international legal instruments by facilitating a single definition that would allow us to strengthen and build consensus on this particular issue. thank you very much, president's. i think the representative of venezuela for state and add to the floor to the representative of chad. >> translator: thank you very much, president. imi termer like to thank the american presidency for having organized this special meeting of ministers of finance at the security council on bringing us together this afternoon to address the issue of the financing of terrorism and how to counter that. i would also like to thank the secretary-general of the united nations, mr. ban ki-moon, and the president of the financial action task force for their briefings. ..

>> have allowed is not just a rollout sanctions, measures such as an asset freeze, travel ban command arms embargo. it also allowed us to prevent a transfer of arms to individuals and entities

inscribed on the sanctions list. we pay tribute to the activities of the sanctions committee and would like to express our appreciation to the surveillance team for the precious and valuable assistance they provide to the aforementioned committee and monitoring the committee's resolution. the security council resolution 2253 we will strengthen the existing regime against al qaeda and take into account the new phenomenon of the terrorist strength links to the activities of isis. we therefore welcome these important steps in the fight against terrorism and the way that it targets the illicit trade in oil and oil derivatives, including the refinement of oil and related materials and the fact that it targets persons and entities who facilitate

the transition travel of foreign terrorist fighters. inclusion of individuals on the sanctions list must be governed by the process of transparency and at all times respect human rights. we would like to underscore the importance of the independence of the office of ombudsman to strengthen the capacity of the office by making available the necessary tools and resources to carry this out effectively and fully. we would point to the importance of ensuring the independence and ability to act as a monitoring team. the independence of the members of the monitoring team and the rules of transparency and confidence also needs to be upheld as well as the principle of geographical monitoring. we eagerly await in the various reports,

particularly that of the monitoring team which is to be drafted together with the executive director of counterterrorism on the follow-up to the implementation of resolutions under 2119. we're also looking forward to the secretary-general report to support member states. global assets to tackle terrorist financing entails the enactment and rollout and full implementation of the national and regional effectiveness of rollout measures. this reason we provide every effort to support actions and to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism. to do so chad has established a national agency for financial

investigation and also have enacted the appropriate 4th of april -- the provisions of the 4th of april 2003 agreement for anti- money-laundering. chad is determined to continue to strengthen its legal arsenal in order to be in a position to effectively tackle all sources of financing terrorism line with the recommendations pertaining to anti- money-laundering activities in the financing of terrorism and to the proliferation of weapons of mass distraction. these recommendations are the bedrock of a coordinated response to a threat which looms over the entire financial system and the f 80 recommendations have also harmonized efforts at the global level. efforts are currently underway to enact

legislation that would criminalize the financing of terrorism. chad has been a key and active participant in the workshops and efforts to put together a set of regional tackling of terrorism and illicit trafficking in arms at the central african regionscentral african regions and never ratified the 19 instruments related to these two issues of financing terrorism. the inclusion of isis on the team and the change of the framework to the sanctions regime is testament to the international community's willingness and determination to provide an appropriate level of response to the magnitude of the threat posed by terrorism. we would nonetheless like to recall that deliberately provocative used by terrorist organizations cannot be used to undermine

any nationality, religion, or ethnicity. terrorism speaks to sow fear and a hide behind the guise of religion, but we cannot fall into that trap. terrorism is an international scourge. it is not the responsibility of the child of any particular religion or ethnicity. to conclude, president comeau we must take effective measures to counter financing terrorism and make sure that the security resolutions are followed up on, including resolution 2253. we have the resolutions, but there is effective implementation has thus far been somewhat lacking. all states are called to do more. thank you. >> i thank the representative of chad for

his statement and note the people of chad have suffered terrible violence. as we look around the table there are too many reminders of how important this were truly is. i now give the floor to the representative of china. [speaking in native tongue] >> translator: thank you, mr. president. china welcomes and thanks the secretary-general and president of fatf weather briefings. at present international terrorist activities are rampant. you are experiencing a severe resurgence of terrorism, which has become the most severe and urgent security challenge. international terrorist forces argue to raise funds for terrorist activities. that has endangered the stability of global financial systems.

in order to combat financing for terrorism international community has been working hard. there are still many challenges. the sources of terrorist funds are many. in addition to such traditional methods as taking to and using new channels such as illegal exportation. second, financing for terrorism is becoming more and more discreet due to the increase in methods, and particular the rapid growth of the electronic payment platforms laid out. third, international corporation needs to be strengthened. at present the coordination is inadequate.

double standard still exist. some countries are so faced with real difficulties. the efficiency to combat financing for terrorism is to be further improved. the current list of terrorists lacks the key information for identifying them, thus hampering the effective monitoring. mr. president, in order to combat financing for terrorism china wishes to emphasize the following five points. adhere to the fundamental principles and counterterrorism. whenever and wherever conducted by whoever for whatever motivation constitute serious crimes. they should be no double standard. the international counterterrorism actions must follow the purposes and principles of the un charter

and other recognized fundamental laws of international relation and bring into full play the leading role of the un. this is the ultimate principle in our efforts to combat financing for terrorism. second, to effectively implement the recommendations and relevant rules. china welcomes just adopted resolution. also follow the requirement to further improve domestic legislation, establish mechanisms and ensure the effectiveness of their measures. they should also follow fatf rules to strengthen cooperation and financial monitoring and a crackdown such illegal activities as underground tanks so as to cut terrorist funding channels. to further enhance international cooperation to combat financing for terrorism. in light of the new trends and changes in terrorist financing international community should take

targeted measures and approaches. at the international level is important to bring in the full play the advantages including the establishment of data based on information exchange platforms. it is imperative to have entered apartment coordination and information analysis at the industrial level, internet companies network carriers should exercise self-discipline and consider the adoption of a global industrywide code of conduct. fourth, to increase the efficiency of our efforts to combat financing for terrorism. china hopes the relevant countries will provide detailed information and some living requests for individuals and entities. the ombudsman and monitoring team should assist where the sanctions committee can further improve the current

list. to enhance the building when confronting terrorist threats thatmeans and resources that for the international community should pay attention to the difficulties faced by the developing countries in combating financing for terrorism and provide them with effective assistance such as financial resources and personnel training. china is firmly of opposed all forms of terrorism. we will strengthen our counterterrorism cooperation with the international community including combating financing for terrorism in a joint effort. thank you. >> thank you, representative for your remarks. i now give before the representative of the russian federation. [speaking in native tongue] >> translator: yes, president, thank you so much.

we welcome the convening of this meeting. we consider it to be timely and important. the consequences of the outbreak of terrorism are spreading far beyond the region. recent terrorist attacks have demonstrated that the world is facing a threat of global nature. at the same time, it is quite clear they are concentrated in iraq and syrian territory. there is a need to decisively and in a coordinated way and for this to elaborate a clear mechanism for the international committee to action. eradicating this kind of evil can only be achieved by acting together with a double standard and by completely suppressing the channels used to finance terrorism. the security council reaffirmed existing and created new commitments and

preventing the financing of terrorism through the illicit trafficking of oil, other natural resources, antiquities, and other sources. the obligations are not being implemented by all and everywhere. the special responsibility unavoidably rests with the states neighboring on iraq and syria. the sale of fossil fuel from isil controlled ^-caret 25 territory continues. oil is acquired by smugglers for cash in areas where it is extracted and refined. it is estimated that exports of fuel is reaching $1 million a day.

