they thought he was going to win. what happened is he got out. i think the way he got out was great. i think he did a really smart thing for himself. frankly other people should get out. i would like to personally have more time to talk about the problems of the united states. more importantly, how to solve the problems, because we can solve the problems. that's great question. people should get out. yes. [inaudible] eva. they just said said one of the biggest applause lines, is when i talk about my daughter of anke. she was just at fortune magazine for something like woman of the year. just say hello, hello, okay. she is going to be very involved and malan is going to be very involved. they will coming out very soon. she is going to iowa. when are you going to iowa? >> very soon.

>> good question. i would say, i don't see threats. whatever it is i have to do. he said one of the top threats to your candidacy? who knows. you are in a crazy world of politics. people change their minds. i'm going to make america great again. nobody else will do that again. i'm going to do it. i'm going to make it, in my opinion, better than ever before. i think that's awfully tough to compete with. one of the reasons that in my book, actually put financials in there, i show some of the developments and i have many, many more because you can only, at simon & schuster schuster they kept me 28 or nine pages but i show some of the great developments i have done that our soul successful and incredible and financially good, i show my financial statement

from about two years ago. now it's even better but we didn't have it certified yet. i do that, not in a ragged oceans way, but i do that because that's the kind of thinking our country needs right right now. we are run by people who are incompetent. i hate to use the word stupid, but you have to use that word in less than have bad intentions, which i don't believe they do, but we are run by incompetent people. we have incompetent leadership. there are so many things, like i mentioned corporate inversion. the democrats want the money to come back. who doesn't want it. the republicans want the money to come back. for three years the democrats have said we want the money to come back. in three years, the democrats and republicans agree, 100%, you have a vast majority, maybe everybody for three years. guess what. they haven't done anything. they can't even get along when they agree.

so here's the thing where we can take trillions of dollars and bring it back into this country, rebuild big parts of our country with it. companies can spend that money in our country. we have everybody agrees it should be done for years and they can't do it. that's part of the problem. there's a lot of controversy with mr. singer. there are those people who probably wouldn't want him to back, back, but we'll see. i'll talk to you. go ahead. [inaudible] >> oh they will agree. they just didn't want to go through the unfair questions because they weren't questions, they were statements. you see they were asking, they were giving statements in a sarcastic disgusting way. by the way, i think becky is terrific. i think carl is terrific. i think john harwood is not very good at what he does but i think becky and carl are traffic.

john was disgrace to cnbc. well it's really an interesting question. the question is should the fed raise rates? they are not raising them because obama has asked them not to raise them. in my opinion he wants to get out of office because we are in a bubble and when those rates are raised, a lot of bad things will happen or potentially could happen and in my opinion, janet yellen is highly political and she's not raising rates for very specific reason because obama told her not to. he wants to be out playing golf in a year from now and he wants to be doing other things and he doesn't want to see a big bubble burst during his administration. she's not doing it because the

administration and president obama doesn't want her to. you've seen it. when there's a talk of raising it just a little bit. one of the problems we've had is our currency right now is not competitive with other currency. if you look at the devaluation of china and japan and many other countries, they're making it impossible for our countries to compete with them. don't do that, if you do that, we will put a big fat tax on you. if you said that, they wouldn't do that if you had the right message. how about one more russian. howard you have another question?? i love him. he always treats me so nice. really i'm focused on one very important election. there are some good elections but i'm not watching any of them

in particular. we will be out voting. the election that i am watching is the election for the presidency of the united states. in my opinion this will be truly one of the most important elections we've ever had in this country. we are so far behind. we cannot go another four years with incompetent leadership. >> okay, what else? one more question. go ahead. that's a good question, okay. so simon and schuster came up to me. they wanted to do a book. they wanted it to do on success and how do you do this and how do you build it and that's what the book is largely about but we talk so much about the country. i settle do it but we have to talk about the country. what happened is they sent this incredible photographer up to do a book cover, to do a picture. he did some some great, almost as good as you, he did some

great photos. i'm small smiling and happy and everything looks good. then he took one where i wasn't really think about a photo and it turned out to be a nasty picture. then the book was written and the title was given and the only really terrible picture i had was that one. it's a terrible, horrible, nasty picture but when you're talking about crippled america and you're talking about all the problems we have, i can have a big smiley face up there so that's how we picked it. we picked the worst photo taken of me. i would have loved to have had a beautiful smiling picture but that doesn't go with the title of the book or the context of the book. simon & schuster agreed with me. said again. what? are the other republicans

afraid to debate? while some of them should be. thank you very much everybody. simon & schuster, thank you. louise, thank you. cspan takes you on the road to the white house. we are taking your comments on twitter, facebook and by phone. as always, every campaign event we cover is available on our website at cspan.org. >> tomorrow a hearing on the syrian government's relationship with russia and the role of the u.s. in the syrian civil war. we will have live coverage on c-span three and cspan.org. a panel of defense analysts

including former nsa dir. testify at a senate hearing about the future of war. they talked about potential threats from russia and china. senator john mccain chairs this committee. this is two hours 20 minutes. >> welcome.

we are considering the future of warfare. this hearing builds on a series of hearings this committee is conducting to discuss our current political challenges and examine our defense enterprise to meet these challenges and identify which reforms are necessary to ensure that we have the most agile, innovative and effective military and defense organization possible. today we focus on the future, what features will define the battlefields of tomorrow and what technology and methods of employing them, what our future war fighters will require and what we will need to adopt closer to the need of innovation and speed of bureaucracy. we are fortunate to have a distinguished panel of witnesses this morning. it will present their views on how to reimagine and reshape our military for the future. keith alexander, former commander of cyber command and director of the national security agency and outstanding

leader. brian clark, clark, senior fellow for strategic and budgetary assessment, mr. paul sure, director of the warfare initiative at the center for a new american security and doctor peter singer, senior fellow at the new american foundation. the witnesses have testified before this committee and continue to warn that the global threat environment is the most challenging, complex and uncertain in 70 years. what is truly disturbing is that as we look to the future, the trends that are making the world more dangerous seem likely to persist and intensify. many of our adversaries are investing billions of dollars into reshaping their militaries

and developing technologies to counter and thwart america's military advantages. at the same time, the speed of globalization and commercialization means that advanced destructive technologists are available at militaries, terrorist groups and other nonstate actors. add to that, the harm caused by the budget control act in sequestration, we are now facing the dual problem of the quantitative and quantitative erosion of our military edge. reversing this trend certainly requires greater military capacity. there is still a lot of truth in the old adage that quantity has a quality all its own. that said, simply buying more of what we have now is insufficient. that's not how we will preserve our advantage or when our future wars. our enemies are not just investing in new defense technologies, technologies, they are investing in strategies to counter americans traditional military strength asymmetrically. hybrid warfare and anti-access in area denial capabilities. doing more the same simply plays into our adversary hands.

