>> the books are right outside. thank you for the gracious crew from c-span reporting this talk so hopefully will be available at some point some format. you can recommend it to others. ethics initiative which is one of the places where we can have conversations with issues like this one -- [inaudible] thank you again for coming. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

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>> they are there for sort of minimum controversy. >> sunday night at eight eastern on c-span's q&a. >> next middle east analysts discuss iran's increasing influence in the region and the rising tensions between it and saudi arabia. the ss u.s. strategy including relations with its allies, the sunni-shia conflict and the war against isis.

the washington institute for isis. the washington institute for near is policy and the hudson institute hosted this forum. >> good afternoon. thank you for coming to hudson institute. i would also like to welcome our c-span audience this afternoon for what i know is going to be a fantastically interesting panel. and also a very timely one given events of the last week, especially the detaining of the irgc navy detaining him and american sailors this past week. of course, other recent events including the attacks on the two saudi are raping diplomatic missions in iran. -- saudi iranian diplomatic missions. we will go for about an hour and 15 minutes, then i will open it

up for questions from the audience and maybe open it up earlier given the amount of interest in the subject. we have a fantastic panel. to my left is ali alfoneh, senior fellow at the foundation for defense of democracies. to his left is filled with smith, philip is an adjunct fellow at the washington institute for near east policy. we have known each other for a while and philip runs also a website or a blog -- >> aaron runs that. i decide level has fallen section. >> to his left is my colleague michael doran and begin its extraordinary panel site you for coming and let's open it up right now. ali, if you would begin come and thank you for being here. >> thank you so much for your kind words, your implication and providing me with this opportunity to share my analysis with you.

containment of american soldiers in the persian gulf by the revolutionary guard came as a surprise to some in town and then the relatively fast release of those same soldiers has been declared almost like a diplomatic victory for the secretary of state, and also for the u.s. government's diplomacy with the government of the islamic republic of iran. i must confess that this was hardly surprising for me, and it is because of the revolutionary nature of the regime in tehran. i would use a couple of minutes talking about that revolutionary nature, and after that i will try to argue why some sunni monarchies in the persian gulf region, by mistreating their shia populations, are actually indirectly helping the

revolution regime in tehran. so in that way i probably put myself in a position where i will be attacked both by the regime in tehran and by some u.s. allies in the u.s. region. the revolution regime, for most americans, the revolution in iran was a historical event which took place in 1979, 37 years ago. and particularly here in washington, 37 years is a very, very long time. it is almost the same age as the pyramids in the biblical event. nobody has that kind of historical memory. in iran, on the other hand, the revolution is perceived as an ongoing process for the government of the islamic republic of iran, for the revolutionary guard, and for the supreme leader khamenei. the revolution is the permanent revolution. they believe and trustees thesis on progress of resolution --

revolution. it is an ongoing process. and the one institution which is charged with permanent of that resolution of course it is the revolutionary guard. but engaging in active use the u.s. navy in the persian gulf region, by staging and attacking diplomatic missions in iran, and by constantly attacking the institutions of state within iran, which serve a different purpose, that of the survival of the revolution because there are such revolution. if you take a look at their constitutional mission it is to safeguard the territorial integrity of iran. the mission of the revolution regard according to the constitution is to safeguard the revolution and the toshiba. in other words, its abstract and it has to do with ideology. it's a totally different mission than that of the military.

if you compare the mission of the police with the nation of the baathist revolution regard, the police are charged with upholding law and order in the country, and by protecting the diplomatic missions government. the permanence of the revolution. this is the duality. this is a parallel structures that we have in iran. so what tools to the revolution regard have at their disposal to continue spreading the revolution in the entire middle east region? that is by reaching out to shia populations in the persian gulf and beyond. now, most unfortunately some sunni governments are making the job of the revolutionary guard easier rather than more difficult. particularly when you look at the kingdom of saudi arabia, where the shia population is practically treated as second

class citizens. you make it easier for the revolutionary guards to appeal to them. and you end up chasing this saudi shia into the arms of the sunni radicals. the same thing of fortune is happening in bahrain, know the kingdom. but if you look at other countries of the persian gulf you see no appeal of iran to the populations. in kuwait, kuwait our loyal citizens, not a column of the islamic republic of iran. they participate in the political process. they are good citizens. same thing with united arab emirates, the same thing many other places. so if there is one policy accommodation that we should think of, and hope this is a message our good friends in saudi arabia and also bahrain will listen to, if you treat your shia populations as citizens, they will be good citizens. but if you look at them with

suspicion, if you suppress them, if you suppress their just demands for being tutored in a dignified way, you end up chasing them into the arms of the revolutionary guard come into the arms of supreme leader, and he -- khamenei. >> thank you. thanks very much. there were a number of different things we want to circle back to later especially i thought it was interesting the point you made about a parallel structure of the revolution. i want to talk about, are the revolution and the state come on these parallel structures at odds with each other, and how do they work. thanks again for a great introduction. phillip, each you could continue. >> i'm going to go into some of the weeds. i got into studying wa what is going on with certain shia armed groups particularly in bahrain because i was falling social networks that belonged to a rocky shia militias that are completely controlled by the

iranians, by the islamic revolution regard for. i found this fascinating. what i'm going to do is try to go into a bit of that and demonstrate what that means for the region and how we are supposed to be looking at this. i don't want to remove agency from certain actors on the ground. ali is correct in terms of saying certain moves by sunni gulf regimes to put shia in a position where they have to reach out or want to reach out to the iranians and will much more quickly buy into the propaganda message or into we will be trained by the revolution regard, or we would do this or we will do that. i think there's a broader sectarian narrative that has been played out due to the war in iraq and the war in syria. the war in syria against the sectarian narrative was driven by the iranians so you now see this coming full circle. there are a few other things that impact what's going on in the gulf with the shia. one of the big issues i've noticed was with bahrain.

in bahrain i had counted on 15-22 different groups and front groups that are declared that they want to use militant message to deposed the monarchy. this has direct implications for u.s. security policy. why quick some of these groups have called for attacks against the americans. one of them actually openly announced only two days ago that they had links to certain iraqi shia militias very publicly on their facebook page, they came out and said they would want to launch rockets. they invented a new rocket to look similar to the sim rocket. there have been a number of bombings that have taken place due to a lot of these militant shia militants are active in bahrain. usually the target security, any security targets they can get their hands on or either

government targets at the message is very clear. if we look at this or not the iranians have structured it come is to send a message not so good to bahrain or the gulf but also to the americans, that they can send, they can start a low-level brushfire war if they want to in the backyard of a very prominent american military base. this also ties in with saudi arabia. why? there's a close relationship between toshiba live in eastern province and with bahraini shia. these militant factions, many of them grew out of a peaceful protest movement, a lot of the them are interlinked and you'll see what arms transfers are going through, magically some will get dropped off in saudi arabia, some will get dropped off in bahrain. i guess going forward from there, there have been a number of developments that have happened in the past you. one of the groups which had links to saudi shia which it

links to a rocky shia groups, and also with a very active militant element that was within bahrain, they were essentially smashed by bahrain security service. there have been a number of arrests, a number of arms caches found. at september the was about 1.5 metric tons of explosives that were seized by bahraini authorities in addition to what we call efp manufacturing plant. if you look at the bonds, i've been able to handle explosives and look at some of the firearms that were confiscated. when you look at the cells that were formed by very similar to the cells of the irgc was formed in southern iraq back in basra back when the united states was there. when you see this upsurge in technological capabilities, it's obvious and outside hand has had some presence in a. this leads us to the question, does iran want to exploit the conflict there but i'm of the

belief i can they our long-term thinkers, very strategic. this is a long-term kind of goal. i've heard different arguments t that it come down from different policymakers enter the policymakers in the gulf that i said maybe the americans during the negotiations may be said why don't you take a break from certain militant activities in bahrain and saudi? i don't have any approved to the effect, but you can see they're still action going on. i deeply iran wants to keep on elbow burned now. khamenei has said the shia are an oppressed population in the widget everything to try unemployment rate them. interestingly enough today's after the speech there was an arms balance he is going into bahrain. i think they're still of interest to increase militant activities are but it's on a low burn. >> thanks very much. mike, if you would pick this up and round off our introduction.

