>> i think soft operations in africa opens up a unique tout look at how we advise, assist, train, equip, conduct full spectrum soft operations from counterterrorism operations to counterbalance extremist organization operations, training and equipping, advise michigan and assisting, civil military operation, to understand how to operate a lethal force we develop, effective live operate in and among the populous. how to gig separate that with civil administration and the police to fill the gaps, and then how to do the proper messaging itch think there's a lot to be taken. i am not going to sit here and say that they can't learn something from us, but that's how we operate on africa. in as lethal and dangerous an environment as anywhere else in the world. we are close to our partners. we do advise, assist, accompany. we do everything that i think is being expected of our soft

brothers in sierra and -- syria and iraq, and we take lessons from everywhere we can get them. so constant live doing assessments and lessons learned and integrating those things. if you look into how we operate on the continent, small teams, one guy, three guys, final guys, six guys, 12 guys, imbedded to do the mission is talk about. on an operationol timeline of hours to years, depending on what we are doing. if it's a crisis response, it's hour, days, weeks. if it's building partnership capacity it could be a presence that lasts to years. >> what are your africa fran partners telling you they want? what type of -- be it training, equipment? >> first and foremost what they want is a meaningful, enduring, long-lasting relationship, and they want that with the united states and the united states military, and we're seeing the fruits of that across the board.

but more importantly what they want us to do is assist them with professionalizing their force. they're particularly interested in develop a noncommissioned officer corps because they see how we operate with our noncommissioned officer corps on the continent and it's appealing to them how we do that. so, in some places that is going to take a little bit of time. they like how we prayed because that's who they're all right. small teams, distributed, types of organizations. they want us to be there to advise and assist them. they want us there with them. not to be a crutch, but in support of what they're doing. >> are you seeing their militaries becoming more structured? than they were or -- i don't want to use the term bureaucracy, but i guess the professionalization as you

mentioned. are you seeing that -- can you talk about the challenges involved in that just with -- based on history in spirit places. >> well, we have a wonderful amendment called the leahy amendment, and if we were having serious problems with our able to work with our partners, we would not be able to vet them accordingly. so, we are seeing less and less issues with leahy vetting, less and less things that would trip a leahy vetting problem, and so that in my mind over the years, the work that has been done, because that has decreased their ability and effectiveness has increased, their communications to us are at a much, much higher level. they're looking at institution-building can professionalizing the force, how they take care of their force structure in a way that we haven't seen before. so i say the overall

effectiveness is going up. >> want to talk about the authorities and maybe the way money is tied -- appropriated for certain missions, unlike other places in the world. for instance, you have the money being appropriated for the lra mission to hunt coni. eventually while you're doing those missions you come across other types of threats or advising for other types of -- you could advise other types of missions but you can'tment can you talk about to the issues you have with the authorities there and maybe tying money more toward threat than a specific mission? would that be helpful to you? >> when you're talking about putting a mission together or special operation forces, given what general rodriguez has asked us to do in his theater campaign

plan, it's all tiled -- tied to threats. so authorities to be able to do with this the maximum flexibility possibility is desirable. the permissions we need to getting also very, very important. and that's why the relationship between the military and the interagency is so important and that's why that integration, coordination, synchronization of everything we do has to happen extremely early so we're all informed and understand what we want to do so we have maximum flexibility. i give my commanders a tremendous amount 60 leeway on the ground to do what they need to get done so we can operate as fast as our partner nation and as fast as the threat and that's hugely important. the risks we have to assume on the ground needs that flexibility for them -- for them to operate. we have to do it within a construct. the construct is established and

given to us. sometimes the construct changes. we need to re-scope it, terminate it, sometimes we need to pause it and regroup and refocus it somewhere else. we want transition it. we have done some of that but not as much as hopefully we do in the out years here. so we constantly are doing assessment and lessons learned. you alluded to the lra mission, hugely successful mission. over 3,000lra when we started four year others, now down to under 200 roaming around aimlessly in an area the size of california in triple canopy jungle. they're hard to find. but we have had four out of five koni -- the fifth one -- of the commanders are off the battlefield, seven other senior commanders have just recently

given themselves up. they are on the run. so, what we're doing now, we have been directed by the national security council staff and the joint staff to give you an example, we're looking at that mission to re-scope it or to transition it or do something with that mission and that will require different authorities because right now we have advise and assist authorities, and depending on what they ask, we may need train and equip authority or something else. so we have been asked to give them that feed back and assessment. so, somalia, another classic example. a lot of success in somalia. a lot of success in the security forces. amazon, our partner countries that we're working with there. i just talked about central africa. tremendous amount of successes in the lake chad basin year we chad and cameroon. on the continent i try to simply

identify everything because it helps out even in a complex environment. it's called outside and inside out. that's how we look at every probable. we have a problem inside the country, we try to develop a plan that looks at the plan and developing support based off of our partners' requirements inside-out, and then the countries surrounding it we look for plans to support outside-in, and in niger, chad, and cameroon, this is hugely important because they're containing the boko haram problem, where nigeria is inside degrading and it defeating it, and so that combination and connecting them in that way has opened their eyes to a regional solution to the boko haram problem. >> can you talk about cameroon? there was some news made a few weeks ago about isr deployment to cameroon and is that in place yet and what are the goals for that mission?

>> yes. cameroonian government requested to be more involved in the operational aspects of countering boko haram, one of those things is placing isr. it hit the news and the president talked about so it i'm on solid ground. they want to put an operational capability inside their country to support that problem set and and that's being done as we set. afrikaan is moving forward with that. wore working on transitioning in cameroon a tactical isr capability. technology transfer is hugely important in africa but has to be sustainable and has to be affordable, and it's got to be simple. even for us it's got to be simple. the more complicated you make something, you're less likely to use it. so this technology transfer is hugely important. i'll use an example of niger

where we have a team in the southeast portion partnering with their force. living right next to them. so the coffee breath close concept. right there with them. advising and assisting, training and equipping doing a number of things along those lines to support the counter-boko haram fight. our guys are living on solar power, and water purification systems which are hugely important. they got water purification systems, sits in a little box the size of a -- little bigger than a briefcase, and it purifies 80-gallons of water per hour. and 99.99% -- i'm knock sure of the other little digit there, what that means, but stomach flu or whatever, but bottom line is, they're doing well, and so what we're doing is we're showing them how to operate in austere, remote areas, efficiently and

effectively, by doing it ourselves and using technology to be able to do that. we have a radio system that we're employing as well that connects all different kinds of ways to communicate. fm, hf. cell phone, a system that allows them to talk. because in country x they may use cell phones and country y they may use fm. and this communications system, which is affordable, recognized, we have used it in flintlock. we'll used against in this year's flintlock, which i invite anybody to look at. it's a great exercise we do every year to include european soft partner's others. a great opportunity to see some of this stuff in action, this interoperability i have been describe hearing today. but those kind of things hugely important as we operate on the continent. >> when you say text transfer, do the countries want drones of their own? is that what they're looking for? >> i think everybody wants that

kind of capability, to see the enemy or see their threat more clearly, and be pro-activing a opposed to reactive. so, yes, that technology -- they know about it, they come to our schools and get trained and they know, they watch the news. they watch discovery channel. they're all very smart and very astute, but they need assistance in that recorder to ex- >> going back to koni, you said they're hide neglect jungles. are their days numbered? >> absolutely numbered. right. i don't know what's going to come first. either we capture him or -- not we -- our partners capture him or he dies of the many health issues he is experiencing right now. don't know. but, yes. >> we're just about out of time, so i'll end with this one.

