c-span. it is available for $8.95 plus shipping and handling. get your copy at cspan.org/landmark. >> tonight, michael rogers testifies about cyber security issues. and later entrepreneurs on the impact of the tax code and regulations on american businesses. >> next, a senate intelligence committee hearing on cybersecurity threats to the united states. the committee heard from admiral michael rogers, nsa director and cyber commander. this is 90 minutes.

i would like to call this hearing to order. admiral, welcome. i would like to welcome admiral rogers, director of the national security agency. mike, as you know we typically hold hearing in close session so we can review your classified programs. given the sensitive nature of the programs and the need to protect methods which intelligence is gathered that position is understandable. today, we want to take time to insure the american people have an opportunity to learn more about the nsa, the mission you workforce is tasked with and what you are doing to combat the increasing cyber threat to the nation. cyber threats are top priority for the intelligence community.

attacks are increasing in scale, scope, and complexity and severity of impact. the office of personal management suffered from one of the biggest cyber breaches our government has ever encountered and there are count less other recent examples of attacks in the public and private sector. while the nsa typically works in secrecy, i think we all expect you will be front and center on the issue for the foreseeable future on informing and educating the american public. i would like to take a moment to thank you and your workforce for your dedication and the critical work you continue to do to protect the nation. you are acustomed to the difficult and direct questions we ask you often in close session and you know we do so to challenge you and your organization to be better.

today offers a unique opportunity to educate the american people on what you do, how you do it, how your agency is postured to deal with the growing cyber threat. i want to thank you for joining us and i look forward to your testimony as you seek to separate the myth of the nsa from the reality of the nsa to the extent you can do so in an opening setting and we recognize how difficult that is. i would also respectfully to remind my colleagues to avoid questions that talk about classified information or anything that would require him to divulge any sensitive information. welcome, admiral, i turn to the vice chairman. >> thank you very much, chairman and thank you for holding this open hearing for allowing the committee to discuss in public

the important work the nsa does and some of the current challenges they face to keep up with national security threats against us. director rogers, welcome back before the committee. as we have discussed in closed sessions, nsa and cyber command are at the forefront of a number of national challenges and policy decisions so i look forward to this discussion today. before getting to the rest of my statement, i want to publically praise the work the nsa has done in collecting intelligence that has enabled the rest of the government to identify and stop terrorist plots directed or inspired by the islamic state of iraq here in the homeland. this threat is by no means over. but the have been a number of important disruptions thanks to good intelligence and good law enforcement work. you figure in that in a major

way so thank you very much. as fbi director jim noted in jul and i quote the foreign terrorist now have direct access into the united states like never before. end quote. there are more than 200 americans who have traveled or attempted to travel to syria to participate in the conflict and that remains a significant concern. i would appreciate your assessment of the isis threat and the threat to the united states from others as well. of course when discussing that threat we have to recognize the due in part to leaks of classified information, improved operation al security by terrorist groups, and the availability of encrypted information that can not be collected there is an increasingly a limit on what nsa will be able to contribute.

i know we will have a chance to discuss that change. there are also numerous press reports in the past week or two suggesting that the administration is rethinking its support for any legislative solutions to this problem. we welcome your thoughts on how to approach the so-called going dark issue. and i think the more you can tell the public about it here today the better. certainly the hack on the opm database as the chairman said demonstrates the need for better protection of personal information. but i would very much like to hear your view on whether this is an either or situation or if there is a way to keep information private while allowing the government to gain critical information. as the head of one of the most

technical agencies in the government your input to this question is important. next, while the committee has been following the implementation of the usa freedom act, today presents a good opportunity for the american public to hear how that transition is going. under the new law, the nsa will no longer collect phone meta data collectly from phone companies and conduct its own tailored queries of the data. instead the government has to obtain a court order in order to ask telecommunication providers to query their records and produce the response. it is important for the public as well as for us to know whether this transition will be complete at the end of the 180 day period. and whether you assess the

system is in place at that time, if you assess it will meet your operational needs. i would like to know whether this system, once fully unplain place, will achieve the goal of providing the nsa with responsive information with a broader set of records than it had before the usa freedom act passed or whether it is a relatively small number of phone records available to you before the change. finally, you briefed the committee recently on the reorganization you are putting into place in the nsa. it would be appropriate at this hearing for you to describe that reorganization to the extend you can, why it is needed and what changes are being made. thank you for the work your agency does. i have been very proud of it. thank you for your leadership.

>> thank you vice chairman. for the purposes of members, we will skip the one question round and go to five minute questions after the admiral testified and we will do that based on seniority when i am sure senator wyden will complain since they are on time today. with that, admiral rogers, the floor is yours and again welcome. >> chairman burrr, vice chairman, members of the committee thank you for inviting me. i appreciate the time to speak to you about the national security agencies, who we are and what we do and how we contribute to nation's security. in talking with you moreover i am grateful for the chance to explain what it is your nelly citizens do to defend our

nations and support allies and partners around the world. nsa plays a critical role in providing security and protecting foreign intelligence from leaders, military commanders and foreign partnersmepartners. america and our allies depend on our efforts. the nsa headquartered is in maryland and we have facilities in 37 states and a global presence spanning the world. the team i am a member of is made up of a diverse group of individuals coming from every corner in military. 40% of the team is military and representing service and active members. our team members include analyst, collectors, operators, lingiust, engineers, computer

scientist, and too many other skills. our workforce is high school interns to senior executives of the civilian services. nsa personal are well educated with over 75% of our civilians holding a bachelor degree or higher. our military and civilian ling ist have proficiency in over 120 different foreign languages. 40% of our employees work in the s.t.e.m. fields and hold over 200 patents that have been granted to the nsa workforce. in addition to working every day to keep our country safe we enhance the community by volunteering in classrooms, planting community gardens, and helping clear the appalachian trail. they donate thousands of blood to the red cross, contribute to

charity drives and give money to the federal funding drive. marines collecting for toys for tots, soldiers coaching little league, sailors volunteering to clean the chesapeake day. in short, they are your neighbors. nsa employees work hard and well to keep the nation safe and protect our civil liberties and privacy. let me explain their main duties and mission in more details. the information assurance system protects systems that keep classified information. we generate ideas and provide valuable security insight so public and allies may benefit. we insure our nation's leaders and military can communicate and

advisaries cannot gain access to secrets. we work hard so america can improve security and integrity. the change in technology as the world shifted from analog to digital communication following the network of devices and functions in the modern mobile society. nsa plays a key role in cyber space assisting the u.s. government effort to see, litigate and deter cybersecurity threats. in concert with public, private and foreign partners our work makes sure users and operators maintain control of data. nsa gives the leaders insight into the hostile environment of foreign nations and lead the nation's intelligence enterprise

and collect, analyze and report counter intelligence and foreign intelligence information derived from the interception of foreign signals and communication. nsa does the work in accordance with the law and specific requirements from us senior commanders that are deemed necessary to address the nation's policy goals and to prevent strategic surprise. it is analyzed by the leaders and we work within a framework of laws, rules and oversight provided by congress, the executive branch and as proposed the courts. that system of accountability insures the privacy and civil liberties of u.s. persons. on a daily bases, nsa provides

insight into the plans and intention so partners encounter threats across the globe. our military and partners rely on the nsa to achieve technical success. our products are part of the fight. essential to the military operation as food, fuel and ammuniti ammunition. discovering terrorist plans, intentions, communications and locations to disrupt and defeat their attacks. at the time the support agency, nsa directly supports the military with information to perform its mission and provide force plotection, indication and warning and support to keep the troops out of harms way. it helps the united states capture bomb makers, spot elicit fund transfers, work international crime, and explain