as the panel concluded, maintaining the operational and technological edge of our arm forces require sustained and targeted investment. i want to emphasize targeted where. we are witnessing areas in robotics and unmanned systems, miniaturization and directed energy and data analytics. this is not science fiction. this is happening right now. we better understand the implications of these changes for the future of warfare because we know our adversaries are working overtime to do so. this is a major defense acquisition challenge. these kinds of disruptive technologies are being developed more by nontraditional commercial companies than traditional defense industry. indeed, the top four u.s. defense contractors combined spend only 27% of what google does annually on research and

development. yet the defense acquisition system, all too often serves to repel rather than attract producers of disruptive new technologies. leading commercial companies are innovating on 18 month cycle, but the department of defense is stuck on an 18 year cycle. this is a recipe for failure in fixing this problem must continue to be a top priority for this committees acquisition reform efforts. it's not enough, however just to acquire new technologies. we must also devise new ways to employ them. it would be a failure of imagination merely to try to conform emerging defense technologies to how we operate and fight today. ultimately, we must recognize the radical potential that these capabilities possess in shape new ways of operating and fighting around these new technologies. the classic example is the tank prior to world war ii. at the time, all the major

powers had tanks but they could only imagine them as mobile artillery or armored calvary. it was the germans who first understood that a tank as a tank. they built entirely new operational concepts around it and realized its true potential. similarly, the united states navy in the 1930 adopted its self despite opposition at times, both internal and external, from a force tilt around their battleship to one organized around carrier aviation. key military leaders at that time anticipated the opportunity that aviation presented, develop ways to fight with aircraft at sea and prepared our nation to wage and win a new type of naval airfare. we face similar challenges now. instead of thinking about how cyber or unmanned systems or other new technologies can simply enable us to do things,

we are already doing now, now, we must discern the real potential of these capabilities. how they may be used against us and how they should be used by us. then we must rethink and reimagine and reshape our military around these disruptive new technologies. that's the only way we will sustain our qualitative military edge. this will require tough choices, , prioritizing for the future will not always be popular in all quarters of the defense establishment. advocates for the status quo will likely resist change. these are the choices we must make to ensure that our military will be ready to deter, and if necessary, fight and win our future wars. i look forward to the testimony of our witnesses, senator reid. >> thank you very much mr. chairman. let me join you and thinking our witnesses for their willingness to appear today to provide their thoughts on the future of

warfare. each of you have contributed to our discussions and i look forward to testimony. i sensed a theme of last week's hearing and one i expect will continue today. it's the need for offset strategy. we capture a distinct qualitative advantage over our adversaries. the presumption that the decades long technological superiority enjoyed by the united states and our ally will continue into the future may no longer be valid and appeared competitors learned from our past success and made advancements of their own. particularly in the area of precision and long-range strike, space and cyber. this has even impacted our nonstate groups like isis and al qaeda who are able to employ tools including drones and satellite communication equipment which would have been

unthinkable only a few years ago. as to be secretary of defense told student/year, as any good student knows, the fundamental nature of war is an interactive clash. a two-sided duel. action filed by reaction. while the u.s. fought to lengthy wars, the rest of the world saw what are the images were. they studied them and they set about devising ways to compete. they face the very real possibility and find themselves facing an arsenal of advanced disruptive technologies that could turn our previous technology advances on its head. arm forces no longer have uncontested access or operational freedom of moves. underlying these challenges are several technological trends that are reshaping the warfare. global investment by the global

sector. to compete we will have to develop an acquisition hiring policy. we need to incentivize some of those engineers to work with us. we have to protect the military and the agencies that are driving innovation that will shape our future military capabilities. pace of technology is accelerating in the dod processes are slower and more bureaucratic than ever. we need a 21st century enterprise to keep up. beyond acquisition reform, this includes the development of new military concepts of operations. for example those dealing with complex robotic systems, new rules of engagement on the battlefield, new regulations to expanded use of things like

nanotechnology, artificial intelligence or biotechnology, and a new attitude, both attitude, both in the pentagon and in congress that encourages the informed risk-taking and innovation that is characteristic of the people and company that are shaping the future. i welcome your suggestions on these issues and i look forward to your testimony. thank you mr. chairman. >> mr. alexander, welcome. >> thank you sir. chairman mccain, distinguished members of the community, i'd like to talk about what you addressed in your opening statements about where technology is going what it means for the future of warfare. i will do this rather quickly. i submitted a statement for the record and asked that that be put on the record.

>> all statements will be made a permanent part of the record. >> thank you mr. chairman. when you look at the rate of change of technology, what you brought up in terms of the cycle of where we are with the dod acquisition system and where industry is, 18 years versus 18 months, it's unacceptable. especially when you look at cyber security. when you think about the rate of change for cyber security, it's doubling every two years. that means the kids in college today, what they learn in their freshman year, half of it is outdated by their junior year. when you think about the volume of information that's being created, the unique volume of information, it's about seven eb. what that means is we are going to create more unique information this year than the last 5000 years combined. when you think about the staggering rate of that information and where it's going and you look at, on the civilian side, the top ten in demand jobs didn't exist ten years ago. that means we are teaching students for jobs that don't exist, using technology that hasn't been created to solve problems we don't even know our problems. there's tremendous good that will come out of this in terms of the future of warfare. and healthcare. and saving money for our taxpayers in the energy market and others. when you look at the revolution

that will go on in the energy sector and how we can stabilize our nation and other nations energy sector and not waste billions of dollars in fuel costs each year, year, this is a huge opportunity for our nation. with that opportunity comes tremendous vulnerability. when you think about what the defense department is required to do, it rests on that civilian infrastructure. it rests on the energy sector. the communications infrastructure and all the other medications that are intertwined. our nation, in order to execute warfare, depends on that being there. it's not secure. tremendous vulnerability. i'll just hit some highlights of what i think we are going to face over the next several years. you only need to look back on what happened in 2007, first distributed denial attack, 2000 eight, same thing. both love those were from

russian hackers. i learned this from my daughter. i use russian hackers. they are going after a nation. in it was sony and georgia. uniquely timed, the the russians entering into georgia. as you know, 2008 in october is where we found malware on the defense network. if you jump to 2012, we saw a series of attacks against our nation's financial systems, largely attributed largely attributed to iran. it was preceded by a destructive attack against saudi arabia that destroyed the data on over 30,000 systems. from 2012, august when that attack occurred to 2013, 2300 attacks against our financial infrastructure.

now when you jump forward to where we are today, with what's happened with target, home depot, sony and you look at what hit other countries, you are seeing that those nations, who disagree with us, are looking at ways to come at looking at ways to come at us. they are using the full spectrum of power, diplomatic, political, economic, economic and military. within military, the easiest form, for at least russia and iran, has been cyber. now we look at what's going on around the world today, you can see that what's going on in syria, if we have a disagreement with russia, or if there randy goes bad, or if we don't have a meeting of the mine on ukraine, or something pops up in north korea, i expect these countries to come back at us with cyber attacks. they can say, our guys didn't do it. it can cause tremendous damage. our nation is not ready for these types of attacks.

across the board. i think the cyber legislation that was brought forward takes us a great step down the road. i think there is more that needs to be done. within the defense department, only defense department can defend this nation in cyber. homeland security can set standards but when our nation is under attack, u.s. cyber command, nsi and nsa and fbi will be the first responders. let's look at what happened to sony and use that as a case to end my opening statement. when sony was hit, everybody can say will that's not critical infrastructure. i've got it. when sony was attacked, we would not allow, as a government, sony to attack back against north korea. the reason is, if sony is, if sony were to attack back, it could start a bigger war on the korean peninsula. that is the responsibility of government.

