we're going, this is what we will do. this is what we will do. and on the other hand, it's also saying that if you continue to undermine the kurdish movement inside turkey, if you continue to try and marginalize the hdp, so that's sort of what we disagree, i'm going to make turkey ungovernable for you. this is, you know, a way of saying if you're going to play hardball with me, well, i'm going to play hardball with you. and very few of us actually predicted this because we all seemed to believe that when the pkk was bogged down in the fight against the islamic state it could hardly afford to open up a second front against turkey, but in a very ironic twist in a certain sense it's america that enabled it to do so because america wrote to the rescue with its air support which, of course, took a lot of pressure off the pkk on the ground, making it easier for them perhaps to do what they're doing now today.

[inaudible] >> i think we talk about tactics of pkk, we have to keep in mind that splintering strategy, which pkk, whether it is pkk. essentially, when he was captured in 1999, the leadership said this. never again will the organization called after its leaders are captured or killed. that's why we have to splinter into multiple modes of decision-making. there's a certain degree of autonomy in local assets as well. as the result of this, is beneficial in the sense that when you want to completely play hardball in the sense that you to create chaos of the nobody can manage it. it works really well. but on the other hand, when

you're trying to control the chaos as pkk yourself come it's also very difficult, which became very obvious into pipeline attacks recently. one local branch basically said that we did this pipeline attack, but didn't hdp said we had no connection to the attack. we don't know what to do. and then several days later all agreed that okay then, we did it, kind of the that splintering strategy has pluses and minuses as well. well. plus when you want to create chaos, perfect and barbara. when you try to control these assets it's impossible. killing police. one thing, it's very easy to do so, especially when you're running an asymmetrical conflict and when you're trying to gain the upper hand in the psychological aspect of war, when there's a car crash you call the police. is a car crash.

the police comes, you ambushed and killed it's very easy to do so. same thing for health services, firefighters and the kind of state services as well. but what happened in last week's is about the leadership started to publish directives to those local combatants that did not target policemen are actually off duty with their families. so that's one way of trying to bring the battle into a manageable phase, but once organizations start to splinter, you can not in splinter than because of baton is a sweet thing. operational autonomy, operation forget. very difficult for centralized leadership to manage. so i think the police killing as part of the splintering strategy come at a to think it's going to go away in short-term.

>> may i just add something? let's not forget what happened in october of last year when you had to drink the kobani rights come if we can call them that. it was down to erdogan to stop that. envies the youth movements and i've talked to them when they were manning -- they say they will only answer to erdogan. said in a sense this they also be part of the pkk strategy of making erdogan relevant once again because they need to pull them out to stop it. so that may be part of the strategy, the pkk strategy of getting erdogan back in the picture by activating the youth movement that said it's only answerable to him. that's just a guess. >> yes, sir? >> thank you. jim holmes, retired foreign service officer, retired

president american-turkish council. amberin opened an issue which i think deserves some more commentary, that is u.s. policy, particularly as far as syria is concerned. as akin is described at the very beginning, there were some differences between 1990s and 2000. one of the differences which he did not elaborate on was provide comfort and acidity which u.s. and other old russian forces provided for the kurds in northern iraq in the 1990s. and the absence of that in the case of syria, indeed it wasn't 2 million, it was a 3 million or 4 million refugees which generated just interest in syria. it was isis and daesh that data. now we are reaping all of the consequences of that. amberin spoke about the possibility of u.s. using its leverage now effectively with respect to turkey.

i wonder, what are the dimensions of an effective u.s. policy with respect to the situation that now exist not just u.s.-turkey, not just u.s.-iraq, iran, but in the region with respect to refugees, with respect to daesh. what the dimensions of an effective policy that will have some of consequences for the region? >> i believe henri the great middle east, expert to answer that one. [laughter] >> i'm glad i don't have to answer questions. i like being a moderator. >> show we sit here for a few days? look, i mean, -- >> give me two words. >> change in american policy? [inaudible] spent what are the chances of change? >> a i don't come look, the american policy i think is a

very clear. is not going to be an american military involvement, direct american military involvement in cd. however, having said this, again, looking at the tea leaves so to say, the united states managed to get the turks to open a -- [inaudible] three bases means that's not just -- gets -- [inaudible] both are much closer to rock a than the other two. so i suspect that the white house must be planning something much more of a post to turn it without ground troops, maybe special forces can i don't know, but certainly you don't ask to open for three bases just to send six f-16s that we did. i think we have slowly pre-positioning stuff for probably much more muscular policy towards isis.

again, for us to focus is isis. there is no other concerned out and whoever helps us on isis, we will partner with. it happens to be a ypg, uid, are the most formidable force in terms of fighting isis. we will continue to work with them provided -- doesn't get in the way. but i suspect, i think the administration is probably thinking a little bit much bigger in terms of military involvement bringing more iraqis troops up, maybe this thing about organizing some of the syrian -- but that's the limits to which the united states will go. it is also part of the deal with turkey and open the basis is

also sealing the border. that also is very important, and already we're seeing reports that isis is having trouble bringing people across to the turkish border. the border is become a little bit more difficult to cross. so that i think is the extent of the american involvement for the future. they will bring in much more higher assets and more drones, more wherewithal. and by the way, not just american but british and french as well. but that it, that's what i can see u.s. doing. >> a thank you very much. chp representative here in washington, d.c. very quick comment and a question. just about the presidential debate in turkey.

