>> but everything is analyzed. >> everything is analyzed. >> screened, i guess you could say. >> depending on how you define screening in scanning , we do look at the advanced data we receive from the shipper in terms of the manifest as well as the importer. we compare all of that to what we have in our databases in terms of automated targeting systems, intelligence information is provided, and from those reviews certain containers will rise to the top causing greater concern. highest risk containers are the ones we look at overseas. >> what happens when you look at a country like uae that scans everything. as passive systems that are made in san diego that scan everything. >> that is correct. many countries of the.radiation scanning equipment similar to what we have here. the radiation scanning is very doable from a technology standpoint. the challenge becomes the --

x-ray imaging of the containers, whether it is high, medium, or low energy, it still takes human intervention to analyze the results of that scam. so you have a radiation portal monitor that is a very ineffective and passive system and will tell you if there is a source emanating from the container of concern. you then need to take it the 2nd step to have the x-ray technology see what is inside. most countries in the world use a risk approach like we do and only inspect those highest of concern through x-ray systems. >> okay. what percentage are inspected after they get here? >> a little bit over 1%. >> and when it hits the us port. >> it's about 2.7 percent on top of the 1 percent. >> the next 2.6 or 7 percent is the next level down? >> yes, sir. ..

examined that whatever seaport they come into. a lot of that depends on shipping patterns and where they are arriving from and where they are coming into. they should be focused on the ports that have more of a greater likelihood of finding that type of device rather than

a universal approach. we thought their findings were very fair and we built a new risk maintenance that have a more likelihood of finding those types of containers. we will inspect high risk containers wherever they enter the united states. >> let me just get this, in 2007, was it 2007 when you all past, i wasn't in congress then. it said 100% of cargo would be inspected, is that correct? so what happened was everybody set that was impossible and there's no way to do that. >> what happened is we ran a series of six pilots around the world in pakistan, the u.k., honduras, korea and hong kong. throughout those pilots, we were able to identify and document all sorts of challenges from the technology to the logistic impact and the effect on

efficiencies of the cargo, things down to whether and things that would impact the dependability of the machine. through the pilot we were able to identify and catalog all of the challenges we found. from that time we didn't move forward in pursuing that any further. since then the department has reengaged on the issue to look at what can be done. we're understanding the technology that is now present in other locations. throughout all of these pilots, what we learned as it's not the radiation screening piece that is troublesome, it's the x-raying of the machines. that law requires both hundred% scanning and screening of all of the containers and that becomes

the troublesome piece. >> for everybody's benefit, the next panel is a bunch of smart people from labs who can tell us what could be seen and what can't be seen as far as they can go in a non- secret hearing. thank you. one last question for admiral brown, if something did happen, and this is just a general homeland security type of question, if something did happen, can the coast guard talk to everybody? can you communicate with the cbp and the sheriff and the ports all at the same time right now? >> yes sir. there are systems in place that bring together ports stakeholders, governmental and nongovernmental to plan and prepare for and in case of an actual event, respond to an event. whether it's a dirty bomb or some other type, there is

ongoing communication among all the ports stakeholders from unit to unit, vessel to vessel, patrol car to patrol car, there is no single communication system that integrates all federal state and local government. >> you say there is not a munication that integrates everybody crush mark. >> there is not a tactful radio system that communicates through all those entities, state federal and local and industry, but there are coordination protocol and command systems that allows each agency to communicate with others and then to communicate to their own. >> is that called a a cell phone? >> we use interoperation, some are brick-and-mortar entities to

coordinate that. we brought those together so the operational priorities or action could be taken and divvied up among the agencies. the agencies would go outperform those given the task to be individual tactical unit. >> thank you all. with that i yields. >> thank you very much mr. chairman. i want to go into the budget and availability of money. it looks like you spent something like $2.4 billion on this overall project since 2013. is that correct? >> i do not have the exact numbers but across the enterprise as that sounds about right. >> i'll take that back since 1995, $2.4 billion i'm putting

in place the technology and the question for the three of you is, is this a money issue that there is not enough resources or money to get the job done question let's start with admiral brown. >> i say that one of our challenges remains coordination. we have a great thing going with dnd zero and within our department as we've implemented the unity of effort goals of the secretary. one of the areas in which we are applying greater effort is to coordinate the acquisition of technology so the physical devices that we are using and the doctrine and the tactics by which we use them are similar and coordinated across multiple agencies and dnd zero has the lead in that.

so in your annual budget report to congress, do you need more money or less money for the specific purpose question on. >> for the specific purpose we have run our requirements through the department and through dnd zero. >> we are the strategic partner for this particular mission. we have the responsibility bring in all of the requirements from the operational requirements and allocate the right resources to meet the nee. very recently we did something for the first time in the department. we pulled together requirements from across the agency and made a single purchase, not just for the equipment itself, one particular unit, but by standardizing the unit across the operational units but also the maintenance contract. in the long run this will

benefit. that has helped significantly. i would put in a slight plug for your efforts to pass our budget, continuing resolution would put a significant clamp on our ability to support cdp in particular to replace some of the aging monitors and support operations at high-volume ports. >> back to sequestration and continuing resolutions. mr. owen. >> similar to the coast guard, we define our operational needs with the dnd oh who will then survey the equipment with what's available. most of this has been dealing with dirty bombs. there is a whole other aspect of this radiological material control that is over and the defense budget and the department of energy budget having to do with the international transshipment and the effort to address that.

i'll note that in the house version of the nda a, we cut that budget which would seem to be unwise. i understand the recently vetoed bill increased it at the senate level. perhaps still insufficient. i do note that we are spending some $30 million this year on an east coast missile defense system to protect us from a nuclear bomb. that's a three and a half billion dollar investment. should it ever come to pass and another $3.2 billion in missile defense systems. the question for the three of you is are we more likely to see a missile incoming or a bomb in a tugboat or fishing vote or in a container? >> a dirty bomb or otherwise question.

>> i think the likelihood of a dirty bomb is mitigated by several factors beginning on the international arena. the presence of radiological detection at border crossings throughout the world is much higher. there is also the logistics aspect of international shipping. if you actually have your hands on a dirty bomb, you turn it over to a truck driver who is going to take it to the port. the carrier will put it on the vessel and that vessel may move to other ships. other ports word is offloaded. you lose control of your asset. i think the nature of that works against supporting the dirty bomb in that container. there is much more detection than we have had in the past. you would also lose control of your asset for some time as a go through the shipping channels. i think there are other scenarios where you retain control where it may be a greater threat. >> example. >> aviation, small boats.