but if sony isn't allowed to attack back, then who does that for sony? that's where our government steps in. that's where our defense department is. that's what we are needed for. but we can't see sony's networks and i'm not advocating for the government to be in all the networks. what i'd advocate for is a radar system. when a company or sector is being hit, they can tell the government at large i'm being attacked. two things have to be occurred in order to do that. those companies need to up their game in cyber security and understand what's going on and they need to, to, much like a radar system, be able to tell the government some things going on. then, the government can determine what to do. in all of this, it has to occur at network speed. it is not a place where you can have someone in the loop making a decision.

if they are doing nuclear exchange where we are racing down the road building powerpoint student brief the white house on the next step when the missiles, and 30 minutes in the briefings come in 30 hours. in cyberspace, to go halfway around the world takes 67 milliseconds. that's your decision space. it doesn't provide any opportunity for us to miscalculate in this area. when you think about what those who wish us harm want to do, if i were a bad guy, i'm a good guy chairman, i believe, if i were a bad guy would look at this as a military campaign and say how do i want to attack our financial sector, our energy sector in our government. i believe those who wanna do us harm can do that much like what happened in 2012, but this time with more destructive tools against our energy sector and our financial sector.

if that happens, the cost to our nation would be measured in the trillions. so, where'd we need to go? i think that's one of the things chairman that we ought to discuss. where we go in this area and how we set up and organize within the government and set the rules of engagement and get things right. train our troops across the board and partner with industry. we have got to do both. we need industry to tell us what's going on. the government has to be there to protect the industry. i am not an advocate of us pushing money to industry for them to go fix their problem. i'm an advocate for industry upping their game and to have the ability to tell the government that something is going on. these are areas that i like to really talk about what's going on. when you look at it, on the internet, our nation is the one who created the internet. we were the first to do this. we ought to be the first to

secure it. thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you very much general. mr. clark. >> ranking member read, members of the committee, chairman mccain, thank you for asking us to come here today on this very important topic. i wanted to highlight some elements for my written statement to get the strategy we should be using to approach technology development in the department of defense. we got a very dynamic security environment today. we've talked about that in other sessions recently and a very dynamic technology environment as mr. alexander highlighted. what that is doing is transitioning several decades of military dominance that we've enjoyed since the cold war into one of competition peered we will now have to compete to be able to maintain our war fighting edge against our adversaries. to be able to maintain that we

have to have a strategy that goes after the kind of enduring advantages that we need to be able to have to deter in the future. the last time we were faced with a situation like this where we had a long-term competition against a single or series of adversaries was during the cold war. during that period, we used several series of offset strategies that have been described as being able to demonstrate to the soviets that we would be able to hold them at risk, attack their targets at home and attack their forces out in the field. these involve nuclear weapons initially with a new look at pres. eisenhower's strategy in the 50s and it was followed later on with the strategies that the defense was ready to use with stealth capabilities.

and low probability of detection sensor systems that would need to be able to be effective against the kind of sensors that the soviets are developing. does -- those entered the force during the cold war and we are familiar. he gave us an advantage that still is benefiting the us today in terms of the ability to strike targets it will almost any place on the globe. several benefits came from anticipating, developing, and moving into the next phase with an advantage that endorse. once again we find ourselves in a situation where we are geographically disadvantaged because allies are far away and we must project power to support them, and we are numerically disadvantaged because potential adversaries like china have much bigger forces than our own.

we need to look at the approach we took in the cold war of anticipating the next phase in the important warfare areas and missions and developing capabilities to be effective in. that should be the heart of our strategy we have been talking about, the 3rd offset should be looking at the next phase of missionaries that we think are important to deterring the adversaries we are facing today. some of those shifts are, i talk about them in detail in my written statement, to highlight the major shifts, undersea warfare is likely to see a shift from listening to summaries and passive sonar to one in which we use active sonar and nonexistent methods which will mean quiet summaries will not have the same benefit in terms of survivability. we need to come up with knew ways for counter detection using active system just as we do above the water, use jammers to counter radar and do the same thing underwater.

we will see the continuation of the trend we saw toward stealth and low probability sensors that started during the cold war that sort of went on hiatus with the soviet union's fall. so they will be the features of strike warfare going into the future. the em spectrum, we have been operating today with high power systems, very detectable systems, and we won't do that in the future but will move to systems that are increasingly passive. key technologies must be developed. and lastly, and air warfare the sensor advancements will result in a situation where fast, small maneuverable aircraft will no longer be as beneficial as large aircraft i can carry big sensors and large weapon payloads and air to air warfare. so those are key areas we must be able to take advantage of and build upon in order to be successful. general alexander brought of

cyber in space, obviously an area of competition today. it looks like in the policy choices that the united states we need to marry those two

ideas and get new operational concepts that leverage new technologies to build requirements that drive the acquisition systems and we also need to look at how we focus technology investment. today it is spread all over a large portfolio of areas instead of focused on the areas that will give us the greatest benefit strategically down the road. we are watering the flowers and hoping that some of them will turn into trees. and the last is how we develop requirements. acquisition reform has been a big topic and focus area. one key area is the need to refine how we develop requirements. when we developed the requirements for a new platform we start from scratch and define the requirements for it up front before we start building a thing.

instead, we must look at ways to build the requirements as we are prototyping technologies to get an idea of what will be feasible. what is achievable in terms of schedule and achievable in terms of the performance parameters of a particular weapon system which can be defined in large part by prototyping existing technologies and building requirements as you do that. we build requirements in isolation from expectation as to how feasible it will be. so it will be a keya key feature of speeding up the introduction of new technologies. we have an opportunity here with our current technological capabilities, many of which are maturing in mission areas that are important, but we need to make changes to leverage them, and i look forward to your questions. thank you.

>> thank you, chairman, ranking member. it is not to be here today. we are living in the midst of an information revolution that is sweeping in scope and scale. 3.8 trillion is spent every year on information technology which has more than doubled all spending by every country on earth combined. that is maturing and number of underlying technologies, sensors, computer processing, data networking that will have significant impact. and so we are seeing changes in warfare much like how the industrial revolution led to changes in world war i into with tanks and aircraft and submarines, and the us has been able to be a 1st mover in the information revolution and gave many of the fruits of this technology. now, the challenge that we have is this technology is proliferating to others.

we get an early move, but we do not get a monopoly. many of the investments are happening outside of the defense sector. we saw in the gulf for what some of these technologies can do in terms of significant to have conflicting significant damage and lethality. and there is precedent for these types of changes. the british developed an early model machine gun that they used for conquest all across africa, but in world war i they faced an enemy that also have machine guns with incredibly devastating effect. the british lost 20,000 men the single day. we are not prepared for the changes that are coming as the technology proliferates to others and continues to evolve and mature. thousands of antitank guided missiles now litter the middle east and north africa

countries like china and russia are developing increasingly capable warfare , all of which threaten our traditional modes of power projection. now that they have guided weapons they can target our forces with great precision as well saturating and overwhelming defenses. today missile defenses are costly, and the cost exchange ratio favors the offense. now, this vulnerability of major power projection assets, carriers, ships, tanks, bases coincides with an unfortunate long-term trend in us defense spending with decreased numbers of capital assets which exceeds the current budget problem and will continue beyond it and leicester are major changes. for several decades the per unit cost has steadily risen shrinking the number of assets that we can afford. to date our responses to build more capable assets.

we have extremelywe have extremely capable, qualitatively capable ships and aircraft and submarines and aircraft carriers, but this drives costs up further which has made sense in the world where others do not have weapons that can target us with great precision. and we have done so in many cases very deliberately trading quantity for quality. but this will no longer work in a world where others can target us as well. concentrate firepower concentrate firepower on our shrinking number of major combat assets, putting more and more eggs into a smaller number of vulnerable baskets. now, the department of defense challenges access area denial the problem is reasonably well understood. the problem is, and lots of different launching a new strategy a better ship or aircraft alone we will not solve the problem because with the acquisition system and the requirements that we have we will build something

even more expensive it will be good. so toso to operate in this area we need a fundamental shift in military thinking, disperse the forces can't disaggregate the capability and a large numbers of lower-cost systems, operate and deceive the enemy through deception measures in the course and we need to be able to swarm and overwhelmed enemy defenses would large numbers of lower-cost assets. early thinking is underway in many parts of the department. we talk about this 1st operation, the marine corps is also experimenting with distributing operations.

also site. a storm of low-cost operative assets. collectively these and at the next paradigm shift. a small number of assets as we do today. aa swarm of a large number of cooperative distributed assets. the main obstacles that stand in our way are not fundamentally technological. and within a reasonable defense budget if we are willing to make trades the main obstacle is conceptual.

