>> i'm fascinated by by but i'm just not satisfied with how we are india. i realize limitations once again to what you said. let me just frame it differently

perhaps to what's a little more comfortable. what i would love to know is the debate that is happening, is it a typical, i know it's not a useful description, moderate versus hardliner or is is happening within the hardline camp? this is all extramusical for everybody. >> the debate as i mentioned is between across the board. you can find on the hard-liners, revolutionary guard, foreigners, think tank, policymakers, professors at university. they are all debating it to think tanks about this policy. what should be done? generally, the government is a supporter. not everybody in the government. personally i have debated with them that they support it. key positions in all of these places, but as i mentioned the general, use the first one but i

know means that's the own do. i should mention to you mentioned a good point. i said the indication of what i said is in the actions. if you see in practice iraqis and iranians are not moving toward mosul, that's a good way of knowing the impact of the second group on the policy. okay, and same thing in syria. if you see the our places that the syrian government as well as the iranians are putting a strong fight, the places they don't care. it means the impact of the second group on the first group. so these are the actions and you can look at the indications. >> my question is related to

what you just discussed and i would like to hear from both the of because i suspect he would have different views on this. but it seems to me that two of the individuals within iran the firsthefirst sort of personify a face on iran's two different foreign policy camps is qasem soleimani. before the nuclear agreements that is basically have the nuclear profile, soleimani has and continue to have the original file. now, post deal it seems the rouhani camp there capitalizing on this sort of political success and having a free range, you know, seeking diplomacy within the region. now my question is to what extent they think that zarif and rouhani have, whether they are actually testing the waters for actually exceeding restrictions

and coming up with some sort diplomat solution within the region, you know, achieving iran's objectives in the regions, or whether they're sort of transport tools on putting lipstick on the involvement in the region, or whether this is just an act? >> they are not all that fundamentally different. basically qasem soleimani, the way he has been perceived, very powerful individual, like superman. that's not the case. in fact, he's a very pragmatic man and was a relatively good sense of situation on the ground, but the most important, the key factor to bring to your attention is these decisions are not being made by any one

individual. they have an institution called supreme national security council. all of them, they are all deaf. they debate all the issues. major issues basically. they debate it and once the decision, once the decisions are made, they will be implemented i everyone. so in that institution, they can be more powerful than both zarif and qasem soleimani. former commander of navy and very key figure in the revolution in iran basically, can be argued more powerful than both of these men regarding the regional issue. rouhani ifr is exercising more influence on regional issue than anyone else. and also this is not something

that qasem soleimani would do, only report to the supreme leader and to make the decision, or soleimani by itself makes the decision. it is not the case. basically will be discussed and debated and finally make a decision. to the supreme leader has the authority legally to veto the decisions, but normally i can almost a 98% of the time he would support the decision which has been made by the supreme national security council. it is not a one man show. zarif was a negotiated. he was not making the decision. the decisions about the right length, what is acceptable, what is not acceptable, those decisions have made somewhere else. not in the foreign ministry. >> i could not agree more. i will share with you recent conversation i had with a senior

rouhani official about this false dichotomy. he said the iranians are incredibly smart. they show the world that is actually a dichotomy in views between practice. but in practice everyone is working harmoniously. perhaps not as well but it is not within the system so fractional and factionalized as the world would like to believe. >> the gentleman over here. >> i'm from pakistan, a journalist, so i've a question to nasser. that deal is finally approved by the congress, it is a fear in the middle east that it will fuel arms race in the region. so because it will also tantamount to recognizing iran as a nuclear power, so how would

you respond to that fear? >> as i said i guess, i do not agree with you that would lead to a arms race. in fact, the reason that we have an agreement is to prevent an arms race. there was a possibility, when used discuss the alternatives, the alternatives were not all that attractive but it was a military attack that would have gone on to iran weaponize is program. and weaponization for sure we know will lead to an arms race. but, in fact, that would stop any arms race if you mean basically nuclear arms race. but for arming ourselves, as i said, we do not -- we do not have all the resources and we don't need that type of an