>> thanks. i'd like to talk about the u.s. reading of office and the dilemma that the u.s. is in, but let me just start by imagining a conversation between the united states and the saudis based on the recommendation that all he made that the united states should urge the saudi to treat their own shia population differently. -- ali. i think the conversation today with the very, it would be unfruitful almost in any circumstances but particularly unfruitful today because the saudis would sit and listen politely to the americans and say thank you for that lecture, and then they would ignore it. fats from a different races but especially now because from the saudi point of view, and i think correctly, the united states has tilted in the region over all

toward iran and was from saudi arabia. it's tilted away from saudi arabia, away from israel and tilted away from turkey, and as well from the uae and the other gulf shakedowns. that's with respect to the larger question from 30,000 feet to what is the proper order, regional order in the middle east dependable in question for everyone in the region about regional order is se ri pak syria, the conflict in syria is a center of gravity of all that is happening. and as far as the regional actors are concerned the united states has taken the side of iran and assad in the syria conflict. i personally agree with them of that. that's not the rhetorical position of the united states it's the de facto position terms of what they are doing on the ground. if you're saudi arabia and you look at u.s. policy anywhere,

anywhere from baghdad to beirut, the united states is in alignment with the iranians, or with other actors that are hostile to the established order in the sunni areas, such as the kurds, for example. and the united states is arming kurds in syria or for all intents and purposes an extension of the pkk in turkey, the pkk being kurdish separatists in turkey. so if you're sitting in the -- sitting in on corrupt and look at u.s. policy in syria, the americans are building an order or their policy is leading towards a new order in syria in which the kurdish separatists will have a safe haven. iif you are looking at u.s. policy toward syria, d.c. that we will have a syria with a revitalize iranian role in the

country, and the assad regime revitalized and assad in power in perpetuity. if you are the israelis and to look at what the united states is doing, then you see that eventually what's going to happen is that the russians and iranians are going to help assad we assert his control in southern three and you'll have irgc members on the ground, right on the israeli border in the goal on. it for the saudis a look at what the united states is doing in iraq, then you see the united states for all intents and purposes is the air force of the shiite militias armed train and equip and effectively led by iran inside iraq. if you look at this the way this is going into imagine this conversation that ali suggested we have, you can kind of see from the saudi point of view you say, well, a, washington, what about all these militias that

iran is arming, training and equipping in four or five arab countries with what your policy for fat? of course there is no policy for stopping that. this isn't just a theoretical conversation because in this sense it just happened recently, and that's when the saudis executed this cleric, shiite cleric inside saudi arabia. that was preceded by conversations from, between the united states, between u.s. officials and saudi officials, and which of the u.s. i don't do this, this is a provocation, a second publication which is going to cause difficulty with iran. from the saudi point of view, this was the united states effectively reinforcing iran's voice as a representative of shiites around the region. it was the united states saying that the rain is have a legitimate say in how we interact with the shiites in our

country. in effect, and i think we actually wrote this in one of his columns, this was a death sentence to nimr your no way the saudi what the americans aligned with iranians about the internal configuration of saudi society. the only way that our voice with the saudis about the way they treat the shiites is going to any resonance with the saudis is a belief that we are building a regional order which are larger to get a concerns are going to be addressed and thei the fear f expand iran is going to be addressed. if they believe we would roll back a random osha's well control.com in militias around iranian trained and equipped and led militias around the region, then we might be able to have a fruitful conversation with them about what's going on inside their country. but under the current context it's impossible. >> thanks very much. one of the things i would come back which you brought up in

which we will play on, the point i wanted to come back to with ali again is about the revolution and the state. if it's possible for actually the white house to integrate a revolution into the regional order. a lot of what we're seeing right now is the result, a function of trying to integrate a revolution into the regional order. but i believe that ali wanted to respond to something you said, so let's start off with that and they will come back around to other things. >> when i talk to saudi prince they do point out some hidden american and iranian conspiracy to counter the sunnis in the entire middle east region. but what i see, and the development we see in the middle east, is mostly because indecisiveness in the white house and a foreign policy, middle east policy which is

wrong. there was this this entanglement military from iraq, completely immaturely before the iraqis did was capable of defending itself, for the iraqi state had the institutions to take care of its own security. i believe military -- has greater a vacuum of power in the entire middle east region that iran was in a better position to take advantage of, and trying to filter this is exactly what they are doing. they do have institutions. they have units, and many, many of its editions which serve the purpose of exporting the revolution. this, of course, creates a lot of concern among the sunni regimes, in particular saudi arabia which is in this case i believe justly concerned about what washington is doing. it as it is changing the balance of power in the middle east region. my argument is this saudi arabia

and bahrain continue treating their own populations as second-class citizens when it comes to the shia groups, then they would be more open to watch propaganda from the iranian regime. so it's like a different angle. i'm not arguing the obama administration has had the correct policy for the middle east region. i think some of the problems we are seeing are consequences of that. >> like what? so let's come into this conversation about whether or not it's a possible starting with your description. you have a state, i mean mike, isn't this something that henry kissinger said a while ago that iran has to decide whether it's going to be a state or a revolution? we have to figure this out. so the problem or one of the things we'r we are coming up agt is the fact that iran come it's really a revolution. are the revolution, that parallel structure overwhelms the state.

>> yes, that indeed is the case. we always see the iranian government, whatever it is facing existential threats it begins to behave. you have emergence of someone like president rouhani at a time when iran was facing bankruptcy. then suddenly you see the rise of a technocratic elites of the rent and somebody like doctor zarif who can charm washington and taken talk to you diplomatic corps in new york. but what ever that need is no longer there, the technocrats and the better educated more sophisticated types into a reigning regime are expendable. >> is this what is happening now, taking the sailors? >> off course. because the revolution have survived. the revolution in particular has to survive the emergence of somebody like rouhani. what you see ezra bush in a car trying to assert its influence, trying to communicate the two messages. percival to humiliate the united

states and second, to tell the world that it is the revolution card which is in charge of iran's foreign policy. the fact that they were released faster than the british sailors who enjoyed iranian persian hospitality for 13 days, it's no cause for celebration in washington. if secretary kerry wants to build an ark of trial for himself in washington, find. but in reality -- >> it's interesting. as it is a great thing for the diplomatic channel that was open from the joint comprehensive plan of action, see a productive it is proven? >> revolutionary guard got what it desired. to assert itself as one institution making decisions. >> phillip, if you can get more detail how the revolution, i was reading an article by one of our colleagues that now lebanon, and i do want to talk to far a field but she was talking about the

nigerian sheikh. i just want to get more detail on how the regime replicates different revolutionary structures around the world. let's stick to the gulf right now, barring an saudi. but if you can give more detail on that like how it replicates itself. >> there's a model they follow and it is the lebanese model were often they would get involved in politics. it is a military wing, and i hope no one stretches that too far by what i mean by that. there's a military section, there is this ideology, called of resistance that is always embedded in there, anti-american, anti-israel, very often anti-semitic to give all these things that are wrapped in an also in i guess going with his anti-western sense that they have they are also loyal because of the absolute -- the ideology

that the iranian, the islamic republic is based upon. often these groups will have that incorporated within the structure. it doesn't necessary mean they are always public about it. output into this for bahrain. a lot of good groups announced don't announce when are ideologically. none of these groups have come out. you will see inklings up at times where you see a khamenei post or you will see ayatollah khamenei being paraded around. the movement which is in a military direction, leaders in this protest movement, peaceful protest movement, now they are throwing molotov's at people that associate with him are building bombs and whatnot. would you look at them this approach is for a day that was intended by ayatollah khamenei to celebrate, if you will, the process to destroy the state of israel. they been parading around with different khamenei posters.

