the afghans have tried to put the right leadership in placee e and continue to fight andople protect the people. veryall the number securities tax compare from 2014 and 15 isr difficult.r, it has been a test fight sir, on both sides.rner but >> i will yield the balance of o my time. i have one comment to make and it is a plea. i know you can't discuss the ericanp incident and conduits, i would plead with you sir, please do not let the crew of thatnd tt aircraft nor those americans that were on the ground thate, guided that fire where they did, become scapegoats.oats. >> sir we have investigation anr the investigation will give me the facts. i'll make sure the committee has all that as we

learn more. >> thank you sir. >> thank you mr. miller. i like to echo mr. miller's, that everyone is concerned about tha investigation and how it ended. those who had no involvement in us the and a mistake.t ha general you and i headache conversation about the report,1, we first got the 9/11 commissiot report delivered to congress it had chapter 12 that detailed what we needed to do in future e e shouldn't do. it specifically set our fight was not against al qaeda and a summa been bottomed solely, if if we viewed our fight is that wextre would lose. it was islamic extremism andter worldwide terrorism. when we look at iraq, it is clear that we have not heraldede chapter 12. we have seen isis take hold, ano now threaten our homeland. you have made recommendations that we continue to hold troops inaf. afghanistan, you both isil

there. can you tell if you did withtr john troops down to a level of ef00 the effect on the safety of our troops and the ability ofcon our effectiveness for counterterrorism actions?to - >> sir if came down to 1000 as you just discussed, there is no counterterrorism structure forco in those numbers. if you draw down to that size in one location, your solely dependent upon protection for tt that particular site. outer layers that we would not have, that we have had in the past. i'm not sure if that answers my court soon. >> it to does it cripples our i ability to undertake those actions. when you jot to those forces ara those forces at greater risk without a larger footprint e ention work.

>> so if they're in one location the enemy would know it they were at.o everythi we make sure we could doumb whatever we could to mitigate as we continue to draw down, every commanded her will make surehe they have the right protection. >> with the effects enter the country. >> sir thousand number, there is no allocation in that. >> thank you. >> thank you jenna for your service and testimony hereu hava today.mo you have probably one of the most complex missions that youbl could possibly even imagine. again, we appreciate your wa efforts.ks again i want to associate myself with mr. miller's remarks about thert investigation.rders, i i think it is important to_when you're talking about doctorsnd a

without parties it was almost ar year ago when they're working hand-in-hand in africa taking on the a bowl a challenge. they ara a valuable international resource. that is why i do think it requires the absolute top level of scrutiny andan independence in the investigation. i would like to turn for a moment, your comments regarding afghan security forces. at at the end of the day,se a i thinkt is the linchpin in terms of the strategy to hand off power and t security in that part of the world. in particular, the alt, alt, of semp comment you made in interesting, about how they were mis-employed, clearly when we're talking about corruption issues and the need to root out corruption, they frankly have been a big topic of conversation. now with just major-jri criticsf u.s. forces over there but with people who want to help the missions.

can you talk about where president donnie is in terms of the alt, the criticism is that they haven't gone rogue out there a lot and there have been complaints within the civilianhe population with how they operate. >> thank you for the question. we have looked at the alt andiz police very hard in the last several months.ff there's about 30,000 and 174o districts. what has been done recently is e new directive to go out to thegt police chiefs to make sure theyt have done the right betting, the right training, they have the right leadership in place and they don't misuse them. in some places they'll put out smaller checkpoints in theen thg village and they're trying to be that village security. when the

get taken out five or 10 kilometers without mutual supporting fires, withoutargets support, then they become easy targets for the taliban and andn other insurgent groups. not only because of that and th, casualties that have been taken, forc have potentially some issues with leadership taken advantage of that. he has done a holistic scrub scrub of the altt and will continue to force thee place and ef to meet the same standardsso in place.he hhe in some places they haven't don it well. he has reenergized that o that.working hard to d this past weekend he yet all th. police chiefs back in the cobble and the entire conference was od al t.ower >> i think that would send a thwerful message that there is realer change happening if therr reforms the government can thely talk about. >> what mr. davis talked about it put conditionality on the alp. if they do do not getures e through the reforms, if they

don't abide by all the procedures, then we do not pay. rage is a is a condition we put on them. >> that sounds like pretty goodd leverage. thank you i yieldk. back. >> mr. wilson. >> thank you mr. chairman i andc greatly to see bipartisan support of your efforts. i'veven had the great opportunity, 12 opportunity, 12 times over the years of my service in congress to visit, i've seen a civilspir society society developed, it id so inspiring to go along streets and seat little girls with white scarves went to school. it warms your heart. then to see little guys with baseball caps that is notindiget indigenous to afghanistan, these are people who are truly working to develop a civil society.maki i want to thank you. it is alsot very personal, my appreciation of your service.un my younger s

nunter, served as an engineer i afghanistan for one year. i know one year. i know he was making aat -- difference by helping build and rebuild that country.onali'm so that to protect american families at home, and you have. additionally, i additionally, i am grateful as a veteran. my unit serve their, it was the trainst deployment from south carolina since world war ii. 1600 troops. they were spread they were spread all over the country. there helping train forces, they were so inspired, these these are lifelong friends of minmiend and would let me know they think. they think and know that they were working with who they identified as their afghanuch brothers. i remember the first time i went to afghanistan was sheila jackson lee, she pointed out thatad bad news has no feet, god news has no feet and bad news has wings.e

the good thing is extraordinary progress has remained. i agree with the chairman to, success is to deny safe havens which protects american families. we cannot forget forget it was september 11, 2001 the attacks are country culminated from a case in afghanistan. i'm appreciative of your efforta in the largely bipartisan support we have here. with that in mind, with special operations alliance with support of conventional forces how can special operations fill in this gap?on >> sir, today we look at tactical levels that continue to build the afghan capacity. we do not have conventional lerces at the brigade level. i only have them at the cored te

level and at the ministry levele we are not really doing thatfoe. much with the conventional side. special operating forcesgrea ngntinue to do great work everyi single day. >> with your leadership, i appreciate. i am concerned about the information intelligence sharing between the u.s. and afghan national defense securita forces. as it leads to operations in afghanistan, can you speak of what is necessary to improve tha coordination throughout the country? >> we have a dedicated effort, we saw them essential function seven which is strictly intelligence and how we work with the moi to share intelligence and build intelligence capability, their enterprise. we have made great strides there. they recently done a non-threat center which brings in intelligence from moi, mod, nds,

the intel organization to produce national level targets. they never had that before. thei difference that is making is pretty huge. we continue every day to build upon theirn capacity, we have seen some grades progress in some of the operations even on the tactical level. not only in the hardware side, also the human capital cyber intelligence. >> that is so important to prevent collateral damage which of course is your goal. as i conclude again, i, i am so your grateful for your service and your service to of american personnel. having been there i've seen, myr first visit there the country was totally disc roi. it was consequence consequence of a 30 year civil war.o there's nothing to see except se rubble. then to see that rubble removed, the streets paved for the first time. to see a shop develop, see f opportunity for schools, for bridges to be built, we sentuch.

units to work on agriculture to advance. thank thank you very much. i yield my. time. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you general for being here today.y. your eciate very much testimony, like so many and many americans, i was so alarmed of the tragedy of the doctors without borders facility in afghanistan. i look for to your investigation in a hopefully a very arensparent one. i appreciate how serious you are taking us. i want to go to a different in place and questioning, how bestf for afghan to secure their country and what kind of support is necessary to aid them in thao effort? i would like to hear more about what you are doing to ensure afghan women, 50% of the

opulation is part of your process. i've been part of a delegation at least six trips overvi that focused on one f visiting with our women whowe'ro served us and for whom w e are grateful, also on an emphasis of learning more of the changesghad that our presence has brought in the lives of afghan women. it has been very promising, over and over again we hear the real differences that have taken th place. i remain concerned that whatever our way forward may be, how best we secure those beings.don' we don't trade them away and a n reconciliation process, we don't adequately trained afghan national security forces, whether it's local police, the y national police whatever it may be. requires a culture change. that culture change has begun but it fragile. i would like to hear, in in your work with the train, advise, and

assist security forces how you o address the rights of women so that the security forces that hopefully will remain in place,k are also committed to securing the lives of women who are verye much a part of their country question. >> thank you for the question. every day present colony and th dr. speak of this, their leadership in our continued our future sist that to engage women in the military continues to improve. they put more of a spotlight on it and continue to assist with emphasize not the committee. this earmarked money has helped us emphasize not only ato infrastructure to house and take care of women in the military, protect them, it has been critical. we think about that. of that. i have a women's advisory committee that i cochair, ituarr meets quarterly to talk about different issues. weee at my level in her level we meet

quarterly but the committee meets weekly.g we in fact over the last month or so it has been meeting weekly ty push women's issues with theit's army. for the police, it is is easier to recruit women into the polick , they go through training and conserve where they're at. >> but general the question i'm asking, i think it's verytever, important the security forces, local police whatever reflect thend population. i appreciate the efforts, especially congresswoman davis to make sure we at least provide some elements and female presence in the afghan national security forces. the reality reality is, most of those forces are men. a they have had a certain histori approach to women. it is really about how we train the men to protect the rights of women. t i'm curious to how that peace ih moving for.