armament to be able to defend ourselves for the future. the type of threats which we are facing is a different kind. it is not a country to country war but we need to have a good weapons or whatever that's the topic of the thing which we have. and we'll basically that the deal can help us to concentrate more on the region and to stabilize. and one more thing about the stabilization. the first group which are pro-stabilization, in fact they would love to go all the way if it demands a need to cooperate the saudis with americans to stabilize the region, said they are open to it and would love to adopt the measure to stabilize the region. that's the type of threat we are worried about it now in tehran.

>> thank you very much for the talk. i have a question for you. he kept mentioning iran is a threat to the saudi but could you be more specific, what are the specific threats to the national security of the saudis that's coming from iran? and my other question is that it seems that, correct me if i'm wrong, that the saudi government is a very close, tight, political structure they've had this for century. it seems to me from outsiders that they are more afraid that this thing eventually will collapse and that's what they are afraid of rather than the threat coming from iran. so correct me. thank you. >> i wish we had actually an official representative in many other gulf states to speak here because a lot of things, i'm speaking on their behalf them which is cleanup the case. i will always be viewed as an analyst. so he asked me what is the

threat coming from iran to saudi arabia. as i mentioned earlier, the threat is not direct. the threat is in direct for the proxies they support throughout the region. both countries would seem to be the main adversaries in the region have vested interest in a number of theaters whether it's in lebanon, whether it's in iraq, syria and others and each one backs its own proxy. therefore, unfortunately in many ways this is seen as zero-sum. the most immediate if you were to push me, security threat humming from iran to saudi arabia is what is going on in yemen and how the saudis perceive their backing of the houthis under the allies is contributing to the big degradation of the nation state of saudi arabia. that seems to be the most eminent to do physical proximity threat to saudi arabia. what goes on in lebanon as you very well know, iran supports the most powerful actor in lebanon which is hezbollah in many ways, have the lebanese

population if not more sees as a major detriment to the stability of that country, rydquist saudi arabia has had it's a vested interest in lebanon for quite some time. perhaps the biggest damage that this happened in saudi interests, they could interest as well happen with the assassination, no secret about it. a huge implicit knowledge in the region that those were behind the assassination, the iranians and syrians, whoever they pulled the plug, it doesn't matter. iraq, the same thing. to go back to repeating the same thing over and over again. it's never been a direct confrontation between the two. it is an asymmetric a confrontation that is conducted through proxies. >> thank you for the terrific panel. i wanted speech i did not sorry respond to the saudi state collapsing. maybe we'll get to that, time

allows. >> i want you to answer something that was asked, the iranians have emphasized after the deal focusing on the region, even the deputy prime minister has said there may be iran gcc talks soon. by understanding is they have been scheduled yet. why haven't we seen this dialogue begin? is at the gcc or saudi side that is reluctant to engage? >> the reef traveled to zarif traveled to kuwait and qatar byt the saudis are reluctant. in fact, i know for a fact they have tried to approach them several times, for revolution, to do with the region issue but they are reluctant to they have their own perceptions come as an agent, personally it is hard for me to convince them otherwise.

they have made up of the mind and no matter what is happening in reality, they have their own perception and it's hard to practice but as i mentioned, no matter how much u.s. we tell them, we are not perceiving it as a but they perceive us as a threat. we are also a convenient enemy for them. i don't see any reason why they have to quit very quickly some major things happen in the region that they may decide, then they decide to come and to work, to cooperate with the others, to handle or to contain their insecurity in the region. >> i don't think it's a useful order to try to understand one threat perception and completely disregard the other. i think that, at the primary significance of this debate really. a set of useful conversations

