy director general for safeguards at the iaea notes that 24 days is sufficient time for iran to sanitize suspected facility and points out that past concealment activities carried out by iran in 2003 left no traces to be detected. this is a long way from the any

time, anywhere inspection that should have been carved into this agreement given iran's history. second, no american or canadian experts will be allowed to be part of the iaea inspection team unless these countries reestablish official diplomatic relations with iran. now i recommend recognize the iaea has many qualified experts, but the expulsion of some of the most highly skilled and experienced experts in the world does not inspire confidence. third, and most outrageous, according to press reports the iranians themselves will be responsible for the photographs

and environmental sampling at a large military institution where work was conducted and may still be underway, iaea weapons inspectors will be denied physical access to that location you know mr. pres., that i say according to press report, that is because the actual agreement between the iaea and iran is secret and has been withheld from congress. as a member of the intelligence committee, i have been briefed on the agreement, but like every other member of congress, i have been denied access to the actual document despite how significant

this issue is. the actual text matters because of iran's repeated repeated effort to exploit loopholes and particularly in light of press reports on what is in that document. fourth, mr. president, iran is not required to ratify the additional protocol before sanctions relief is granted, if ever. the additional protocol allows the iaea permanent inspection access to declare suspected nuclear sites in the country in order to detect covert nuclear activity. ratification ratification of the protocol would make the ap permanently

and legally binding in iran. 126 countries, including our country, have already ratified the additional protocol, yet the agreement negotiated by the negotiation only requires iran to seek ratification of the additional protocol eight years from now. in the eighth year of the agreement and to comply with the terms of this agreement until then. if iran's past behavior is any guide, iran may never ratify the additional protocol and thus be subject to its permanent legally binding inspection regime. to prevent iran from cheating, the administration has

repeatedly pointed to the prospect of an immediate snapback of sanction as the teeth of the agreement. i will be surprised if they work as advertised. third, the rhetoric on the snapback of sanctions has been inconsistent. on one hand hand the administration said the united states can unilaterally cause the international sanction to be reimposed. at at the same time, the administration repeatedly warns us that the sanction regime is falling apart which is it? second, iran has already made explicit in the text of the agreement that the sanctions will be treated for grounds to

restart its nuclear program included in the jc poa is this clear statement, iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, iran iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitment under this jc poa in whole or in part. mr. president, in effect, iran has given advance notice that if the united states or any of its partners insists on re-imposing sanctions, iran can't iran can simply walk away from the deal. given their investment in the deal, i am very skeptical that any of the country will be willing to take that action.

after the united nation security council endorse this agreement on july 20, the iranians released a statement saying they may reconsider if new sanctions impair the business and trade resulting on the lifting of nuclear sanctions. this is a direct quote, mr. president, irrespective of whether such new sanctions are introduced on nuclear related or other grounds. let's think about the implications of that for a moment. the iranians are saying, a sanction as a a sanction as a sanction. iran appears ready to resume its

nuclear activity if any sanctions are reimposed even if the purpose is not nuclear. even if the purpose is to halt iran's financing of terrorist groups. that means, if the united states re- imposes a sanction in response to the iranians continuing to finance training, arming, equipping terrorist groups all over the world, iran, the foremost exporter of terrorism, according to our own director of national intelligence, iran can just walk away from the agreement that we are being asked to approve.

third, according, according to the nonpartisan congressional research service, the agreement states that sanctions would not be applied with retro active effect to contract between any party prior to the date of application. this grandfathering clause will create an immediate rush of businesses to walk in long-term contract with iran. iranian foreign ministers assured iranian lawmakers that the swarming of business for reinvesting their money is the biggest barrier to the reimposed position of sanctions and he is right.

the state department insists that each case will be worked on an individual basis, but there is no guarantee that any case, much lace last every case will be resolved in the time necessary. esther president, there are deeply flawed agreements reached in the deal. while while i recognize it would be difficult, the fact is, the administration could renegotiate a better deal. as the former lead state department attorney for nuclear issue recently noted in the wall street journal, the senate has required changes to more than

200 treaties that were ultimately ratified after congressional concerns were addressed. this is not unusual. for example, the 1997 resolution of ratification of chemical weapons included 28 conditions inserted by the senate. the treaty was ultimately ratified and is currently enforced in 191 participating nations including iran and the united states. similarly the senate insisted that the threshold treaty with the soviet union has additional provisions strengthening compliance measures before it

was ratified. of course, course, one of the problems with this agreement is that it is not in the form of a treaty which precludes the senate from inserting reservations, understanding or declaration. that does not mean this agreement cannot be renegotiated and there are so many precedents for side agreements for renegotiation of treaties themselves, more than 200 times. another alternative to this agreement would be to further yield our unilateral financial and economic power against those conducting business with key iranian entities.