>> this combines nonfiction style research with a fictionalized scenario of the 21st century great power conflict. shaping the geopolitics of last century. great power competition either by accident or choice in turn the scale of such a challenge demonstrates the stakes at hand which hopefully we will not have to wait for to drive change. in my written submission i cover five key areas, most especially in a great power context the needed actions we need to take to dealing

with a pattern of buying the pontiac aztecs of war, defense programs that are overpromised, engineered, and overpriced and in my remarks i would like to focus on one important issue since 1945 us defense planning is focused on having a qualitative edge to overmatch adversaries planning to be a generation ahead which has become baked into everything from our overall defense strategy all the way down the small unit tactics, yet us forces cannot count on that overmatch of the future. mass campaigns of state linked intellectual property theft has meantmet we are paying much of the cost for our adversaries.

this is crucial as not only most of our dominant platforms are vulnerable to new classes of weapons but an array of potentially game changing weapons that lie just ahead. a new generationa new generation of unmanned systems more diverse in size, shape, form simply reversing the cost equations.

redefining the observed the side-impact, hypersonic, high-speed rockets and missiles, 3 d printing, technologies that threaten to do to the current defense marketplace with the ipod did to the music industry. reshaping what is possible and maybe even what is proper. the challenge is the comparison that can be drawn between what is now or soon to be possible versus what we are actually buying today who fled to buy tomorrow. if you start at conception there all of the vote for you.

locking in on a single major program that is too big to fail and is not all that new. in this shapes not just what we buy but extends development time and expectations of how much people by decades into the future driving where reese to the horse. disruption is the new buzzword in defense, part of the outreach, we struggle with the dual meaning of the concept claiming to aspire for the new but to be disrupted, outdated and must be discarded. from programs to organizational structures to operating concepts. there is a long record of the government funding because they cannot supplant

the same goes for all the new and important ideas and proposals. to be adopted something will have to be supplanted. as you program for the future what you support and the new game changers are not just programs with thinking structures and organizations what you eliminated the old mattering more than any single additional planar tank squeezed into a budget line item. it may even be the difference. i would like to close by offering two quotes that can serve as guideposts. the 1st is from the last. want of foresight, unwillingness to act, lack of clear thinking, confusion

of counsel until self-preservation strikes is stirring gone, these are the features which constitute the two have endless repetition of history and the 2nd is from professor at china's defense arguing how his own nation should contemplate the future of war. we must bear a third world war in mind when developing military forces. they must be mindful of the lessons of the past and acknowledge the trends in motion so that we can take the needed steps to avoid miscalculation and in so doing keep the world were where it belongs. >> thank you very much. you mentioned legislation that was recently passed on cyber was a good step forward. >> chairman,chairman, they key thing that must be clear and that legislation, when

there is military response required from actions that that must go immediately to the defense department. what i am concerned about his we set up process that is delayed the department of homeland security, inspected, and then sent. what i would encourages the development of a set of standards, think of these as protocols were both houses in congress could agree that these types of information hold no personally identifiable information when necessary for the protection of the nation and can go directly to all of the parties. i am not saying dhs out but ensure that they get it in real time. it would be analogous to a radar. that goes dhs. >> you said it is important

to partner with industry. i get the impression that industry is not interested in partnering with us. >> there are two parts to that. it has been an exciting year and a half out. industry is very much in the cyber security, very concerned about what they share with the government because of liability, but at the end of the day, they recognize that the government is the only one that can defend them from the nationstate like attack. >> the last manned fighter aircraft in your view. >> i do not know if it is the last. we may as well. the question is make a historic parallel thinking about the interwar years, the spitfire or to use it may be example the wildcat

systems, or whether it parallels the last best biplane. i would offer to the committee to explore that parallel history of the program, requirements and the world changed around it. all of the things that seem fantastic, a metal biplane that could go faster than previous and it was outdated before he left the development cycle, but they continue to push forward. his nickname was not the gladiator but the flying coffin. >> several other aircraft have inherited that moniker as well. >> the challenge is going to be -- we will buy the f3 five.

we will have to wrestle with issues that you have pointed out, the per unit cost, how that will affect how many we want to buy. i have a hard time believing that we will still be buying the same numbers we expect to buy now. the world will have changed, also integration with unmanned systems and what role it will play will be able to play in terms of partnering with unmanned systems for managing them. there is a sea of change. it is a program that many of the concepts were sent the year that i was leaving college. >> we all agree that the pentagon is not structured illinois the command system structured to meet the new challenges that the witnesses have aptly described. take a stab at how we should restructure the pentagon to

meet these new challenges. >> thank you, mr. chairman. one important disconnect that has come to light is that between what the pentagon is doing which is long-term acquisition and near-term needs. we saw this in iraq and afghanistan, the creation of these ad hoc policies, things that were basically silver bullets that the secretary had to personally fire at a problem to get it fixed. institutionalizing that is important not just for counterinsurgency the more importantly for major wars with the level of violence is likely to be higher in the timeline is shorter and the need to rapidly innovate is essential. the department has made some steps in that direction, but

there is more to be done in terms of getting a voice and then creating a pathway command the services have some of these individual to do rapid capability development. >> mr. clark. >> ii would say we need to look at having one process, how we develop the requirements and develop large man acquisition programs, ships and aircraft or we might want to have a more deliberate process and then a separate process where we acquire smaller programs, everything below that we can develop the requirements in concert with a technology demonstration

prototype program, a lot of the technology is already mature and sitting waiting. well, they could take advantage of a bridge at valley if we said everything that is not a large manned platform is able to take advantage of an acquisition process we develop requirements at the same time as the specifications and plans for the system. it would merge requirements and acquisitions. >> we would not need a thousand page document for a new handgun. >> exactly. new handgun, unmanned system , technologies that will harvest from industry or department of defense labs that have already been developed. the specifications we want

in the final program very quickly based upon what has been achieved technically. >> thank you, senator. >> thank you for your insightful testimony. it strikes me that we are talking about, as many of you mentioned, is disconnect between the reality we all recognize and operational practice, institutional outlooks, the equipment, the training, everything. the question is how we think those things up. one thought is by having exercises where we actually game this out in a comprehensive way to go the

mentioning of the development of the carrier can carefully about the threats any technology. where are we in the process of forcing the system by having comprehensive exercises that will force us to answer specific questions like how we organize our reorganize. >> senator, the 1st thing we have to do is look at expanding outlook homeless cyber can do to our country. in the military we focus on military to military engagements but an adversary will go after our military structure 1st. on more, take the we will of the people out to fight. we are seeing that. take down the power grid in the

financial sector and everyone will forget about these problems and we are essentially isolated, so we must step back and look at a more comprehensive manner, what it means for the defense department to protect the nation. there is athere is a great start with the way that the teams have been set up, but there is a long way to go, and we must have this wargame. during my tenure questions came up with folks like the trace said go to a separate service. ii was not there, but we must step into this area, and secretary gates had insight on how he would do this because it is a new way of thinking about warfare where our nation is at risk. in the past week it separate out the military to overseas and what went on in the country is others. in this area you cannot do that.

