and other technologies. we did that job before there were negotiations with iran on its nuclear program, we did it throughout the negotiations, and we do it today, with the same tenacity and creativity, and partnership with dozens of dedicated agencies across the federal government. we will keep doing it. since the negotiation of the jcp oa we have devoted our chief resources and support of the ambassador's admission to to achieve full implementation of the jcp oa. in particular, we work hard unsupported cooperation with the international atomic energy agency, agency, as well as in creation with a procurement channel that can meet the limited, legitimate nuclear needs that iran may have under the jcp oa.

it in no way diminishes, as as i said the task of counter proliferation, of preventing acquisition of technology. i look forward to addressing any concerns or questions you have about these two central roles in my bureau. or any other topic. thank you thank you again for this opportunity. >> thank you very much. >> thank you chairman corker, ranking member, and ranking members of the committee. it is a great honor to testify before this committee and to have the opportunity to discuss the role of the department of energy and the national nuclear security administration play, and will continue to play in support of the u.s. government's actions to implement the jcp oa. as my colleagues from the state department have already stated, the jcp oa ensures that iran's nuclear program is exclusively

peaceful. it provides unprecedented verification measures, it constrains iran's nuclear program and a manner that gives us ample time to respond if iran chooses to violate its terms and it takes, of our options off the table. as we move toward, and beyond implementation day, the scientific, engineering and technical expertise within the department of energy, including our national laboratories will be called upon to help ensure iran complies with all of the nuclear related measures of the jcp oa. the department of state is leading the efforts to oversee implementation of the jcp oa. doe will continue to play an indispensable role in this process by providing scientific engineering and technical support, and analysis tool for policymakers and making sound decisions and judgments. allow me to provide a few brief examples of the kinds of unique expertise and skill the doe brings to the table.

the secretary of energy has testified that the jcp away blocks all of iran's pathways to building a nuclear weapon including the production of weapons grade plutonium. to this end, as the ambassador pointed out, it requires iran to redesign and rebuild the reactor effectively eliminating a potential source of weapons grade plutonium. the jcp oa further requires the redesign of the reactor be approved by the joint commission. for the united states, the expertise for assessing the technical aspects of the redesign including fuel and safety standards, and ensuring it implies with nonproliferation of the jcp oia resides within the department of energy and its laboratories. the jcp oa establishes process for review and approval for procurement of specified nuclear items. this process process will be conducted as ambassador said

to a procurement working group. the office of nonproliferation and arms control has a unique expertise and a long history in working with domestic agencies and international organizations such as the nuclear suppliers group on matters related to the export of nuclear related and dual use technology and materials. they will play an important role in advising the department of state which will coordinate with the u.s. government's efforts regarding the working group. finally, the international atomic energy, the iaea will play a role in verifying the nuclear related measures so the jcp oa, the department of energy worked very closely together with that iaea including providing training, developing technology, providing experts to the organization. by the way we have just published this brochure which lays out our support of that. if

the committee likes i'd be happy to submit it for the record. it is it is also available on our website. in conclusion, the jcp oa is not built on trust, it is built on hard-nosed requirements that will limit iran's activities and ensure access, transparency, verification. the transparency, and verification. the department of energy takes seriously its participation and efforts to lament the jcp oa and help ensure iran carries out its commitments under the deal, including participating in the administrations implementation efforts in supporting the iaea. again, thank you for the opportunity to be here. i look for to fielding questions you may have. >> thank you for the testimony, without objection we'll enter without objection will enter into the record the document you just refer to. ambassador moll, we first of all, you have a winning personality and we all like you, you have been very energetic in your meetings with us. at the same time, we have not

verified the u.s. government has not verified the second missile launch, to my knowledge. is that correct? >> sir, we are aware of the reports of that launch area we are analyzing those reports. >> so we have not formally stated that it occurred? >> the u.s. government has not. >> you came before us, just want to make sure as we go forward that we are clear with each other, you came to our committee on december second, the launch took place on the 20 first, no mention was made of that in this classified briefing. i'm just curious as to why that did not occur? >> senator, i had not seen any of those reports at our last meeting on december 2. i was not. >> so you are on aware of it happening? >> on december 2 i had not seen any reports. >> did you have an idea something had occurred? >> you had no knowledge of it whatsoever? >> i had heard that someone said

there may have been a launch, it was and i'll confirm source. i've not seen reports of that though. >> if you would though, against we can maintain an appropriate relationship, even things like that would be useful especially in the kind of setting we had which is very casual. we like to know those kind of things in real time. >> okay. >> iran is obviously conducting work on long-range ballistic missiles. i know this is again outside of the view, the only use for those in history, up up until this point in time, is to put a nuclear tip on those. is that correct? >> -- i think intercontinental up until this point in time had only been used to deliver nuclear weapons, is that

correct? >> mr. chairman i'm trying on my experience as an air force missile officer, long range intercontinental ballistic missiles to my knowledge have only been used for delivering nuclear, or being capable of delivering nuclear weapons. short arrange systems have been used by a variety of countries to to be used as conventional means. >> as we understand this is the case, that this is the only purpose, we know that they are doing that now. what does the administration drawing from that activity? >> i think the administration as you mentioned in our meeting with the committee last week, we have strongly condemned the violation of un security council resolution which legally forbids

the missile program for going for. in fact, the united states was the leader in mobilizing un security council resolution. >> but i'm really talking about -- since history has said we're pretty sophisticated country or cells, the only develop those for the delivery of nuclear weapons. they are continuing to do that now in violation of un security council violation. we have taken no issue that it's a side issue and it's very important and i'm sure many will focus on that. what does the administration draw from the fact that their testing missiles that throughout history have only been used to deliver nuclear weapons while quote, dismantling the intake centrifuges that they are dismantling now. >> senator, one of the reasons we pursued the jcp oa is that iran has in fact, repeatedly violated security counsel violations on the program.

so iran is going to develop that program regardless of the consequences. an important part to remove that threat, if iran is going to continue to develop that program, let's program, let's make sure it does not have the capability to put a nuclear payload in such missiles. by reducing the amount of enriched nuclear material available to iran's nuclear program by 90%, iran now has, within 90 days it could amass enough material to produce a nuclear weapon. following implementation of the steel, will take more than year. the missiles may continue to fly but we have made it a lot harder to put a nuclear payload on that. >> understand that. can you share with me why, and he thought the ministration has over this 180-degree inconsistency. where they are continuing to develop the ability to deliver nuclear weapons, that is the only purpose in history that these long-range ballistic missiles have been used. what is the the thinking aside iran,

from your perspective? >> first of all, the missile launch that took place the most recent one was an immediate range. it was not a nice epm. the thinking that we apply to this is that we need to make it as hard as possible. >> i am not asking about your thinking and please don't read those paragraphs to me anymore. i'm asking you what the administration things iran is doing when this is totally inconsistent with rational thinking? >> i'm not in the position to characterize what the iranian government is thinking. we are focused on making sure they cannot develop a nuclear weapons capability. >> let me ask another question. senator menendez really press secretary kerry when he was here, many is bus since that time. relative to whether the launch of these ballistic missiles, as defined, will be in violation of

the new agreement that is being implemented now. it was in violation of 1929. we have. we have done nothing about that which is unfortunate. but there is some really cute language that we discussed while we're trying to discuss what the agreement really said. secretary carey was adamant that they cannot continue to test missiles even after this agreement was put into place. there's some weird language that this refers to, says they are called upon. out of curiosity, after the implementation, if they launch these type of missiles, is it, or is it not in violation of the agreement? >> it is not in violation of the jcp oa. it is in violation of national security violation. >> so the called upon language from your perspective, makes it clear that going forward it will continue to be a violation. >> the language it would violate