>> they do some of that and womn their officer training, basic basic training, not only the rights of women but men. they continue to work that.r they continue to get after thaty as they see more women in positions of increased responsibility, they see more womene who are tied with aatior special operating forces to go t on objectives, search other thndles, and is pretty incredible.ontr when other men see this and hown they contribute, it does have a change in attitude.l cont as you know, the army and police have only been around for a couple of years. it will take yo times, we do put conditions as u well on recruiting women, howit, they do that, i think it will tk continue to improve. as you said, it will takees tim, it took time for the united states army for 240 years to get above 15 or 16% at west point. n this is something they're focusing on. g

besay good things for it. >> you spoke of conditionality and how you've use that as leverage to achieve certainour goals, is that a tool in your toolbox as you move for question work..el >> yes ma'am,d absolutely absolutely. >> thank you, i'm yield back. >> thank you for being b here, you'll mentioned about your that s and the role they play, you think them and i want to make sure they hear that same kind of thanks and heartfelt the admiration for what they have done and allowing your team to do it you do. we thank them very much in our behalf. in the recent attack, what can we glean from what thewhat w television did and the afghan response, what kind of advice and assistance to we provide them in that response. in or was it all them. >> thank you for the family fora piece as well.

quite frankly the afghan security force was surprise, did president connie has directed ao commission to takeo a look andof figure out what happened. we continue to work that now. in ae nutshell, congress has about 250,000 people in it, predominantly inside the city's police, outside the predominantly inside the city's police, outside the city there are pockets of the army. over the period ofrs the holidab some of the army was not president. the the tele- band probably has a lot already insidegh the town, right after that time. the attack from within the city, the police fought, although they do not take a lot of casualties. when they do not see reinforcements from the army, it kind of method out. i don't think the taliban hadfl. any intentions to hold conduits it they got a good victory in their race and their flight. the difference here, i think foc they the afghan security forces responded quickly. they moved supplies step there, change leadership l out, once tf

got back into the city, the taliban for the most part left. there continue to be isolated pockets of resistance in fighting, very small grou inside an urban area.people they continue to work that. hari i talked with administrator who is in conduits then he told me that he sees that is stillan fragile but he is confident that all the major aries that they own. what do we provide sir, for the, most part of was afghan lead, they got themselves back into the city. i had a few special operating teams that were south of thee el city that provided some planning, training training advice for the special operating forces. i so put advisory team in ane airfield south to they could provide the core level headquarters of logistical planning capability to oversee the afghans.

>> what kind of marks when theye get for running the trainings ot time, water, electricity all thu things that you expect government to service, what does that tell us. the conversation as it is a fragile government and not likely to be resilient, can you talk about that. >> if you are a cobble, for the most part you give them a c.gh g with high profile attacks insidn of cobble that would be lower.fr if you are in that outskirts in a faraway your gray would below. much lower because they haven't seen some of the governed mintse they have seen at that level. the national government, on 20 september of september that was one year, they continue to move forward. it is a very tough environment,u

they continue to improve. that may change in almost all of theo administers. they changed out the governors. they governors. they have key positions to work on together. level policies dght there is no daylight between them, the issues that happens when it comes to pick picking people. they understand how important that is.ty they will try to do what they can to make this work.ga they do have to engage bettere i with the afghan people, not onli only a cobble but outside the city. >> in the time we have left, can you give us what the financial e supports, we so we can already s afford the forces we have, talk about what you see as their hea purchasing the fight?rsaw >> i don't think right now welyf have donor fatigue, i don't i think the international community understands how important this is. at the summit we will look at

future funding. afghanistan has to continue show progress as t they move forward. that donor supports iso absolutely crucial because afghanistan cannot afford what they have now. they are working at heart, pres. connie is the right guy to do t>>hat with his experience. >> thank you. mr. >> chairman. general first thank you for your service and your leadership, through you i want to thank all of the men and women who are currently serving in afghanistan and who have served in the past. i would ask you a few questions about the bombing and the attac on the hospital. i recognize there is an ongoingk investigation but i want to ask army per your knowledge by the afghanistan national army call that strike at that location.

>> 's are again, that is a question we're asking investigation, i would not want to get out in front of the investigation. i need to learn those facts.inv there is a dod investigation, it will be very thorough, transparent. as soon as i get the details how make sure the committee has it.toqu >> is there ever a scenario where it is okay to esstrike at. hospital? >> hospital is a hospital is an protective facility, we would not target a hospital. when the afghans call for fire, that is not an automatic response. every dayai the afghans asked ft air support, we just don't goe . anyplace. has to go through a rigorous procedure. a u.s. w a u.s. process under the u.s. o authorities, so that is where ww have to figure outan what happee in that case. i don't want people to thinkny

that just because people the afghan people asked for fire does not mean it was automatic was sent. >> are you of where pressing reports within afghanistan that that hospital was treating tele- band and non- tele- band combatants alike, which raised the thought of conducting a raid at that hospital days or weeks before that strike. sn >> i have seen media reports. >> i would not be a justification for strike on hospital.tike o >> no. >> related question, and one that you can speak of.erms can you talk about the terms of our security agreement wh afghanistan and under whichndit condition we can easily lethal force. i understand there are exceptions for counterterrorismt activity for these, there are

exceptions for when u.s. forces are under attack and there are exceptions for urgent situation. could you characterize our involvement in conduce undergogo that? a >> sir again i'm not going tobot lllk about what happened there. i would not do that in a public hearing. i would would be happy, to discuss that with the enclosed hearing. ght >> this might be my last question.e the how do you balance the need to a ensure that we are adequately supporting the afghan national army, not abandoning them, andan d noinuing with the train, assist, and advise operations. at the same time not creating a prolonged moral hazard where they note u.s. of port will be there year in and year out.

where they may not make some ofi their difficultnv political decisions, investment decisions in their own armed force capabilities, for their leadership that otherwise might be made. >> that is a good question we work that very hard every day. we know and that's why you can't compare with other fighting seasons, the level of forces that we have, where we do train advise and assist, the ability press to provide close air support. there is no doubt in my mind that military was on the afghan side and it is different. they have to pick up the fight him want this more than we wanted. i. i have seen a change of behavior on that.ther i don't see that as an issue. what i think they're looking at now is how long we are continue to support the international

community and the u.s. will continue to be there. continued to provide supportppoi would make a huge impact withpe supporting pres. connie and the afghan people. the impact it would make on the tele- band, i the message it sends to nato anw others, the decisions upcoming would have an impact on all of those audiences. >> when will be likely get the results of your investigation on the attack westmark.i >> i talk yesterday with the investigating officer, i should have some preliminary investigation results in thed next, yesterday i was asked about 30 days. i don't have ants exact date but a make sure you have information.sc >> thank you.nel, t thank you for being here. a few quick questions and then i'll specifically get to the thb air support capabilities.

harry reid promised earlier thit week to uphold the president's bid veto, the president has not opportunitat legislation yet. i was wondering if you and they other leaders have had the opportunity to speak with the president about the importance of the and eaa since it has passed. how do you assess the additional risk if that bill is vetoed in the detail is upheld by senator reid. >> to be candidate i have not talked to the president on it. the last several weeks i've beet focused on afghanistan. i cannot give you good answer here. >> we asked you to do an awful luck, i want to send, with nome budget, certainly you and your men and women are being judged

standard of perfection and that is kind of an unfair scenario that we put you in and animan extremely important mission. i represent an air force base we are training the afghan politics to flight the 29th, one of the key aspects and capability gaps is the close air support. you are expecting these aircraf in theater pretty soon, we originally planned for 40 of them, we are we are now expected to deliver 20. >> .. delivered? how many do you need? and, could you speak to just that issue generally? >> sir, we are looking forward to get the a-29 super socani. i'll six in december time frame and more in '16 and '17. we don't close out the program of record i think until mid to

late 2018. that's a great camability they're lacking. i have asked for a study to take a look at the close air support capability of afghanistan in a rotary wing and fixed wing cape b89. until that goes through, i couldn't make a call on numbers but we are looking at 20. i don't get the first five or six until the end of this year and we look forward to that. the afghans look forward to that yes, sir. >> you think they have the ability -- they have enough impact to change the fight? >> sir, if they would have had the a-29 this summer, it would have been a game changer in some locations. yes, sir. >> thank you, general, for your service and what you and your men and women do. i yield the remainder of my time. >> mr. lanzman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general, i want to thank you for your testimony here and most especially for your service to

our nation which is invaluable and i hope >> i hope you will pass our appreciation on to the men and women under your command. first of all, again, i would like to better understand the current situation in afghanistan. i'll also serves aserve to better serve our men and women in uniform and coalition partners underground. we are seeing lives lost in this conflict. i recently killed. we had to dohave to do everything we can to ensure that our policies in afghanistan maximize our strategic gains while minimize the tragic loss of lives we see too frequently across the headlines. the tragis of lives that we have seen too frequently across the headlines. make no mistake about it,

