i'll take the question on visual art you talk about upward bound the -- go ahead. >> just quickly, it really goes back to what the president tacked about not just upward bound but pell grantses at risk early childhood education they want to zero that out of the budget. as students, educators to not pit this program against the other but to hold folks in washington accountable for investing in education. we want to get results and not blindly investing but a lot of things in our budget upward bound being a piece of it that honor a significant danger in it that is fighting hard. some folks backing us but some see things, and i think it is so important that as young people, voters, family your voices be heard. he can not by himself prevent these cuts. it is not how democracy works so we'll hold us accountable in the

country, and we need voters voices, being heard saying we need upward bound programs and need trio, childhood programs and talk about arts a as well. >> look, the -- also make life worthwhile. right? [applause] it's -- you know, you need food, shelter, and you know all of that good stuff. but the things that make you laugh, cry, connect, love, so much of that is communicated through the arts. and you know, i don't want our young people to think that the arts are just something that you sit there passively and watch on

a tv screen. i want that everybody even if you're not a great artist to have the experience of making art. and had the experience of making music because that's part of what makes for a well rounded education. we also know that young people learn better if they're not just looking at a textbook and you know, multiple test quizzes all day long. and that it breaks up ma not and experience for the educational experience. i think you know visual arts, music, it is all important. and we should not be depriving young people of thoseç experiences and they're not experts. they're central to who we are.

ma whacks us human is our ability to make art. to represent what is inside of us in ways that surprise and delight people, and i don't uses to start thinking that that's somehow something we can just push aside. now i want you to be able to read. and be able to do your all algebra too but why this idea to choose between the two things used to be standard practice and there was no debate everyone in the smallest town, in -- it you know, poor community or rural community. there was always a the art teacher and the math -- art and music teacher and nobody assumed u somehow that that wasn't extra. that was part of it. just like having a sports program was part of it.

that's part of what a really rounded education is all a about. but it does cost them money, and that's something that i -- i want to emphasize that you can't do this stuff on the cheap all of the time. so -- how many more questions? how much more time we got? >> only one. i'll take two. [laughter] all right i'm going to get to you, don't worry because i promised -- i'll tell you it is a guy's turn. this guy right there.ç all right. [applause] >> all right -- okay. i got two short -- >> your name. >> marcus carter and i'm a senior.

[laughter] and out of all a of the schools in iowa, whyç did you come her? and after this, can i get a picture with you?ç [applause] >> now marcus, i'm going to answer your first question. [laughter] second question, though, if i start taking a picture with you look at this crowd right here -- i -- that we would be taking a lot of selfies, so i'm imposing the no selfie rule although i'll try to shake as many hands as possible. >> all right. >> we came here because some really good work is being done here. and i think that your teacher, your principal, superintendent deserve credit for the improvements that have been made. [cheering and applause]

well, i want to arnie travels to schools all across the country, and sometimes, we get so focused on what's not working that we forget to lift up what is working. and when a school is doing a good job, i'm sure that principal and superintendent and teachers here feel like they want to do even more, do even better. but when we've made progress, we have to acknowledge that because that makes us feel encouraged hopeful that we can continue to make more strides to barn knee. >> not a coincidence that we're here but a school that historically had struggled, had hard time, new leadership, new expectations, talked about technology here, talked about a much need sense of culture, dircht way of discipline. i go back to i don't know if i remember exact but couple of years ago you had two af classes

now you have 15. and now -- [applause] to go from 2 to 15 asis a big deal but students here aren't seven times as smart four years ago, it is a higher sense of belief among adults that is possible so we highlight places that haven't always been successful, but are trying to do the right thing and a move in the right direction. president said noç one is satisfied you feel hungry trying to do better but that's real progress. that's adults saying kids, students, young people deserve the opportunity to take college class in high school. deserve to go to a safe school, deserve to technology, i think that lots of lessons schools learn from the progress you're making here at a north high school. >> i promise -- >> i promised i was going to call on this young lady last.

go ahead. >> okay. >> what's your name? >> sonia from north high school, an my question is, if you legalize college, or twoç year college, is everyone including legal as soon as being able to get this benefit? >> well, right now the way -- no this is an important question. i know this is debate that has taken place among some of the presidential candidates. right now, the way that the federal student loan programs work is that undocumented students are not el l -- eligible for loan programs that's how the law is currently. and it is my view, well, two things i want to say. first, if you fall in that

category fill out the fafsa because it may be state, university, or college or private scholarship or other mechanisms so it doesn't automatically mean that you may not qualify for some benefits. so it is still important for you to kind of -- because that's the standard form that's used by everybody. but this raises broad or question that i've been talking about now for couple of years, and that is -- for young people who came here, that i recall parents may have brought them here, and they now are americans, kids by every other criteria except for a piece of paper. they may be your classmates, may may be your friends, they may be your neighbors.ç the notion that somehow we would

not welcome their desire to be full fledged parts of this community, and a this country and to contribute and to -- [applause] serve, makes absolutely no sense, and -- you know, this whole anti-immigrant sentiment that's out there in our politics right now, is contrary to who we are. [applause] the -- because unless you are a native american -- [cheering] your family came from someplace else. and although we are a nation of

laws, and we want people to follow the law and we have been working and i've been pushing congress to make sure that we have strong borders, and we are keeping, you know, everybody moving through legal processes, don't pretend that somehow 100 years ago immigration process was all smooth and strict and that's not how it worked. there are a whole bunch of folk who is came here from all over europe, and all throughout asia, and all flout central america, and all -- certainly who came from africañr who there wasn't some orderly process that -- you know where where all of the rules applied and everything was strict and i came the right way. that's now how it worked. but the notion that now suddenly that one generation or two

generations or even four, five generations were moved, that suddenly we are treating new immigrants as if they're a problem when your grandparents were treated like the problem or o your great grandparents were treated like the problem, or were considered somehow unworthy or uneghtsed uneducated or unwashed. no, that's not who we are. that's not who we are. we can have a legitimate debate to set up an immigration system that is fair and orderly, and lawful. and i think that people who came here illegally should have the consequences of paying a fine and getting registered and all kinds of steps that they should

have to take in order to get right with the law. but when i hear folks talking as if somehow these kids are different from my kids. or less worthy in the eyes of god that somehow they are less worthy of our respect and consideration and care. i think that's unamerican. i do not believe that. i think it is wrong. [applause] i think we should do better because that's how america was made by us caring about all of our kids. thank you everybody. i love you guys. ♪ ♪

♪ outgoing army secretary john mccue will speak this afternoon about the state of u.s. army, and the impact of sequestration over the past few years, we'll be live with his commence starting at noon eastern from the american enterprise institute. pope francis is coming up next week. coming up on krshes span president of catholic university will join a panel discussion on the pope view on capitalism and fits impact on povertyñr and equality. again that will be live on c-span, gets underway at noon eastern. the u.s. senate returns today to take another vote to advance the debate on disapproval of the iran nuclear agreement. senators gavel in at 1 eastern this afternoon that vote is set for 6 p.m. eastern today. we'll have live coverage of that

debate here on c-span. the house is back tomorrow. members are expected to debate airport security and funding for planned parenthood the house is live on c-span. setting the stage for c-span's new upcoming series, land cases, historic supreme court decisions, the national constitution center post a live discussion in philadelphia wednesday on the same cases we've selected for the series exploring the human stories behind these historic scixes. the distinguished panel is from yale law school, georgetown university law professor and solicit tore general and senior federal judge michael, u.s. district court for eastern court of pennsylvania. moderated by jeffrey national constitution center president and ceo that's live wednesday, starting at 7 p.m. eastern on c-span 3.