that part of the un security council resolution. but that security council resolution contains legal prohibitions on any international support for iran's nuclear weapons program. any exception to provide materials or other resources to iran's missile program is forbidden by un security council resolution two to three one, exceptions exceptions can be sought. united states will veto any vetoes. >> i'm going to reserve the remainder of my time. >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you all for your testimony. i like to follow up a bit on what the chairman line of questioning, from what i could see. before i do so, i want to echo senators comments about the chairman's process of leading the committee. i do appreciate probably the most bipartisan community of the

united states senate. it speaks about the fact that we need to be as bipartisan as we can. >> the fact that i was ranking when your chair and you have no idea how much i appreciate the way that you dealt with me and your staff. the respect, just know that when someone like you his chair says that kind of example, it really calls those who come behind you to want to do the same. thank you. >> thank you. i hope to do so again. will there has to be a point of convergent. at any point. i have a very clear sense, and i hope i am wrong, that what we have here is a permissive environment. we have a set of circumstances where regardless of what you saw of the pnd issue, we for the

longest. of time pushed to get a real sense of what was the breath and scope of how far iran got in development of its efforts for a nuclear weapon. for the longest period of time the government of the united states said we needed to know that. what we got really, was a process in and the jcp oa that gave iran the easy out by just simply answering questions ads they wanted without fully coming clean. now, the administration consistently came before this committee and said that if we move aside from the nuclear portfolio that we would aggressively pursue iran's violation of international

order, missile technology, weapons trafficking, human rights, and its interests in the region. so, what we have seen sense, we have seen not one, but two missile tests. we have seen an introduction of arm shipments and when i don't think we can accept the security council to do about it. so the question is, is the administration ready to act and flied its own set of actions so that iran understands the consequences for violating the international order, and setting the tone so that when the full implementation of the jcp oa takes place that will have a

very clear understanding by then, that failure to comply fully will have consequences. >> senator, i stress we fully can occur with you and the rest of this committee, that iran has violated the security council resolutions and does commit many of the things that are very hostile to our interest. >> so what are we going to do about it? >> well, iran is one of the most sanctioned countries on earth. thanks to an effective partnership that we have had with this committee over to presidential administrations of putting together a patchwork of sanction regime that has exacted serious cause to the iranian economy. we believe going forward, as we confirm these missile launches, we have been swift in condemning them as we did in the security council and measures that we

will take in response to those confirmed missile launchers, we are actively considering additional measures at this moment. >> if you say to me a basket or, they are the most sanctioned, it almost implied that there is nothing else we can do. if that's the case then we are in deep trouble. >> but those sanctions will be coming up assuming implementation. so the bottom line, and i see you shaking your head no, but but as far as i understand those sanctions are going to be coming off upon implementation. >> sir, the nuclear related sanctions. >> goats what i'm talking about. >> those will come off when iran has rid itself of 98% of its enriched iranian. >> so it would no longer exists, and if you say they are the mustangs and country the world,

i assume that you're referring to their nonnuclear sections. so what is left to do? basically let iran violate without consequence. >> senator, i would underscore that very important part of the agreement that we negotiated with iran was a snapback provision. that allows the imposition of sanctions for any violation of the agreement. the united states is not bound by any. >> but these aren't non- nuclear actions. let's put the nuclear portfolio side. if iran continues to violate non- nuclear actions that are in violation of the un security council resolution, in violation violation of what secretary carey said before the committee, that we will aggressively pursue iran on violations that take place for missile technology, human rights, arms trafficking,

then, what is left? >> we will use the considerable full authorities that we have to take action. i can asked my colleague who oversees those authorities in pursuing our nonproliferation interests. >> specifically with regard to ballistic missile technology, we rely on two related concepts. one of sanctions, what a strategic tray control. it is correct that we sanctioned virtually every iranian entity that is connected with the ballistic missile program so that they cannot do commerce with the u.s. or acquire u.s. technology legally or use the u.s. financial system. we have used such such sanctions and exclamations against commercial entities and other countries that have traded with the iranian ballistic missile program. those sanctions remain in effect, we maintain the authority to a impose those sanctions even after the nuclear related sanctions are lifted.

we retain, as the previous administration, and i think the next administration the determination to do so. strategic tray controls are different, they allow us through the missile technology controlled regime, through the proliferation security initiative, in support of the un security council resolution to partner with dozens of nations around the world in order, as i said to interrupt, delay, impede, and every and every way possible the transfer of such technology. we have not, and we cannot entirely stop that trade. but, we believe our efforts, which which will continue after nuclear related sanctions are lifted, have made the iranian missile program less productive, less accurate, less of a threat to our friends in the regent than it otherwise would have been. >> let me close by say mr. chairman, number one i'm going to be looking forward to

see what actions you take. so far, they have not been forthcoming. number two, you talk about snapback, you have to step back to something and the iran sanction act that we all helped with and passed unanimously expired this coming year. i'm going to seek its reauthorization because you have to snapback to something. number three, i've been following iran says my day in the house of representatives for the other part of 20 years. i know some of my colleagues think this is a question internally with iran showing the hardliners have some skills and strength by firing missile technology and testing it, i know that iran, over the last two decades have tested the will of the international community. that is why they got to the point where they are on the verge of having the nuclear power that could be converted to nuclear weapons. basically, we said it is too big to roll back.

so, at the end of the day if we allow them to continue to test those, they have a history. they have tested us and the world. if we allow them to continue to test without consequence, believe me they will continue to expand. that is the risk here. that is that is what i hope we can come together on, not only on understanding but action. >> just a follow-up, i'm getting a strong sense that the reason we are doing nothing and creating a permissive environment, which i think is going to be problematic over the long term, i think we are doing that because we are trying to affect the internal elections that are taking place this spring. that is just not in keeping with the integrity of this agreement. i can understand the desire by some to do that, i know that is why they are dismantling so quickly so that sanctions will be relieved before the election. i get the sense that you and

others are complicit in trying to affect their internal actions and that is why we are not taking action. what i'm saying you and others i'm talking about are un and bathroom talk about the administration. >> sorry, i just called you johnny. excuse me. >> let me echo what senator cardin said, we appreciate very much what you had done. i want to say something before the whole committee. yesterday yesterday afternoon the 43 surviving hostages from the american embassy in iran and that we passed compensation to them that they will take up later this week, the emotional relief of those 43 surviving

hostages that are deal is not expressible in terms of words. i want the chairman, the ranking member in every member to know that you did a great deal of work to help us over a seven-year period of time make that a reality. you have made the lives of people who were tortured, beaten, and held captive by the iranians at least get closer on that terrible part of their life. i want to thank everybody for making it possible. i hope all 43 above know that it's because of your persistence and leadership that is why this is happening. we all get frustrated on the impact that were able to have with the body but there's no impact that you had incredible impact on these 43 citizen. >> think it was a great team team effort. it really is a template for my comments. in 1981 when president carter obtained the release of those americans from the iranian hostage in the embassy, to get

