money on it. those performers are receiving no performance pay at all. that is something that is unfair as this business model has evolved. performers no longer show up to the radio station, play a show and get paid as they walk out the door. those days are gone. it is all done through digitalized music. >> let's finish where we started. we talked about the house leadership changes going on. what about at the enc committee? would you be interesting in being the chairman? >> we have a great chairman with fred upton. we need at a -- we need to focus on getting the energy, telecommunication, and data and security bills and not look at that. people want us to take action. they are not worried about

personalities and leadership. >> this was the "the communicators." thank you for watching. >> c-span2, created by america's cable companies 35 years ago and brought to you as a local service by your local cable or satilate provider. >> on the next washington journal, congressman tom kohl of oklahoma talks about the elections, budget and deadlines. and then the representative on wednesday's deadline to fund the highway trust fund. and greg fitch talks about the cost of congressional perks and new rules that will affect how congress handles expenses. washington journal is live at 7 am eastern and you can join the conversation with calls or

comments on facebook and twitter. >> a signature feature of booktv is all day coverage over the weekend. here is the schedule for this weekend. we will be in nashville for it southern festival of books. at the start of november, we are back on the east coast for the boston book festival. in the middle of the month, it is the louisiana book festival and at the end of november we are live from the 18th year in a row from florida for the miami book fair international and the national book awards from new york city. just some of the fairs and festivals this fall.

>> up next, a review of the iran-united states relations. this is an hour and a half. >> good afternoon. i am rob satellite and i should welcome you to the new conference center and new offices. delighted to host this special program which is a book release event. if you follow the washington institute you know we publish quite a lot. we publish hundreds of essays a year. we publish them under our own logo and our own series of policy watches and policy focuses. we have scholars publish them and major newspapers and

journals and then once in a while our scholars publish books and we are especially proud of the books that our scholars produce. they are among the most lasting and meaningful of the products of this organization. we are a research organization. we are not a fly-by night topic driven headline focused institute. we want to add to knowledge about the politics and middle east politics and nothing does that like a book.

this book was just published by there counselor and fellow dennis ross. please join me in celebrating the publication of dennis' new book. dennis brings an entire professional career, both academic and policy making to the writing of this book. dennis has spent the last quarter century, more than a quarter century in public service that dates back to the carter administration. he worked for the administration of clinton, and of course president obama.

he has been the president's envoy for middle east peace, and the envoy of what is known as the central region and especially focused on iran. he has seen the ins and outs especially of the israel relationships in republican and democratic presidency. there is no other america who has the deep insight, personal background, expertise and experience to bring to bear on a history of america's relationship with israel going back all the way to the founding of the jewish state in 1948. and that is what this book is all about. today we are going to have a deep, in depth look at what lies behind doomed to succeed, why is it doomed to succeed, and what can we learn about this relationship has we look forward to the arrival in two weeks time

of the current israeli prime minister to meet with the president of the united states at a moment that is especially strained between our two allies. there really can be no better companion for this discussion than the third person on this platform today. i am truly delighted to be able to welcome to this audience president obama's second national security advisor, thomas donilon. a true friend of this organization, a true friend of the u.s.-israel alliance, and someone who has, over the course of administration after instruction, contributed deeply, not just to strengthening this alliance, but building the foundations for security and peace in the middle east. it is privilege to welcome tom. to have tom and dennis together on this platform for a

discussion about what makes the u.s.-israel relationship, how it is developed, what could lead to strains, what are the opportunities and the challenges and where this relationship may be heading in the years ahead. first, i will turn to my colleague dennis to explain and why doomed to succeed and why write this book. >> well, thank you. obviously this is an interesting time to be writing about this. many people have asked me about the title. they look at the a time when everybody is pessimistic about the behavior in the middle east. this is optimistic. it is doomed to succeed.

not doom to succeed question mark. my original plan is to write the overview of the history and go through the administrations i haven't served in in a summary fashion. the problem was i began to get into it and had a number of wow moments. i found i was finding all of the same arguments i had dealt with. i found 50 years apart, and the same words being used and arguments. the more i discovered that and with wow moments the more i was convinced i needed to go through each administration and show where the key assumptions about the relationship emerged, why they emerged the way they did, and in effect why they had a durability. one of the things that struck me was the assumptions lived on, lessons learned from the

assumptions that were validated, the less things were learned. i said in my own mind, i need to write this book, not only so i can give visibility and expose that but i need to write the book because i know it is going to come out the year before the next administration. and i wanted to next administration, the next president, whoever it may be, and the people who are advising that next president, to be much more aware of the history, to be much more aware of the assumptio assumptions. one of the things that tom knows is in the policy making world in the midst of this the tendency to look at your assumptions and be aware of them is non-existence. i wanted to expose what the assumptions were over time and how they had a durability and were sustained. i wanted to highlight also the approach to israel has been

derivative of the larger approach to the middle east and many of those assumptions have been misplaced. one of the key themes of the book you will see when you read it, because i know you all will, one of the key things you will see is there have been a number of assumptions about what are the priorities of arab leaders. those assumptions have been almost typically wrong. the key driver has been security and survivability. the relationship with israel, which frequently influenced american policymakers, fearing if we did certain things, this would impact our relationship with the arabs. but if you look historically and go administration to administration and look at the examples, and i go through each administration and over the key events and how the key assumpti assumptions drove responses, one thing you will see is typically

what drove arab leaders was their preoccupation of what mattered to them. i am not saying the relationship with israel was immaterial to them but it never drove what they did toward us. it never drove how they decided how close they should be, from their standpoint, the one thing that was critical especially among those who were traditional american friends in the region was how reliable are we? were we going to be the source of their security which mattered more than anything else and they would not do anything to put that at risk. so their relationship with us was a function of their priority. not a function of what our relationship with israel is. i demonstrate this in one administration after the next. one thing i do throughout the book is show the echoes that reverberate over time and how you see not just the same arguments reflect on the inside but the same behaviors on the outside.