can you talk about kind of -- if you had just -- if you mad here money. budget is clear lay big issue in washington. we have a budget deal now. if you were to get a slice of that, what would you spend it on? >> if i was to get a slice of that? and it cape if a a capability, right? i -- it came with a capability, i would probably ask for more isr that has a multiend capability, itself was possible. i've already asked my higher headquarters for that so it's not a big secret. anyway, that's what i would ask them for. but like i said, soft doesn't focus on that. we focus on the right people, not necessarily the technology all the time. we got to have the right people. mentioned earlier, and i thought about three things that are extremely important to me. i'm a south africa command sore i'm an employer. i get my stuck -- structure from

the -- articulates how to support the combatant commanders and doing that through the -- that's hugely important point to make because i work for two four-stars, operational commander and then my soft commander, so, the global campaign plan for the -- the campaign plan for goal special operation, the theater campaign, they lay that out, give me the mission, give me the people to do the mission, and most important to that is the families that support those people as they go out and do the mission. so i've been thinking about those three things. think about it all the time. but hit home with a couple of speakers here today that, give me a mission, have to resource me to do the mission. i you don't resource me fully, we'll tell you what we can't do i have to have the right people, and i have to -- we have to take care of their families.

>> as you've say that, our clock has hit zero. so great job working it right down to zero and thank you everybody for joining us. thank you, general bolduc. >> god bless you all. thank you. >> please book, deputy director of the cia for digital -- and technology editor at defense one. >> all right. it's on. great. so, thank you so much for sticking around. it's wonderful to have you all here with me today, andrew holeman, the new deputy director at cia in charge of the new directorat, a huge change for the central intelligence agency and we'll get into what that means and what's going to change, and also an intelligence briefer to president obama and a director of the office of iraq

2007 to 2008. so, the directorat of digital innovation, has two primary functions. one is to create new insights through data that we can use, cia can use, as part of its effort to analyze and predict what is happening around the world, understand those emerging hot spots, understand our areas of operation, and also to help the agency and to help agents better use cybertools in operations in an effective way and most, the remaining clandestine in an era where all of us are producing exponentially larger amounts of data than we are just a few years ago. something like 90% of all of the data ever been generated was

generated in just the last three years, at the very least, and so remaining clandestine, remaining secret, maintaining a legend or cover in that sort of operational environment, is a tremendous challenge. so, those two areas, we're going to get 0 both of them. let's start with the first challenge, which is creating new insights for cia through the massive amounts of digital information that all of humanity is now creating all of the time. can you give me a sense -- a picture of what that means exactly in terms of the challenges of creating a better picture what is going to happen. >> sure. thank you for having me here. i already see some familiar faces. the way i would characterize it is our role is to drive capability into our ten mission centers which are organized thanksally as well as geographically, they will

produce 0 integrated insight from the digital data. for the analysts what would i say is this i moving them from a period where they have been accustomed to what i'll call the manual curation of a finite body of del intelligence reporting and other data to one where they need to generate insights from a vast volume and variety of data they haven't had before. so, the cultural dimension of that, technological dimensioning, analytic dimension, and data management dimension that this directorat will hell them in the way they organize the data, apply analytics in a way too generate useful insight from the vast amount of data. >> helping them manage a world where they have to keep all their browser windows at the same time, turning that into something they can use. >> that's the challenge,

providing platforms that don't require them to go from domain to domain to domain or application to mix -- to plains, to application. the power users will be able to do that in a way other analysts won't, but this is helping them develop the user information that helps the leverage the data. >> when we talk about mission application, what are we talking not terms of the way cia is going to have to put new information in the hands of people that are carrying out incredibly dangerous and critical missions in very difficult places, 50 special operators now landing in syria and they require vast amounts of intelligence to do their job. how can this directorate shape their future realities like that for operators on the ground. >> one challenge will be providing them with, one, the ability to leverage vast amounts of what i'll call human

geography data. human training mapping data, give them fidelity what is going on the ground, culturally, tribally, food conditions, whatever the case may be, natural resource conditions, but in a way that gives them the ability to -- with agility exploit the massive amount of's data in ways they can't now. part of that is a question of mobility, and providing them with applications or platforms they can actually do wireless work, that they can't do now. much of that information is open source, and is readily available and can be used in that way. but to the extent we need to integrate that, especially at the dat layer, we have to find a means to do that securely, portably, and mobilely for those officers. >> almost like an app and have an immediate sense of here is the relevant information that is going to affect water here,

possibility of civil unrest, recent events in this area that could be threatening to you or to allied forces, and all of this is available in the same way i access cereal. >> open source data, human data, they need all of that in a way they can't access now in an integrated fashion on the ground, mobilely, and so that's what we have to help them secure. >> how would you characterize how big a change this is for the cia? sounds like this is the sort of thing that a lot of people are probably already doing but at the same time this is something that was so necessary and urgent that they established a in the directorate. >> the important thing to understand it didn't take this directorate to come along to generate information at the agency of we have very strong pockets of innovation around the agency, very strong power users of i.t., of digital applications, of cyber.

we don't have -- all of the mission areas so we need to raise the digital proficiency of all officers and really, importantly in the prim role of the directorate is to take that where that occurs and scale that other myth area -- mission areas >> you say where this innovation occurs. give me a sense of what that looks like. >> ry give you a couple examples. if we have a particular -- choose the middle east -- the near-east mission center. if they have a custom application they built that rides on top of a secure global agile i. t. platform, and they develop that in a way to exploit data they just got. the -- have to scale that for the enterprise to they can that

innovation and help look for broadly scalable applications and claim tot mission areas. expects they kind of pocket innovation that occurs all the time at the agency. but again, the -- it's not really up to those mission components throughout the entire interprize. it's about their execution of missions. >> so, really what we talking's can somebody comes one anew way to access data, analyze at that time dispassion you can pay attention too that and move it quickly to all of the places it has to be to centralize those, digest them, and feed those to the director of analysis, and the director of analysis is then in charge of ringing the alarm bells and saying here is an area of concern here, something we have to look. >> it's to the mission centers which has both director of analysis and director of operations personnel integrated. whether it's data exploitation techniques, analytics, voice

managing data or cybercool that is particularly effective that one mission center develops, we need to scale that on a broader level. >> so, this is, i think, very good segway into the other part of your job, which is helping the agency generally. and agents individually, to better remain clandestine in a difficult and open digital environment, better help the cia broadly to govern its data, one of the ways we use -- we govern our data and make sure we remain as private as we can is through a lot of different tools, like encryption and things like this. how do you see your new directorate having a relationship with transparency and in many ways with privacy? because you are in charge of all of the data that would be coming in. it's gathered through a variety of different means and you have

to think about what should be done with it now, how to govern it, where to send it, how to create transparency where it can be created and how too refute requests for transparency. what is the balance you're looking to strike? >> part of this comes from the technological challenge of take what has been a for-good data security ropes, stovepiped pockets of data, and what has resulted now a vulcanized system data and look across -- assure ourselves we can tell where our data, hough it's being used who is accession it. past our job is to provide a data management trimwork for the agency -- framework for the agency, and for those who have a need to know and governable, which means we can have the assuredness that we know