we are agents of iranians but it never works that way, particularly in a rented remember bahrain and and also in saudi the shia population there, these are not khamenei followers running around. many of these people are more independent in terms of who they get as their clerical leadership. sometimes they like the radical types, so i ran what you're attempting to do is call off of that. are trying to co-opt and turn one makes a valid point. they co-opt this anger that comes with the distrust and dislike for the regime, this is how they are treated, and they will put that in and say iran will address our interests. what the iranians do as response is a, and by the way, why don't you do and ideological training seminar? a would agree. you will really like it. the whole ideological element to this is very, very important.

i think it gets passed over quite a bit and a lot of analysis. i focus a lot on iraq issued malicious thing for the that everyone is a khamenei group. there's like a new one every other week. but beyond that you look at what you're doing at in iraq now they feel secure enough to see these groups are with khamenei, with the islamic revolution in the region. same thing with syria. a few irgc leaders are calling syrian hezbollah and ago by different names, subgroups. descriptor coming out and saying we are firm believers. we listen to khamenei. we see something like that, they feel more secure in those apartments. of corsica and come right out. in other environments that are far more patient. >> like in the gulf, for instance, is that what you mean? >> in the gulf. they want to pull the numbers and want to make sure people will say but you know what,

maybe it's more nationalistic. this is the same thing done with lebanese hezbollah. i love propaganda music but i'm obsessed. it's interesting in 2006 you will notice they had a song -- sorry, i'm stuttering -- a song about the victory of the arabs. they were playing the arab narrative on this one. they have another one with a talk about the cedars of lebanon. magically this comes in after the comes in after that this destructive war in 2006 and now the we switched to syria it is, who cares about lebanon? they will shift the narrative whenever they need to do both in the more people that they need. when we are looking at bahrain with more covert organizations, the conflict has ever if i could secured apparatus with american assistance. you don't always want to come out and show all your cards and say hey, by the way, did you

know that khomenei was the best guy ever? they don't want to do that but they want to send a message. spin that it's interesting how they apply different messages in different communities, different societies. very interesting. mike, if you want, i mean, if you're interested in coming back to this question about the revolution versus date on what we are seeing how or if you'd like to pick up another thread. >> i think it is both revolution and the sense they explicitly say they want an international revolution in the middle east in the sense that what the americans dominated system that existed this is. at a new system in which they are the central player to replace it. >> kind of ask you something quickly? i should point out for the audience about the different articles you've written especially for peace he did for mosaic explained the administration's iran policy. i guess if i could ask you to give some sort of, did the

administration see that they were effectively tilting toward a revolution? or do they think they're going to return the revolution into a real estate? >> -- a real state? >> i believe the obama administration sees iran as a pillar of middle east stability, as a partner for middle east stability, and is, understand that it is tilting towards iran in syria and tilting toward iran and iraq. there's a lot of evidence. ali put forth the visas this tilt toward iran is happening in a kind of fit of absentmindedness on the part of the americans, or the americans might think we just don't want to get involved so they are hanging back and iran is filling the vacuum. i don't agree with ali on that point but it's not, we don't need to argue about it because

it doesn't matter in a sense when were trying to understand the dynamics in the region. whether the united states is thinking about the invasion from mars, and this is happening, or was it is actually thinking consciously about aligning with iran. the same dynamic is taking place. because as ali correctly points out, iran has these institutions like the quds force, it has the ability to project its power exact in the way phillip was saying, by building up proxies on the ground that looked after its interest. stuff on the point of view of everybody else in the region, although traditional allies of the united states, u.s. policy is facilitating the expansion of this iranian, the expansion of iranian power throughout the region both directly, i mean, the iranians intervened directly with the russians as part of a military coalition to prop up assad. they are using iraqis. we will have implementation of

the nuclear deal with probably this weekend exact would take us up to put early as saturday or sunday, implementation dave bing the moment we start releasing 100-$250 billion to the iranians. when you're sitting in saudi arabia or israel and you see the proliferation of these proxies around the region and then you see the united states is about to drop $150 billion on the iranians, it looks like the u.s. is consciously tilting toward iran. maybe it's not. i believe though that it is. the iranians play this game which ali described i think they're actually up in both the arsonist and the firemen. the quds force, the irgc, they go out and star of problems, and then zarif comes in and says that the extremists. i'm a moderate. if you work with me, and they're

very talented, zarif, in sitting behind the scenes, behind closed doors with secretary kerry and the americans and saying, we understand each other. uf enters, with interest, with e been overlapping interest. they present themselves to the americans as consummate players of -- basin with overlapping interest them we can cut a deal. that's what the americans believe that they are domesticating the iranians, that they are showing them that a partnership is possible. and in doing so they are elevating those more pragmatic and defensive elements in iranian society. it's a complete, it's a fiasco basically. what's amazing to me, and i will stop at this point, is that everything that happens in the middle east, every time something happens whether some outrageous provocation from the iranians, we either ignore it or

we put a ridiculous interpretation on it, like, for example, right now hezbollah together with iranians are starting the citizens, the inhabitants in syria. 30,000 people are starving to death. this is the policy of the assad regime, policy of iran. this was going on while the saudis executed nimr al-nimr. which issue did we decide was a sectarian provocation? it was the saudi execution and that the starvation of 30,000 people, which every sunni in the region sees as a sectarian provocation, of course. nobody in the american media, i should say nobody, but very few people in the american media are even aware of the perception of people in the region about this and reporting on the. the same thing with the sailors, right? ali describe accurately how the irgc navy put out the message very clearly to everyone in the

region that we are in charge. we have the last say on what goes on. the white house decided to pitch it as tremendous diplomatic victory because we got these hostages released within hours. the message the irgc was sent to the rest of the region barely got reported on. our news media just repeats, repeats the talking points of john kerry as the it's a deep analysis of what happened without any suggestion that there's another way of saying this. >> then let me ask, thanks, mike. ali, is this the incorrect interpretation? are you telling me the white house has already succeeded in empowering moderates but will it take more time? will it never happened? what's your understanding of this? >> i do believe that counting on rouhani victory for the parliamentary elections in

february is a mistake. what we are more likely to see is the supreme leader is going to block and disqualify many of the people from the rouhani network to run for parliament and one for experts. experts. >> with the disqualify rouhani as we'll speak with probably not rouhani himself but is that works. what you will see his rouhani be an isolated president who has the entire parliament against him, and the body, the body which is going to point the next supreme leader is also going to be dominated by the regime loyalists. and then you have the technocrats going back into the shadows. who is by the way going to benefit from the money which is now being released because of the sanctions relief? the most likely scenario is that the money is going to be transferred to the economic business empire of the revolutionary guard. the largest contract in iran is a construction base.

that base is going to get the contracts. it's not going to be the private sector. the former president and his rouhani are arguing if you give us the money we can empower for middle-class. we can make the private sector come back into iranian economy. in reality the private sector more likely than not is going to become soft contractors to the revolutionary guard. in reality you can actually strengthen the irgc control with this is the sixth of iran. so the calculation from the white house i think it's been completely wrong. >> this is the way the white house speaks about it publicly, right? you would look very strange if you said we don't care about empowering the moderates. we are getting with the extremists. these are the heart and around the region, as the president apparently said, totally number of gulf arab officials at camp

david in may, he spoke approvingly of the quds force and suleimani. you wouldn't be able to speak publicly as a look, we have dealt with extremist. that's what's happened and a nuclear agreement with the regime locks in the rgc, right? that's is in control of the weapons. they have been empowered. mike, you and i have spoken about this a bit. do you think they believe it? to the belief they are empowering monarchs or are they much more rail policies like we made a deal with extremist? >> i believe both. i believe that it's a deep aspect of american thinking about international politics, to believe in the gradually moderating influence of international markets. there's a model in their heads,

the model is china, right? the chinese are our rifles. they're building up their military but we also have this economic -- rifles -- independency. we are changed in the might of the obama administration would change the calculus in beijing about how much is worthwhile to challenge the united states because there so many economic variables, submit economic interests are hanging in the balance for the chinese. they want to create conditions in a rental bring about the same kind of change of calculus. they understand that in the short, they will not admit it. they understand in the short term it will lead to a strengthening of some of the more hardline elements in overtime once this when he starts penetrating and there is this interdependency, this will change the calculation. plus they think about, there are two interpretations of iran in