them released by the rainy is he had to negotiate away for their ability to be compensated for their ordeal. that was the way iranians negotiated the ideal. we finally got some money which was compensating those hostages from, the iranians never want to accept responsibility or culpability for any crime they perpetrate against the american people, but until now. i worry and as senator menendez have said that if we are passive about the jcp oa enforcement and just look the other way, the iranians will look the other way into whatever they want. by way of way of example, and i'm quoting here, the iranian regime has declared any type of sanction at any level, or end any precept or breach of the deal that would release iran from the obligation it has. in other words if we reach implementation day and the sanctions have been waived, we take any action in the snap back which is the enforcement mechanism the iranians will call

the snapback of violation of the agreement they will be able to do what they want. am i missing something? >> sir, we believe this steals a political commitment by all sides. the united states have been very firm both in the negotiations as well as publicly and explaining the deal since then, that any violation of that agreement will draw consequences. we have a wide range of consequences from complete, re- imposing some of the sanctions partially to reimposing all of them and walking away from the deal. a number of the factors in the steel are close to irreversible. if iraq us hard as it says it will in the next few weeks to disable the reactor core of the heavy water reactor : that it

would swift action will remove iran's ability to produce a weapons grade plutonium for the foreseeable future. that is a huge win for our interests and those of our friends in the region. iran decides to walk back, they will have, for for iran and unprecedented inspection regime. there will be 130-150 iaea inspectors of a full-time, 24/seven access to the nuclear facilities. we will be able to determine if they're in compliance or not. if they're not, there will be consequences. >> on that point, it seemed like to me that once senator menendez would want to do is probably the proper thing for congress to do. that is if we move reach implementation day and the sanction regimen goes away, shouldn't we have in place, before that date, what sessions

will snap back to it if in fact there is a violation? >> sir, we have in place and will have in place on implementation day and far beyond implementation day, a comprehensive network of sanctions authorities to bow through the legislation that congress has passed as well as a complex executive orders which has the ability to impose sanctions on iran swiftly should not be required. we believe that we have the tools in order to do that. >> general, can i ask a question please? the iranians are going to be sending 25000 pounds of nuclear

enrichment material to russia as part of the agreement? >> yes. >> if my math is right that's a number of times of nuclear richmond material. our research in this kitty of that material in russia will be watched after and will we have any ability to monitor to how they take care of that material? >> senator, we were very closely with russia over decades to enhance cooperatively their security and safeguard of their nuclear sites. also, many of the sites in russia are subject to ie ea safeguards in the way many other sites are. i think on this one, the impression that we get is this as i move the russians are taking very seriously, very professionally, they know how to move nuclear material. they know how to store it and counted. >> the reason i asked the question is, and and i think i'm correct here, there was a significant breach and the integrity of some of that material and russia are number of years ago which brought about the creation of non- lugar threat that took place in the old soviet union.

that had let some of that stuff get loose and not accounted for. we want to make sure we never revisit that chapter in history if they're giving that much nuclear material going in russia now. >> i cannot agree more. let me just add that the non- lugar threat that were taken immediately after the fall of the berlin wall and the dissolution of the soviet union was probably one of the most singular achievements and the u.s. national security that i have the opportunity to participate inches we we were quite concerned in those early days about security and safety at nuclear facilities and rushers, both civil and nuclear and it is because the work of senators non-, lugar, and a bunch of patriotic americans would make countless trips there working with russian counterparts that it is better than it was before. there's still work to be done. in my opinion and the opinion of the

nsa in the doe, and under the current political circumstances it has been very difficult to get the russians interested in pushing forward. we will continue to look for opportunities to do that. >> thank you very much. thank you for your service. >> thank you mr. chairman and to the witnesses. i strongly support the stealing continue to. i strongly support tough enforcement of the deal, it's very glad to join senator corrigan and others in the letter to the president following the october missile test. i'm gratified the un reported the test was so clear that it was a violation of the security council resolution. the reason among many supported the deal was the u.s. has to try diplomacy first. we started a war in 2003 over nuclear program that turned out not to exist. we need to try diplomacy first. we need to keep the military action on the table but that has strengthened legally,

strategically, in terms of coalition partners, even in terms of the intel we get if we get forward on this deal. so we keep that option on the table. we need to try diplomacy first. the good thing about trying diplomacy is that is that we are now in a hearing like this. we're keeping the focus on iranian behavior. that's where the focus should be. iranian behavior. if we walked way from the deal, the focus, the focus would have been on american negotiation tactics. why would america take a deal that the international community, that would've been the focus. now the focus is on iranian behavior, we need to focus on iranian behavior what the consequences should be. i was gratified, i think senator senator corker said that we are kind of asked acting the iaea report to be a little bit of a fudge factor. but they were very clear, iran had a nuclear program.

we are gratified with the clarity because it kept the focus on iranian behavior. i am gratified by the un panel conclusion that has been reported on in the last couple of days about the october test. clearly, this was a test and it was a test in test in violation of un security council resolution. i expect we'll have a lot of these hearings, i i hope the focus is always primarily on what is iranian behavior. that lays a predicate for all kinds of actions that need to be late globally. i do think the chairs question about what is going on in iran, we should all be humble about psychologies in any situation. i think it's fair to say that were not monolithic, a lot of what is going on in iran is a non- monolithic dispute within that political society and about broader issues of whether they want to be integrated into a global economy or want to be an outlier. when you see the way the steel

has been treated by the iranian legislator and the degree to which hardliners hate it, print to kill those involved in negotiating with it, i think you see some of the challenges that are underway there. i think what we need to do is we need to have these hearings every time there's activity. we need to keep the spotlight on, and we do need the demand of the administration, and precision and the consequences. to use the example of something that is done well by this committee, we have a pretty broad set of sanctions that we could have used in venezuela. >> ..

>> our spotlight on any violation either of this deal or any other un security council resolution is exactly what we ought to be doing, and when senator menendez asked the question, that we are thinking about doing stuff isn't a good enough answer. we arewe are a few days out from the un. there has to be consequences we don't want our actions to undermine legitimate political opposition.

i am interested in this question and i was not able to ask ambassador power this the other day. the un is now definitively concluded the panel that analyzed this, the activity in october was a violation of the un security council resolution. we have reason to believe russia and china will probably not go along with this. i hope our attitude on things like this isn't comeau well, russia and china will probably veto it so we shouldn't do anything. i hope we get our colleagues to put a resolution on the table in the light of day back to buy a clear un security council report and asked them to take action and make russia and china be an apologist for something that is clearly a violation. i hope we do that every time

and think of other steps that we can take, but let's not give up any lever at our disposal to keep the spotlight on iranian misbehavior violation of rules. with respect to the situation about the october missile firing will we have got a great report that definitively establishes this was a violation. what is the strategy about how we pursue that, and let's make russia and china use their veto power and use of publicly. walk us through the steps that you are thinking about right now. >> senator, i am proud to say that our colleague has been the leader on the security council and drawing the security council's attention to this issue and then this week when the report came back from the panel of experts. she was forthright urging

the security council to take action and calling out those who would reject sex action as being inconsistent with common objectives to keep this serious threat to international security under control. i mentioned in terms of responses we are now actively considering the appropriate consequences to that launch in october. in terms of moving forward. >> i will have to get you an answer on exactly how this will play out in new york. we have not hesitated previously task for resolutions, even when we knew that they would be vetoed if it was valuable for making a point, as you have suggested there is obviously much broader dynamics at play in the un security council, and i just can't speak for amb. power on what the next steps are.