for our party with commissioned more than a dozen balls between december of last year and may have this year, even less than half of the akp waters are convinced the presidential system in turkey is a good idea. so i think even if normally what the outcome of this election to become i still think it's a non-issue for most of the turks in turkey. so this one quick observation do i want to shoot. and my question is about the pyd policy, or u.s. policy towards pyd. we know that they do get a lot of support from the u.s., but why the administration won't grant visa? thank you. >> maybe you should ask this to the white house. i don't -- i don't know. the united states sometimes works in very mysterious ways. i'm income for its superpower, for a superpower that cannot decide or cannot get a visa

because he might come when they offended the turks settled, that's the only reason i can think of. there is no other reason. we talk to him. >> but so do the turks. >> but for some reason, i have no idea. please come if you find out, at the white house please tell me because i want to know. >> in my ear, i think the white house, not the state department. notice. [inaudible] i have kind of a follow-up question regarding the potential operations on isis and whether the election results could potentially change turkey's position on whom to support on the ground because turkey so far couldn't come up with a strong alternative constantly push for partners. >> the question, what's the question? >> what could possibly change after the election regarding,

let's say erdogan is all the wars he needs. article to see a potential change on turkey position on whom to support as partners on the ground? considering and assuming there will be increased number of air operations on isis. >> it's an interesting question because if he feels confident he might then pick up the peace process again and, of course, we know that mr. erdogan is an incredibly flexible person. and he may indeed, you know, decide that the hdp needs to support the kinds of constitutional changes that mr. erdogan is seeking. so with that in turn means that turkey start partnering with ypg and if i decide yes, indeed, i suspect that after two bits of probably more than anyone else

since we have a 900-kilometer long border with syria? that part i really don't know to be honest with you, whether what happened inside turkey whether the peace process would be picked up again will also be reflected in the relationship with ypg. but if it's not that peace process is going absolutely nowhere, that we can safely predict. >> i would say that the danger of policy change would occur if the election results are an exact duplicate of what happened in june. in other words, if erdogan loses again, adding that essentially, not retaliate but essentially change policy as a diversion, but also to punish the one of the things that sold disturbing, very disturbing i should say, when you look at the erdogan controlled press at the moment, the press that's sympathetic, it

is amazingly at the moment anti-western. and making a connection between the pkk and the west is constant barrage of, a friend of my just wrote to me this way and said she watched a document on turkish television about germany is essentially providing arms and training to the pkk, but the rest of the turkish press keeps things all the equipment the pkk has that it is working against turkish troops now came from the united states. that the united states has trained them to put ieds -- i mean, this kind of atmosphere is not necessarily conducive to a good decision-making because of a lot of people -- erdogan may believe this nonsense. and second, you know, in the event that he is defeated again it may be, this may be a place where you can change.

but maybe not. look, it's too speculative of a question. >> we are all focusing a lot on mr. erdogan and sort of not looking closely enough at the army and the police in turkey. and i think that there is a very sort of odd kind of way some degree of sympathy for ins to the extent that it seems like the only force capable of giving with the pkk -- i.s. pick an effort to are very close to members of the security forces, the fact that figure people can disagree forces sign welcome good for i.s., good for them, they're going after these guys. they seem to be the ones capable of teaching these kurds listen to and i find that extremely worrying. and it is something you can apply to some extent if you look at twitter. if you look at the followers of some of these i.s. people or their sympathizers, to me it was

quite shocked to see that many of their followers were people whose profile pictures were of ataturk or had the gray wolf, ultranationalist types who somehow connected. perhaps, i guess similar case of these old -- in iraq who somehow had this alliance of convenience with these people, with al-qaeda because they had the same injury. i think that's a phenomenon that people like ocalan, probably are already scrutinizing more carefully. and niger reports and ddgs it on youtube -- and now these reports and you see it on youtube sta circuit was not in the old days they would have a to b. great mustache and a happy isis. and no mustache. that's really kind of scary. i think as i said, needs to be examined more closely.

>> yes, sir. >> if i am wrong please correct me. you said, you mentioned about the army position come at you said there is no monolithic leadership. what do you mean by that? can you explain what you? >> no monolithic leadership of the pkk. >> army. >> i didn't say that i said there's no monolithic leadership of the pkk. pkk is a very clear-cut leadership where erdogan was the leader and the leadership pyramid been spilled over through erdogan. right now there's no monolithic leadership in the pkk as decision-making is splintered. i didn't say that for the army. >> thank you very much. i'm from turkish embassy. i have a few comments and a

question. my first comment is actually just i think we need to underline contact here, which i think is not touched upon very much. and this is how the turkish government is eager to fight against daesh, isis. and against terrorism in general and also isis. [inaudible] -- the point that isis, some people can't say good for isis, just for going after pkk, but this is not a government policy. that's for sure in the '90s. and one fact important to the peace process was started by of course the government. and also its counterpart over

kurdish part. but one point is we shouldn't forget. this peace process was stopped by pkk itself. so it was not the government -- let's stop this, it's over, finished, but pkk announced it. and a few things about kobani, if there is a general perception that turkey has not supported kobani, but also i need to put one fact about this is what the turkey can which is not mentioned it can maybe some of us did not knows. turkey has helped -- [inaudible] and to finance the fight against isis. and the our other helps, assistance that turkey keeps,

especially to peshmerga united states pics of fighting isis is very, very important. my question is, is a general one. to our some i heard that maybe if you can comment on that, why do you think the pkk has chose, opted for stopping this peace process and violence starting? because it started just right after switch by pkk. thank you very much. >> well, i think i kind of elaborate on that to some length. i explained to you what i thought was the pkk's vantage point, but i we don't have much to add to that. >> okay. let me just come one important

issue here you brought up. the fact that the turkish government allowed the peshmerga to cross from northern iraq into kobani. you have to number a decade much, much later the it after the united states dropped supplies, after the united states started bombing it was essentially an effort to show both, to repair come if you want, a very significant problem that the government had created for itself in turkey. it was an attempt to show that yes, we are not against the kirkuk here we are going to use the peshmerga, to put by the time the peshmerga came, the fight had already been stabilized by from posted by the states air force. and book, let me also remind you that mr. erdogan was absolutely livid about american bombing of kobani to support, to support

the pyd. because if you remember he said he came out and says, he said something like what's in kobani, oil, gold, diamonds? and it the way, first of all the united states will only intervene if there is gold or diamonds. in the way it was a very shy we say demeaning attack on u.s. intentions and u.s. strategy in that particular case it and anybody you talk to at the time will tell you in turkey, maybe you know, too, that kobani was not a place that turkey wanted to defend the it's about the peshmerga to come after both world opinion and encouraged opinion especially in turkey change. look, kobani was the main breaking point for turkish kurds. a special of what happened with the peshmerga, you know, the peshmerga operation was way to signal to those conservative kurds i mentioned earlier who were eventually defectors to

stabilize that constituency. and it didn't work. and as far as why the pkk started it, look, i think what was said, the perception but i think the pkk probably decided that the turkeys you think the turks were not serious because such as kobani. it's also during the election process. if you would overturn the election process, i talk about the june 7 in a period coming to the june 7 election, both mr. erdogan and the akp press went wild in terms of accusations against hdp. it was a campaign against hdp because they understood very correctly that the hdp was the single most important threat to akp maintain its majority to u.s. and ago but that was waging war on hdp on the kurdish party while at the same time engaged