washington. there's one this is a rant as an aggressive revolutionary power like they want to overturn the american order of there's another one that says that his rhetoric, this revolution rhetoric left over from the revolution of 1979 but nobody in iran believes that anymore. assist with set up so they have to pay lip service to it. in actual come and actual fact they are pragmatic actors. president obama's it is in a number of interviews. they are pragmatic. we can cut a deal with them. that's what he is banking on in the end. >> ali, is the irgc, other pragmatic? have they lost their case for revolution? >> the revolution and behavior serves their interests, the corporate interest. to begin this between iran and china of course is that president nixon made a deal with chairman mao, the communist party was from empowered to a

single party system. it still is a single party system. the people's liberation army was under total medical control. into iranian case, if there is a one-party system, on one party s the party of the revolutionary guard. it's not the civilian politicians. so serves the interest of the revolutionary guard to be revolutionary, not only do they lip service to ideology but also to practice it once in a while. went up with the threats from outside or the threat from inside templates the economic meltdown, really is facing the elite of the revolutionary guard, they did engage in pragmatic deeds to secure the survival. gathering system is not nazi germany 1945. it is not suicidal but it is highly ideological and it serves their interests. >> let's just go through, not to deliberate too long, but what do

you think will happen next? phillip? i mean, what is the regime likely to do next in the persian gulf? >> like i said before i think we are on this slow burn trajectory that want to turn up the flame. right now they're building the militant groups they would possibly need in the future. some of them are being dismantled your. >> what would turning up the flame look like? what does that mean? do they have an interest, and investment in actually getting the persian gulf and the region very hot right now, or do they just like throwing matches at the persian gulf? every once in while getting people upset and then walking it back. i want to ask all of you what you think is likely to happen next. again, not predicting date and event but what will the next few months, what will the next year

will obama's presidency look like? >> i'll go first. for starters it is going to be throwing matches. and begin your to look at this also from a strategic level and from their messaging angles. a lot of these militant groups have been expressing support for the houthis in yemen. so right now for me a rhetorical narrative bubble that the islamic resistance is growing, but beyond that the attacks they are doing, in good measure due to security operations that have gone on in both saudi arabia and also bothering, they haven't been -- also bahrain. it's that low birth. the logo is effective for no. i couldn't give you a good time for when they might want to turn it up. >> almost randomly. i like to look at timing when certain things happen.

it was interesting a lot of these other groups privately were sending messages, and the american threats. they're going to target a starbucks, attack the ritz-carlton hotel. they're going to do this, that, and the other thing. fire rockets at the u.s. naval base. but those didn't really coincide with a big push by the americans in the region. not even really with negotiations. so i think sometimes you might have when they come out and just want to press the button a little bit and see let's see how they react to this. what worries me though as the united states pulled out of this region more calm and again we are in the last year of the obama administration and this is the trajectory of where it's going, if they feel emboldened, everything that may be a possibility with what's going on in iraq and in syria despite the fact they have, ground battles are not all that great for them right now, but if they feel

emboldened they might try to do something more spectacular. i think we are on this little burn trajectory of villages people like that until they really want to stir things up. i'm quite sure there are elements on the ground that are conversing with irgc has said we really need to do it now, and they are saying not yet. maybe we negotiate, approach this in a way not to recycle the strength of will be more pragmatic about our revolutionary militarism. again, just because, but just because you have a revolutionary mindset it doesn't mean you can't pursue it pragmatically. i think a lot of people get confused because they don't pay, they are pragmatic actors so that's all good. when you revolution actors like this, maybe we need to be more patient. the big term for the iranians at islamic revolution is the patient ones. they are very, very big on pushing when it comes to launching the revolutionary

goals. >> keeping the region and a permanent state of low intensity crisis has served the interest of the revolution guard in the past that those are the interests of the revolution a guard in the near future, and also further ahead. i do believe it's going to continue. most unfortunately i see that some city leaders are playing in defense of the revolution regard pashtun sunni leader. but keeping somewhat they sheikh the tank and bahrain, there's not even a sense against them. i heard he was crucified in saudi arabia. if these are the policies of some sunni leaders, it is hardly surprising the revolutionary guard and some radical lived in iran, and the entire revolutionary elites in the islamic republic of an issue time persuading those shia people to follow the path of the iranian revolution. >> can i asked why, what is in

the interest of the revolution, of the islamic republic, to keep the region in the state of at least low intensity, conflict and anxiety? what are they in anti-status quo power? is about the united states? >> no. in order to increase and spread the influence of the islamic republic, in order to operate more freely you need a state of crisis. if the neighbors of the islamic republic are well ordered societies in which there is no political crisis, no social upheaval, no suppression of the minority, then the revolution regard is much more difficult times operating in those environments. this was the revolutionary guard was not happy with the overthrow of saddam hussein. they wanted a state of crisis in iraq so they could replace the old order with her own people. so that the iraqis would not be

part of the power structure in iraq. so that the moderate saudi shia did not cooperate with the saudi regime. a state of permanent crisis helps them attract the support of those shia populations. >> mike, what do you come again without asking you to use your crystal ball, though feel free if you would like, but what are the things that you see happening over the next year in the gulf region? >> let me start by emphasizing how much i agree with what ali just said, maybe we can draw a conclusion from this. and that is about i do believe that the obama administration is looking at this mess stretching from baghdad to beirut, it looks over at tehran and to seize a big, stable country that behind closed doors talks to leverage of regional stability to it and give thanks wow, if we could incorporate them, the arenas

into this could architecture, then they will work with us to stabilize the region. what ali just said is they don't have an interest in stability. we don't have to call them necessary revolutionary. the way to think of them is not as pillars of stability but as actors who are carrying out, i'm sorry for missing the worker what to do with the mafia with it offer you protection? it's a protection racket or they develop interest to blow things up and they tell you if you work with us, we won't blow it up. and if you don't work with us we will blow stuff up. that's how they operate. they don't have the money or the political skill or the institutions to actually work to stabilize any of these regions. we sold ourselves a bill of goods. we've convinced ourselves thank you. they don't. it's just a racket. >> i don't want to move too far from the subject at hand but i put one of the arguments the administration would make again

quietly but about syria, would say we don't like us outcome is not a good guy. but the fact is without him is going to be even more chaos so we'll have to work with -- secretary kerry, that's why the iranians and the russians have been invited to negotiate over syria's future. i believe it's a stable of potentially stabilizing influence. >> again we sold ourselves a bill of goods. >> by the argument is what? >> i will lay out. i understand the argument you are making but it is false. let's say our number one interest is to defeat isis, right? i think our number one interest is actually to contain iran come and isis is never too. but let's say for the sake of discussion which is how i think the obama administration looks at it, isis is the strategic threat.

we can't defeat isis analyst with sunni allies on the ground who can help us to take and hold, that's the important part, these areas are isis now controls. when we are in alignment with iran in iraq, and with the shiite militias in iraq, when we were in alignment with russia and assad in syria, we alienate all of those, the sunnis on the ground. what is assad doing in syria and one of the russians doing? they are not attacking isis. they are starving men, women and children. that's what they're doing. they are dropping chemical weapons on them. they're going after the opposition elements that the united states itself has trained. so on the day the russians started bombing, that's during the u.n. general a summit meeting in september, the russians bombed consciously bombed elements of the u.s. trained. what was the u.s. response to?