the secretary of the treasury testified before the senate foreign relations committee, we can't charge you in the same breath as snapback sanctions offer a real sort to be yielded over the heads of iranians for years while arguing that there is no way now that the united states can maintain crippling financial and economic isolation which helped bring the iranians to the table. every country and every business would have to choose whether to do business with a nuclear iran or with the united states. i'm confident that most countries and most businesses

would make the right choice. despite these options, the administration negotiated a packed in which its red lines were abandoned, compromised or deluded. the iranians helped firm to their core principles. the iranians have secured the following if this agreement moves forward. broad sanctions relief, uranium enrichment capability, international acceptance of iran as the nuclear threshold state, international acceptance of its own ballistic missile program, the lifting of the arms and embargoes, repeal of all

previous un security council resolutions and removal of the iranian nuclear issue from the un security council agenda. accordingly, mr. president, i shall cast my vote for the motion of disapproval. i believe iran will abide and bide its time, perfected rnd on advanced centrifuges and secure an icbm capability and build a nuclear weapon as the jc poa is phased out. it is time for congress to reject the jc poa and for the administration to negotiate a

so many times in the past when the senate raised serious concern. the stakes are simply too high, the risk too great for us to do other rights. thank you mr. president. >> debate on the iran nuclear agreement is keyed up in the house and senate. the last piece of the puzzle, senator cantwell said she will support the ran deal in any way she can but others say they are undecided on a filibuster. rachel oswald joins us from capitol hill reporting on the iran nuclear agreement. let's go first to what senator rich mcconnell had to say that they would take this up with members and their seat. what can we expect as that debate gets underway in the senate question. >> well it's not clear what all

senators are going to do. he wants it to remain for the duration of the debate and today he said he only wanted them in their seat for the beginning of the debate. regardless this is something that almost never happens where you have all 100 senators at their desk discussing with one another on a serious topic. i don't think i can think of it time or that has happened in recent memory. >> your article in cq said democrats are on the verge of blocking iran vote talking about their ability to filibuster a final vote on that disapproval resolution. what are you hearing on democratic plans? >> we know we've got 42 votes in

favor of the deal but it's not clear if there is enough support within the group to filibuster the deal. at least three senator oppose the deal and told me they are undecided on the issue. we know that the minority leader been will be briefing them on the subject. they've made it clear it is important to them. if all of the senators supported the deal, we will see a lot of pressure for a filibuster. if you support the nuclear deal, then you should filibuster because for the republican control of congress to disapprove the deal and the democratic president approves it , it would send a confusing message to foreign countries and financial institutions about the long-term viability of the deal.

>> let's turn to the house. house rules committee taking up the disapproval resolution as debate begins in the house on wednesday. what we know of the schedule? >> it don't look like it will be a closed rule. no amendments will be offered for it. it looks like looks like there will be 11 hours and it will be divided among several committees which includes financial services and foreign affairs. >> among the first words that we heard of the disapproval resolution, they brought it up on the house floor on tuesday. what was his point? >> he is arguing that the deal doesn't begin the 60 day review clock until congress has received all indexes and related deals. they reach to separate side arrangements having to do with resolving long-standing issues.

the white house shows that the iran clock began on july 19 which ended all of the indexes and the deal to congress which means the deadline would be september 17. now regardless of the validity of what he is saying, under the terms of the review act, i don't think his effort is going to gain much traction. i asked the senator formulation senator about it and what he thought of it and corker was the author of the review act and he thought the best way for lawmakers to register their disapproval of not getting the iaea agreement would be to vote down the deal and not bring up

other issues. it sounds like he doesn't think it is an issue. i don't see it having legs at this point. >> as they come back from the summer recess they are wasting no time in issuing their opposition to this resolution of disapproval. what can we expect in terms of lobbying on capitol hill or elsewhere from the white house? >> so far we have not heard of any last-minute plans by the administration officials like president vice president biden but these things tend to be announced last minute. i wouldn't be surprised if it happened because of how close this filibuster is looking even if it is an issue that the administration is using as many resources as the healthcare overhaul act a few years ago. >> you can follow her reporter on twitter and cq.com. thanks

for the update. >> the house rules committee voted just before eight pm eastern. to eastern. to move the house resolution disapproving it to the floor tomorrow. the plan is to debate at 411 hours over three days per the final vote in the house is expected on friday which coincides with the anniversary of the september 11 terrorist acts. more about the ran nuclear agreement with a discussion on the technical and political aspects of the deal including a former national security adviser for president clinton. it's hosted by the international crisis group. this is one is one hour 40 minutes. >> i'm particularly pleased to be here this afternoon to host this event with the president who is here with us and we'll

take part in the panel. the issue we are going to discuss today is among the most important that have come in the diplomatic forum in the last 20 or 30 years. actually when i think of the complexity of this agreement, i think it compares only to those arms control agreements that were negotiated in the 70s and 80s, and the reason why it compares to those is because it's not an agreement which is just, let's say a statement of intention, statement of general realities, it is a complex contract not based on trust by verification, on detailed arrangements. that is what makes it in a way comparable to what

we saw in the major arms control agreements decades ago. i think think in comparison stops there. i would want to share with you before i introduce our speakers, i want to show share two thoughts with you that makes the agreement different than the arm agreement of the 70s and 80s. the first and major difference is that those agreements were essentially agreements between the united states and the soviet union. no trust between the united states and the soviet union. no trust between us and iran. tonight i say this is an international agreement and this