in a peace process. that contradiction is also one of the reasons why i think the pkk decided there was no hope. >> but even before the action of the government was building his army, fort -- what would you call it posts, throughout the southeast, and also building these dams which were cutting off, saying that's why the couple was building them but as the pkk saw it, cutting off their roots, sort of supply, logistical routes inside turkey. at the pkk was very unhappy about this and was making a lot of noise about that. as you remember your those protests, rather deadly ones, and some people died. and so it didn't just happen overnight. does a lot of mutual distrust and the government for its part would argue that even as they were discussing peace, the pkk was busy stockpiling weapons

inside turkey. so obviously a lot of distrust between the sides to this also a big problem, the lack of trust which i think begs the question of why you don't have a third party as you did in oslo, sort of monitor the peace process. >> we are running out of time. do we have time for one last question? i think am going to take my prerogative and asked the last question myself it says we'll have five minutes i'm going to post it to all three of you and ask you to be relatively brief with the answers. i have a big picture question about where turkey is having. there are two conflicting narratives about the june election. one is that the akp lost its majority for the first time your erdogan did not get what he wanted from the election to the of is that the ocalan party still 17 million more votes than

the other part of the chb saw its percentage decrease. which of those narratives is the more persuasive explanation of where turkey is helping? i mean come is there an opposition of informing that could become turkeys next governing party or does the party look like turkeys indispensable party for years to come? >> since you look at i will just start. that's actually the topic of my next article. i'm writing something on a third party dynamics in turkey. it's a long debate so i was just cut it short. but practically when you look at church politics in crisis period such as cold war's end '60s, '70s or 1990s kurdish question, every crisis period the election that produces our coalition option, a coalition government come in that setting whichever party is at the third becomes the first party in the

next election but this is almost like a 100% uninterrupted pattern that i discovered. it's quite interesting, like whichever third party becomes first party, the other election third party becomes first part. it's rude interesting dynamic. i have a whole set of theories to explain it but i'm going to spare you from that. but then how does, what does that tell us? it tells us that one thing that we have to third parties, mhp and hdp. one is more like coalition party. i think the big picture is the main polarities in turkish politics are becoming more structurally established in the sense that you six center-right parties, six central is part of the one turkish nationals party, one turkey political movement party which i think if the

proper political process continues it's going to become the blueprint for elections for years to come. so that's my answer. >> thank you. >> i think if you look at turkey traditionally, you've always had a single party rule that's managed to push through reform in turkey, right, and that single party rule is traditionally always been held by a center-right party. and until the present -- when you look at the demographics of turkey come any party that wants to rule alone needs of the kurdish vote. that's the reality. so given that the akp or mr. erdogan is totally alienated the kurds, how do you go forward? canyon afford with a coalition, even if it's the chb? i'm afraid i have to say i'm somewhat doubtful come and to think what really needs to happen is for the akp to sum up sheikh off mr. erdogan, put him

back in his box and then only i think can we move forward. but hopefully i will be proven wrong. >> look, the problem in turkey is a that the republican people's party doesn't seem, has made significant changes of late but somehow has yet to figure out a way to connect with the bulk of the population. in turkey the centerleft has always been very weak. historically. it's not just this of the centerleft. so the centerleft has to figure out a new message, new organization but that will take a very, very long time. i think before that even happens, i actually think there's another likelihood that we haven't talked about and that is akp. now we are seeing a great deal of opposition within the akp.

they're still out there at the former president who's may be moving in the direction of a new party, something new. so it's quite conceivable that especially if the next elections produce the same results as they did in june, that you will see new organization and the fracturing of the akp. primary because i think mr. erdogan has become so dominant that essentially sucking up all the oxygen on the party and adobe the actual one in the park and that's the most likely outcome. >> great. thank you very i think we are out of time at this point. ..

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> a reminder, if you missed any of this discussion, you will be able to watch it any time in the c-span video library. go to c-span.org. coming up tonight, hearing examining the security of the us-mexico border.

officials from the state department and border control agencies. here's a quick preview. >> battle to increase security, rule of law command justice in mexico is going to be a long-term battle. i think that we can see what has happened in columbia and the types of improvements that have been made they're, and those are the types that we will have to help mexico make. and i think they could talk more effectively about this in terms of the programs that are in place on but continuing those types of programs we started in columbia and are currently running in mexico, all of those types of things are what is ultimately going to make this a safer location. >> before the gentleman euros back, there is no police force in nuevo laredo. you can work on training them, but there is not even one.

it is run by the drug cartels, and shame on the state department for cutting the pay. thatthat is not the way you will build morale and do more things. you areyou are giving tens of billions of dollars command you will cut those poor people's pay. you can talk about training local police force, but there is not even want to be changed. >> you can see that tonight at 8:30 p.m. eastern here on c-span2. >> tonight gary epstein, chair of the fcc and sent to an auction task force will discuss the upcoming broadcast spectrum auction that will allow wireless companies to bid on airway space. >> a congressional determination i was made, and one thing i want to emphasize, we are not taking spectrum. itspectrum. it is a voluntary auction on behalf of the broadcasters.

they continue to be an extremely valuable service, but congress passed this act where broadcasters will be able to relinquish the spectrum rights in return for a share of the proceeds. and so what it uses congress' determination and the ftc's implementation to use market forces to make available more low band spectrum to meet wireless broadband needs. in other words, the need for broadband spectrum is burgeoning multiples and exponentially. there is not a good -- there is not a lot of good, low band spectrum left. this is a new and novel method. >> tonight at 8:00 o'clock eastern on c-span2. >> british foreign secretary

philip hammond answered questions on uk foreign development in the parliamentary hearing in london. topics included combating i sis, the syrian refugee crisis, and iran's nuclear program. >> welcome to the session of the select committee. the foreign secretary, thank you for coming to join us this afternoon. we will get straight into questions. the issues, some sense as to what we were cover, inevitably isis, isil, daish , whatever you wish to call it has the agenda. we will start off they're and with syria. in july you indicated the last policy and attacking isil in iraq but not syria was incoherent and the defense secretary has been