the 1st thing they will go after his are civilian infrastructure. and so they have to start with that and how we respond to that. >> thank you, again. >> senator, it's a great example because it was to fund the war fighters would get together at the naval war college and play out the wargame on the floor with play ships and models and everything and go out and do a series of experiments that seek to practice the concepts that came out of the process. the department of defense is reinvigorating its wargaming efforts in an effort to put the intellectual capitol, and those were fighting concepts that emerge, the best-of-breed, if you will, need to be taking out and experimented with an exercises using real systems

in a real operating environment. one thing that the department of defense is not do well is incorporating technologists into these discussions. we get a bunch of operators together and give them a problem and they know there are systems from the ship or aircraft, and they go play it out and figure out the best way to fight, but they are not taking advantage of what technology might offer them which is the timeframe we are aiming for. we need to bring technology experts in the no where technology is going but not necessarily how it will be use. you are more likely to get an operational concept that can leverage new technology and do something different that we did before, and the examples of the past of stealth or passive sonar are perfect examples where technology people came in and said, this is possible

and they came up with a way to apply it which is something that needs to have a better job out of it. >> your comment. >> yes. thank you, i could not agree more that the process of experimentation is critical, and it must be segregated from training in terms of qualifying. we send an army unit about ensuring the unit readiness and training. there may be room for taking units to try new concepts. and it is something that the department should be looking at. >> very rapidly the challenge in the existing system is the exercises either are about validating existing concepts. you here the phrase getting back to basics, or they are about allies, making allies feel better about themselves

, partnership capacity building, partner building. those were very valuable not just in showing what to buy and how to use but linking exercises to the personnel system, rapidly will budget is not preventative of it. it is often culture of implementation and finally been aware. i think to circle back to cyber security command that is the challenge we are taking new capabilities and putting some window boxes. we have built up cyber command the soul have a system where the pentagon's weapon tester found significant vulnerabilities.

>> thank you command i assume that gen. alexander's commentgeneral alexander's comment is that this is much broader than the department of defense, and we tend to look at ourselves at the stovepipes, but this is usually a comprehensive exercise involving the department of reserve, department of defense, everyone engaged, and i assume everyone agrees with that. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate the time that we had. i learned a lot in the time we spent together. it was meaningful, and i recall when i was 1st elected to replace the chairman of the intelligence committee who told me at that time, one of the problems we were never able to deal with this effectively have all this technology and things we

have finding out and we seem to be competing with ourselves. fbi, cia, nsa, homeland security, but i am seeing the same thing. we made headway. the 1st time all of the entities i mentioned were in one room together talking. you mentioned in your statement commercial private entities cannot defend themselves alone and that the us government is the only one that can should fire back. it seems to me, how this should be restructured because we have each one of these, they have a cyber division, cia and all that.

practically speaking fbi has great talent for domestic capability. when you talk about network operations that is the best expertise. the question then becomes

what you do that brings those partners together. and he looked at it, and i would ask you to reach out to him and get his thoughts. directly from him on that was probably the best approach. that is where our country needs to get to. both of those must be synchronized as we go forward. if our nation is attacked and they take on the power grid and a massive damage where is your 1st priority for the future of the nation? something that has to be, how will i defend the country's 1st and foremost on the table. those kind of decisions have to be made. i have not been able.

>> i was going to bring up the effort you made, working with -- and they developed a great program. we have to watch what they are doing. have a passing this up everywhere? really quickly let me get back to the fact that the statement that was made by bob gates talking about how we never once got it right i can remember one of them

said that engineers who will no longer need ground troops. people in think takes defending -- consuming 51 percent of our budget not giving the right emphasis to defending america. they are insisting on having an equal amount of money. so do you think that we need -- and you can say yes or no , reprioritize making

defending america number one priority again? >> sequestration is incredibly on strategic, but it is a camea came to shooting yourself in the foot not shooting yourself in the head. >> mr. chair. >> thank you.you. i acknowledge that there are difficult domestic political compromises, but it is clear that we are not spending enough on defense today in order to adequately defend the country. >> yes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you for being here today. if i could, which country or group has the most to gain from attacking the cyber attack?

, russia, china, i sil? >> each of them have different objectives. when we disagreed on crimea we saw increased attacks against companies like target and home depot. >> how would that benefit them as a country? >> they allow their hackers freedom. they steal, make money, we get hurt, russia sends an indirect message. the same thing in a rain. you look at the disruptive attacks on wall street and what they are doing is sending a message. you sanctioned us, we will fire back. in china it is different. china is all about building the economy. they are stealing everything that they can to grow their economy.

i think it is the greatest transfer wealth of history, and interestingly, we could stop that. you know, if i could, what senator reed and in half brought up, if you put those together and ask where we don't have a major effort with industry, industry is willing to pay their portion i am convinced. if they do there part right in defending what they need to you could stop attacks, and we should do that. >> let me ask you about the nsa. we are talking about the outside interest. what have they done to stop the edward snowden's of the nsa from inside attacks?

>> we set up a program. >> was it aa surprise to you? i am so sorry to interrupt you. i know when you were there. >> i was surprised a person we had entrusted to move data from one server to another was not trustworthy. >> you had him at a high level. >> well, his level was exaggerated by himself. he was a low-level system administrator within important job of moving information from the continental united states to servers and hawaii and in doing that dictated from those servers. you are seeing, it is interesting. more than 50 percent of their concerns come from insider attacks with things that are going on, you have got to do both.

i think that we did a good step, but you know an important point. >> but you think that they have been taken to shore it up so that it does not happen again. you are not sure private organizations have taken your advice or lead? >> we ran tests, gained, and ran back toward data. >> and how damaging was the information that he has shared or stolen and taken with? >> it was hugely damaging. you can see what the dni recently said, the fact that some of that information has gotten out and our ability has been impacted. the same thing on terrorist attacks.