completely where our data is being used so we can assure or civil liberties folks and those external stakeholders that we can govern our data well and so whatever data access or civil liberties protections we apply to that data, by our stakeholdded, -- because it's not just about the agency -- we can assure them we can govern it in that's the kind of transparency. >> when we talk be in ability of an agent to govern dat to, to employ cyber tools effectively. an individual agent level, because we all live in an environmenty we're creating unprecedented amounts of digital information. the sort of thing that can get news trouble. so what does govern data mean when, say, hypothetically, 13-year-old impersonates the cia

director to aol. what does that escape what change did that signal to you? >> i won't go into the details on that incident, but perhaps public affairs can answer that for you. >> no they won't. >> i guess it really comes down to an issue of vat is really -- that is really -- that example is not a case of where -- it's about mission data generated through the conduct of intelligence. that's what we're talking about when we talk about governing the data. so in some cases, whether it's data that is involved in an operation, sensitive information, some of that we will not put on our network, for example. on the cloud. so that will be in highly secure individual holdings. we'll still have to have the ability to know, as we do now on

those very secure holdings, where it is and how we're using it, but there will be three different categories of data, departmenting then sensitivity of that. much of it generated through operations well be in that secure domain. >> as you transition, you have this issue where you have lots of different people from different generations and they all use digital tools differently and some more soundly than others. so, i guess first question being, did that incident trigger -- signal to you there should be a change in the question of, like, cyberhygiene generally, and what -- what change should that signal? >> well, it's not a so much about that indent. it's been a growing awareness over the years of the reality, especially for our new officers who have a digital identity since birth, that they've got to think about their cover identity in different way because mose of what they do will generate some kind of digital identity and

digital signature, and for a clandestine operation, organization that relies on the cover identity we have to think differently about lou to do that in a world where we're always generating that kind of digital signature for our operatives and for our case officers. so, it's been a growing awareness over the year wes have to think differently about cover in that environment. >> safe to say some change -- might be some change at cia as a result of the growing likelihood of that sort of event, as we deal with more people that -- they are people, have to carry out missions but they're stale people and still have to live in the world with the rest of us. is it that going to cause change internally. >> already is causing changes and looking david ways of maintain can our cover. >> i would think so. so, one of the other aspects of this is you have all of these different points of data that

are coming in, then feeding out to different mission centers, and the ultimate goal is to create a window of what areas of interest are going to emerge. so, what is realistic to expect in terms of what that is? is it realistic to expect that in the future, in, say 20, 25, we'll be final anticipate the rise of something like isis? ...

>> we're -- you might not have exactly what you need to order to create a real transparency in a place where you need to have that transparency in the hands of a special operations forces person. when you think of the data streams going to emerge in the next -- biometrics, on top of the endless -- when you look at the way our adversaries around the world, be it -- or a pure nation like russia is interacting and responding to our ability to collect data. what is the most important data stream that is going to factor into this analytic effort? >> i can't point to one particular important data stream. it's a multitude of data streams of much different variety, so, i think one of the things our officers have to get used to is thinking in terms of, well,

there's -- the variety of data just in the open source realm is of such magnitude they have to get more comfortable with that variety and volume they just aren't used to now. >> the amount that is open sourced -- there's no future view of advantage we can hold in terms of intelligence permanently. it's almost a question of, because of the huge volume of open source data, there being fewer secrets you can leverage and use. >> it's important to think in this way of the intelligence community operating in this environment and many years we have been thought of ourselves as having a kind of dominance on the best information, best intelligence, and there will always be a role for the

intelligence we provide, and there is exquisite intelligence that no one else can provide that will be a case of denying the -- penetrating the secrets. but die think we have to think in terms of this in a competitive environment because we dope -- with the abundance of information out there and intelligence out there, we don't necessarily come to the table with a instant credibility, say, for new administration, where i think we need to think more competitively. always thinking about, where do we add value. >> in a competitive information environment, that is true for a lot of people. who is the competitor you're most concerned with and what are you doing about them? >> it's not one particular competitor. i think, again, we have to think of ourselves especially with the abundance of the open source information as thinking about where the intelligence has the

most value relative to the broader context that a lot of open source information can provide, and i think moving from a -- being accustomed to thinking of an operating model in the intelligence business of finding answers to specific questions, and, again, leveraging that sensory environment where we can leverage that on a way that provides greater understanding for our policymakers, but that kind of competition is really, i think, where intelligence officers have to be thinking where we have the most value. >> thinking through this change now, and it is going to be an enormous transformation that affects cia. it's going to look very different in ten years, perhaps as a result of some of what you have discussed today. how will you know that direction has been successful in how does tomorrow look differently from

today if you have succeeded in what you're trying to do? >> i think across the board our intelligence officers will have greater prophecy in deals with cybertools and digital uses, whether it's applications or management of data. leveraging the open source in ways they haven't before, getting more meaning out of social media, for example. it's partly also a case of where we are going from a period of where we feel like we are trying to make great strides, to catch up to technological advances, to when we're more kind of riding the crest of the with a of in -- waive of innovation in the private sector, we're bringing the private sector in and riding ding the wave. helping us stay on the cutting edge is where we'll be hitting the success.

>> are you collecting more data or collecting just better data? >> both. there you go. so, i would like to thank andrew hallman for coming up here and talking with me today. i really appreciate it. thank you for giving us a window into this change at cia that we're all going watching and waiting to see what happens with that. so thank you so much. ...

how they are approaching future. again, to get back to today's theme, they are preparing for everything. we are seeing companies focus more on research and development, a mix of traditional high-end weaponry, and there was more than we have seen in the past decade. the secretary has closely watched those areas as he searches for knew technology that will give american forces in edge on the battlefield of the future. as the budgets have tightened we have seen companies merge and acquire one another, anyone lucky martin's recent purchase of sikorsky, which prompted the

pentagon to take the rare stance of speaking out against it in a way and saying how they are concerned about how they will be less competition down the road for major weapons. so we have talked a lot about the budget today, and the pentagon finally has some budget assurance -- budget a surety and shortness which i'm sure we will hear about. [applause] [applause] >> ii'm sure to find out i am responsible for everything in the pentagon. the good afternoon. what i thought i would do, since this is the end of the day, i will give you attend a 15 minute overview. it is pretty simple.

if i can't see here. measured in the number of people, sizepeople, size or budget, the size of our capitol account. breath in the depth of where we operate the department of defense is without a doubt a large tip of the largest and most complex global corporation on the planet. we have a very very simple mission to organize, train and equip a joint force that is ready for and operated forward to preserve the piece. so how do we accomplish this very simple, straightforward mission in the age of everything? well, we do it like we have always done, try to take the ends of our foreign policy and supporting national security strategy, balance them left with the resources were means that are made available to us by national leaders, and try to come up with the best balance between what we have to do in the world took on the

show mission with the resources available. i hope what you have heard today is that this is becoming far more difficult and happening on both ends of the equation. both on terms of the ends as well as the means. but by my view, the cold war ended may 12,12th, 1989. that is when president bush announced from a programmatic perspective that the department of defense would no longer view containment as the lens through which we would build our defense program. the white house largely resourced to the pentagon and gradually stopped thinking globally and some thinking more regionally.