>> can ii just say, let me tell you what i hope you will do. many people appear will feel the same. we ought to make the point every time we can. if we are sure there going to veto we should still make the peemack. when itpoint. when it comes to iranian behavior we should never say someone else is going to veto so why bother. here is another question i was confusedi was confused about. senator menendez was asking questions about the ballistic missile, the un security council resolution versus the jcp away and ballistic missile. there is an article in the guardian from the 15th of december about the experts report about the ballistic missile test by the un security council resolution. it says most sanctions will be lifted when its provisions are implemented, but the experts report noted that ballistic missile launches would be covered under the 20 july resolution

the experts in concluding that there was a firing that it was in violation of the un security council resolution are saying it is covered under the july 20 resolution. they are saying it is covered by the july 20 resolution which is embracing the jcp away. i'm going to ask that question for the record because we should all have a clear understanding of that. i hope soon you will be able to come back. >> am happy to answer. the jcp away does not address iran's ballistic missile program. un security council resolution 2231 the purpose

of which was to endorse and give the security council blessing as well as address some other elements preventing trade and otherwise support the iranian ballistic missile program. it was about jcp away and these other issues. >> thank you. >> i would say that regardless of where the un security council takes action or not which we all no they are not comeau we still have just like we have would north korea recently the ability of the administration today to implement unilateral sanctions in a surgical way as you are describing. hopefully that will happen after the un security

council does not take action. >> he has served as the ranking member of the east asia subcommittee, said he is pull double duty. thank you for your bipartisanship and leadership. wanted to ask a question. her my me what the jcp away states about the 25,000 pounds of enriched material. will there be iaea inspections anytime anywhere inspections as the word or phrase was used by the united states? >> thank you, senator. what iran is required to do is to reduce stock of enriched uranium down to 300 kif uranium that has been enriched. >> assuming they do that

25,000 pounds, will there be inspection? >> there will still be iaea inspections under the safeguard regime and the additional protocol and it ran.ran. and russia, the 25,000 pounds to verify. >> i'm happy to take that question. we are in the midst of this active period for us right now, negotiating the removal of that material. it is still in a ran. i believe it's departure is imminent. however, we are working closely with russia to make sure that that material will be removed and stored wherever it ends up. >> what is the inspection requirement? >> we are in the process of discussing that. >> we don't have a plan in place? >> we would certainly not be comfortable releasing that

amount of nuclear material anywhere without appropriate safeguards. we are pursuing -- >> can you share the planet with the committee? >> in the midst of negotiating. >> so you don't have a plana plan in place right now. >> we are negotiating the terms of how. >> yes or no? you have a plan in place once it is in russia? >> we are strongly condemned the ballistic missile launches, swiftly condemned iran for the ballistic missile launch and raise concerns about iran's ballistic missile launch. in your response you stated in response to the ballistic missile test one of the reasons we pursued this jcp away his iran has repeatedly

violated security regulations on the program and then you stated iran is going to develop the program >> you stated iran will violate the ballistic to come ballistic missile provision resolution regardless of consequences. >> well, as i mentioned earlier we had substantial sanctions in place of practically every entity involved. >> if you knew do you believe it is appropriate that they have access to billions of dollars once the implementation arrives on the sanctions are lifted freeing the economy of the sanctions that prevented those dollars? >> correcting the record, i

said that they have continued to develop. >> official record. again, the unofficial playback. iran playback. iran will develop the program regardless. >> iran has. regardless of the consequences. we are considering active measures, active consequences for this latest launch and will share those with the committee as soon as we make a decision. >> in your testimony city continue to use unilateral sanctions what unilateral authorities to impose sanctions has the united states use after the last two ballistic missile tests last two months?

>> executive order, there was another one. every iranian entity connected to the missile program has been sanctioned. we are actively considering what steps to take in response to the october 10 test. i don't understand the argument about a permissive environment.a permissive environment. the obama administration is doing the same thing the bush administration did, to respond to every violation of ballistic missile room resolutions of human rights, , terrorism, hostagetaking with the legal authorities congress is given us. hurt those taking that action. in the united nations and in other bodies, that is what

we do.do. we do it aggressively. we have been doing it for 15 years, and i have not heard an idea for doing something different that goes beyond the legal authorities we have in the diplomatic capabilities. >> perhaps one idea would be to prevent iran from receiving the billions of dollars that they were going to receive which could then go into continual ballistic missile program that will continue regardless of consequences. >> and that violation would lead to a resumption. >> again, someone used -- this permissive environment we have created which big knowledge iran will continual program we referred the violations to the committee, talked about

it unless charlie reprimanded all wagged her finger and it has done nothing to protect the american people. this committee has done an incredible job of making sure we understand the facts. we have not taken steps necessary. >> clearly identifying this is a violation of a un resolution. preventing the ballistic missile technology. >> i think the chairman.

>> isn't it correct that the un experts is just a few days old? >> correct. >> we will continue to call on the security council to address this matter and shine a spotlight on stabilizing activities and increase the cost of behavior. will you act? >> it is certainly my intent. >> it was the mandate of my bureau to push for such action. >> i think the focus that all of us as members of the foreign relations committee have on this issue is important because at a time when our country, constituents are focused on other things whether it's

isys or terrorism or refugees insist on a relentless implementation and enforcement of the jcp away and the continued and aggressive enforcement of the sanctions against other inappropriate illicit activities whether support for terrorism, human rights violation would ballistic missile program. my willingness to support was rooted in a clear eyed commitment to holding this administration in the next accountable for active enforcement of the jcp away and frankly was rooted in a deep suspicion of iran's intentions which ii think have been amply confirmed by the iaea pmd report. i do commend the administration for its active outreach and for our

recent successful high season addiction a weapon shipment from iran to support the hutu rebels. we need to continue to work together. relentlessly enforceable we got in terms of us unilateral and multilateral ability to constrain iran's actions that take that is a clear signal we have taken our eyes off the ball. so let me 1st if i could many members will call for this will for know. what is the administration's opinion on the renewal?

you have reason to consider the united states would be breaking its commitments? >> certainly as i mentioned earlier the administration thinks as a result developed an incredibly powerful toolkit that threatened our critical interest. the iran sanctions act has been an important part of that. in full force to the end of 2016. the administration look forward to working with this committee and considering as we get close to the expiration of that authority whether it makes sense to continue, but it is in place for the next year.

we have a good, solid toolkit to use in protecting our interest with iran. >> do you believe iran would argue we have violated the jcp away if we extend it? given these recent actions i think we will have more reason than ever to restrain actions. >> it is difficult for me to predict how iran would respond. i -underscore that as we exercise our sanctions authority we do so to protect our interest, not to anticipate or overcome any anticipated reactions. >> tireless work. the key piece of this, i ithis, i mentioned the interdiction on the high seas, ship loaded with weapons being is inin violation of international standard. we have to continue and increase our interdiction of weapons flows and capital flows. tell me something about the administration's plan.

>> of course interdiction's can refer both to critical technology from nuclear ballistic missile programs and can also refer to the transfer of conventional arms. interdiction depends crucially upon intelligence. it depends also upon building a framework of confidence with partners in the region, and i think that we have successfully developed such a partnership with key countries in the region that i would be not only willing but down white proud of the closed session to tell you some of the successes that we have had working with friends in the region. it has been a business for over 20 years to make the

program more expensive, less successful command we have done that. >> thank you. having been briefed about a number of successful interdictions, my concern is that other colleagues in the general public are not as aware of it. what a sheriff conducts a successful drug most you put all the drugs and guns and money out on a table for the rest of the community interested, recognize there are costs and consequences and we need to be doing some of that at a bigger and more visible way. given what i understand and be the actions by china and russia and blocking the un security council from condemning the ballistic missile test them are you concerned that we do not have reliable partners in the snapback of sanctions.