general, the work that you and the people -- men and women in uniform there serving in afghanistan are vitally important work and i know they're defending us here at home and presenting those who would plot and plan against us from coming here. at the same time, but still a big frustration on the part of the committee and certainly the part of my constituents that the afghan forces are not further along in their training and where we need them to be. i'd like to begin with a "the new york times" article from yesterday in which a senior afghan military officer blamed a lack of coordination among afghan forces for recent taliban advances. this relates to your mention of the need to improve -- for improved leadership and accountability of nsaf in your testimony. i would like to ask you directly, you know, how do you explain to the committee, how do i explain to my constituents back home as to why after the 14 years of effort and training and

presence there and the billions of dollars that we have been spent -- lives lost, the people that have been injured, why the afghan forces are not further down the pike and in their training and why are they not where we need them to be? and i'd also like to ask you directly what you need with regards to time and resources in order to help build strong leaders. nsaf are missing to sustain themselves beyond our eventual withdrawal. >> sir, thanks for the question. i think very quickly where the afghan forces where they plan, preplan, where they work together, both the cross preliminary organization, the police and the army, they conduct operations, work together and preplan, they do very, very well. where they don't, it's crisis mode, that's why where they continue to need help in working that. when they don't work together you're right, sir. they don't do well. but again, i would say we have been there for 14 years but this

army continues to be very, very young. we have just started their air force the last three, four, five years, the army's been around for eight or nine years. the police about the same time frame so it continues to be a work in progress but i would tell you they are -- they can do a lot of things very well. but the areas that they have issues in are any areas of any army would have and sustainability, close air support, special operating force capability, they're tough pieces for u.s. army to do. they've been fighting at the same time, trying to build this army. and so, i see continued progress. i've been there three times, first time in 2002-2003 timeframe and they are today is light years from where they were there. i do see progress. their special operating capability, i mentioned probably

last time i was here take four m-517s and in kandahar, a small landing zone, special operators off the back, a little ipod device giving them full motion video, to a high-value target. i told that story and asked people to think about open your eyes and think the s.e.a.l.s, the doiranger, the delta. they have that capability. they continue to get better and better. they have gaps and seams we knew they would have that we have to continue to train, advise and assist on. >> thank you, general. with respect to our drawdown, can you talk about nato's willingness to step up and add additional forces and resources there to supplement our drawdown? >> sir, my discussions with the senior member countries of the 42, most of them i believe will continue to support. but it's going to take a u.s. decision first before they do that. >> thank you, gentlemen. thank you.

i yield back. >> dr. winstroke? >> thank you, mr. chairman. general, thank you for being here today, as always. you know, on september 11th, 2001, an attack was launched on america. from a place that most americans never heard of. and bay person that most americans had never heard of. and when i think about the freedom that e enjoy in this country that came flying in our face that day that was at risk, i was reminded in an isolation cell that congressman sam johnson spent time in at hanoi hilton said that those that fight and almost died taste the freedom that the protected will never know and i sometimes think your accomplishments and throughout history and the freedom enjoyed are often taken for granted in america. i think that needs to be recognized. i think many in america and some in this room don't fully understand the effort and

sacrifice that went behind every one of those ribbons and pin that is you wear and so many in our military wear and i want to thank you for that and all those that serve us in that regard. one of the thing that is you said today that really stuck out to me and i think you know why as a veteran of iraq, what stood out to me is when you said we honor their memory by building a stable afghanistan and i think that there's a lot to be staid for that. and i think history has shown and i believe that the greatest chance for peace on this earth comes from a strong u.s. military that can be reactive, can be postured well and can serve as a deterrent to evil doers and i think that's really what we're after. i think that's what we want to see happen. and so, my question today is, what do you think would be the bare bones level that we can maintain in afghanistan to prevent a vacuum like we have

seen in iraq and what level gives you the most comfort or most assurance that that won't happen? and then, also, i want to get some of your thoughts on the benefits of the idea that even if we had a stable afghanistan that was able to stand on its own two feet, would there be benefits to us still being there in a postured position like we do in other parts of the world? >> sir, thanks for the question and thank you for -- thanks. i think, sir, i don't want to go in details on number and level. again, i provided options to the senior leadership. i feel comfortable with the option levels in terms of risk, higher is less. less increases at risk in general terms but i feel comfortable in those options and i know that senior leadership will continue to look at those and weigh those and i provided pros and cons of all that. but it was based on capability as we look forward. not numbers but capability needed based on afghan

capability and then as you said, a u.s. ct mission, as well. we took a hard look and included that in there. i do think on presence -- you know, presence equals influence. if we're not there to provide influence somebody else will be there. whether that's russia, china, iran, you name it. the u.s. and having people on the ground provides influence. >> long term benefits from even a stable afghanistan? >> sir, you know, afghanistan lives in the neighborhood that doesn't follow the rules. take a look at the countries around it. very, very tough neighborhood. and again, presence equals influence. building a stable afghanistan to provide stability in that region, having a partner that want it is partner with the u.s. and the other coalition nations is key. we haven't had that last several years and i think we have an opportunity today to take advantage of that for a very modest continued nstment in both the money and personnel. >> thank you very much, general. i yield back.

>> mr. gab bard? >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. thank you, general campbell, for being with us here today. you're talking about presence equals influence and other members have mentioned the instability and the threat of this same brand of islamic extremism in other countries around the region. would your recommendation, strategic recommendation be to maintain or deploy a u.s. presence in military service members to other countries in the area such as libya and yemen facing similar threats and far greater instability than we're seeing in afghanistan? >> i think chairman dempsey before he left talked about a regional presence throughout different areas of the world. and i would concur with that. >> how long do you suggest that given the track record for the last 14 years in afghanistan that we continue to ask our service members to deploy to

afghanistan on this similar train and equip mission given the lack of progress that we've seen and given the failures that we have seen in iraq and in syria? >> ma'am, i can't talk -- you know, iraq, syria. i would disagree a little bit on lack of progress in afghanistan. i think there's been great progress. i think this fighting season's been very tough and probably uneven progress, but either our areas and capabilities and continue to have issues with that take any army a long time. building a pilot take twos or three years. building a maintainer take twos or three years. we started that late in afghanistan. we have to train, advice an assist on for years to come. they want to take this on. you know? and they have an attitude to do this by themselves. they welcome -- i talked about

conditionality. so i think that we have an opportunity here where we have a willing partner where they want to continue to improve on their own kafabilities to be a productive country in that part of the region. not only provide for stability and protection for their own home lnd and the region. >> you are seeing an open-ended commitment from the united states military to maintain a presence there? >> i think we have to continually assess that and as we have done over the last several years from 140,000 down to less than 10,000. the amount of money continues to go down so i think we have been very good in continuing to assess that to bring that commitment down. i said in my opening remarks this is not without conditions and there's -- it can't be unlimited forever and ever and continue to assess that and make those calls as we go and i think i've been asked to lay that out for this period in time where the afghan security forces are and what i've attempted to do. >> given the corruption we have seen, though, in all levels of the government there in

afghanistan, but including at the lowest levels and it's been talked about a lot recently given what happened in kunduz, with the talibans taking over that city for a short period of time, but also, people saying that it's likely that that was kind of a first volley and that one reason that they were able to do so is that the local communities there and we have seen this in other parts of afghanistan, because of corruption by the afghan local police and by local government, people are getting shaken down multiple times and see perhaps the taliban as the lesser of evils in their daily life and their challenges. when's being done about stemming out and getting rid of this corruption so that the afghan folks who you have been training can actually do this without us? >> thank you for the question. again, i think president ghani, dr. abdullah, the senior

leadership i deal with every day tries get after corruption. they understand that's a huge issue. it's been there for years and years. they're trying to get at it by picking the right leadership, holding them accountable. trying to get at it by looking at procurement, by providing the right education for their leadership and for the folks that join the army and the police. you know, i think if you ask most afghans they would tell you they don't want the taliban. the taliban target. the taliban kill innocent women and children. the taliban put suicide vests on little kids and hold their mother or father hostage and say you're going to blow yourself up. i know the afghan people don't want that. they want a secure afghanistan. and they have -- they have that hope because of the afghan security forces and because of the great work that the great men and women do. >> thank you. mr. chairman, in closing, i think it is dangerous to ask the service members to go on this

nation building mission across the region and something that we have got to look at carefully. thank you. >> i appreciate the comments of the gentle lady. i went to highlight for members, week after next we'll spend a week in this committee looking at train and equip around a variety of countries and what's worked and hasn't. are there lessons to learn? this is a very important issue we need to dig down deeper on because there are a number of instances where it's not worked very well and we need to understand that. so i appreciate the comments. mr. nugent? >> thank you, mr. chairman. and first of all, i want to thank the general for your leadership to our troops, your service, but as we move forward with the taliban, what are their abilities to recruit and train? do we see an uptick in that or

is that stayed level or has it dropped off? >> sir, you know, i think it at least stayed stable or at least stayed level. again, they have surged really this fighting season business th because they know it's an opportunity for them. they want to make a statement. they want to remain relevant. they want to