to other nations how terrorist hope to come into their te territory and work to identify threats to embassies and people around the world. we devote resources to the international campaign to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction and tracking and sharing data to keep nuclear and biological weapons from the wrong hands to keep the nation safe. we assist the department of homeland security to prevent cyber attacks and we support u.s. cyber command and i lead that and will help develop the capacity it needs to accomplish its vital mission. the threat environment in the cyber space and physical world is evolving and we must keep pace to maintain the advantage the nation is counting on. data is increasinincreasingly a

from stakes including rogue state, organized enterprises and terrorist showing a willingness and available to provide a threat. various cyber terrorist are threats. certain states conduct cyber cohesion. the effort is well beyond government into privately owned business putting the privacy and data of all americans at risk. terrorist tactics, procedures and techniques continue to evolve. they use the same platforms we

use. as terrorist become more savvy about protecting communication we have to keep pace to protect innation and allies. the nsa will continue to rise to the challenge. we have had to invent ourselves before and will do so again. it dates back to the united states origins. predecessors are working with their world war ii partners helped the german boats and cracked the japanese codes. the men and women of the nsa fight terrorist around the globe. today we target the communication of terrorist organizations who mean to do us harm helping to uncover and stop the effort of sleeper cells around the world or recruit fighters to their cause. the means of communication changed but the requirement to maintain the ability to exploit hostile foreign actors remains

constant. when the information resolution transformed communication, the nsa helped lead the way toward information assurance and pioneer cyber space while enabling counterterrorism operations in real-time with compliance with the law. every member of the nsa takes an oath to preserve the country. we just repeated this oath across our workforce on 9/11. security and privacy are not trade offs but complimentary and parallel and we support them both. before us today we have the opportunity to right another opportunity. nsa plays an indepenispensable .

we have delivered this for well over 60 years. our capabilities are in demand and more important to the nation security than every. we are proud of that accomplishment and what we continue to accomplish and we are striving to insure the american people take pride in the nsa. mr. chairman, madam vice chairman, and members of the committee, thank you for allowing me to be here and look forward to your questions. >> for members we will go to five minute rounds based on senority. admiral, cyber threats continue to grow in the public and private sector. nsa faces stiff competition from the private sector at recruiting those individuals with the skills that are needed. what can you offer at nsa that

silicone valley can't offer? >> i think the difference for us is we are competing for much of the same workforce. the advantage we have is not unique to the cyber mission. i experienced this over the last 35 years. it is the power of mission and serving something bigger than yourself. that is ultimately the edge we have. that is not something you can easily replicate on the outside. it enables us to attract cutting-edge technology, incredibly motivated men and women even in the face they could earn a tremendously greater amount of money on the outside. but it is that sense of purpose and ethos of culture and compliance that i think it is our greatest advantage. >> the nsa plays a role after discovering terrorist plans and intentions and communications and locations to disrupt or defeat their attack.

obviously we can't go into great detail here but to what extent do you discuss and please say what the nsa is doing to combat terrorism and more specifically isis. >> so without going into the details of how we do this, we broadly use our ability to work communications in the foreign space to generate insight as to what isis and other groups with are doing largely through our cyber and intelligence exp expertise. the challenge with the counterterrorism mission whether it is isis, al-qaeda in the arabian peninsula and i have

seen more changes in their behavior than any other target. they reference the compromise and we know they achieved a level of insight they didn't have in the past. as a result, this is becoming harder and more difficult to achieve insight as to what they are doing combined with in fairness the broader changes in technology, encryption, use of the apps that offer end to end encryption, more complicated attempts to hide in the broader set of the noise. the positive side to me is in the end it is not technology. it is about the motivated men and women of the nsa. that is our edge. i remind them the nature of our profession is we tend to gain

and lose advantage over time because technology and the opponents behavior also changes. >> admiral, why should the american people care whether you are successful or not? >> because the insight that the nsa is able to generate help to insure the security of every citizen of this nation as well as those of allies and friends. i will not pretend we are a perfect organization but i am proud of the mission and the way we do it. and quite frankly the only reason i am doing this is because i think the mission is important. >> what is your greatest resource challenge right now? >> requirements are competing for resources. the growth of cyber challenges shows the proliferation of communication technology, trying to stay on top of this with a workforce that has not grown.

we are in fiscal year '16 starting october 1st and we project this is the fifth year of the declining budget. as a leader, i have to determine how to increase what the people are relying on with decreasing fund. >> turning to the vice chairman. >> thank you. let's go admiral to the usa freedom act. how long did it take one of your analyst to do a query under the old bulk collection system and how long does it take to do a query under the new system? >> i assume how long includes getting the court's approval, the analysis going into the deciding to query the data.

under the old system, we had emergency authorities i could use that were the very quickest. under those authority, generally we could do the analysis, the team could make a case to me as to why i needed to use the emergency authority when i believed there wasn't sufficient time to get to the court, on the handful of times i did that i notified the attorney general and fisa court on why i did. each time i did it was driven by the fact we were getting ready to pursue tactical action and i was afraid it would participate a reaction from isis. that process probably anywhere from all of the analysis, briefing me, me approving it, going in and looking at data,

probably something less than 24 hours if you count everything. the average under the old system, not using the emergency bases, i think the fastest we did the process, was something on the order of two days. using the normal process the average was closer to four to six. >> how are you saying you have to use the emergency more often? you said five or six instances. >> no, we queried the data multiple times. >> you are saying it is faster now? >> no, that is under the old system. you asked me to compare old versus new. under the new system, because it is not implemented i cannot tell you. we are in the process of transitioning and that must be complete by november 28th. we have not completed the

process. that is why we said this will take a number of months to work with the providers and make the technical changes. >> sunday's new york times reported that our country will ask the chinese to embrace the united nations code of conduct that no state should allow activity that damages critical infrastructure and impairs the use and operation of critical infrastructure to provide services to the public. from your perspective, would a cyber arms control agreement along these lines be valuable and enforceable? >> that is a broad policy question, first. in terms of the input, my opinion the devil is always in the details. i would want to understand the specifics of what we are talking about. >> that is a good duck. it just doesn't crack.

let's move on, i want to ask you about the use of encrypted information by terrorist and criminals. the fbi director came before us and gave us stark testimony about going dark and how big the problem was. did you believe the increased use of this kind of encryption and apps as you pointed out poses a national security threat? >> yes, ma'am, i am concerned the direction we are going, if we make no changes is minted >> we have to get together with

the government and industry and policy side. this is a complex network and there is no simple answer here. if we put our mind to it, we can come up with a solution that is september acceptable. you don't want me or an intelligence organization making those kinds of decision. you don't want us to unilaterally do that. i am the first to acknowledge that. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator? >> thank you for your service. following up on senator fienstein's question, given the procedures on the old system, if it is an energy you can get clearance in less than 24 hours?

-- emergency -- >> under the previous framework, as the director, i was able to authorize data and had to go to the court and attorney general to put in writing why i did it and the bases >> what if it is imminent? what if you get a call that a plane took off from boston and went south when scheduled to go to montreal and said it will arrive in 15 minutes what happens? >> that is one of the reasons for the emergency authority. as we transition to the new law, i have last that authority and it has been raise today the attorney general and i will have to approach the attorney general on why she needs to authorize access. >> we are adding time to the process? >> it is probably going to be longer i suspect. we will find out.