>> senator, we worked very hard throughout the negotiation and make sure there would be absolutely no stricture on the ability to impose to fully use the sanctions tools at the disposal to respond to the iranian violations of un security council resolutions, challenges to our interest. in terms of broader international sanctions we also structured a process that when there is a credible report to the joint commission that administers the steel any member of the joint commission can bring such a complaint to the commission and if a limited number refer that to the security council the presumption is that the sanctions will be step back. it will be impossible for any member of the security council to veto a

recommendation to reimpose sanctions. >> i understand andi understand and i'm hopeful the mechanism will work as intended. i expect we will work on a relentless and bipartisan basis to ensure our allies understand that we intend to continue to enforce sanctions against iran's ongoing bad behavior. thank you. >> it would be helpful if something were certain can be given from the administration knewdo us relative to this extension of the iran sanction data. i think the senator is right. they will be efforts to extend. if there are things you need to share with us that would be fine. i don't think this vague response -- and i'm not

criticizing you. that is where the administration is, but, but i don't think the vagueness of the thinking is particularly helpful. the maybethere may be things you want to share that we are unaware of is present. >> senator. >> thank you. we have a tough job.a tough job. i think we are very naïve and what we're trying to do, and i look at history. a couple questions related to the reports coming out. the iaea released a report that basically says iran has lied about their pmd effort. the foreign minister of a rana ran said the islamic republic of iran has never sought nuclear weapons in clear contradiction of the iaea report as i read it, the activity prior to 2003

as late as 2009. given the missile violations that have already been asked about, violating 1929 resolution 2231 the question is about the ninety-day certification that the secretary of state has given congress, and i am going to quote in here, iran is not taking any action including covert activity that could significantly advances nuclear weapons program. i am not clear on how the secretary can make the certification they have not taken any action when just last year the defense science board concluded in the case of a ran our capabilities detect

undeclared facilities were covert operations are either inadequate or more often do not exist. the revelation that our own report in the december ie report basically said they were doing this all the way through 20092009 but there was a report the us national intelligence estimate back in 07 assess trends nuclear weapon program was halted has not restart the program. given our own intelligent community reservation to assure us both in public and in private about our ability to detect true covert

activity. >> thank you for the question. my own sense having worked in and around the intelligence community for decades is that we have good capabilities to my a lot of different tools in the toolkit that can be brought to bear, sometimes it takes time to ferret out all the details and put the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle together. but ii commend our colleagues in the intelligence community for getting to that particular point. the iaea report that came out earlier in december on possible military dimensions just how detailed it was in terms of its laying out the very nature of iran's program and following up on those issues which had not been resolved at the time.

it is very clear, very frank and very candid about what the iranians have done, what they have denied doing that we know that have done and what we know we need to pay attention to. the areas that are laid out in the pmd report weapon eyes a nuclear weapon, find their way back into the jcp away as the people who negotiated the structured agreement in such a way that we would place limits on those very things that are intelligence community and the iaea have identified as issues.

>> second question, ambassador, i would like you to address this,this, the 4th item that was in the certification is that this is the suspension of sanctions pursuant to the agreement is appropriate and proportionate to the verifiable measures but determining its illicit nuclear program. in my to read this to say that we are already certifying after the 1st 90 days that we are in support? i would like you to clarify this in terms of appropriate and proportionate suspension of sanctions. >> yes. there has been some limited sanctions relief up until now. that was negotiated as part of the joint program of action which was a mechanism by which to build some good negotiating faith to go forward in exchange for iran's cessation of certain enrichment activities and

other steps to begin to limit the nuclear program that was later codified the jcp away. the united states did agree to allow the unfreezing of the small percentage of iran's frozen assets. >> can you be more specific? can you quantify what that entails? >> it amounts to permission for iran to withdraw 700 million of its frozen assets and various institutions around the world. >> thank you again for your testimony. i appreciate your objectivity. i take issue with one comment you made earlier that the administration has done everything it can to protect us interest. i don't want to failed to fail to remember that we have for us citizens being held by this regime.

realistically where the security council veto sitting in front of us what can we expect to be the reaction of the united nations and what are we trying to get them to do specifically related to the violations of these two resolutions? >> thank you. on the 1st point i absolutely share your frustration that we can't solve every problem at once. in negotiations with the soviet union arms control we were never able to settle human rights questions of foreign intervention in the warsaw pact countries or host of other issues. yet those agreements were vital to us national security, and i think without making any kind of prediction laid the groundwork for eventual progress that was made in eastern europe and ultimately the soviet union.

i take very well the.that we should force people to be on record. to continue to support with their own expertise the un sanctions committee which we will have a bigger role in identifying and publicizing violations by iran and violations by companies and merchants outside. that kind of publicity is what we rely upon when we go make the argument to an exporting country or a transshipment company. you have got to do something to stop the shipment of technology. even if there is not a un security council resolution with the sanctions committee has done is valuable to our counter proliferation efforts. >> thank you. >> i want to thank the panel

you're workingyou're working overtime to protect the world from a nuclear armed iran. i can think of no higher calling and appreciate what you are doing. i have the privilege of introducing la resign on. we welcome you here today. as we all no jason "washington post" reporter is being held i like to use this opportunity so many of our pointed these the 500th a of detention.

as a senator who stayed with those who are willing to take a chance at a new relationship and as someone who can i makei make this humanitarian request to release jason and knees the extreme pain of his family. as i listened to everyone and it has been so interesting it is important. i here a narrative developing that is painting an administrationand administration that is permissive and one of my colleagues said naïve in terms of iran and i personally believe the facts belie this.this. i believe you do not have to scream every day and pound the table to be strong.

i know this president did not scream and pound the table or take a victory lap when he took out osama bin laden. he just did it. and so i justi just don't see the narrative that way. i respect my colleagues views on it and they back it up with a lot of passion. i just don't see it. samantha powers, and i want to ask you if you think this is off stuff. as we know from our un representative. this past october iran wants to ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear weapon, security council resolution 1929 still in force prohibits this kind of lunch. after reviewing theafter reviewing the incident the un own independent panel of experts concluded definitively that it was a

violation, instead of them effective timely response the security council dithered. we intendwe intend to keep working. she is speaking for the administration. the councilmembers to respond appropriately councilmembers can cast doubt on the violations. to say this administration is naïve then there is a letter that was sent by the president to senator cones. i will continue to be a critical element of our policy.

countering iran's support for terrorism. i ask unanimous consent that applies both these documents in the record. because we all no that we have sanctions to counter iranian support for terrorism, human rights abuses, so proliferation was the sale or transfer of weapons and they have not been changed. they still will continue. i just don't like this narrative because i think it sends a bad message to iran. i think our messages we are united on this. we are not divided. maybe we were divided on giving them a chance we are not divided on standing together to enforce those kind of sanctions.

i will move on. is there anything in this agreement that would prevent the united states from taking action if the iranians violate our agreement? >> no, absolutely nothing. >> everything is on the table. >> they are very important. in your testimony you mention the extensive coordination and cooperation between the iaea and the department of energy.energy. with regard to training how would you describe the quality and capability of iaea personnel. >> thank you for the question. the quality professionalism seriousness personnel including those who work at

the headquarters and the inspectors to be high. we support the training. in fact every single inspector takes a course on nuclear material management at los alamos national lab in new mexico. other members, other inspectors and members of the staff perceive what you might call continuing assessment education of monitoring plutonium and other aspects of the fuel cycle and other national laboratories here in the united states. we also provide at the request of the iaea a number of people to support the safeguard staff. there are about 800 people. roughly 10 percent are american citizens. many of them have come to our national lab structures across the united states. we also provide about 15, what we call costs experts

to serve on the staff. the other thing we do besides training if i might take just a little more time on this tomorrow national laboratories are developing a lot of the processes and technologies which are part of the process for them carrying out there inspections and continuous monitoring. i visited just last week and saw some of the work there doing. developing the seals, cameras, monitors that the iaea uses. they have agreed to safeguard agreements are additional protocol.