between these two heavyweights is long overdue. it's ridiculous how it has been, and nasser obviously blames the saudis are now being ready for it. i think the conditions are right for you. i think the saudis would be doubly interested. >> i know what, i think they're waiting to see if assad collapses and they will say that it is hard to do and negotiation right now. right now let's negotiate to come up with a solution. >> does iran have a practical solution if assad falls? army, there is more pressure on us forces and a longtime. >> the point is the analysis in tehran is a collapse or the removal of assad as a vision would lead to the collapse of the regime and collapse of

regime will create more chaos that no one interest is going to be sick. the point is right now to negotiate for transition, for assad to be removed or to leave the office, two, three years down the road. in other words, i cannot be a precondition for the negotiation. that should be the result of the negotiation. the consequences of the negotiation but that's not the way the saudis we perceive. that's entirely another issue. my point is, in fact, that's my perception come on baby run. it tomorrow assad this is okay, i'm totally fine with you, i love to subject myself to welcome they will have no problem with assad number how much crime is committed. the point is they are fighting in syria. they are fighting, not assad. but as. that is the point.

they are not fighting saudis in syria. >> the gentlemen here. >> nasa, bill jones from executive intelligence review that i was one if you could say something about the changing threat perception in iran given the very dramatic changes in the international situation. for decades of course this was the u.s. versus iran. the u.s. policy was to isolate iran if they couldn't get a color revolution it would isolate it. but that isolation has been broken partially by disagreemens agreement but also by the change if he international situation but i will point out three things. china's role in the middle east, the promise of the silk road economic belt which is going to accomplish iran as well as the arab countries and china will be playing a more important role there. we saw that putin now is sending troops to syria. i don't think because it's simply a power move on his part but that there's also a concern that the whole thing spilling

out into chaos, and he wants a different trajectory. he has gotten support from europeans on the. the u.s. is critical in setting the usual thing but europeans are saying maybe this is what we havhad to go to get a diplomatic solution. and thirdly, the change from europeans given the refugee situation where not only did they decide to take in refugees but also critical voices being raised about the u.s. and the policy in the region that has cost the. that's a different ballgame that we are working, i a different world we are working in. how does that reflect and the perception come into threat perceptions in iran? >> very shortly they said they had been vindicated, they would say okay, that's exactly our argument. they feel, in other words, they feel you have to continue the tough policies which we have had. but they are simply applying the reality this as i mentioned

there's not just one group in iran. there are debates and they feel that okay, you know, in other words, the agreement, this is part of, the agreement would give us a good chance to play a different role. it would give us a chance to be they secular or died. was able to secular ties iran did run a former president ahmadinejad. they would be able to pass a number of resolution at the security council. hopefully now, still they can basically move toward that. hopefully normalization and then we can do with the regional issues, and as you mentioned,

particularly with china. china be considered as a rising power. we're debating more and more about china, no longer as a factory and we as a market. china is being perceived as i strategic player in the world. because no longer the energy security for china is going to be, is going to be taken as granted. in other words, they have relied on the u.s. to provide security for their energy. as a rising power, possibly in 10 years, china is going to be the biggest economy in the world. so china wants to be sure about the energy security. in other words, that's why they are going to be in iran, not just only seeking the market or we look at them as a factor, but rather to seek a sort of a

strategic partnership. so we are in the midst of a lot of debate about china. china's role in the future in china's role in iran. >> john, did you have a question also? >> john from u.s. naval academy. my question is really about these debates on both sides of the persian gulf. and my question is, are there voices in these debates that are advocating for better relations with the neighbors? in other words, saying look, whatever our problems, these people, these others, they are our neighbors, they are not going away. and we shared a culture in which your history and we share a

religion. and, therefore, we need a change the existing situation, which is not in our interest. >> john, as i mentioned, you know, to report to you, not an analysis, in think tanks in tehran, we don't even consider saudi arabia as an enemy. we don't see them as a threat, they design strategies, okay, how to deal with them. we consider them exactly as a neighbor. rethink web to improve -- you know, the last two years the situation is different but even the last two years hardly find a voice which is a no, we should have a good relation saudi arabia. what is even hard-liners, rafsanjani, all supportive of better relations with saudi

arabia. rafsanjani want to go to in october he thought he had a very good relation and develop personal relationships are important and they can improve the relationship. but even today in fact he's ready to do that. there's a number of important forces within iran who are ready to take the initiative to improve the relationship with saudi arabia. as i mentioned it is very much one-sided. we don't consider them as any. why should we consider the weight or qatar as an enemy? but the other side is the true. the top of the threat list. in other words, we are at the top of the threat list. in fact, you know, i once personally was talking to the national security advisor, you know, he is heir.