extremely robust on his remarks. but it is that british military interference trivial and in terms of the mission irrelevant when set within the highly incoherent international policy? >> well, i think there are two issues here. there is the question of the international approach to the crisis in syria. of which isil/daish is a part, and there is the question of isil in syria, as part of the challenge in dealing with isil and extremism in a rack and far beyond iraq. if the point that i was making, there was a military incoherence to carrying out a campaign of airstrikes

against an enemy on the ground in iraq who supply lines originate in the neighboring country, but being unable to attack the supply centers in the neighboring country. there may well be political arguments and, indeed, there are. the 29th of august, 2013. but from a military point of you it is incoherent. a single theater of conflict , and the supply lines run from syria into iraq. the isil/daish forces that are attacking iraqi forces. >> but what about the juxtaposition of the military, a british aircraft and the supporting function

being able to authorize an invasion. military utility arguments. but when set against the wider, strategic incoherence of the international position toward greater syria. >> the international community's response is coherent. it is coherent, but limited. , but limited. limited in the sense that we have taken a decision that would not be appropriate to put coalition ground forces into iraq. the coalition's activity is limited to the use of air power, the provision of materials, training, mentoring to the iraqi forces, the kurdish --dash murder forces. that means that the

objectives will take longer to achieve than they might have done if western forces had been injected into iraq, but the judgment is that the ensuing result will be more sustainable, if it is delivered by iraqi forces acting on the ground. i think that is perfectly coherent. there will be many people, and i understand the frustration, who are reluctant to contemplate what i think general alan from the beginning was indicating, that it could be taking years, not months, to resolve the isil problem in iraq and frustrated because of the barbarity of the isil occupation of parts of iraq. if we look at the other part of the question, the international community's response to syria, that is a

different challenge make complex by the fact that the two most important external players and a rack -- the three most important, russia, iran, and turkey all have very different agendas. in the case of turkey, and agendaturkey, and agenda which is clearly evolving even as we discussed this afternoon. >> you describe the international coherence. >> limited in the sense that we have made the decision for better or worse. not going to put western ground forces into iraq but can isil be defeated? >> i think my view on that is, yes, it could. if we were able to attack

isil across its theater of operation from northern syria through eastern syria into iraq, it is possible to defeat isil in that theater. theater. as a separate issue from the broader serious civil war. >> can you paint that scenario for us? >> the -- obviously we already talked about the possibility of coalition airstrikes in the uk perhaps deciding to join coalition airstrikes in syria. we will only defeat isil and in a rack when there is a ground force that is then called to inflict serious damage on the, and it is possible to envision a situation without pursuit

and destruction would go on into syria. i'm not saying it's the ideal situation or the most likely. i don't think it is a necessary condition of destroying isil syria. >> yesterday from some of the country's most distinguished academics and journalists who follow this. their conclusion was they won't be defeated, share our priority. and was the coalition uses its airpower to contain and restrain isil is able to focus on other national priorities. so isn't the coalition, western powers from our policy and the unintended consequences of removing

those key parts of the need to cooperate, prioritize. >> well, i think i have already made reference to the fact that the complexity in syria, the three external powers by most directly involved in most influential have a complex agenda. in some cases internally conflicting agendas. and that is what makes the problem in syria so difficult to tackle. i agree with you. having turkey, iran, and russia pursuing separate agendas, in the case of turkey a shifting agenda makes it very difficult to move toward a point where we have a clear response to a

clear, agreed approach to moving forward in resolving the crisis in syria. >> but in stereo we are at a stalemate. regained some ground. that is likely to continue, vis-à-vis evidence we received yesterday. iran and russia are not willing to transfer the forced removal of the sod. if british and american policy contributes to the stalemate, and the uncomfortable -- >> how is that contributing? >> in our position is threatened, indeed this afternoon, to equate aside and isil and that the removal of the sod is a start.of the united kingdom's position that the rather uncomfortable truth

is that well iran and russia are not prepared to contemplate the forced removal, we they're share of the responsibility, and the continuing bloodshed, the great migrant crisis, and the inability to put together a strategy to defeat isil in both syria and iraq. >> responsibility lies squarely with those who are perpetrating it. we need to be clear about that. isil and the areas they control, the regime in the areas that they control. but you have put your finger on what is precisely the problem. our analysis of the problem is that the sod is a recruiting sergeant for isil.

any suggestion that western powers were prepared to work with k-1 and the defeat of isil would redouble the recruiting sergeant effect. and at the same time, two of the most influential powers in this occasion, iran and russia, are apparently not prepared to contemplate the removal of k-1 from power. our diplomacy is focused on persuading russia and iran that their equities can be protected, that the future stability of syria could be best assured by allowing a transition, which did not seek to dismantle the entire regime. but which did remove assad and the group around him who are manifestly responsible

for the bloodshed and atrocities that have been committed. >> the problem with that analysis is it is not shared by commentators and davis x 25 us evidence yesterday. the points put to him by the behavior of assad and whether it is possible to cooperate. he said, don't diffuse pragmatism with conveying the methods of the teenage assad regime. the whole.is to put the syrian population 1st. i approve that the men had more blood on his hands. yetit because he is backed by two of the strongest powers in this conflict, the demand that he must go is not realistic. the question is, doing was to stand to stand on purity and damn the syrian people?

>> i do not agree with that analysis because we also are being pragmatic that any sense that the west was prepared to work with assad against isil would redouble the recruiting sergeant affect. we also have legal restraints around supporting are working with the regime, which is committing crimes on any scale, and we are very acutely conscious of our legal obligations. even if it was convenient to us, and i don't think it is. even if it is convenient, we don't have the option of working with assad. we would be abetting. >> not while inviting the british government to do. the starting., and our own

position, assad moscow. and by starting in that place it means that negotiations can happen. because the critical partners, critical players, turkey, saudi arabia, and he ran with russia standing behind in rent will not then enable a process to happen, and therefore not inviting the united kingdom government along with western allies to stop the process, to stop stopping the process from start by dropping our and principal objection to assad and go to

language.get a language. it is not possible to have that continuing role, which strikes me as rather more sensible language that it would enable a process to start. >> i don't think the difference between myself and the madam on this issue, ii think that the turks are also in the position that the sod must go. they are prepared to be pragmatic i have made that clear. on day one he and all his cronies, if there was a process that was agreed upon which took months and there