atlantic counsel held a discussion yesterday on iran's regional role after the nuclear deal. tehran professor and middle east peace and security initiative senior fellow shared their thoughts. thisthat was about 90 minutes. >> good afternoon ladies and gentlemen, i'm director of the south asia center here at the atlantic counsel on baf of my colleague and i would like to welcome you all today for a timely discussion on iran deal after the nuclear deal and welcome our live audience who is maybe watching at home. we sit at a critical juncture for iran, the united states, and allies and the entire international community. after over 30 years of relative isolation, and intensifying sanctions, iran may be entering a new phase in engagement by the joint reached it in july. at the atlantic counsel review the historic moment as holds in

opportunity. iran task force has served as comprehensive source on iran for bringing together iranian, regional, stake hold percent to task force has made significant strides in increasing our understanding of the jcpoa and investigating its gee political effects. until now we have primary heard prospects from outside iran object deal but today we're going to hear more about the deal from iranian perspective and learn more about iran intended role in the region and international community following the jcpoa. these view points are presented by a professor at the university of tehran. he's going to be joined by the senior fellow with our middle east peace, and security initiative of the center of the atlantic counsel, who is going to take a broader view of iran intentions the gulf of the middle use today's event is part of the iran task force which is chaired by ambassador stewart and led by senior fellow barbara i would like to thank for their

generous continued force of the iran task force and turn it to moderate today's discussion. >> thank you huma thank you for coming all own this beautiful day. once again i think our timing is reallyç excellent, and with apparently the congress it be to hold pits nose and allow iran agreement to go forward, one of the key questions is how will iran behave in the region? will it take additional funds from sanctions relief, and in the words of opponents march into añr fifth arab capitol? will it double down on more interventionist policies or not? and for that reason, we thought it would be very important to have a discussion and we are so lucky because as huma mentioned, we have a guest from tehran. dr. hudiaan professor at the political of law and political

science at the university of tehran. he's also served there as director of graduate studies, he's been a visiting professor and research scholar at the middle east institute and middle east and asian language and culture department at columbia university. he also held a prominent role at the center for straw strategic research close to president ruhani and area of scholar interest include iranian and contemporary politics and political islam ph.d. in political science from the university of tennessee and knoxville. and then we have our own, who is mentioned center on international security. balal has 13 years of working as advisor and corporate manager of the middle east he's a military and security expert with a focus on the --ç the arab state of the persian gulf. lebanon with a ba from the

american university of beirut and two master's degrees from the university of st. andrews and the university of maryland, and i recommend you an excellent paper that he did just a couple of months ago that dealt with the issue of containing quote unquote iran. i'm going to invite our guest to come up now to take a seat, and sort of begin with a question. so yes gee gentlemen why don't you come on up here. on the other side -- written a new paper that should be up on our website, so you can read it yourself but i'm going to ask him to discuss points in this paper and also to pose a question for him. a few years ago i interviewed a very --

journalist and he told me when i asked him about iranian influence in the region he said we're not going to stretch our legs beyond the capacity of our carpets. so my question to you nassir is how big is that carpet? [laughter] how big should it be? how big will it be? and what is the debate of the nature taking place in iran about iranian region policy in particular? >> let me -- thank you very much. i appreciate intro in writing to share my ideas with you involving -- the programç and the region.ç but anecdote you used. there's a time which the carpet much bigger, and, in fact,çó usd carpet every space in the room but the passion is carpet is in

the middle. but, of course, if i can say that --ç so i guess i can say basically it is not one view in iran not regarding -- regarding the region. and mentioned in reports which you can read it, you know, there are two views there. one view basically which called in sort of tourist stablization view, the one who calls for basically iran to be -- to be stagizing force in the region and produce security in the region. insecure on a statement, and it was fitting into hand and what you're seeing is at least we

have another problem, we have a problem with -- with refugee, drugs, narcotics, and worried about pakistan as well. particularly -- [inaudible] and rise of extremism there. but what about iraq and what's happening there, and also see lebanon to a lesser extent, yemen. so they argue that for next 10 to 15 years primary objective of foreign policy should be stabilizing the region and should be a country that basically produce. they argue we cannotç be an island of security and be dismissive of the insecurity that's the official view of iran

and that's the dominant view in iran. but there's an alternative view which recently is gaining more popularity in the policy, policy -- and in the think tank and if you find them at the university, among pundit that they would argue, you know, iran is already overstretched. you don't have anymore resources to allocate, and basically we are parting right now. we are the primary force in fighting with dyish. of course, the militia in iraq. and that's not our fight. basically -- they would argue why such a fight to make ourselves a target of the attack. if they have not yet attacked iran. is not because they're not capable of doing. but that it is they have not

made a decision to do so. otherwise this can easy -- and explodes bombs -- [inaudible] so why we have to do that? the argument is oil engagement should be minimal. minimal basically reduce vital and necessary -- meaning in iraq and damascus basically in syria. so if really interested to have representative of the government why we should -- at least let them have it. but afterall it is not all that much concern for us. it is going to be, if they confronted into power, basically that's going to be a threat, not

for us but going to be a threat for many. their arguments also because they know if they want to come to those, they have to fight and the fight is beginning to be a serious fight. and normally if you assume they're not totally crazy only partially, the territorial expansion could be to saudi arabia, with jordan, and yemen rather than going -- it [inaudible]ç so the second argument is basically we're better off to withdraw to make the engagement to the minimal level.

but the fast group arguments would be this isç somewhat naie that if you think that, you know, in the flonger term, we're not going to if face problem. going to be aç major threat if not in the short-term but a long-term they're going to be a major threat. but also the issue is important. what would happen in other words, i mean, if the south and courts will choose -- and independence and what would be your position? i can argue most important who has called for territorial integrity of iraq and syria, and supportingok arabia so if beyond theç draw from the integrationf the two countries are very easy

to imagine.ñr so this dominant view would say okay, what would position -- iraqi announced, or claimed independence what would be your position? special groups argument would be you know, we have good relations, we have good relations with courts and intelligence, and security and commission infrastructures. [inaudible] we can benefit from the situation, and they're not going to cause a major threat for us. but as i said, i mean, this group thinks it is naive argument, and, i mean, independence is basically opening inç the region. and then we're going to face an

entirely different -- different not just one, two, three but may claim for independence. it is not appropriate to basically put forth -- or accept independence of that independence of any one of the states. any of this independence. we have to present the territorial integrity of this country. stop here. >> thank you that's very helpful. most people in washington ring not even aware that there's a foreign policy to date going on in iran. now, as you have mentioned and written in your paper, the dominant view still in iran is that iran must be a force for what it calls, destagization. but of course you know very well that iran what calls stablization, arab countries

call medal or worse in arab countries so i'm going to ask you to get your analysis of the paper and how you think the iranian debate can be somehow factored into the debate that's going on in the arab world if there's a debate and if they haven't reached a condition collusion how to see iran activity in a less negative light. >> thank you. my wife tell me that my speaking skills have regressed i'm going back to basic with a few slides. two parts of this conversation there's iranian tensions and iranian capabilities so what iran wants to do, with and a regardless of what it wants to do what its capabilities are. i'll address both because i think they're important. the issue of iranian intentions is stilt question mark for me. i listen carefully to what he had to say and i read with great interest, the paper that he wrote. to me when i hear if a assistant debate i looked at two thing,