i said why did you travel to this country? you know, in fact to improve the relationship, because of the same language. you may be able to give them more confidence that okay, we are not considering or perceiving you as a threat. but what we do not affect the time to arrange not take initiative. surely we have to, to take initiative to put to rest the concerns about us as a threat but it is not going to be easy thing to do. as i mentioned now, in particular the last two or three years, we have become a convenient enemy. there has to be a reason why they have to believe it. >> you asked about the arab -- >> sure.

>> a quick follow-up. i'm from the wilson center. what john ask you, don't you think that the animosity goes back t when ayatollah khamenei started talking about the saudi royal family as a legitimate presence to look after the holy places, number one? number two, i think it was during the iran-iraq war with all of the arab countries, except for serious, supported saddam -- except for syria, supported saddam? and my question is why did saudi arabia wait so long to send an ambassador to iraq? number one.

number two, when the a ring is got involved with hezbollah, the initial state, why didn't the saudis get involved? money always speaks. thank you. >> that's a good boy. that's a good point but that was for the first decade of the revolution. we got over it. we said all the stuff after that we had a better relationship with them, particularly on russian johnny. -- rafsanjani. historically are right. also there's maybe a negative view against one another. but if we put aside even though stuff. those are not reasons why we should have a better relationship. as i mentioned that there is, we have to look at the actions can not just the rhetoric. it look at the action, the gcc was formed as you mentioned not against israel. it was formed against iran.

they supported all along i rocky in the water after all these animosities and after what about your writing, i mean, at the beginning we didn't even call them saudi arabia. we call them had jobs we did want to recognize the saudis. -- hajabs. after which things change and we cannot explain the current behavior on the basis of what happened in because we've had a number of other we that much different relationship after those years. >> nasser, you speak with much confidence and candor. it's really something to admire. if you were to go to court with a legal case such as yours, i think the judge is going to part-time really to continue.

you have to understand regardless of how valid and true iran's claims are today, that country has tons of explaining to do to the rest of the world. it's not enough to be right if it is, in fact, that you are right. you have to explain it to the committee of nations around you that simply just do not believe what you are saying. the problem is also that there's tons of evidence actually that goes against what you are saying. everybody wants a 2 billion what you were saying, but it's really hard to. on the arab side, john, you're actually interested in enhancing relations and creating a dialogue between both sides. it's always a mistake is because the gcc as one entity, right, and you know that very well.

at the top of that community of people who are actively advocating for a dialogue is -- and they've been doing that for a long time. never equate the saudis with the kuwaitis or the countries of the bahrainis that i think the kuwaitis are rather indifferent when it comes to relations with iran. it's not adversely but it's also not entirely positive. bahrain has a very difficult perspective when it comes to iran, and they are in an entirely different league for reasons of their own. i think qatar's relations with iran, and nasser, i think you alluded to, or drastically improving. to the chagrin of their neighbors. saudi arabia, we've been talking about it all day. there's no point. and nasser, you are exactly right, that perhaps the most

intense and adversarial relationship is between abu dhabi and iran, and both of them have their own reasons, as you very well said. dubai has fewer concerns about iran than abu dhabi. >> i know there are many more heads out there but were at an end. i invite you to stay and ask for the question if you have them, but i think this is been a very interesting debate that we've had on the iranian policy debate and i thank you very much for coming. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> the senate returns today at 1 p.m. eastern to continue debate on the iran nuclear agreement. their work on a disapproval resolution will come down to a procedural vote scheduled for 6 p.m. eastern. 60 votes are required for the

measure to advance. as always you can watch the senate live on c-span2. >> a signature feature of booktv is our all day coverage of book fairs and festivals from across the country with top nonfiction authors. here's our schedule.