was a transition now, we can certainly discuss that. what i am not prepared to discuss is what i understand to be the russian and rainy a position that we need to elections in syria, and it will be for the syrian people to decide in the selections whether assad should remain as there president. that is not acceptable position. international community cannot in my view facilitate and oversee a set of elections in which somebody guilty of crimes of the scale that assad has committed is able to run for office. that has to be clear. he cannot be part of serious future. >> could you comment? as a guarantor of the regime

assad is the glue holding it together. >> aligned straight from the russian iranian playbook. that is the iranian national security advisor, has lied to me word for word. word for word. >> does not automatically mean it is wrong? >> no, but our analysis is that this is one side of the story. assad plays a role in the regime structure. >> shared by the people who gave us evidence. >> i mean,, the committee will look at the evidence. >> the committee will take evidence from experts. it should do so. now your asking me for my opinion and the british government's position and i'm giving your political judgment that we cannot work

with assad in anything other than the very short term of the transition command we have indicated the russian and iranians, if there is a sensible plan for transition, ae remaining in some way involved in the process, we will look at that and discuss it. they are not saying he must go on day one categorically. of course we will be pragmatic in a discussion with them. but we will not concede is that he should be allowed to be a contender for a future major role in the new syria. >> just turn to the practicality of the policy. is it correct the number of free syrian army and the western alliance, in the civil war, the united states and others is actually

frighteningly small. we have been given a number yesterday, we completed the training, some of whom are already dead. >> i don't think that number is correct. it is a small number, but my collection is that it is thousands him. >> you were leaving the committee saying that it appeared to be a sustainable strategy in syria. do you now accept that this does not actually appear to constitute a credible and adequate's policy? >> long-term it has taken us longer to get off the ground family would've likedthat we would've liked to do, but it is now underway. it is -- it requires the cooperation of turkey to be

successful, i think. and as i said earlier, turkish policy on syria is evolving as we see turkey being much more engaged in the syrian problem, but problem, but in a way which is particularly pursuing its own agenda. >> return to the international coalition. can we set forth and make the coalition more effective? >> the 52 nations. >> to counter isil? >> yes. >> well, the process is the same as it was. there are number of working groups dealing with different aspects, for example countering the isil/daish machine which is

beginning to work. that is co- led by the uk and the us in the uae. there is another group working on finance flows. these are three strands of work, the military operation which you are aware of coordinated by general aaron all of that is continuing. >> this is not going to happen overnight. they have always been clear about that. looking at those competing parties inside syria, with the success, would it be any more desirable? >> let me ask the question a different way. we would not regard success

as a satisfactory or acceptable outcome. if i was put on the spot to rank the horror living under isil control, i would have to think quite hard about that, but both would be unacceptable to us, and we have made that clear to any of our partners in the coalition who have been inclined to think otherwise. >> so what is your view? a coalition which includes -- >> well, it includes other parties as well. we recognize the situation on the ground is not as we would like it to be. it is complex. sometimes compromises have to be made on the ground and tactical compromises.

the history of warfare is that you have to make tactical compromises, but we would not regard a strategic alliance as being an acceptable way forward at all. >> the complexity of the situation in syria, isn't this an area where british diplomatic capabilities, our capacity to coordinate combined with unlimited hardware, software, diplomacy is one of the nation's main efforts in bringing others together for a coherent strategy. >> it is part of it. i do not agree with the 1st part of your analysis there. in iraq we conducted more airstrikes than any other coalition partner apart from the united states. our surveillance and intelligence gathering assets in syria are making a

very major contribution. again, i would say 2nd only to the united states. we are playing a significant role in the military and intelligence part as well. in terms of working on financial, we have expertise in predicting clandestine financial players which again i would venture is 2nd to not. ..

constraints in syria and if there's no immediate threat to the united kingdom? >> the coalition force that is are operating in syria are doing so on the basis of the collective i was of iraq and the challenge that the iraqi government is facing from isil in syria. >> so that would be operations against government of syria? >> not on that legal basis. different countries, of course,

have a different approach to their analysis of legal basis for action and famously the united states has the legal approach for justifying action. >> i'm sure you think about when you're going to come to parliament to seek authorities to operate, you might be able to tell us when you expect it -- the authority. >> the overall strategy, we go back to the last. being a part of the campaign against isil which at the moment

is confined to iraq. we would see it as being driven by military logic, which says, you look at the enemy and you look at supply lines, support base and commander control, and those are the things that you want to attack. at the moment we are able to attack both in iraq, but not all of them because we don't have authority to attack those in syria. the logic of extending our mandate to cover isil targets in syria would be very clearly a logic in sports of the mandate we have in iraq for the collective defense. >> can i ask you how successful the policy in attacking iraq --

[inaudible] >> they give the impressions months ago -- it doesn't look like that. >> well, on the question general has always been were cautious about the timing. it's also true that the iraqis had their attention deflected. it would be next year that mosul can be charging for retaking. i realize to say something about general alan's view, just before

i do that, how successful do i assess the intervention in iraq? it stopped, dead. if we go back 15 months, 16 months, we were looking apparently unstoppable search across iraq or down river valleys towards bagdad appearing to be under threat to isil. coalition forced isil to change statistics from acting from a conventional army to a gorilla force, operating in small cells by night and making them less able to control the territory that they taken in a conventional manner and it has

allowed a breathing space for the iraqi forces to be regrouped, retrained and rebuilt. now, that hasn't gone as quickly as anyone would have like. in the meantime, it's holding in check, but we've been up front about the fact that it will merely hold them in check. it has to be iraqi boots on the ground clearing iraqi territory. >> i just want to update. in terms of the situation, if you look a city where isil about a thousand people have driven out of the city, you can see it now returning to something

approaching and so forth. there are still substantial military operation to retake and making progress albeit slowly because they are experts at ied's boogie traps. you could go quickly and lose a lot of people. there is still men fighting, which is really the extent of the conflict line and as secretary said, there is clearly a plan to retake but does require shaping operations. there has to be what iraqi forco be trained, leading to trained units appearing on the

battlefield. without wishing to overstate, it's certainly not an entirely picture in terms of retaking territory from isil. [inaudible] >> is free of isil and how much -- >> the city itself is under isil control. but the city is -- nobody is claiming otherwise than the mosul is still under isil control. [inaudible] >> iraqi army or -- >> isn't possibly iraqi army. it's a separate force. they have made clear that why

peshmerga will act in the area adjacent to mosul it is not likely to take parton assault. it would have to be carried out by iraqi forces. >> yesterday a discussion about future for syria and some -- how do you see that? >> that would be great. the reality is -- humor to a diplomatic -- >> it has been working on. there is a bit more difficult to implement on the ground when there are so many parties involved and so many shifting

alliances to, you know, earlier on. frankly, best sellers coming together, tactical alliances particular towns or city that have been threatened or assaulted and it is a very fluid and complex situation, and i'm afraid the prospect of achieving cease-fire is further away. >> ho do -- how do you think the turkeys on the kurdish in syria and also the iraqi --