it is one of the ways i draw out one of the key lessons and conclude the book with a series of lessons for the future, both about the u.s.-israeli relationship and in terms of the region as a whole, but also how we should be dealing with each other so we learn the right lessons from the past. both of us have lessons to learn. this book is primarily told from the standpoint of american policy there is lessons for what the israelis should do as well. >> thank you very much, dennis. his brief overview doesn't do justice to the nuggets or gems of historical insight in this book. if you are a historian and fascinated by the cycles of history, seeing the repetition of the same words almost, certainly the same themes, administration after instruct n

administration it is fascinating. now turning to tom, opening remarks about the book and your experience. >> thank you very much, rob and dennis. i would tell you about my mistakes but they are not clear at this point. let me say a couple opening things and make four or five observations on dennis' book. it is delightful to see you general. we had a terrific relationship and something i will value for the rest of my life. i am grateful you asked me to come talk about this book. the last book, two books ago "the missing piece" that was 805 pages and this was only 408

so a less of a lift to get ready, dennis, than your prior works and i am very grateful for that. let me make four or five observations, if i could, on the book. one is a general observations on the importance of the book. it is a big history. we don't have enough of that. it is diplomatic history and we don't have mf enough of that. it is useful history. i believe one of the great failures of american policymakers is a lack of history understanding and the lack of attention to und understanding of the history. we have a phrase in america saying that is history. that is not the way it works in the rest of the world. having a deeper understanding of how we got to where we are and

what the methods are is really important. neal ferguson in his volume one of his biography of henry kissenger makes that point. i gave a commencement address at columbia university and that was the one piece of advice i gave to the policymakers; read history, read a lot of it, read it obsessively. it is critical. this is a great contribution to the work of future policymakers. my relationship with dennis goes back a long time. i spent a large part of my career trying to talk dennis into taking jobs. he worked in the bush 41 administration as the middle east negotiator. we were on the other side of each other. i prepared then governor clinton for the debates and dennis was in the white house during the campaign. so opposite sides. we begged dennis to stay for

three to six months and turned that into eight years including one scene when we were in a nato meeting and dennis was about to leave and i said you cannot leave. he said i promised the trustees. and i said dennis, i was chief of staff to secretary christopher, i said picture this, i am in a hotel room on a secure phone and on my knees begging you to stay. dennis did and the country was all of the better for it. i then tried to recruit dennis to the white house, i did the national security transition were president obama, and tried to recruit him but failed but did get him a year later. thank you for this contribution to history. the second thing i want to say is a couple observations about the various chapters if i could. want to talk about the carter

chapter for a moment. i was struck by something that doesn't get enough notice. the contributions made by president carter, particularly in the camp david accord, is extraordinary. i think the general would attest to this being an important pillar of israeli security and remains so today. they were tested during the muslim brotherhood period. the muslim brotherhood movement of egypt wouldn't engage at the political level with israel they respected to accord and remained in place during the period and in place today and that is one of the most important coordination relationships for

israe israel remains the egyptian relationships. and we have the security forces that remain a clear component. i noted that in the book and wanted to pull it out as something that doesn't get commented on enough in my judgment. the third point i want to talk about is why leaders make the decisions they make about engaging in the middle east process. you make the point, dennis, there are a number of consistent assumptions that leaders embrace and you call them myths, the need of distance from israel, the concern about the high cooperation and the link called the biggest myth of all from your prior book, i think other things are driving this. this is my own observation i wanted to talk about.

that is a president seeing context and opportunity. historic, leadership context, and the opportunity for achievement. indeed, i think that is what drove president clinton in 1992. in 1992, the united states after the fall of the soviet union and the gulf war, the united states had a level of power and in fluence in the world like no other and could take on this challenge. there were not issues today looming as deeply. iran was nowhere near the threat it was today. it was exhausted after the iran-iraq war. you had the israeli leader who decided as a matter of strategy and increasing strategic depth for israel he was going to engage directly and intensively

in the peace process starting with syria. you dennis, working with secretary baker, put in place and pushed away the taboo on direct talks between israelis and arabs. there is a story in the book, and rob was in the meeting, talking to president clinton when coming into office, saying if you put the current power behind the intentions there is a possibility of achieving four arab-israeli peace agreements in the first term as president. that story is laid out in the book. it was the context and opportunity for achievement as opposed to a cost-benefit analysis. second, if you look at the decisions that the bush 43 administration made, i think that was about perceived

opportunity for achievement as well, right? i think they rejected the clinton approach because there was a general anything but clinton view to foreign policy. they thought he invested personally in the effort and they were going to push away. if you look at the situation president obama came into, when we worked in at the beginning of the administration, i don't know if it was necessary -- there was a set of circumstances very different from what president clint clinton faced. you had the peace camp dimini diminished in israel. people throw phases around about the third inta-fada but that was a violent and highly impacting event with the death numbers that don't get reflected on enough. 1100 israelis and 3800 palestinian deaths. it greatly diminished the peace camp in israel.