a relative strength of the enormous our strategic action was largely unfettered. we worry about economic contingencies of the time. those were the three scenarios that motivated the planet. on the what if if any of those contingencies occurred. we worry about transnational threats, if you go back and look at it it was prevalent -- primarily about the proliferation of weapons of mass distraction. we did not worry about any of those three regional competitors. essentially because we were way ahead the application of conventional guided munitions that employment.

we are not worry about whether we could prevail against these three regional contingencies. in fact, by 2001 we had a planning metric called 103030 in which we assumed thatassume that we could seize the initiative against the competitor or adversary and swiftly defeat them within 30 days. take 30 days for parade, and repeated again in a different leader. by 2001 we were so confident in the overwhelming military capacity and capability of the department of defense in terms of historical period we look back we look back and say what a change.

they uniformly started to decline. as the capabilities and capacities are potential competitors all began to rise rather dramatically. now, my boss, ash carter, deputy secretary of defense just two years ago likes to say we used to have three contingents we would worry about. by this time it was iran, china, north korea. now we have to worry about a potential contingency with russia them an article five defense of our nato allies. we go from three to four contingencies in two short years and now have a condition, global counterterrorist campaign which is increasingly find by fighting against isil in

the middle east, northern africa,ñr and western africa. on top of that, we worry about global pandemic, as witness last year when the pres. or the united states military to be the leading edge of the international response against ebola and we worry about the potential destabilizing effects of climate change. we worry about cyber attacks on the homeland. all of these problems are interconnected. now, from a military point of you there are conditions that are totally different than 25 years ago. one, almost all the combat power is resident on us territory,territory, either the continuity united states or alaska, hawaii, or guam. the amount of forces we have based overseas and are ready to fight condition is much lower than we had in the cold war, so that is one big

difference. that means instead of thinking about four defense we think about more of a transoceanic defense in which we are swing forces quickly from theater theater , and what that means is that if an adversary does want to attack they can generally pick the time and place of there own choosing and have an initial advantage of forces. second, our adversaries are now gaining parity with us and guided munitions warfare which has given us such an operational and tactical advantage for the past 25 years. and that means that they can throw guided munitions all those as far and as dense as we can. which means it is harder for a transoceanic movement to get into a theater, the so-called anti- access problem, and once you get there you are subject to immediate attack by a wide

variety of guided munitions. that is the so-called area denial threat, the eight to 80. the 3rd thing that is different is now you have to assume that your going to be under intense cyber and electronic warfare attack from the time you move. that is much, much different than in the cold war. fourth, we used to say we would fight away games in the department of homeland security and northern command fight the home games. but in this environment with large state competitors, advanced capabilities, the distinction between home and away games starting to blur. because as we push forces across the ocean, you can be sure that our adversaries may be thinking about ways to attack the homeland to forestall or deter our advance. so, going from three contingencies to four plus one plus this difference in

the environment, and if you think about it from an overall view, here is the big deal. he defines great power as the state they can take on the dominant power in conventional warfare as a nuclear arsenal that can survive for strike. we now have two great powers , russia and china. whenever you have to think about great powers you have to rethink grand strategy. is the era of everything, the era of grand strategy. and if you're taking all of the ends of what we have to do in balancing with our means. as you all know, we just got a budget deal. we now know for certain what our budget resources allocated to the department of defense are going to be for the next two years. that is a good thing. we applaud this.

this is something that we have been waiting for for quite some time, and as secretary carter said, we crave stability. in the age of everything, trying to balance between these demands with this constant resource uncertainty is keeping it -- is keeping us from creating a coherent program that stands the test of time. but we are not done yet. this is the 7th year in a row we have had a continuing resolution. 93% of every 1st quarter we have been under a continuing resolution for the past six years. the department of defense is operating on a nine-month fiscal year. it is totally unsatisfactory. we cannot continue this so we applaud what congress has done coming together in a bipartisan nature coming up

with a budget deal he gives us clarity for two years but is just the 1st step in our view. you cannot see a rise in the ends of the department of defense is being asked to do and the resource levels that we have had to contend with the past three to four years. you probably heard me say this before, how do you sleep at night, and you see me saying, i sleep like a baby. i wake up crying every two to four hours. [laughter] and this is the time of grand strategy, trying to step back. the 1st ruler strategy is, all resources are scarce. you must make prioritization within your budget. and that is exactly what the secretary has charged us to do in the fiscal year and the pvr, the presidential budget review for 17 and

which will be reflected by our budgets submission september. so hopefully at the end of this day you will now have a sense of the growing pressure in terms of the ends and the fact that our resources, while study for the next two years, we all hope that there will be a serious debate in the upcoming presidential election on what is the long-term solution after this to your budget deal on better balancing the ends and the means. and with that, i lookthat, i look forward to your questions for the next 15 or so minutes. marcus. >> do you want to sit over here?

>> thank you again. we will have people with microphones running around. stay on the theme of the budget deal. what does it do for you immediately. he said it will inform the way you're looking. what we see more of a shift toward high-end combat stuff involving pressure like what we had in the last budget? ..

and that we demonstrated these capabilities on a routine basis to underline our conventional deterrence. and so that's the first thing that we will look to do. knowing that we have this condition that we cannot ignore in the middle east. so it's kind of a bipolar type approach. with a budget deal does for us immediately is on 16, it's a reasonable target for us to get. we do not expect, we don't expect the budget deal to be signed until about the 11th of december. so we will be through the first quarter of fiscal year and again we will start our nine-month

fiscal year. in 16 have been a big, big delta than what we've been planning, that would have been extremely extremely disruptive. we are happy to say it's within reach. so don't expect 16 to be huge, major disruption. it's going to be harder in 17 without question. we calculated will be about $14 billion delta and that given year than what we had planned. that's going to be a harder target to hit, and we are now working through that right now. the big thing though is we no longer have to worry about fighting for 16 and worrying about 17. we know both 16 and 17 we will be able to say okay, here are the decisions we have to make and we can get on with our lives. >> all right. questions? >> hi, mr. secretary. breaking defense.com. on that subject of conventional

deterrence, how is that offset strategy going cooks i know you guys are deep in the throes looking at new technologies and tactics and concepts, but are you finding any interesting stuff that is triggering your mind in the minds of your colleagues into ways we can to deter and if necessary prevail, think you can tell us without having had to go to jail that is. >> i assume that the term also search has been used today, and was it explained? >> i don't, i'm not sure it was specific explained. >> the united states has never any matter of conventional deterrence try to match our potential adversaries tanks for 10, ship for ship, airplane ticket when. is always look for technological and operational offsets, way in which we do not have to do that it weakens to underline our conventional deterrence. in the 1950s the first offset

strategy when president eisenhower came aboard, he asked for the planning figures and we would've required 92 nato divisions to assure a conventional deterrent against it warsaw pact attack of western europe. the president said it is just a way we can afford to build 92 divisions. so that offset strategy we took determined with tactical nuclear weapons. as a matter of policy and military strategy and tactics we're going to employ tactical nuclear weapons early and often to forestall a soviet conventional invasion. now by the 1970s the soviet union had achieved nuclear parity, could no longer underwrite our conventional deterrence with the threat of doctor -- tactical nuclear weapons because of the threat was just too high. we had two choices.