>> turkey is holding its general election on november 1. next, a discussion on the country's political landscape with two triples and a university professor from istanbul. to talk about the influence of the kurds encouraged affiliates, the policies set by the incumbent president and the future of you is turkey relations. from the wilson center this is an hour and a half. >> good afternoon, everyone. thank you so much for joining us. i'm just waiting for our friends in the back to take their seats

and then we will be ready to start. my name is a david kenner is a david kenner, middle east editor at "foreign policy" magazine. we are all very happy to have you here at this panel at the woodrow wilson center's middle east program on the road to elections, turkey and the kurds. we have here doctor akin unver, assistant professor of international relations, and author of 9/11 -- "turkey's kurdish question: discourse and politics since 1990". amberin zaman, journalist who covers turkey for the economist, and henri barkey, who is the director of the middle east program at the woodrow wilson center. anyway we had a great discussion for you here today. thank you so much for coming and i think we will kick it off with akin unver. >> thank you so much. i'm really happy to be here.

i'd like to start this talk with really interesting anecdote i heard from bernard lewis. so at the beginning of world war ii, turkish ambassador to uk was summoned to come here, foreign secretary's office, lord halifax, and are basically trying to inquire whether turkey was going to join the allied side will remain not attached. so practically he says that we have big instability in our east. we have this eastern problem. at the time they didn't use the term kurdish problem for kurdish question. it wasn't eastern problem. we are worried this eastern problem will destabilize us in case we enter into war on either side. and so lord halifax says, yeah,

i've known about this eastern problem for a long while, so why can't turkey just resolve this issue just like we resolve the scottish question? question? why can't you resolve this issue the scottish way? and he takes a good pause and he says well, sir, kurds are not scottish. and while everybody is like, you know, right, he says the kurds are irish. so that point where we have kind of freezes. so in any case i think turkey's kurdish policy, or overall turkey's approach towards the kurds have since been what's bernard lewis told me as increasing the number of scottish courage, decreasing the number of irish kurds.

so practically has turkey been successful, unsuccessful, that's quite up for grabs. but basically what and when to talk about is in my recently published -- recently published book i spent a lot of time analyzing 1990s, the most violent days of the kurdish insurgents in turkey. i want to talk about how right now compared to the 1990s. more specifically what's the difference between 2015 and 1991 when the insurgency started? so a lot of analyses look to the start of the gulf war in the 1990s as a source of wide it's been such a chaotic and violent character in the 1990s. goal for, turkey opens up the airbase for western jets. saddam hussein decide to punish

turkey and launches a chemical attack or any other conventional attack. he attacks the northern iraqi kurds and driving into the turkish iraqi border that as a result of which have a large population shift together with the refugee crisis which ends up benefiting arguably the pkk but over all it into the eyes the security question. now 2015 we also have an extra territorial crisis which is the syrian civil war as with the emergence of isis and iran and syria. against a large population shift emerging from especially syria through turkey. a new refugee crisis that's worsening the crisis conditions in turkey. so as a result we pretty much look like in terms of structural settings, 20151991 are quite

alike. politics, what about politics? 1990s, basically 1991, there was a general election that produced the coalition government first time after a very long period of a single party rule. motherland party. 2015, again an election of june 7 which produces a coalition government after a long period of single party rule. one exception between 1991 and 2015 is that for the first time ever a political party rooted in the kurdish political movements as the 10% threshold which is the peoples democracy party, or hdp. so in a lot of ways 1991 and 2015 are quite alike as well in domestic medical setting as well. what about the complex? in 1990s that conflict was mostly about rural conflict,