second, you had the 2006 parliament elections among the palestinian authorities that brought hamas to it state. they had a difficult and weaker partner to deal with. the threat of iran was much different and a lot larger for president obama than it was for president clinton. iran was heading head long toward development of a nuclear weapon. israel faced iran, hamas, and hezbollah all committed to destructi destruction. and u.s. relations of the muslim world were in a more complicated place after the iraq war and in the midst of us pursuing the most aggressive counter-terrorism campaign against violent islamic groups the country had undertaken.

much more difficult circumstances. we can talk about the decisions the president made. the fourth point i want to talk about is personalities and two and a half decades at working with the highest levels, a strategic sense, full of integrity, great strength and thoroughly reliable. you could just feel it when you were with him. he was in this personal behavior, quite modest, but the steal came through in the decisions of his leadership. the other personality was comes through very strongly is arafat. a decade of achievement.

why didn't it close? and i think studying it for a long time, thinking about it, and again think about what was on the table. i reviewed preparing for today. forget about the clinton parameters from december of 2001. a palestinian state in all of gaza and most of the west bank, the capital of the state in arab east jerusalem, security plans built around an international presence, the right of returning to the new palestinian state, and an end to the conflict and arafat walked away from this. there has been debate about this. i don't think the facts can be in dispute despite of the core offering. there is a tragic example of the impact of personality on policy

outcome. the last thing i want to mention, the fifth part, on my own engagement with israel, and the approach that we have, we viewed israel as an ally. we viewed israel as part of an alliance system that the united states had on the world which was a unique asset. no other alliance has the partnership the united states has. it is a unique and important asset to be attended to. second, given that in addition to the palestinian-israeli issues we had obviously the most important security issue in the world, iran facing us. the engagement was not just at the federal level butt the professional level. it was critically important on the israeli side.

why is that? in a region where there is so much politics it was important for our decision makers to have us do the very best job we could to get ground truth and come as closey as we could with respect to the analytics. i think it made a different in terms of decision making and in terms of assuring and reassurance. with that, i will turn it over to you, rob. thank you very much. >> excellent. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you very much. excellent. let me pose a series of questions to my friends on the panel, have a bit of discussion, and we will turn to you for your own questions. i would like to begin with one of the premises of the book and that is you can go back to

truman and divide our presidents into two groups. one group that prioritized share values between the united states and israel. a group that included truman, reagan, bush 43 and i would divided steve hadly president bush's security advisor is here, bill clinton and a group of presidents who viewed israel through what you call a competitive lens. it seems from the book that barack obama leans toward the latter group. where would you place president obama on this spectrum? >> the way i describe it in the chapter is that he is, in many

ways, a hybrid. when it comes to security, tom described this as well, when it comes to security he was very clear, from the beginning, that security was something he walled off. ... and when it came to the peace issue, the instinct was the more competitive one

driven by a sense that somehow it was in israel's best interest that it understood that the peace issue was headed toward a cliff. what i tried to suggest in the chapter is thathere the president thought to be effective, needed to create a connection and he waited far too long. in a sense, he was a collaborationist, meaning he viewed israel through are rotated partnership lens and even emotionally felt himself very strongly committed. yet when it came to the peace issue he saw it through a very different kind of lens. i will just say one last word, the previous presidents who you identified who consciously made a decision distance. the length to which eisenhower goes is really quite extraordinary. he actually contemplates the use of american force

against the israelis and 56. when theywhen they requested arms throughout this time when the soviets began providing arms to the egyptians and syrians and later a rack, the recommendation frequently was to the israelis, you should be a good neighbor. a good neighbor to all of those around you who completely reject you which is a better answer. nixon, the 1st two years, takes a very, even though personally he presents a different picture, but his actual posture, eye guy -- nixon believed that 1957 war was a defeat for the united states, someone who actually made a decision to suspend phantoms to the israelis at the very moment that the soviets for the 1st time in history are sending military personnel and forces to egypt, and the reason is he wants to reach

out to nasa and since his undersecretary of state to see nasa right after the decision to suspend expecting that kind of response. and the response he gets is clearly not the one he hoped for. we gain nothing from it. carter is an interesting contrast with what tom was saying about the notion of opportunity and threat. it isit is interesting that carter pursues piece out of a sense of great fear. >> and. clinton pursues p7 a great sense of opportunity because there is something there. a pretty good way to read, when you read his diaries his attitude toward israel comes through again. the 1st believes you live up to commitments, commitments, but he does not look at israel as any sort of special state he thinks we have obligations that need to be fulfilled, but he does not feel it is a special state.

in a lot of ways obama does feel israel is a special state, but he is worried that somehow they are not living up to his values. >> what do you think about the spectrum and where the president is? >> i would say number one, the contour of the debate and policy approaches have changed pretty dramatically since eisenhower and a certain assessment that has been made, indeed, the four corners,corners, if you will, the guideposts had changed pretty dramatically since then. number two, as was said from the outset, the pres.outset, the president made it clear that he had an absolute commitment to israel's security. indeed, if we were going to pursue a peace effort, that was absolutely essential

that israel could not be expected to take the steps and risks toward peace that would be required absent the united states providing that kind of clear assurance and to see manifested can greatly across a range of projects. number three, i do think that the president has an emotional attachment israel. and i think that it may have been a mistake for him not to travel to israel earlier in his term to express that and to have the israeli public see that. next, i think they're really was a few that in fact israel could do better. in terms of its approach to the peace process, and there were disagreements on this. and, you know, it is a