is the final result, not in a way of making decisions but more accurately of some 12 years of engagement. it all started in 2003. the date is interesting because that was the year of the iraq war and deep worries that saddam hussein could have weapons of mass destruction. that was the year when north korea withdrew from the npt so there was a sense that the nonproliferation regime could unravel and the only possible response was war. hence the initiative at the time of the u.k., france and germany to engage iran diplomatically. that was initiative where they

became a big part of the engagement and let the engagement with the iranians. that came to nothing. he became the president in 2005 and in 2006 you have thousand six you have a second stage of the issue. the security council was brought in. the security council had means of legal coercion and that did not exist before. so what we see today is the product of a very intense diplomatic engagement of the united states with iran. it's also a way of intense diplomatic action of a range of players. the european security council as

well as china and russia. that is what is behind this agreement. that makes it, in a way, quite remarkable because today what we think of the international community, the word that most come to one's mind are unraveling. it's not a time when we see the international community coming together. it's a time where we see international relations in a terrible shape being able to agree on most issues. the fact that this agreement is the one bearing exception to that trend toward an unraveling of the international community. so that is an important point when one considers this agreement. the second thought i would want want to share before introducing the panelists is not when you consider the arms control agreement they were

achieved in the context of derivatives strategic ability where there was some implicit agreement on the status quo. this agreement, to put it in political context, is profoundly different because it comes in a region that is the most volatile in the region where they certainly have no agreement on what the status quo should be. if you talk to their leaders, they they won't have the same answer. so in that context is why the europeans stand

>> as you know, for the sanctions, ten years, 15 years, 20 years, 25 years.

there is time opening the for us if the agreement is confirmed. the political challenges power going to use that time how are we going to use that time so that once those years have gone through, have we consolidated the stability of the region or just open the time of calm --, i mean, nonproliferation but did not resolve the fundamental issue of the region which is the political were before us, which is read decadesdecade long effort that needs to be made. i think they're is going to be quite important to focus on the politics of the region so that the implementation on the one end is all the technicalities and on the other side there is the political context to make

sure there's a foundation fora foundation for a different middle east and not just a nonproliferation agreement which is already a huge agreement. to discuss the agreement probably have an extraordinary path. tom pickering missed the plane and so he is not with us this morning. he regrets it very much, but we have sandy berger. you have the biographies. i don'ti don't think i need to go into the biography of sandy, former national security advisor to president who we will speak to the national security interest of the united states. i would add one point. he is a distinguished trusting, and we are pleased to have him on our board. the president coasting this

event, and world not expert on nonproliferation command he will speak to the implications of this agreement for the broader context of nonproliferation. and our own international crisis group analyst who has been engaged in the negotiation relentlessly, as relentlessly as the diplomats were conducting the negotiation in the last four years and playing a very important role behind the scenes, talking to the actors because he has the better quality of understanding the technicalities of the issues which are numerous and at the same time the politics of them. without further ado, i will ask sandy to get us started. >> thank you. i am pleased to be here. i am pleased to be here.

in many ways this is the eyes and ears and conscience of the world and constant the world. and this has been at the heart of the groups that are working to see this agreement adopted. i am pleased to be part of this. abraham lincoln used to tell the story of a man who was lost in a forest on a dark night. vicious storm. every minute that would be a funders or of thunder and the flash of lightning. finally hefinally he looked up and said, god, i would appreciate a lot more like a lot less noise.

i think that is an admonition that we could bring to this debate so far, a lot more night more noise in the debate. if all you are doing was listening to the congressional discussion, you would think the agreement is somewhere between horrible and just good enough. and i think that is misleading because those who think it's horrible, but if you are a democratic senator and you have made a very courageous judgment to before this, you also have to than deal with all of the folks who are against it. it is easier to say i heard your argument. they are good arguments. this is a close call. i am for this, but i

recognize all of the things he said. you have a discussion here which is somewhat skewed, and not very many members of congress want to stand up and be a cheerleader for this. we will see how the debate unfolds. i am not sure that this is an accurate reflection of how congress really feels. i will say i think it's a strong agreement. from an arms control perspective, national security perspective. it's very strong. i'll let my colleagues to the left are experts on this describe the pieces of this. my top lines here are,

unbelievable prevent iran from getting a nuclear weapon for at least 15 years , perhaps more. it eliminates a key threat to the stability of the middle east, and i think it's verifications provisions of our ability to know what is going on our stronger than any arms control agreement ever. so on the positive side, i think we have a strong, strong case. let me focus on three issues that would be opponents are talking about and address those three issues. one is that we should defeat this and get a better deal, put more pressure on iran and get a better deal.

it won't happen. it can't happen. and it can't happen for a number of reasons. number one, our partners in this enterprise have no interest in further negotiations. they think this is a pretty darn good deal, as does most of the world. they're not interested in more sanctions. so we're not going to have them as partners. the outer rim of the sanctions regime, which has been china and india and south korea and japan, which is what made these sanctions work, with great credit to president obama and secretary clinton, they have no interest in more sanctions. so they're won't pressure. in fact, existing sanctions will quickly erode.