clashes around rugged terrain mountain areas, out those and not one holds have substantial strategic influence. whereas in 2015 this clash is turning gradually more urban. you have different splinter organizations, armed groups that have popped up in urban areas in the predominantly kurdish areas that have diverted this rural mountainous come back into the urban setting, which means that now we have a setting in which there is more civilian involvement and also more potential civilian casualties as well. what about the pkk? in 1990s pkk was pretty much a monolithic top down entity with a very compact decision-making apparatus. in that sense turkey's argument

imposition throughout the 1990s was very clear. get rid of pkk's leadership and the organization is going to collapse. in 2015 we have a much different pkk which has decided to engage in splintering strategy, especially valid after the arrests and capture of its founding leader in 1999. 2015, pkk is much more different than the 1990s pkk in the sense decision-making is more localized, clashes and command is also more localized even though the central executive body is quite influential as well. main difference is the emergence of urbanized young cohort of localized leadership of the younger cohort is the kind of the breach between the pkk and the local populace.

but that local intermediary groups have also taken up arms and became armed groups themselves. so in the 1990s basically to defeat the pkk to to get rid of the leadership. right now to settle security question, the chaotic situation, you had to do with the issue locally and on a case by case approach. what about the turkish military? turkish military used to have a de facto control over all it takes and executive origins in the 1990s and it was the primary actor in my merry decision-maker on a very large component of most options on the kurdish question. and 2015 you don't have that kind of an influential military. it went through a very difficult process of arrests of

leadership, enter institutional mistrust persists along with mixed views on the ability of its political leadership to resolve the crisis. so there's also not a monolithic leadership in the military as well. now, what about social perception? in the 1990s, turkey society was fiercely nationalistic. near complete support for the military's handling of the conflict and belief that only full defeat of the pkk will result to resolve kurdish question, given the album people have access to conventional media. what happened in predominantly kurdish areas, operational areas, would rarely be communicated through mainstream media, and that's why people had imperfect information what was going on there. in 2015 they're still every nationalistic society, but this

doesn't translate right now into a near complete support for a military solution. part of this emerges from the fact that part of that nationalistic electorates now thinks that the peace process, even though it was imperfect, succeeded in creating an extended period of cease-fire and relative stability. so once people saw that they can actually happen, it divided social perception away from unilateral resolution of the question through military means. to the contrary, public opinion is divided along partisan lines. on the one hand, where people who are closer to the government argue that this new phase of clashes is 100% of the doing of the pkk and her decision to go to war with turkish state, where

as those who do not identify themselves with the government believe that this is a political kind of calculation, or political measurements that are in place in a way that the state and the government have decided to go into war. that's partisanship divides our society thinks about the kurdish question as whether on the one hand you have people who argue that peace process was doomed from the beginning and peace process should be shelved completely and military only solution should be pursued. the other part of the society argues that the peace process, although it was imperfect, with still going relatively well and the government is choosing to step away from a political

solution. so this is basically painting a picture on how 1991 and 2015 are similar and also dissimilar. so after painting this picture i'm going to give the floor to other speakers and complete this in the q&a session. thank you. >> great, thank you so much, try one. amberin? >> hello, everybody, and it's wonderful to be here today, and happy rosh hashanah those of you who are celebrating it. i want to start with 2012, which i think was a turning point in many respects when the kurds in northern syria, talking about kurds who are very closely linked or support the pkk to control over several areas along with the border and have steadily been expanding their

control ever since. and what the turkish response to that was. because the less we understand that dynamic we cannot really properly assess what's happening today between turkey and the kurds. in my view, what happened then was a great opportunity for turkey to advance the peace process. what turkey needed to do at that point i think was to extend a hand of help to these kurds to do what they finally did with the iraqi kurds, which is to develop economic and political relations with them. but instead of doing this as an opportunity, turkey chose to do this as a threat, and the reason is quite simple, as i said. because the kurds in that area happen to be very closely affiliated with the pkk. they perceive this as a national security threat and decided that what they needed to do was to

keep these kurds under check. and this is what underpins turkeys kurdish opening back in 2012. yes, mr. erdogan's ambitions were part of that equation but above and beyond all else i think it was a fact that turkey perceive this as a huge national security threat and decided that what they needed to do was to go off up through erdogan and some updating to keep the kurds of syria under check. and so that was what they were talking about. and as we saw subsequently, that somehow didn't pan out, that erdogan, rather than being able to keep them under check, somehow encouraged them or at least that's what was conveyed and what we saw with the steady progression of the kurds in northern syria.