and this was run by a long range of research and development planning program to sit here are the choices. you can try to make nuclear weapons more usable, neutron bombs, micro nukes, selectable yield, all of these things. board you can go after conventional weapons with what was then called near stillness which we now call precision guided munitions. and the conclusion was you cant make nuclear weapons more useful. you simply cannot do that. you always will risk a nuclear exchange if you do so. so the united states in 1975 made a conscious national decision to go after conventional guided munitions, the battle networks that would deploy them at whole bunch of other supporting things like stealth. the third offset, because the first and second offsets only had one competitor, you had to fight against, now we have four different potential competitors that we worry about, plus we

have this condition of transnational regional terrorism that we have to really worry about. it makes it more difficult. we also had a very steady, very stable competitive long-term competition with the soviet union. most of the information or innovations are coming out of the united states ever come out of the department of defense when it came to defense thanks. now all of the innovation is global in scope and it is being run by commercial, commercial sector driven. so this is much more like the interwar period where everybody knew there was radio's, everyone knew there were tanks, i mean mechanization's. and we knew there were airplanes with no certain competitors put them all together, made him into initial operational tactical advantage. is going to have a very competitive environment. it's going to be right for technological surprise.

what we're trying to do in the third offset is to figure out how to set ourselves up for this very competitive long-term environment, and how do we make sure we can have temporal advantages. we are no longer think that having an adventure for years, too many fastballs with. what we are planning is what are planning is likely to take advantage for the next five to 10 years, and then start working on the advantage that would give us an edge in the next five to 10. i can't give you, sydney, got the what the third offset is yet. the secretary will be talking about it here soon. and you will see when we roll out the budget in february for technological and operational that's that we are making to preserve our conventional edge. >> question? >> charles from federal --

[inaudible] giving the increasing importance of the cybersecurity and the cyberwarfare and given the fact on the civilian side we are basically losing the battle against the bad actors in ipv4 stat, and what is the plan for dod in terms of deploy ipv6 which is the required prerequisite shunned for iot and future to support the future of the internet? thank you. >> i think you all know what a challenge cyber warfare is causing us at all levels. at the strategic level because it's a means of homeland attacked we've never had to really deal with before. at the operational level, at the campaign level. it has an amazing impact on being able to get into your adversaries systems and blinding simple things like that and would have been an effective way

campaign might play a. been at the tactical level, the ukrainians found out, for example, that the russians that use electronic warfare and cyber right of the tactical level to gain enormous tactical advantage. so cyber is playing out on all these levels. so let me just say what our national policy is. we are trying to strengthen our cyber deterrence, and there are three components to that. the first from dod is to make sure that our networks are secure. our own networks are secure. and you are seeing that. you as a whole bunch of different investments on what we are doing. we are moving, for example, from over, i do remember the exact number but i will use, i will try to use as an order of magnitude 1000 defendable firewalls to less than 200, all sorts of different cyber cultural training to put the hygiene of our networks, hardly our networks, making sure that

our networks can fight through an attack. the second component is taking a look at the national critical infrastructure, things like our electronic, or electrical grid. you know, water control, things like that the this data networks and all the systems, making sure those are as hard as we can be. the third one is to have a means by which the offense of cyber capability which would deter attacks upon us. we are in no way, shape, or form fully develop our theaters on deterrence. it really isn't the wild west as a jim clapper will tell you, a lot of cyber activity is espionage and it's very difficult to establish norms for espionage. generally if you ain't cheating you ain't trying in espionage. so he didn't inside somebody's network and you can exfiltrate data, hey man, that's a great thing from your perspective. it's not very good for the

people who has the data exfiltrate did. so we have a lot of work to do in this agenda to the internet of things that makes it even more difficult when a potential adversaries might be able to take over the vehicles were ships were airplanes. so this is an area in which we have a lot of attention and it is being, and i believe, i can assure you that it's from the president on down, we'll look at this very, very hard. >> we have time for about one more. >> hello, deputy secretary work. considering the complexity of the budgetary process and appropriations, what do you foresee as a way for the type of innovation that takes place in the private sector in the united states to have a convergence of technology sometimes to provide

solutions to those challenges facing the department of defense speak with this is a great question. is something secretary carter hasn't been a lot of attention to it as you sit in the op-ed for this very event and he believes that there are too many barriers around the department of defense and the ideas are not penetrating as freely as he would hope they would. and he recognizes after come after spending a year in silicon valley of a vibrant innovation that's going on there. so he has reached out and i started an awful lot of different initiatives. one is the defense innovation unit experimental. it is an experimental unit writer in silicon valley to provide a point of partnership for the big innovation engines inside the valley confident to be able to come to the department of defense and say we have a solution to some of your problems, and for us to go to them and say we have a problem, you have any solutions for us? we are experimenting with the

dinkytown model that the intel community did so successful. this gets us in with the venture capital community. we have $10 million pilot project going on right now and hopefully that will be able to spur even more innovation. we started longer-range research and development planning program. that is under the cognizance of frank kendall, our undersecretary of defense for html come and his assistant secretary of defense acting for research and engineering, steve welby. either try to look at different innovative ideas and will try to change the paradigm so that we can become more nimble in this very, very competitive environment. we have something that is unique in the world called a strategic capabilities office. this is an office that looks at weapons and platforms that we have an existence right now that says how to use them carefully

to really change the way they operate and provide a facts? i know of no other organization in the world that does this. in february we will be able to explain some of the things that we are doing. some of the things we won't. if you look back, we now say stealth was part of the second offset. and it certainly was. but we didn't announce, we didn't to anything about stealth until 1989. in other words, we kept that as a black program because we thought that the damage to provide us with so great. so there will be parts just like that when we submit our budget, that would be part you'l you wie able to readily see, other things that we want to keep quiet. and it's the combination of demonstrating capabilities working with the defense industrial base which has a lot of innovation, working with the venture capital community, working with a commercial

enterprises and really trying to become much, much more nimble and much, much more capable of creating these new operational concepts and offsets that will give us an advantage over time. this type of a forum, i want to applaud marcus and "defense one" for setting it up. as the secretary said, the department of defense is a five sided box called the pentagon does not have all the answers here and this is an age of everything in which problems are connected in ways that we've never really had to deal with before, and require thought from everyone across the united states. so it is our intent to try to patch in and touched all of the good ideas that are going on and hopefully see our way through an era which is quite challenging in terms of balancing our ends and our means. so thank you for everything that you do for our nation come and thank you, marcus, you know, for

having this summit. and i wish all the best of luck. god bless. >> all right. thank you, secretary work. [applause] >> ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much. that is the conclusion of the third annual "defense one" some annual "defense one" some of your i want to thank everyone for coming, everybody who watched online as well, our speakers, our moderators. this is a month-long endeavor. i want to special acknowledge or a french director at her amazing team who has been working through the night to make this happen for everyone. "defense one" step configure but executive media group staff, the atlantic media company, our. as well, and once again all of you. thanks for coming again. i hope to see you next year. ♪ [inaudible conversations]

and if you missed any of this today you can find it of course on our website, c-span.org. both chambers of congress in session this week. the house returning today beginning work on a number of bills including several on intelligence sharing between states and local officials. tomorrow debate begin on a long-term transportation and highway funding measure of the current funding is set to expire on november 20. later possible work on 2016 defense programs after the president vetoed of the defense authorization bill on october 22. follow the house on c-span innocent returning to washington tomorrow begin debate on a water quality protection bill. they have a vote to advance the

schedule for 2:30 p.m. eastern. the senate is live writer and c-span2. more than an hour with remarks and president obama on america's criminal justice system. he is speaking in newark, new jersey, and you can see that live writer at 4:20 p.m. eastern on c-span2. later the house veterans' affairs committee holding hearings come hearing tested on the alleged misuse o of funds or that is programmed to relocate workers. >> all persons having business before the audible this agreement court of the united states draw near and give their attention. >> this weekend on c-span's "landmark cases," schenck versus the united states. in 1917 the united states entered world war i, patriotism was high and some forms of criticism of the government were a federal offense.