sanctions worked. sanctions did exactly what they were designed to do. i cannot think of another case, except south africa, where sanctions it worked as well as this. the international coalition was constructed, economic sanctions were imposed. it was a white coalition. the iranians came to the table. they negotiated a serious agreement. some people think that's wrong. but it's a serious agreement. the no one is interested. from the iranian.of view you have to imagine the following conversation because presumably during these negotiations for a better deal things have to at least freeze. you have to imagine president lonnie going in to

see ayatollah and saying something later, i think that we should stay at this, continue to imply, notwithstanding that the united states has no obligation, notwithstanding that horrible, the debate horrible, the debate you just heard for the last three weeks to five months. people take the high ground and stay with us. if you still in office, he then has to say, by the way, i think richard -- i think we should offer more concessions. i can't see how the iranians will do any better. i don't think there is a better deal. it is an illusion, a self-delusion, and we ought

to get it off the table as quickly as possible. the 2nd proposition here is that iran, with all this new money that it gets will increase its sponsorship for radical groups in the region , has below, hamas, and others, and that will cause turmoil in the region. i do believe that iran is a threat and region and that the intention is to gain influence over the region. one of the reasons i am for this agreement is because i would rather be dealing with

enron it does not have a nuclear weapon rather than one that does and can use it to intimidate its neighbors, to try to keep outside powers for moving in to help that is the reason for the agreement. iran we will have more money first is the vaunted hundred billion dollars. $56 billion. there are claims against it. some of it will come back. and presumably the iranian economy is healthier and will generate more revenue, and more revenue will be available to spend on external matters. this is just the concept. number one, this kids were

demonstrating on the street not because they were happy to get rid of centrifuges but because they see an opportunity to have a better life. they see an opportunity. suddenly the iranians ship all that money tucson. it is a repressive government. this is a very connected generation in terms of the internet. estimated to be half a trillion dollars of unmet domestic needs and iran as a result of the sanctions. if a lot of that money does not go to dealing with those needs, i think they will be in trouble. but they're we will be money , and we have to be aware of that and our

regional strategy. president obama is moving in that direction to help our allies better determine defend themselves against iranian pressure. not only through arms through other ways. the gulf countries now spend eight times what iran spends it is not really money that is giving iran an advantage. it's capabilities and other asymmetric amenities. we need to work with our friends to better position to push back a bit. the 3rd thing swirling around is that the verification provisions are not really effective because they said they would have anytime anywhere inspections and don't.

joe probably knows he says that. i don't want to denounce something. it was unfortunate because no country anywhere would permit anytime anywhere. the only time that happened is in iraq after the invasion. we were occupying. so it was kind of a false expectation,a false expectation, but i want to put it into bigger context. a big puzzle with a thousand pieces. we will have 247. monitoring of all of iran's nuclear program, stuff coming in, the mines where they mine uranium, the places where they make centrifuges and assemble the centrifuges.

all of that will be viewed by cameras, seals, totally transparent. 99 percent, 98 percent is an open book. this whole debate and discussion 24 days being too long is about a couple pieces of the puzzle. we don't no fair there, but we see something going on on a military base. the simple fact is that as we see it through our intelligence, and want to go in and see it. iea asked to. iran says now. we are talking about that subset of issues. in that case we can just go

blaster way in. i don't think anyone is in favor of doing that. it's a process. it is a 24 day process. i actually think that is a good time period because hopefully the pressure will build during that period to open it up involving the countries that negotiate and iran, but ultimately if iran does not open the site any country, any of the p5 plus one countries they go to the un and push a button and have the sanctions reimposed.

we have the ability. that is the ultimate enforcement tool. the last thing i'll say, some of the critics say is too big of a tool, like having a nuclear bomb to do traffic control. you will never use it. that is a pretty good argument. but there are alternatives. we have our own sanctions, our own unilateral sanctions we can impose if we can't get our allies to go along or think we're doing too much. we have a range of options to go after iran under those circumstances. i will stop there. there are a thousand questions and a thousand and one answers. >> thank you very much. it is our pleasure to join

with the international crisis group and sponsoring this panel discussion. thank you for this opportunity to partner with you. we are dedicated to reducing and eliminating nuclear threats throughout the world this is why we got involved. we don't do the middle east. we do nuclear. we saw iran is one of the greatest nuclear threats facing the world and tried to muster our resources to focus on this thread, to provide grants to groups working on this threat, to try to find a way diplomatically to stop iran from getting a bomb. a new war in the middle east. we are very close to achieving that goal. today we got 41 senators to say they were in support of the iran agreement painstakingly negotiated over these last few years. this brings us close to the

possibility of being able to defeat, even without a veto, and a threat by the u.s. congress to kill this deal. we'll see how this plays out over the next few days. i am delighted that c-span is covering the panel. i want to thank them for the opportunity. one of the most pleasurable addictions many of us have that is still legal. and it has been a source of great information for and against the steel, as this drama is unfolded. there are lots of things to say, and they are all being said today. if you are involved, this is like new year's day. you're not sure which came to turn into. this may be one of the few where we will dig deeper into what disagreement -- what this agreement actually is.