>> i would tend to agree with that assessment. i think the answer to your question would probably better come from the intelligence community but i would say in addition to the dirty bomb scenario and a container and the challenges associated with delivering one, some of the other threats we face would be from smaller boats on whether they were radiological devices or small arm attacks. that's another area of port security that we take very seriously. >> i think most of the hearing will be focused on other than that, but it would be useful for us to focus on that. i know we've had some previous testimony and other hearings about that piece of it. my time has expired but i thank you very much mr. chairman. i yield back. thank you for the witnesses and all the work you do to protect this country. the year so go the radiation

detectors in shanghai, i think they were put in place in the early 2003. after 911, what is the status for monitoring the effectiveness , their wear and tear and the lifespan and then is it to replace them? is their plan is there better technology #is their plan for replacement? just in general. i saw that in shanghai. it was right around that time in 2002 that you would see that equipment around the world.

we anticipated about a ten to 15 year life cycle at that time. this technology was new and we didn't know what to expect. it has held up very well and has been a workforce of radiation detection in our seaport. they are now coming to the end of that lifecycle and we need to replace them. there is better technology or the algorithms has advanced from where we were in 2002. the original equipment, just speaking for los angeles long beach it would receive several alarms per day and they were all non- threat materials. with the new algorithm that we now have within our radiation port monitors, we reduce that number from about 35 to 50 alarms per day. that's about an 86% reduction by having advancement in the last decade. so there's a plan in place to replace those just like a prime sector does. >> like a refresh of all the logarithms out assume globally

that same type of activity is underway. >> i believe my memory serves me right there are shippers, like coming out of china, if you got shippers that you work with all the time that are credible and go through certain procedures you can certify those containers. >> as part of that adoption we go out and validate we have implemented what they said they would. we will treat them as lower risk than an unknown company. >> so you can be more effective. >> yes the higher risk. >> i guess, once a specific

pathway for smuggling, how often is that used, when you find something, do they shut it down and open back up later on. >> transnational criminal organizations are very resilient. they react when we are successful and so they will move the geography of their smuggling. they will sometimes change the timing in ways and we combat that primarily with intelligence so we can try to have a very limited offshore assets in the right place at the right time. i would say i started my career in the caribbean in the mid- 1980s and just this week we have fishing vessels that are trying to get from order he go to the virgin islands.

they never completely give up on something that works for them. we continue to monitor those same threat pathways even 30 years later. >> a real challenge is small aviation and small boats. i think the real challenge, i don't know how you handle that but it's got to be a real challenge. >> did you want to stay something? >> when it comes to small and general aviation, i would mention that all general aviation aircraft using radiation detectors so we have seen an increase in last ten years. our capability in the general aviation environment are thinks in a large part due to aircraft. >> thank you gentlemen. i guess i'm just duck telling here. the bad guys are sending up

small bass boats from central america. isn't that how they would get anything here? some isomers the bowls, do you think we are putting too much emphasis on the shipping container when they are sending all the drugs up in small boats. 30% total of the 100% that we know of are coming from south and central america, right #. >> that's fairly accurate. we do think somewhere in the 15 to 20 or 30% depending on how you measure and what we think the flow rate is for those drugs that are bound for the united states. those small vessels and some isomers of almost never attempt to make landfall in the united states. the era of a go fast vessel going from the bahamas toward south florida or a fishing

vessel going from columbia all the way to the florida keys are long over. most of the drugs that leave south america first make landfall in central america and then take land pathways toward the border in much smaller difficult packages. the success that we have using offshore aircraft offshore covers, that really takes those multi- ton loads out of circulation and causes success that we've had over the past decades. we see very few drug smuggling vessels arriving in the united states. small amounts of marijuana landing in california. some landing in puerto rico. that particular pathway from south america toward the united states is not really a a full marathon pathway. so we don't see significant threat of nuclear material along

that pathway. certainly it could be exploited. we would have to make landfall somewhere in central america and then move on land pathways toward the u.s. >> thank you. we are honored to have the ranking member whose recognize. >> i served eight years on homeland security and a lot of these programs were very much a work in progress. >> have you audited the program lately? when i served in the arrears years ago we found significant problems with that program. >> we looked at that program roughly in 2008. we have an ongoing review that just started a month or two ago. it still underway and we are very far from having our final findings. we'll be happy to chat with you about what were finding along the way. >> that was a major vulnerability previously. >> in terms of, you say under the noa you will have to

register to own the vessel. real registered owner or a front? when i was discussing these issues, they were like no way are we going to give you the names of people who only ships because we will lose all of our business here. that's what we provide. we provide cover. has that changed or are we getting the names of the real owners question on. >> we typically get corporate names which are. >> right which are double-blind triple blind lawyer officers etc. >> what we scan against are the names of all of the ownership entities associated with the vessel and with the containers and with the crewmembers in their hiring. those are some of the areas that we look at to try to see beyond the individual names of the people on board or the company that is shipping a given container. we try to look at all of the corporate entities and their history behind the vessel itself, its cargo in the course

that it's been in and the crewmembers in hiring practices as well. we see some characteristics of companies that are engaged in the hiring that may be more problematic than the individual him or herself. >> you mentioned the monitoring of all ga aircraft coming in. what are we doing in a maritime environment for ships or large boats that cross into the u.s. #. >> as i mentioned, all coast guard teams carry radiation sensors. they certainly include the detection element. we have also worked with our coast guard partners to give them some capability to detect the standoff ranges for small vessel scanning's. whether they they are scanning a marina for fourth of july or

they have some reason to go up and out of c to look at a particular small vessel. they now have capability to do that. not just that they can carry on their backs but in their boats as well. >> the coast guard also asked us to look at detecting from above so we have a very interesting research project where we are looking at the ability to equipped coast guards with detection system so they can scan from above as well. >> on the ais, what about in exchange, a theoretical exchange at sea. maybe the containers have been scanned and we know the risk but the ship exchange is a container. theoretically, i guess if somebody was watching every vehicle at every moment, you would know that perhaps these two ships came in very close per proximity and there seems to be no movement, but were not doing that. >> that type of rendezvous at

sea, it would be extraordinarily uncommon in a container environment, it is common in the drug trafficking so we use a variety of systems, ais beingofg d the vessel lingers somewhere for a longer period of time than economically viable route. using ais systems and other national sensors that are available, i think we would be able to detect if a laden container ship deviated from its track or significantly delayed in route on a non- economical way and we would be able to then decide how to target that vessel either off shore or once it arrived in port for additional scrutiny. >> thank you i notice that you said we monitor every container

on the way out. who cares? why? >> we scan every container before it enters the commerce of the united states. >> no no, you said it was reversed, on the way out. >> no on the way out of the seaport, on the way in. they're positioned at the exit gate before it gets on the road and leaves the seaport environment, to enter the united states. >> so were not entering on the way out? you are not. i guess in the post- 911 environment, i wouldn't call it a reaction, it was a warranted reaction based on the tragedy that occurred on 911, but what we all know from this civil liberties standpoint and a

variety of different standpoint, there is probably over reach because of operational things that were just flat out impossible to get to. in other cases from a cost standpoint they didn't prove that effective in deterring whatever it was we were trying to deter in that particular sphere. i guess as i listen to this, the question would be along the same lines. if you look at the briefing material there's really not enough radiation to kill people. if you look at the logistical components in terms of the improbability of use in that somebody trying to do it that way, you put it as lose control, you look at alternatives to sort of masking where one would come from in terms of rendezvous at sea. it becomes a relatively low probability vehicle but were spending a couple billion dollars a year as i understand it in the gestalt on these

different programs. is it overplay relative to the degree of risk that we are really confronting as a nation in this particular sphere? >> congressman, the way we calculate risk is we couple the likelihood with the consequences. the consequences are a nuclear attack that would be so catastrophic that we cannot afford to take ri off this fall. we do need to remain vigilant and make sure we have capabilities to detect and mitigate. this is the ultimately preventable catastrophe. we can't stop doing it. >> again, let's back up a minute. were looking at, in essence, a