charles schenck it was general secretary of the philadelphia socialist party handed out and mailed leaflets against the draft. >> this is the father was produced by charles the schenck in 1917. 15,000 copies were produced, and the point was to encourage men who were liable for the draft not to register. the language and particularly fiery your kid equates the conscription with slavery, and calls and every citizen of the united states to resist the conscription laws. >> who was arrested, tried, found guilty under the recently enacted espionage act. he appealed and the case went directly to the supreme court. find out how the court ruled, weighing the issues of clear and present danger and freedom of speech. that's coming up on the next tranfifteen live tonight on c-span, c-span3 and c-span

radio. for background on each case while you watch, order your copy of the "landmark cases" companion book. it is available for $8.95 plus shipping at c-span .org/mark --/landmark cases. >> westminster college in fulton, missouri, recently hosted their annual hancock supposedly issued a focus on security versus liberty. speakers look at edwar edward snowden's revelations and how to better balance government surveillance and civil liberties. here's more. >> all right i think we'll go ahead and get started are we having a great first at the symposium? and tested. we've got some wonderful speakers begin with as this one with doctor dawn hewitt will continue this afternoon. it is my pleasure to welcome -- answers from the university of

wales where he is a teacher and researcher in the department of international politics. in 2012 he was appointed -- and in 2014 he was made senior lecturer. is also deputy director of the state for intelligence and international security studies. he's a member of the project on nuclear issues run by the center for strategic and international studies out of washington, d.c. a fellow of higher education academy and a fellow of the royal historical society. he has spoken at a wide number of conferences nationally and internationally and for various forms of media including the bbc. he is the author and co-author of four books. really? overachiever. his current and future research deals with the protection of critical national infrastructure against cyber attack. today's talk addresses and expense of many of the points made in this morning made in

this one is plenary session condescending talk would all enjoy i think about the civil liberties and historical context of the government data collection, specifically he will talk about edward snowden and what his revelations about the surveillance means for you and the 21st century. i will also add a and i grew up about 200 yards away from each other in wales so he has been a good friend of mine for about 40 years. so is my distinct personal pleasure and professional honor to introduce doctor stoddart. [applause] >> now we are showing our age. harder for some than others. i would like to thank professor bolton for the wonderful introduction. i would also like to thank with vista college in particular the vice president for the insight

into one of our position, hosting this event which i think is being extraordinarily good. bear with me for just a second. it's surprising, all of it surprising that edward snowden has been mentioned so frequently in the course of these last few days. it is of course a matter of record now that he was a main whistleblower of what isn't as the prism revelations which have been a source of much speculation, controversy, and general thoughtfulness by both the united states and in some of the departments. this includes of course the united kingdom but a number of others. so let's look at the gentleman

himself. i was safe before i start, doesn't he just up on the screen that i find come when i looked into his background as much as you possibly can some of the ways -- and away she was recruited and the things he did, the level he achieved to be somewhat mysterious. i would ask you to look up when you get a chance, and opportunity, how he managed to get into this position of authority and was able to ask will take the data. i think that in itself is revealing of a number of system issues in the intelligence community post-9/11 what intelligence sharing became very, very important to the intelligence community. [inaudible] his grandfather was in the pentagon on 9/11.

when he was interviewed by "the guardian" he was -- he didn't very, very much what of your personal views, very, very much didn't himself as a traitor. quite the opposite. he felt he had a public duty to disclose these activities to the wider world, for the american public and the wider world to be able to scrutinize some of the decision-making that went on. he wasn't a high achiever, which may suppress and he also didn't have a college degree which might surprise some more people there he also tried to gain entrance into the u.s. special forces. he went through basic training, suffered two broken legs which ruled him out of military service. but the important thing was he tried. he wanted to serve his country. it will be interesting for me to know from you at some point what

your views of them are. it very much is a matter of opinion i think, whether you see them as a whistleblower, traitor or patriot, or some other. he was only 29 when all this happened. is a very articulate speaker. he's a very, very bright guy but this is only 10 years older most of the new. is not a large period of time. some of you will go into the security services. the world he may go into may well have been changed by the snowden revelations. and by this sort of resulting debates of recruits through what's happened.

he was, apparently, allegedly, only a systems administrator. but a systems administrator role in data security gives you almost unprecedented access because it is where if you decide to do with the very highest levels of classification beyond that even those with top security clearance but not necessarily see. it's almost subverting the system. this is a computer system, not necessarily a computer -- [inaudible] interesting is how he managed to exfiltrated the data. like many of you, were considered a suspect you cannot walk in announced carrying a data stick. you cannot gain external internet access. they are what is called -- they are sealed off from the internet. this is primarily to prevent

exactly what happened from happening. the exultation of data from secure sites. one thing is also interesting is how much data was exfiltrated. there was some estimates up to or over 1.7 million documents. that is not a small number. given the fact they were likely in the form of text only documents, very limited pictures, jpeg, et cetera, probably almost no video. certainly this is how we passed it to and from the journalist he was speaking to when he flew to hong kong from hawaii. and this was a big star for both "the guardian" and the "washington post" and a variety of other newspapers, all of the now hold of his data. he himself, when he ended up in

russia and the united states sees his passport i think before he boarded the flight, didn't have in possession of those documents. that's what he claims. and, of course, the counter clinton is the fsb and the russian government will be very interested in what he had in his possession, or what he had up here. similarly with the chinese. to the untrained eye, maybe previous destinations. america's two biggest adversaries, not at war, big trading partners but nevertheless adversaries of a different kind. to illustrate some of the context, part of what the

national security agency does is analyze all sorts of intelligence on foreign -- it signals intelligence agencies. what has been argued is they didn't his target foreign but also domestic and traffic as well. some of which was to and from the united states. the argument being it is a massive, it scooped up everything in its path. so everything you say and do on the internet carries a digital footprint. your browsing history and e-mails, headers, content potentially, telephone records. depending on your usage and utilization of computer technology, you either have --

or you have a giant digital footprint. and this produces data out huge amounts of data. what's also interesting about edward stout is he didn't work directly for a national secret agency, as far as one can tell. he was a subcontractor. worked initially for dell, who was responsible installing these systems and for maintaining and running them in a classified environment. a legacy system up curtatone for google. they can't be modernize very

well. it's a very important job to keep these systems running. in addition he then worked for booz allen hamilton, which is when he decided to flee the why did he only worked for them for three months. but he did that in order to gain access to more data and to give axl to that data and lead to hong kong. it's a question of whether the city procedures in themselves are sufficient as well. to prevent this from happening in the future. one of the issues you may want to consider your selves is that of encryption. since the snowden revelations the use of something called -- partly funded by the navy, which

encrypted data through security connections routed to the internet has grown exponentially. directly result of snowden revelations because it was revealed that largely unencrypted data -- in addition, our connectivity, our recommendations are global. and maybe local entrance of you in a packet of information to someone who sits next to you in another room but that information could easily transmitted around the world. the internet takes the shortest possible route from one destination to another. so when you think local, thank at the same time global. the data that is harvested and analyzed by the nsa and there is