>> i think there are so critical for all of us whether we support of the agreement are not and i would urge you if you see anything that you feel is changing your view we need to know. >> this issue is one that has been felt strongly on both sides of the aisle. as i understand it a strong letter that went from a large group of democrats yesterday. the concern is that we have known of the violation. we have had multiple -- we met directly with the un security council and we know that russia and china will block. people see this breakneck thing happening where likely at the end of january all the sanctions will be relieved. yet potentially no push back >> i would like to engage in

it. i never said it was partisan. there is a disagreement, and it is not part of that. i just disagree with you. you can write a hundred letters. you can create any scenario. scenario. it is not that it hurts. they probably emboldens a people,, but i just don't agree with that and we can argue all day. >> i'm sorry, but we never got to vote. >> if i may interject, there is i think unanimous support in the united states senate for zero tolerance violations by iran.

a hundred percent support to work as hard as we can to prevent iran from becoming a nuclear weapon power. i think there is pride that the engagement of congress has given us a better opportunity to achieve those objectives. >> my concern and what tipped the balance for me is the concern that our ability or desire to stick to the

nuclear side of the agreement may prevent us and challenging or punishing iran on the nonnuclear behavior. and the ballistic weapons thing is fuzzy. only used for nuclear payroll but it is kind of a nonnuclear side. i am concerned that it seems as if we are accepting the security council is not going to act on this. what remedies do we have outside of that? you can publish and try to work with others who might be participating are supplying for helping them with this program, but what else, what other remedy do we have outside of the security council? >> this should not be taken

as any way excusing iranian violation with the missile launched was a medium-range ballistic missile. we do have a general concern about the proliferation of medium-range ballistic missiles by a number of countries in the middle east that is making the region more dangerous but our number one concern and are number one target for action is the iranian program. now, the authorities that we have comeau we have used aggressively and creatively and we will continue to do so, but they are the authorities that congress is given and that the president has established under executive order in order to designate specific iranian entities and entities outside of her on to impose a genuine economic cost upon the entity and upon the program of development of ballistic missile technology.

with the sanctions and designations test companies outside of her on it is a matter of significant commercial harm to those companies and those countries that allow countries to participate in that kind of behavior. that is what we have the authority to do and what we do very aggressively. already describe what we can do within the united nations wewe reached well beyond the united nations last friday i was in brussels with meetings with all 28 of my counterparts from the european union states where i emphasized again the necessity to stand strong on preventing the shipment of technology and ballistic missiles to iran. those are the authorities we have. i sincerely welcome ideas on how to use them more effectively.

>> iran has already said the government has stated over and over it will consider any implementation or going back to the sanctions we have in the books for any behavior of a ran in violation of the agreement. if iran were to take action outside of the nuclear agreement that we thought to be egregious enough to justify implementing sanctions in particular year yes we will. we are out of our obligation. what is your sense of our

willingness to use those levers? >> thank you. the administration has been quite clear publicly that this deal is exclusively about the nuclear question and we will not hesitate to use other authorities to address other threats to our interest outside of the nuclear deal. >> even if it is the same sanctions we impose on the nuclear side? >> yes. we have a wealth of authorities available to confront all of these threats to our interest whether it is human rights, the missile launches, iran's regional destabilization activities in support for terrorism. we have a wide variety of sanctions the target any number of aspects of iran. >> as i mentioned, i was prepared to vote against the agreement.

having said that, this is going forward. i hope it works, ii hope this committee and the congress ensure that it does work. it is important we not countenance from the beginning. if we do that it is all gone >> thank you. last spring the committee held a hearing on the new us china civil nuclear cooperation agreement. during that hearing we discussed very credible allegations about china's ability or unwillingness to enforce its commitments to permit bad actors from selling ballistic missile technology to iran, north korea, and other countries of concern. as has been discussed today

iran has conducted to ballistic missile tests in the past few weeks in violation of un security council resolution 1929. which countries do you believe are providing ballistic missile technologies to iran? >> my assessment is the same as it was the spring. the primary source for companies in china. i believe the chinese government has stepped up its efforts to enforce its own laws and un sanctions. however i cannot say that they have reached a satisfactory point of enforcement. >> again, that continues to be my very serious concern. to attach those conditions

the conditions would have imposed upon china safe guard against carly and others into iran and north korea and other countries. very close safeguard being the bullets. the missiles are the guns. and we are in the gun control discussion here today, ballistic missiles. and china is the gun manufacturer. and so from my perspective we missed a great opportunity here to condition that agreement. we should have. this whole discussion on ballistic missiles go back to -- goes back to the china agreement.

most likely source of the ballistic missile technology. we had a lot of leverage. a stork missed opportunity to draw line on nuclear proliferation issues to create the linkages so that we could have been one year, the bullet program,program, the nuclear materials program and on the gum program, the ballistic missile delivery. that was china, not iran. they will receive whatever can come through clandestinely. as long as people are able to move around china with impunity we will continue to have a serious problem. we might as well just have a hearing on that subject because that is the ballistic missile discussion not withstanding the public

support for gun-control we don't step up and user leverage many stork opportunity arrives. if anything was directly related to iran it is with china was looking for at that point to have the discussion. so going forward having lost that opportunity what else do we have is a tool to let china know how serious we are now we don't intend on countenancing a circumvention of international agreement that the entire world ostensibly says they believe is very important long-term global stability. >> i will be in beijing again next month.

i doi do not wish to have whatever i say there dismissed his finger wagging because it will be a pretty strong message. i also cannot predict and cannot forecast at this moment what additional actions we will take against chinese entities that are complicit in providing ballistic missile technology as we said earlier under active consideration for additional effective measures in response to the october 10 test. >> i appreciate that. i think it is inadequate. i don't think it will have the force behind it, rejection of our conditioning up the agreement would have, but it continues to raise the question of the nuclear 123 agreement on the very high hypocrisy coefficient that

it sends out as a message to the rest of the world. i would hope that next year we take up once again the 123 agreement of climate that we have created around the world where we are suppliers ourselves and unfortunately turn a blind eye to often to other gun suppliers who are out there who do not believe there is going to be a sufficiently well enforced international response. i don't think there is any question that he is the gun dealer, the ballistic missile dealer. the still is not sufficient. i don't think there is sufficient response from our own country. there is no point in trying

to convince people that iran is sincere if they are engaging in an ongoing clandestine ballistic missile program with supplies coming in from china. that leaves the clear impression that we are in a temporary period of abeyance before they attach the bullets to the top of these ballistic missiles which is a cynical approach which they are taking and i think that we had an opportunity. we have to focus upon this. >> thank you for your continued vigilance. >> you guys no where i am. so you know, the comments by

senator boxer are not shared equally by members of this committee. you have apologists year. i get that. this is a joke and has been for months and years. i will answer her rhetorical question. she read samantha power's letter. you think this is soft stuff? yes, i think this is soft stuff. the iranians standing up shaking her fist and saying death to america. we have prohibitions against is developing ballistic missile systems but we will continue to develop them and continue to test them and we don't care what you are doing. you're right that it does not matter. they will continue to do it. the only hope -- you know, senator cain who i have great respect for talks