1% rate on the way in. you can maybe bump that up to 4%, but the reality is, the papers in pakistan or in other places around the globe can be relatively mixed. that's ultimately what we are checking about 95% of the cases. were% of the cases. were looking at that as to trigger a degree of further and inspection or look in that further inspection look is less than 5% rate. so you say the consequences are catastrophic but we've already determined that we can't ask backed every container. were not doing so. so we are inspecting less than 5%. worse still spending $5 billion per dollars per year. >> i apologize. i was thinking about this at large. i could not agree with you more. we need to level our investments across all the pathways and across all the layers so that we are not over strengthening one element of our system for the ways things can come into the nation. >> i only have one minute, let me come at you from a different angle. i guess what what i want to say is this, if you look at break bulk activity and container activity, the overwhelming

inspection seems to be at the container level not at the break bulk level. so if you wanted to bring something in seems like you could do that. if you go back to the issue with the small vote, the reality is, if you leave in the bahamas and had for fort peers, you're not inspected until you've docked the vote. you could've hopped off at the vote go and the inspection is coming after the point of entry. if you really want to do harm is seems to me there are a whole variety of rather porous vehicles by which to do so if you're looking at marine time activity. i think it gives us false security. >> i could not agree with you

more. we have to be careful to make sure we apply our resources across the board. that's why we work with our international partners to build our own detection architectures and make sure they are aware and can stop them before they have any form of conveyance to the united states. >> thank you. >> the distinguished gentleman from maryland is recognize. >> thank you very much. your testimony describes gao's review of the operational covert tests. you found several areas in which the cvp could do a better job do

you believe they have taken the steps necessary to identify systemic trends and systemic weaknesses to resolve these in a timely manner when they're found? let me say what i'm asking this question, it's a series of question, i found so often, when we have a situation where were talking to each other and telling everything's going to be fine and then when the rubber fits the road we discover there is no road. where are we? talk to me? >> they had three recommendations in our report last year. they've taken actions to address all three of those recommendations. they've taken action to try to make a more risk-based approach to target their limited

resources for testing to areas that are of higher risk or the technologies that are a little more costly to deploy and use. they've also done a better job of following up on the recommendations of their prior testing, for example when they found problems on the path they want to make sure those problems have been recognized and fixed. they made improvements in that realm as well. what they haven't done enough yet for us to consider those recommendations closed, they are very close and were pleased with the progress they have made. it's only been about one year since the report came out. >> the appointment of the screening capabilities across the nation's seaports was done in a manner that caused violence and threat levels at each port or is it based on a single standard that all ports are

meeting and if so, are all ports meeting the standards? >> the radiation detection equipment is in place to ensure they are all scan for radiation before it leaves the port and enters the united states. so in that regard there making sure everything is done before it is on the road to united states. >> can you cover the steps that are taken to avoid smuggling people onboard these containers and onboard vessels? >> think you that question. i will really address this in two different ways. we did have, for quite a while, problem was still a ways on vessels. stowaways.

the number of stowaways on commercial vessels has dropped dramatically over the past decade. we are down in single digits per month of stowaways arriving on commercial vehicles in the u.s. >> as compared to what? >> as compared to hundreds that are happening in the early 2000's. the shippers and the ship captains are highly incentivized to prevent stowaways from coming on board. that problem has been mitigated substantially with financial incentives and policies. with immigrants coming on various pathways, we do have a nationality screening process,

in the case of puerto rico and the virgin islands we do scan many of the people who are attempting to get in. we have many agreements to make sure that they are in very high percentages returned to their country of departure or origin. >> mr. owen, in your testimony, you identified an initiative. i understand it was previously being implemented at several form ports other than the one in pakistan. is that correct? >> yes sir, that is correct. secure crate was our pilot program in 2007 - 2010. that was one of the six locations we piloted. >> my time is expiring so i will have some questions in writing. >> my colleague from california is recognize. >> thank you for holding this hearing. this has been of huge concern

for me really since 911. when i came to congress i started the ports caucus because i think ports are so important to this country. they are the main economic engine and i always had a sense that after 9/11, we spent a a little more time, effort and money securing our airports and we did our ports. when people ask me what keeps me up at night, it's a dirty bomb at the port of los angeles or long beach. ships make 50000 calls per year on our u.s. ports. they carry 100 million passengers, they are incredibly important and one dirty bond at bomb would be disastrous.

we were able to finally quantify what those ports meant to our economy in 2002 when there is a labor dispute and the workers were locked out for ten days. everyone finally figured out that the closure cost about $1 billion a day to to our national economy. i am concerned and i applauded congress when they passed the 2006 safe port safe port act. i wanted 100% scanning of all cargo containers. as we are hearing today, we are around 3% of scanning, greening is very different than scanning, and we keep moving that deadline. no one really seems to believe we can ever do 100% scanning so that deadline keeps being left

down the road. it makes me very nervous, and all the scenarios that you are saying could never happen. two all remember in 2002 and 2003 when abc news smuggled depleted uranium through the port of new york and the port of long beach #no one detected. it was in the size of a soda can with shielded by material that was bought off the shelf no one detected that in either port. so i get that with resources we are doing this layered approach and risk-based approach, but i am still very concerned that we

are not scanning, and by the way there is a big gap between when they come into port and then skinning scanning them before they leave on a truck. i'm worried, and i thought this hearing was about what could happen about one of these large ports, a dirty bomb exploding. not to mention the lives, we have 5000 men and women who work in long beach and los angeles every single day. i am still extremely concerned in the next panel, i'm going to see if we can talk about technology that actually could scan 100% without slowing down commerce. i'm worried and i think part of why our ports are vulnerable to this kind of terrorist attack is because of the disruption it would cause to our national and global economy and also because