[inaudible] >> well, the turkish attacks are in iraq, not syria. clearly this is an additional and cig -- significant complication to the situation. the military people have ought thought that the involvement of turkey would be key to resolving the situation in northern syria. the fact that turkey has an agenda, which is differently, frankie from the agenda from any of the others, they are focused on their own tensions with the kurds. it is a complicating factor. it's just one more complicated factor. each one players has a different set of agenda.

we cannot do together accordingly. >> there was an independent of drone strikes. who is -- >> who made the statement you were referring to? i mean, the situation is that we have a very robust process of any subtraction that the prime minister made clear on monday, and then there is a whole set of rules of engagement.

once it moves the whole set of rules have to be complied with and there's a rigorous process for monitoring that and for setting outcomes. that's -- that's how it would recollects in the minister defense. i'm sorry, i'm not sure what was meant by -- i'm not sure who said it, first of all. i'm not sure what it meant by independent -- i'm not sure. >> i'm trying to find out who said it. >> yes, thank you. with regards -- i'm pleased to hear you say that you would not deal with president assad. evidence that we have yesterday from some experts. the prime minister saying the

opposite and saying that we do need to engage with assad. my question is how quite sd the european union on this issue of whether or not we should deal with assad and you said that even the united kingdom might deal with in some transitional phase. it would be appalled by that, any engagement for our country with this brutal tyrant. what would that consist of? >> we don't have a proposition yet. the russians and iranians turn up tomorrow and say, an arrangement led by relations in six month's time, in the meantime they'll be an interim regime and the existing players will continue to play a role within that regime, i'm not saying we would accept that, but

we would be prepared to discuss that. we wouldn't rule it out. we won't say we can't contemplate such an arraigningment. we would have concerns that would need to be measured in place to ensure that the actions against syria population couldn't be continued and assad couldn't use that power to continue that campaign against the syrian people, but clearly -- there are two options here. either political solution or transition or there's a military solution. one force or another takes control. perhaps doing some things that we wouldn't be ideally comfortable but would get us to a better place.

what i was trying to convey in answer to the chairman's questions, is that we have not set opposition as being so ideologyically about the need to assad to go, some kind of short transition under international supervision couldn't take place. >> you said this, transition, a solution. [inaudible] >> basically victory and conceive victory. that's exceeding the idea that there would be a victory as

opposed -- the question about success. you said success in iran from the ground. is the complex -- in those two countries. now, obviously the question of the chairman -- [inaudible] >> how many thousands need to be trained and by when for victory for the side that we are -- >> we don't believe that a military solution is the way for it in syria.

there has to be a political solution. there has to be an agreement to a inclusive political entity to take syria forward into the future and it may well be the case, but some elements believe that military victory is possible. frankly, on the regime side, i rather -- regime has said publicly that level of ambition is holding the areas that it currently holds. it no longer spies to control or govern the whole country. that doesn't sound like believe in military victory. there maybe groups among the extremists that they believe that they can achieve victory, but we don't think there's going

to be a clear-cut military solution. the involvement o. russians, iranians, and now some extent the turks, again, suggests to me that it would be unlikely that anyone side will be allowed to gain clear military victory. solution has to be political. the challenge for us is how to deliver that. i agree with you that we're not going to get that by talking nicely to the players in syria, essentially this is going to have to be a decision made from responses of the key players in syria, and in particular iran and russia deciding to call the shots with the assad regime.

making clear that they have to be challenged. they can make a phone call. russia and iran can have a discussion today and make a phone call and change the future of this situation. [inaudible] >> the americans are doing it at the moment. the second thing, given the complex of the nature on the ground, how are our forces going to differentiate and the ground at the moment? >> i mean, i am concerned by in the line of questioning the repeated confusion between the challenge dealing with isil in syria and the wider problem of the syrian and civil war. if we see parliament's approval

in engaged in targeting forces in syria, it would be -- it would not be in order to play a role in the syrian civil war. these are two different issues. of course, isil is involved. >> yeah. >> but i don't envision that we would be wanting british forces, british air strikes to be getting involved in complex three-way fights in north western syria where regime forces and other syrian forces are involved. what we are looking at, particular, is commander in control around, where the organization is run from, supply lines running. we are unable to attack those

lines of supplies. we are unable to supply those commander control. the military logic drives us to believe that there could be utility in having -- >> but the americans -- >> the americans are able to -- yeah, i think we had a discussion in the last meeting. we are currently flying operations in syria and where we are identifying targets through intelligence mission, we are tasking u.s. to take action, that's inefficient and sometimes leads to targets not attacked, available targets not being attacked. it just doesn't make sense. if you have a military force comprised of different components and the different

components have different missions, some able to act in one place but not in other one, that undermines the utility of the force. >> you didn't say when you were willing to do that. >> i think the prime minister has made clear we are continuing to look at this question. we do think there are arguments for it, but we are clear that we require parliamentary and bring such a proposition to parliament when we are confident that the circumstances and the evidence that we can bring forth is likely to find favor in parliament. [laughs]