other agencies across this globe can produce extremely, highly accurate pictures that individuals as well as social, economic, medical and political trends. this is called analytics, and still a few slides later detailed analytics, but it is one of the most remarkable things you'll ever see. if you want to look on youtube or if you want to look on google and the own version of analytics, you can put the amount you can find about your friends, your family, their associations and their backgrounds, their work patterns come in life patterns is phenomenal and it's a trend that will only grow. particularly with small technologies really come on stream. say they control the power in your house. it tells an individual who may or may not be monitoring you when you were leaving, when

you're coming home, when you're on vacation, when you leave for work, when you come home to what's in the fridge, whether you're married and unmarried, with the children, no children, whether you have pets, et cetera, et cetera. this is an example of what can be done through analytics. if you're happy with that, wonderful. how many of you agreed his conditions would would you sign up for social media or for services? one, two, how many? one person. really? or lack of 23 of you. 30 page of terms and conditions. isolator hand, that's fine. you are very keen. who -- i'm sorry. i don't have time to read 30 pages of terms and conditions. i was saying to someone earlier

that in one of the terms and conditions that i have seen they inserted, to ask the name of your firstborn child, i kid you not. people don't read what they signed a. it's not legally enforceable. i don't think he was serious but it gives you an idea of what you're signing up. would you put services pictures, chats, et cetera onto the internet or into the cloud, you don't own ownership of the. you lose ownership of that ownership passes to google, facebook, yahoo!, to skype and so on. it's not private. think of everything every time you log onto your computer. it's public information. if you think it's public rather than private, maybe, maybe. maybe you're the generation that doesn't affect. you are less concerned. i don't know. i would be interested in finding out the maybe it is a

generational issue. as someone who has worked previously as somewhat of a nuclear weapons historian, i always kind of assumed that some of what i was saying and doing online, maybe all of it, was being tracked and traced, in part because of the people i was talking to, i kind of expect that. but if i'm not one of those, if you see one of my students communicate with me something i am teaching, nuclear weapons related, prism related, snowden related come at a flag some of these keywords which goes into search engines which is analyzed by algorithms which gets fed into databases which goes into an analyst, then maybe i would be a bit concerned. in fact i may be very for attention. i would be more concerned advocate a knock on the door or an e-mail that says would like

to have a chat with us, please, about what you have been doing? i think it's unlikely, but what it does say is it a non-liberal democracy that capacity is there. i would worry less about the united states, i would worry less about my own country but i may work a bit more about a non-liberal state. because one of the things that encouraging does is allow people in repressive regimes to talk more openly without fear of persecution, without fear that a knock on the door of someone with a gun behind it to take them away. it does happen. it has happened. there are good reasons for encryption. there were good reasons for non-intrusiveness. there are good reasons to think carefully about the principles underpinning and all the other data collection programs.

part of the releases or the disclosures was presidential policy directive 20 back in 2012 which i would invite you to look at. it laid out amongst other things defensive cyber ethics operations, d. ceo. the military governments, business people in general love acronyms. it's an alphabet soup. i get lost. it's easy to get lost but it's also in legalistic and diplomatic language. it's been said that the existing legislation has been extended to cover things that maybe

shouldn't comment was intended initially to cover. both from a legal and medical standpoint. that's probably the thing is happen and it's one that we've been having since these releases. what you should notice from this extract is that ppd 20 required the cooperation of private companies owning component operate cyberspace. is a big provided you and i use on a daily basis. some of which were cooperative, some of which had reservations about cooperation because of what it entailed. it's a debate that's been had backwards and forth regarding whether isps can internet service providers and the like should be part of the policing of the internet come at the

policing with a small p. rather than a big p. the reason the over arching global police force to look at these issues. it's partly self policed but it is partly also about whether or not you believe in something called internet freedom, whether or not you want the unit to be unregulated largely uncontrolled by nation-states, largely a bottom-up process driven by you as individual users, or whether or not there should be a level state involvement, and if so what is the role of private companies? to what extent should it be unregulated and to what extent should it be policed? would you allow illicit trade in drugs come in child pornography, in things that we deem to be

illegal? it also encourages terrorism. it's also a method of recruitment. and it's also a method of communication which is the way of targeting individuals involved in terrorist activities or who run counter to ideas of national security. and it's partly your the dilemma, between who you want to protect yourself from, the bad guys, the bad people, if so what are you prepared to deal? are you prepared to give up your privacy and civil liberties? if so how much? were on the intersections, at what point as individuals space.com enough, or pause they thought the we need to discuss this. this needs to be thought about. if it's a piece of legislation

as we've seen in the last couple of days, they are time-limited because technology changes, our attitude change. we need to think a little more carefully about what this is all going. and this we are right now is barely a slap shot. with this technology will have in the next even five years is very hard to predict, along with smart technologies, artificial intelligence will increase. this is already being used. as both public sector and private sector. it's partly government-funded, partly private funded. it's partly enhanced of individuals. smart technologies will all combined to produce something different and changed again but

the depth of the pervasiveness breaches in each and every one of us, will be remarkable. either that or we opt out. we've always got that option, turn off the internet, turn off the lights. there is so much to consider if you're an analyst and if you look at it from the protected side of the fence. this diagram is in something called -- produced by the uk ministry of defense. its own partnership with the government communications headquarters, gchq which is the nsa equivalent. it's an alternative way of thinking. it's the way that the agencies have been trained to think.

it is layered. it is tiered. it's expanding. it contracts human interactions as well. but if you're going after someone, at some point in time you are going to have to find them. and in some cases you have to either kill them or place them on trial. and in some jurisdictions that's going to be impossible. there is so much we can actually talk about in terms of how many

of you have cell phones but i'm assuming most of that every one of us. i mean, look, it would almost be surprising if we did and. did. have cell phones that reporters can produce tracking data which tracks our locations which makes us very vulnerable in some senses to being found. if someone wants to find as. how we go about that is a matter, using there's different methods of tracking, trailing and tracy. it's social media can e-mail or your phone, by her lap, by her notebook, catalogued all of this is used to build up certain pictures. we also know that the nsa and gchq are -- and other agencies through partnership agreements

have secretly attached intercepts to the fiber optic cables that brings this world. these are the architectural backbone of the internet and a key enabler along with satellite technology of the global technology and connectivity that we take for granted. there will was testing this provides a high degree. it also has a method of subverting potential our civil liberties and freedoms. edward snowden told the journalist glenn greenwald from "the guardian" that he did want to live and work where everything i say, everything that i do come everyone i talk to, every expression of love or friendship is recorded. by using metadata, using the vast resources that are generated by the internet, this runs into quintilian's of data every day.