i'm not convinced all of the ports have a good recovery plan. if in fact something like this happened. i was going to ask admiral brown, what are you doing to work with ports in the recovery plan? if if you imagine the ports of los angeles if a a couple ships overturned in the main channel, not to mention maybe thousands of lives that would be lost, folks not even be able to get there to work or to rebuild the ship or clear a main channel, what are you doing that would convince us, and maybe the terrorists that that wouldn't be such an attractive target because we can get back up and running quickly? there is a question in there somewhere. >> thank you for that question. i will have to go over time to answer it because it is the fairly complex. one thing i would say is through the area of brand time security,

part of that is an exercise program and each city can prioritize which scenarios they think are the most important scenarios. think since about 2003, different ports around the country have done over two dozen exercises that specifically address dirty bomb scenarios. one element of each is recovery. we have learned through a a variety of real-world events, that the resilience of the system is vitally important to the population and our economy. we've developed a process called the transportation recovery system and we've used it in response to super storm sandy and in response to the haiti earthquake that you don't feed

the country through an airport but through the seaport. helping to recovery that from sunken vessels, damage peers that has all informed our processes so we engage with industry in the army corps of engineers, the navy and other federal partners to put recovery of that system on the fast track of recovery. >> i know los angeles has a port recovery plan. are you convinced that every port in this country has read covering plan in the case of a major disaster? >> i couldn't tell you that every port has a plan is robust and well exercised as the port of l.a. long beach, but it is a significant part of the responsibility. >> i would like to see that. thank you mr. chairman.

>> mr. grays from louisiana is recognized. thank you for being here today. i just have a few quick question. do you have any information on the percentages that are actually coming into u.s. ports and any breakdown of foreign vessels opposed to domestic vessels? >> i'm afraid i don't have a specific percentage breakdowns because the inspection regime for u.s. and foreign vessels are quite different. what we do are called port port state control examinations. they are risk-based based on the history and as i was discussing earlier, the ownership, the cargo ship and so on. some of those holes are examined every time i come to the port. >> would you be able to come

back to the committee and provide information for the record, but would you know off the top, if we inspect more foreign or domestic? you have to ask my staff to do some research and get back to in writing. >> would you mind? >> i would be happy to do that. >> in regard to u.s. vessels, because they are a flag state we are sponsored will not only for the safety and security of the vessel, they are subject to different inspection regime that may suspect them two more visits or less visits. >> i've seen statistics and data that show the percentage of data that are actually inspected i remember that being low.

i remember that being surprisingly disturbing. does that make sense question what. >> it certainly does. how that relates to criminal organizations. with regard to both security and a dirty bomb, the main subject of this hearing, but also with regard to protecting our borders from other transnational threats, our operation is based on layered security where we attempt, some of the partnerships that we have with regard to port security, to inspect facilities and with regard specifically for narcotics, we also have partnerships with countries in south and central america that allow us to board their flag

vessels on the high seas. those partnerships allow us to detect -- one that i made, over 1000 miles west of the galapagos island, there would drugs destined to land in mexico and ultimately the united states. what we do using our long-range aircraft and cutters, and other partners, partners, we attempt to identify those targets as far away as possible but then whenever we can, prosecute in the united states. we not only take the drugs off the streets. >> and less any of you customs are dhs folks care to --

>> no. >> there is a federal law enforcement present on each one, not to the level of inspection for the issues the coast guard looks for but to determine the crew. >> i have one other question. whenever i look across, you have local and federal law enforcement, in the state of the louisiana, they form this organization and they were grouped together and doing a lot of security. what role do you see those folks doing? what role do see them playing

important security, part of the overall system? >> yes, we are. >> we were in new orleans for four years so we certainly understand the role the local county sheriffs will play. they will often come in contact with individuals that may be of concern with what they're doing and those seaports. they will notify us and we will respond out. there are very strong working relationships, particularly in small communities clearly a strong role for that role. >> i would just like to add that we certainly believe the progress we have made in we have been working with our state and local department to build

capabilities across the state of public safety and law enforcement agencies. in fact all 50 50 states, we have engage with all 50 states to begin to build capabilities across ernie chen. >> thank you very much. i just want to make note that homeland security is no longer allowing the eight sheriffs to apply for homeland security grant jointly. they have to separate out. i just want to put that on your radar. >> think my first question is to mr. mauer. i represent a small deepwater port on the coast of california. a lot of automobiles come through that port. big ships come in and there are 6000 automobiles coming off of those ships.

i was wondering if they have reviewed the screening procedures for non- containerized cargo and if you had any specific recommendations for improving screening for non-containerized cargo? >> most of our work has been focused on containerized cargo because i think that's where the bulk of the federal investment has been. from a larger perspective, we have done work at a much broader interagency effort to make sure terrorists and nationstates aren't getting their hand on nuclear material that would allow them to construct a device and bring it into the united states. one of the themes of our body of work has been the technology and screening procedures are very important but there are all these other programs to make

sure we have a robust program to identify flaws before someone is able to construct a device and bring it into a port. >> mr. owen, can you talk a a little bit about the screening process? >> for all of the brake box that you see, depending on how the cargo was discharged, it might still pass. they would just that through hand held radio devices. the bananas and pineapples that have come into the port are also computerized and come through the radiation monitors. it is our primary detection methodology but we also have

some personal radiation pager. >> thank you for that. do you think small ports are more vulnerable than large ports? >> i think small ports are less honorable because everybody knows everybody. you have the same vessels that call every three or four bit days. i think in that environment from the outside, unknown, somebody who somebody who is up to no good will stand out. when the terminal operators, when they notice something that is amiss, they reach out to the federal police. >> if there was a port that went down, are there contingency

plans to keep trade moving? >> that's a great question, thank you. partly because trade is not entirely of federal responsibility, the private sector and their distribution shipping networks would adapt to any disruption, whether it was a national man main destruction or a. some of that could be directed or shaped by federal response including the coast guard captain. they would work with neighboring captains of the port to see if we could expedite the adaptation of shippers to the new conditions. >> each part does not necessarily aware of a specific contingency plan. it's just if something happens, you will adapt.