>> so if they don't support the taliban, where are they recruiting from? are they recruiting within? >> sir, i think both. from within afghanistan and there's also reports of foreign fighters that come in that assist the taliban, as well. >> how do they train? do we have a metro con how they train or where they train? a sir, i think there's areas inside afghanistan that they have potential training areas. there's areas outside of afghanistan that have sanctuary that provide them the opportunity to train. you know, when they conduct an attacks, it is not something that you would see from a large, modern technological force command and control movement. this is counter insurgency, one or two people putting an ied out there, one or two people killing a few people here, a suicide vest going on. they can -- they don't have

to -- you know, they don't follow the rules. all they have to do is cause fear in the people and that's what they want to do. instill fear to make the government seem they can't provide security for the people so it's going to take everybody in afghanistan to fight this piece there but i do not believe the afghan people support the taliban for the most part. >> and that's good to hear but, you know, i was there in 2011 and was struck with -- i was in iraq and then afghanistan. actually, struck with the security level in afghanistan versus iraq in 2011 withdrawing troops. we had more freedom of movement within afghanistan. we had less restrictions on movement in afghanistan at that point in time. and now i wonder where we are as

compared to 2011. like i said, when i was in iraq in 2011, everywhere we went was, you know, fast, quick, you know, with ballistic protection and it was just the opposite in afghanistan. has that changed? if i go to afghanistan today, will i see the same type of movements available to us? i got to visit with the afghan police. training facility. >> sir, quite frankly, where we were in '11 to where we are today in 2015 we don't have that many areas so the areas to go to, you'd go by helicopter and land in a small location based on the down size and the number of people there. we don't are folks that end up driving throughout afghanistan at all based on location, based on the density of people we have there. as far as the afghans, i think they continue to have as i said

movement of freedom on highway 1, which is a ring road. throughout kabul. >> general, one -- i mean, i don't mean to interrupt but one last quee. in 2007, 2008, my older son was in afghanistan for 15 months. and he said, dad, he said, a lot of folks talk about just going back into the stone age. he said, the problem is they're already in the stone age. has that changed at all? >> absolutely. i mean, i think in especially in the cities at least. in the outer parts of afghanistan, you're still going to see people that are very -- living in very limited, prim live housing but inside the city, cell phones, business, internet, you name it, yes, sir. as was mentioned earlier today. >> thank you again, general. my time is expired. >> mr. molten? >> thank you, mr. chairman. general, i want to thank you

again for your service and also specifically for your courage. when you come to washington and disagree the policy we're sending your way. thank you for that. as an iraq war veteran, it was hard for me to return to iraq this winter, disheartening to say the least. to see so much of what my colleagues and i had fought for and frankly achieved during the surge gone to waste and i'm particularly interested in how you're learning from that experience to make sure we don't repeat the same mistakes in afghanistan. and one thing that i think stands out in particular to me is that it was not just our rapid withdrawal of troops but our failure to continue to support and influence the iraqi government that ultimately led to it falling apart n. many ways what happened in iraq was not just the failure of our train and equip mission as far as the troops go. the iraqi army put the weapons down and went home because they lost faith in a government that rotted from the inside and so it was pulling those advisers out of the ministries, the prime

minister's office. we disdain malaki and we forget that he was in power during the surge and actually had made a lot of progress and a relatively stable government and because of our influence. so, who are you talking with from the iraq experience to make sure that you don't repeat those same mistakes and can you give us some examples of things you're notably doing differently than what we did in iraq? >> sir, thanks for the question. you know, in afghanistan, we have a lot of iraq veterans. thank you for your service. all of them i think feel as you do there and want to make sure we don't -- we learn from our experience so as we do different plans, as we look at the security operation office in particular of kabul and did that in iraq verse how they did that in afghanistan, planners got together with planners that had done that in iraq, they talked. they worked through that. and we made adjustments based on that kind of discussion. so i feel confident that we've been able to take it -- take a

look because as you know the military ar or after action reports on everything we do and we have to learn from that and i think we have done that in that particular case and taken a hard look at how we set up advising teams and continue to down size and proside some level of expertise in particular areas and i think helped us but i think what you said is key, though. the fundamental difference for me between iraq and afghanistan is that you have a government that is a willing partner here, that wants to continue to have a presence from the international community, that favors that, that wants that, asks for that and wants to continue to grow a professional army, a professional police. different than what you saw in malaki there. >> i have heard some report that is government is suffering from a serious brain drain right now and talent is leaving. are you seeing that and is it a concern? >> it is a concern. young people are leaving afghanistan is a concern. it is a concern for both

president ghani and abdullah. they have both spoken about that but at the same time i see great potential with the army, the police an young men and women that have been trained in the u.s. and the uk and germany, other countries as they continue to move up and increase responsibility and leadership positions. i think there's some really good talent there. we have to get them into the right potions. >> from the outside we're seeing cooperation between president ghani and abdullah abdullah. are they actually sharing power or is that an area of concern, as well? >> national government is hard and i think they have to continue every single day to work at it. the president is the president. there's no doubt i think in his mind or dr. abdullah's mind who the president is but i think, again, on policy matters they work close on that. there's no daylight between them. they work together in the security council and the cabinet meetings. but they know there's no other choice there as they move forward. >> general, one last question following on mr. scott's

question earlier. both the chairman and the secretary of defense testified before this committee that using oco funds to fund the base of department of defense is not a satisfactory way to ensure our national security. do you agree with that position? >> sir, what i would agree is i've been fortunate to have the resources and that i need. i've had the right people trained and equipped and that is because they have done it by oco but i think as everybody's mentioned it's hard for any of the services to plan when you go year by year. >> i think it is important for you to understand that's the rational the president has given for voting against the ndaa, the rational myself and others who have taken that tough vote have used, as well. we hope to change that situation by forcing the issue. it's in no way a reflection of our lack of confidence in you and the troops on the front lines. thank you. >> ms. sa lor ski. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general, i again want to thank

you for being here and i so much to my colleague's comments appreciate your candor. it's really a -- it's just a fresh moment to have a bottom line general come in and basically say, you know, here's what i think to the president. and i guess, you know, a couple of comments i have is that i think and i appreciate the gentleman's questions and opinion, but i happen to have the opposite opinion. i think that we're talking about symptoms in here and i think we need to remind the american people that over the last few years, certainly in my short tenure in congress there really has been a vacuum of foreign policy and a lot of reactionary things happening and not a support of this administration and i think when you have a president that stands up and willing to volley back and forth politically the entire defense budget which absolutely has everything to do with the aloe case of the good people you get the money to support them, i think it's very, very dangerous and i think the american people understand that.

and i do appreciate so much your not being able to talk to us specifically about the troop drawdowns, things i have seen in the media 1,000 to 5,000 to 8,000 and i guess i really appreciate your comment where presence equals influence. wayn't to make sure we're talking about for the record when there is less presence there is less influence there's greater risk and that counts across the board so that would count with counterterrorism, training, advice, assist, force protection and missions s. that not correct? isn't that what presence equals influence mens? the less presence, the greater the risk? >> i wouldn't argue with that statement, ma'am. >> and then my other question, general, nobody's really talked in some of my other colleagues talked about policy. that you're just implementing the policy that we're sending. well, again, i think it's not we are sending policy, there's the administration sending policy that many times can't be understood, has created a vacuum for the enemy, and the american

people certainly don't understand, as the losses in iraq, as the presence of russia right now in syria. and i think certainly with the iranian proposal that was signed. do you detect currently or are you concerned about increased iranian presence and what that means as you share a border, now that we're venturing in by an administration's desire to sign this agreement with iran? >> ma'am, i won't go into policy but i would tell you -- and i talked as well about iranian influence on the taliban and providing taliban support to fight isil. so president ghani, security forces are concerned on the impact that would have from iran on its western flank. if i could add, though, on -- not really policy but as i've gone forward and asked for flexibility for 2015, the administration gave me that flexibility as i asked for, enablers, a bridging strategy, and authorities. i was able to get that as well. so again, i'm very comfortable as i provide options to my

senior leadership that they put due diligence and scrutiny on that and that's what i would expect. i think that's what the american people expect. >> sure. and then to just a further question on iran. and the forces that you're suggesting. does that take into account a new level of activity with tehran and kabul? >> maybe not specifically, ma'am. as we looked at that, i've talked about that with the minister of defense and the impact that would have on horat, specifically on the west. we do have an italian -- led by the italians in tac west. that gets some of those reports but i don't think we looked at that specifically as we looked at the capabilities required. >> sure. so i guess my final question is, so as we launch into uncharted waters with this agreement with iran and should you see the need for things going awry for additional training, help, forces, money, people, personnel, should anything happen on that border, do you feel like you the flexibility

with this administration to go back and tell the administration, also the american people, hey, something's wrong here, we need help? >> ma'am, whether it's on the west, south, north, east, my job is to provide the best military advice. fy see issues where i have concerns, i'd absolutely raise that to my leadership. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> mr. johnson. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and general campbell, thank you for your service to the nation. i think americans are getting tired of being bogged down in afghanistan. we've been there for 13, 14 years. and it seems that there's no end in sight. it seems like we are doomed to always maintain a troop presence there. and i don't think that that's

something that is good for our country. for us to be nation-building forever in afghanistan. that's exactly what the future holds for us. there is no point in our plans or in the plans of those who want to build the nation of afghanistan, there is no stopping point. because whenever you do stop, there's going to be some adjustments that have to be made. so why not make the adjustment now? why not draw down our troops? if the russians or the chinese want to come in and be players over there, good for them. i would think that they would not want to embroil themselves over there, they would probably want to see the locals work everything out.