john kerry said i'm going to meet come he didn't say i'm going to. he met with the russian foreign minister lavrov and started talking about the conflicting. that's the message to all american allies in the region that we are not going to back up the sunnis on the ground, that we designated previously as our allies. what the consequent is we're not going to achieve come and i can say this confidently, we will not achieve our achieved the -- strategic goal of stabilizing the region at a don't think we're going to defeat isis. all of these countries, it's not the saudi arabia wants isis they are or turkey once isis. it's that the alternative to isis that the united states is offering the states is an iranian dominated order, and that they absolutely do not want. so the choice is an iranian dominated order or muddling through with this horrible i suspect they will muddle through with isis. that's why president obama brags

that he has a 65 member coalition with the most powerful countries in the world working to defeat isis for a year now. this is 20 or 30,000 nasty guys with pickup trucks against the most powerful countries in the world, and we don't have a significant victory to show for it. and why? does we don't have a political vision for the region that is attractive to any of the major actors in the region that we used to call our allies. >> let's go through one more pair of want to ask the three of you one more question for i am going to open it up to questions from the audience. ali is going to come back to something you were speaking about before regarding some of the gulf states and their treatment of their shiite communities. i believe the administration has in many ways handled it incorrectly, have spoken too much about sectarianism, have

spoken too much about sunni and shia. and instead it should see it the way american foreign policymakers have most successfully seen the middle east which is in terms of strategic interest rather than in terms of -- we are thinking saudi arabia pop -- problematic but an ally. iran, revolution regime, instead of sunni power shia power. is there a way given the way the region is going, not to the other gulf states alone but is there a way to take away some of the sectarian tension come even to reduce the level the we talk about here in the united states, which is i think it's not helpful? >> the stability of the states, stability of u.s. allies is also depending on how they treat their citizens. that was by the way one of the reasons that the shah's regime collapsed in 1979.

the problem with the sound these and many other sunni regimes is not that they're not modernizers. they are enlightened, modernizers forget been modernizing their societies actually fast, but the process has not had a parallel process of providing the citizenry with responsibilities, with powers to control the government of their own. in other words, a process of democratization. this is why the shah's government collapsed in 1979 and, unfortunately, we see similar tendencies all over the middle east. this is what the arab spring was all about. the argument of course makes sense but we also should pay attention to the dynamics of the regimes inside the states. >> no, i certainly agree with that. i guess i'm thinking specifically about, take a language away. not just like say we will do

with them because, you're an ally but we were you doing this and that. this is a classical part of u.s. foreign policy and seems like a good idea. how do we move away from the sectarian language? >> you need to promote democracy rather than talking about different sex. it's also sunni citizens were being persecuted by the states. -- sects. there is issues with the suppression of freedom of religion. those issues make u.s. allies much weaker. these are good allies. they want to modernize their societies but they are not liberalizing their societies. that's process. upheld a process, that is great huge problems for them. in the longer-term it's also a problem with you is because they are good allies. that is one of the things one

should emphasize. now this sector nature of issued by the issue of human rights and democratization. >> phillip? >> i think both actors in the region him how they are projecting, they are playing the sectarian message whether we like it or not. i think if we are talking about how the press handles it, well, unfortunately -- >> i mean in the regional press or our press speak with even our press. >> i'm not so concerned about that. i'm concerned how the administration address is in many ways. i didn't mean to cut you off to defend my colleagues in the press. spent i promise it's not going to be bad. unfortunately, when it comes to journalism there's a lot of repetition that happens. because people want a narrative and it's easier to convey. began to produce 850 word article and you have to do this for some woman who was living in denver this is going to work every day, how else can you describe it? it's hard to get in all the nice

nuances that are going on. .. this is what they are doing. either way, go out with one of your manhattan arrayed around with it and this will send a

message to the populace. it is very hard to escape and i think a lot of that is coming from the administration. a lot of the response to that when your kindness it out, how do we handle it, here is the easiest most acceptable kind of wine. when you deal with particularly iranians who know how to craft a narrative, boy did they know how to do it and get the message out. i was talking to ali earlier about haley released martyrdom information. the timing of it, everything is well thought out. i do want to say of another government department handled this, but it needs a little bit more foresight here. how are they presenting it and are we going to accept their message and roll with it? i don't think that's always the best idea. >> that was something might work on when he worked in the bush

administration. i don't know if that's a subject you want to pick up countering how the government counters the message. again, just to take down the level of sectarian discourse in the region. it is very bad for the region. it empowers bad actors whether this on the republic where the islamic state. >> i don't think that there is any way we can avoid sectarianism but i don't think that we should raise our strategy on it. i think the starting point for a sound american approach to the region is to focus on state, but you have to be aware of the sectarian issues. if you are not, you will make bad policy. effectively what we do right now in the united states everyone would understand if we had riot in harlem and the united states

work together with the ku klux klan to stabilize harlem and we said to the people, listen, we all have an interest in ability here. that is not going to work. we are aligning the elements that are starving sudanese in the area and getting angry with the saudi's when they don't like it. it is ridiculous. we have to find sectarianism and the u.s. government. it is anything tearing it down, not g.i. sectarianism. there's very little awareness. which is sectarianism but also to spread about my knee and government influence. when they create these militias,

they train them, equip them, offer them ideological support. as philip said, they indoctrinate them -- it means ultimately what it is cracked equally a submission to all meaning and tehran. but they are supposed to do is follow the orders given to them very much like the comments are in the days of the soviet union. the job of the united states in that context will attempt on sectarianism is to teach geography to iran. very simply there is iran and not iran. iran can have its forces and not iran. syria, not iran, lebanon. let's talk about geography class. >> let's open it up to questions from the audience.

we have at least one microphone, maybe to circulating. so wait for the microphone to get to you. the gentleman here in the blue shirt. [inaudible] >> -- neglected saudi arabia. the question is the saudi regime was strong enough or is it too brittle to confront iran? >> michael, would you like to -- >> the saudi's are in a difficult situation. we see that they have declining oil prices. they've taken on a number of projects including the intervention in yemen and so forth which are costly and have no end, no end in sight.

the saudi's are not going to roll over and hand the region to the iranians. that is the signal they are trying to land us very clearly that they are going to fight where they have the resources and the ability counter this rising iranian power. so how they are going to deploy resources to faculty is unclear, but the idea that they are just going to fold up and look at her saudi arabia oman and have no interest in what happens in the area for neighboring iraq would be a mistake to assume that. >> philip, you spent time and some of their capabilities. >> what worries me is the longer-term. i think mike touched on this a little bit. where did i put those resources? gehman is not simply the f-16

amin on florida law. what happens if they say a few ap, al qaeda in the arabian peninsula. they have executed a bunch of them but they are in effect give citing source. the same things happens. what happens with this. al qaeda in there. the saudi synonym for us dates were facilitating not. when we leave a vacuum, the vacuuming to get filled here because of this, they are going to look for actors that are strong that no matter project to get stoned and kill enemies. if it's not the united states with their happy moderation in everything else can we might as well turn to them because they know how to kill iranians. the site in order comes from their, again, al qaeda does not like the united states. if they feel they've been completely abandoned and go back to your question is the regime

brittle? i think they are scared out of their minds. we had a very good security relationship with them for decades now what is happening? it is collapsing from within. i've been to so meetings in the golf where in the goal for real running into policymakers and they will just say they screwed us. we are no longer -- they are no longer friends anymore. you share a cigarette out. where do you think you go from there? we have to build up our own forces. those don't always do so well. they know this. it is the whole second order of what happened next and what is also the added effect of the united states. they are going to be less considerate about the american point of view, the more we pull out. they will be more worried about will happen to saudi's. they just launched another stud into saudi arabia. you know what, fine. we will back these guys.