>> each port has this committee which has a planning process, but because it would be so dependent on one scenario, it would be hard-pressed drive a specific recovery plan for that port. >> thank you, i yield back. >> we have a second panel now that we were just looking at their testimony and it's in math, whatever language math is in. i just want to stress, coming in from known areas we can do the assessment. i guess my question is why wouldn't a bad guy who wants to get a bad device take the same route as drugs into the u.s.

why when you bring it up through central america and sneak it across. is that totally crazy talk? do you think they would ship it in and have the manifest beyond us and all that stuff?? >> that is certainly one of the scenarios we consider. we do look at alternate means of bringing the vessel in. we analyzed almost 400 elements of the architecture. we then base our resources on that. >> thank you mr. chairman, i guess i want one more clarification from the three of you, we are basically banking on this layered approach. this point of origin, when it leaves the port. although the three of you sitting here today saying that

you are 100% positive that a dirty bomb could not slip through and get to have our ports through our security model? >> i don't think anybody can give you 100% guarantee for that but i can tell you based on the incredible resources of our law enforcement officers, our intelligence committee and technical community, community, we are bringing every lost resource to bear. if we didn't have this multifaceted approach we would be far more vulnerable. >> would we be better off with a hundred% skinning? >> in the classified section i'd love to walk through with you would describe why we probably wouldn't be. >> the only thing i would add to that is we have had over the past 12 years or so several scenarios in which there was a radiological or threat concern

on a vessel coming in from overseas. with the motor process begun, we were able to board the vessel at sea and resolve the issue are bringing the issue to a safe place with minimal population to conduct the examination and resolve the issue. in one very specific case, not regarding a bomb threat, but a possible terrorist threat where it was ambiguous to whether the vessel was going to a united states coronary u.s. court, are you still able to do that same level of communication? it's a very good effect? the processes we have in place are effective for recognizing and responding to these threats in a way that will mitigate the

probable impacts but i can't guarantee with 100% certainty that we can completely prevent a dirty bomb. >> every container coming out of tif theme is scanned. i think in those strategic locations that give us more concern, it is the right approach. >> thank you. >> we have about 30 minutes with the next piano thank you for your time. we will have more time on this coming up.

the next panel should come up and take their places. mr. gregory cabana, joe lawless and stephen flynn.

>> once. >> and i will just say a few

words. i am listed as the senior fellow from lowe's alamos and that is my daytime job but this is something i have spent working on emerson's 9/11. on that day the department of energy in the department of defense were kind enough to send an airplane out to mexico to get the doctor out to pursue some projects that we were looking into one of which was a concern there were nuclear materials here

in the capital perhaps in the form of an operational form. so we spent some time looking into that. looking at dirty bombs and the big brothers. put those protection approaches are similar that as was pointed out to earlier, groups have smuggled fairly frequently with actual enriched uranium is a little harder to find excuse me it is harder but not that much easier. so we tried to find nuclear materials. as an air force colonel for whenever it has been, i worked on designing nuclear weapons, a testing of

nuclear weapons, but 9/11 was the first time i ever had to worry about the problem to detect nuclear materials. i find it to be very difficult and challenging business. there are a lot harder to find they and the dirty bombs and we also found although we have good techniques for diffusing nuclear weapons once you find the business in the first place is very difficult. after 9/11 a continued to work with the department of defense for a couple of years to remedy this problem it was very frustrating and was quite difficult because we went in the wrong direction to recognize

neutrons' the tiny particles of matter, they don't carry an electrical charge but can go through the thing it is a great way to a canceled nuclear to materials in particular when they produce maurer neutrons and hence the signature so that makes them a good thing to work with but we got off on the wrong foot we adopted the idea of the track was to standoff for miles with the particle accelerator to try to do the elimination from there but that does not improve survivability and it just made everything more complicated and we got discouraged with that approach.

after a while at looked too hard and we gave up. so the problem has nodded financed very much from 9/11 two today to detect nuclear weapons. what has changed? there are five things. number one. a decade of development of nuclear sources and detectors that made much more practical schemes possible. and even affordable possibly. so you could now have detector systems on transborder vehicles or ships and do an inspection of all the things from nuclear weapons.

second to, what that leads to an end in the testimony inland's to a modular deployment most moving to the 20-foot equivalent unit now is a 45 unit that i get wrapped up between the bulkhead of the big ship. happily if you use neutrons arafat last, they are very well suited to candle or inspect such creatures in port or in transit. second, what hit me there is a mistake that we made early on to ignore the countermeasures to the approach that we were

dancing for detection. we were asked to go against a friend of the adversary that makes life easier for us and that turned out to not be a favor because we ignored the fact that there are observers better used to control ordinary power nuclear reactors. they gobble those up efficiently so 1,000 of an inch could not the signals down to almost nothing but then it turns out to that the neutrons could easily get a rare these absorption to produce the big signal that is insensitive to the known countermeasures.

there is the penalty does somebody mentioned already when you x-ray, most go places that you're not interested lake with the big teu if you look for a ball that is 10 centimeters across and said teu is 3 meters only a fraction of the neutrons hit the core activate to produce a signal the rest is not always so there is a problem you have to overcome. but the third thing that i realized is that in the process to get the nuclear core that the neutrons would identify themselves instead of that the initial energy%

to have a spectrum between 10% and 90% better readily identified air and can beat filtered out if you throw away the new ways efficiently. particularly since the distribution of norway's from the source is fairly specific and doesn't degrade much in the process to slow down so you don't wind up with too many new ways neutron's showing up where you expect your signal. those three things or four things, made life a lot easier to the point you can do very effective filtering on energy that makes up for

what you lose initially in the numbers of neutrons that miss the target. overall you can get signals at the appropriate energies that are observed halfway through the slowing down process ratios between 100,000 or more that means you can have a confident detection of nuclear materials with the very low false alarm ratio of other materials. as someone alluded to, the tough thing about x-rays is you never know what it will be in a shipping container it could be axles or electronics and even if you can radiograph those then you have to go through long screening process are the unpacking process to figure

out what it was. with those high signals of norway's you have a fighting chance to pass everything through without having to go back to sort what the problem was in the first place. it just seemed to have the characteristics that we were looking for. i was on the advisory committee for air force base in the north command when it was first created we were trying to figure out how to parcel out, all the smoke. it just jumped forward for by big your pardon is seemed to do everything that the coast guard would do that

would detect failings or eradicate losses and false alarms with the first line of defense of the country purports sorry i went over. >> we will contact you. >>. >> chairman hunter and ranking member and distinguished members, they give for the opportunity to testify today to respond to an attack. ims systems analyst from albuquerque mexico specializing in architecture over the past five years in

its states government and foreign partners have been working for more than a decade to reduce the risk of her idiological disbursement attack from the engineering standpoint rest is a combination of the likelihood of the degree that the adversary has the intent and capability and materials acquired. it is a complex and multi dimensional problem the u.s. government has designed and implemented a number of programs based on scientific studies to reduce the likelihood of attack to reduce the availability of exploitation as well as identifying the pathways but the scientific understanding of the cost in the psychological effects are less well understood.

and has been established for cleanup and publications written by the organization indicates there understanding of the possible economic consequences of an attack. in 2006 or 2007 and august of this share were convicted of attempting to develop a dirty blonde in the eric city and chicago and elsewhere. they could be developed by a lone wolf individual to a high capable and technical competence adversary like who perpetrated the attacks on the subway system in 1995 in tokyo. the more likely they would be to find ways to spread over a larger area at higher activity levels. says the study at the port

of boston angeles many programs have looked at that threat likelihood for security or the office of domestic and foreign programs in said dhs architecture to identify radioactive material. if a device is located prior to detonation we have a rapid response. they're unlikely to result peeling to those caused by the blast there may be long term effects to other individuals however depending on involved the consequence could be considerable if it is difficult to remove from the services the contaminated area could be off limits for months or years that could affect those businesses to be shattered or their

residences to be relocated holocaust and decontamination is undertaken. also into your dependencies -- interdependency since there is no standard, it is difficult to estimate the cost of decontamination. the risk is real and multifaceted and there's a number of programs to increase the difficulty of movement of materials read to -- resulting in reduced likelihood of an attack. for the development of policies and capabilities for cleanup to allow for resumption of formal operations constitute an important element of the integrated solution to address the threat. thank you.