what do you say to that? >> sir, i would say that we have continued to redeploy and draw down our forces. we have continued to -- we had 300 or 400 different outposts when i was there in 2010-11, and we're down to less than 20 today. so we have continued to draw down, both our forces -- and i think we've drawn it down responsibly. i'm thankful we've had the ability to do that. i think as we look forward what we're trying to do is continue to provide the afghans support where they need it, reasonably and responsibly as we continue to draw down. but in the areas that are very tough for them, in the close air support and other areas, having a stable government, having a stable afghanistan, is not only good for afghanistan, it's not only good for the region, it's also good -- >> i understand that but it just seems like stability is not there and there will be no stability in the short-term or in the foreseeable future.

there won't be any stability with theups presence there, with our 10,000 troops. i mean, do you believe that we should just maintain that force level for the foreseeable future? or should we think about drawing down even further? >> sir, as i said earlier, i provided options to the senior leadership, that weighs out pros and cons of different force levels based on different risk. and i said up front i don't believe it should be unconditional and that, you know, it shouldn't be forever and ever. we have to continue to work through that. if you look at korea, if you look at germany and the amount of forces that we continue to have in those countries 70 years later, would korea or germany be as stable as they are today? >> well, that's exactly what the american people are looking forward to with afghanistan is a multi-decade presence over

there. and if we do maintain -- if we do maintain ourselves as targets over there, as long as we're supporting the afghan government, a corrupt government, which does not have the full allegiance of the people, which is highly factionalized over there. if we maintain our presence over there, and being a target for those who just simply want to drive us out, then we're just stuck. and i don't believe that's a good thing for america. >> sir, i'll not sure of the question. but i don't think -- >> it's a ra tore ka -- >> the government wants us there. >> well.

i think we're getting sick and tired of being sick ask tired of the same thing happening over and over again in afghanistan. and i think it's time for us to look at closing up shop. and with that i will yield back. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you general campbell for your testimony today, for your service, and for your family's support over your decades of service to our nation. earlier this year i had the opportunity to participate in a delegation visit to afghanistan with mr. wilson, mr. molten, mr. ashfo ashford, my colleagues on this committee. in addition to meeting with our troops deployed we also visits with president ghani. one of the issues president ghani rated was the threat of daesh within afghanistan. in your written testimony today you state, daesh has grown quicker than we anticipated and presents a legitimate threat to the entire region. in the last year we have

observed the movement's increased recruiting efforts and growing operational capacity." i wanted to see if you could elaborate on specifically what you're seeing on the ground in terms of that increased recruitment efforts, their operational capacity, and their presence in the 34 provinces in afghanistan. >> thank you, ma'am. i'm sorry i wasn't there when you came through. in fact, i was back here i think testifying. thank you for taking the visit. daesh or isil kp continues to be a concern of dr. ghani, dr. abdullah, the security forces, pakistan has issues with daesh. i think if you talked to president ghani about it in terms of recruiting, what he would have told you is al qaeda was windows 1.0, daesh is windows 7.0, in their ability to use social media to get out and recruit. having said that, daesh and taliban ideology are different. they continue to fight each other, specifically in the province of nangah a. r in the east. that's where we've seen the

biggest presence of daesh. there are reports throughout the different provinces upward of probably 25-plus provinces we've had reports of daesh. but the significant presence is really in the east, in northern helmand a little bit, in the west. predominantly in nangahar. i don't believe today -- when i was here in february, march, i said it was nascent. today i'd say it's operationally emergent. we have to continue to watch, make sure that the afghans apply pressure on the -- on isis or daesh to make sure it doesn't continue to grow. as you know they are very barbaric, brutal, and they've shown instances of that in afghanistan as well by cutting off heads of captives, by kidnapping, by taking men and women, throwing them on a pile of ieds and blowing that up. again, afghan people have no time for daesh and the afghan

security forces want to continue to go after that. >> what is your assessment of afghanistan's approach to countering recruitment efforts? you talked about daesh's successful social media which we're seeing throughout the middle east today, and frankly global hi. what is your assessment of what president ghani and his administration are doing in countering that? >> i think a lot of it is the educational piece. trying to work that in the universities, trying to work that through radio, tv, campaign ads, showing the benefits of having a unity government, supporting the afghan security forces. i don't think for the most part they have to -- they show video of how brutal daesh is, that really just turns the people away. so they have to continue to work that very hard. i think they've done a good job of that. and they'll continue to try to work together with support forces on the ground and the neighbors in the region. president ghani's approaching this really from a regional standpoint and has said, we

can't -- we're fighting daesh, we're fighting this for the entire region, we've got to continue to reach out. they'll hold a conference here i think the end of october time frame where they bring in all the operational and intelligence arms of all the surrounding countries to talk specifically about daesh and how they can combat that together. >> thank you very much. i yield back. >> mr. aguilar. >> general, can you give us a size as a follow-up to the last question, can you give us a sense of the size of daesh and isis and their presence in the region? >> you're talking about just a number, sir? >> yes, sir. >> this would be -- this would be a guess. but open-source reporting would be anywhere between 1,000 and 3,000. >> and your best guess on what that will look like in the next few years if not managed or contained?

>> well, sir, they have a -- their stated goal is to build a province that includes afghanistan, parts of pakistan, jalalabad in the east to be the capital of province so they're going to continue to fight hard, they want to spread that north up into kunar and neurastan. unchecked they'll continue to grow a base. but i do believe the afghan security forces understand this. there's operations ongoing today that are going after daesh in nangahar by both the army and the police. and based in nangahar. >> we've understood and we've read some members of the taliban have gone over toward these networks. can you give us a sense, because of the change in leadership, can you give us any other discussion or comments about other reasons why they have made that transition? >> i think a lot of it --

there's been a lot of ttp, pakistan, taliban that has switched over, regular taliban that has switched over or at least publicly expressed allegiance to isil, daesh. i think some of it is they think they're going to get more resources. they look at it as maybe more media attention. so i think for a lot of these reasons you have some folks that don't want to come back into the government, that don't want to reconcile, that want to continue to fight. and they'll join something new like daesh that's coming up and see see what's happening in iraq and syria, and for whatever reason, why somebody would want to do that i couldn't tell you, but they see that as something they want to do and they continue to join that. again, i think from a regional standpoint, president ghani, dr. abdullah, general raheel, they want to fight this continue to get it now before it grows out of control as you talked about. >> thank you, general. appreciate it, mr. chairman. i'll yield back. >> thank you. mr. knight.

>> mr. chairman, thank you. thank you, general, for your service. i just had a couple quick questions. can you give me an idea of the definition of train and assist? when we went -- i went over to poland and some other countries with the chair and other members, and i was thoroughly impressed with the polish soldiers and the interaction that we had with u.s. forces. so can you give me an idea of what train and assist means for the afghans, what's going to happen when they're done, when they're through with their training what can we expect from them, how they're going to interact, those types of things? >> sir, thanks for the question. again, the numbers that we have right now, as the chairman asked me early on, we're really working on the ministerial level. at the ministerial level we're focusing on what we call aid essential functions. the intelligence realm, planning, programming, budgeting, executing realm, transparency, sustainability, intelligence, strategic communications. what we do is our trainers are really our new weapon systems

and we have much more senior folks, where this war would have been about privates, captains, sergeants, our advisers are more senior generals, colonels, lieutenant colonels, great senior civilians, trying to bring technical expertise to build the afghan ministry, interior, defense. we don't have people at their basic training, we don't have people providing them marksmanship train, they do all that themselves. the afghans for the most part do all their own training, eod training, all of that. the technical areas a that they don't have the expertise in the maintenance areas, in pilots, growing their air force, that's where we continue to have to do the train, advise and assist. >> very good. and with the recent issues with russia, their strikes in syria, can you give me an idea of the level of -- maybe the weekly or monthly interaction that you get

with -- i'll use different terms than i'm sure are used now. maybe between commanders and people of that level, that the four stars are going to get together and talk about what's happening in the region. i know this region is quite a bit to the west of you. but it is going to affect maybe what happens in afghanistan, maybe what happens in -- now that we're getting strikes from the caspian sea. i would expect that there are kind of connective interactions between the commanders, between what's happening now? >> i talked to general onsen, video, e-mail conversations with general breedlove, i've talked to general rodriguez, i know that relationship between the