complicated matter, including politics. we politics. we also have the complication of a weak palestinian authority as well. iran loomed over this entire relationship, and i think in that respect there was, and we express it quite clearly, a shared commitment to defending iran. and theand the united states took and i spent an enormous amount of time in israel, a full range of steps to pressure iran. the narrative is that the president came into office working with allies and friends and it was clear that if we were going to have them along on a pressure campaign we would have to make a bona fide effort. we do that, but the deal was with the russians, chinese, and rest of the world that we did this and you would join us in a pressure campaign and they would not a could not engage and we

undertook one of the most effective pressure campaigns put together and diplomacy. and it led to the negotiation. and it was a comprehensive simultaneous set of pressures that included economic pressure but also a lot of other things including building up our presence in the gulf to a substantial level where when we said all options on the table it was clear we could actually implement that commitment. so i think that president obama on the outset had aa commitment to israel's security. necessary if israel would pursue a peace effort. we had substantive disagreements with respect to a number of the steps that were taken. there were personality issues as well that are pretty clear to anyone who has seen this, but he did protect through all of the disagreement the security commitment. and it is fair.

more emphasis on interaction between president obama and the israeli public. >> one of the things you recall, you asked me to write a memo where the presidents outreach speech to muslims should be, and i made the case that it should be cairo as opposed, but i said in the memo, he has to go to israel because if he does not the outreach will be perceived by the israeli public as if in fact this will come at israel's expense and unfortunately you may also recall at the end of the 1st year after you asked me to do a briefing and i outlined where we stood, one of the conclusions the president your at the end of the meeting was, i draw to

lessons from this. we should up with the settlement issue in context and i should have gone to israel after the cairo speech. do you agree with that? >> let me pursue the question of personality this way. sometimes the relationship gets lucky and there is a strategic convergence between the leaders on the two sides. clinton rubbing, bush 43, ariel sharon, they see the world and more or less the same way, and sometimes you don't have strategic convergence. but bill clinton figured out a way with netanyahu to reach a piece agreement. what was so different about that relationship and that was not in the relationship obama gave in which they're was, in retrospect so far no

progress. >> i think there are two distinct points that i would make. the 1st one, i think, to be fair, is the more comeau what i we willi will call the more tactical one and then i will go to the personality and i would say perspective one. arafat was prepared to do limited agreements, so he was not easy to end up doing white river. but in the end we were able to get there. after we did the hadron accord, from the time that was completed, january of 97 until the end of october 98, we were involved in a quite difficult time, and the relationship between the president and prime minister was not an easy one, but the key difference was that clinton had a strong feeling that when you had differences with israel it

was better to keep them private. his perspective was, and just to give you a sense of how difficult things were personally at one point, he came to the country. thethe president did not see him, talk to him on the phone. the israeli pressthe israeli press picked up on this, clinton was very careful not to be publicly saying things that would be construed as being critical, and the reason was clinton operated on a premise that the us was israel's only real friend in the world. we could have differences in disagreements,disagreements, but he wants to keep them private because he felt that israel's and she felt israel's enemies would see that as encouragement and it would weaken the israeli deterrent. president obama came in and had a different perspective. and i describe this in the chapter genuinely a strong

commitment to israel's security, he felt that that gave him license to be openly critical command he did believe early in the administration that being openly critical could also create some benefit for us at a time when we were reaching out to the muslims and he worried. i have a quote in the chapter where he says to malcolm in a meeting that they have in july of 2009, when he says to him, look, if you want israel to take certain risks they need to know you will be standing next to them. he comes back and says, look, for eight years the bush administration allowed no daylight at all, and we get nothing for it, and look at where we are. so he drew that lesson. that lesson in a lot of ways was aa misplaced one because ariel sharon withdrew unilaterally from gaza, and he presented a proposal that actually went farther than the parameters and did not

draw a response, but that was, i think, think, again, the kind of mindset and instinct was in some ways because i am so good and really mean it, that makes it easier to be able to establish some distance. clinton's attitude was just different. their view of the world was different, their view of israel and the place in the world was different, and it did not mean that president obama did not feel that it was not in israel's interest to be isolated. in fact, they would say that , but he also saw a benefit and being prepared to establish some distance when he felt there were real disagreements. >> you work so closely with both. >> i think him as i said earlier, i do do think that the context is entirely different. remember, then prime minister netanyahu was succeeded in 1990. preceded. preceded.

>> prime minister after the assassination. >> right. so the context was entirely different. the us position in the middle east was entirely different. and the politics in israel was entirely different which i think is a fair point. succeeding and moving toward camp david prepared to make unprecedented offers to the presidency for palestinians. after the decade of the two thousands the politics were very different. the politics of the coalition that the prime minister put together was very different than the politics in the 1990s and much more difficult, frankly, to make the kind of progress that president obama sought to make. let me ask you both. i think the government from

1996 until 1999 was a narrow -based right-wing government. the government that is established when he is elected in 2,009 has barack and it, so there was a center, they said. what is different is that arafat is prepared between 97 and 99 to do limited deals, not the whole deal. but we are looking toward in 2009 clearly is the whole deal, not a limited deal. that is a difference. it is fair, and in every chapter i show the context which does affect choices, so it is a combination of the context that affects choices, but the instinctive presidents and the.of departure is important. >> let me ask you about the concept of no daylight no

surprises. this idea is so otherworldly the idea that truman, eisenhower, very far away from each other, but in the last decade or two, this concept has entered the lexicon of the relationship. is this a legitimate and reasonable standard? is it something that could ever be fully implemented? how would you implement and execute that sort of approach? >> well, i think that it is a principle, and it is implemented through a deep and consistent engagement, not to say he won't have differences, but i think it