>> if you actually gave 30 seconds back to the doctor. [laughter] >> from the american association of port authorities you are recognized. >> chairman hunter and ranking member and distinguished members of the subcommittee and a director of the maritime security in boston and here today on behalf of the port authorities. a unified collective voice we empower the poor authorities maritime industry and service providers to create economic and social value for the communities so those resources in partnerships inform the leaders in maritime professionals in all segments of the industry

security is our top priority for all members in the testimony i am giving today is to secure airports from the dirty bombs could not happen without strong partnerships. our ongoing relationship support authority of federal government specifically customs import protection, united states coast guard, fbi, the state and local law-enforcement who play a vital role to identify threats, combine security resources into a dirty bomb were to arrive. the threat of a dirty bonds ending up in the hands of people was underscored recently from illicit smuggling operation that was reported over the last five years there has been the least four attempts by criminals in eastern europe

to send the materials to the middle eastern extremists of the plots were successful these materials could have been used to construct a dirty bomb used against us. the concern is terrorists could exploit the maritime system to bring a dirty bomb into the country. stopping them before they reach the shores is a priority but we must have the effective system to detect if there never to make it to the shores. a fully funded border protection agency is the for step to fight the threat of dirty bombs. to meet the ships and all ports of entry to check the manifest to utilize rhodesian portal monitors. the ports rely upon these to detect 30 bombs with cargo shipped into the country.

the protection device has the noninterest their process to detect movement of freight to their presence of nuclear idiological materials. they are mandated from the active 2006 the volume must have our opinions and all containers must be screened for radiation. most 10 years since they were mandated but questions have been raised of who is responsible to pay for new portals? what is the long-term obligation? a d chess inspector general states the initial estimates showed the average useful life expectancy of 10 years.

what we hear repeatedly is the lack of clarity of funding to read minister the r.p.m. program. it has become a hindrance how we protect our ports. we're fast coming to the end of first generation of life expectancy in the ports such as tampa, jacksonville, long beach, new york, a mobile report complicated discussions with regional offers on a the ongoing responsibility correlated to the r.p.m.. the recent example where we requested jacksonville assume financial responsibility for the technology park where suffering connectivity. this is significant given the complex and critical nature of these systems.

other ports are reporting similar disruptions. there is too much at stake congress and the administration. >> is a federally mandated program there should request adequate federal funding and it became all equipment at the ports through the united states but this is not feasible. the department of common security should consider a standalone priority titled radiation detection monitors. it will expand on the full capability to support the purchase and installation of radiation detection portals.

regarding the port security grant program many port authorities have utilize that to obtain idiological nuclear detection equipment those devices the first responders where the isotopes are used to determine the radiation and a sophisticated backpack detection device are some of the items acquired they not only supplement the efforts efforts, also enhance law enforcement role in the small vessel of the protection program jeff congress restore the funding to the original level to maintain them as a stand-alone program. additionally they go directly to the ports with

that security facility to have the necessary resources to implement the security programs. in conclusion, we must provide law-enforcement agencies such as the port security directors with all the tools and resources necessary to succeed. i appreciate the opportunity to testify and look forward to answering any questions. >> final witness on the second panel the center of resilience studies you are recognized. >> you'll hear back to back boston accents. i have been knocked this about 30 years now currently at northeastern university in support of the macarthur a foundation to manage the spread of the global supply chain so i am honored to be

here today. it is my assessment the threat of good dirty bomb is the clear and present danger that current u.s. efforts are not up to the task to prevent an adversary for exploiting the system to setup the dirty bomb if it was set up it would be so much of a weapon of mass destruction but mass destruction there ribby three immediate consequences first local death and injuries with the blast, a second the environmental damage the extremely high clean-up cost, we don't have standards to cope with bad and third is the morning after paul since there is no way to determine a way to compromise that led to the way it happened the entire

supply chain would be presumed to be a risk of potential follow-up attacks and call into question all the initiatives that the first panel talked about today. nearly a decade ago, this is my 29th time talking to congress since 9/11 i outlined a scenario that has been informed by bioresearch who is chairman of the security operations. but looking at the investigations but the athletic flaubert is from indonesia. these are destined for retail stores all across america. there are but then he turns

into the alleyway when one prize lose those hinges and so are removed and then that'll all this heat the portal monitoring. now he takes the container to the buyer were it to it's concurred in and they go to another ship carried between 12 and 1500 containers and then the ship goes to hong kong ltd. on a super containership with a trans-pacific wage it is then loaded directly to a railyard in chicago. and is carefully deployed along the border and when

the container reaches the distribution center the trigger device sends the ball off. is revered as realistic today as it does 2006 because it still remains unaddressed to target a shipment while being transported to where it originates from the local truck to a the factory to the poor river is loaded aboard the vessel. once the leaves the factory edwin's placing a dirty ball into the container in to they can reap a polished or

those containers who have metal skin and it could be breached some erectile fluid look at the known shippers. first you can kill the faggot is extremely unlikely that they will subject the container to any physical security as it originated from a well established company and it has no past record of smuggling is no chance and hit anybody is radar screen. as a trusted source is deemed to be identified already inspection in vancouver if it is offloaded. to explain from unknown shipper they can be confident they can generate the maximum amount of fear down because of high risk.

with its sensational media coverage american people would set the entire regime records instead a level known to emphasize this is why potentially david platt the dirty bomb in a small box because the goal is not to get it into the united states but disrupt the global supply chain systems and the aftermath. . .

there is a compelling rationale for doing this. requiring donations take action to detect and intercept shipments of illicit nuclear radiological materials. we have the rationale.

secondly, the us government must focus on the active participation of private industry that owns and operates the terminals. this is a significant business continuity enterprise. a public-sector responsibility to work this, but the private sector as a has a critical role to play. the foiled october 2010 bomb plot makes the case. we saw the air cargo industry working to significantly step of scrutiny of air cargo. the maritime transportation system is a highly concentrated system with a few large terminal operators and carriers responsible for handling the vast majority of cargo.