the americans want to cut deals elsewhere. that is something that really worries me. i talked to a lot of different saudi policymakers. it's not as if they are saying al qaeda is the best. it is cool. we love what happened on 9/11. when you are presented with certain options and you try to pick the worst one, i worry unfortunately they make a decision if they feel pushed into the corner and not idea rainy and and maybe feel they've completely left alone to the united states. the mac mike, did you want to follow up? yeah, sorry. i want to make one or point. i agree with everything philip just said. i want to say the washington attitude right now is to point out and hector society than to suggest that they don't understand their own interest and they are going down the bad path. if bad things happen they will continue. the point that would make the batter number one, they have

iran is an existential threat to saudi arabia. it is a mistake to think it is not. i read about to crack her saudi arabia if they could. we should keep that in mind because you see an existential threat and they will act to prevent it. if they fail at that, we will then have the crackup of saudi arabia. but though the united states do? will the united states at back and do nothing and let chaos ensue? or will the united states feel compelled to send in troops? we have to be thinking about that now thinking about that doesn't mean hectoring saudi's. it is developing a region of order that would prevent some of the saudi's are feeling compelled to take actions we think are in the interest. >> i wanted to call on a college

here at hudson. we spoke before it has a lot of information about the detained men to detain and attend american sailors. bill was in the navy and so he'll understand the details. if you could have a microphone right around here. the gentleman right here. >> i am still nerdy here at hudson institute, former career naval officer. i have a general question for the panel about the administration's response to the seizure of the two boat in our 10 sailors. there appears to be considerable unhappiness in the military, especially in the navy in the way the administration is handling the response to the detention of our sailors. even the secretary of defense has confirmed that the two boats

came back dead -- have a navigation error and went into iranian waters. but it appears to seizure by the iranians violated several if two or three well-established principles of international maritime law, the first one being innocent passage where ships of all state, whether coastal farmland blog have the right of innocent territorial waters. in this case the u.s. marine ) headed from kuwait to bahrain to change their command base that the navigation error the secretary of defense admitted to they were conducting innocent passage. a normal country would have rendered assistance at sea and instructed them to leave and send them on their way. the second principle that naval commanders relied on, i relied on when i was commanding a ship

in the gulf is the principal of sovereign immunity of russians. father damien able vessels are not sub it to search, seizure or detention of the crew. again, in traveling even in court for territorial waters they would have rendered assistance for instructed them to leave in the third principle while we are not technically at war with iran that you need the conventions of protocol one and two of 1977 which clearly prohibit the filming, photographing or otherwise using videotape or audiotape confessions or apologies for propaganda purposes. it's not a literal violation of the law, it is certainly a violation of the spirit. >> is going to say very quickly i believe tony blair in 2007

when the iranians to british sailors for 15 days, prime minister blair made the exact same case with a violation of geneva. >> given those three long principles of the international maritime law, these rules are extremely important to u.s. naval commanders. they are vital to the safe he of the cruise and the efficiency of their operation in u.s. naval commanders relied on the enforcement and adherence to these rules. my question is why do you think the administration hasn't even touched are formally protest towards the iranians. what is your view? >> thanks very much. the implementation date from the nuclear deal is about to go in force in a couple days here and

you can rest assured that any discussion in the white house or the state would have endangered the iran deal, the nuclear deal with that to make sure to tamp everything down in order for the deal to go through. ask ourselves what not how come the uranium release both do it so quickly $250 million because because -- because with $150 billion hanging in the balance, how come they risked -- how can they put that at risk? the answer is twofold. number one it is that we have shown them time and time again that we are so hell-bent on achieving that nuclear deal that we will not take any kind of retaliatory action.

number two, it is the revolutionary guards showing iranians, everybody in the region and asked the air in charge. that is the message we all should've taken away from this thing that even with $150 billion within days of release they still went ahead and behaved like this. you think they will moderate over the next six months i think you're mistaken. >> ... give my own opinion quickly. i entirely agree with mike it has to do with protecting the joint comprehensive plan of action. there is another reason as well. mike and i have spoken as well that the president believes that his role is to have extricated the united states from the middle east, not to overcommit again to more turmoil. i believe the president sees whenever there is an iranian provocation he turns the other cheek because these guys are not

going to get united states involved in another war. i know they are doing bad stuff but i'm not going to say this to be a bad thing. the problem is i think that does encourage bad behavior. though, i'm just going to ask you to round this off. if you can say in 1988 how did the reagan administration check aggressive iranian actions? >> not to draw too to draw to closely parallel that i was on the uss enterprise when the iranians relay in international waters, president reagan ordered us to think iranian major combat in and that is how we responded. >> thanks very much, bill. there is a question and back. the gentleman in the yellow shirt. >> i have a question picking up -- mario loyola.

something mike alluded to a couple different times. is there a realistic vision for restoring the allies in the region can really commit themselves that doesn't require reversing the extension of iranians hegemony over the shiite part of iraq. if we do have to reverse, how do we do that without the u.s. assuming the central dominant presence that it had in 2008 when obama was elected? >> unfortunately, i think this is one of those lost opportunities. after the u.s. invasion of iraq, there was a true sense of optimism among many she has who were critical of the role of the islamic republic. you had the grand ayatollah

khomeini who moved because he could call it the regime in iraq. under u.s. protection, he was preaching a very different type of theology that we are feeling. many other iraqi shia and iranian shia who could not speak freely in iran because they are against the theology of state state takeover religion. that obligation of the right had the divine law who sought asylum in iraq because they consider iraq a free place where they can think freely and they can speak freely. most unfortunately because iraq sank into this order of chaos in the u.s. has returned from iraq. unfortunately we see more or less domination of islam's republic.

so many of the proud schools of theology is not chief are directly or indirectly dominated by money, theology which is dominant also. that is very unfortunate. this is why i am saying even in the sunni and friends, there should be schools for shia. there should be madrassas. there should be media. there should be debated. many of those shia are critical of the regime in iraq can find a safe haven and can debate and develop shia theology. if iraq is to it, saudi arabia is not too late. even by rain is not too late. and although societies, what you do need is just a little bit of freedom for debate with the shia can express themselves freely. >> i like to add to this because

you brought up a very big point. i can give you a smaller example of how if you allow more independent shia voices to grow, it makes a lot of the radicals crazy they believe their interpretation of how she has organized is the only answer and everybody else is either crazy or not following the religion correctly. so i was looking at hezbollah. i wrote an article when barry rubin was still a bias about the independent shia in lebanon. something that drove lebanese have all a crazy was the whole thought to be independent centrist for scholarship developed in lebanon that teach new scholars had to do their jobs. they actually do find some competition which technically aligned them in parliament. they are trying to buy control of the voices from all the

clerical leadership with money, sometimes through force. people were free to be done even if they disagree with. i would like to see the united states try to promote this kind of semi-quietist form of thinking among shia. this was the normative form that was going on right up until. >> we know exactly what the administration has done. and lots of ways i believe the difference double society argument nations in iran, the administration with various forms of funding and for sure in lebanon are friends, the administration cut off funding for different programs they had and they are very opposed to hezbollah. that's an independent shia organization in their entire thing is hezbollah. >> when you watch this, what do you think this will mean for the future? it is not very funny site.

when i look at iraq, they still have a very good level of control. even his own militia structure but when you compete against 100 something iranian backed shia militias pushing us with all the cash and nobody else is coming in and saying here's a little extra money. he's a little bit of extra political support it makes things hard. we are now heading in the direction that khomeini was quite literally plodding when he was writing what it was supposed to become a model. i hate saying this, but i would rather get it out there. it means the united states were interested in this we have to play kind of dirty. it means sometimes backing certain radical shia elements. some of them won't even talk to. look at all father with plenty of problems with the iranians. i wouldn't mind trying to co-opt

in even if he's not even welcome if that means he's going to cause problems for the iranians. but then again, do we have the stomach for that in this room but we eventually microcosm of shia jurisprudence to the state of iraq from the domination. i think we dropped the ball and we just let it roll downhill. >> mike, did you want to add something? >> yes, thanks. i don't know how easy it would be to pry southern iraq away from iran at this point. iran is vulnerable across the region. we talk about it now like it's the rising power that has a lot of influence. we have decided not to contest it in any way. if we decided to contest it it's got huge vulnerabilities and we could make it burn up to $150 billion we're about to give it to very quickly and the place to do a defense area.