>> based on my question and your answer something that imminent probably can't be addressed in time to put up the defenses? >> not in minutes. >> you stated in your statement here that nsa works daily to protect privacy and civil liberties. we have seen breaches of tens of millions federal employee records. we have seen breaches of well over 50 million major insurance companies in my state, we have seen breaches of everything from retail stores to you name it. obviously those occur partly because those entities did not have the procedures in place to block that and the nsa does. and yet your criticize, your agency has been criticized for

being too lose on privacy. you are collecting phone numbers whose names of individuals you don't know. the breaches are occurring with all kinds of information on when you were born, what your social security number is, bank accounts and everything else. give me again, for the record, what kind of things the nsa went through and continues to go through that protects privacy and civil liberties. and if you can an explanation of why the nsa is deemed untrustworthy of handling information but we rely on organizations that link information by the tens of

millions. >> it is one of the great challenges as a leader and i would argue as a nation that we find ourselves as a society distrustful of government at large and in the aftermath of media links nsa on broad terms. i think that is part of the broader agreement we have now. you live this every day in your political lives unable to achieve political dissonance. we acknowledge we must follow the law and operate within a legal framework and set of authorities and policy. we do not collect everything we do is driven by the law and a set of priorities as to what we do and focus on. those priorities design to

generate insight to help defend our nation not violate privacy. in the world we are living in now that is lost in the ether. i cannot go into details on why you should feel comfortable. let me walk you through what we have done but you should be comfortable with with. in terms of what we put in place to insure privacy and civil liberties you look at the legalal framework that was collectively created for the call data records, usa freedom act, and you look at the three reviews of the section 217 that called the records of collection

in general. the nsa has a law to insure oversight of the data we collect. we make sure no one in the workforce can access anything. section 215 out of an organization i told you that is close to 40,000 we have limited access to that data to approximately 30 people. we understand the sensitivity of the data we collect and week tell you from oversight that we are not arbitrarily misusing the data, opening it up to anyone in the workforce who wants to look at it. we take those duties and responsibilities very seriously

and each of the three reviews we have had came to the exact same conclusion. >> senator wyden. >> let's see if we can do the first question on bulk collection. collecting millions of phone records on law-abiding people on yes or no questions. i would like to do this on the record. do you expect ending bulk collection is going to significantly reduce your operational capabilities? >> yes. >> in what way? >> right now bulk collection gives us the ability to generate insight and we call it discovery

would this replace the current bulk collection? it was found no. under the current structure there is no real replacement and that bulk collection as used by nsa generates millions. >> the president's advisory committee disagreed with you. they had an independent group pointed and they said i believe on page 104 of their testimony that there was no value to bulk collection that could not be obtained through conventional means. let me ask you about encryption. this is a problem largely created by predecessors. general hayden and alexander in

specifically. i believe they overreached with the bulk collection that undermined the confidence of consumers and the companies responded because they were concerned about the status of their product with strong encryption. now the discussion shifted to whether there should be the availability of encryption keys to access these products. i don't want to go into anything classified but let me ask you about a policy matter. as a general matter, is it correct any time there is encryption keys that exist, it creates more opportunities for foreign hackers to get access to

the keys? >> depends on the circumstances but if you want to paint it like that for a yes and no i would probably say yes. >> i will quit while i am ahead. what concerns me is as this is pursu pursued, and i indicated from the original stance, which companies have to build weaknesses into their product which is a staggering development, it seems you just told me as the general proposition when there are multiple keys and there will be multiple keys and that creates more opportunities for malicious actors or foreign hackers. to me, the good guys are not the only people with the keys. there are going to be people who do not wish the country well.

that is going to provide more opportunities for the hacks and imaging conduct my malicious actors that makes your job harder. i think you are doing a good job and have been straight with the congress and me but that is what concerns me about access to malicious keys. look at page 104 on the question of operational capability not only do we have cases that indicate there was a compromise on the ability of the intelligence community but it was the findings of the president expert. >> senator rubio. >> thank you admiral for being here. as you were aware, the leader of the chinese communist party is going to be at the white house this week and receive the full honors of the state visit but our relationship with china is not in a good place. they breached u.s. government

databases, continue cyber attacks against the government, over the last 20 years we witnessed chinese companies stealing propriety and data and secrets and now the personal information of 25 million citizens or more. i think we should be expelling known chinese spies operating in the united states as retaliation for the cyber attacks. i think we should disconnect sensitive databases from the internet. and i think we need to make clear we will respond to deter people like china to continue to attack us. would you agree a public discussion on cybersecurity is an effective deterant? >> i think we need to have a discussion about achieving deter

bas basic. >> as the director of the nsa and commander of the u.s. cyber command have you provided advice to the president, i am not asking what the advice was, but ways to defend against attacks, and appropriate measures to respond to such attacks? >> yes. >> i understand you are not charged with creating policy but has the white house sought your opinion on these matters specifically on a more effective cyber deterance? >> yes, i am very happy in the process in the sense of i am just one perspective, but i have had the opportunity to communicate my views on what i think we need to do. >> my last question is the point i made about expelling chinese spies and disconnecting the sensitive databases from the

internet, are these measures you think are worthy and would have be part of the broader public discussion about this issue? >> in my experiencex one of the challenges we found, and my other hat dealing with penitation in the department of defense, one thing i understand is you need to minimize your exposure with what we call public interface and connection with the internet. the flip side is there is a requirement in many instances to insure information flow of the internet. >> the idea you will be able to do some of these things with no internet connection can be problematic if you expect data to flow back and forth. >> i have one last question. our doctrine and the most of all

nations is there is a difference between intelligence gathering on government versus private gathering. all nations target the government but is it fair to say for the chinese there is no distinction and the notion of intelligence gathering they view commercial intelligence and governmental intelligence gathering as part of their foreign policy? they don't have that distinction we have. >> they don't have the same lines in the hand. i watched counterparts do things there we could never do. >> many americans are not perhaps fully aware of this and the chinese government encourages as part of the national policy the stealing of commercial secrets of american

companies for purpose of building their own capability. this is not a chinese company hack an american company. this is directed influence and funded by the chinese government itself. thank you for your service. >> general warner. >> thank you were your service. let me add a comment here to the chair and vice chair. my hope would be in light of the testimony of admiral rogers that we could urge respected leaders and both parties to bring the information sharing bill back to the floor. i think we do a great disservice to our country if we don't act on that legislation as quickly as possible. >> the vice chair and i can assure all of the members we are working aggressively to get that back up. my hope is members will have an opportunity to debate and amend it if need be in the month of october. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

admiral, i will spend a couple minutes on the opm bridge with 22 million plus individuals and now understanding 5.6 million fingerprints. i know you cannot comment too much on this but we found and senator collins and i are working on legislation and looking at dhs to protect the dot gov regime, they don't have the same responsibilities at nsa to defend this. no regime with cyber hygiene and the dhs has the ability to recommend but not enforce and recognizing this might be asking for your view here. do you want to make a comment on that? >> i would argue those authorities to defend the dod network reside operationally

more on my u.s. command role. in the department of defense our culture is you are focused on generating actionable outcomes, focused on empowering individuals and clearly identifying responsibility and authority and holding people accountable. i think where we want to get to with the dot gov domain is similar over time. it is fair to say we are not there yet. >> senator collins and i have legislation that would give dhs similar command. there is a lack of clarity on who is in charge. we hear that dhs made recommends that were not implemented and a variety of other regimes were not good processes going forward. can you speak within this

setting what responsibility you have in protecting cyber and sensitive but unclassified data on the dot gov side of the house? >> i do not have immediate responsibility in the sense that the structure is that i at nsa work through dhs to provide support when it is requested. i am not in those networks. i am not monitoring those networks. >> and has dhs requested your assistance? >> yes. >> again, this is an area that i believe would be addressed as well and hopefully with an amendment to the information sharing bill and something senator collins and other colleagues share that we need to give dhs the same tools. let's me switch over to the area where senator rubio was. we have not identified the

source of the breach, but there is talk among members and the press, and my comment is we need a deterence as part of the strategy. i would like any comment you might have. we are playing on different standards but the chinese in july passed legislation that would require all of their information systems and companies that do business in china to have systems that were secure and controllable in terms of access by the chinese authorities which not only precludes any of the encryption tools that the american domestic companies are looking at and i think raised concerns. and i agree with senator wyden with there being concerns that need to be raised. but the secure language, isn't that an open ability for chinese authorities to potentially get into those companies databases