commanders there reserve i've mostly talked to general austin through centcomm. i had the opportunity to go to india to talk to some of the senior leadership in india to talk about afghanistan, houp that mays, how they're tied in with afghanistan, what that means to china, pakistan. really quite helpful for me. also to explain how afghanistan's tied into that. president ghani again is reaching out to the entire region, i think it's quite helpful. last monday i was in germany for a day with general austin. we brought the chiefs of defense from five of the countries surrounding afghanistan to bring them together to talk pakistan, turkmenistan, uzbekistan, all came together to talk about regional issues, byrder issues, drug smuggling, what they can do to enable each other to fight this common enemy, so that was quite good. >> very good. thank you, general. thank you, mr. chair. >> thank you. miss duckworth. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general, thank you for being

here. i want to talk a little bit about the capacity of the afghan troops that we are training. from your testimony, you characterize a security force's performance of the afghan national defense security forces as uneven, inconsistent, still require broad support. you talk about the fact that without key enablers and competent operational level leaders they can't handle the fight alone. in contrast, you talk about the assf and how they are actually able to mount operations and seem to be much more successful. what i'm concerned is that we seem to be talking a lot in our metrics about our training of security forces in terms of numbers. how many do we think they need to accomplish the mission, as opposed to the capacity or the quality of the forces? i just think that we're a little overfocused on building up troop levels in terms of quantity. you laid out a few significant

threats that we face in afghanistan, in the region. so as the president evaluates what right troop and adviser levels are, could you explain what the primary issues and variables are that continue to plague the security forces areas ability to carry out its mission and compare that to the assf who seem to have the capacity to do this on their own? >> thank you, ma'am, for the question. yeah, i was very tough on the afghan security forces in my written comments. and i've talked to the afghan partners about all of those. and again, you have to have that type of relationship to be able to continue to improve and i value that with both the m.o.d. and the moi. again, we're not at the levels of the candac brigade. we're at the six coarse, we're at the ministry level. some of those comments focus at the senior leadership. i've told president ghani in you put the right leadership in place and you hold them accountable, that's going to take care of 70% of the issues

we see day to day out there. one of the reasons that the afghan special forces, assf, are where they're at is because we continue to provide train, advise, assist at the tactical level with them today. they also have the ability based on their size, much smaller, and the training that they go through that they have a very good force generation cycle. so they're able to go training, they're able to take some leaves, they know they're going to go into the fight. for the most part and the rest of the operational force they don't have that. if you're down in helmand, you've been there three years, you've probably been in a consistent fight for $years. you've had very little opportunity to train, you've had very little opportunity to take leave. and they're really working hard at trying to figure out how they can work this force generation cycle into the convention at side and they really want to get after that as one of their priorities if they have a winter lull after this fighting season. i think if they can get there,

their performance would continue to improve. they have some very good young leadership at the captain, lieutenant colonel level. they've got to continue to progress. they need more experience. so although i was very, very tough in some of the words there, i do believe that they continue to improve and that they're very resilient. and with continued time, they'll get much, much better. >> so would one of the key contributing factors, high awol rates, this lack of sufficient force generation level, then i'll ask my second question, you can take the rest of the time to answer. since the is throwback thursday i'm going to use an old-fashioned term. i do feel like there's a hacking in the green tap leadership training that's going on here that those frontline leaders -- in your testimony you talk about the fact that when they do execute deliberate cross operations that are plant and resource, they're actually

successful. what is going on there? we have the high awol levels, the young -- even more junior than your lieutenant colonels but even younger than that. is that what's -- >> you're absolutely right, the attrition level, a lot of reason because of the attrition and the awolt, is poor leadership. they don't have sergeants, they don't have company commanders, platoon leaders that know everything about them and take their welfare into consideration like we do back in all of our services here. they don't have that noncommissioned officer corps. we're trying to build that, that's a backbone of all our services, that would look after those type of things. so they're working on that. as you said the force generation cycle. if they got that better that would reduce the level of attrition as well. what we are trying to do on the leadership piece, i know you'd be familiar with this on precommand course, we've initiated a precommand course for lieutenant colonels. before you're battalion commander, you have to go through the course. we've started, have not run yet,

a cap stone type course for their general officers. that will get initiated. the human capital and leadership piece we have to continue to work. >> it's year 14. we have i don't know how many more years we can keep doing this. but thank you for your testimony. i yield back. >> mr. russell. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i guess as i look at these colors on the wall behind us, on them are living streamers from the fill pephilippine campaign. from 1899 to the mid 1913 to '15 period is when those 11 streamers were earned. and we debated these same things in this congress about the worthiness of, can we train the philippine constabulary? can we track down aldo and bring him to justice? can we deal with the insurgents and moral warriors? can we, can we, can we? and yet we did. we transitioned the government

successfully. we did capture alguanado, executed him, bringing him to justice. we saw our warriors achieve all of that despite what we here in the halls of congress often question. i look back on 9/11. at that time, two-thirds of the country was under the control of the taliban. very little of it was under the hands of anyone that had freedom. girls weren't allowed to go to school. couldn't fly a kite. it was haram to play a radio or to play chess in kabul. i remember it. we've seen successful elections and the transition of government successfully. i remember working with the british 2nd parachute regiment 3rd special forces when the afghan army was nothing but 600 people that showed up. and now we see 150,000. and mr. chairman, what strikes

me is that isn't it wonderful that we're debating 150,000 troops in the field, and their capacity for intelligence and command and control in complex operations in an urban and rural environment? thank god we've reached that point to get to that point and that we're having the debate and this discussion. and it's due to warriors like this that are sitting before us that makes that possible. general campbell, thank you for your perseverance and patience inenduring our questions. the status of forces agreement -- often we saw that was problems with the iraq experience. and i know we're much further along with president ghani. and i know from having worked personally with dr. abdullah, afghan national security conference in geneva, switzerland, in 200, 2 that we do have some capability there in kabul with the leadership. are there any limitations on the

status of forces that you can see moving forward? as we morph the troops, their based embassy, not strike force, not train and assist -- any shortcomings that we can assist you with on the status of forces agreement? >> sir, i've seen none. if we've had issues i've gone to president ghani and we've worked through those. absolutely none right now. >> that's very encouraging. you also made note that the strength of the a.n.a. was that it was not fractured. think that's an important point. they haven't broken. they've retaken ground. they've regrouped. they are determined to fight. they don't drop their weapons and run. could you speak to that a little bit? >> yes, sir, absolutely. people try to compare iraq and afghanistan. i tell them it's absolutely different. in helmand, in july time frame, taliban took over district center komusakala. it took the afghans a bit of time to reorganize. they changed out leadership, put a tank commander in y'all because he ran, so they did make

the right corrections. they resupplied, got pack in, took over the district center. it took them a couple of weeks to do that. they were very methodical as they went about that. but they eventually got that done. in condeuce they did that much quicker. within a couple days they were back inside of the city. they've taken a hard look just like our services will to figure out why thatted when, to make sure it doesn't happen someplace else. that's the sign of a professional army, professional police, and a sign of a government that wants and cares for their security forces. quite frankly, president dawny is the commander in chief and that's different than what we've had there before. >> i appreciate that. in fact, i think about our own history in the united states army. 40 years after our formation, we broke and ran and left this capital exposed in 1812. it was set on fire. i'm glad that our nation didn't give up on us at that time. the authority to strike daesh -- are you allowed any independent

or are there any prohibitions on your command level to strike daesh independently? or does it have to go through the afghan structure? >> i can strike insurgents if they're a force protection issue to our forces. >> thank you. and thank you, sir, for your dedicated service to our nation. thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> thank you. ms. mcsally. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general campbell, good to see you again. thanks for your continued service to our country and everything you're doing. it was great to see you in may when we were over there on a congressional delegation. i know the current situation with the hospital is under investigation. but i want to ask about the targeting process in general. since the last time i was over there in uniform, with my a-10s, and my time in the air operations center, we would usually strike under two different circumstances. either counterterrorism, dynamic targeting, in which case decisions and positive identification and collateral damage, all that was done at

headquarters with approval to then strike. or we were under joint terminal attack controller's control in close air support. and obviously we had u.s. troops very much deployed all over the nation in that time. but even sometimes the jtak was back at headquarters, not in the fight we were hitting. they were still the ones that were calling the shots and making sure we had the pid and collateral damage assessment. maybe this is not in setting. it may be a classified answer. what the targeting process is right now? both if it's just on the u.s. side, but also, if the afghans are asking for support, how do we go through that and make sure we have pid and cde? i imagine you see challenges. we have less forward presence, being able to get that pid and ced done correctly. if you could just share that. if you need to talk classified we can do that afterwards. >> ma'am, i'd rather go to classified session and give you that. i would say we continue to ensure we have pid. we're very, very precise. and it's very rigorous.