>> so just mr. philip on the question of mr. hendricks. you mentioned air strikes, the last time you were here you talked about the ground as well, i'm not sure where you see the boots on the ground coming from. i'm wonnerring -- wonder if you can commit to providing us an update where you see boots on the ground -- >> sir, i think we are confusing two issues. i didn't say that air strikes in iraq had been successful because of boots in the ground. i said it would hold the line. it was required boots on the

ground. in the ayes -- east syria, the ability to attack from the air in our judgment enhance the utility of the military mission. and in the end, the objective is to defeat isil, we have to get to the controlling. >> so will you bring something forward to parliament before we finally -- >> no, i can't commit to bringing something to tell you where, you know, how this -- how this campaign will play out in the long run. at the moment we are attacking an enemy in iraq and if we form a judgment, that air-base military operation, attack by

targets in syria as well, we would ask parliament for authority to do that. that's all i can say. [inaudible] >> yes. >> at the end of the last parliament, being imposed between 2010-2015 had been severe and gone beyond, capacity now is to be vanished.

but up to that 20% of your budget mark, if that's the case u we're talking about priorities, very difficult choices. latest proposed figures. >> first of all, forgive me, you'll indulge me, sir. itself is undermining national security and credibility and influence in the world. idea that somehow we do nothing, we have to deal with the situation to regain credibility.

we regained credibility. now that requires further tough decisions. i don't think it's any secret that we have been asked by the treasury to model 25% and 30% of all budget. we are going through that exercise now. that doesn't mean the cut of those amounts were all -- any amount between them will be imposed. but indicates that the range of option, treasury wishes to consider. >> in the previous discussion you talked about diplomatic services and you said it's the

crown jewel of capability. it's already less by the french. they only spent one-third of the united states state department. more like six times, maybe seven. and can you give us some idea in detail of how can you make further reductions on the scale of 25% or 20% and the figures you've used without significantly reducing the size of the diplomatic? >> yeah, first of all, let me make the point that we should be powd of -- proud of seeing

efficiency first. we've done a huge amount. when you compare the budget with the budget of the french, we operate in network roughly the same size, we do with fewer people, and i think we should be proud of that. we should be proud of the fact that we are operating more efficiently with fewer assets and i would be proposed to argue anywhere where we go head-to-head with the french. let me deal with your specific question. there are further efficiencies that can be made and i can physically identify them and can be particular focused in this area. there's always more efficiencies

technologies have changed the way you work has changed, the world around you has changed. there are further efficiencies that you could make. but we also have to look at lower priority activity that we would be prepared to sacrifice without inflicting damage in the organization. and this comes to the question of priority, to answer your specific question i used the phrase crown jewels and i'll use it again, the network and there's the policy, the ability to maintain the network at its current level and in the future and the ability to have a

sufficient density of policy making capacity here in london that we can lead the policy-making process across government and beyond is the key to the -- everything is subordinant in my view. one of the things that we will be doing is looking at how in any given outcome scenario with spending review, we would manage the impact of that in a way that protected the network and protected the central policy-making capabilities. >> in recent years a significant reduction in the numbers overseas. >> yeah. >> do you think that that can go much further? >> no. >> no. >> i believe as much further --

we have only two uk based. but we are pretty close to the reducible minimum. >> therefore, you would agree, perhaps, increasing and can't go much further and capacity to fit into the resources -- [inaudible] >> i think the innovation of expanding was the right thing to do. i think it's been successful, and do make a huge contribution. just to share with the committee, it surprised me. when i first heard the term

locally engaged staff,i thought it's people from the population, what i discovered a very significant proportion of locally engaged staff, british nationals that happened to be living in the country, perhaps the family lives there or the staff is working there or sometimes people who have gone there to be employed is not on london terms. [inaudible] >> that really helps our country . now, on the question if you try -- does that mean you're actually talking about reducing the number to continue a process of example to produce significantly in europe over the recent years.

>> i would hope not. we may wish to look at some of the sub subordinants. we have to be flexible about this. the last place we would want to go is reducing principle. >> is there a special processor

special unit, are you asking some particular individuals or groups given the international priorities shift, a place that you see 25 refugees? >> one of the things that we already do and have to do is the ability to search functions and within the foreign office in london, the reality is priorities can change and change very rapidly and we need to be able to respond in a way -- >> can i ask you another area of your budget? is that one of the areas that you may well be getting rid of?

what will the implications if you do for the branding and identity? >> but it has been generating an increasing proportion of the resources that it needs to do that. i should -- i should have said earlier that, of course, the exercise of the treasury asked to do is in relation to none other departmental resource budget. the older resoue budget is in a different category because the amount is able will increase. >> you said the local government -- >> some of it will be spent in support of refugees being rehoused in the u.k. during the

first year in accordance with rules. what this means, is that a further reduction in none funding and looking at the options for the british council to spend overfunding. what will end up, i don't know if it will happen in this review or future review, what will probably end up with the british council that does not receive -- with a much larger proportion of it being open. and that will mean that the british council will need to generate its nonoverspending from the recyclable resources

when using. >> what do you accept the danger overrelying and steer the direction rather than having a strategic view, which you wouldn't done if you had the resources that were targeted and protected in that way? >> i think what we have to recognize is by making a decision to spend of that gdp, we have made a decision to focus resources on other eligible countries. that's the decision we collected. >> i'm not talking about the department development. if it's relying on overfunding to fund certain things, does

that shift the focus of the priorities of your department? >> well, it clearly we can only do funding to do things in eligible countries. it's a new stream of funding available to the foreign office to address priorities and many of the challenges that we're dealing, particularly conflict and stability-type challenges do present themselves in eligible countries. the funding was taken away from your budget and was given through the responsibility of the bbc. as a result of that, it's now responsible for funding for service. as you know, bbc is going

through a very difficult with you, and i was struck that the new director of the bbc on monday implied that he might be seeking public funding to support new services including a russia, other services, have you had any discussions with the treasury about whether, in fact, it's going back to the question of funding world service and the decision that was taken two years ago? >> no. i don't think that that would be a discussion that we would be likely to have. it maybe a discussion that general of bbc has had. i don't know. i suspect that would be the

correct channels. >> a position where part of the funding for the world service would come from bbc and part my come for some new services, language services as was the previous -- >> it's not incon -- inconceivable. we're not exactly looking for new business for funding from the foreign office right at the moment, but it maybe that the bbc has ideas to work up proposals and certainly entitled to do so. the way it's funded, the scope and extent and direction and alignment of the world service agenda is an important subject that we need to consider, the

bbc needs to consider. i think the director generals intervention with a helpful step in that. >> evidence in the last parliament we actually asked your predecessor a question about the korean language. at that time the view that we got is not a very positive one. political problems. and do you have a view about bbc should be -- >> if there was no resource constraint, i think that bbc is generally speaking around the world a very highly valued resource. it is maintained the reputation for impartiality and i would

always to see bbc service in a country in a local language rather than not -- >> so that's, a yes? >> so if you ask me whether i thought it was a top priority, i would have said that, because i suspect that there are other channels of information being broadcast into north korea, including i'm told just having come back from there, widespread availability of south korean domestic broadcasting material albeit is illegal to receive it no north korea. it is not unknown for people to i -- iligally receive broadcast.