evidence of that debate. so news commentary, statements by iranian leaders, and even some reporting it be. also i look for a clear description of what the players are and what their views are. i did not hear that today. :

capability is very important because in the american policy debate about iran in its regional role, those capabilities are completely misdiagnosed or worse neglected. i would like to offer a little bit of nuance because it's important. never underestimate what iran can do in the region to it as its own interests. 1983 from a hobart towers 1986. ieds in iraq kill dozens of american soldiers. they are going to declassified pentagon documents. the iran-iraq war lasted eight years. at the end the other side which was heavily financed by the states and armed to the teeth and the last comment outside was the one on life support until the end of this life, saddam hussein. iranian nation survived very well. hezbollah, the most successful nonstate actor in the world, the

most disciplined all because of iran. hamas and islamic jihad. probably the most important security threat to the israelis. let me save lovely lebanon will not have a president unless iran's test though. hezbollah has no meaningful future without the decision of iran. the faith in serious future is a function of iranian design. israel's national security is a function among others of iranian design. gold security overhaul is a function of iranian design. iran has succeeded in entangling his main adversary at saudi arabia in a vicious fight in yemen. tehran has a dominant influence in iraq. the only actors i can credibly threaten his faces. finally there cannot be any

major wars about iran having a say in the door one of his surrogates. that's an iranian decision as well. because of these accomplishments, iran has considerable political bargaining power in the region so if you are sitting in tehran today to meet the bad start. the wars in which iran is involved today has a bullet is a single state and have failed to build peace. iran may have succeeded in bleeping it saturday at her scary, but that comes with a heavy price. that comes with a price of telling the world that it is supporting an illegitimate

militia that has revolted again and elected and legitimate president. the houthis today will neither reconstruct the country or help it achieve its political solution. the iranians have been successful in protecting trina levin and area and all the authorities in the world and perhaps causing the military overs -- for the arg see. the economist had a terrific piece about that and the risks were overstretched. there is some truth to it. on iraq, who said it was okay to give money to iraqi politics is clearly wrong. some of the most important and influential people today, rubber hasn't fired a very angry letter to its counterpart, ayatollah khomeini complaining about the

iranian handers handling of the iraq sunni politician, perhaps a later time and now handling non-with care. also has that the former commander is now back in action to hold him in check or perhaps just watch over his shoulders. there's also a price for awakening gulf and arab nationalism. because of this intervention and the reverse, anti-reaganism if that's a word i can use is at an all-time high in the world today because of yemen here i get military effect of ms., because of yemen, some learn how to which combat with the most important and powerful weapons on earth. that's never good news for iranians. with all the talk about iran's prowess in asymmetric warfare,

we have to remember the country has very modest capability is also. the iranian air force is irrelevant in any military scenario or in a dogfight with arab goal fighter jets. iran has considerable skills in land warfare due primarily to the iran-iraq war but if you think about the iranian military threat, the last thing you should be worried about is iran's link capability. territorial conquest should not be occupying the top of our list of concerns. iran missile arsenal is quite oppressive. it is not reliable. it is not precise. it's not as lethal as we think it is. moreover, adversaries have been not to be defenseless. they feel the most powerful missile defense systems in the world and the houston progress

of integrated missile defense is regionally. so in short, iran is very good asymmetric warfare, but whether it is on land or at the, the most it could do is create problems, not necessarily win wars. so let's put to rest any notion iran can close the strait of four minutes anytime it wants. it simply can't. in closing -- i know i've taken too much of your time. it matters less what iran's intentions are when we try to assess the countries regional role after the nuclear deal. what matters more is action and the speak much louder. those capabilities i describe are clearly not inadequate or inferior but they also do not

match their rhetoric out of washington and some of the arab goal states we are about to read is a rising regional hegemon on conquest and domination. that's simply not true. there may be debate in iran today. but i think an equally important is not far more important debate happening today is between iran and the arab goals dates. how it happens i don't know. it doesn't matter what it is. what matters is that should happen as quickly as possible. one thing we all have to keep in mind is that iran's policies are based on iran's threat perception and as you point out, iran feels the threat comes from the united states and israel and

its asymmetric policies in support of hezbollah are based on that. i would argue with that couple things bilal. it would continue because it's such a strong component of lebanese society. [inaudible] i am sure there are many who will love to hear what you said. they really think they have such a capability. the second part of your talk -- anyway, let me go over a number of issues. first of all regarding saudi arabia and yemen, they are all different.

the impact of demands on the institute is meaningless. to be frank, it is mostly the failure by gcc policies. of course i'm sure they would love to get the credit that this is the policy and yemen, but the reality is that few millions of dollars to be a quagmire. anyone who goes there will remain there. we are not under any illusion. no tendencies in iran are any under solution that we cannot do anything in yemen. if gcc with all the resources they have have not been able to stabilize the situation, possibly the fire, fire them in a forces.

you know, they say iran is basically meddling in the affairs. expect them to be frank from the saudis, but not from you. but because the difference between the perception is too far. [inaudible] very limited. but anyway, the gcc talk about to meet saturday's have been basically adopting the policy regarding iran, which is a containment policy. they have built important infrastructure in a number of

provinces. you know, trading students, spending money in building mosques, so forth and so on. they have tried to build infrastructure ll along iran's borders. in other words, saudi sarin packets and. they are there basically because they contain iran. there is no reason for them. in other words i don't think there will be era where most of them were the entitlement to intervene. you know how much money they are spending. in iraq, in lebanon it is basically on the basis of a

threat perception. a threat perception coming from israel in the u.s., that's on the basis of the threat perception we define the strategic depth of armed forces. the strategic depth would be lebanon. not yemen of course. does we have a sickly tried to have an infrastructure to do the two most important things. first to deter israelis from taking military action. number two, basically retaliation in case of an attack. we are not there because we are challenging the saudi's. we are not in lebanon, syria because we want to challenge the gcc or saudi arabia. threat perception we don't see saudi arabia as a threat. we don't prioritize them. they are very much at the

bottom. after two years you cannot find anything. we don't consider them as our rivals. we don't consider it to be a threat. we have not dialogued infrastructure to deal with the challenge. but that's exactly the opposite of saudi arabia. saudi arabia. if they are lebanon, they are not there because they want to challenge the israelis. they are there because they want to challenge us. in your hair not challenging israeli. so in all these areas, the saudi's are challenging us, not we challenge them or consider them as a threat. but then come in and blaming iran is really strange for me. but even stranger is a can easily balance us as you mentioned. a combined population is greater

than iraq. it can be balanced relatively easily in terms of population and military referees. they have super power behind them. they have a lot of economic wealth. why they cannot balance their spirit to me it is inherent in the political system no matter how many times president obama tells us we are behind you, they are going to support you no matter how much we tell them we don't want to do anything with you but inherently because they are sourcing the security it is not anyone, but someone else

will see. that has been the case throughout history because all we've been avoiding this possibly the other guy is going to be sold or bought by the other side. they may think they will pay a higher price to the americans and they'll be left. so unless they rely on their own resources to provide security for themselves, they are going to feel threatened no matter what you tell them. it's not going to resolve. they are a convenient enemy for them. for the pundit, for some of the policymakers, for some of the journalists they can easily attack us. attacking americans has a cause

spirit attacking israeli has a cost. so we are a convenient enemy now bush will feed a number of psychological desires basically otherwise just look at our behavior. forget about the world. as you mentioned action. tell me the action which iran has taken against the saudi's and the situation at the beginning. the last 30 years is the number one, number two action. after all, we have a very good relationship. the most secret talk was

basically kuwaitis in qatar and in the rain is only four or five years. even with saudi arabia, the organization -- the only country which does not have a good relationship with us is the uae and ironically we have more than 20 flights a day of tehran to dubai. hardly we have it affect his. so there is still this myth in 1.1 when you reconstruct that you don't know why it is they are. it is convenient.