so much of the debate has been dominated by criticism, what is wrong with it, picking at this with that part and stretching it out and magnifying the flaws so that they seem to be somewhere between a terrible agreement and barely good enough. the fact is, as a nonproliferation expert, this is by far the strongest nonproliferation agreement i've ever seen and is more to stop the country from getting nuclear weapons to stop the region from getting nuclear weapons and preventing the rest of the from pursuing nuclear weapons programs and any treaty i've ever seen, and i include in that the nonproliferation treaty, the mother of all nonproliferation agreements, the core of the regime. this deal is stronger than the nonproliferation treaty. it is certainly longer. it is much, much longer than

the original nonproliferation treaty. it had a week verification regime. this has the strongest ever negotiated. the us would have to physically occupy iran to get a better verification deal than this. let me explain a little bit about why i say that and why in the nuclear policy world this agreement is noncontroversial. there is an overwhelming consensus of nuclear policy experts in favor of this agreement. ii was pleased to sign a statement by 75 of the world's leading nonproliferation experts just released a couple weeks ago praising this agreement and urging congress to pass it. you have to search pretty far and wide to find a nonproliferation expert who is against the agreement. there are those who have criticisms want to work on

the verification regime, but opposing it, hard to find a nuclear policy expert against this agreement. when the us entered into this we had three objectives , block iran's pathway to a bomb, put in place a verification regime that could catch iran should it tried to cheat and keep together international coalition that had allowed the strongest sanction regime ever placed on a country outside of war to be put into effect and allow that if iran should cheap wicked snapback sanctions nearly instantaneously. we achieved every single goal. this agreement shrink-wrapped iran's nuclear program to a fraction of its current state car wraps it in the

toughest inspection regime i have ever seen, and it then freezes it for 15 years, almost all of the restrictions, as you will see any starts around me last at least 15 years. some start to come often. some, we set up a special procurement channel so everything that they buy has to go through this special procurement channel. what country does that? disagreement -- this agreement mandates that. stumps -- some start to come off, but some are like diamonds, they last forever. iran is never allowed to build a nuclear bomb. the inspection regime is never allowed to and. even as some of these are relaxed 15, 20, 25 years

from now, and eternity in national security terms, those barriers remain. no nuclear weapons ever and a forever inspection regime. this, for me, has implications far beyond iran the steel tackles the most difficult nonproliferation threat we faced. north korea is difficult, but this one threatened to unleash a nuclear arms race in the middle east. if iran got the bomb, there was a high probability that other countries would at least try to get a nuclear bomb. you were looking at the possibility of a middle east nuclear arms race and the possibility of the entire nonproliferation regime, the entire interlocking network unraveling. for me this would have been a disaster, a catastrophic failure of our effort to try

to contain the bomb. but with this agreement we bottle up iran's nuclear program. you have to understand what your talking about. i know you heard a lot about it taking 24 days to inspect or that iran will self inspect or other, tiny parts of the argument that have been picked out and exaggerated beyond all meeting, but you have to look at what actually happens. they have to rip out two thirds of their centrifuges and put them in locke and seal and warehouses under the monitoring of the international atomic energy agency, take 98 percent of their uranium stockpile. remember the cartoon bomb the benjamin netanyahu brought to the un podium where he warned iran was at the point of that red line

with a might be able to build a bomb within weeks, the steel drains that. there is no uranium left. they go from -- they have to eliminate 98 percent of the uranium, not even by diluting it but shipping it out of the country. they are left with about 300 ki. you know what you can do with that? squat. you cannot build a bomb, make fuel. it is a token amount that is left. some of the real news is gone uncommented on for most of the debate. this deal completely eliminates the plutonium pathway to a bomb. iran is building a research reactor at the wreck site. this was a research reactor for peaceful purposes. the problem was the fuel it

was using would,, during the lifetime of the reactor, generate enough plutonium to make a bomb. as that reactor if that reactor were to go in place it will be producing approximately enough plutonium for two to three bombs every year. if you remember a few years ago that was the reason. israel saw that reactor and said that as a threat to us. we cannot allow that to go operational. that is how israel made his palms. most countries use plutonium, not uranium. israel built a research reactor in their country many years ago and said it was for peaceful purposes and secretly used it to make plutonium. so when they syron doing the same thing, they understood what that meant.

and this is a proliferation path, what north korea did. israel was justifiably concerned. this deal completely eliminates possibility. iran has to take out the core, what is called the cauldron of its research reactor, drill it full of holes, and fill it with cement. they have to completely reconfigure it. the new configuration will produce less than a kilogram of plutonium every year. that is a quarter of what you need one bomb. and even that has to be shipped out of the country wants is taken out of the reactor, and iran promises not to build any reprocessing facilities to do what israel and north korea have done, take that plutonium out of the spent fuel and build a bomb. as a nonproliferation expert i am excited by the provisions that set a knew standard for countries.