the majority of cases, the shipment of oil is an oil tankers through the copper mesh and for the crossing point. the numbers are in the thousands. shipments are carried out by a number of turkish companies including. [inaudible] transported to refinery owned in the main flow going through ports located on the mediterranean sea. as a result of the russian federation a substantial reduction in volumes was achieved. on the other hand this increases alternative forms of financing through other natural resources like the

cultural and industrial production. the total value already equals close to $700 million in year. the sale of phosphates is close to $50 million from the sale of barley and rye 200 million, cement a hundred million. now, there is also trafficking in hostages and cultural artifacts and donations are continuing. the proceeds are used for the purchase of weapons and ammunition. the supreme military council monthly allocates over $30 million. they take place through shell companies. just from september this year through to today from there under the pretext of syrian opposition multiple rocket launch systems grant

and handheld portable antitank rpg's, sow's international control syrian territory. most of the confinement of weapons are of soviet design manufactured in eastern europe. measures undertaken by states and the community as a whole. upon rushes in the united states initiative combating isil and other terrorist organizations. now the un monitoring and

sanction mechanisms can clearly be focused on eradicating any manifestation. what will not be limited to the united nations alone. the potential to elaborate counter financing and money laundering measures will be utilized in 45 days following the adoption of the resolution. we await concrete and honest assessments. it is important the resolution pinpoints isil in the most dangerous independent terrorist threat. for this reason the sanctions list and special committee were both renamed. the listening criteria was made clear, which allows for natural or legal persons to abstain themselves. the resolution calls for full coordination between states to investigate crimes related to the financing of isil and al qaeda.

including the extradition of prosecution of those guilty of such actions. now focus here. in the russian federation we are consistently and systematically carrying out work at national levels to counter and suppress the financing of terrorism. on november 18 bipartisan -- presidential decree and interagency community to suppress the financing of terrorism was created. and interagency plan within his framework a financial intelligence and law enforcement agencies have conducted close to 5,000 investigations into hundred 70 criminal cases of been initiated. over 1600 national persons

are suspected of having provided materials with the support of the legislative branch. there is continued work to improve legislation. our country will continue to take decisive measures to counter isil. the presence of the russian federation has repeatedly said, combating the threat of terrorism will require the consolidation with respect to those of international law and with a central role to be played by the united nations security council. >> i think the representative of the russian federation for his statement and offer condolences for the lives lost in the terrorist attack on a civilian life carrying so many holiday travelers. there are no more names on the list of speakers. before and during the meeting, i would like to make a few closing remarks.

this has been an unprecedented session. but it has also been a constructive and productive one. we have adopted resolutions that will help us protect the international financial system from abuse and exportation by terrorists and we have reviewed our work to counter isil financing. and we have reaffirmed commitment to use the measures in today's resolution and to use the tools we have found over the past 14 years to make the world safer from isil and other deadly terrorist groups. we must remain united as we move forward to execute with the same determination that we have spoken today in the adoption of this resolution. and that is the only way we will be effective in combating this threat of terrorism. i think the secretary-general and the master for organizing the session and with that, this session will be adjourned. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> this holiday today artist and columnist molly crabapple talks about her drawings of the israeli-palestinian conflict and of the guantánamo bay detention center, as well as videos she has made on immigration detention centers at 7:00 p.m. eastern today here on c-span2. and join us tonight for book tv in prime time, our focus supreme court. we will start at 8:00 o'clock eastern.

>> tonight on c-span2 the charleston, south carolina church that was the site of a mass shooting in june host a conference on gun violence. there was a recent gathering a recent gathering to discuss the problem and possible resolutions. here is a preview. [inaudible conversations] >> to start off the leap with ame put a framework for the question. we no gun injury and death in the united states is far higher than anywhere else in the developing world by far. over 30,000 gun deaths each year, over 60,000 injuries.

think about that. some of those debilitating, horrible injuries. 30,000 plus 60,000. that is about 90 a day. ninety every day. we think of some mass shootings. we don't think about the 90 a day deaths from guns in the united states. more people have died, the number of american soldiers that died in korea, vietnam, afghanistan, iraq combined. think about that. korea, vietnam, afghanistan, iraq combined. that stunning. questions, why does this happen? does it have to happen?

why do the murders occur in this church almost six months ago? >> a short preview of tonight's charleston conference on gun violence. you can see it in its entirety starting at 8:00 o'clock eastern our companion network c-span. next, officials from the state and energy departments testify about the nuclear deal with iran. senate foreign relations committee members focus inquiries on iran's testing up to ballistic missiles in october and the ability of the us to enforce key provisions of the agreement. this runs two and a half hours. [inaudible conversations]

>> i want to thank our witnesses for being here. senators here at the moment. i know others will be joining. this hearing is the 1st public meeting the committee has held since we began to oversee implementation of the iran deal.deal. i would like to underscore the importance of the oversight. the strongest element of the year-end review act. we intend all another hearing in january after the administration submits the 180 day report. and one 3rd if implementation day occurs. i'm sure there will be more after that and we will work to make sure that those are scheduled in a timely fashion. as we begin this process, it is worth noting whether or

not any less support or oppose the agreement, the deal is being implemented at present. the matter what anyone's view on the agreement is or was will support the goal of preventing iran from getting a nuclear weapon. one area we agree on is the need to be tough with the stabilizing are illegal action by iran. we have talked about the something classified settings. since the agreement was signed iran has convicted an american "washington post" reporter, launch cyber attacks against the state department not defy the un travel been and exported weapons to syria and yemen and violated the un ballistic missile test been twice and lied to the iaea in the pmd investigation. i realize not all of those

issues are covered by the iran agreement, but they all relate to our relationship with iran and its evident they are taking a different tack than the officials that will be the case after the agreement was agreed to. can anyone.to any substantive consequences that iran has faced that will be a constant thing because we see no evidence of them paying a price for any of these actions. instead of consequences, iran got what they wanted in the administration support a resolution closing the investigation which i think all of us believe without they would maybe get a d- in their actions. most of these actions fall outside of their jurisdiction.

but i don't think we can take a narrow view of this oversight. failure to impose any consequences for violations of un security council resolutions and other destabilizing actions sets a dangerous precedent. before implementation of the nuclear agreement comeau one sanctions are lifted and the leverage shifts to iran. we hope you will talk today about how you plan to enforce the agreement when it appears we're paralyzed the present tack for fear of year-end backing away from the agreement. most of us have talked about the leverage shifts that will take place and feel like it will be more difficult for it to be -- for them to be pushed back again. ..

a. >> i think this committee had set an all time record on the number of hearings and briefings which i think was because of the issues. we started, senator menendez leadership on the iran review agreement with your leadership, senator kaine's leadership and others. and took on a very important responsibility of trying to do with iran's nuclear ambitions.

but we also to do with russia's activities that were not helpful in ukraine to syria. we'll do with the state department authorization bill. we dealt with individual bills and resolutions in a way that if it wasn't the best tradition of the united states senate and this committee. i applaud you. i also want to point out as i said many times, your timely considerations of nominations that we've had so many and actions in this committee was again, not the best tradition of the senate and nonpartisan marty ever thank you for that. i can tell the members of this committee and senator menendez will agree the working relationship among our staffs, majority and minority, couldn't be better. i just want you to know that. this is fortunately our last hearing i hope. >> i do too, actually.