>> i don't want this to become a debate between you two, so i'll open it up to the floor and ask that you say your name and wait for the microphone and please ask a question. did you have one? wait for the microphone up in front. [inaudible] >> you will. you will. >> imr ltd. atlantic limit the atlantic council. i have the privilege of being a barbarous task force. i've a question r nasser and 14 bilal. i liken it to a marriage between two parties that don't trust each other in a prenuptial of that concerns the data we have not had to make it work he recommends iran this was a good time to have this particular agreement and what can iran do with the want term to make it succeed because people will be coming out of the woodwork.

for bilal, the jcp was a massive strike or the administration. they can put things in place. they stink of execution. go back to the strategy to asia and all the nonsense of the affordable health care act. so what would you recommend for the longer-term on the part of the administration to make sure the agreement has every opportunity and success and if it does fail what would be planned the analogy put in the place they need to do that. >> so with fire to discuss the issue before, but there are three reasons which made the diplomacy and necessity. two reasons facilitated that. the three reasons which necessitate his number one war. no matter how much it was flamed, but still the country

hangs they can experience a war basically is not a good thing. so they have to eliminate the chances of the war. so that is the number one reason we talked.diplomacy was a necessity. war cannot achieve their days because basically i discussed three scenarios on war and as you know, the niv has reported by argument. iran has two weapon as the nuclear program. the war is going to recognize this. in other words, it will be at most a later couple years and

after that, iran is going to basically wholeheartedly go for the war. if pakistan 40 years ago with the sources, human and material if they decide to make a bomb we can. it is because it does not bear star interests. it will not increase security but none of that will increase our ability in this are the 14 reasons it is the case. anyway, the u.s. that war would not them achieve their object is. the number two issue the sanctions. those who negotiated the new sanctions are important. they may sanctions have impacted our economy, but they have not made as desperate. one in tehran asked me to come a kidney take me to a place in tehran within impact of sanctions. i told her if you expect me to

take you to a store where the shelves are empty, such a place doesn't exist. for sure it has impacted our life. so we're hunting has promised it will improve the life. so that's why he had to do some thing in the sanctions were buried fortune factor. for americans, they thought no matter how much sanctions can be crippling, capitulation means no way that can happen. it is not an option, bass the third necessity was the lack of attractive alternatives. more sanction on your part he will have the jet did the

second-generation centrifuges. more sanctions and installed centrifuges. more sanction in the iraq reactor fall of impact. so after two years of it come back. iranians have suffered through the process, but you are talking now with a much more capable autumn. 40, 50,000 centrifuges in stock pile far greater than the 10,000 in fact 20% enriched uranium. these three factors -- but to what the facilitated says our number one in momentum created because of the iranian election. no one can create a moment to.

they are not a plan number. but they both said that in frustration careful to use the momentum, which happened because of the election. in this campaign he said -- [inaudible] said he demanded it. the max factor towards the facilitated process was the momentum entrée momentum and number two are really at the same time wanted the diplomacy to work. the iranians didn't want it and americans didn't want it. but we have rouhani in iran. they both wanted a deal could visit these two factors facilitated them. the last factor was a regional

issue. from syria -- from lebanon to syria and lebanon and also in afghanistan. we need to pay attention to these issues and they are far more important. so we thought the regional issues if they want to reduce the presence in the region and pay more attention to east asia, they don't want iran to be disappointed. they will explore everything possible. >> bilal, i want to add to harlan's question in terms of recommendation. we've heard a lot of talk about israel compensating for gcc for the iran deal as though it is somehow detracting from their security rather than adding to it. my question is whether the

provision of more sophisticated weaponry of upper busting bombs and whatnot to israel in particular, but also gcc will simply increase iran's threat perception and have the reverse effect to cause the kind of arms race and more conflict in the region. >> i couldn't agree with you more. we are what we are, but the implementation has been miserable. the iranians have played a weekend masterfully and the weekend masterfully and the americans have played a strong hand miserably. we are what we are. the ultimate purpose was no word from the star. i'll leave it to nuclear experts such as bob einhorn to give you details about the best way to make sure the deal does not fail or is not cheated by iran. three recommendations that are quite broad that could be useful for the immediate future and for the next 10 to 15 years.

you have to have impeccable verification. you have to have clear language to comply with the provisions of the deal. that is not an option. you have to get serious about the deliverables. you show hesitation or ineffectiveness on the delivery of those in the united states that will end up with far fewer friends in other parts of the world. compensation i don't like the term. what contributes should be the ultimate purpose. i'm not sure how that really contributes to that. it's really hard to measure. i'm not sure the provision is what contributes to arms races. we are not going to get into that. with your permission it is only fair i will respond briefly to the assertions made earlier which is useful and important

for the debate not just here but over there as well. i think the central aim is iran is misunderstood and only if we better and it primarily defensive posture in the region, things could be so much better. fair enough, we have a lot of misperceptions about the country. some are failing because it's quite a notoriously opaque system over there. it is becoming increasingly easier to leave due to the long negotiations that had. we know much better today, but there's still a lot we do not know. what it nasser describes is stabilizing after his are nothing but destabilizing.

it's not a theoretical conversation. there is a substantial amount of evidence against iran's claim. for example what is iran doing to threaten security. this has never been a direct confrontation. it's always been in direct confrontation. when i ran months of full support to amman and damascus the single they handed play. and cost tremendous amount of human catastrophe and also had a spillover into iran that contributes to commit terrorist attacks inside kuwait in no way contributes to stability. mind you i would hundred% agree, but i'm not sure why they still dabble regardless, that does not

contribute to stability. the verdict is out. there is funny to praise because they are like no other actor fighting isis. [inaudible] >> as i mentioned earlier, there's never been direct confrontation between the two cities. [inaudible] they are doing that directly. there is funny to praise in iraq , but it is worth asking if the end justifies the means. when i ran recruits malicious, that exacerbates sectarianism which in his cell prolongs the survival of isis.

look at the list of actions that are really incontrovertible. there's nothing to debate about 10 in terms of the negative impact of regional stability. i am not sure why iran is good for there's so much to debate. how many folks in this view it. i will leave it to that. >> i want to give our audience time from our questions. can i borrow this i have something i was writing for a paper for the u.s. institute of peace seven years ago. iran's goals appear to be is largely defensive to achieve strategic safeguards system against foreign intervention to other major say in regional decisions and prevent or minimize action in my print counter to iranian interests. in the service, iran has been willing to sacrifice many

non-iranian blogs. >> i've never heard an assessment of a country that's actually been offensive action. it's always perceived defenses. >> let me open to the gentleman right here. if you can take the microphone. say her name and ask a question. >> i have a question for professor hadian. i was wonder if you could talk on the assembly of experts election. do you see the blocking of moderates and reformists again and lifting sanctions will have a positive or negative impact on the moderate success. >> that's a great question. >> we have it federally and briefly answering your questions, yes it is forces for the government and we think the

pro-modernization versus. we expect to see a massive disqualification of the big names. but still we expect to win the election. because the people are hopeful from what has happened and although they are not going to see any tangible impact in their life, but the hope is here and the optimism is there. ..