maybe you havemaybe you have heard that it might set off a nuclear arms race in the middle east. it was a former saudi official said we want whatever capability iran has which led to fears that if you let iran keep even a token amount of uranium enrichment that saudi arabia would say, well now we want some two. as a nonproliferation expert i say okay. if you accept this package, this deal and go enrich uranium, go at it. this is the knew gold standard for nonproliferation for how you contain and monitor a nascent program, build in the maximum tools for assuring that a peaceful program stays peaceful. it is not an absolute guarantee. a country could still breakout.

what this package gets you is years of warning, years of warning. under this deal for at least 15 years if iran were to break out you would know it, and you would have a year of a year of warning before they were able to make enough material for one bomb that is just to make the material. itit would take another year or two afterwards to manufacture a weapon. no country has ever broken out with one bomb. you have to test it. when you look at this package you really see the incredible security that it gives you for the potential for becoming a standard for the nonproliferation regime. and here's the kicker, you often here the phrase countries like iran and north korea. well, there are no countries like iran and north korea.

these are the last two countries with programs of this type, someone vicious that they could either get nuclear weapons like north korea has goneon the on the threshold of getting one, which is what you feared. there is no one else with the program this large. if you can stop the program and try to apply some of the lessons north korea and in these last two, you could be looking at the end of proliferation, the way that began after hiroshima 70 years ago one country after another decided they had to get nuclear weapons. that crested about 25 years ago. more countriesmore countries have given up nuclear weapons that have tried to acquire them. more countries have given up nuclear weapons programs and tried to acquire them. we are down to these last two. you have just taken one off the list.

you have just taken one off the list. for nonproliferation expert this is a deal that is an historic breakthrough, diplomatic triumph, something that can make not just the us safer, not just israel safer, but make the world safer. thank you very much. [applause] >> good afternoon, everyone. thank you for coming. you have heard a lot about this agreement in the past few weeks and will here a lot today. ii thought i would do something a bit different to make it more interesting. i will 1st visualize some of the things you have heard about the agreement in the past and then tell you something you have not heard hopefully that will make it a bit more interesting.

so let's start with the visualization. as you heard from john sandy , this deal goes a long way in rolling back iran's nuclear capability. but what is difficult for some people to realize or visualize is what happens if there is no deal, if we go to status quo ante? i want to show you a few graphs starting from that side, the number of centrifuges that iran had command i would like you to focus on three time frames. from the beginning to 2013 is what i call the period of escalation, and from 2013 to 2015 which was the period of negotiation, and from 2015 onward, that is the post deal scenario depending on

if this deal survives or if it can no longer be killed at this point but is undermined in some way or another. if you look at the number of centrifuges, iran went pretty quickly from 2006 to 2009 president obama came to office to around 7,000 centrifuges, and from that point until 2013 when the geneva agreement joint plan of action froze the program iran went up to 19,000 i are one centrifuges. so than the graph plateaus between 2013 and 2015. if this deal comes into force we know exactly what wap. it will come down to 5,060 centrifuges and will stay that way for ten years. and i would actually say for 12 years because the total

enrichment capacity stays constant until your number 12. now,. now, if there is no deal it is harder to predict what will happen. let's take the critics at the word and believe that if there is no deal the best alternative is to start ratcheting up sanctions in the hope that we would put enough pressure on to make more concessions. that will take is probably to status quo ante with the previous pattern which was escalation for escalation. in that scenario iran, you see how the graph just goes up and up and up. by the end of this ten year period we will get to about 60,000, 50,000 centrifuges. well, the same thing will happen in the facility that

is under a mountain and has the capacity of 3,000 centrifuges. iran installed 3,000 centrifuges but 2010. it did not turn on all the machines but installed 3,000 and was operating around 800 if there is an agreement, this number comes down to 1,000 centrifuge machines installed the 350 operational and would only enrich stable isotopes which are not dangerous at all, and it will stay that way for ten years. if there is no agreement iran can turn on all the 3,000 centrifuges that it has. now, these are the old primitive machines that were talking about. they also have more sophisticated centrifuges. currently it has about 1,000

second-generation machines that are installed ready to go. they just have to turn them on. it has a smaller number of more advanced machines. now, if the agreement comes into force, that number goes down to one. for eight and a half years. from that point on iran can operate 30 machines. a huge reduction compared to where we are whereas if there is no deal they can turn at least 1,000 people to machines on overnight. let's come here to the side of the room and look at the stockpiles of enriched material. the stockpile 5 percent enriched material grew quickly from 2007 and went

up to around 10,000 kilograms before the ga poa came into force. if there is a deal, this will be significantly reduced to 300 kilograms, but if there is no deal the stockpile is there. if you project based upon the previous pattern it can grow pretty quickly, and instead of staying at 300 kilograms, it can grow up to 30,000 kilograms by 2030. of the same pattern with 20 percent enriched uranium, it went up to around 190 kilograms. by the way, prime minister netanyahu's redline was drawn at 250 kilograms. actually, the j poa already