>> on to today's hearing. our responsibility on oversight the iran agreement that it goes well beyond the actions we took in regards to go after the agreement was agreed to. we haven't oversight function, at today's hearing is the first on oversight functions of the senate foreign relations committee. and as you indicate we will be having a series of opportunities during the course of next year as relates to this agreement. we all, all share the common objective to prevent iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state get together, we want to work to make sure that iran does not attain nuclear weapons capacity. so we want to see how we can work in that regard. for possible military dimensions, it was thoroughly disappointed but i don't think anybody here wasn't surprised.

what did point out is that iran sheets and that they want to develop a nuclear weapon. that's not a surprise. but i think it verifies the point that as we go forward we need to make sure there is zero tolerance from any deviation iran's obligations under the jcpoa. so i think that's the lesson that is learned. i also want to point out that we have to be able, the review act points to this, consider the other activities that iran will participate in outside the four quarters of the jcpoa. are support for terrorism, there human rights violations, there ballistic missile ambitions and tests. let me first mention, jason and his unlawful detention. over 500 days he's been held in

captivity. we need to make sure we don't lose sight of that gross violation of individual rights and iran's other activities that violate the human rights title of its citizens but citizens of other countries. yesterday in helsinki commission we held a hearing in regards to -- point out the incarceration of journalists is the way that you try to that, prevent the country from to do with rights of citizens. i think this is a particular case that hope you always keep in mind that this person is unlawfully detained, he's an american citizen elliot use every tool available to bring him home safely. a ballistic missile test that the chairman referred to, not one but two now confirmed on october 10 at on november 21, include violation of united nations city resolution 1929. do we expect the security council to take action?

they should but we understand russia. we understand china. we understand their politics but we also know about u.s. leadership and what the united states must do. for zero tolerance of violations. it's not only i hope u.s. actions but we have a coalition of the willing we hope with europe. and they will be watching very closely what the united states does in response to these violations as well as our impulse honor european allies to make it clear to iran that we will not tolerate any violation of their international obligations. i look forward to this hearing and i look forward to working with you and all the members of this committee in a comment objected to prevent iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state. >> thank you. in that regard, just like of which is that earlier i want to thank you and your staff for the way that you have made sure that

we had totally bipartisan efforts throughout the year award to thank senator menendez for the town that he sat before that -- that tone that he said before the end for our foreign policy first. and causing the other issues of this agreement to really know by the wayside. so this has been outstanding do. i do want to apologize to the prm's. we were talking about this month in office, both of us have staffs to cover a wide range of issues. you cover all the issues and i do think we have about hit the wall this year as far as the kind of things that people have come to demand people have to want to thank everybody. we didn't numbers the issues they need to be addressed i think the committee together has addressed those in a good way, but thank you. i do hope we'll get additional nominees confirmed before the end of this week somehow. with that, our first witness is

the honorable stephen the mall, the second with his today is the honorable thomas countryman assistance secretary of state for the beer of international security, nonproliferation and finally the third witness will be lieutenant general frank klotz, retired u.s. air force and current undersecretary for nuclear security at the in an essay, administrative and that the is department of energy. we want to thank you all for being here. i think u.s.a. would like for you to summarize if you would in about five minutes. without objection your written testimony will be entered into the record. and with that if you just go in order in the order that i just entered issue i would appreciate. again we welcome you, we thank you for changing travel plans to be with us today. thank you. >> thank you very much, chairman corker and ranking member cardin, and all the members of this committee. i really appreciate the opportunity to provide an update

on how we are doing on the implementation of the joint comprehensive plan of action, or the jcpoa. my name is ambassador stephen mull. i served in the foreign service for almost 30 just. certainly after the jcpoa was concluded in july secretary kerry asked me to return to washington for my last post as ambassador to poland to serve as the lead coordinator. in this job leading a terrific team of colleagues in the state department as well as the department of energy, treasury, commerce and other parts of our government to make sure that the jcpoa is fully implemented to enhance not only the security of our country but also of our friends and allies around the world. i am pleased to of my colleagues, department of energy administrator of the national nuclear security, frank klotz, and thomas countryman assistance sector of bureau of international security and nonproliferation with me today. i'm honored to meet with this

committee which has been such a valuable partner in shaping our iran policy over many decades with bipartisan support for our common strategic objective as you mentioned of preventing a nuclear-armed iran. as you mentioned our government has numerous and serious concerns about iran's policy in the region which are unrelated to the nuclear deal. we continue to raise concerns about the issues you mention, iran supported terrorism to its hostility to israel or its human rights abuses which are rampant. my job is fully focus on the critical task of making sure that jcpoa achieves its one crucial objective, preventing iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability. when fully open the jcpoa we'll dramatically scale back iran's nuclear program and provide unprecedented monitoring, verification tools to ensure that it is exclusively peaceful as it moves forward. we are making steady progress

towards this objective. october 18 our adoption day under the jcpoa when the deal formally came into effect. on tuesday offer participants begin making the necessary arrangements for the implementation of their jcpoa commitments. that include iran's for me the international atomic energy agency the iaea that it would provisionally applied additional protocol and fully implement modified code 3.1 which provides early declaration of nuclear facilities and granted unprecedented access to iran's entire nuclear program from cradle to grave. these are two important mechanism which will ensure the international community has much greater insight into iran's nuclear program that it has ever had before. the p5+1 and iran has also issued an official document outlining the plan to redesign the iraq -- arak heavy water research reactor that will no longer be able to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

the united states, european union have taken actions to lift nuclear related sanctions upon reaching and only upon reaching implementation day when all these commitments will be met. implementation date is the next major milestone in the jcpoa and it will occur only after the iaea verifies that iran has completed all of the nuclear steps that were specified in the agreement. these are the technical steps that will quadruple iran's breakout time to least a year from the current estimate of less than 90 days. at the time iran will receive relief from the u.s. and the eu and u.n. nuclear related sanctions. the time for reaching implementation date is primarily within iran's control. however, i reiterate that iran will receive no sanctions relief under the jcpoa until it has verifiably met all of its nuclear commitments. since adoption day iran has been making tangible progress to reach those commitments. for example, iran has begun

dismantling its uranium enrichment infrastructure by removing so far more than 5000 centrifuges and transferring them for storage under continuous iaea surveillance. it has begun to move quickly now to remove the remaining 8000 in the coming days. iran is also reducing its stockpile of affairs forms of enriched uranium to know more than 300 kilograms of up to 3.67% enriched material. it will accomplish this primarily by shipping a significant amount of such material outside of iran while diluting the remaining access to the level of natural uranium, or below. commercial contracts are in place for iran to ship its enriched uranium stockpiles russia. we expect this material, about 25,000 pounds of enriched, up to 20% low-enriched uranium, will the iran in the coming weeks. this step alone will significantly lincoln iran's breakout time.