and so i can cover all thousands in classified. >> is it safe to say that with the troops being pulled back more to centralized locations and less numbers that it's just more challenging for us to get that good intel in order to reach pid? >> it may be more challenging, but that means i would not -- >> absolutely, i totally agree, great. it just becomes more of a challenging situation. what about if the afghans ask for support, again, we can talk about that in a classified setting. >> like i said, if the afghans ask for support, like they do almost every day, it still has to go through our process. >> great, thank you. when we talked to you in may there was some setbacks i would say or delays in moving some of the things forward we were trying to do because of the fragility of the unity government being formed, some delays obviously in setting up defense minister. a lot of that seemed to have brought some things to a standstill. similarly the uncertainty as to whether we we going to be there,

how long we were going to be there, what time we were pulling out was creating when we talked to individuals in the afghan security forces and parliament and others that uncertainty was creating a lot of angst. just delaying a lot of things we were trying to move forward. has anything changed since we talked in may? have things gotten better? >> i think in some areas better, some they're about the same. i think on the administrative fence, although the minister is an acting minister he has really taken charge. i've got great trust and confidence in him. he's got a great vision for the future of the ministry of defense. we all thought he would be the minister. july 4th, he didn't get through the parliament. but he has been in an acting capacity, he's doing quite well. i think he would do good for the parliament to ensure the minister continues to serve in that position. in other areas there, there have been some hold-backs waiting for -- there's going to be people that are waiting to find out where the u.s. is going to go post-2016. i think they're pretty comfortable for 2015 into 16. but after that, we do get a lot

of questions on that. >> great, thanks. what else can we do to help build the afghan national air force and the close air support capability that they need? is there something else you need from us, whether it's authorities, resources, platforms? i know you've touched on it in your testimony. can you share what's we need -- if they don't have cash that's a significant shortfall for them. >> i think everybody back here, osd, everybody's working very hard to get after that. part of it's going to take time. it takes two to three years to get a pilot through. afghanistan understands they have to make some tough decisions left of the boom. two, three years out they've got to put the right number of people in with the right training to get through pilot training. if they don't make those decisions now, it's going to take longer and longer. we work with them very hard on that. but i think everybody's worked hard to get there. there are some restrictions that inhibit or have inhibited in the long haul on their mi-35s, mi-17s, we're working through. when they started the fighting

season they had five mi-35s, now they have two. they'll be down to mi-17th, not designed to be close air support platform. we have helicopters coming in. as soon as we get the fixed-wing aircraft we talked about earlier, that will help. we're taking a holistic look at what they really need based on the continued fight, wear and tear, the attrition level of the aircraft, that kind of thing. >> great. thanks. again, thanks to you and your family for your continued faithful service to the country. i yield back. >> thank you. ed general, appreciate you patiently answering all of our questions. more importantly, i very much appreciate you and those who serve with you for what you do every day to protect the security of our nation by working with the afghans and in other ways. it's challenging circumstances. part of those challenges are external environment. part of them you are placed upon

you by the chain of command. but i think it's clear to all of us that you're making the most of the situation for the country's security and we're very grateful for your service. with that the hearing stands adjourned. >> thank you, chairman. you by the chain of command.

>> is it a matter of expressing that sent i better? how do you counter those feelings of, we need to get out, we need to end this? >> well, there are legitimate frustrations. i mean, i was surprised when general campbell said -- i heard him say something like this before -- we've really been training the army for eight to nine years, air force for about the last three. why did we wait so long? maybe we were so absorbed in defeating laip ining al qaeda t taken that long. i don't think it was, you know, malfeasance. but there are legitimate frustrations. the rest of the story is, this takes a long time how long have we been in colombia, for example. look at where they are now versus where they have aboutn. so that's the reason that we're going to spend a whole week on this subject, week after next, train and equip, not just iraq.

iraq, syria and afghanistan. historically in a broader context, what are the lessons? is it always hard? are there particular circumstances in every country beyond our control? are there lessons we can apply more broadly to different countries and our efforts to improve their security forces? we can't do everything ourselves. so nebraska's gsomebody's got t there helping us do it. we're trying to work with others. you just heard somebody today mention poland. we have allies of different capabilities. how well are we organized, equipped, prepared to work with those different capabilities? i think this is a big, very important question. >> so is the hearing going to be oversight or education? >> both. so we're going to have close the roundtable, we're going to have outside experts, we're going to have administration witnesses at different events. so it's try to understand, but

it's also hone in on what we're doing now and is it working or not? are this things to do differently? >> that's all going to be the week that you come back? >> yeah. >> it looks like we're -- when are we going to have an answer on the obama troop levels? >> i don't know. he says he's given them the recommendations. he also said if you heard it that it's really important that we provide some reassurance and stability to this fragile unity government so they know we're not bailing on them. >> nato said today they were willing to put more troops there or keep more troops there? >> but they're going to follow us. you know. u.s. leadership is what matters. so i don't think nato's going to be there if we're not there. but if we're there, then i do think these other countries will contribute, absolutely. >> eight or nine years is kind of a long time, though. why do you think the u.s. effort at train and equip hasn't worked to this point in afghanistan? >> that's what we want to explore, not only with

afghanistan but other countries as well. i do think we shouldn't be too cavalier at how hard this is. who was it, somebody today said when they were there in 2002-2003 there were like 600 folks in the afghan army basically guarding the presidential palace. so, you know -- meanwhile, they've been under constant war during this time. so i don't want us to kind of have this arrogant attitude, why aren't you all like us in a year or two? but on the other hand, there are a lot of frustrations. not just iraq -- i mean, but iraq and obviously syria recently. so it's our job to understand why things have not gone as well as we wanted. and to see what we might have done differently, what we might do differently in the future. not just the way we train people, but maybe we're not

organized right. maybe we don't have the right authorities. which is congress' bailiwick on train and equick issues. maybe we make it too cumbersome. i'm not presupposing all the answers, i'm just saying i think this is a big question that applies in lots of regions of the world and we've got to do better because we can't go fix everything ourselves. yet the security situation in these far-away countries affects us. >> on the house leadership race, are you concerned that freedom caucus members are going to ask a potential speak tore agree to thing hts. >> i'd be concerned if any group trie

european parliament over volkswagen's rule and admissions test. later house armed service meeting meeting on house operations in afghanistan.

>> the house budget committee met today to consider the 2016 federal budget. reconciling measures proposed by three other house committees. it passed along party lines 21-11. the markup is just under two hours. >> the committee will now come to order. today we meet to report the recommendation cemented to the budget committee pursuant to the reconciliation set forth in title to of the current resolution on the budget fiscal year 2016. under the congressional budget act of 1974 the budget committee has the role of combining the reconciliation summit of the three committees. reporting the bill to the house without any revisions. after any will follow the customary practice to request

changes to the reconciliation bill. at the rules committee which may make in order amendments to reconciliation bill. under the agreement i've reach with rankin member from maryland, ben holling, the procedure for the markup is as follows. first rankin member follows. first rankin member will each make an opening statement, give time constraints with four but schedule later today i ask that members some of their written statement into the record. i will hold the record open later today for that purpose. after the opening statement staff will be open for a ten minute q&a. followed by general debate. we'll then proceed with a motion to the house pursuant to the reconciliation of instructions. after voting to report the restoring americans freedom reconciliation act of 2015 we'll then debate up to two motions, one offered by the minority, and one offered by the minority, and one offered by the majority. for each motion they'll be 20 minutes of debate, the member opposed will be recognized for ten. i now recognize the general from indiana. >> think mr. chairman since we're scheduled to have four votes i asked that we have unanimous consent for that.

>> without objection, so ordered. >> will now move to our opening statements. i want to thank everybody for joining the markup today. we are reporting today a package of legislation cemented by three house committees pursuant to the reconciliation instructions including in this year's concurrent balance budget resolution. this is the next step in an ongoing process they'll give congress the opportunity to move legislation both through the house and senate. it will happen an expedited manner and to the president's desk for his review. this first time in over a decade we passed eight bilateral tenure budget. it promotes job creation and economic opportunity, hold washington accountable to make government more efficient and effective, support key priorities like national security, as well as health and retirement security, and, and get our fiscal house in order.