is a fair assumption to have in the relationship. yes. >> i do, too. the major thrust of the book , and i point out an exemplar of this, you do best in the relationship not only from the standpoint of mutual interest, but on those issues were we will have differences. there will be ups and downs, but what binds us is much stronger than what divides us. and the key is in a sense having those people in key positions who are perceived by the israelis as well as israel to do something, the something, the perception is, is asked her perspective of understanding the israeli predicament fun doing it because there is a genuine

belief that what we are asking is genuinely believe is the right thing to do and not because somehow it will gain a something with the arabs. when you ask israel which is something i.out over time, when your asking them to do something, it is difficult. they need to know where you are coming from. when you are perceived as genuinely having their best interest at heart and not being driven by concerns about where the other side is, you are more likely to draw response. we are going back to the 1st administration and would constantly talk about what we would do: we would do it as a way of trying to prepare for decisions, even in contemplated circumstances. one of the things i try to point out, having those relationships makes a big difference not only in terms of the overall relationship of managing the areas where the potential for differences are real and i

describe it is a very good example on an issue like he ran where we had the same objectives but often times my look at them through a different lens. they managed them in a way that kept us closer together, and so i draw a distinction here. no surprises. no daylight, if you manage atit the right way you can have differences without daylight. >> the key to this, it does not happen as much as you would think. to have a completea complete and thorough understanding of the other side's perspective and depth, understanding of the other side's perspective. take positions for a reason. and particularly with so

moving parts it's important to understand the motivation in the history and for the other side to understand it as well. with that background, i need to ask you about the iran agreement and the new world in which the us israel relationship is now entering. up until july 14 and the approval of the iran nuclear agreement we were essentially partners with the israelis. we may have had our tactical disagreements, but we were partners. we are now in a detailed agreement to which the israelis not only are not partners but are opposed. and they are not bound. when you think about the future of this relationship and dealing with this complex issue and the implications, what sort of

knew understandings, new procedures, new approach to the alliance do you think needs to be put in place to manage this totally new and uncertain moment in the us israel partnership. tom, let me start with you. >> first is that we end israel have a deep joined interest in seeing implementation of this agreement. the agreement will, in fact, prevent iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. and most directly over the next decade and a half. so implementation is absolutely critical. it has to be the case that having a decade and a half of a roll back and a freeze

has to be in the interest of israel and the us going forward. implementation is critical. second, they're should be understandings as to the consequences of violations, and those kind of conversations are important among the parties enforcing the agreement between the us and israel. third, the agreement is properly seen as transactional and focused on the nonproliferation security problem and not some sort of transformational kind of event and ia relationship between the united states and iran, which means that the us needs to pursue in detail and aggressively confronting uranian behavior and other aspects of its behavior in the middle east. it means that the united

states needs to put in place in detail a set of deterrent steps to ensure that iran complies with the agreement, and if it doesn't, and sees what the cost will be. deterrent steps obviously include our capabilities and are declaratory policies, which are important in the region but also include broader steps like a much deeper and set of relationships and assurance with the gulf cooperation council countries. we had a start at the camp david meetings, we need to work much harder including, including, in my view, thinking harder for things like extended deterrence. they would agree on all of those points. it has obviously been disagreement but i don't

thinki don't think that negates the five or six points i laid out here with respect to a common interest going forward. >> are very much agree with what thompson and would amplified in the following ways. the deal buys you 15 years. the focus should be what can the united states and israel due to take advantage? you don't sit back and say we have 15 years. now do something about it. what i would likei would like to see emerge from the presidents meeting with the prime minister is a decision to create a joint consultant of committee where on the one hand we would focus very much on the kind of things that could be done to enhance deterrence, bolster deterrence both at the level of a ran understanding that after 15 years there is a firewall between where they are and moving toward a weapon and what is done in the region, and so i would like to see that focus on

the issue of implementation. tom will recall in the year 2009 we had extensive discussions with the israelis on how to plug the holes in the sanctions regime. many suggestions we got we been acted on. well, the same thing here. no one willno one will have a higher state of the israelis and the implementation of this deal making sure that they are caught and we should have discussions about what those might be, what you do about it. the other thing that is important under the rubric, israel is now facing what is a very different kind threat in syria. the russians without question reduce israel's freedom of action. yes, they have created some channels but we have already seen in one case where there were some firings out of syria and israel complained,

put in came back quickly and said, there is no interest in pretty much pooh-poohed the kind of response. i would like to see a discussion between us and the israelis on if, in fact, there is any effort to transfer what is the crosses that line. what is our position? what is our position about the fact that there is now a revolutionary guard whose position is opposite. what is our position? that is something that we should be talking about. the fact is, we all along have the same objective as it related to her and not having nuclear weapons. all along we have had the same objective that therein is destabilizing activities in the region need to be countered so that the regional balance is not shifting is our mutual

interest. it alsoit also happens to be the interest of the gulf cooperation council. if anything, there are more reasons to be working more closely together, not fewer, which is another reason in the end when i conclude i offer an explanation about if anything the relationship is down to five bound to be closer because if you look at the region the state system is breaking down. the nature of conflict is over the very issue of who defines and shapes and controls identity. nothing is more basic in terms of conflict than that. the one state that stands out having institutions, the capacity to deal with its problems is israel. this is hardly the time we will unravel our relationship with israel. >> i need to ask one more question. which concerns some of the

headlines that emerge from the book and from all beds that dennis has written about the impact of your own departure from the white house where it has been written that with your departure there was an increase in the white house of suspicion about israel, the idea that we give but don't get from the israelis and the demise of true strategic dialogue with counterparts in the israeli security establishment. i know that this was a great complement the dennis paid to you, but i would appreciate your observations on the impact of your own departure. >> on the principle impact is i get a lot more sleep. [laughter] my service at the white house included 850 morning briefings with the president.