as i briefed the committee before, iran must also remove and render it inoperable the existing calandra or court of the content reactor by filling it with concrete before a limitation they can occur. these actions will effectively cut off iran's ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium. iran and the p5+1 are also continuing work to advance the redesign and reconstruction of the reactor so that it can no longer produce that weapons-grade plutonium. the p5+1 have set up a working group to facilitate this project which will begin to be soon after the new year. regarding the possible military dimension of iran's past builder program, an issue which all of us have been very focused, on october 15 the iaea announced iran had fulfilled its commitment under the so-called roadmap for clarification of past and present outstanding issues, as if we do with iaea. subtly on december 2, the iaea

director-general released the final assessment on past and present outstanding issues regarding iran's nuclear program. the report confirmed and corroborated what we in the initial committee have long known, that iran had a structure nuclear weapons program up until 2003 but there are no indications that the program is continuing today. this candid assessment gives us further confidence that the iaea will perform its duties related to the jcpoa vigorously and honestly. just this week on december 15 the iaea board of governors in special session adopted a consensus resolution addressing that reported this resolution submitted by the p5+1 turned support focus from comfortable we already knew about iran's past activity towards fully implementing the jcpoa. this resolution gives the iaea much better tools for deterring and detecting weapons related activities going into the future. we continue to work close with

the iaea as a makes preparations to government that jcpoa is monitoring and verification provisions of iran's entire nuclear program. the iaea will continue as monitor of all of iran's key declared nuclear facilities, includes uranium mills, as well as centrifuge production facilities, a first for the iaea. these measures specific to the jcpoa will give us increase confidence iran is not diverting but who to a covert program to we've always said this deal isn't based on trust but rather on intense verification of iran's program. that's why we are working so close with the iaea to make sure it has everything it needs to do this crucial job. meanwhile, we continue to engage with our international partners on other matters pertaining to the limitation of the jcpoa. u.s. experts continue to meet with our p5+1 partners and others including the eu and iran in setting up a procurement channel. that's the mechanism by which we will put together with the u.n. security council review and

approve or disapprove transfers of nuclear suppliers group until items and technology to iran's nuclear and nonnuclear cement industry as well as other items that we think are inconsistent with the program. on sanctions we continue to work within the u.s. government as well as with the eu and others to make the necessary arrangements to lift the nuclear related sanctions once the iaea confronts iran has completed its implementation default implementation is in our interest, in a partisan interest as well. it will place iran's nuclear program under unprecedented verification and monitoring regime and when fully implement it will give us an international committee the tools message which would iran's nuclear program is exclusively peaceful and make us, israel, articles borders and the whole world safer. i am after disposal 24/7 as we go forward in this deal. senators, look for this being the first of may and gauges with

you. we really value to partnership and guidance as we go forward towards our common objective. look forward to taking your questions. >> thank you for that fool some -- fulsome testimony. if they could, unless fulsome for the remaining witnesses. that would be great, but thank you so much for that. mr. countryman. >> thank you, mr. chairman and senator cardin and other members for this opportunity. you have my written statement so i will be less fulsome. for decades, my bureau, isbn and its predecessors have had as a central assignment taking every opportunity to analyze impede and frustrate the development by a rent of technology related to nuclear energy and to ballistic missiles and other technologies. we did that job before the any negotiations with iran on its nuclear program. we did it throughout the negotiations, and we do today

with the same tenacity and creativity and partnership with dozens of dedicated agencies across the federal government. we'll keep doing it. since the negotiation of the jcpoa, we have devoted our key resources in support of ambassador nation to achieve full implication of that jcpoa. and in particular we work hard on support and cooperation with the international atomic energy agency, as well as in creation of a procurement channel that can make a limited, legitimate nuclear needs that iran may have under the jcpoa. it in no way diminishes, as i said, the task of counter proliferation, of interdiction, of preventing acquisition of technology. i look forward to addressing any

concerns or questions you have about these two central roles of my bureau or on any of the public. thank you again for this opportunity. >> thank you very much. >> thank you, chairman corker, ranking member cardin, and members of the committee. it's a great honor to they can testify before this committee. and have the opportunity to discuss the role of the department of energy and national security administration played and continue to plague in support of these governments actions to implement the jcpoa. as my colleagues in the state department, ambassador mull and assistant secretary countryman have already stated, the jcpoa ensures that iran's nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. and provides unprecedented verification measures, constraints iran's nuclear program in a manner that gives us ample time to respond if iran chooses to violate its terms and it takes none of our options off the table.

as we move toward ending the on implementation day, the scientific, engineering and technical expertise within the department of energy, including our national laboratories, will be called upon to help ensure that iran complies with all of the nuclear related measures of the jcpoa. the department of state is leading the administration's efforts to oversee implementation of the jcpoa. dod place at the system will continue to play an indispensable role in this process by providing scientific engineering and technical support -- d.o.e. -- and analysis to inform policymakers in making sound decisions and judgments. allow me to provide a couple brief examples of the kinds of unique expertise and skills the department of energy brings to the table. as secretary of energy mondays has testified, the jcpoa blocks all of iran's pathways to build building a nuclear weapon including the production of weapons grade plutonium.

to this end as ambassador mole has pointed out, requires iran to redesign and rebuild the iraq -- arak reactor. that jcpoa further requires in the final redesign of the reactor be approved by the joint commission. for the united states, the expertise for assessing the technical aspects of the redesign including fuel and safety standards, and ensuring it complies with the nonproliferation provisions of the jcpoa resides within the department of energy independent national laboratories. another example, the jcpoa establishes a process review and approval of procurement by iraq of specified nuclear related items. this process will be conducted as ambassador mull said through a working group of the joint commission. the and s. phase office of nonproliferation and arms control has a unique expertise

and a long history inward with domestic agencies and with international organizations such as the nuclear suppliers group on matters went to the export of nuclear related and dual use to talk to them at 230 will play an important role in advising the department of state which recorded the u.s. government efforts. finally, the international atomic energy agency, the iaea, will play a major will and monitoring and verifying the nuclear related measures of the jcpoa. the department of energy and the nsa work very, very close with the iaea in support its nuclear safeguards mission. including providing training, developing, technology and provide experts to the opposition. we have just published this brochure which lays out our support of that. and if the committee likes to be happy to submit for the record it is also available on our website. in conclusion, the jcpoa is not built on trust. it is built on hardnose requirements that will limit

iran's activities and ensure access, transparency and verification. the department of energy takes souza is participation in efforts to include the jcpoa and help ensure that iran carries out its commitments under the deal, including participate in the administration's implementation efforts and supporting the iaea. again, thank you, chairman, for the opportunity to be here and i look forward to field any question to me have. >> thank you for your testimony. without objection we will enter into the record the document you just referred to. ambassador mull, we first of all, you've got a winning personality and we all like you, you know, you've been very energetic in your meetings with us. at the same time we have not verified, the u.s. government has not verified the second missile launch to my knowledge, is that correct? >> we are unaware of the report of that launch. we are analyzing those reports.