for property theft and other activities? >> the chinese have a different con instruct than we do. they believe access to the data is a sovereign right. we reject that notion. it leads to things we have seen them do and why we we have discussed this with counterparts because we want to get to a place where we can work together. but the current approach where we are apart and have been upfront this is not acceptable. we cannot sustain a long term relationship if this is the approach. the privacy of individuals, the access to individual property is something the state can chose. >> i hope our president will continue to raise this. and again mr. chairman, my hope is many of the businesses we saw meeting with the president in

seattle i hope they will not default into lower standard. >> senator collins. >> thank you, mr. chairman. admiral rogers, let me add my thank you for the dedicated service. you mentioned that only 30 nsa employees had access to the meta data authorized to query the database. am i correct that those 30 employees were well vetted, trained, and held responsible if there were misuse of the information? >> yes, ma'am. >> had there every been any misuse of the information? >> no ma', ma'am. for those 30 individuals we

monitor every key stroke they use to access the data. we don't do that for the tens of thousands of other employees. we realize the sensitivity of the data. >> i think that is a great point. to me it is ironic the usa freedom act was passed under the guide of increasing privacy protections for the american people when there are 1400 telecom companies, 160 wireless carriers. not that you are going to have to deal with all of those, but isn't it likely that far more than 30 people will now be involved in this process? >> yes, i would expect that to be the case. >> and given that those compani companies market and sell a lot of this information aren't the

privacy implications greater under the system than under the careful system you describe with only 30 people authorized? >> i would submit that is for others to decide. >> i understand why you are saying that but if one looks at the numbers the case is evident. in the usa freedom act there is no requirement for the telecom companies to retain the call detail data and by that i am not talking about content. i am talking about calls, details, and data. that is another misconception that some people have. there is no requirement that that data be held for any particular period of time. companies hold it for their own business records purpose. is that a concern to you? >> based on our initial interactions with the providers moving from the old structure to

the new structure where the providers hold the data, in talking to them there is a wide range and we are dealing with the three largest that have been the focus under previous structure. among those three, a wide range how long they opt for data. one thing i promised about the discussion that was part of the legislation was once we get into the structure i promise directive feedback on if this is working.

>> let me turn to the protection of the critical infrastructure from cyber threats and cyber intrusion which is an issue that has been a huge concern for me. the department homeland security identified more than 60 entities in the infrastructure where damage caused by a single incident could result in 50 billion dollars in economic damages or 2500 immediate deaths or a severe degradation of our national defense. your testimony, your written testimony, talked a little bit about this issue, your predecessor, general alexander pr prev previously said our nation's preparedness when it comes to protecting against oa cyber attack against our

infrastructure is a three on a scale of 1-10. where do you think we are. >> right now i would say five or six. not where we need to be. clearly. >> so there is still a severe problem in this area that makes us very vulnerable as a nation? >> yes, ma'am. >> thank you. >> senator king? >> general rogers, greetings. would a shutdown of the federal government compromise national security? >> yes, and if i could to go beyond that, in the last five days or so as we are publically talking about this possibility, watching the reaction of the workforce of the nsa at u.s. cyber command are going again, who could get jobs on the outside and earn significantly more amounts of money, this instability and message to the workforce that and this is

saying you are a secondary consideration and larger gain. >> no, no, a smaller gain. >> it just drives the workforce to the point where today i literally was talking to the leadership about we need to sit down and figure out how we will keep these men and women. >> keeping these talented men and women is hard enough to begin with because of the higher salaries outside. there is a survey i commend to your attention and i will submit for the record done late last year of national security professionals across the government and one of the fascinating results is the us political disfacs is more of a threat than north korea, russia and the many others with the only thing being above that is islamic extremism.

that is shocking. political disfacs pogo. -- disfaysfunction -- and i wan talk about this being a high priority. deterence doesn't work unless people know about it. we are in a fight. the cyber war has started. we are in the cyber war with our hands tied behind our backs. we would never build a destroyer without condguns. we talked about this before. i hope you will carry this message back. we have to fashion a theory here of detering or we will lose. you cannot defend and defend and never punch back. if you opponent knows you will not punch back it will not go anywhere. i think you understand it. >> yes, sir.

>> i hope you will take that message back. you are a very strong advocate and the right guy to take that message. >> another question that is being touched upon is the idea of a cyber non-proliferation treaty. i find this fascinating and i wish you would expand on we can establish rules of the road in the field for our mutual protection of the various countries that are cyber capable. >> i certain think we can get to the ideas of norms. formal treaty, i don't know. how do we build a construct that works is a concern for me.

states like russia or china that are willing to have this discussion, i think it's a profitable discussion. along with the idea of deterrence, because we are asymmetric include vulnerable in the war. the woes wired country on earth and that makes us the most vulnerable country on the planet. i appreciate the work you're doing. oh, you testified a few minutes ago that you had a variety of reactions from the telecoms about retention levels you. said they were short to long. what's the shortest you have been informed of? >> i want to say it's something on the order of 12 to 18 months.

>> okay. so that's on the short end. i hope you will let this committee know if it goes below that level, because at that point it becomes very problematic as to whether or not the data being retained will be of usefulness in a national emergency. >> i will. >> thank you, admiral. thank you. >> senator largeford. >> admiral, thank you for being here. i appreciate what you bring to this. what else can nsa do to help other agencies deal with cyber deficiencies? we had some public cyber deficiencies of the federal government. what assets can the neace' bring to bear to help on this? you come in to clean up the mess as much as you try to help defend. how do we get pro-active on this? >> what i'd like to do -- nsa will be part of a broader team. i'd like to be pro-active and get ahead of the problem.

>> the agencies have responsibility to make sure their systems are protected, and there doesn't seem to be a lot of accountability in the structure of the people, advising agencies. >> i'd be interested in could we build a framework where someone from outside the organization is doing an independent assessment. i can within the dod and also with nsa. i can go into any dot-mill network, anywhere in our structure, can assess it, attempt to penetrate, don't have to give notice to the network owner, as an example. that really doesn't exist on that scale anywhere necessary the government. i'd like to see what we can do to try to get ahead of the problem, try to replicate activities we're seeing from opponents ahead of time before they do it, to test our abilities. >> okay. let me ask about auditing and

how you do that for your own poo processes you. mentioned on the 30 folks in the past every keystroke has been monitored. how do you audit that in and how often? you have an incredible group of folks that serve the nation. we have had rouge folkness the past. thank you. >> so, auditing varies. as i said the 30 individuals, they call that a record database, the area we pus more external monitoring and controls than any part of our structure. on the other hand in the aftermath of the media leaks we have set back and asked ourselves, so how could tis have happened? what have we failed to do as on organization and what do we need to do sewn sure it doesn't happen again and we put a series of capabilities in place to monitor behavior, capabilities in place where we look at personal behavior more, although i well tell you this is another issue that often can provoke a

strong reaction from the work force, who says, so let me understand this, because of the actions of one individual, you are now monitoring me and now watching my behavior in a way that you didn't initially do before. die want to work in a place like that? we try to sit down with the force and walk them through, hearings what we do and i whoa. i each one of us as we voluntarily accept access to information we're begin, we hold ourselves to a higher standard. we hold ourselves to a different level of accountability. that's part of the quid pro quo here to be an nsa professional, be an nsa employee. but it is not lost on our work force at times. >> let's talk about cyber war we're dealing with internationally at this point. biggest threats we have, are they state actors, nonstate actors at this point internationally? >> let me answer this way. the greatest amount of activity is still criminal based but when