the zombies could potentially take on a leadership role for deploying technologies and tools on a global scale by providing near real-time visibility and accountability for content and location of all cargo. whatwhat they would need is a means to cover the cost. the estimated cost ranges from three to $5 billion. given that there are millions of containers moving, we are talking about ten to $15 per box a less than the security surcharge i had flying from boston to washington for this hearing today. the risk of an adversary exploiting remains clear and present. the disruption of such an attack would generate and goes well beyond the local port rippling through the entire maritime transportation system. accordingly the stakes for

the us national security and economic security could not be higher. there is no urgent need to bolster and build upon the many initiatives which aim to bring and improve the security of maritime transportation systems. these global networks required for us to operate. we must work on ensuring we can survive that in the event of a dirty bomb going off in port. thank you so much. >> thank you. i will ask a quick question and pass it off. i guess the question is this, if you're going to have a nuclear weapon come into majority are not commit will be shielded. if it is not, i would recommend recommend to our enemies that they shielded, otherwise it will be easier to see. the smart people would shielded. can you still see it? >> that is a good question which i covered a little bit in my testimony. the -- bombs are not easily shielded from inspection by

neutrons. as is said, if you keep the neutrons fast enough, that is, high enough energy, they are not affected by absorbers and other -- i mean, neutronsi mean, neutrons can go through a whole ship without hardly slowing down. the tricky part is what are called moderators, things that reduce the energy of the neutrons. if a bomb was packed and a bunch of moderator material, carbon or something like that that can slow neutrons, enough of it could slow the neutrons down to where not enough of them would penetrate into the core to give you a good nuclear signature. that -- it is not a precise number, but 1 foot or so of carbon outside the device could maybe affect that sort

of slowing down, but there are two things that you must consider. one, by the time that you have a few feet of carbon on either side of the device, you have blocked the whole ceu, the container that is in, and that in itself would be a signal that someone had tried to do this. it is not an easy thing to do. the other thing is a technical point, but when neutrons bound -- bounce off of moderator like carbon, they produce a spectrum of bands of energy that pop out that i easily detectable, and the spacing of the energy bands are a good indicator of what kind of moderator the person is using to try to beat you and the number of those bands tell you how thick the moderator is. so it is -- that is the game

that they would play. it is not an easy game for the adversary. >> there is a company called decision sciences that is able to test nuclear stuff with really thick lead. you must be in their system. it has to be within basically one of those drive-through systems to do this, and it takes more than a drive-through. >> if i might quickly, neutrons like to go through anything, particularly steel and led and stuff like that. ordinary shielding, which is very effective for dirty bombs and even uranium and its natural state as it is just emanating gamma rays, all of those things which are effective otherwise are not very effective against the approach that i am using with neutrons. someone has to really go out of their way with a lot of

wanting to try to knock the signal down too much. >> it would take an actual scanning system to do that. >> no, sir. the trick with neutron detection of any kind is that you put a signal and the neutrons come out. and so you are stimulating very gently the fissile material to produce a signal that would not be there in the case if you did not stimulated. >> another way to do that would be these drive-through systems. none of this will happen by a handheld device that someone is holding

walking around or a bell device. >> no, sir. >> all of this comes like a drive-through scanning system where you can spray with neutrons and have the right on the other side. >> that's right. there is no free lunch. you have to produce the neutrons, but the fact is the neutrons are not hard to produce. the trick is knowing that you have to put them where you want them and collect them in a smart way. >> and i will yield because i am out of time. >> the bomb line ofbottom line of your testimony is that a compact fast neutron inspection can't work. we are not deploying those. >> i'm sorry. we went off on a tangent thata tangent that was not productive. it has only been sitting around scratching her head they gave me the idea.

as doctor teller used to tell me, the hardest thing about doing something as a learning what you thought you were. >> you seem to think that domestic steps need to be taken. cesium's fluoride specifically. >> national academy study was done some years ago pointing out the need to protect fluoride sources throughout the united states. >> wouldwe do our attention to that issue and presumably we will avoid dealing with the problem. which is not a good solution. finally, dr. lawless comes down to money, doesn't it? or mr. lawless. who is going to pay for the detectors. domestically with cesium chloride, how much money do

you need to put these detectors and to maintain? we are working with the indio and a company to develop a state-of-the-art detection system in the port of boston. but there is money needed to fund the program, clarity. federally mandated systems. and they believe the federal government should be paying cbp and the indio to fund projects. >> willing to put $10-$15 on ten to $15 on each container. i assume you have an opinion on that.

>> yes, no? >> yes. >> all right. and i would just go back to why i started this. we make choices around here and are looking to spend three and a half billion dollars for a missile defense system for the scarcity with uranium exclusion. which presumably will be available for some decades. thank you command i yield. >> the gentleman is recognized. >> thank you for being here. i have followed your work and read a lot of what you have written. i am always very concerned. the container security initiative scans less than 1 pe.

you believe scanning at the point of origin is 100 percent effective, or should we be investing more in scanning at our domestic ports? >> this is an issue with the stakes being so high that we should be looking at dealing with this across the board. relative to where we split resources this ranks right up there given the consequence relate up which is many good bit of time in the port of la and long beach and you get the sense of scale and with the problem would be in this dirty bomb scenario, how would you work in that port as well as neighbors who live in san pedro and so forth. in the face of this, there is opportunity at the port of loading, even at the largest terminals to scan cargo. what that would do if he should be baked into the terminal operations just as the variation portals are here.

we would like to have that when people drive into the terminal command you can do it for just the us. that is where there is counter proliferation value going out to the united states but around command to the extent that is a national security imperative trying to get visibility should be key. so let's be clear right now of the numbers, 2,013, the numbers of cbp inspections overseas and the than 50 gave ports around the world was 103,000.103,000. if you divide that by 365 days and 58 ports are talking five containers purport per day being examined overseas under the csi system. five a day. singapore, shanghai, others, it may be up a little bit because the current approaches, we will identify the risk and pump the box and take it to a government inspection facility. if you

bake into the operation of the terminal you would collect this in real time. it does not mean you have to look at images. you get those that have a much greater degree of confidence about deterring this risk but also ultimately finding these when they go wrong or worst case even isolating the incident after the word so that you do not shut down the whole system. there is so much that can be done, should be done, it is not is not being done. >> thank you command i appreciate the morning. the threat to our global economy is significant, particularly if something happened at long beach and los angeles. we knowangeles. we know what that impact would have a not just the national but global economy. i'm just going to ask one more. the biggest issue that everyone tells me is that in some way that would impede, slowdown commerce and we just cannot afford that.

i was going -- by the way, i do have a bill that would provide grants to two ports in this country that would voluntarily decides to implement 100 percent scanning with the technology that we have available just to prove everybody that we can do this and not impede commerce in a way that would really impact the economy. is there technology that you spoke about, which one of those technologies could work and also not impede commerce? >> there are -- there is one technology that i talk about. interrogation would neutrons. i think that it would fill the requirements you are sort of setting.