>> so we haven't formally stated that it occurred speak with the u.s. government has not. >> you came before us and want to make sure as we go forward we are all really clear with each other. you can door committee on december 2, the launch took place on the 21st. no mention was made of that in this classified briefing. i'm just curious as to why that did not occur speak with senator, i had not seen any of those reports at our last meeting on december 2. so i was not in a position -- >> you are unaware of it happening? >> december 2 i got seen any reports. >> did you have -- did you know something had occurred speak with had i -- >> you had no knowledge of that whatsoever of? >> i had heard that someone said that there might have been a launch. it was an unconfirmed source. i had not seen in reports are that they'll if you would though, again so we can maintain

an appropriate relationship, even things like that would be useful, special and the kind of setting we had which was very casual. we would like to know those kinds of things in real-time. >> okay. >> iran is obviously conducting work on long range ballistic missiles. i know this is a can a little bit outside of the purview. the only use for those in history up until this point in time is to put a nuclear tipped on those, is that correct? i think general klotz would agree that antiballistic, intercontinental ballistic missiles, i've been told up until this point in time to fully been used to deliver nuclear weapons, is that correct? >> long range, trying to -- >> and i mean long range spent on the drawing on my experience

as an air force missile officer. long range icbm to my knowledge only been used for delivering nuclear or being capable of delivering nuclear weapons. short-range systems have been used by right of countries to use conventional munitions. >> ambassador mull, as we understand that this is the case, that that's the only purpose, we know that they are doing that now. is there anything, what is the administration drawn from that activity? >> i think the administration as ambassador powered mentioned passionate about her power mentioned meeting last week a the united states a strong and in violation of u.n. security council resolution which legally forbids that missile program from going forward. in fact, the united states was the leader in mobilizing and security council resolution -- >> but only talking about the intent. what do you mean sense, history has said we are pretty sophisticated country ourselves,

the only developers for the delivery of nuclear weapons. they are continuing to do that now in violation of u.n. security council resolutions. we've taken no action. that is a side issue that the favorite aboard and i'm sure committee members will focus on that. what does the administration drawn from the fact that they are testing missiles that throughout history only been used to deliver nuclear weapons while quote dismantling the intake centrifuges that they are dismantling a? >> senator, one of the reasons that we pursued the jcpoa is that iran has, in fact, as you mentioned repeatedly violated secure because resolutions on that missile program. so iran is going to develop the program regardless of the consequences it is paid for the. and important part to reduce the threat if iran's going to continue to develop the program let's make sure it doesn't have the capability to put a nuclear

payload in such missiles. and by reducing the amount of enriched nuclear material available to iran's nuclear program by 98%, iran now has today within 90 days, they could amass enough material to produce a nuclear weapon. following implementation of the student will take as more than a year. so the missiles may continue to fly but we have made it a lot harder to put a nuclear payload on those. >> i understand all that. and you share with me why anybody the administration has over this 180-degree inconsistency where they are continually to develop the ability to deliver a nuclear weapon, that's the only purpose in history that these long range listed missiles have been used. what is the thinking inside iran from your perspective? >> first of all the missile launch of it took place mostly so a medium-range. it's not an icbm. the thinking that we apply to

this is that we need to make it as hard as possible speed is on asking about your thinking. please don't read those paragraphs anymore. i'm asking you what the administration thinks iran is doing when this is totally inconsistent with rational thinking. >> well, i'm not in a position to address what iran or the iranian government is thinking or we are focused on making sure they can't develop a nuclear weapons capability. >> let me ask another question. senator menendez really pressed secretary when he was here. many of us since that time. relative to whether -- secretary kerry when he was here. relative to whether the launch of these ballistic missiles as defined will be in violation of the new agreement investing in limited now. it was in violation of a 1929. we have done nothing about that, which is unfortunate. but there's some really cute

line which was utilized that we discussed what we're trying to understand what the agreement really said. secretary kerry was adamant that they could not continue to test missiles even after this agreement was put in place. there's some weird language that this refers to process that are called upon to out of curiosity after the implementation, if they launch these types of missiles, visit or is it not in violation of the agreement because it is not in violation of the jcpoa. it is a violation of security council resolutions. >> so the called upon language from our perspective makes it clear that going for it will continue to be a violation? >> it would violate that part of the u.n. security council resolution but that resolution contains legal prohibitions on any international support for iran's nuclear weapons program. any exception to provide

materials or other resources to iranian's missile program is forbidden by u.n. security council resolution 2231 come exceptions can be sought. united states will veto any such exceptions that are requested. >> i'm going to reserve the remainder of my time for interjections. senator menendez. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you all for your testimony. i'd like to follow up a bit on what the chairman i think the question was from what i can say. but before i do so i want to echo senator cardin's comments about the chairman's process of leading the committee. i do appreciate publicly the most bipartisan committee in the united states senate your speaks incredibly important to what u.s. foreign policy needs to become which it needs to be as bipartisan as again so i appreciate -- >> if i could, i was ranking when you were chair, and you

have no idea how much i appreciate the way that you dealt with me and your staff, the respect. and just know that when someone like you is the chair, such that kind of example, it really causes those who come behind you to want to do the same, so that you. >> i hope to do so again. spent i hope not but we will see. >> there have to be a point of convergence but in any event, i have a very clear sense, and i hope i'm wrong, that what we have here is a permissive environment. we have a set of circumstances where, regardless of what you saw of the pmd issue, we for the longest period of time pushed to get a real sense of what was the breadth and scope as to how far

iran got in development of its efforts for a nuclear weapon. and for the longest period of time the government of the united states said that we needed to know that. .. and what we have since is not

one but two my sill >> we have seen an introduction of arm shipments off of oman and i don't think we can expect the security council to do anything about it because of russia and china. so the question is, is the administration ready to act and find its own set of actions so that iran understands the consequences for violating the international order and setting the tone so that when the full implementation of the jcpo8 takes place, that we will have a very clear understanding by then that failure to comply fully will have consequences? >> senator, i would stress that

we fully concur with you and the rest of this committee that iran has violated these security council resolutions of the missile program and other things that are hostile -- >> so what are we going to do about it, if that's the problem? >> they are the most sanctioned country on earth thanks to putting together a patch work of sanction regime that has exacted serious cause to the iranian economy. we believe going forward as these -- as we confirm the missile launches we have been swift as condemning them in the security councils and measure that is we will take in response to those confirmed missile launches we are considering additional measures at this moment. >> well, if you say to me,

embassador, that they are the most sanctioned, you imply that there's nothing else we can do. if that's the case, we are in deep trouble. those sanctions are going to be coming off assuming implementation. as far as i understand, those sanctions are going to be coming off upon implementation. >> sir, those nuclear-related sanctions. >> that's what i'm talking about. they are going to be off. >> will come off when iran has gotten rid of 90% of uranium. >> if you're saying they are the most sanctioned country in the world, i'm assuming that they are nonnuclear sanction, so what is left to do? basically let iran violate without consequence? >> i would underscore a very important part with the agreement of the iranian was the

snapback provision that allows the reimposition of sanctions for any violation of the agreement and the united states is not bound by any -- >> embassador, these are nonnuclear actions. let's put the nuclear portfolio aside. if iran continues to violate nonnuclear actions that are in violation of u.n. security national resolutions and in violation what secretary kerry before the committee, we will a-- aggressively pursue iran.