that's entirely possible. everything you say and do an speak can be recorded, can be played back, can be understood, can be and allies, such a picture of your life. it's incredible from cradle to grave. the are examples of people now understandably putting pictures of the unborn child on facebook. fine in and of itself. you find baby photos, then it's first birthday, two, three, four, five, six. troika. they do it themselves but i think the age of facebook is something like 60. but certain people i know have children who signed up much, much younger. it seems like a benign thing to do. but what happens over time could produce such a detailed picture of someone's life. and it's something that a future employer, whether to a government department, a

mainstream business can look at, can analyze how can decide whether you take the job or whether the employer or whether they don't. they may not like certain things that they see. and like i said earlier nobody reads the terms and conditions. that david is not yours. you can request to take it out or have taken to whether or not you will be able to, i fear not. that will be -- whether you want an employer to see a picture of you dancing, maybe doing something you shouldn't do, maybe it's something benign, totally in congress. but they decide on the basis of that sorry, there's a better candidate. i just don't like the look of that person. that's because you did something four or five years ago on one night for a moment, but it is

captured. it's a selfie. if someone else is taking our picture and they tagged you in it. it's not you personally. it's not representative of you, but taken with analytics and the depth of data that is out on facebook, twitter and flickr and so on and so forth. your life is revealed as a totality. again, accountable with that, the happy with that, if you thought about that, fine, good. but this is accessible to companies, corporations and external partners who do go through this process. anti-governments come including your own, including my own. again if you're comfortable with that, fine. if you haven't thought about it, think about it. if you like to question your government about this, that is your democratic rights. and is one i would suggest you

exercise. dookie b further examples, the are many dimensions, as you can kind of see from this picture. there are some -- subprograms within programs, some which are still classified, some of which are still not been rebuilt and some of which have been moved on target as a result of the stove and revelations, partly because technology moves at such a pace. this is based on the talking to people in the intelligence community. but of those which would be publicly revealed in which you give some small insights into what technology is capable of doing and what this don't revelations actually revealed, executes core, that is an internet targeted database system, a form of data mining.

someone is trying to find information about you actively. given the amount of information that is put out there, including things i myself put out, a great deal of information can be found out about you. a great deal. it's able to draw on everything a typical user does on the internet which includes web and search histories and e-mail content. another is dni, that can be used alongside -- facebook chat and private messaging. this is perhaps a private. like i said nobody reads the terms and conditions. it's not private. the legislation is being used to move into this space, to move into social media and to be honest, if it's not the nsa, it's the fsb, it's the chinese, it's other countries.

to my mind this is got to be thought about more in terms of the global level issue. you can look at it purely through the lens of snowden and all the other programs. but i would suggest this is more thathan a national issue. is more than a national security issue. is something we should discussed in the context of internet freedom and government debate. it's all part of a package. do you want a free and unfettered internet or duke sucks a measure of policing? if so, where do the boundaries lie? that's probably the main take-home message from this talk. where do these boundaries lie? in policing, control, regulation and internet freedom. and your own personal and civil liberties. to give you some of the

justifications for these kind of programs, one only need to look at a few data which is the 14th anniversary of 9/11. it looks a little like the kennedy assassination. for those who are life, everyone knows what they were. i certainly do. it was incredibly shocking and it was preventable. that's, what's the big deal from the 9/11 commission report. it was preventable. we could have done something to stop this. the madrid bombings took place but we see on a daily basis now. that are this bad people in the world. they don't necessarily respect the rules of the game. but we've also got respect our laws come our values, our value system. this is the state of the justice and the degree to freedom and

liberty. but to prevent what's been described by leon panetta as a possible cyber 9/11, an attack against critical national infrastructure which is part of what i deal with it through my project, it's the very high-end level threats. it these and others of a lower order that intelligence agencies are trying to stop and prevent. general keith b. alexander, the commander of the u.s. cyber command and director of the nsa says these programs together with other intelligence have protected the united states and our allies from terrorist threats across the globe over 50 times since 9/11. that is in over 20 countries

around the world, he added, i believe we have achieved the security and the relative safety in a way that does not compromise the privacy and civil liberties of our citizens. and their critical to the intelligencintelligence committs to connect the dots. yet it's those desperate thoughts and the connections between them that prism at his programs do along with human analysis. this is what a human being will do. this is what artificial intelligence alongside it with you. these trends will accelerate. nobody wants to see another 9/11, or worse, cyber scenario. but that was the balance.

would you want to see your data, including audio, video, chats, e-mails, pictures, when an image is taken of you where ever it may be complications tactic to get to facebook across the globe. we know who you are. we know where you are. we know who you're with. we know what you're doing. very short steps to produce a very detailed. but he has done nothing wrong have nothing to hide. to our cascade effects which we need to think through away. like i said i don't think this is only a national circuit issued i think it is something we should discussed globally. but if you look at examples of

climate change, of nuclear nonproliferation of global health, we are not come we don't send of the tools or the vocabulary. and this is something we need to move forward with i believe. you also ask whether or not whether the oversight has been sufficient. there have been not surprise not only in the united states but across affected countries including new zealand, australia, canada, germany, particularly. it's been shocked by the revelation of the death of the spine and the data mining that went on and allegedly perhaps still goes on. whether or not the national sister judiciary and --

provisions through fisa and amongst the patriotic -- hatred act is not for you as a people but we as a committee, for us as a global commons is a valid question. for some it goes, it's gone too far. people in the intelligence community and and the security service it doesn't go far enough. to give you an example, member of the australian government, and this is what other partner nations in the long-standing fisa agree but, noted that the u.s. may be able to brush aside from the diplomatic fallout from the snowden lake but that may not be the case for australia, china, malaysia and other countries. who may respond to us in ways that they would not washington.

it is also judged to have a much greater impact than the naming leaks, which brought julian assange and wikileaks into the limelight. they are kind of all parts of the same package. those who are exposed to that freedom, they shouldn't see this between government and its citizens and those as they got to drop national security boundaries for the protection of you, for me, for us. this is the break we need to have. the revelations regarding present intelligence gathering and analysis have shaken the trust between the u.s., uk governments, other nations and also in key element of the private sector, and in civil

society. we need to better understand to share information and to protect that information. we also need to be careful of insider threats come in snowden should anything is that they were alive and well. and foreign consumers who attempt to install agents in various companies in order to either update access to business information upon their systems or to ask look at the data from malicious purpose. risks to the private sector, to governments, for us individuals will grow and are growing faster than our capability to act. this is partly technological determinism. we can see around the bend of the ripped an extended we can see over the horizon to limited

extent. we don't see everything and we don't know necessarily where all this is leading. as i said technology, this is a snapshot of where we are now. if we don't have an informed debate of what to be in five years time, you could find a sub in a very uncomfortable position. your privacy could be extremely limited in a way it's already compromised. but if you have to do that, if you're happy with that, if nobody says anything or nobody knows, that's probably a bigger problem and a bigger issue. threats not only emanate from individuals and groups, some of which are well organized, some which are based in hard to reach jurisdictions. they also can be or are from industrial competitors, for and

filtered services, or simply hackers for the sake of it. and like to find out what they can do. there are lots of cases of these people. there are also groups like anonymous hoosier political purpose but they tend to be of the younger generation, who draw on political and ideological rationales, some which will resonate with each and every one of us. that growth and complexity of the attacks have seen enormous growth. and quoting from one of the intelligence services, what was considered a cyber attack on a year ago but now been incorporated into a downloadable and easy to deploy intranet application required little or no expertise to use. they are wise every of audited the i wouldn't suggest you go looking for them but they are

there. they are very easy to find. search engines defiance back doors into systems come into looking at critical infrastructure to look at shipping, to look at electrical grids, to look at which airline is passing overhead is widely available. in fact, it's very interesting to look at. at it can also be used for nefarious purposes. it's just a case of looking what's out there. increase your awareness, increase your knowledge base. understand the issues, the snowden releases at the prism programs have had. understand your own lives and the context. ..