i always like, they have these big cranes that move things around. i would like to put my source on one line -- one leg of the thing in the detector on the other. it's plenty of time. it does it inspection and seconds or milliseconds, very fast. the other thing, what i mentioned briefly in his mouth a little source and detector on the balkans of the ship. one per canister so that you can keep track of what happens to the canister the whole time it is odyssey. sure, you can do that. i have not proved it. i have it. i have tried to tell you that the physics is okay. >> thank you very much. >> ms. miss brown is recognized. >> thank you, mr. chairman. your points and testimony are well taken that it is not an attack just on us

soil, but an attack on trade and interrupting the goods movement in our country. and i am just wondering why if you have very specific recommendations for how individual ports and the businesses within the sports can really prepare for or prepare for a contingency plan in the event that we did have an attack and also specific recommendations for our governmental agencies and what they should be doing for contingency as well. >> i mean come i really applaud the question in the focus. unlessfocus. unless we assume there is a zero chance that this will happen, we should have a plan. that is something that we can do. the heavy coordination and collaboration issue. the court challenges that

this is a global system running on steroids. if you disrupted increasingly it cascades across the system. it is a lot of choreography. right now the us government has no plan for how to deal with this beyond the borders there isthere is a global strategy the president put out, the world's thinnest strategy california have pages. we should have a plan, but what he actually has executed on. thinking through that, specifics, clearly raising the awareness about what this event would look like and then mechanics about how we deal with the immediacy of the dirty bomb, what is safe? this is something a community cannot solve because the us government has to set what standards are for safety.safety. the coordination is heavily between the industry runs a system in the port authorities on the local authorities and the governmental authorities.

we have limited visibility. a unique and challenging issue for critical infrastructure is that 90+ percent of it is internationally known, not us owned. we have to we have to coordinate with those key players, but the opportunity is a concentrated industry, five operators that move 80% of all the goods in the us imports all over the world. he ought to go to 180 nations. they're basically 20 open -- ocean carriers that matter. but we have been doing is looking at this as a government to government issue or local government issue when it really is an international private system

in our financial meltdown we had central bankers who can manage the morning after. it was messy, but we had a system. we have no such system for managing a major distributor of that which is which is something that i think transcends anything that these agencies here who are here this morning their jobs could do but it is a high order national security and economic security issue for us to wrestle with. >> you had mentioned that we have been listening to industry and businesses clearly in terms of what they believe or the right -- what is the right direction and plan for contingency. do you have any idea what they would suggest? in earlier testimony they said, if we had an incident the industry would just respond and that would be the contingency plan. >> i worked closely on that end of talk to the ceos. if there is a plan they are willing to engage. a business continuity issue. if there is a cost recovery mechanism, i had to colleagues and other work. the one that we have right

now where we would select a box out of the container and send it to be inspected and very small percentages command one where you scan all of them. it is easy for me to scan them all in for you to come into my art,art, pack six high, and get to to take around. in some cases it turns out doing more is easier. the economics are better. in other places you will not have the same level and then use an approach. it will not be one side fits all. but he comes out different than the one you have when you do a government to government one , and here it is an engineering problem, and operational problem with technical complexity that it is not insoluble. this just hope it never happens. shame on us when it does happen. >> thank you, and i yield back. >> thank the gentle lady. we have run out of members.

this was not a bad showing for today. at least we had some people, but thank you for what you do for the country and for industry and thank you for being here. with that, the hearing is adjourned.tetely needs and

deserves. with that, mr. president, i thank you for the time today and i yield the floor. a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from west virginia. a senator: thank you,

mr. president. today i rise on behalf of west virginian families and communities and all hardworking americans who will bear the burden of these onerous carbon mandates. mrs. capito: the bipartisan resolution of disapproval that i have introduced with my colleagues, senator heidi heitkamp and 47 other cosponsors, will block greenhouse gas regulations targeting existing power sources. i also very longly support leader mcconnell's companion resolution to block the regulations targeting new power plants. as i was thinking about this teach spoad and as i rise to give this speech, i realize i've said many of these same words so many times before. expressed the same frustrations and spouted off similar statistics. so what's the difference this time? well, the difference is we've already seen the devastating effects and the callous nature of regulatory overreach. and so we know what the new reality would be. the new reality would be what we're facing with these new

carbon regulations. the reality of the families, the faces and the hardships that we have already endured. the thousands of layoffs in my state of west virginia that have already been issued. the jobs that have been lost and will never come back. just this morning, just this morning, nearly 200 west virginia coal miners in randolph county were informed that their jobs will be gone by christmas. think about how those families will spend their christmas holiday. and then consider how those realities would be magnified and felt throughout many households across the country if these carbon mandates move forward. the higher electricity bills that will result. the squeeze already is squeezing the struggling middle-class families who live on fixed incomes and those who live on fixed incomes , the squeeze they will feel. our most vulnerable will bear the burden.

consider the far-reaching effects these regulations will have on schools that are now seeing their budgets shrink, home values that are now on the decline, and fewer dollars that are available for public safety and law enforcement. the reality, it's the reality that the policies emanating from this government, from our government, are causing this destruction. this is not a natural disaster. this is not a fiscal crisis. this is not an uncontrollable event. but a carefully crafted, precise and very meditated assault on certain areas of the country. policies that help some states and really hurt others. policies that target states like west virginia, north dakota. we produce some of the most affordable and reliable energy. policies that are ripping the american dream away from families in my state and communities. our families want and deserve

healthy and clean air, water and they want to live in a great environment. but policies from washington that pit one state against another and prioritize certain communities and certain jobs over others are bringing the livelihoods of many to a halt. members of congress, on behalf of americans across the country, we now have the opportunity to express those concerns with these carbon mandates. we have an opportunity to weigh in about whether these burden some regulations should go into effect. i believe that a majority of my colleagues understand the need for affordable and reliable energy and that's why i'm confident that congress will pass these resolution and place this critical issue of america's economic future squarely on president obama's desk. with the international climate negotiations in paris scheduled for december, the world is watching whether the united states will foolishly move forward with regulations that

will do virtually nothing to protect our environment and will tie one hand behind our back economically. even if the president vetoes these resolutions, as we recognize the likelihood that he will, passing them will send a clear message to the world that the american people do not stand behind the president's efforts to address climate change with economically catastrophic regulations. i'm pleased to be joined by several colleagues on the floor who understand the need for affordable and reliable energy. and i would like it to recognize senator heitkamp. i ask consent to engage in a colloquy with my colleagues for up to 30 minutes. the presiding officer: without objection. ms. heitkamp: thank you, mr. president. and thank you to my great colleague from the great state of west virginia, a state that's been powering america for a lot of years. in fact, from the very beginning. and my great thanks to all of the great workers and coal miners in her state