specifically with regard to ballistic missile technology we rely on two related concepts, one is sanctions and one is strategic trade controls. it is correct that we sanctioned virtually every iranian entity with the missile program so that they cannot do commerce with the u.s. or acquire u.s. technology legally or u.s. financial system. we've always used such sanctions and designations against commercial entities in other countries that have traded with the iranian ballistic missile program. those sanctions remain in effect. we retain the authority to impose those sanctions even after the nuclear-related sanctions are lifted. and we retain as the previous administration and i think the next administration the determination to do so. strategic trade controls are different, we -- they allow us through the missile technology

control regime through the proliferation security initiative in support of the u.n. security council resolutions to partner with nations around the world in order to interrupt, delay, impede in every way possible the transfer of set technology. we have not and we cannot entirely stop that trade but we believe that our efforts, which will continue after nuclear-related sanctions are lifted, have made the iranian missile program less productive, less accurate, less of a threat to our friends in the region -- >> let me lose by saying, mr. chairman, number one i'm going to be looking forward to see what actions you take and so far they haven't been forthcoming. you talk about snapback to something and the iranian sanctions that i opted and my

colleagues helped here to pass expiring this year. and number three, i have been following iran since my day of the house of representatives for the better part of 20 years and i know some of my colleagues think this is a question of showing that the hardliners have strength by firing missile technology and testing it. i know that iran over the last two decades have tested the will of the international community. that's why they got to the point that they were on the virtue -- verge of having the nuclear power that could be converted to nuclear weapons. we said, well, it's too big to roll back. if we allow them to continue to test us, they have a history. they have tested us and the world. if we allow them to continue to test without consequences, believe me they will continue to expand. that is the risk here, that's

what i hope we can come together on not only in an understanding but in an action. >> just to follow up, i'm getting the strong sense that the reason we are doing nothing and creating a permissive environment which is going to be problematic over the long-term, i think we are doing that because we're trying to effect the internal elections that are taking place this spring and that is just not in keeping with the integrity of this agreement. i can understand the desire for some of us to do that so that the sanctions will be relieved before the election, but i get the sense that you and others are are complicit in trying to effect the elections, when i say you and others i'm talking about

embassadors and administration. >> sorry, i just called you johnny, excuse me. >> say, hello. >> great leaders for the committee, we appreciate very much what you've done. yesterday afternoon the 43 surviving hostages from the american embassy in iran learned that this congress had passed compensation. the emotional relief for those 43 surviving hostages is not expressible in terms of words. i want the chairman and ranking member, democrat and republican alike to know that you date a great deal of work to make that

seven-year a reality and made the lives of people who were captured, tortured by iranians get closure on an event that was a horrible part of their life. >> i hope all 43 of them it's because of your persistence in leadership that this is happening and we all sometimes get frustrated with the impact that we're able to have with a 100-person body but there's no credible that you have had an impact on the 43 citizens. >> thank you. it was a great team effort. in 1981 when president carter obtained the release of those americans from the iranian hostage taking in the embassy, to get them released by the iranians he had to negotiate a way to be compensated. we finally got ahold of sanctions money with the department of justice had, where

it's the money for compensated for hostages was. and i worry as senator menendez has said that if we are passive and look the other way, iranians will look the other way and do whatever they want, by way of example, and i'm quoting here, iranian regime has declared, they will consider any type of sanction under any level of breach of the deal that would release iran from the obligations it has. in other words, if we reach implementation and as i understand it and the president says the sanctions are then waived and then we take any action to snapback, which is the enforcement mechanism we are all told by secretary kerry, they will be free to do whatever they want to. it's kind of having it both ways. now, am i missing something, mr. mull?

>> we believe that this deal is a political commitment by all sides, the united states has been very firm both in the negotiations as well as publicly and explaining the deal since then that any violation of that agreement will draw consequences and we have a wide range of consequences from complete -- from reimposing some of the sanctions partially to reimposing all of them and walking away from the deal. so we -- a number of the factors in this deal are close to irreversible. if iran goes forward as it will in the next few weeks to disable the reactor core of the heavy water reactor at iraq, that one -- in one swift action will reduce plutonium in the foreseeable future.

if iran decides to walk back -- they will have for iran an unprecedented regime. there are going to be 130 to 150aie inspectors given full-time, 24/7 access to all of iran's nuclear facilities and so we will be able to determine if they are in compliance or not and if they are not, there will be consequences. >> on that point which seemed like to me what senator menendez what he wants to do would be the appropriate thing for congress to do, if in fact, we reach implementation day, which i assume we will, and sanctions reach before that day, do we have sanctions to snapback to if, in fact, there's a violation? >> sir, we have in place and will have on implementation day and far beyond implementation day a comprehensive network of

sanctions authorities both through legislation that the congress has passed as well as a complex of executive orders which has the ability to impose sanctions on iran swiftly should that be required. so we believe that we have the tools in order to do that. >> general, can i ask you a question, please? the iranians are going to be sending 25,000 pounds of nuclear enriched material to russia as a part of the agreement? >> yes. >> okay. if my math is right that's a number of tons of enriched material. so are we certain that the security of that material in russia will be watched after and will we have any ability to monitor how they take care of that material? >> senator, we worked very closely with russia over decades to enhance cooperatively their

security and safeguards of their nuclear sites, also many of the sites in russia are subject to iaea safeguards in the same way that other sites are. i think on this one, the impression that we get, this is a move that the russians are taking very seriously and professionally, they know how to move nuclear material, they know how to store nuclear material and they know how to count for nuclear material. >> the reason i ask the question is and i think i'm correct here and you can correct me if i'm wrong but there was a significant breech in the integrity of some of that material in russia a number of years ago which brought nonnuclear threat initiative and the inspection that is took place in the old soviet union which let some of the stuff get lose and was never accounted for. we want to make sure we never revisit that account in history. >> i couldn't agree more, senator. let me just add that the

reduction measures that were taken immediately after the fall of berlin wall and the disillusion of the soviet union was one of the most single foreign achievements that i personally had an opportunity to participate in. we were quite concerned in those early days about security and safety at nuclear facilities in russia, both civil and nuclear, and it's because of the work of senators nun and looger and patriotics americans which have made trips that it's better than it was before. there's still work to be done, in my opinion and das and doe and we ought to under the current political circumstances it's been very difficult to get the russians interested in pushing forward, but we will continue to look for opportunities to continue to do

that. >> thank you for your services. >> thank you, mr. chairman, thank you to the witnesses. i strongly support of this deal and continue to and i strongly support tough enforcement of the deal. i was very glad to join with the senator corker and the letter following the missile test and i'm glad the un reported clear that it was a violation of the security council resolution. the reason among many that i supported the deal is i think the u.s. has to try diplomacy first, we have to. we started a war in 2003 over a nuclear program that turned out to not exist. we need to keep the military on the table. actually that option has strengthened legally and strategically and in terms of coalition partners, it's even strengthened in terms of the intel we get if we go forward on this deal. so we keep that option on the table but we need to try

diplomacy first. and the good thing about trying diplomacy is that we are now in a hearing like this where we are keeping the focus on iranian behavior. that's where the globe's focus should be, iranian behavior. if we walked away from the deal the focus would be on american negotiating tactics. why would america tank a deal that the international community -- that would have been the focus. now the focus is on iranian behavior and we have to keep the focus on iranian behavior and what the consequences should be. i would gratify -- i think that senator corker said we were expecting the iae report was a fudge factor. it was very clear. iran had a nuclear program. we were gratified with the clarity because it kept focused on iranian behavior. clearly, this was a test and it was a test in violation of un

security council resolutions. i expect that we are going to have a lot of hearings and i hope the focus on iranian behavior because that lays a predaquit. we should be humbled about any situation but it's fair to say that just as we know we are not monoliphic, a lot that is going in iran a dispute within that political society about this deal and about broader issues of whether they want to be reintegrated into a global economy or continue to be an outliar. when you see this deal has been treated by the iranian legislature and the degree to which hardliners hate it, i think you see some of the challenges that are underway there.