>> need not to be clerics, but nory they are clerics, and they are, they have three main functions; to supervise -- not supervise, but rather to check the power of the supreme leader, and in case of he is not handling the job, to remove, and in case of his death, to be replaced. so they are not all that important in terms of day-to-day affairs of the country. but they are important for appointing the next supreme leader. so in that regard, they are important, but, you know, again, we -- meaning pro-modernization forces -- are not that much hopeful which we can have major input in that election.

it is going to be election, basically, between the traditional conservative forces of the society and the rivals -- [inaudible] so we expect and we hope the traditional representatives can win that election, and they have a good chance of winning that election. but i wish to -- [laughter] >> very quickly. >> yeah, very quickly. i mean, regarding basically you know what we said about bahrain and kuwait. first of all, we have not exploded any bomb in kuwait, no one has claimed that. i just don't know where you get the information that they have exploded a bomb in kuwait -- >> no, but -- >> it was the discovery of explosives that they said had come from iran. >> yeah, but there is no incentive, you know? there's no incentive to do anything to kuwait. you have not been doing it. we have good relation with kuwait. but bahrain is a different case.

and, in fact, bahrain, there are many in iran -- secular and not secular -- they feel that iranian government has been so passive in its reaction to bahrain. for many it was really humiliating to see saudi arabia sending forces and invading bahrain and scapegoating iran for what they are doing can. it is, believe me, it is humiliating. to see that, you know, why saudis should do that. why they should send forces there. as i'm telling you, yes, we are involved in kuwait -- we are involved in iraq, we are involve inside syria, we are involved in afghanistan, we are involved in lebanon, but we are not involved in bahrain. it was not iran. >> nasser, i want to ask, we had mentioned this earlier, and i wanted to give you a chance also to say something about this. the impression that you get from the opponents of the nuclear

deal here in this country is that, you know, it was a huge win for iran, a huge loss for the united states. but there is a substantial component of individuals in iran who think they gave away too much, so i just wanted to give you a chance to mention that. >> okay, thank you for giving me the chance on that one. [laughter] because i have been critical of it myself. i developed four criteria for assessing the deal. these four criteria are, you know, the timing, strategic weight of what was given and what was taken, strategic composition of what was taken and what was given, and the fourth one is irreversibility/reversibility. on the strategic -- on timing what i mean is cash for cash, promise for promise. go through 190 -- 59 pages of the documents, you will see that in terms of the timing, i mean,

the conversation which iran has given is far more. first of all, we have to remove 20,000 centrifuges from -- we have to remove centrifuges from natanz, we have to dilute or get rid of about 11,000 kilograms of enriched uranium. we have to transform the core of our reactors, we have to answer the pmd questions to the iaea, and after we did all of those things then the iaea should say i'm satisfied, then the sanctions could be suspended afterward. frankly, i would have not signed this deal. i would have negotiated a different deal. what will happen if iaea says i'm not satisfied? what would happen if the u.s. congress pass a law two-thirds veto proof and prevent the

president to take whatever measure he is supposed to take? what would happen? so -- [inaudible] i mean, we get rid of 2,000 centrifuges, you have to lift the sanctions. we get the other 5,000, you are going to do this one. that was not the right way to do, and that's exactly what happened. of course, i'm optimist, trust this administration, but it should have not within relied on trust. as you guys say here, it should have been basically based on, you know, a different kind of verification, a different kind of way of handling this issue. on number two, strategic weight of what was given and what's taken. i'm not one of those guys who would say it should have been 50/50. you know, that's too much expecting from iranians. basically negotiating with six major powers and expecting 50/50, if you can quantify which

i have done in my book that if i can't quantify what was given and what was taken, to me it is not -- [inaudible] but still this strategic weight is not all that important for me personally. what is more important is strategic composition of what was given and taken. what i mean by that is, basically, personally i would have preferred to have only three -- [inaudible] of second generations and closing on iraq and natanz. but what we have is 5,000 centrifuges, about 5,049 centrifuges in natanz of the first generation which are, you know, very old, very old models. and that's what i'm critical of, basically, i mean, what was -- the composition of what was given and what was taken. but on the u.s. side, you have

four principles which guided the negotiation. number one was basically, basically four path to the bomb, so you closed down the four path. then the issue was detection. so that's why you basically supported the very robust verification system beyond that initial protocol. there are a number of things beyond initial protocol. in fact, not only additional protocol, but beyond additional protocol. number three, concern number three is breakout or a sneakout meaning, okay, we detect your compliance or your cheating. maybe we won't have enough time to react. and that is the time from the time we decide to have enough material for one bomb. it is now about two to three months, they want it to be in one year. so that concept guided your

negotiation, and that breakout is the subject of basically number of centrifuges and enrichment process.ç so that's why we have to go all the way down to 300 kilograms of enriched uranium. number four is reversibility/irreversibility. many of the things you're going to do with irreversible. iraq is irreversible, and diluting or sending out this stockpile of enriched uranium, they are irreversible. but you are all the time calling this although practically some of the sanctions are irreversible, but theoretically, legally they are very much reversible. snap back, basically, in the agreement, and, you know, the architecture of -- the structure of the sanctions are there. they can be easily be be back.

so that's what i say. by these four criteria, we feel that, you know, what was given and what was taken was not equal, but i sported the -- supported the deal at the end of the day. you may say why you supported the deal? because of the strategic consequences which are very important for me. or desecularrization, regional issue. none of them are in the deal, but these are the consequences of the deal. and number four are sanctions which are, of course, parking lot of the deal. >> bilal, you wanted to say something. >> just a quick moment. i'd love to go back to the key point here which is the main argument of the paper, which is the debate. i'm fascinated by it, i'm just not satisfied by how we're ending it. i realize the limitations -- >> you want him to be more specific. >> well, let me just frame it differently, perhaps it's a

little more comfortable. what i'd love to know is there's debate that it's happening. is it the typical -- and i know it's not a useful description -- moderate versus hard-liner camp, or is this happening within the hard-line camp? where does rouhani and his team fall on this? this is all extremely useful for for everybody. >> okay. yeah. >> the debate is, as i mentioned, i mean, across the board. you can find the hard-liners, revolutionary guard, foreign ministry people, think tank, policymakers, professors of university, they are all debating in different think tanks about this policy. what should be done. generally, generally government is a supporter of the first perspective. not everybody in the government -- [inaudible] personally i have debated with them that they support -- [inaudible] key positions in all of these places, but as i mentioned, the general and dominant view is the first one, but by no means that