and so when that plan failed, what turkey chose to do was then take it to support the other armed groups inside serious to fight the ypg. and we first saw that very clearly in the summer of 2013 when it was this battle for the control of -- where it was very obvious that groups like al-nusra and certain factions of the preceding army and others were being supported by turkey, and -- sorry. and that, of course, was also that that didn't work out terribly well because the kurds ended up taking control of that town as well. so that policy was obviously not working for turkey persisted in it, and we saw that in combining both recently.

and that was another turning point and a very big shock for turkey when the americans airdrop weapons and other supplies to the ypg. and that was what propelled turkey, in fact, to open a corridor to kobani. and, of course, once that was sort of adjusted in ankara, the decided what they needed to do then was to open because they do somehow get the americans on their side because they became very, very nervous about this deepening of operation between the united states and the ypg. so what we now have is this sort of understanding that the ypg won't go in the town. and to that extent you could say that turkey's policy of opening the town as a way of curbing a kurdish expansion has been

somewhat successful, but for how long. and many kurds in turkey believe that part of the key of opening the town was that turkey would get to attack its own kurds. that is, the pkk. and so of course the idea that you can have good kurds and had kurds, which is always been the case, unfortunately, that on the one hand the iraqis, sorry, the ypg, good kurds in the pkk are bad kurds and that the americans can maintain this fiction i think is very unrealistic. because in fact we all know the truth that however much pkk may be on the united states list of care organizations and, therefore, it has maintained that, in fact, the pkk and the ypg are one and the same.

this contradiction is going to catch up with this government sooner or later because while you call the ypg your alex sink you continue to condemn the pkk and say that turkey is justified in its actions against the pkk, which also have to realize is that there are many families inside syria, inside turkey who may have sons fighting both in the pkk and the ypg alike. when i was in northern syria and i went to the homes of people, ordinary people, what i saw on the walls were pictures of their children who have died fighting for the pkk but also fighting for the ypg against isis. so i think what we now have before us, actually another opportunity. the fact of american engagement with the ypg can be turned into

an opportunity. the united states can use its leverage with the kurds now to somehow revived peace process that is not completely shelved. and it needs to get turkey and the kurds back to the negotiating table because endless it does so, this isn't come it's going to be very destabilizing for turkey obviously, but also for the region. you cannot have this situation where you have turkey fighting the kurds, and not just the pkk. if you've been following what's been happening inside turkey in places like -- it's not just the pkk or the youth wing that had once described are being targeted, but ordinary citizens as well. this is having repercussions. it's having repercussions among kurds across the region. and so what needs to be done is for somehow for the americans to use this leverage as i said to

get the sides back at the table. because if you don't i think the cooperation from the alliance between the united states and the ypg will not be sustainable either. but you cannot have a situation where the americans are seen to be approving turkey's actions in continuing this alliance. because at the end of the day the pkk itself will start saying, okay, you want to go and get raqqa, you need the ypg's support, they will say if you continue to back turkey and its actions against as welcome we are not really sure we can do that. so i think that there is a great opportunity here, as i said, for the tiny. i think it has leverage over turkey because if it didn't, clearly turkey would not for instance, open either the quarter to kobani.