>> do you believe snowden should be treated as a traitor and try to such? >> i do. >> thank you. >> i was drawn with you and your comments about breaches and the issues on general alexander which is important. i do not sense that we are having any significant threat to individual american liberty. apparently the president knows everyone that owns again we don't have anything like that.

well, several years ago my subcommittee talked about the threat and we ask we have reports and analysis on that. we agreed that this was not only a problem missile systems that are entire system. now 200 million toward identifying those.

i will ask you and mr. clark about that. first of all, are you familiar with the legislation? do you think it is a step in the right direction? doing need to go further? i'll be vulnerable, and can we take action to eliminate vulnerability? >> i am not 100 percent steeped, but i am aware of it. >> let me give you an example. the issues we face was 15,000 not claims. the answer is, as the commander responsible they

should be automated. i think it is a step in the right direction and ii encourage you to look at how you can now automate. >> they are special to me. tell senator mccain what you say. i would say i agree with the general.

cyber attack and also this idea that we need to modernize our networks to reduce the number of separate systems and reduce the amount of surface area. instead we need to bring more of those in the same enclave in today it's a lot of different systems that are interconnected as opposed to one system which goes back to the automation idea. a couple of other things. we have to deal with the fact that no space the advent of knew technology like microsatellites in

servicing robots, but the idea that there are countries that are developing satellites that are designed to repair or service will put new batteries and other satellites could be used to attack a satellite without generating the type of debris that we would assume would deter someone from attacking a satellite in space. we have to consider those as well in terms of how we develop our satellite infrastructure that we depend on. >> would you like to add to that? >> i wouldi would just add that an important component of enhancing our resiliency in space is off space bar caps on networks for redundancy command it is our to protect assets but also to reduce the incentives for attacking them in space. there was a program to build a joint network to do

communications and sufficient navigation and timing for a number of years that is sufficiently underfunded. so that is something to add to thinking about strategic resiliency. >> aa note of caution and maybe a little bit of disagreement on the panel. we should not lean too much on the cold war parallels of deterrent and mutuality of response thinking that showing our ability to hit back with liver 100 percent security and also the idea of the quick timeline. yes, cyber moves a digital speed, but attacks take not days but months and sometimes years to put together. on average it is 205 days between when an attack starts and when the victim finds out and turn your best

response and cyber attack is not to have back within that 30 minute window with nuclear weapons but maybe to pause, study from last year them into areas that they cannot cause harm. parallels are not exact. the model is more on deterrents by denial to networks of smaller, cheaper, microsatellites, the same thing in cyberspace , the military and the civilian sector and within that ii hope we are willing to look at alternative approaches as job trying to take new capabilities and problems and put them in the old boxes. i would contrast our defense approach and the way it has not done a great job of pulling in civilian talent.

estonia was mentioned as a model of a victim, one of the 1st victims,victims, but they have also built up a level of national resilience that we don't have.have. i would suggest the model of the estonian cyber defense late as an alternative jar parts that might be positive. >> one of the problems with the estonian model is the privacy issue that causes many of the industry's here, companies to be resistant to that model. senator shaheen. >> thank you for testifying this morning. if i could, i wish toi wish to ask each of you to give a brief response. do you think the biggest threat comes from the great powers, the great power competition that you refer to, or do they come from

terrorist groups in non- nationstates? >> i think the greatest concern comes from nationstates. the most frequent attacks come from hackers, terrorists, and others. >> mr. clark. >> the greatest threat will be from nationstates. >> i would disagree. in terms of large-scale nationstates can bring more power to bear but this issue of frequency and likelihood is absolutely imperative. >> general alexander, i think i understood you to say that we can stop attacks , and you preface that by talking about the importance of the private sector in their willingness

to invest in there own cyber security. if we can do that what is the impediment, and how should the operation be organized? >> there are several. having the right cyber technology, a holistic and comprehensive approach that allows a commercial entity or company to understand when they are being attacked or exploited, humility to share that information, the ability for the government to receive and respond,, and i think it easier where the wargaming and other things go on. what will your response be if these events occur? you have thought that through an no how and what they will do. >> again, if we can do that should it be organized under cyber command or should it be organized someplace else? why have we not done that

already? >> this goes back to the organizational structure that was asked previously. parts of the sign dhs responsible for the resiliency, the department of defense and then the department of justice who is responsible for criminal activity. what secretary gates said is you have those three talking about the same domain, and you can go quickly from a non- nationstate actor. you have to have wargames and we have to go through that. we have to organize it and we do not have the legislation. >> are you suggesting -- suggesting we should organize within the department of defense? >> it must have a key, if not the lead role. when push comes to shove and

down to follow someone has to respond it is the defense department. if our nation is under attack they are the ones that will be held accountable. >> thank you. you wrote about the dangers and how our adversaries be able to exploit what our military does take you explain or suggest what we might do to respond to that. the ability to take large amounts of data, but there is also an element of transparency. we have seen this transformed domestic policing. this era of ubiquitous smart phones, and i worry that

armed forces of the ground are not adequately trained and prepared. we have seen one off incidents every action is recorded and tweeted in real time, something i do not think that we are prepared for nsa this from personal experience. were occasionally we have interactions with the population where things are rough. it is difficult, but having them go viral is a different kind of environment. >> my time is up, but if i could ask one more question. sec. gates when he was here reference the fact that the us information agency and

our strategic efforts to communicate pale in comparison. and so how do any of you suggest we better respond? and should those efforts given the challenges of transparency that you mentioned, the need to do a better job in these areas, how do we do that command to should have that effort? >> i think that it is worth exploring the idea of a new agency. certainly we need to adapt communications to the digital and social media age. >> ii think one area we have not fully exploited since the cold war is taking advantage of the demonstration of new technologies and

communicating that to create uncertainty. so we develop a new railgun, laser, electronic warfare system that will offer promise. we build a few. we could take it and turn around and use it for our own purposes by creating uncertainty in the minds of potential enemies. ..

between their communication strategy and their model fields operation super example before they launched the operation they had preset hashtag's ready to go we don't have that kind of cohesion between our strategic communications and our bottom field operations. >> thank you all in thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you mr. chairman. doctors singer earlier you said the per unit cost is -- i would like to open it up to the entire panel and ask what can we do about cutting? work you may do less quite a lot

of times we talk about where we can do more. i'd like your opinions on where we can do less with regards to research, training. but only need in the future? dr. singer. >> i think you have heard many great ideas and how we will be able to implement dementias from everything from our personal system and professional military education all the way to the example of distinguishing between the type of systems and requirements that the pill for them, when we approach it. the problem of legacy systems, another thing i would put specifically on the table is our tendency to plan and asem for the best and then we act surprised when things don't work out that way or that was what i was referencing in terms of the problem where we have systems

and again all of you are thinking about certain systems in terms of we develop a warship and the navies says won't be survivable in contact. or a tanker aircraft not to be anything above medium threat and we go guys we should have figured that out. what i'm getting at is we too often in an attempt to again but cost dynamically per unit cost shapes everything from what we develop to oh my goodness we can't change the amount we are planning to buy for what it will do to the future per unit cost of it and as part of this and i would associate myself with the other remarks we visualize certain weapon systems could take on new important roles the way the b-52 bomber went from strategic nuclear deterrence operations to close air support. we may be able to rethink that approaching everything to the

aircraft carrier will some rain be able to take on that role was will it take on i asked are or are air-to-air combat roles in the future? these are possibilities if we allow them to happen and not be locked in by past decisions. >> mr. chair. >> thank you senator. i think this initiative quantities and there are certainly places to trend the quantity not just to have more capable things but then to trade that for larger numbers of lower-cost so moving to this issue been thinking about as dr. singer mentioned this major combat asset think of it as sort of a quarterback. a bomber that is not just carrying access to the fight but the pilots are controlling a swarm of vehicles and the submarine as the hub of the network of autonomous undersea