the assad regime is vulnerable and hezbollah is vulnerable and the two are siamese twins they carry the same organizations that if we topple one we toppled the other. we could give a huge defeat if we just started turning the heat up in syria. how many fighters does hezbollah have, seriously active fighters in syria? my guess is it's not much more than two or 3000. we could start causing hezbollah an enormous amount of things that that was our goal. we just have to train, equip syrian forces and deploy them in areas where they can cause hezbollah pain. i would send a message to tehran in two seconds. >> i have a question about

tehran. when it goes through the iranian people are going to benefit and the economic trickle-down will make the liberal movement stronger. could you please tell us what could turn the situation and is there any hope this theory has any. the >> a very poor record of predict the resolution. we didn't predict the revolution so much. we are not in the best position to make the predictions. however, it is important the iranians decided yes and every once in a while in a while it surprises us because people go and protest against the regime. just like the green movement. the interesting thing is that richey manages to infiltrate

organized opposition to the knee. but if it is not organized, if people go to the streets because there's a general sense of anger towards the regime, you cannot predict it and therefore you cannot counter it in an efficient way. this is why the green movement became a green movement. now i must say i do not share the argument because the money which is supposed to benefit in particularly the middle class is going to strength in the revolutionary. we are party seen the budget of the military, particularly the revolutionary guard was increased with 20%. this is even before the government of the islamic republic got a hold of the money. 20% increase in the military budget. also likely to see many of the infrastructure development

projects which will start once they have the money will be given to the contact in terms of the revolutionary guard and then hiring the private sector actors as subcontractors. that actually also gives more control to the revolutionary guards rather than less. spread of technology i had to debate some time ago here in town was perceived as some are good for civil society and a period unfortunately i ran spread of technology means more control. everybody has a mobile phone to control you more efficiently than ever before in the entire history of iran. they do not make rash predictions that this is going to liberalize the iranians. i do believe mr. brokaw name is perceived as expendable. the technocratic elites are perceived as expanded

individuals and now the time is over. no longer needed because the nuclear deal is full. you can activate the government again. this is a game that will continue for a very long time in the future. but when the iranian public is actually going to rise against this type of mechanism, we cannot predict. >> i remember a few years ago you and i spoke about this. you said some sand has to be careful because if he actually manages negotiations that will become obvious the more expendable. he's not useful anymore. they don't need him to serve the function applies. the gentleman in the back here. yes, thank you. if you could stand and identify yourself. >> josh london with doa. my question is certain about time horizons to the panel.

in the short-term for the duration of the obama administration, it's a pretty good guess nothing is going to change in terms of u.s. posture in the region. what is the time between now and then if things reaching some sort of conclusion were as large or small rather than folks just treading water and occasionally flicking matches where they may decide here is the opportunity to seize and hold an advance. >> evening for the islamic republic? >> either way. either the islamic republic or saudi arabia to decide here is my chance. if the u.s. has to get more involved and they don't want to get more involved or for that matter ticking signals it seems clear the white house is going to move into hands that won't

differ. >> what do folks see here is time horizons? >> we are going to shut down in a couple minutes here. let's make this our last. >> the iranian party is more patient. i actually do agree there is no sense of urgency from their point of view to stop a board revolution right now. they are playing a game which they believe is serving their interests and also perceiving the united states is a gradually declining world power. even also in the weekly magazines and journals, the united states today is just like grape written in the night and 50s after world war ii. it's weakened in the entire empire is coming down and it has to be replaced. they have also been economical

in their fights. if the u.s. can get entangled in conflicts all over the world, in asia in the far east, the u.s. cannot pay so much attention to what is happening in the middle east. by the way, the saudi's and turks can play on missouri and daish. from that point of view, they believe time is on their side and they can afford to be patient, to build and expand gradually and slowly and this is why we see the saudi's union in such a difficult predicament. >> might, if you say the same thing i'm going to have a real

problem. >> the priority from the iranians right now it sure ain't not assad. assad is still vulnerable even with the russians bear. and as i said, if assad does, the power is drastically reduced. so their greatest effort is on expanding his power and expanding influence within syria within the umbrella of his power. the americans are pretending this is not going on. president obama keeps telling us the ingredients in russians will work best to get rid of assad soon. change is just around the corner. we can't see it yet. they may possibly just maybe get rid of assad.

but they can't get rid of is the isle of wight structure of the regime. without that they don't have their influence in the region. it will keep the structure intact and not open it up to the sunni majority in the country. it's going to remain the ku klux klan in power and they will likely keep assad the grand wizard and power as well. >> lovely closing image. i want to thank you all for coming. thank you to the hudson institute and thank you to c-span as well. round of applause. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you. >> thank you so much. [inaudible conversations]

>> as i've been watching the campaign this year it's far more interesting for republicans to look at the democratic side. and that may have something to do with why there is more interest in these candidate and their books.

>> everyone i think does have interesting stories in their lives and politicians come and go, who are so single-minded in his pursuit of power and ideology could have particularly interesting ones. but when they put out these memoirs, they are sanitized. they are guided. they are therefore sort of minimum controversy. >> sunday night at 8:00 eastern. >> state department climate change special envoy todd stern talks about policy and diplomacy after the paris climate conference agreement. he also talked about how the u.s. allies and the rest of the international community could proceed with the agreement implementation. the council on foreign relations hosted this event.

>> so if i may get up to your conversation. my name is jessica mathews. i started working on this issue before todd stern believe it or not, 1982. very glad to be here today. you all have mr. stern's bio in front of you. for anybody who has ever worked in government on the international side, probably half of the people in this room i am sure has had the experience of sitting next to somebody from another government at a dinner and hearing their envy of our system that allows people to go in and out of government at senior levels. the wind, kill yourself, go out, go back in, kill yourself again. it is a wonderful system and people angry at in other systems. it has one big downside, which

is very often in international negotiations, the head of the u.s. team is doing it for the first time. on the other side of the table is some ready who has been negotiating for his country or her country for 30 years. and there is a pretty steep learning curve. this issue is one where the united states has not had the disadvantage. because todd stern is the personification of institutional memory, both because the his work ethic and his passion about the issue in his dedication over an extraordinary period of time. i don't know whether there is anybody from any other country who has lived through in senior positions nine of the 21 props.

maybe their hats, but there is certainly no buddy who has made a bigger difference. so we are here to talk about what is really a pretty historic breakthrough and not by any means and i mixed a victory. we saw them have. it does represent a major turning point on one of the handful of the most important issues the world faces. so i think it is fair to say that we should begin with the recognition of the extraordinary success mr. stern has achieved. we are lucky to have him. we will hear from remarks to me and i'll had 20 minutes to talk

and then we will have half an hour for all of you. [applause] >> thank you very, very much, jessica for the kind and generous remarks. thank you to everybody who is here and the accounts on foreign relations. [inaudible] -- so i could watch my time. i'm going to take a few minutes to set the stage and then we cannot conversation for the remainder of the time. i want to start by giving you an outline of why the paris agreement is so important and it is indeed a genuinely historic event that i hope and think will be up to that point going forward. in a nutshell, this is what i

would say are the key point about paris. first establishes the first genuinely universal endurable climate regime, and an agreement that is really applicable to all. we have had others that cover all the parties, but this is the first time all the parties are taking action. second, sets us on a path of high ambition. we came into this conference that the extraordinary fact that 186 countries having put forward their target. that is completely amazing. i think if you asked anybody a year earlier with a high end of the most optimistic prediction could have bad for the number of countries, i can't imagine anyone would've told you more than 150 and i would've been 10

on a scale of 10 in terms of optimism. this was in another self quite extraordinary. it is not enough. we know that. but if you look at that first that of i.e. and d.c. projected to do, it is significant. the climate action records, one of the best outfit doing this kind of analysis that in october of 24 team that the world is on track for about a 3.6 degrees celsius increase in temperature. remember the goal of the convention generally rallied around two or below two degrees. as of october 1st of this year, because of these trenches, they put out a revised number which is 2.7. 2.7 is a long way off of where we need to go but also a long

way forward for what they predicted a year earlier. so you also have structure built into the agreement with respect to ambition. most importantly you have every five years ago full text take to see where we are doing, how we are doing with other goals. and in the year following the stock take, a time to ratchet up an individual country targeted. that enormously important and there are also very strong goals that will agree to well below two degrees and even enough for her to pursue far more a 1.5-degree goal as well as the notion of essentially climate neutrality, a balance between emissions and removal of

emissions in the world during the course of the century. very stuff. that is the second point. third, related to ambition, the agreement establishes a strong trend pair of the inviting transparency requirements of common standards for developing countries can a regular in the tour is done according to agreed international standards, regular reporting with respect to inventories in the progress countries are making towards achieving goals, robust review of all of the reporting based on expert teams and also on peer discussions to be held during big conferences. and flexibility built into the system to take into account the effect of capabilities but it is supposed to be based on not. it is not based on the fact you

are a developing country by status, but rather what capacity -- what flexibility do you need based on the real capacity. for the point i would make is the agreement revises the fundamental architecture of the system but the means differentiated among countries that is looking forward rather than looking back and was grounded as i indicated a moment ago in a countries on circumstances and capacities. the firewall between developed countries as the following from the very beginning for over 20 years. kyoto would buy us a structure was largely stillborn because of that. because of the administration we can't convince. we have no quarrel whatsoever with what needs to be treated differently with a vast range of country capabilities and differentiation absolutely.