i look at from a national security perspective, i would argue at the moment the nation state represents the greater national security challenge, if you will. there's three -- when i look at the future they're three things -- i said this publicly -- the concern me most. something directed to -- tree instructive activity against critical infrastructure. number two, is manipulation, changes to data. a most most of the activity has been theft. what if someone gets in the system and starts just manipulating changing data to the point now as an operator you no longer believe what you're seeing in your system. the third area that i think about in terms of concerns about the future really go to your question, is what happens when the nonstate actor decides that the web now is a weapon system? not just something to recruit people. not just something to generate revenue. not just something to share their ideology. >> so the relationship between private struck infrastructure,

both state and local utilities and the federal government, where do you think we are on the conversation level as this point? >> we're having the conversations clearly. dhs is in the lead here. we're having the conversations. it's a little uneven. some sectors more than others. but we're all victims of the culture we're form. the culture i'm from as a uniformed individual is isn't enough to talk. you must fully get down to execution level detail how to make this work. how to coordinate this. i don't want to get into a crisis and the first time i've dealt with someone is when their network is penetrated, i'm watching data stream out in the giga bit level. and i'm going, can you tell me about your basic structure? that's not the time to have the dialogue. >> thank you. >> senator. >> thank you, mr. chairman. admiral, thank you for your service and for being here today. you and director clapper had testified before a house

committee that data manipulation and what you refer to as data destruction is probably on the horizon, and while we can't do very much about those kinds of behaviors on the part of nonstate actors, isn't it very incumbent on to us engage in discussions and as some of my colleagues referred to as proceeding toward the goal of a cyber arms control agreement with certain state actors who have that capability? >> i don't know if as an arms control agreement is the right answer -- >> whatever we -- we come to some kind of understanding so state actors do no engage in manipulation and destruction of data. just totally -- >> i would agree. we have been able historically, as sailor i can remember at the huge of the cold war we knew exactly how far we could push each other. we have to get do the same level of understanding in this domain, and we're not there right now.

>> do you know whether, with the president's china visit, the cyber issues will be discussed by the two leaders? >> i think the national security adviser of the president has been very public in saying they will raise the full spectrum of issues to include cyber if their chinese counterpart. >> i have a question relating to the opm brief. our understanding is of 24 major agencies to have declared the cyber security is a significant deficiency for their agency, and you indicated that the nsa doesn't have immediate responsibility to help these other agencies, but that you would respond at the request of the dhs. has dhs made such a request to nsa that you become engaged in helping these other dot-gov agencies to become, well, cyber safe? >> not in terms of the day-to-day per se there hasn't

been major penetration in the federal government in the last 18 months that nsa hasn't been called in to respond. i think the challenge -- i know dhs shares this -- we have to move beyond the cleanup in aisle nine scenario, to how it -- it goes to my summons to senator langford, how do we get ahead of this problem and start talking to organizations to take steps to make sure they account get, not they're already in. how do you get them out? >> are you engaged in the process with the 19 agencies -- >> not with every agency in the federal government, no. >> why not? >> under the current construct dhs has the. responsibility over the.gov domain. have to be asked. >> so it's on an agency-by-agency basis that dhs asks you? to -- and if they were to ask you to deal with all of the.gov weeds you have the resources

to --ize my first comment would be we have to prioritize. i'm expended to spend all of the dot-mill, and that same capacity is also going to work on the dot-gov, my first comment would be, we have to prioritize. what's the most essential things we need to protect. >> as in all things we have to prioritize, but i think it would behoove dhs to make such a request. thank you for your frank assessment of what would happen if theirs a government shutdown. and you also indicated in your testimony that recruiting and retaining people in what is going to be ongoing challenge for our country to stay ahead in the cyber arena -- i had the opportunity to visit our very large nsa facility in hawai'i, and i thank all the people there for the work they're doing, but can you talk at bit about what

you're doing, how aggressively you're going after the -- getting the appropriate people to sign on to work for nsa? >> so knock on wood, both our retension of our stem or high-tech nick -- technical work force, continues to be good as well as ability to recruit. we have more people trying to get with the right skills than frankly we have pace for. i am always -- i'm -- we will lose more than we can bring in. i would tell you the work force at nsa and u.s. cyber command still will talk to me about the shutdown in 2013 as an example. i get this every time, literally, when i talk to the work force around the world. sir, is this going to happen again? am i going to be told i can't come to work? i may not be paid? or i'm going to be put on furlough? again, as we did in 2013, and wt

the work force is reading is not helpful. >> i agree. thank you. >> senator cotton. >> thank you. admiral rogers, nice to see you in an open setting. and on behalf of the three million arkansasan is represent i want to thank you and the towns of men and women you represent. they're patriots and professionals and they're responsible for saving thousands of american lives. in 2014 north korea state sponsored hackers launched a cyber attack against sony pictures. sony responded by calling the fbi and ask for help. my understand is sony chose the course of action due to the fbi's expertise in this area specifically cyber forensic and defense. their belief that a crime had been committed and because of the strong relationship they had developed with the fbi.

do you believe sony did the right thing by calling the fbi? >> i am not in a position to tell you why they did it. i'm glad they reached out because then very quickly the fbi reached out to nsa and we ended partnering. never thought i would be deal waiving motion picture company about cyber security but i was grateful for their willingness to be up front and honest. we received a major penetration with a massive theft of intellectual property and we need help from the government. >> the same way we encourage a bank that's been held up oar brick and mortar company physically attacked to contact the fbi, do you believe we should encourage these private sector actors to contact the fbi? >> i think the fbi needs to be part of this. not whether it should be dhs, the fbi, part of the thing i believe we need to do is we have to simply identify things for the private sector. when i talk to companies around the united states, and i'm often approached, hey, can't you do

more directly for us? i'm going, no, i cannot under the current construction. i'm struck by them telling me, you guys have to make this easier. it is -- i can't figure out if i'm supposed to go to the fbi, dhs, you? because i'm -- for example, i'm in the financial sector sheriffs go to treasury? i think check -- collectively in the federal government we have to simply identify this so potentially one access point and everything at machine to machine speed to ensure accountability and privacy and the data is quickly disseminated across all of us because you have to bring them to bear in an orchestrate, structured way. can't be like kid with a soccer ball. everybody just runs. >> the nsa is in charge of information assurance operations for the federal government, meaning the nsa is in charge of assuring our national security systems. am i correct that the nsa from time to time will also help

federal agencies protect their unclassified systems? >> yes. when they request assistance. >> i realize this is before your time but to your knowledge did the stayed department ever ask the nasa before the wisdom of setting up a private serve sore secretary clinton could conduct state department business. >> i'm not aware if they did or didn't. >> what would be your response if the current secretary of state or another cab met member said i'd like too set up a nongovernmental server and use that to nongovernmental business? >> you really want to drag me into this one? >> i'd like your professional opinion. >> in my -- my comment would be you need to ensure you're complying with the applicable regulations and structures for the department. i'm not smart about what the rules and regulations are for every element across the federal government. >> the communications of the senior most advisers to the president of the united states, those that may be unclassified, top priority for foreign

intelligence services in your opinion? >> yes. >> if an nsa employee came to you and said, boss, we have reason to believe that russian foreign minister lavrov or the irann foreign minister is conducting business on a private server, how would you respond? >> from a foreign intelligence perspective, that represents opportunity. >> are you aware of any nsa officials who e-mail's secretary clinton at her private account. >> i have no knowledge. >> aware of any nsa officials who were aware that secretary clinton had a private e-mail account and serve center. >> now you're talking about something before my time, senator. i apologize. i just don't know the answer. >> could i ask you to check your records? >> yes, sir. >> and responsibility in writing. >> a good question f the record. >> thank you. >> to this committee, however that's just my opinion, i do

have a question. admiral, you indicated in a private session that you were taking a look at reorganization. i know that isn't completed yet. still underway. what can you share with the public about the reasons for it and what you bring -- what you believe it might bring about. >> i blame the direct -- i've been the director of the nsa for approximately 18 months and i spent the first portion of those 18 months to trying to make sure we were structured as an organization to deal with that challenge and to make sure we were in a boeing to tell or oversight as well as the citizens of the nation, we are fully client with the law and regulation and we're in a place where you should be comfortable we're able to execute our missions and ensure the protection of the dat we access as well as the broad privacy of u.s. citizens. i then pose the following question to the work force.