vehicles and then expand capabilities to have them in place. >> what this kind of points to is separating the platform a few well from the payload so what we have done in the past we have developed the shed from aircraft with all that systems built into it and we would periodically modernize that by tearing it all apart and rebuilding it all with new technology every 10 or 20 years or so. we need to move towards not buying the next-generation of these aircraft in shifts and other platforms in a way that integrates all the systems but instead by much cheaper and less equipped things and equipping them with payloads that can then adapt much more quickly over time because the innovation cycle for something like a missile or a radar system or a passive radar sensor is much quicker than that of the overall platform so we can afford to get cheaper platform so in terms of what we have today i wouldn't say we'd want to throw things on

the scrap heap that we currently have in the fleet that we would want to look at ways we can reequip it with a next generation of payloads instead of placing them at the highly integrated airplane or shift but to keep them, take out the old stuff and use interchangeable payloads in the future to start reducing the cost of these platforms in the future. so maybe the f-35 in the last aircraft we buy that's really a purpose built strike fighter and to get to doctors singer's point maybe you end up with airplanes in the future that are just larger and have ticker sensors and they do all the missions in the payload changes to accommodate that. >> senator i think one of the things we should look at is the commercial industry spends billions if not trillions of dollars a year on cybersecurity alone and when you think about all that money that's being spent is being spent to solve their problem but if they work

together to create a sector solution and that their solution can be very important for defending our country. if we had government and industry work together in a way that was meaningful so that what they applied to those resources for help give them more for selective service in cyber that we tell the government when the government has to act. you could focus government resources where they are needed so i think the idea of having a wargame and looking at how you get the financial sector, the energy sector, the health care or in the government together and maybe a few others, but those in the room and look what they are doing. what you would find out is we are spending almost $750 million a year on cybersecurity. what if it was done in a way that helped protect the whole sector and if they worked together? that surface would be far better than anything the government could do. we need them to do that so the government can focus on what you want especially the defense

department to do. >> mr. scharre you are talking about swarms and a change in warfighting. if i could mr. chairman we hear about platforms, we care about payloads. what about personnel? are we going to be looking at the same infantry in 20, 30, 40 years? >> and bigotry can take whole-gram. infantry can take the whole ground. >> gas when it comes to building up security infrastructure to pass on to someone else that something that's going to require it personal interaction. could we use robotics to help ground maneuver warfare, i think absolutely and i think there's a lot of opportunity for the army probably is not yet to look at something like a modern-day robotic maneuver to experiment with maneuver warfare. >> thank you. thank you mr. chair.

>> thank you mr. chairman and thank you to those witnesses. general alexander you talk about and we agree all the time the number of cyberattacks on the nation or governmental agencies that are occurring with greater frequency and i think he is a 350 cyber attacks. i'm not sure what time that was. give us a good example of a counter cyber attacks that the united states has undertaken so when we have been attacked, give me good example of something we have done in response. >> senator i can't give you that in this forum but i think that something that would be good to discuss for the committee in a classified session. >> i does want to make this point. i thought that was going to be your answer. there is not a deterrence doctrine and people don't know what the response will be. the president last week said he was going to send 50 special forces to syria.

i know to the number how many bombing raids we have run in the work and sisal bets now and it's nearly 16th month. we know the number of personnel had been deployed that when america public and policymakers read over and over again in the press about cyber attacks on the nation they are very public but when we can't discuss even with the committee of public setting where the american public what we are doing in response to kind of leads to a little bit of a feeling of -- and i know we are not but if we can talk about cheer deployment in the war on isil and bombings and the sorties that are run but we can't talk in open session about what we do in response to cyberattacks that are every bit as in the public news as any the bombing campaigns are, i think it really leads to a sense of helplessness by the public and the committees themselves. i hope we will have a follow-up to talk about this. >> with the hypothetical instead of actual and we could talk

about hypothetically at the defense department could do and other so we talk --. >> i would rather move to another topic great hypotheticals are great. why can we know actual in so many rounds of what we do in defense that we are not willing to talk actual about cyber? because we certainly hear about the actual attacks on us so i think that raises the question that i would like to explore more. very interesting hearing all of your written testimony and the oral testimony too and the title is provocative. a future warfare, a a lot of the discussion has been about technical technology issues. i think one of the interesting areas of future warfare is the question of unilateral with partners. we are attacked on 9/11 by al qaeda and we immediately assemble the coalition that amounted to about 60 nations to try to respond to that.

the first thought after the attack on pearl harbor was not we have to go out and assemble a coalition although there were other nations i've easily that we didn't fight in world war ii. is there something unique about the future is certainly the current and future warfare that renders this whole idea of coalitions kind of more of a common feature? the f-35 is a platform that was built with the participation of nine partner nations, not just different service branches the partner nations. talk about coalitions and alliances in the future warfare. i just be curious to hear your thoughts on that. >> if i could come in the cyberround we would be much better off with partners in this area. think about the undersea cables. they come from the united kingdom to us, 17 or 18 so the united kingdom and europe if they had a similar approach to cybersecurity and they agree to defend and did we defend our and we have moved our defense out to

europe for our country. i think that's a very good thing and we could do things like that so i do believe there is much need for collaboration but it also brings in all the issues. now you have the civil liberties and privacy because every nation sees it differently even in europe. i think we have got to set the standard and that's one of the things we could do as a country. >> i would say coalitions are primarily not material. i would argue that they don't bring a lot of military capabilities to bear better easily applied. it makes a little bit harder if you are trying to do with multiple nations but what they do bring his access to areas that we would otherwise not be able to operate from or be able to monitor and it also provides if you will for political top cover so that if we can demonstrate that is the way we are used operating it may drive

our competitors are adversaries into the calculation where they realized i'm not just going to be putting in the united states but also upsetting a number of my other neighbors which could re-create other problems down the road politically for them so there may be a political benefit in the long term to us managing things from a coalition. >> thank you mr. chairman. general alexander, do we have a stated doctrine with regard to what is a cyber attack or do we have a defined limit where we identify something as an act of war if our defense, our energy or financial resources are attacked? >> the only thing that i know that comes close to that is the president's statement 2009 about how we would respond using any form of power cyber, military or diplomatic to respond to cyber. there are no rules of the road or red lines in cyber.

i think wargames can help tighten some of that up. >> would anyone disagree with that analysis? i would add one thing that one of the challenges you haven't cyber is if you try to use cyber capability to respond to a cyber attack we may end up making clear to the adversary the access we have into his network so one problem we have is we don't want to burn the source so if we are attacked in cyberspace we might need to go to some other means to respond because we don't want to give up the fact that we have access to his activities and as general alexander said we might able to take advantage to gain new access that we don't want to make her to him. >> the key is not the means. it's not that it's cyber, it's banned affect which will determine it so whether it's through cyber or missile or whether it causes loss of life in physical damage even if someone sets up a foreign

adversary set the fire that killed hundreds of americans we wouldn't say -- you used matches not cyber or a missile. so don't -- cyber can be misdirected. it's really about the effect of how we judge it. >> do we need it established doctrine to determine whether or not a cyber act as cyber act as a before? >> i would say so. we need a more clear definition of what we think constitutes an attack that would be a response. we do that in the physical realm to a much greater degree and obviously it gets built up as a body of action over time so is the precedent that does that to some extent paid. >> if i could answer that question. when we look at our nato responsibilities i think we do have to have is laid out. but we can't do is walk into a war because we didn't understand that this would be an act of war so that if someone were to attack one of our nato allies and cost structure and in lives