so i think what we need to do is we need to have these hearings every time there's activity, we need to keep the spot lot on and we need to demand of the administration consequences but precision in the consequences. to use an example of something that i think has been done pretty well by this committee and the administration is we have a pretty broad set of sanction that is -- sanctions that we could have used vis-a-vis venezuela. they were a smaller subset of what could have been done. the reason for that precision was of a concern that i believe if we went maximal, gives the ruling the authority to blame all troubles to the united states and that crushes internal critical opposition. what we saw in venezuela a stunning refute to a government because people rose up because

you're trying to blame the u.s., you mismanaged our country and they demanded significant political change. so harsh spotlight of this deal or any other un security council solution is exactly what we ought to be doing and we ought to be demanding when senator menendez asked the question, what are you doing, i recognized that we are still just a few days out from the und -- un issuing definitely. we don't want our actions to undermine legitimate political opposition, legitimate desires of the iranian people for a different path than the regime has pursued in the past. i am interested in this question and i wasn't able to ask

secretary yesterday. the u.s. has concluded a panel that analyzed that the activity in october was in violation of un security resolution. we have a reason to believe that russia and china will not go along this in security council. i hope and probably shouldn't do anything. i hope something like this we get our colleagues to put a resolution on the table and put it on the table in the light of day backed up by a clear un security council report and we asked the un to take action and we make russia and china before the whole world be in apologist. i hope that we do that every time and also other steps we can take. let's not give any lever at our disposal to keep the spotlight on iranian misbehavior,

violation of rule. with respect to the un security council situation about the october missile firing, we got a great report from the un that establishes that this was a violation. what is the strategy right now about how we pursue that in the security council and let's make russia and china use their veto power and use it publicly and pressure them for doing that. walk us through the steps that you are thinking about right now? >> well, senator, i'm proud to say that our colleague senator power has been the leader on the security council in drawing the security council's attention to this issue, first when we confirmed in october and then this week when the report came back from the panel of experts. she was very forthright urging to take action and calling out those who would reject such action as being inconsistent with our common objectives to keep this very serious threat to international security under control. i mentioned in term of responses to that action we are now

actively considering the appropriate consequences to that launch in october. in terms of moving forward, perhaps embassador countryman. >> i will have to get you an answer on exactly how this will pay out in new york. we have not hesitated previously to ask for resolutions even when we knew they would be vetoed. it was valuable for making a point as you've suggested it is. there's obviously much broader dynamics that play in the un security council and i just can't speak for embassador power on what the next steps are but we will get you an answer. >> can i say what i hope you will do and many people will feel the same as me, we ought to make the point if we can. when it comes to iranian behavior that's clearly in

violation, we should never say, well, somebody else is going to veto, why bother, we should make that point. here is another question that i was confused about, senator menendez was asking questions about the ballistic missile, un security council resolution versus the jcpoa and ballistic missile. there's an article from the guardian from the 15th of december and -- about the expert's report about the ballistic missile clearly violating un security resolution. most sanctions on iran will be lifted when exchange for curves on the nuclear program. the expert's report noted that quote, ballistic missile launches will be covered in the resolution. the experts in concluding that there was a firing that it was in violation of the un security council resolution, are saying it is covered under the july 20

resolution. i guess it's not the same thing saying it's covered under the jcpoa but covered by the july 20th resolution which was embracing embracing the jcpoa. what is the status of this vis-a-vis the jcpoa and maybe i'm going to ask the question for the record because i think we should all have a clear understanding of that. i hope soon you will be able to come back and i'll probably ask this for the record and lay out what are the steps that are in violation of the security council? >> yes, sir, i'm happy to answer it. the jcpoa as i mentioned to chairman corker does not address iran's ballistic missile program. un sciewrt council resolution 2231, the purpose of that was to endorse and give the security council blessing to the jcpoa as well as address some other elements about iran's policy including continuing the embargo

on conventional weapon sales to iran for the world community for the next five years and preventing trade and otherwise support from the international community from the iranian baa -- ballistic program for years. >> all right, thank you. thank you, mr. chair. >> i would say that regardless of whether the un security council takes action or not which we all know that they are not, we still have just like we have with north korea t administration can implement sanctions in a surgicel way as you're describing, so hopefully that's going to happen after the un security council unfortunately does not take action. senator gardner. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank you for the leadership on this committee. he also served as the ranking member so he has pulled double

duty and has done an outstanding job. thanks both for your bipartisanship and leadership. remind me what the jcpoa states about the 500 pounds of enriched material? will there be iaea inspections on russia? >> what iran is required to do is to -- under the jcpoa is reduce stocks of enriched uranium down to 300 kilograms or less. >> right, if they do that and once it's in russia, assuming that, the inspections will be -- remind me of the jcpoa terms? >> under safeguards regime and additional protocol in iran.

>> but in russia, the 25,000 pounds, verify that? >> senator, i would be happy to take that question. we are in the mist of negotiating the removal of that material. it's still in iran, as i mentioned in my testimony, i believe it's departure from iran is eminent, we are working close with russia and making sure it will be restored. sir, we are in the process -- >> we don't have a plan in place to inspect the 25,000 pounds of enriched material in russia? ..

>> it is the mandate of my bureau to keep pushing. >> thank you. the focus we is important. it is a time when we are focused on other things like isis, terrorism, refuges or concerns about the economy but this is the challenge and job of this committee in partnership with you to insist on a relentless

implementation and enforcement of the jcpoa and the continued enforcement of the sanctions by other activities of iran. and this is a commitment to holding this administration and the next accountable for active enforcement of the jcpoa. it was rooted into deep suspicion of iran's intentions. suspicions which i think have been amply confirmed by the report and by these two ballistic missile test. while i do commend the administration for its active outreach to congress and a recent successful weapon shipment from iran to support the rebels. i think we need to continue to work together because if we take

our eye off this ball. if we fail to relentlessly enforce what we have in terms of u.s. uni lateral and multi lateral ability to constrain iran's actions they will take it as a signal that we have taken our eye off the ball and continue actions that go against our values. many members of congress will call for the swift renewal of the sanctions act. what is the administration's opinion on the renewal of the iran sanctions' act? do you believe iran would consider the united states would be breaking our commitment under the nuclear deal if is

unexpected. senator mull? >> from work with this committee and other parts of the congress over the past decade and more have developed an incredibly powerful tool kit for imposing sanctions on iran for behavior that threatens our interest. the iran sanctions act is a part of that and it is in full force through the end of 2016. the administration looks forward to working with this committee in considering as we get close to the expiration of that. >> do you believe we will extend it if iran violates? i think we have more reason than

every to constrain their actions. >> it is difficult to predict how iran responds. i underscore how we exercise our authority we do it to protect our interest and not to overcome this. >> the partners as well as continuing to enforce what sanctions authority we have and extend them as a key piece of this i mentioned the ship loaded with weapons being sent in violation of international standards. i think we have to continue and increase the weapon flow and the capitol flow going to terrorist proxies in the region. tell me about the administration's plans to heighten the pace of interdictions and whether you are working with regional partners to prepare for this?