got rid of the stockpile or drained the cartoon bomb the prime minister netanyahu held up the un. it is already gone, but iran has the capacity of again producing it and based on the previous pattern if there is no deal by 2030 iran will be able to have not 250 kilograms but 900 kilograms of 20 percent enriched material. and this contributes to the breakout time than the amount of time needed to produce enough fissile material for nuclear weapons the breakout time came down quickly from 2007 to 2013 from 18 months all the way down to two months. since thesince the obama administration is come to office it has been below six months, and the joint plan

of action already increased to around three and half of four months. if the agreement comes into force breakout time will go up to 12 months and remain they're for 15 to thought between ten and 15 years. and if there is no deal, breakout time can actually shrink significantly almost overnight depending on which of these steps iran decides to implement to match the escalation it comes from ratcheting up the sanctions. by the end of 2016 we could go down to one month by the end of 2016 to zero, almost zero. now, i'm not using this as a scare tactic to say if there is no deal that will be a doomsday scenario, but it is important to understand the logic behind this mutual pattern of escalation.

the iranians believe that if as a weaker country dealing with six world powers they change or are seen as changing their nuclear policy as a result of sanctions, than thethen the west can put pressure on them to change everything else, all the other strategic decisions that they have to make as well. they want to make sure that the west does not get the signal that sanctions actually will change iranian policy which is why they try to match the leverage that the united states was trying to build with ratcheting up there own nuclear capability which is why i believe that they will escalate if there is no agreement. of course we don't know exactly how or if they would remain below the bedliner not, but if you compare the deal to no deal scenario we will be in a much more difficult situation.

now, this gets me to the 2nd point that i wanted to make. imagine we come to the conclusion that we don't like these downward trends in the certainty that we give the deal and we decide we want to take the risk of escalation and see if we can get a better deal. i would argue a better deal is more dangerous. imagine this famous provision with some miracle iran comes back to the table and goes down to a two hour notice for inspection of suspect sites, not 24 days as a challenge. let's imagine how that will work in practice. as soon as there is some kind of intelligence about suspect activity they have to show up, get access

almost immediately without the iranians having an opportunity to study the evidence, discuss ways and means of making sure that the legitimate commercial or confidential information is safeguarded, and of course we are mostly talking about military sites that are under the control of the revolutionary guard and the revolutionary guards are not a big fan of the agreement which threatens already the economic bracket that they have acquired in the sanctions economy during the past few years, and they are concerned about infiltration by western intelligence as a result of doubling the number of inspectors on the ground at any day and any time. so this will make the revolutionary guard which is already resentful very sensitive, very, even more

opposed and it yesterday which does not make for a sustainable agreement in the long run. ifif you have every day of witchhunt somewhere in the country because we did not have due diligence or due process, it really does not make for a sustainable deal. now let's get a look at another example. imagine that iran somehow accepts to get rid of all research and development. the single advanced centrifuge machines, they decide they don't want that. you have to remember that there are around a few hundred people if not a thousand people actually working in the research and development area of iran's nuclear program.

these are scientists who already have that w's knowledge. if the program is totally shut down these people will be out of work and probably pushed underground and these are the kind of people you don't want to be unemployed and pushed underground. it will also have another effect which is important to say and for people to remember, that we are talking about a proud nation which wrongly or for right reasons believes in this nuclear program as a symbol of national pride. an agreement that provides for unfettered access the same way you heard from our distinct panel implemented in a country that was vanquished and more, of course it will humiliate the radio nation. a hard time keeping up a deal like that in the next president will be in a

difficult position. so the bottom line that i want to emphasize here is it is just not enough to get a good deal. a good deal is a sustainable deal, and it is only sustainable if it is sustainable for both sides. let me stop here. [applause] >> there will be a question-and-answer period. >> i am happy to take questions after those excellent presentations. who wants to start? introduce yourself. who wants to ask the 1st question or comment? yes, in the back. >> it was mentioned that the iran nuclear program was at the top of his group's concern.

where does israel rank in your scale of concern? >> there are three major threats that you face if your worried about a nuclear bomb going off someplace, worry about the new country trying to get it, worry about a terrorist group that can get there hands on a bomb and then your worried about the nine countries that currently have nuclear weapons. there are about 16,000 in the world, and your worried that one could be used in anger of a miscalculation or accident. israel is one of those countries with an undeclared nuclear weapons program. people estimate somewhere between 10200 nuclear weapons. i think it's at the low end of the scale, so israel would be one of those countries where you worry that something can go terribly wrong, upon could go off whether they intended it to were not are that a conflict could arise where

they might feel forced to use the weapon. it is not at the top of my list of countries. if i was to think about the country every about the most , that would be pakistan which for my money is the most dangerous country in the world with already enough nuclear weapons, almost as many as israel, is racing past that, building nuclear weapons faster than any country on earth and is in an unstable situation internally and regionally. >> the ranking democrat on the foreign relations committee agonized long time and finally announced he would not support the deal but has said he is going to introduce a legislative package that will include more resources for israel in