what constitutes an act of war is not really clearly stated. there has been a lot of stuff in the papers that have been written but it doesn't get to the point that this is clear. so i think we need to have those discussions that are classified and unclassified sort of one understands that i do agree with the intent of individuals. if their intent is to do harm i think you now need to look at where you. >> would you share with me what you consider to be an appropriate response, should there be an act of war and the cyber round? >> i think ideally you could prevent it but if he couldn't prevent it i think you have two things are going on, resilience in your networks bringing those back up and the whole series of actions from political economic diplomatic military. in cyber there are a lot of things you could do to stop that nation from communicating outside that nation with other tools and i think it's those

types of capabilities in wargaming in things that ought to be looked at analogous to the way we did armored warfare 70 years ago. >> sometimes we talk about this in a way in which we have a tendency to literally scare ourselves because we are talking about how serious this can be. do we have the capability and the resources right now to actually respond? should we have that type of a cyber attack that would amount to, if we defined it as an act of war are we in a position as a country to respond as an act of war? >> so you have 40 offensive teams that were created at cyber command. those teams have some great capabilities. it gives you a great starting point and our first thought was in 2010 setup with the initial force structure we needed set up in terms of offense and defense

and teams that could actually do offense of actions to defend the country. >> anyone have anything to add to that? >> i would add two things. the first is the idea of assuming that our response would have to be limited just to cyber means. if someone carries out in that of war using cyber means we are not and should not be limited in a response to use other means and that's why we are seeing that deterrence. the second though we have built up great cyberoffense capability. there are many things mr. snowden did that one of the other things he did was reveal that he had very potent cyber offense capabilities. i would add those to those who believe that building up more will deliver deterrence, question why did not not deliver deterrence he had? there's no question we have offensive capability and yet the

attacks have continued to come and that's why come back do we need to do more about building up deterrence and denial which is making ourselves more resilient both the military and civilian means that we can shrug off those attacks which therefore makes the attack less productive and less like they own us. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you mr. chairman. dr. singer i must compliment you , too founded technology advisory firm called me a luddite is an act of genius. i also enjoyed your church of quote. one of my favorite church of quote was he was asked how history will treat his role in world war ii. his response was very well because i intend to write it. on this issue of deterrence and i think senator rounds rounds early get the point and i think we should follow up on this. the question of what is an act of war and when will we respond

because if an act of war isn't defined your opponent has to know you are going to consider it an act of war and there will be a response. mr. singer i think your point is well taken that doesn't necessarily have to be a cyberresponse but i do think there does need to be some response that the deterrence by denial seems to me ultimately you've got to have some offensive capability. you've got to be able to punch back or you were simply always on the defensive. you were nodding your head. i would assume you agree with that concept. >> i very much agree. i will compliment you and it turned thank you for your confidence. i will have an article coming out next week on this question up deterrence and the three approaches are what with the committees wrestle with. to set very clear norms so both sides are easy to understand

what is and isn't an act of war so that there is no miscalculation. the second is to understand he can respond that you can respond in many other means, many other areas and it's not just through military. it may be through trade, it may be through espionage whatever. there's a are more complex game going on in the cold war were your only response was you hit me with a nuke and i threatened to hit you back and the third is deterrence by denial. something that was impossible in the cold war the idea of civilian involvement, the alms shelters weren't useful and now with the incredible useful concept and resilience works not just against state level attacks but also excel the other attacks out there when nonstate actors like terrorist or criminal groups. >> on that point general good to see you again but the point you made that i haven't thought about was the idea of a joint

private sector cybersecurity effort, perhaps facilitated by the government. it strikes me as an efficient in extreme to have bank of america spending billions on cybersecurity and target and walmart when in reality they are all chasing the same problem. it may be that a consortium, as i recall there was a semior consortium some years ago to do with this in a joint way might be saving the private sector a lot of money. the government could act as a facilitator. dr. clarke, an important point has been made to dana was made one of the hearings today that instead of building weapons systems that have absolutely everything that are going to last 40 years and therefore by definition be obsolete we ought to be building modular systems if you will that can be

modernized on the fly rather than starting all over again. is that essentially what your testimony was? >> yes definitely. the ability to take advantage of the technology resided system. we talked about moore's law and how that results in computer programming power every 12 to 18 months in computers are the heart of almost everyone every one of her payloads whether to censor or a missile or a smart bomb today for an unmanned vehicle. to develop those payloads on a faster timeline. >> and trying to develop a weapon system that has everything for everybody. it's just the wrong way to go. >> if i defined my requirements in isolation on when the technology might be able to give me in the near-term timeframe i end up aspiring to something. >> and their requirements

proliferate because it's the problem of a camel is a horse designed by committee. >> in conjunction with the technology is. >> mr. singer i would urge the quote from robert frost good fences make good neighbors. when people know what the rules are that's when you can avoid conflict. the final question for the record mr. alexander. very chilling in your early testimony that we won't have time for human decision-making. in responding to some of these kinds of attacks. in other words 30 minutes or an hour for the missiles is now a matter of seconds. the question is how do we wargame and prepare response that can be done instantaneously without the intervention of human discretion. i think that's an issue in my time has expired but i think that's an issue that deserves

some serious thought and discussion. thank you gentlemen very much. this has been very illuminating. >> dr. singer i would suggest words of chairman mao, it's always darkest before it's totally black. >> thank you mr. chairman thank you mr. chairman. gentlemen thank you for your support termination and so many varying ways. i think the discussion today has been very beneficial. i think for all of us and our constituency. general upstander i would like to start with you. we have spent a lot of time talking about the cyberthreat that exists out there and the devastating effects to our networks should they be attacked or when they are attacked. and really the ability to recruit and retain some talent to deal with the cutting-edge threats that exist out there. what i would like to know is us a little bit more, how can we utilize our reserve and national guard forces to bring in some of

the best of the brightest? we have a lot of folks that certainly served in similar capacities and their civilian employment. is there a way that we can use them to leverage our forces? >> actually senator it's a great question and we were doing that. i know that continues the reach of the national guard units are setting up cyber teams that would also help -- you know some of these have some of the best technical experts in the civilian industry to partner with us so you go out to washington, the state of washington where microsoft employees are all around the world, all around the u.s.. i think there's great partnerships there and it also gives you an opportunity to bring them to active duty when you need them and then take them off. finally for the worker pried it also helps provide security for the state and local government. >> i think that's wonderful. i know in my transportation company we had some computer is working in civilian industry.

they were truck drivers when we were mobilized. a lot of talent that exists out there and mr. scharre, paul leyna we have spent time talking about future personnel generations in our department of defense and i would like to visit a little bit with you about again that national guard and reserves and where you see their role in the future. whether it's army, navy, air force and marines and how this would support future conflicts. >> thinks senator. i think this issue for civilian expertise is a unique capability that the national guard and reserve brings to the table and an example of computer experts driving trucks. i saw many similar things in iraq were even consumer affairs functions we have people misaligned with some of these

skills in the guard and reserve force. the process inside the department, to actually identify those skills allows them to be tracked inside the department so that the nation needs to drop on that we could no. it would be extremely valuable in the way to increase the skills and capabilities the national guard can bring to the table. >> i think that's a great idea. we identify many of our civilian skill sets for the guard to messieurs but i don't know the dmz but truly pays attention to that and i think we have a lot of wasted talent and ability to be better utilized in the active duty force. do you think the dod will rely heavily upon our guard and reserves as we move into future complex in outlying years