>> this can transfer to the transfer of covert arms which iran is heavily involved in. interdiction depends upon intelligence. it depends upon building a framework of confidence with partners in the region. i think we have successfully developed a partnership with key countries in the region i would be not only willing but down right proud to tell you the successes we have had working with friends in the region. it has been our business for over 20 years to make the iranian program more expensive, less successful, and we have done that.

>> other colleagues and the general public are not as aware of it. when a sheriff conducts the drug bust you put the guns and money on the table so the rest of the community interested in conducting illegal activity recognize there is cost and consequen consequences and i think we should be doing that in a more visible way. given the actions by china and russia blocking the ballistic missile test are you concerned we don't have reliable partners in the snap back of sanction when and if there is incredible evidence on iran cheating on the jcpoa? >> senator, we worked hard, my colleagues and i worked hard throughout the negotiation, to make sure there is no

restriction on the ability of the united states to impose and fully use the sanction tools at its disposal to respond to challenges of our interest. in terms of broader international sanctions, we structured a process that when there is a credible report, when the general administers this deal, any member of the joint commission can bring such a complaint to the commission. and if a limited number of members of the joint commission to the security council they would be snapped back. it would be impossible for any member of the council to veto any of the sanctions. it is the assumption of how the

security council handles this. we believe it protects our entities. >> i am hopeful that mechanisms works as intended. i suspect we will work on a bipartisan bases to make sure our allies understand to restrain iran's ongoing bad behavior in the region. thank you, gentlemen. >> i think it would be helpful if something more certain could be giving from the administration to us relative to the extension. i think senator coons is right with the efforts after the first of the year to extend them. if there are things you need to share in a classified setting that is fine.

senator perdue. >> thank you i appreciate what you are doing. i think we are naive. we look at history and to come to that conclusion i have a couple questions related to some of the reports coming out. the iaea released their report this month that said iran lied about their pmd efforts. when the foreign minister of iran said, and i quote, iran never sought nuclear weapons nor will it in the future. that is in clear contradiction of the iaea report as i read it of their activity prior to 2003 into as late as 2009. my question is given the missile violations that have been asked about the day violating 1929 and

resolution 2231 the question is about the 90-day certification the secretary of state has given congress. i am going to quote in here iran hasn't taken any action, including covert, that could significantly enhance their nuclear weapons program. if they are firing missiles in violation of the sanction, they are thumbing their nose at us. my concern is i am not clear how the secretary can make the certification that including covert activities that could significantly advance nuclear weapon programs if they had not taken actions when just last year the defense science board concluded in the case of iran our capability detect undeclared facilities or covert operations are inadequate or more often do

not exist. i am just not sure how to believe the facts here. the revelation that they were -- our own report in a december iaea report says they were doing this all the way through 2009. but there was also a report that a national u.s. intelligence assessment in 2007 suggest the iran nuclear program was halted in 2003 and they have not restarted the program. i know those are old reports. but it goes to the question and i would like the general to first address this and that is what confidence do we have given our own intelligence community reservation to assure us in private and public about our own ability to detect true covert activity. >> thank you for the question, senator. my own sense, having worked in and around the intelligence community for decades is that we

have very good capabilitiecapab. we have a lot of different tools in the tool kit that can be brought to bear. sometimes it takes time to fair it out and put all of the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle together. i would commend our colleagues in the intelligence community to getting to that point. i am also struck as i read a couple times, three times, the iaea report that came out earlier in december on possible military dimensions, just how detailed it was in terms of it laying out the very nature of iran's program and following up on the issues it was not resolved at the time the 2011 report was written. it is very clear, frank and candid about what the iranians have done, what they have denied

doing, and what we need to pay attention to. the areas that are laid out in the pmd report that was put out in terms of specific capabilities and the development of non-nuclear capabilities that is necessary to weaponize a nuclear weapon find their way back into the jcpoa as the people who negotiated this structured that agreement in such a way that they would place limits on the intelligence committee and our intelligence committee and the iaea have identified as issues. >> ambassador, i would like you to address this if you will. the fourth item in the certification is the suspension of iran pursuant to the

agreement is appropriate and in proportion in terms of the program and vital to the security interest of the united states. does this read to say we are certifying after 90 days we are in support -- i would like to clarify the appropriate and por portionate release of sanctions. >> there has been some limited sanction relief and that was negotiated as the joint action. it is a mechanisms to build things to go forward in exchange for iran's cessation of certain enrichment activities and other steps to begin to limit the nuclear program that was later codified in the jcpoa. the united states did agree to

allow the unfreezing of a small percentage of iran's frozen assets. >> can you be a little more specific? can you quantify what that release entails? >> it amounts to permission for iran to withdraw 700 million dollars of its frozen assets in various institutions around the world. >> mr. secretary, thank you for your testimony again. i appreciate your objective. i take issue with the comment the administration did everything they can to protect the u.s. interest when we didn't even mention and fail to negotiate the four u.s. hostages. we are not addressing that at all. the real question i have is in the united nations with the security council veto in front of us what can we expect to be the reaction of the united

nations and what are we trying to get them to do related to the violation of these two resolutions? >> thank you, senator. on the first point i share your frustration that we cannot solve every problem at once. in negotiations with the soviet union on arms control we were never able to settle human right questions, and questions of intervention and the war saw pack agreements. but the agreements were vital to u.s. national security and i think, without making any kind of prediction about iran, laid the groundwork for eventually progress made in eastern europe and ultimately the soviet union. but they were limited. they didn't solve every issue at once. now in the case of what we can expect from the security council i take very well senator coons point that we should force people to be on record. further, i think that it is an

important that we continue to support, with our own expertise the un sanctions committee which has a bigger role of identifying violations of iran and companies and merchants outside of iran. that kind of publicity is what we rely upon when we go make the argument to an exporting country or transshipment. you have to do something to stop the shipment of technology. there is not a u.n.security resolution but what the sanctions did is valuable to our counter proliferation efforts. >> thank you. >> senator boxer? >> i want to thank the panel. i so appreciate what you are

doing. i do have the privilege of introducing ali. we welcome you hear today. his brother is jason and as we know, jason, a "washington post" reporter, is being held in iran and convicted. thank you so much. i want to make -- i want to give a message to the government there if tay are listening. i would like to use this opportunity to eco my friends and so many of our pointed views about the need to -- for this government to release jason. december 3rd marked the 500th day of his detention. jason's family lives in california and they yearn for his release. as a senator who stood as taking

the chance of a new relationship with iran, i make this humanitarian arrest to release jason and ease the extreme pain of his family. you know, as i listen to everyone, and it has been so interesting and in some ways you come a little later and get to hear everybody. it is very important. what i hear is a narrative developing here that is painting an administration that is p permissive and one of my colleagues said naive in terms of iraq. i personally believe you don't have to scream every day and pound the table to be strong. and i know the president didn't take a victory lap when he took

out bin laden but he did just did it. i respect my colleague's view but i don't see it that way. they back it up can passion and policies they see that bolster that narrative but i don't see it. i just read samantha power's comments and i wanted to ask you rhetorically if you think this is soft stuff. as you know, she is our un representative, she said this past october iran launched a ballistic missile that could deliver a nuclear weapon and this is prohibited. after reviewing this incident, the un panel concluded it was a violation. instead of an effective timely response the security council has dithered.