>> but he was counting. [laughter] >> right. but with respect to israel, the principles that undergird the us israeli relationship come from the president and the president's absolute bottom line axiomatic commitment to israeli security, if not in any question, and i don't think the united states has done that. my own approach we talked about earlier. my own approach was to have intensification, engagement not just at the political level but at the professional level, if you will, professional intelligence and defense counterparts in israel. my approach was not to let things faster but to engage, if they're seem to be misunderstandings at the political level to engage those and address them as quickly as possible.

a significant disagreement over the iran accord,, but i think the way dennis and i have described it here we now need to look at what we have in common, the get -- the goals that we share, and to do these very specific things between israel and the united states to ensure implementation, deterrence, accountability command to take into account a number of the circumstances, absolutely correct, chose to have more shared interest. a situation in syria is complicating and dangerous. and it is dangerous for practical perspective. ongoing every day in a small space. life with the possibility of

a mistake, miscalculation, accident. this also impacts israel with respect to the freedom of its operations and the threats that it has from syria as well. we share a tremendous amount. i think that the core fundamentals remain in place, and those emanate from the president. i also had a lot of experience with israel for i came into this administration. and i brought that as an asset, i think, and tried to build that while i was national security advisor. >> anything further? >> look, i was not trying to single anyone out, although obviously there was an interpretation that i was. i was highlighting the contrast between tom and his successors approach to dealing with the israelis,

including the dialogue. the, i wanted to highlight the mindset that exists on the part of some is a mindset that is a very traditional one, not unique, not unique to this administration, has been in every administration from german until today. and one of the things i try to highlight in the book is, that perspective that sees that if you do not partner with israel, somehow you are better off, one that i try to show analytically and repeatedly actually does not serve your interest with the arabs, does not benefit you there, makes the israelis more suspicious, and the very behaviors that frequently we don't want to see a repetitive throughout history his enemies. make unilateral israeli actions more likely if they have many more doubts about you and the nature of your

readiness to work with them and what is driving you in the region. and so what tom embodied in my mind, exemplar of how the most senior officials ought to be working with there israeli counterparts. when you look at american politics, changes in american attitudes, the changes in the middle east. >> if you look at the fundamentals, yes. a deep, shared interest. ensuring strategic goals.

there are political circumstances with stronger relationship in different directions and on occasions their personalities that come into play as well. i do think that it was of late a mistake to in any way drive the debate over iran to a partisan place. that was a mistake because one thing that has been consistent over the decades the dennis describes is a bipartisan commitment to the us israeli relationship, command we saw some damage to that, frankly, through the way that the debate unfolded on the iran agreement. i agreement. i think it was unfortunate and should be corrected going forward and we have an opportunity to correct some of that. >> there are a number of suggestions that i make about where we go from here,

and one of those is to reinforce what has in fact been the key underpinning of this relationship, aside from shared value and interest in threat, israel has been an american issue, not a republican or democratic issue. historically we have seen the pendulum swing. george hw bush got 11 percent of the democratic vote end of the time democrats can 11 percent of the jewish vote in that election, easy for me to say , and there was never a ploy on the part of democrats to try to exploit that. when you do that, it is clear that you have a political interest related to a party ina party in mind, but you do not have the us israeli interest in mind, and that is, in ais, in a sense, if you want relations to stay on a solid footing, it must be on a nonpartisan basis. >> it is interesting.

president obama personally has become a fiercely analytical person, as you know. and the arguments that he makes on these issues in the discussions on the peace process and other things that he had were kind of from two points. one is a commitment to the us israeli relationship, but additionally coming from a deep consideration of the analytics and the facts. >> okay. very good. we will end our conversation and open it up to your questions. wewe start over here with my colleague david and moved to peter. stand up and ask, have added. >> fascinating conversation.

just to pick up on the last points about how much you separate the overlay of the relationship and principles from the kind of, strategic objective and kind of a recent iran example going forward, quoted in israeli media, i think the "wall street journal", not from him but other saying that israel was not informed about the talks and really was a turning point. do you think that that was a mistake? going forward, is that same distrust, and even though they share, strategic objectives, no one wants a nuclear iran, despite what has been said, the more i share with the israelis who knows if it will be used to unravel the iran deal.

we could all make the opposite argument. the more they will be embedded in it and committed to it, but you could see that argument going forward that says in the last year of obama i want to keep israel, iran implementation, not talking about has below and the regional stuff, but on iran nuclear implementation, i want them at a certain distance because i am not sure where the prime minister is at. regardless. i want to ask you to look back and forward on these two examples and give some 2nd thoughts on what happened in the past on that .? >> with respect to moving forward here, it is in the interest of the united states, in my judgment, to have the kind of consulting group that dennis describes to have an accurate,

fact-based, solid, analytical assessment asked implementation. it is a -- it should be the platform upon which we continue to talk about. that is my strong view command i think that it should be done at the professional services level as well as the political level. in both countries the professional intelligence and military services are quite professional. they give their leaders their best analytical advice , and i think that the way to have a common view with respect to whether or not iran is complying are not complying with there not complying how bad they are noncompliant and have these join consulted to professional level exchanges. at the end of the day the political leaders have to look to their analytical teams to give them the information on which they