is the only view they are defending. as you mentioned, you mentioned a good point. the indication of what i said is in the actions. if you see in practice iraqis and iranians are not moving toward -- [inaudible] that's a good way of knowing the impact of the second group on the policy. okay? and same thing in syria. if you see there are places that the sir yoon government -- syrian government as well as iranians are putting a strong fight but there are places that they don't care, it means that the impact of the second group on the first group. so these are the actions, and you can look at the indications. >> yep. lady right here. >> hi -- [inaudible] with ihs, and my question is related to what you just discussed, and i would like to

hear from both of you, because i suspect you would have different views on this. but it seems to me that two of the individuals within iran that sort of personify or put a face be on iran's two different foreign policies can't -- [inaudible] sulemani and zarif. before the nuclear agreement, zarif basically had the nuclear profile while sulemani and the irgc had and continue to have the regional file. now, postdeal it seems that the zarif/rouhani camp is capitalizing on this political success and having a free range diplomacy within the region. to what extent do you think zarif and rouhani, you know, whether they are actually testing the waters for, you know, actually exceeding restrictions and coming up with some sort of diplomatic solution

within the region in, you know, achieving iran's objectives in the region or whether they are sort of khamenei's tool of putting some lipstick on iran's involvement within the region? so, basically, whether it is just an act or -- >> okay. >> zarif, first, to sulemani. >> that's not a good dichotomy. they are not all that fundamentally different. basically, you know, sulemani, the way he has been perceived as a military figure, you know, as a very powerful individual, you know, like superman. here, basically, and in iran -- >> [inaudible] >> you know, that's not the case. in fact, he's a very pragmatic general and relatively a good sense of situation on the ground. but the most important and a key factor to bring to your attention is these decisions are not being made by any one

individual. we have an institution called supreme national security council. all of them, they're all there. they debate the issues, all the issues of -- major issues, basically. they debate it, and once the decision, once the decisions are made, they're going to be implemented by everyone. so in that, in that institution there are people who can be more powerful than both zarif and sulemani. the former commander of our navy and very key figure in, very key figure in the revolution in iran, basically, can be argued is more powerful than both of these men regarding the regional issue. rouhani was, by far, is exercising more influence on regional issue than anyone else. and also so this is not, this is not something that, you know, part of sulemani would only

report to the supreme leader, and they make the decision or whether sulemani by himself make the decision. it is not the case. basically, it is going to be discussed and debated and finally make a decision in a supreme national -- [inaudible] though the supreme leader has the authority legally to veto the decisions, but normally almost i can say with a 98% of the time he would support the decision which has been made by the supreme national security council. it is not a one-man show. zarif was a negotiator. he was not making the decisions. the decisions about the red lines, what is acceptable, what is not acceptable, those decisions were made somewhere else, not in the foreign ministry. >> yeah, i couldn't agree more. maybe i should be -- the time allocated to me to answer, maybe i should give it back to nasser because, obviously, he's ideally placed to answer that. i'll share with you a recent

conversation i had about this false dichotomy. the iranians are incredibly smart, they show the world that there is actually a dichotomy and views between sulemani and zarif but, in fact, everybody's working so harmoniously. perhaps not as well, but it is not within the system so fractional and factionalized as the world would like to believe. >> gentleman over here. >> this is -- [inaudible] from pakistan. i am a journalist, so is i have a question to nasser. if the deal is finally approved by the congress -- >> or not blocked. >> -- there is a fear in the middle east that it will fuel arms race in the region. so because it will also tantamount to recognizing iran as a nuclear power, so how would

you respond to that a fear. >> as i said, i guess, i mean, i won't agree with you, i do not agree with you that it would lead to an arms race. and, in fact, there's a reason that we have an agreement, it's to prevent an arms race. there was a possibility. there was a possibility that, you know, as i said, when you discuss about the alternative, the alternatives were not all that attractive. and if there was a military effect, that would have -- [inaudible] to have to weaponize its program. and weaponization for sure we know it's going to lead to an arms race. but with the deal, in fact, that would stop any arms race the you mean basically nuclear arms race. but for arming ourself, as i said, you know, we do -- [inaudible] and we do not have all the resources, and we don't need that type of armament to be able

to defend ourselves for the future. the type of threats which we are facing is a different kind. it is refugees, it is narcotics, it is chaos. it is not a country-to-country war that we need to have sophisticated weaponry or whatever. so that's the type of a thing which we have. and we hope, basically, that the dqb& can help us tot( concentrae more on regime and to stabilize. and one more thing about the stabilization, in fact, i'm in the first group which are pro-stabilization. in fact, they would go, they would like to go all the way if it demands and needs to cooperate with the saudis, with americans to stabilize the regime so they are open to it, and they would -- [inaudible] to stabilize the regime. that's the type of threat which we are really worried about in tehran. >> i'm going to go to faye here in the front and then to laura -- [inaudible] >> thank you very much for the

talk. i'm faye. i have a question for you, bilal. you keep mentioning that iran is a threat to the south, but could you be more specific that what are the specific threats to the national security of the saudis that it's coming from iran? and my other question is that it seems, correct me if i'm wrong, that the saudi government is, it's a very closed, tight political structure. they have had this for centuries. and it seems to me from the outsiders that they are more afraid that this thing eventually will collapse, and that's what they're afraid of rather than the threat coming from iran. so correct me. thank you. >> i wish we had, actually, an official representative from any of gulf states to speak here, because the last thing i want this to look like, as if i'm speaking on their behalf which is clearly not the case. [laughter] i will always speak to you as an analyst. so you asked me what is the threat coming from iran to saudi

arabia. as i mentioned to nasser earlier, the threat is not direct. the threat is indirect through proxies that they support throughout the region. every -- both countries, which seem to be the main adversaries in the region, have vested interest in a number of theaters whether it's in lebanon, whether it's in iraq, syria and others. and each one backs its own proxy. therefore, unfortunately in many ways, this confrontation is seen as zero sum. now, the most immediate if you were to really push me security threat coming from iran to saudi arabia is what's going on in yemen and how the saudis perceive that their backing of the houthis and other allies is contributing to the degradation of the national security of saudi arabia. that seems to be the most imminent due to physical proximity threat to saudi arabia. what goes on in lebanon, as you very well know, iran supportsw3 the most powerful or actor in the lebanon which is hezbollah. half the lebanese population

sees as a major detriment to the stability of that country, right? and saudi arabia has had its own vest ised interests in remember nonfor quite some time. perhaps -- lebanon for quite some time. perhaps the assassination of -- [inaudible] huge, complicit knowledge in the region that those who are behind that assassination were the iranians and the syrians, whoever, they may have pulled the plug. it doesn't matter. iraq, the same thing. so i'll go back to repeating the same thing over and over again. it's never been a direct confrontation between the two. that is an asymmetric confrontation that is conducted through proxies. >> laura, back there. >> thank you for the terrific panel. i wanted -- >> i did not, sorry, respond to

the saudi state collapsing. maybe we'll get to that. >> okay. >> if time allows. sorry about that. >> nasser, i just wanted to ask you to answer something that bilal asked as well, you know? the iranians have emphasized after the deal focusing on the region and even the deputy foreign minister had said there might be iran/gcc talks soon. but my understanding is they haven't been scheduled yet. why haven't we seen this dialogue begin? is it the gcc or saudi side that's reluctant to engage? >> i mean, zarif traveled, zarif traveled to kuwait and qatar, but the saudis, you know, they are reluctant. in fact, you know, i know for a fact we have tried to approach them several times, you know, for the resolution or for the cooperation to deal with the regional issue, but they are