if we stay exactly the way we are, if we change nothing, in five to ten years, are we going to be able to say that we're the world's preeminent information assurance snorings i aid i'm asking you the question because i concern if we make know changes we can't say that. and i believe part of my responsibility as a leader, when i turn the organization over i want to be able too tell whoever relieves me, you should feel good we structured this so you're ready to do what you need to do. as a result of that i posed a series of question dozen the work -- questions to the work force from, how do we build the work force of the future to what should organizational structure look like, oh to you to optimize ourselves for cyber, because my argue. was cyber will be like counterterrorism for the last 15 years. a foundational mission set that drives us as an organization and it will require us to do things on a scale we have never done before, and to do it more

broadly. and so to do that, particularly in a decline can resource view. , we have to be more efficient to be effective, guys. as a result of that the other point i made to the team dish don't want this decided by senior leadership at fort meade. we're a global enterprise and i want them to have a vote, an input what should the organization migrant look like what do we need to structure ourselves so in five to ten years, given the changes we see in the world around us, we can say, nsa remains the preeminent signals intelligence and -- as a result of that we spent six months in the organization, the work force teed up a set of recommendations numbering in excess of 200, cover from very minor things to very broad things. there's three final area is said i want you to spend more time on, the first was the military part of the work force. i tried to remind everybody as i

said in my 'em opening statement to you, we're an enterprise come polessed of civilian employees, military men and women, active and reserved, officer and enlisted and contractors and we have to optimize every part of the enterprise to get where we need to be. the second issue was i want you to think a little more broadly about cyber. i don't think we're being far reaching up in. the last one was organizational structure. i you building nsa from the ground up, is this the structure you would create? our structure reflects a series of changes and choices that have been made of the last 20 years. the last major organizational change at nsa, on wide swath, was 1999-1998, coming up on 20 years ago now. the world has really changed and our missions have evolved, and i just want to make sure we're optimized to meet the future. and so i'll receive the final input back on those three by the

first of october. in fact i think i'll actually review a draft this week to be honest, i'm told. they think they have some initial work for know look at. as i indicated previously, once we sit down and decide what we think we ought to do it's my intention to come back to the committee in its role as oversight and say, this is what has been recommend, what i intend to do, why. this is what i think it will generate in terms of value. >> thank you. i think nsa is in good hand. thank you very much. >> thank you. >> admiral rogers, i seldom debt the opportunity to highlight north carolina's high-tech successes. especially given the fact that my vice-chairman represents silicon valley. i keep reminding her, i have the research triangle park. i'd like to note mat while there are 99 days left in the nsa's lts, net code breaker challenge, that north carolina state

university is currently ranked number one out of 182 entrants. >> is that good? >> depends on whether the admiral thinks it's important to please the chairman. >> it is good but i think it highlights again something that dianne and i both know. that that's the fertile ground you go to recruit. it's where we develop the next talent that not only works at the research triangle park or silicon valley but works at the nsa, and it really is the backbone of our intelligence organizations. admiral, your mission continues to change in large measure because of a technology explosion. and it's an explosion like we have never seen before, really. it will only speed up. it will not slow down. your mission will be impacted by the innovation. i want to say, as we conclude,

the committee is here to be a partner. we're anxious to hear your reorganization plans because the reorganization i think gives you the flexibility to move to wherever the challenge forces the nsa to go. and i speak on behalf of the vice-chairman and myself when i ask you to please go back to the 40,000 plus nsa employees and on behalf of the committee, thank them for the work they do. work that many times the american people don't understand the value of, but sleep safely at night because of the work. this hearing is is adjourned.

[inaudible conversations] >> coming up on c-span 2, senator jack reed on the senate's failure to pass to a

spending bell. then entrepreneurs on the impact of the tax candidate and regulations on american businesses. later, a hearing on the merge offering health insurance companies. >> on the next washington journal the pope's visit to new york. then a review of the pope's speech to congress with tom roberts, editor at large, including the tone, topics, religious significance, and political implications. washington gorgeous is live every morning at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span and we welcome your calls and comments on facebook and twitter. chinese president xi is in the united states this week, and visits the white house friday for meetings with president obama. we'll have live coverage the chinese president's arrival at the white house for a state dinner his honor at 6:00 p.m. eastern here on c-span2.

>> the c-span network feature weekends full of politics, nobody fiction books and american history. the pope's visit to the united states continues saturday as he travels from new york to philadelphia. live coverage starts also 4:30 p.m. eastern as pope francis speaks at independence hall. then at 7:30 p.m., the pontiff attends the festival of families which is part of the world meeting of families. moving to the road to the white house coverage, join us sunday evening at 6:35 eastern harris sadr over and presidential candidate lawrence lessic taughts about this run for precision and his suggestions to change the political system. on booktv, saturday night, at 10:00 p.m., bill o'reilly speaks on his latest book "killing reagan," a look at the ronald

reagan residents political and tear -- and then on sunday, doug casey sits down with c-span to discuss his latest book on politics and economics. on american history tv on c-span3, saturday evening, 7:00 eastern, we're live from gettysburg college to mark the anniversary of dwight d. eisenhower's birth. and sunday afternoon, at 4:00, on real america, an archival film documenting the 1963 visit of the king and queen of afghanistan to the united states, which included a meeting with president kennedy and a parade through washington, dc. get our complete weekend schedule at c-span.org. >> thursday, the senate failed to move forward on a bill to keep the federal government funded after next week because of a provision in the measure

that defundedded planned parenthood. following the vote, senator armed services member jack reed spoke on the floor about his disappointment with how government funding is being handled. this is 25 minutes. >> mr. president, i rise today to join my colleagues in support of a clean, shore-term continuing resolution or, as we say, c.r., to temporarily fund the government without controversial patrol si riders. -- policy riders. after the vote we just had i hope we can move to such a measure. even some republican leaders have acknowledged this previous vote was a show vote, expect told appease but to fail. part of a pattern emerging over many months of avoiding meaningful bipartisan talks to fix the budget and waiting until the last moment to deal with issues that everyone knows must

be addressed. we have an obligation to the american people to keep their government working. it is one of the most buysic responsibilities we have as members of congress. a clean cr at this juncture fulfills the obligation, keeping the government open for a few more weeks while we work on plan to eliminate the sequester caps for defense and nondefense programs. i wish we could have begun work on the overall agreement further in the year as advice chairman mull cow ski and others strong he urged months ago. bit at this late hour we should pass the short-term measure and mover on to serious negotiations about budget caps for this year and beyond. shutting government down now will not serve any useful purpose but a shutdown will waste taxpayer money, and hurt the economy. and indeed the two-week run government shutdown in 2013 cost the economy billions of dollars.