because the house and senate reached agreement on the budget we have the opportunity t to pursue this recognition process. the fiscal year 16 states that ought to be use to address obama care. in an effort to help all americans to gain access to the health care and coverage they want, not the government forces not to buy. that is is exactly what we're doing here today. we are committed to protecting every american from this harmful law and the damage it has done, and will do to patients, healthcare, healthcare providers, family budgets, and job creators. whether it's your healthcare choices, less access to care, higher out-of-pocket costs, or less medical innovation, obama care obama care is an attack on quality healthcare in our nation. last week, the house committees charged with ways and means committee, education workforce

committee and commerce committee held markups on their respective recommendations. i want to think chairman thank chairman ryan, chairman klein, chairman upton for the hard work in the hard work of the committee members. this is a team member. they and their committee have showed real leadership in this endeavor. under the reconciliation process the role of the budget committee is to combine recommendation sent over from the three committees into a single bill. we consider that single bill here in our committee before reporting it to the full house for its consideration. a quick review of the policy in this legislation demonstrates the concerted effort to provide relief to the american people. from the damage inflicted by obama care, while focusing resources where they can do the most good. the ways and means committee has achieved $37.1 billion of savings by repealing the individual and employer mandates. the so call cadillac tax, medical device tax, as, as well as independent payment advisory board. the 15 unelected unaccountable bureaucrats that are powered by obama care to make decisions will effectively deny care to

seniors. the energy and commerce committee has a g 12.4 billion in savings by repealing obama care/bun called the prevention and public health fun. they have included an additional policy that would prevent for one year, taxpayer dollars for being used to pay abortion providers prohibited in the legislation. this is accompanied by more money and more resources for hundreds of community health centers across the country so women would have greater access to healthcare. the education workforce committee has achieved 7.9 billion in savings by repealing the auto enrollment for health insurance. when these components are combined in one bill, the total savings is $79.8 billion. together this will dismantle many key elements of obama care they're hurting families, spending taxpayer dollars on programs with little to no congressional oversight. our goal here is to say the country the country from this disastrous law and start over.

with patient centered healthcare solutions for patients, families, and doctors were making medical decisions not washington d.c. it allows the job of the budget committee told these recommendations it is not within our power under the reconciliation process to make sensitive changes to the legislation before us. as as you see projected, section 310 of the budget act, states that each such committee should promptly make a determination a recommendation and submit recommendations to the committee on the budget of its house, which which upon receiving such recommendations shall report to its house reconciliations carrying out all such recommendations without any substantive revisions. therefore today's market may not include any amendments. there will be an opportunity for amendments after the legislation's address. i want to think this committee and those who helped draft this for their efforts and i look for to the debate. i now now yield the opening statement to mr. van hollen.

>> think mr. chairman. it's apsley mind-boggling that we are here, on this day, in this place, with this piece of legislation in front of us. we all know that we have a crisis of leadership within the republican caucus, that may be just a matter of political intrigue to some, but the reality is it is causing harm to the country as we speak. we have a huge number of pressing issues facing our country right now. we have the threat of another government shutdown in mid-december, we have our debt payments on debt ceiling that needs to be address of the united states makes good on the full faith and credit of the united states so we do not put our economy at great risk. we have transportation authorization bill that expires within weeks, yet here we are today, for the 62nd time, by

my my count, trying to dismantle the affordable care act and on top of that attack women health programs including planned parenthood. rather than tackling those issues, here we are trying to do the bidding of a faction of this house that just can't come to terms of the fact that the affordable care act as the law of the land and upheld twice by the supreme court. it it is pretty outrageous that the focus now is on dismantling the affordable care act. i draw my colic the tension to the congressional budget offices, analysis of this reconciliation bill. as everyone as everyone here knows, these are the nonpartisan experts, new head of the cbo is here headed by the chairman and the chairman on the other side of the capital.

here is what the congressional office says this bill would do, it would reducthe number of nonelderly people in the united states with health insurance coverage by about 14 - 15 million, in most years about 20% of percent of those are estimated to be children. i would like to put up a chart. as you can see, the affordable care act has had a dramatic impact in reducing the number of uninsured in this country. it is doing its intended job of providing affordable healthcare to 16 million people, including children. yet the priority of our republican colleagues in this house, at this time of dysfunction and pressing issues, is to pass a piece of legislation that would take that health insurance away from 16 million americans. it is astounding. at the same time we see an attack on women's health programs, i would just like to put up another chart here, this

house has had three committees investigating planned parenthood. this was the conclusion announced by mr. chairman on the government reform committee on national television the other day. is is there any evidence in your opinion, that planned parenthood has broken the law, answer no, i am not not suggesting they broke the law. next chart. please. the the hearing where that committee brought the head of planned parenthood for four and a half hours, it wasn't a question of planned parenthood's wrongdoing, the chart was put up to make the point by the republican chairman of that committee was given the pants on fire rating, meaning the most untruthful statement that you can make by the nonpartisan political act. so here we are today with a piece of legislation designed to deprive 16 million americans from affordable healthcare, designed to go after women's

health programs in a witchhunt against an organization that provides cervical cancer screenings and other important preventable health measures for american women. that seems seems to be the priority. mr. chairman, you said this would actually help reduce the deficit. i also refer our colleagues to the cbo report, just draw your attention, right here to page eight. what it says, if you actually look at the long-term, beef up beyond our artificial tenure window, this legislation actually increases the deficit. all this talk about balance budgets is just nonsense. this actually increases our deficit over the period of time, outside the tenure window. and, interestingly, i think the chairman said inside the tenure

window it had 79 billion in cuts but of course those go away, that is just an artificial marker. if i remember the republican budget had almost $4 trillion in cuts. this is your one shot and reconciliation. your one shot. you are just telling the world that you didn't mean it when you put for that whole budget. you are coming up with a piece of legislation that, in the long run it actually increases the deficit. it doesn't come close to balancing the budget. that was all smoke and mirrors. you are doing it though at the expense of 16 million americans who now have affordable healthcare, take that away and launch an attack on women's health programs and organizations that the chairman of your own investigatory committee has said has not violated any laws. by the way

himself, he put forward an argument that got him the most untruthful rating from nonpartisan political effects. so i will offer later a proposal to prevent the government shutdown, i hope we can all agree on that. we certainly don't agree with the idea of taking away health care for millions of americans. thank you mr. chairman chairman. >> thank you. given the time constraint i say that people have to the end of the day to submit information for the order. we have ten minutes to hear arguments. i urge members to have factual questions. we are here to answer any technical questions regarding recommendations, not to debate the policy and implications of the recommendation. we have ten minutes for this. and if members have questions. >> mr. chairman, i will ask one question. did you leave in place the provision in the affordable care act that requires insurance companies to issue insurance

policies to anybody, no matter what their healthcare statuses? >> thank you for your question sir. the legislation before you reflects submissions of the three instructed committees. for the fy 16 budget resolution. the language before you does not , i believe the provision you are referring to. >> you believe. >> it does not. >> it does not. >> so it would require an insurance company to issue a policy to somebody if they find out they are sick, they would go to the insurance company and say i am sick i want to insurance company. they would be required to issue one at that point question marks. >> yes congressman it does limit leave in place those provisions. >> thank you very much. >> with the budget committee let

me ask questions that are clearly in the subject matter domain of this committee. have you had had a chance to review the analysis of this reconciliation reconciliation. >> yes congressman, i've had had a chance to review. >> and is it the case that they have concluded that this legislation will increase the federal deficit, beyond the 10 year window. >> i believe the submission you are referring to front cbo analyzes the ways and means reported language to their house budget committee. according to the budget control act, the decide whether they were in compliance with the directive and relies on cbo's estimates. overall, the ways and means submission does reduce deficit by $31.7 billion over the period. >> i understand that, but they

they also focused on what we should all care about, which is not the deficit within an artificial window but what is the long-term impact. i'm just asking a question. on the budget committee. but i don't think, there been a lot of other things going on in the house yesterday, i think it's important that we vote on this that we get the analysts from the budget committee staff to tell us what's in the budget report. >> i can address address your question sir. according to cbo, it says that the legislation would not increase the direct spending by more than $5 million either the first two consecutive 10 year periods beginning 2026. however the agencies, cbo are not able to determine whether an acting the legislation would increase net direct spending in

the third or fourth 10 year period. by enacting legislation that would increase budgets by at least $5 million beginning in 2026. >> in fact i have not seen that my cell. it makes the point very clearly that despite comments about trying to balance the budget, this impact makes the budget deficit worse. i think i think it is import people understand that is what they are doing here in the budget committee. the budget that passed the house, do you recall how many trillions of dollars in mandatory cuts, mandatory spending cuts that had? with respect, i'm not sure that as a technical technical question about this reconciliation bill. if you want to carry on that line of conversation during the debate that i think that is appropriate. >> again mr. chairman i am

referencing your comments in your opening comments regarding your balance budget. i do think it is important to point out that your balance budget rick choirs i think $4 trillion in mandatory cuts, this has 79 billion that is in a 10 year window. and it actually increases the deficit. we can move move on from there. let us understand the factual impact of this legislation as well. in terms of the impact on some of the children's accents to affordable care, do you have any information that indicates how many kids, who today have affordable healthcare coverage, will no longer have that if this legislation passes? >> sir, cbo has not analyzer provided us with the information on the aggregate totals in regards to the legislation summoned by the committees.

>> your referring now to the fact that they have not, you have the ways and means analysis but not the analysis from other committees, is that what you're. >> referring to the package as a whole, not for further analysis that you're talking about. >> do you know if the impact from committees other than ways and means would have any impact on children's health, access to affordable healthcare? >> we are not prepared to answer those questions at this moment. impacts of the - we would refer you back to the cbo estimates regarding the recommendations that each of the committee submitted to the house committee on budget. >> was this for the benefit of the committee, during the technical question, could you