about lead to spotlight the violations. they say look at us. we are violating this. we will continue to do it. the report of the un on the ballistic missile firing, we had to wait. no, we didn't. everyone in the world new when they fired those ballistic missiles that that was a violation. do. do i think this is soft stuff? tremendously so. my prayer is the 402 days ago but we inaugurated new leader that leader will convince the iranians that indeed we are going to do something about this, protect the american people and stop them from testing

ballistic missiles and doing what we all no they will continue to do. >> senator. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate you being here today. i will try to put a finer point on senator boxer's comments. i appreciate some of the name-calling. i support thei support the agreement not because i am an apologist but it is the right thing to do. there is broad agreement that we need to take definitive steps to respond and take ambassador countrymen at his word that this is not just lose talk about a consideration of options but a predicate to action and there is

agreement that that is an absolute necessity. the disagreement is over this broad labeling of the culture that may exist with respect to the actions that iran is taking. the report that was issued by the iaea describes a culture of permissiveness that allows for the ukrainians up to 2003 and in some respects after to conduct a military scale nuclear weapons research program. there was a culture of permissiveness created by a lack of international consensus that in the years after 2003 allowed for the iranians to stockpile up to 8,000 kilograms of enriched material.

in many ways this agreement ends the culture of permissiveness that is allowed for the iranians to conduct a nuclear program that was unprecedented scope. and with respect to the ballistic missiles program we are united in the idea that there should be a response, but this is not new. the iranians have been engaged in a ballistic missile program since there were with iraq. ..

goes back to the time of the i ran/iraq war in the 1980s and it proceeded an active nuclear weapons program in i ran and i think it goes back a little bit to your question mr. chairman, there are multiple reasons for iran to engage in this program, including the desired ultimately to have a nuclear weapon to put atop an icbm but also including the fact that there is a proliferation of such systems throughout the region and they have made enemies about just all out all of their neighbors so

they are building a whole bunch of them but it also includes an element of national pride as it has been in another countries and indigenously produced ballistic missile -- missile technology become something that military and politicians boast about as well as a number of other motives, so it is a long-standing program, you are absolutely correct. >> and i think the chairman's point is that our inability to act this time may have greater consequences in networking business with him and different level than we were before and i get that but having a full scope of the program as well. two specific questions on other points, i wanted to follow up on the question senator gardner asked you ambassador mull about what happens to the material that's being sent to russia and i know he wasn't satisfied with the fact that there wasn't an agreement but let me just

clarify, as a member of the iaea russia has obligations to save guard that material in the iaea has an ability i assumed to assure that they live up to those safeguards that exist separate and aside from an agreement that you may be negotiating today. and i'm happy to have you take that question. >> if i can give her brief answer for the ambassador speaks on this. the way but to safeguard system works is for existing nonnuclear weapon states. they are going to have safeguard agreement with the iaea it has to be voluntary. the case for us and the case for russia. it will depend of course at the end of the day where this material actually goes and does the ambassador said that's still a discussion is going on as to whether or not safeguards exist there bet me go back to irn

if i could. the russians have been in this business for a long time. they have to package, store, ship safeguard and account for nuclear missiles and we have collaborated work with them in terms of improving capability over the years under such things as they none that are dashed nunn with there so we are confident that this will be done in a professional manner. >> thank you general and thanks for the question. i don't want to read any concerns that this material whether it ultimately allies and russia will not be subject to safeguard so we are in the process of negotiating very closely discussing what the iaea what exactly that will look at but there are 27 nuclear storage facilities in russia that are subject to safeguards. iaea safeguards and this material will end up at the safeguard facility.

>> one quick question. we are about to pass a reform of the visa waiver program that will include in it a naming of iran such that individuals who have traveled to iran will no longer be eligible for the visa waiver program and there has been a suggestion that because there is an element of the agreement that obligates us not to take steps that would stop the economic relations between other countries and iran that we can perhaps be in jeopardy of reaching the agreement. i think there are some other things that trouble me about this visa waiver reform proposal including how it affects dual nationals but at the europeans raise concerns to you or have of others raised concerns to you about that provision should be something we should be thinking about in the wake of its pretty clear imminent passage? >> yes sir. i have heard from very senior

and secretary kerry has as well very senior officials differing european allies of ours that it could have a negative impact on a deal. >> i think it's early days but just something for the committee to consider. thank you mr. chairman create. >> if i could i think because the way the on the bus came together there were some concerns about some of those technicalities my sense is down the road they will be. ranking member gardner. >> thank you mr. chairman. appreciate that promotion. thank you senator murphy. i do think senator corker this is an issue that we are going to need to take a look at. obviously there has been a great deal of congressional interest in the visa waiver program and the refugees etc. since the terrorist attacks on the attacks on our own country and including

this and the own that this was not the right venue. we should have had an opportunity to debate this issue and look at the consequences far beyond just the immediate impact on individuals who wish to come to the united states. so i think senator murphy for raising that issue and i hope that we have an opportunity early next year as a committee to take a look at this from a point of view of the senate foreign relations and if i could say one thing i want to make sure you understand this is not of our jurisdiction. >> i know but the iran agreement oversight is in our committees and the connection that senator murphy made to that issue is very much in our committees jurisdiction. i understand the direct interest of the legislation may not be ours but it was on the floor of a separate bill our committee could have waited and we didn't have that opportunity and appreciate that. senator murphy i agree with you completely that a lot of the

activities in iran are not new and we should not expect that will change unless i said in my opening comments about the americans that are being held, that this is an area with the now we are going to have to be aggressive and i appreciate the response from the administration as they have said consistently throughout this that the iranian activities with regards to human rights violations and ballistic missiles, in regards to terrorism that our response has not been at all hampered by the iran agreement which focused on one issue and that stopping iran from becoming a nuclear weapon states so i appreciate all of those matters. so let me take my first question to deal with not a direct issue that's been talked about by members of this committee that is the iranian violations of u.n. security counsel resolution on ballistic missiles. my question is pretty specific.

yes the united states will respond and i think it is clear that we are going to respond that we have a mechanism under the iran agreement for an individual country that's it purchasing can take direct action unilaterally, that's true but you are depending upon the coalition with our european partners to have a day-to-day strict compliance with the iran agreement by iran so it seems to me this is the first test of the unity with our european partners and i just hope and i asked that question that you are trying to coordinate a response to our european partners that they also understand the importance of that coalition to successful implementation of the iran agreement. >> yes sir i completely agree. one of our strongest suits as we do have a really powerful toolbox that we can use later laterally but to the extent we

can get others in the international community to join us that substantially increases the impact and i think that's actually been one of the great success stories of the more -- american diplomacy in confronting these threats to iran over the past several decades. >> we are looking at the map of the p5+1 and actions with the compliance within the iran agreement radius we want to get international support to respond to iran but it's important that we have the numbers that will be important in enforcing the iranian agreement. >> yes and respond to your specific question about this missile launch we in fact have the support and the security council in reporting this violation of u.n. security council resolution 1929 from france united kingdom and germany who joined with us. >> we will be watching their actions to the u.n. resolution in violation because to me it's

telling whether we will have zero tolerance for the compliance with the iran agreement. yes we can take in a lateral action but a lot of it depends upon iran understanding we have the support of our coalition partners in europe. let me move on to the second issue that has me concerned and let me get your response to it. throughout the iran review of the agreement itself the estimate from all of the administration witnesses was that iran would most likely be eligible for sanction relief in the spring. that was the date given and many of the specific estimates they said they had so much to do that it would take at least until the spring. now we understand and it's likely that iran will be in compliance and entitled to sanction relief as early as january.