reluctant. they have their own perceptions. and as i mentioned, i mean, personally, it is hard more me to convince them -- for me to convince them otherwise. they have made up their mind, and no matter what is happening in reality, they have their own perceptions, and it's hard to crack. and as i mentioned, you know, no matter how much u.s. or we tell them, i mean, we are not perceiving you as a threat, but they perceive us as a threat. we are also a convenient enemy for them. i don't see any reason why they have, why they have to -- [inaudible] very quickly unless some unfortunate, major things happen in the region. they may decide, you know, they ma decide to come and to work, to cooperate with the others to handle or to contain, to contain the insecurity in the region. >> i don't think it's useful or fair to try to understand one threat perception and completely

disregard the other. i think that -- and, hence, the primary significance of this debate really. a set of useful conversations between these two heavyweights is long overdue. i mean, it's ridiculous how it has been -- and nasser, obviously, blames the saudis for not having an interest or noting with ready for it. i think that the conditions are right for it. i think the saudis would be definitely interested in -- >> one point, actually, unconditional. i know they are waiting to see assad collapse, and they would say, you know, but the point is hard to do the negotiation right now. right now let's negotiate to come up with a solution for the -- >> nasser, does iran have a practical solution if assad falls? i mean, as we speak there is more pressure on his forces than we've seen in a very long time. >> good question. >> of course. the point is the analysis in tehran is the collapse or the

removal of assad as an authoritarian regime would lead to the collapse of the regime. and collapse of regime is going to create more chaos that no one's interest is going to be served. so the point is right now to negotiate for transition, for assad to be removed or to leave office not right away, but two, three years down the road. ..

the changing threat perception and iran given the very dramatic changes in the international situation. for decades of course this was the u.s. versus iran, he was policy was to isolate iran if they couldn't get a color revolution, they would isolate it but that has been broken partially by this agreement but also by the change in the international situation. i will point out three things. china's role in the middle east, the promise of the silk road economic belt which is going to encompass iran as well as the arab countries. and china will be playing a more important role there. we saw that putin now is sending troops to syria. i don't think because it's simply a power move on his part but others also a concern that the whole thing spilling out

into chaos and he wants a different trajectory. he has gotten support from the europeans on the. the u.s. is critical in sync the usual things but the europeans are saying a be this is the way went to go to get a diplomatic solution. thirdly, the change on the europeans given the refugee situation where not only did they decide to take in the refugees but also critical voices being raised about the u.s. and their policy in the region that has cost of that. that's a different ballgame that we are working, a different world we are working in. how does that reflect in the perception, and the threat perceptions in iran? >> very good question. >> very shortly, they say they think they been vindicated. that has been their argument. they feel that, in other words, they feel that you have to continue the tougher policies which we have had. as i mentioned it is not just

one group in iran. there are debates and they feel that, okay, you know, in other words, the agreement, this is part of rouhani, the agreement gives us a good chance to play a different role. it would give us a chance to be -- the principle secular pricing access was able to help iran, particularly on the former president ahmadinejad, successfully. and once it did that, they were able to pass the number of resolutions in the security council. and hopefully now we can still basically move towards transport and hopefully normalization and then we can deal with the regional issues -- desecularization and i should

mention particularly with china. china being considered as a rising power. we are debating more and more about china no longer as a factor in we as a market. china is being perceived as a strategic player in the world. because no longer the energy security for china is going to be taken as granted. in other words, they have relied on the u.s. to provide security for the energy. but as a rising power, possibly in 10 years from now china is going to be the biggest economy in the world. so china wants to be sure about the energy security. in other words, that's why they are going to be in iran, not as, not just only the market public of them as a factory a rather to

seek this sort of a strategic partnership. so we are in the midst of a debate about china. china's role in the future and china's role in iran. >> john from u.s. naval academy. my question is really about these debates on both sides of the persian gulf. and my question is, are there voices in these debates that are advocating for better relations with the neighbors? in other words, saying look, whatever our problems, these people, these others come they are our neighbors. they are not going away and we share of culture and we share a history and we share a religion.

and, therefore, we need to change the existing situation, which is not in our interest. >> john, as i mentioned, you know, to report to you is not an analysis. there are think tanks in tehran. they don't consider saudi arabia as enemy. they don't see them as a threat. that they design strategies, okay. hard to deal with them. we consider them exactly as a neighbor. we think went to improve -- hardly he will find a voice, hardly. you know, the situation was very different. but even in the last two years how do you find a voice which does we should not have a good relationship with the saudis and i want to say but hardliners.

rafsanjani, all along supportive of a better relationship with saudi arabia every -- want to go to king abdullah. viaticum relationship and develop personal relationships are important and we can improve the relationship. even today in fact he's ready to do that. there are a number of important forces within iran are ready to take initiative to improve the relationship. that is saudi arabia come as a major. it is very much one-sided. we don't consider them as enemies. why should we consider kuwait or qatar as enemy lacks precedent -- but the other side is true. we are at the top of the threat list. in other words, we are at the top of the threat list. in fact, you know, i once personally was talking to, of course he was not in the national security advisor. these arab.

i said why did you travel to this country lacks and you know, in fact to improve the relationship. because of the same language utah. you may be able to get them more confidence. okay, we are not considering or perceiving you as a threat. but what can be done? are missing the arenas should not take any issue. for sure we have to take an initiative to put to rest of their concerns about us as a threat but it is not going to be easy thing to do that as i mentioned now, in particular the last two years, or three years, it will have become the convenient enemy. there has to be a reason why you have to live it. >> you asked about the arab --

>> okay, sure. [inaudible] >> we will get an answer from tremblant. >> a quick follow-up from the wilson center. what john ask you, don't you think that the animosity goes back to when ayatollah khomeini started talking about the saudi royal family and then legitimate presence to look after the holy place. number one. number two, i think iran -- during the iran-iraq war when all of the arab countries except for syria supported saddam. and my question is also to bilal. why did saudi arabia wait so long to send an ambassador to iran, number one.

number two, when they got involved with hezbollah why didn't the saudis get involved? money always speaks. thank you. >> that's a good point. that's a good point but that was for the first decade of the revolution. we got over it. we set all the step after that we had a better relationship with them, particularly on the rafsanjani. but you know, historically you are right, also the negative view against one another. but if you put aside even though stuff, those are not a reason why we should have a better relationship. as a major we have to look at the actions can not just the rhetoric. if you look at the action the gcc was formed as you mentioned not against israel.

it was formed against iran. they supported all along the iraqi in the war. still after all these animosities and after what exactly are right. at the beginning we didn't even call that saudi arabia. we called it turn 11. we did want to recognize the family. but that's very much a beginning of the revolution -- hajabs afterwards, things change. we cannot explain the current behavior of the basis of what happened then because we have had a number of companies have had much different relationship after those incidents. >> nasser, you speak with much confidence and candor. it's really something to admire. and if you go -- if you were to go to court with a legal case such as yours, i think the judges could have a hard time really to continue.

you have to understand that regardless of how valid and should iran's claims are today, that country has tons of explain to do to the rest of the world. it's not enough to be right. if it is, in fact, that you are right, you have to explain to the community of nations around you that simply just do not believe what you are saying. the problem is also that there's tons of evidence actually that goes against what you are saying. everybody wants to believe what you are saying, but it's really hard to. on the arab side, who is really interested in enhancing relations and creating a dialogue between both sides. it's always a mistake to speak at the gcc as one entity, right?