but not a bifurcated basis according to categories written in 1992. in a nutshell that is where we are wrapped. the agreement also includes enhanced focus on adaptation which is an enormously issue and continued robust financial support. so those are all the critical features of this agreement. i have a few more minutes. i will talk for a minute on how we got this done. did you know pretty well that you had it in the back? the answer is no, not at all. there is less big meeting at the seven ministerial level. for these purposes i get to be of minister for purposes so i don't go to the meetings during the year that the seven ministerial level and the last of those this year was the week

of october night scene and it was a bad meeting, very acrimonious. there was a pause i revolt against a short and concise draft that have been put on the table by the cochairs negotiation. the previous drafts had been ungainly comp elation documents that were 90 pages or so along. not very useful. nothing i could've got us to paris. cochairs tried to cut the knot by putting forward a short concise text intended to be the thing that could take us to paris. many countries were prepared to work from it but some key players weren't. as i say, it was an acrimonious meeting in a sober analysis of essentially five weeks before going to paris said that was the last time all the parties were getting together.

it was not a quiet path to an agreement in paris. we came out of that meeting and i came out of the meeting convinced that we needed to revive the strong coalition that you had been instrumental putting together in 2011. durbin is where the mandate for the four-year negotiation was agreed to and pull together a coalition of progressive countries that included the highlands that the developing countries from latin america and that was a very important group in back in german. our main focus has been working with the biggest developing country, china, india, brazil, south africa. that coalition had kind of been quieted and the voiceless

silence this october meeting. i went to the so-called pre-cap meeting, which was two or three weeks before, very much within view of the coalition needed to be revised in strength and again. i was worried that there were certainly some in the overall group of countries, the large group of countries who very much prefer a minimalist agreement, a few sketches that would then be filled out later through negotiations over guidelines and such that wasn't at all where we stood. we were concerned about the architectural change was talking about, again the firewall was so ingrained in the game of countries that we didn't know

how that was going to go in the end. i think just to check just to tick off the factors and then i will stop so we can move on. critical factors in getting this done in the end where solidarity among the u.s. and the e.u. and the so-called umbrella group countries, basically the non-e.u. developed countries who we have group with. i think the china diplomacy we've done over the last several years and most dramatically at the end of 24 at team was hugely important. i think that there was a very important u.s. diplomacy at the highest level president obama acting very aggressively and consistent with not just china, but brazil, south africa, india, brazil and secretary kerry, my

own immediate boss was working in this issue almost constantly all year and spent the whole last week in paris. that coalition i talked about wanting to revive that came together in spades in paris. somebody, it might've been made, but certainly i didn't coin the term, but high ambition coalition became a very powerful and significant diplomatic force pushing against the notion of minimalism. i think the french did a great job that the foreign minister on a kind of true north in these negotiations which was to have the ambition, to have a regular ratcheting up rss built into the agreement and to not let that go

into not let there be a minimalist kind of result. i think that was all very important. i'm going to stop there so we don't take too much time and we can pick up questions. >> before we leave the future, was that important and certainly more public in the run-up to paris. talk for a minute about that. >> i think actually it was very important. not so much in what language is everything. now to solve the problem in this or that provision. ii think the french have been notion from the beginning to create what in their lingo they described as a pillar for, which was an odd stay at her, so subnational, governors, mayors and business. i think that all of that kind of

act two beauty and we in the u.s. and the white house had a lot of interaction with companies and i forget -- i lost track at 80 plus i think it went sagely higher than that in the number of companies who signed onto both present what they are prepared to do by 2025 themselves with regard to greenhouse gas emissions and to sign onto shirt statements supporting a strong paris outcome. that kind of activity much more broadly. i think that that -- all of the activity from outside the negotiation sent a message to people in negotiations that this is not just a bunch of climate people by themselves is a much

broader worldwide effort and in h. man. back in new york there was a big march in the streets of new york that i think again there was supposed to be one in paris that was canceled because of terrorism. that had occurred recently in paris. but all of that sends a big public engagement and certainly including, very much a living corporatization really important. the corporate engagement is we always have to remember that started the game here, the play that is necessary with respect to climate change is to accelerate the transformation of the energy base of the economy. that's what all of these agreements are about. that is what all of this is

about. >> absolutely. we'll come back to that if we can. let's talk about the coming year. key moments, key events inserted impacts on markets, political expectations. >> maybe let me start with an act on market and then talked a little bit about what we have on our agenda for this year. i think this is going to have a big impact and i think you start with a proposition that you have 196 countries to agree that the leader level that we are going to go forward, but again the amazing number of 186 of them. i think 187 was not just said yes we will sign an agreement, but here is what we are going to do and we've taken the time to figure out what we are going to do, which is an exercise of considerable complexity in its

own right. i think the sense and again the kind of loss nature of the agreement with the periodic stock takes a new commitments i dove into it with transparency measures and so forth. i think should create a sense of inevitability about where we are going and i think that sense of inevitability is going to be important and yet i don't know if it is yet i think it is important with respect to markets. it also i think is more probably i guess i'm not of enough of an expert to know if this is a change, but let's just say what paris and the kind of historic vendor headline the nature of what happened there happened at

the same moment the fossil fuel market aren't quite a lot of stress. oil, you know also comes backed to some degree. so i think that the sense that this is where we are going and there is not any turning back. i think it is the right message. i think it is real. the natural world unfortunately will keep confirming that there is not any way back. so i think it will have a big and lasting impact on market. with respect to this coming year, in the first instance, we will be focused and other countries also will be focused on the next immediate steps with respect to this agreement which is signing, joining.

some countries will take some period of years probably to join. hopefully the agreements opened for signature on april 22nd in new york. i think ban ki-moon is planning some kind of event around that, but i don't know any details. that will be important. the agreement actually enters into force upon the joining by 55 countries, comprising 55% or more of global missions. i think it would be a good thing if we are well on our way to meet those goals. it will take some time, but that will be one piece and then there will be additional elements. there is a raft of guidelines

guidance, work or grahams come it seems called in the agreement for the accompanying decision. mostly not to be done this year but to be done and the work will start on all of those guidelines and more specific guidelines on the transparency system and across a range of issues that kind of work to be done. there are additional important element for additional venues for action this year. the international civil aviation organization has their three-year assembly. the 2013 assembly which for reasons i won't go into one detail on, i ended up eating heavily involved in. there was an agreement to try to develop essentially a system, a kind of cap-and-trade system or countries, where airlines would

house the bulls in which they could then partly meet by byte offset in an effort to set up the system is going on right now. the montréal protocol regulates substances, one of the substances that was developed to not deplete the ozone level, so to be a substitute. they don't deplete the ozone level, but they are huge greenhouse gas agent. the small but growing by leaps and bounds because it is an industrial chemical that is used in air conditioning and all sorts of cool aid and sony developing world it is just sort of skyrocketing. ..