so i guess my point is, and obviously we want them to comply as quickly as possible, don't get me wrong but are we under estimating iran's participation in this agreement that could affect other aspects here as well and why do we misjudge so badly that date which was like before compliance? >> senator cardin i think the agreement is very clear that implementation day comes with the sanctions relief comes only when iran has completed every single step that must do in terms of reducing the capacity of its nuclear program. >> i don't mean to interrupt that i want to focus on this. based upon intelligence information and based upon technical information as to how long it would take to dismantle the centrifuges and ship the equipment etc., there was a

thought that it would be spring. now it's december, january so is it a concern or not? >> i assume during the negotiations there were assumptions that some members of art administration did speculate on how long it would take up what ultimately guides the answer to that is has iran done everything it's supposed to do and so the pacing of that is fully in iran's hands. we have men very firm and clear and delivering a message. they have to do this right. they don't have to do it quickly in fact beginning with adoption day they move very swiftly to begin dismantling their centrifuged operations so we are not there yet. we are working closely with the iaea to make sure that they have fallen site to be able to verify everything that iran has done. we will get to implementation day only when iran has completed

those steps. i don't think anyone in the united states is able to predict when that will be. the responsibility for that lies with iran is verified by the iaea. >> last question deals with the shipment of the enriched iranian iranian -- uranium to russia and perhaps kazakhstan as i understand their there are considerations of some of this material may end up in kazakhstan. my question to follow up on the question asked earlier and that is from a legal point of view will we know whether iran after the time. on restrictions of their stockpile has elapsed whether they will have the legal right to reclaim this material and have it shipped back to iran? >> according to paragraph 60 of annex i of the jcpoa iran even before the agreement ends is eligible to receive a five-kilogram increments does

that have fuel for its chevron research reactor and they can only receive those increments as the iaea verifies the preceding amount of fuel has been used. that's going to be under very tight control. after the end of the jcpoa years from now in the future there is no restriction on iran's enrichment activities beyond what they have committed to us that they will develop an enrichment program consistent with peaceful purposes whether we have this agreement are not. that's going to be a constant focus of u.s. government. >> i understand that but my question is the agreement, will we know whether the legal agreement entered into between iran and russia and perhaps iran and kazakhstan today will give them the right to reclaim this

material after the jcpoa restrictions are eliminating -- eliminated? >> the only exception for that is getting the feel increments. whether or not they will have the ability to get the stockpile that would be moved to russia back, that is not addressed in the agreement. they agreed to the agreement must keep a low 300 kilograms. >> we will will not know legally whether they have the right to reclaim. that's not something that is required to be disclosed contemporaneous with the arrangement being made with the shipment of the enriched uranium? [inaudible conversations] >> that's just not addressed within the agreement. the agreement only requires 300 kilograms. >> thank you. before turning to senator perdue

and the audience we talked earlier before he arrived relative to your efforts to secure its brother and getting back into the country. we -- would you want to address that one more time briefly before he turned to the senator? >> i can say this is a subject of great concern for the administration. secretary kerry repeatedly raises the plight of mr. resigned and the other detainees in iran whether mr. mr. kobani or syed albertini as well as asking for help and cooperation in finding out what has happened to others such as robert levinson who disappeared last seen in iran. i am not in every meeting that secretary has with his iranian counterpart that everyone in which i have been he has raised this issue in the most unambiguous terms.

you can understand how there is a broad concern about -- and i know the senator spoke to eloquently earlier that despite this massive agreement that's being put in place these issues of these for people not being addressed causes a lot of consternation in our country and there is a lack of understanding as to why that cannot be resolved much more easily than it is. >> yes sir. >> senator perdue perdue. >> thank you for the courtesy and i really appreciate your testimony today and what you are doing pretty mean that seriously. it's not the first time you guys been before this committee and may not be the last that i want to make two comments quickly and i want to applaud the ranking member and the chairman for your leadership in this committee. this committee has more nonpartisan, not bipartisan, nonpartisan. this is about global security. i used the word naïve earlier and i stick by that word but

mr. mr. secretary you mentioned you haven't heard any alternatives. we didn't talk about the third alternative. war was never talked about. he talked about this negotiation could we never talked about book about these people to the table in the first place. i noticed the sky and i know how serious the sanctions that hurt them and i think we could have doubled them and talk about that as an alternative that i want to come back to the word naïve. before you do that but they said they record straight. my colleague from california said this was not bipartisan i take issue with that. this committee unanimously passed a bill, it was an act that gave us a look at this bill. otherwise nobody would know what was in this agreement other than administration so i give you guys full credit for that. but we never got a vote on it. we couldn't even get it to the floor of the senate to have a vote on it. that's what drives my people back home. absolutely apoplectic, i'm sorry but this is wrong with this process. it's all talk.

50-42, four democrats voted to even put on the floor. the rest of them unanimously almost, 42 votes voted to not even move this bill to the floor to have a debate on it. the last thing i would say about the word naïve, i didn't use that word lightly. not just this administration, other administrations. we don't have a great record dealing with rogue nations. in 1993 another administration said just us, the steel will preclude the potential of ever having a nuclear weapon on the peninsula of korea. we know how that worked out. of course these guys are headed toward a nuclear weapon. who returned to kid? united nations have no ability in my view except to talk because the vetoes that are part of the security council situation so i just think we are faced with a false choice and i wanted to set the record straight but i do want to commend this committee for its bipartisan nonpartisan approach to this whole topic and the

leadership and what you're trying to do to make sure the implementation goes properly. >> mr. chairman senator perdue is one of the most effective members not only this committee but the united states senate and i deeply appreciate the comments he made. i just want to put on the record negotiations to place including the senator came -- senator kaine and senator corker in of the members of the committee. was i sufficiently wouldn't have an expedited process for the consideration of the iran agreement interpreted in layman's language it was ice anticipated there would be a 60 vote threshold in the united states senate so it had to be a bipartisan action considering we have divided government between congress and the white house by party. that was always envisioned in the agreement. i know there is a different interpretation among the democrats and republicans as to

whether we had a vote on substance or not. i fully understand what senator perdue was saying but i think the american people know 58 senators oppose of the agreement and 42 supported the agreement and it did not hit the 60 vote threshold that was the ground rules in which the legislation was negotiated that got the broad support for unanimous support of this committee and the support of united states senate. i just want to put that because i think there was a difference among parties as to how that was to be handled and i respect that but clearly there was an anticipation that would take 60 votes. >> at think and i'm just going to refrain from entering into the discussion regarding that and i thank you both for your comments. i want to thank you for the tremendous role you have played this year is a new member in foreign relations. i'm so glad that things worked out or we could have two senators from georgia and thank

you so much for digging into the issues the way you have. i want to just mention a couple of things. i don't -- the provision for what it's worth, if we cannot get the u.n. security council to act relative to the missile issues i don't think any of us really believe the snap back itself is real. we can call for it but the other countries have to implement it, and if they are not willing to implement, it has no effect. so i think it's u.n. security council, and i stand with senator boxer was saying, much of the discussion here is to try to shame the administration and shamed the u.n. security council into taking action action. that's what people want to see happen in