of course we also have to presume that a reasonable summit will prevail in over as well. it's a very hard assumption to make these days unfortunately. and what happens after the elections will be key. indeed, whether will have elections at all. but if we do have elections and if they are held free and fairly, then the question becomes what kind of government will we have put in a government, a coalition between the a.k. and mhp will be very unhelpful so we'll have to hope that first of all we do have these elections, that they will be fair and free, betty hdp will be able to participate, that people in the southeast will be able to go to the ballot box and that what comes out of it will hopefully be a coalition. obviously, the a.k. will continue to be the top party i'm assuming and that it will somehow make a deal this time

and that earned one look at his losses and they will make a deal with the chp are maybe even a hdp. that's harder to imagine. thank you. >> thank you so much, amberin. henri? >> thank you. i'm going to start in 2015. i'm going to talk about elections and the current crisis, and, in fact, actually built on both what amberin and akin talk about. clearly things appear to be spinning out of control intricate as a look at the events in recent times that it's not just the violence that we've seen between the pkk and the government. in fact, we've seen significant pkk attacks that have clicked significant casualties among the security forces. but it is also fact the government is not responding especially a government that is technically election government.

it is not necessary that government that is a party government that is supposed to be somewhat independent. in fact, it has members of the hdp in a. you have seen this government is taking various strict actions. we saw the stuff going on with the whole town has been under curfew for eight days. they lifted the curfew and reinstated it. you've had today the announcement that they hold a great number of television stations that broadcast in kurdish, one of the great aspects of the reforms introduced by erdogan, peace process to the people actually have television, radio stations and published and broadcast in kurdish. does have now been closed today by order number by the order of the supreme broadcasting authority. you have newspapers that are

being blocked from access. you can't reach the newspapers online anymore because they have been blocked again without any kind of order by a judge or by a court. so you have essentially an escalade situation in turkey that is becoming more and more one between i wouldn't say between turks and kurds, although it is significant but also between really a government, or a president and significant segment of the population. that's what it boils down to come and i would say that at the root of this is essentially the failed election results of june 7. on june 7 the akp for the first time lost its majority. lost its majority for essentially two reasons. one is because it was very clear that president erdogan wanted to transform the turkish system

from a parliamentary system to presidential system. maybe i'll a french system. there's a great deal of resistance to that among people. not necessary, this was not a kurdish. is issue but it became a wave for people, the way for people to express their opposition to mr. erdogan was to make sure that the kurdish party would cross the 10% threshold. and two things that we saw happen in these elections. one is that a significant number of what people called white turks, liberal turks, or maybe even not very liberal turks but who essential want to make sure that earned 1000 it is majority voted for the kurdish party. the other recent of course is that most of the conservative kurds in turkey or tradition have always voted for the akp, this time splinter.

this time for good. when you look at the kurdish forces historical they've always come most of the kurds have always voted, i declined percentage i was a voted for akp or akp predecessor. if you think about the other parties -- [inaudible] but there was a break and this 2015 election was the case where we saw these conservative kurds changed sides to was interesting of course is it that these conservative kurds are also very closely aligned in the krg. despite efforts to get the courage to vote for erdogan comp they didn't. why didn't they do? i would say there's one word answer for that kobani. in kobani when the turkish government made it very clear and especially erdogan made it

very clear he would rather see kobani fall to the hands of i.s., that was a psychological break between the kurds in turkey and order one. in a way i think that is the breaking point when it comes to kurds and heard one. because look, there's every reason why the kurds should be thankful to erdogan. erdogan has done more in terms of pushing the idea that turks and kurds can live in one country, pushing the idea that can be a peace process. he talked to the pkk. even if he did not mean to come even if his heart was not in it as we think, people now think is the case, the fact of the matter is that the major threshold was crossed that threshold was talking to the pkk, talking to the enemy. that is the point you can't go back from. in that sense is a very important threshold. there was every reason what conservative kurds who don't necessarily like the pkk would have voted for mr. erdogan and his party.

but kobani was a major psychological break. because erdogan came on television with great glee, made it clear he wanted kobani to fall. and the fact that the united states as amberin said, shifted sides to the student kurds also kind of gave the kurds a great deal of self-confidence. ..