and you know that very well. at the top of that community of people who are actively advocating for a dialogue, have you been doing it for a long time. never be quite the saudis with the iraqis or the kuwaitis or the batteries. i think they are in different when it comes to relations with iran. is not adversarial but it's also about entirely positive. bahrain has a very difficult perspective when it comes to iran, and they are in an entirely different league for reasons of their own. i think qatar's relations with iran, and you alluded to it, are drastically improving. to the chagrin of their neighbors. saudi arabia we've been talking about it all day, there's no point. you are exactly right, i think that perhaps the most intense

and adversarial relationship is between abu dhabi and iran, and both of them have their own reasons, as you very well said tobias fewer concerns about iran than abu dhabi. >> i know there many were had out there but we are at an inn. i invite you to stay and ask further questions if you have them here but i think it's been a very interesting debate that we have had her on the iranian foreign policy debate and the thank you very much for coming. [applause] >> thanks, barbara. [inaudible conversations] >> outgoing army secretary john mchugh is going to speak about the state of the u.s. army and the impact of sequestration over the past few years. we will be like with his comments at noon eastern from

the american enterprise institute. pope francis is coming to the u.s. next week. the president of catholic university joined the discussion on the pope's views on capitalism and its impact on poverty and equality the u.s. senate returns today to take another vote to advance disapproval of the iran nuclear agreement. the vote is scheduled for six. live coverage of that debate here on c-span2 and the house returns tomorrow. they will debate airport security and federal funding for planned parenthood. the house tomorrow live on c-span. >> a signature feature of booktv is out all day coverage of book fairs and festivals from across the country with top nonfiction authors. here's our schedule.

>> former defense secretary chuck hagel was recently at the american legion convention to talk about treatment of veterans. he spoke for about 15 minutes. >> commander, thank you for what you have done and continue to do. and for this institution, and to all of our leadership, american legion, and all of you who have devoted so many years of your

lives to this country and to the american legion. i am particularly honored to receive this award. as some of you know, mike knows, my friends are nebraska here know, that -- you get two drinks tonight. [laughter] >> maybe three, i don't know how that works. i come from a leaking family. my father was a three-time commander of the american legion post in the 1950s. my mother served three terms as president of the legion auxiliary. this is i think my 47th year of being a life member of the american legion. my brother is. [applause] so i'm particularly proud of

this honor, and i recognize you are so many of you and people across this country, veterans, people who have given so much that deserve far more than i do. but at one time i was a shameless politician so i will accept the award, of course. [laughter] [applause] but again, thank you very, very much. let me offer a couple of thoughts. first two again acknowledge what this institution the american legion means to this country. they shaping and molding that the american legion has done with our young people, i see some here. i know you are in the audience over a generation that is very

significant. to continue to do that, you continue to expand on that pic and i think that's as critical a contribution as any you may. we all know, especially as parents, that's the future. and to continually imbue in our young people responsibility, patriotism i think it's an easy word to roll off people's lips, but sacrifice is different. and patriotism is about sacrifice. and it's so important that we teach our young people about that. and all the different programs the legion has done have been part of and continue to initiate over the years really, it really does that in a special way, so thank you. second, we are living at an incredible time in the world. i think we all appreciate that,

understand that. this is a time when a world order to establish right after world war ii that has lasted about 70 years, and when you look back over that 70 years, it's been pretty successful. imperfect, problems, issues, conflict, and we still have that today in some areas, even more exaggerated than we've seen before. but when you look at the long pole with history and how all of this has worked over the last 70 years, the world is better today. van it was 70 years ago, by any measurement. and i think when you look at measurements of the kind of world we've had, and if we have generally been successful in the world, no world war iii, no

nuclear exchange. those two issues are pretty important. we kind of today except that as so what, but as the previous speaker, recipient noted in his remarks here just to few months ago, and the world war ii veterans out there, korean war veterans out there, know that this was not a given. and all the great leaders of the world war ii generation that helped shape this new world order, eisenhower, marshall and truman, adenauer, schuman, went to their graves concerned about a nuclear exchange and about a world war iii. so we have preserved that element of 70 years of relative global peace. now we've got challenges are

immense. they are different kinds of challenges. we live in a world now that is completely interconnected. we have 7 billion of global citizens, all part of a global community. and that global community is underpinned by a global economy. we are seeing a diffusion of economic power around the world at a rate unprecedented in history. we are seeing technology shift and change everything. we are seeing relationships develop and unfold. and past conflict, buried in centuries of conflict, religious conflict, tribal can't let, historic conflict. and it is a time when every leader, responsible leader of every responsible institution of the world, starting with leaders of countries, are faced with an

immense array of challenges

has said over the last couple of years much of what is going on is driven by no hope, despair

and joblessness at so when you have these 18, 19, 20 year-old young man especially with no prospects, no education, no jobs, no hope, what we think is going to happen? it won't be good. so all of these things have come together at a point where the strength of our military just as always must never be compromised. we must have the strongest most sophisticated most well led and well-trained motivated military ever. [applause] that alone will not fix the problems. that's a huge anchor to have, and we must have it, but economic issues and other issues factor in so we must use our military carefully, wisely, judiciously. and what mike said is very

generous introduction to me, and i did say this, when i was in the senate, i used to ask the question, what's the exit strategy? i was supposed want to talk about that. but we need to have a series of questions asked before we commit military to different adventures. then what happens? then what happens? it's the same set of questions that each of us in our own lives ask each other in our personal lives everyday, our business lives, whatever you do. then what happens? then what happens? what effect this is going to? this is a time out in particular for the kind of reflection and thinking. i'm hopeful about our world. this country, as much as people occasionally step back and wonder what's going on, as the world gone mad? everything is upside down. we go through those periods in

history but we think about america and to think, first of all, we are rooted in the constitution that works. balance of power, checks of power on the governing institutions. everything about our society and our people and the fabric of our society is good, is strong. sometimes our greatest strength appears to be a weakness, it's not. and that is the question of each other, the questioning of leaders. that's healthy. it's an outlet. but at some point then we've got to let our leaders governed. we have to let our leaders lead. but not without question. but that's a responsibility we have as citizens. i ended my remarks as i began

about the american legion. the american legion has always done that and been as responsible and institution and influential institution as there has ever been really in our last 100 years. and i say that because of the way you have done it, they represent. you have earned through your contributions not only the right to do that but the responsibility to do that. at a time when every poll in the united states over the last few years shows clearly that the trust and confidence in every institution in the united states is at record lows accept the military. the military is the one institution that is still very high, higher than any other institution. and so we are going through one of those periods when there is a lot of conflict, question, complication, uncertainty.

but we need the strength of institutions as well. because that's another strength we have. i often in and out of afghanistan and one of the points i used to make was karzai or any of them, all of our leaders, secretary defense, is a strength in the institutions. institutions outlive all of us. strengthened those institutions of governance and help them build their own institutions so that they can govern. because we can't be there all over the world forever. to protect everybody and do the things that we can do better than everybody else. we don't have the capacity to do that. we don't have the will to do it. we shouldn't do it. we can't impose our will on people, but we can help them into images ways. we have done it more than any other country i think in history m