>> having interviewed literally hundreds of british sme's. there are -- there was a great deal dissatisfaction from ukti. with all the issues of budget for the foreign budget, can ask you for your evaluation of what changes, if any, will be made to ukti in terms of funding, structure and accountability. >> well, ukti is separate.

the new is conducting a review of how it operates and making recommendations. we will look at those and consider them across. we recognize that there's a need to change the way ukti operates. we look -- we look enviously that some of our competitors have in foreign markets, on changes of commerce. >> okay. >> therefore, we don't have the density the chamber of commerce network and we don't have the level of facilitation.

but looking, part of the work of this commission is comparative study of how competitors support businesses including small and medium and enterprises and very much recognizes that there needs to be a reform to make ukti work terms of encouraging uk enterprises to export and encourage them to take the plunge into the market and downstream, working effectively around the world to role the pitch and identify specific market opportunities the british companies can explore.

[inaudible] >> i'm sure that you will agree that the refugee crisis we have seen in the past days, a european problem, we are working with european partners on these issues. distribute 130,000, 120,000 from previously. will the uk taking part of that meeting and you will be traveling to that meeting? >> we will not be -- we will not take part in the system that is being proposed. i'll do my best to answer. we make clear we will not take

part. we have doubts about whether it's the best response, and we have, however, as you know, made a separate commitment to take a significant number of syrian refugees, 20,000, and to take them directly from the place where the most vulnerable are around syria. we are not convinced that simply reallocating the fit and the able who get through what is a pretty brutal of making their way from syria to europe is the best way to deliver humanitarian response. what we are proposing to do is to take 20,000 of the most vulnerable, those who perhaps are not able to make that

heavy-risky journey to europe, to take them and offer them a place for safety here. we still believe that for the majority of syrians and for the sake of the future of syria, the response in most cases is to provide generously support to those people. if i may, take the opportunity to pay transcribe out of the generosity of turks, lebanese, jordanians who have taken thousands of refugees and this burden for many years now and we should be proud of what we have done to support them. we are the second largest after the united states, we just

increased the level of our spending by 100 million pounds to a billion pounds. we continue to believe that supporting these populations close to place of origin in the hope that we will resolve, that there will be a new syria to rebuild. we should encourage these people to be part of syria's future, leaving the future syria denuted of the citizens. >> i think i'm -- i speak for other colleagues, but the generosity of the people of jordan, lebanon and turkey taking people in their homes. i'm glad that you mentioned that. let me just focus on the european issue for a moment.

i mean, are you saying that if we have, you know, 160 refugees in europe, it's not a problem to deal with those already here? >> we want to work with european partners, of course. >> yeah. >> but it's about how we can best contribute. 160,000 are already in europe are by definition sent. they're in the europe union. they will be protected in the european union. we are taking people that will not make their way to the european union and to offer them protection in the uk. we think it's a humanitarian response. we also think it avoids creating

-- suggesting that the announcements would have been made about reallocation of people around europe are generating a new towards europe. a message that the door is open would drive the people traffickers with further efforts. we have to be careful and responsible that delivers effect to those who need it more, rather than those who perhaps need it less because they are already in the place of safety. >> i mean, isn't there question -- in relative terms a rich european country, are relieving our colleagues in hungry, rather

than -- [inaudible] >> of course, we want to work with that european colleagues. the huge bulk of refugees will end up in germany, because germany has a generous and we want to work to try to ensure an orderly preface in europe. if we can help to support of border security arraignments, of course, we will. if we can work with european colleagues, we will work with european colleagues in addressing problems in syria. it's a particular issue there. the majority of migrants in germany are from the west.

we can absolutely work together with european union partners to address the drivers in upstream countries. >> and on the issue of the 20,000 -- yeah, on the issue of the 20,000, you announced the action last week, and it's welcome but looks like it's just a start to take more. is it just a start? >> 40% of refugees from germany came. the prime minister said, i thought very clearly on monday, although challenged many times,

in the house, that he thought that the number of 20,000 was about right. he thought that we got it about right. that that represents a response -- [inaudible] >> i tend to agree with him. >> 20,000 isn't appropriate -- >> you're falling into the trap i said earlier, that what we are doing in supporting refugees in the region is equally important. i think a response that say, we will be the largest european to provide safety and support in the region, and we will take 20,000 of the most vulnerable, these will be women, children, people that are sick, people that have suffered particularly

trauma and we will bring them here and deal with their needs which sometimes will be complex. i think that is a more measured and generous response than simply saying, we will take young men, something like half, education. we are dealing with the deal humanitarian crisis here. >> let me just finish up. you see it equally important. but you say equally important. this is still an important part i don't think it's unfair that the u.k. is now playing european context, 25% over the next five

years. [inaudible] >> the organizations, other groups among the u.k. to do more. [inaudible conversations] >> you know, i totally see where you are coming from. the good-will that it's based upon. but i have to say that i think on this the prime minister -- your effort is designed to help many, few, by helping people, you know, in that area. >> we can certainly -- we can certainly help a lot more people by helping them in the region

than we ever can in europe. there are some people, this is the u.k.'s position. there are some people that need to be brought here because they are particularly vulnerable, and that's what we are now committed to. there are others that can be supported in the region, but we are seeing across europe, its people, who's of whom who are by definition, you know, not the most vulnerable but been able to get themselveses from the region to europe. ..

would need to be healed and dealt with. we have aa capability to do that here in a way we could not in the region. i'm afraid i think we have got the balance. while they're clearly is plenty of scope with different views, we have to make a judgment, and the judgment we have made is that accepting 20,000 of the most vulnerable here while stepping up a program of providing support in the region is the right balance. >> some years ago i went undercover in a refugee ca