might base very serious decisions with respect to how they might -- with respect to actions they might or might not take. the line that was drawn was that we needed, the united states needed to ensure that there was a conversation that would be held, and once there was we would certainly brief in the engagement the israeli government on the substance. with respect to the 1st point on wasn't real, we had to -- and there is a long history to this, as you all no with respect to negotiation or talks between the us and iran, and it was absolutely incumbent upon us to ensure that the people we were talking to her authorized, that this was a real conversation, authorized not just by the state government but the

authority of the supreme leader's office, and prior to that, prior to our testing that was fidget through a series of interactions, prior to that we kept -- we this says a private channel, but the line after that when we get into substantive negotiations the united states engaged in -- my understanding is pretty deep and consistent and intensive briefings and information sessions with the israeli government including getting reaction from the government with respect to positions we might take in the negotiations. in the 1st instance it was important for us to test and see whether or not this was real, authorized are going to go anywhere, do they have the kind of authorization not just from the

governmental entities, but also from the supreme leader. having an extended set of negotiation and conversation about substance with a bunch of folks who were -- might have been authorized by someone in the foreign ministry with the supreme leader stepping back and not taking responsibility and having complete deniability, that would not have been a productive path. that is a little bit of insight into their mindset. >> no 2nd thoughts on that. peter in the middle. >> the last year of a two-term administrative, the time of energy, alsoalso a time of opportunity, as you both know, for getting things done and getting difficult issues off the table in advance of the successor coming in. we have seen about the consultative idea.

are they're twoare they're two or three other ideas or issues or problems that can be addressed in the waning days of the obama administration given that facts on the ground, the context of the relationship, anything that comes to mind about things we have not talked about that might be good to get off the table? >> the president in his letter made a commitment to finalizing in mlu. the obama administration inherited it from the bush administration and it would be nice for the next administration to inherit the same ten year mlu. that would be a good want to get off the table. you know, i hope that on the peace issue with the approach of the administration, it is going to be rooted in what i call what is possible. i think that it would be aa

big mistake to adopt a posture that our choices are to do nothing or solve everything. if we doif we do that we will end up doing nothing because we can't solve the whole thing right now command when you do nothing you create vacuums. if are going to be doing something command i hope we will, we take practical approach. we focus on how you restore calm, how you can do different things on the ground, how you can begin to try to restore believe between the two sides because it is the level of disbelief that i think is so problematic. we need to think about whether or not you can bring the arabs into this, whether it will be possible i don't know, but the palestinians are at a point of such dysfunction and weakness that they can do little. with an arab umbrella they might be able to do something. from an israeli standpoint the ability will be minimal.

i think there needs to be a kind of effort at least a practical efforta practical effort on this command i hope the administration will adopt practical approach. >> i agree with all of that. one, we should work through the next iteration of the defense understandings with the israelis. we should make every opportunity between now and the end of his term. second, the issue of interim are partial versus trying to solve the whole problem because this can lead to -- this leads to disengagement by the us. the history is that when the united states is disengaged and a vacuum emerges, things go in a negative direction, and the is filled by the forces who are against cooperation. so a set of ideas around,

you know, certainly political horizons but the practical steps that could be taken on both sides to build confidence and to show joint interest and continued calm and cooperation would be, i think, an important set of steps. third, it is important for the administration to work through this implementation and to have the mechanisms in place after the initial and mentation which could take -- we are now in the beginning of november. this could take another six or eight or ten months to put in place. there are number of things that have to be done. having that in place and the oversight mechanisms up and running is important for the administration to finish. max is, i do think that the united states needs to

develop and articulate a comprehensive anti- isi -esque strategy and implement the next phase of that, and we seem to have done so and to have taken some concrete steps, and the effort underway in northern syria to move is an important kind of step to break the narrative of success. this is the recruiting talent, the recruiting tool that this organization has which is a narrative of success that took on the leaders in the region and the rest of the world's successfully, and it needs to be broken. if at all possible, to work through a political next up, and i do think as i said earlier, it is important for us to put in place the kind of reassurance that we need to have with the gulf cooperation council state.

>> clearly we need to have a strategy on syria. needs to be coherent. the risk right now is if we are carrying out more attacks, which makes sense at one level, and the russians are attacking the non- isi is opposition everywhere else, we run a grave risk of undercutting the thing we most want. one of the ways you destroy the narrative is by having them be seen as being unsuccessful, but they cannot appear to be the only ones for protecting the sunnis. if there is a parallelism where we are getting isi isiasis, and they are hitting the non- isi -esque sunni opposition, we run the risk that in a sense we will instead of discrediting them add to the appeal. if we want the sunnis to be

part of the effort to discredit them they have to have a more coherent strategy than we do today. >> is it fair to say from the answer you both gave that neither of you think the last year of the obama administration will witness a major push to settle the israeli-palestinian conflict coming from the white house? >> that last qualifier is an important one. i don't see an enormous appetite within the white house to do a major push. i just don'ti just don't want that lack of appetite translate into doing nothing. and i worry that if you create a binary choice, the instinct not to do a big push translates into doing nothing. at the state department there is a different instinct to be active. again, the key is be active in the right way. what we don't need a more failed initiatives.