based on that experience, here is some of what we can expect if there's another forced shutdown this year. >> department of health will have to furlough work force. payments will be delayed to roughly 3,000 local public housing authorities that manage the countries publicly assisted housing programs and shifting the burden on to them, causing hem to turn to the local municipalities, who are equally stressed in terms of the budgets. so, there's no avoiding the pain. in fact it's multiplied if we shut the government down. thousands of home sales and mortgage refinancing packages backedby the federal housing administration, fha. will be put on stanby, people ready to close, ready to make a commitment to a home, keeping

the economy moving, will be told, stand back. wait and see. cities, counties and states will not be able to move forward with block grant project ford running important local economic investment. a program that affects every community in this country, and it's something that is a very positive, constructive way to give local leaders the resources to fund local initiatives that the community desperately wants and needs. this is not big washington. this is local america, getting a chance to see their projected put in place. the federal aviation administration will not be able to verify -- rather -- certify knew aircraft, interrupts billions of dollar inside sale. the pipeline and hazardous materials safety administration will be forced to stop investigations in emergency response training. classrooms will be shuttered for 700 midshipman at the united states merchant marine academy

in new york. and these are young men and women who are committing themselves to serve the nation either directly in the armed forces of the united states or as members of our merchant fleet, and they will basically be told to go home. and financial support for marry tine excuse me property or the msp, and this is an important private public partnership critical to serving our troops serving overseas. these are just a few examples from two of the departments under my purview as the rank member on the transportation subcommittee there are many other examples throughout the redder government that my colleague outside will be talking about today. knowing the result that shut down and these hardball tactics brought before, it's hard to believe that some still are willing to resort to budget

brinksmanship again. i know many of my colleagues on the other side share my concerns. i want to commend senator collins who has been an excellent leader for her support of a clean cr. she has done extraordinary work under very difficult and challenging circumstances, and her support for a clean rr so we, negotiate a longer term budget solution, is indicative of the kind of forthright, thoughtful, and in some cases very courageous service she rendered for the country. let's remember the bigger problems we face in fiscal year 2016. we're here because of the budget control act, and its intended sequester level caps on discretionary spending. let remember sequester an caps -- the cuts were considered

to be so stream that congress would not let them happen but they would embrace defense and knopp defense, they would be an action-forcing mechanism to cause us on a bipartisan basis to come up with a long-term budget solution. and unfortunately, that solution did not materialize over time. we had, i think, very good work of senator murray and congressman paul ryan to come up with the two-year suspension but we're right back where we were in the sequester cappers staring us flight the face. today, rather than working together to tack then sequester, we're on the verge of orchestrating another fiscal crisis, and it's not a crisis that will help the american people. rather, it will hinder the american people, and indeed the

members on both sides recognize the caps should be raised for both defense and nondefense appropriations. indeed, both the defense authorization and defense appropriations bills carry bipartisan sense of the senate's language that says, sequestration relief must be accomplished in fiscal years 2016 and 2017, and sequestration relief should include equal defense and nondefense relief. so you have a bipartisan consensus these two committees that represent a significant number of our colleagues who are saying we have to end this. and they're saying it because they believe that, as i do, i think, our national security rests not just upon adequate numbers of the department of defense but adequate investment

for all our federal programs. so we must focus on eliminating these draconian spending caps. we know these caps will cause real harm to programs across the federal government that our constituents rely on. these are not academics. these are not issues that could be dismissed as being some programs that are image effective. these are across the board cuts that hit all of us and hit them hard. indeed, months ago, chairman mccann and i wrote the budget committee to include a higher number for the defense. asking them to ignore the bca caps and produce a budget that realistically recognizes the base needs of the department of defense. not the one-time spending of

overseas contingency but the routine spending project forward. and somebody came -- worked in extraordinarily good faith to try to get such a provision, including budget resolution, but he did not succeed, and in response, the use of the overseas contingency fun was incorporated to skirt the budget amount. speaks e essentially what the committee has done -- essentially what the defense has done, the defense authorization committee, has taken the president's budget numbers but moved money out of the base budget into oco, beyond the president's request, and what you're doing is creating this oco funding mechanism as a -- in a sense a gimmick to cover the real costs, the ongoing costs, the routine continuing cos of the department of defense.

that's not good for defense either. because of this, i was unable to support legislation on the floor for the bill that in many, many other respects, virtually every other respect, was extremely well done and extremely thought out, and again i will commend the chairman and my colleagues. so, i clearly disagree about using this oco funding arrangement, gimmick, sleight of hand, whatever you want, is the way to proceed forward. relying on it essentially pre-empts the defense from the budget control act, and leaves everything else under those onerous caps and not only not adequately and realist particularly funding defense, but seriously eroding national security, because national

security is something more than simply what department of defense does. it's the department of state, the department of homeland security, a myriad other funks that will not see funding. in fact see their funding shrink dramatically. if we use this approach this year with the argument it's just a bridge to the day we finally get ourselves together, i think we're deluding yourselves because i think it will be much easier next year to put even more money into oco to take programs that are traditionally funded through the base budget of the department of defense and say went don't have room, let's put it in oco. it's the gift that keeps on giving and will not provide the real resources and the certainty that the department of defense needs over many years to plan for their operations. to stick things in in one-year funding, is not to tell the

defense you can be confident two or three years from now when you developing that new weapon systems platform, the money will be there. it may but again it may not. we can't give them that insecurity. we have to give. the a sense of certainty. now, this is the view that is shared not just by myself and from colleagues here on both sides of the aisle but about senior defense department officials. they testified repeatedly that oc-lo funding dot not provide long-term budget certainty. they need that, and the troops, the men and women they lead, need that. and in fact really just allows you to plan for one year, and very few programs in the department of defense that are one-year programs. a major weapons system is a multiyear development, and then product process. strategy is not year-by-year. it's over several years at least. and so this is not an efficient

and effective way to run the organization. budget planning in the department of defense at least requires five years. that's the standard. the standard measure. the five-year program forecast, budget forecast, and we're telling them, well, this year you could have a bonanza, next year, could be more could be less. could be much less. not the way to efficiently allocate resources for national security and to efficiently develop a strategy to counteract an increasing array of threats across the globe in many different dimensions and many different regions. i we go down this path, it will lead to instability for troops and families, for our defense, industrial base, and again, i think they deserve certainty, not a year-to-year, perhaps,

maybe, maybe, perhaps, approach. also need to -- repeated before that national security ills not just the department of defense. other agencies are critical, department of state, department hoff homeland security, department of justice, department of treasury, assault the terrorist financing sanctions who have to trace funds, crawling around the world to ensure they do not aid and assist terrorist activity or other ma line activities. they need resources, too. but taking this approach is a sense of using the -- this oco approach for defense and then letting everything else stay on the bca will not give these agencies they resources they need. i was struck a few days ago -- they were testifying and one critical area against isil is

informational. they have proven to be extraordinarily adept at using social media, at communicate through the internet, and one of the questions of my colleagues was very thoughtful and fundamental. is the state department doing enough to counteract, as one of our major foreign policy organizations, this information campaign by isil? and the general sort of chuckled a bit and said, well, let me tell you, when i was commanding, on active service, the state department had to come to me and essentially borrow a million dollars from centcom funds so they could get in the ball game. just get in the game in terms of information warfare. it's counteracting measures. public campaigns of information in countries throughout the globe, particularly the middle east. and that will be much, much worse if we proceed down this

path, and we will not be enhancing our national security. if the isil measure -- message, rather, is unanswered, if they're able to attract from around the globe because all they hear is this grotesque violent discussion of isil and what they propose and there's no counterargument? , now countervailing point? we lose that information warfare and that's knot just a dod function. now, we have to make these investments in both the defense and nondefense. as i said before, if we stick with these caps, our nondod programs will suffer, and in addition to that, the needs of the american people will suffer. will not be able to investment in adequate transportation and water infrastructure.

we won't be able to do things that provide, a quid and decent housing for citizens, and under the budget caps, we'll lose jobs, too. when resources diminish, the need for a workers diminish and that's going to happen. now, we have a situation, particularly where some of the most vulnerable americans wouldsive grievously. and just a few examples again. the housing program has been cut in half since 2010. even when we know that the united states population is aging faster. every member of this senate has numerous elderly housing programs in their state. their citizens rely and it i suspect they take pride in the fact there is adequate housing,

and some cases not enough adequate housing but at least some adequate housing. they're all suffering. so 7.7 million is very low income renters in the united states and that means they pay more than 50% of their income in rent or live in substandard housing, or both. they're living in substandard housing and paying half of their monthly income for rent. if these budget caps go into effect, then the bill will not include meaningful funding for the affordable housing production programs available to local governments. this trend, which is disturbing, will not only continue, it will accelerate. when we turn away from the rental assistance program wes have for many, families, many seniors. if we look at public housing with a significant population of seniors and disabled americans.