the event of additional terrorist activities on the part of a ran, aa pathway to additional sanctions if there are violations to the deal. one, do you think this is a good idea, and is there any prospect that this could provide a different kind of coalition of support in the aftermath of acceptance of the deal that will move us away from what has become a sharply partisan issue. >> i think it is likely to have some other initiative. i think to be consistent with the treaty and does not initiate or trigger any provision of the treaty i personally have no problem with the. a number of those things are things the president has

said are committed to. we'll be happy, but they have been instructed members when it gets to sanctions, i noted i don't think further sanctions are going to be effective. let's stay on that for a 2nd. i don't think any other country in the world will for sanctions. calling in the ceo fae and saying thank you for the last several years. very strong. iran came to the table. we think it's terrific. the un approved this. we like to stay out of there for another three years.

i can't imagine the conversation. in the sanctions area i doubt it will be effective. many folks are talking about what they call secondary sanctions. you choose. you have access to iran. we have access to the united states. it is pretty powerful. i think that also is not sustainable. i cannot imagine the united states, german and chinese, indian companies and punishing them for violating sanctions that most of the world thinks are not legitimate and are inconsistent with the general global norms.

could i see congress doing sanctions? yes. as long as it is not inconsistent with the agreement. >> anthony garrett, thank you for your presentation. my question has to do with assuming the deal goes through, what are the implications in terms of the terrible tragedy right in the region with syria and iraq? >> let me start. >> specifically the implications of this deal. >> well, the easy answer is none. the administration's position has been that we are negotiating a nuclear deal and not going to mix

and other issues,, and i think that was the right position for the negotiation we don't want either reality your perception that we dumb down the nuclear agreement because without syria might. that has been the right position. i think it depends a bit on iran. as i said before, i am deeply suspicious of her on. iran can do things in both iraq and syria which would be very helpful. i don't see any evidence that iran has prepared to throw aside under the bus. if they want to be a constructive player, it would be enormously helpful. in iraq we have this strange

little cat and mouse game in which we're fighting the same guys as the iraqi militia but don't go to the same restaurant. there we could have more cooperation on a tactical level. i mean,, this could be interesting drama to watch unfold. what is the evolution of serious approach to the world? the hardliners would say syria is a revolutionary country is basically still embodying the view that it should dominate the region. i think the president believes that it is possible that iran will evolve and that this agreement to the extent it opens up the wrong

will contribute to the evolution. that's a very important question. >> may i just add? this is not an agreement that solves all of our problems with iran. it does not cure cancer. it will not help you shed those unwanted pounds. it does one thing, stocks iran from getting a bomb, but it does that very well. and that isand that is the position that the us and the european partners took at the beginning. russia and china agreed. this is what israel wanted. this is what saudi arabia wanted. if we're going to have a negotiation about regional issues some of our regional partners want to be in that discussion. real quick what it does do is, it is a gateway to those discussions.

the biggest difference you had opens the way to conversations about these other issues, areas where you have overlapping strategic objectives. they both have an interest in stabilizing the region, and interest in stopping the war in syria. can you get to those conversations? we don't no. if you did not solve the issue was no possibility of even entering the room. >> one thing, you come to the hill and breathe the air and start filibustering. [laughter] i don't mean to do that. a that. a very important point. the argument that we cannot enter into this agreement because they are causing trouble, sponsoring hezbollah and sponsoring us on and causing both to me is

illogical. you have to flip that argument on its head because to the extent we can take the nuclear issue and while it off, put it out, were in a better position to deal with those things if iran is not able to intimidate its neighbors. if iran is not able to intimidate other countries with nuclear threat i think we're in a better position to stabilize the region. >> the europeans are mostly supportive of the deal precisely because they feel they are on the receiving end of what is happening in the middle east at the moment. and they believe that, as was said, that deal does not solve that all the problems of the middle east. they have there own dynamic, but it opens the possibility and then we have the

possibility of a more rational conversation between the powers of the middle east and the powers of the middle east and the outside powers. of course there will be a balance of power to mention, and one of the questions is whether the balance he ran, it's all about more weapons, more firepower for the gcc countries or whether that has to be accompanied by diplomatic framework of engagement between iran and the gcc countries. at the moment, talking about the diplomatic framework seems a bit like pie-in-the-sky because considering the rhetoric on both sides, it's difficult to see that engagement, but it is even more difficult to see that engagement of tomorrow your talking to a nuclear iran. in that sense, frankly, the

answer to your question, question, the implications of the deal will be what we make them. that is our responsibility and why i think your going to see a great flurry of diplomatic activity in the middle east. everyone knows that the deal is not the answer to all the problems, but everyone knows this is now the time to work very aggressively to begin to build the diplomatic framework in the middle east that the moment doesn't really exist. >> one last. >> very good question. i just want to add a point about the money issue because i think i always like to look at data, and this is a case where we have data. if you look at 2011 to 2013, that is when the sanctions regime reached its apex.