we don't need failed initiatives between israelis and palestinians because there is already too high a level of disbelief. we don't need failed american initiatives were we need to look more successful i say they are always different echoes from earlier time frames. he describes after qaddafi boosting interest in libya. every single leader from an american friend in the region, every single arab friend sends a message to president nixon in which they are basically saying, look, the radicals are on the rise here. there are shifting the balance of power against your friends and you are being completely passive in the face of this. it sounds rather familiar. interesting enough, the one thing that changed for us in the region was the aftermath of black september because when the syrians sent 300 tanks and jordan and we

moved some, but principally it was getting israel to mobilize, aside does not commit the syrian air force and the jordanians are able to expel. it looks like an american friend. we need a manifestation right now, and it will translate, you get a disproportionate payoff. again, doagain, do not want to failed initiative, but do not let your fear of failure prevent you from doing something. >> the administration has a lot of things to do between now and the end of the term. in the middle east and elsewhere in the world, and it is confronting the breakdown of really the arab states system, if you will. we have seen the reemergence of great power competition and disagreement.

we have seen one of the great powers moved to a posture of active hostility. we have a lot to finish in asia including finishing the transpacific partnership agreement. so in terms of a major initiative it was determined on an assessment of what is possible. but dennis is exactly right. i am pretty certain that this is not where secretary kerry is, but a disengagement will lead to a vacuum in the lead to a worse situation facing the next president of the united states. we need to get beyond this binary structure that we are in the middle east and the israeli-palestinian context. >> congratulations for your knew book. you both touched

on the question command i want to push it a little bit. especially given the timing. observing the anniversary. my question is, is he dead? if not busy on life support and what will it take to revive him? interim steps, the baby steps, but there is a bigger picture. it doesn't seem like there is much on either side right now.

>> thank you. look, i would say the following. the structure still exists. he may say that he is not bound by it, but that does not mean he is not implementing at least on the issue of security cooperation. it goes on now. and from an israeli standpoint as far as i know they are still transferring revenues that they are collecting, and you still have the designated areas of a, b, and c. so the structure still exists. you don't have an active peace process right now. what you have is something that is a wave of terror violence. it is not organized the way the 1st or 2nd was and is being carried out by those who are 15 to 25, being driven by incitement in social media, a lot of

the videos go viral and portray the result after aa young palestinian stabbed in israeli and that palestinian is killed. they don't show the stabbing but the result. the puts this false narrative out there what you now have is an agreement that obviously we contributed to between the prime minister, the king of jordan which is going to put cameras on a 24/7a 24/seven basis on a way of showing the status quo is not being changed, and i would like to see more done in that regard , more done in terms of spelling out in explaining what the status quo is not repeating this over and over, doing more to highlight this and getting them to acknowledge that

this is what the reality is as a way of trying to stop what is right now a kind of level of terror that has taken on a life of its own. because it is not organized that is the good and the bad news. is more limited. it is hard to bring it to an end. so 1st things first, you, you will have to find a way to calm things down. the 2ndthe 2nd thing i would say, and you said it at the end of your comment. anyone who thinks a binational state is a prescription for anything except what you are seeing right now should look again in the mirror. there is no place in the middle east where there is more than one identity that is at piece. and the kind of conflict you see is terrible. the worst form of bloodletting. and the idea that a one state outcome is anything except a prescription for

enduring war is an illusion. that is exactly what it will produce. so, you know, if you are a believer in the state of israel, believer in the us israeli relationship, the idea of a jewish democratic state, you needed to state outcome. i do not see how you produce a two state outcome right now because on the palestinian side in particular i don't see the capacity to make decisions. he will have to bring them into this. you can pursue an arab initiative in public. he hadhave to create a context which requires a change of reality on the ground. and so you start by creating calm. i don't call it baby steps. for the last four years this has been a siren song. both sides have been able to

restrain their enthusiasm for this idea. but i think one of the problems we face is that very few people in israel believe they accept a two state outcome. and very few palestinians believe they will ever accept an independent palestinian state. and you need to be able to construct an approach even if it's coordinated unilaterally where each side begins to take steps maybe in response to us that demonstrate, no, look, when we say we are per -- for two states, two states for two peoples and would be good to see some actions that reflect that. one way to show he believes in two states for two peoples would be to declare i am not going to build outside the blocks, build and what would be a palestinian state. the border has to be negotiated, but this is my demonstration that israel

believes in two states for two peoples. it would be nice on the palestinian side to either show that they would put israel on a map which would be nice, or that they could, you know, the idea, if you don't want to say jewish state at least say to states for two peoples because there are two national movements. diagnostic is such a thing as a jewish people. a very interesting article where he explained why it seems so hard palestinians to acknowledge. one way to demonstrate there is a commitment to asked to state outcome is for each side to even if it is to us take those actions that would do that. if you begin it is not going to transform things overnight, but what it will do is create a basis to take a 2nd look. if we were guided by a strategy that is designed to transform the situation so

that what is not possible today can become possible tomorrow, that is the way we would approach it. >> in a future negotiation would be based on the structure. >> i don'ti don't think starting from scratch is in the cards. indeed, the practical things that go on our under the structure and continue today. i agree, as you know, fully with taking interim steps which reinforce a path toward an ultimate agreement. it is an important question to ask why it takes the us secretary of state to go to them on for there to be concrete steps taken to reassure on both sides with respect to maintaining the status quo in terms of access to the holy site. why is that? >> it shouldn't. that is an important conversation for us to have. >> i will add, given the climate right now can even

there is a capacity to communicate directly, sometimes inside is the excuse that the united states provides, and right now what secretary kerry provided was an umbrella for communication to take place, and that contributed to the outcome. it is a reminder that we have a role to play, but we must structure it in a way that has a chance to succeed. >> thank you. in front, right here. >> five. i wanted to ask, and light of prime minister netanyahu's visit and in light of the bitter debate over the iran deal comeau what do you think is the best tone for the prime minister to strike and aei a mistake or not in terms of trying to heal the wounds that might have been created