they're facing more than $3 billion in capital needs just to keep them repaired. just to make them places that are decent to live in. something that people can have appropriate hall -- hallway lighting, elevators that work, plumbing systems that work. the basic. this is not whirlpools and spas and jacuzzi. thissest just keeping basic requirements and maintenance and capital repairs. those $2 billion in capital needs for more than one million of these households and public facilities. will leave us, if the budget cap is in effect, with the same level we had in 1980. that is going back about 30 years. 30 years ago, relatively speaking, we would be spending as much, if not more, on simply maintaining public housing.

these are real world consequences. again, if bca comes in in terms of the funding. funding for transportation fall while ridership is going up. our our subway systems, light rail systems have been enjoying increased ridership and threat good for people to get to work, good for the environment because of displacing the universe individual volleyballs. it's good for -- individual annuals but -- individual automobiles but we'll see a system stat is less eliable and effective and you resident lute the riders and incidents where you have significant safety concerns. you have significant disruptions. it's not uncommon or the last several months here in washington to hear on the radio that a whole subway line has

done down because of maintenance or something else and that day's work force doesn't get to the office for three or four or five hours and guess what? that costs a lot of private employ years a great deal of money because the people aren't doing the work. and they are -- weren't probably being paid. so eveningly this impacts the -- essentially impacts the economy and will multifly if we start cutting where the money is suggested in the bca. budget control act. enough it's time to work together. it's time tone act first a clean cr to give us time to address systematically and comprehensively the issues that are staring us straight in the face because of the bca. the sequester caps on defense and nondefense. it's time to be able to move as i believe the vast majority of my colleagued want to, the excess oco funding back into the

regular budget of the department of defense, as we raise the budget cap, and as we raise the budget cap -- the department of defense to recognize we have to raise the cap for not only national security agencies to protect our country, but also for other agencies in order to invest in our economy, keep us productive, keep people employed, and also keep faith with -- keep pace withthousands and thousands of americans who have worked hard but now they need the benefits of public housing. they are seniors in need for rental assistance. they need support of a good transit system to get to work, if if they're a senior citizen to get to a doctor's appointment. and they're counting on us. so, i hope all of my colleagues can come together, form an agreement, avoid a shutdown, and then do something more than just

keep the lights on. invest across the board in our people and watch those investments multiply to a productive, successful economy and a more secure america. with that, mr. president, yield the floor, and i would neat the absence of the quorum. >> a reporter with political records opening congress, going to talk to us about the status of the temporary government spending bill, the cr, or continuing revolution resolution. the senate took the first votes on temporary spending bill. tell us the details of the legislation and what the result was. >> well, the legislation that they voted on today would have funded the government through december 11th but also cut offered funding for planned parenthood and so it failed. didn't even get a majority today. this is essentially an exercise to prove to the house that a spending bill defunding planned parenthood cannot pass the senate and would shut down the government if that was the

position that both the chambers took. >> and now eight senate republicans voted against advancing the cr. you tweeted out their names. here's a look at that. heller, paul, murkowski, kirk, collins, cot top, ayotte, and man'sup. why are they voting no. >> you have consecutives arguing that they want to see a more robust spending process. cotton said the military got short-changed. rand paul says this is business as usual, although he still supports defunding planned parenthood, and then people are just trying to disassociate themselves with any threat of a shutdown ask that's lisa murkowski, mark kirk, sues can collins, kelly ayotte types. they just don't want to play games with this, and kelly ayotte in particular. she came to senate floor to

blast the tactic from senator ted cruz that would risk a shutdown over planned parenthood. so trying to get a distance from defunding plat plaid in a government funding bill. >> well, you wrote at bit about what majority leader mitch mcconnell's strategy was, and moving forward, what are we looking at here for this cr? >> the senate is now essentially on kind of a -- it will take a few days but a glide path 0 a clean cr which will fund the government and not touch planned parenthood. and so senator mcconnell is expected to set up votes on this on monday. they'll probably finish work on this on tuesday. the government shuts down on thursday so on wednesday the house will be confronted with this question of do we swallow the clean cr or shut down the government some left them with no other options. >> let's look at the house. things are active over there very much in motion. what has been happening?

speaker boehner meeting with what is call the freedom caucus. who are they and what are they talking about hip the closed doors. >> the freedom caucus is a group of several dozen, almost dissent republicans who want the leadership and specially boehner to take a harder line on almost everything, and on this in particular, they've thenned to vote against any spending bill that doesn't defunded planned parenthood. and that's the kind of choice that boehner has to make, whether he crosses them. he may face a referendum on his speakership but i if he doesn't he will get blamed and his party blamed for a government shutdown. >> they're meeting on friday. what do we expect might be come ought of the doors when they depart the room? >> my guess would be the strategy that boehner is floating right now at this point, leads to a clean cr and continue the fight against planned parenthood and also has

some anti-abortion legislation that would be separate from that, and my guess is, that's not going to do it for a lot of of the freedom caucus and a significant amount of republicans who are going to have hard time voting for anything that funds planned parenthood. so, you're probably going to hear a lot of complaints. you will probably hear plenty backing for boehner from people that want a more responsible path that does not risk a shutdown, and then probably going to hear next week that democrats are going to have to help boehner pass the cr to keep the government funds if that's the ultimate direction he chooses. but it's a listening session tomorrow. trying to figure out exactly where everybody is. >> would he have enough support if he tried to combine if democrat inside. >> i believe he would but that would raise the question, about his own political future, whether he can keep leading house runs if he has to pass more legs with democrats carrying a lot of the load. he has got an lot of criticism having to rely on democratic votes in the past, and also

wants to keep the trains running on time. so it's difficult to do that with only republican votes. >> government funding expiring on wednesday. we'll keep following you, your twitter handle is at burgessev, and you're write agent political.com. >> thank you very much.

>> an opportunity for students to think critically of issues of national importance by creating a five to seven minute documentary in which they can express those views. >> getting involved because it gives them the opportunity and a platform to have their voices heard on issues that are important to them so they can express those views by creating a documentary. we do get a wide range of entries. the most important aspect for every documentary that we get is going to be the content. we have had winners in the past created by just using a cell phone and others that are created using more high-tech equipment. but once again it's really the content that matters, and shines through in these documentaries. the response from students in the past has been great. we have had many different issues they created videos on. we have topics from education, the economy, the environment.

really showing thed wide a rite of issues that are important for students. >> having -- would have many positive impacts. >> just -- we have definitely come to the con ken sunday that humans cannot run without food. >> prior to the individuals with disabilities education act, or the idea, children with disabilities were not given the opportunity of an education. >> at this year's theme is road to the white house. what's the most important issue you want the candidates to discuss in the 2016 presidential campaign. it is full on into the campaign season. many different candidates discussing several issues. one of the key requirements in creating a document is to include some c-span footage. it should compliment and further their point of view and not just dominate the video, but a great way for them to include more information on the video that furthers their points. >> first bill, i'll sign today

is the water resources reform and development act, also known as wrda. we also heard about the school meals and going up the -- burnt fish sticks and mystery meat tacos. >> a votal role of the federal government. especially vital for stupes with dippability. >> students and teach efforts can go to the web site, student cam.org, and on the web site find more information about the rules and requirements. but they will also find teacher tips, rubrics to help them incorporate into the classroom, more information at prizes, incorporating c-span video and ways to contact us. the deadline is january 20, 2016, which is exactly one year away from the next presidential up in racing. -- inauguration. >> the commission on presidential debates has announces the sites and dates to