aggressive thing. in terms of complaining about mercantilism, some of the most interesting correspondences between washington and robert carrying company. if you follow that the early 1760s they are both quite candid with each other as well as the sense and interestingly enough it is not defendant. i would look at their end is

pretty explicit. some of that i quote in my book, others you can find online. now i say that with the caveat that sometimes in particular crisis appear washington keeps his own counsel things caps on profile. the duties committee is pretty quiet but more generally speaking he is talking about the mercantilist system.

>> kind of along the lines of what your doing. >> you mean in their financial efforts of the relationships with each other? >> sharing information. >> yes, we do. i have been operating from prince for a long time. about a decade ago the the branch at monticello. they do first-class work and have uncovered a great deal about jefferson.

i cannot claim any amazingly revealing new correspondence has been uncovered. i think some of revealing material i found has been jefferson's notes on conversations. washington tended to hold informal cabinet meetings but to talk to members individually. jefferson was the exception. as soon as the conversation was done.

particularly when washington started complaining about how he was feeling worn out and tired, freight his memory was going. jefferson would say tell me more. their relationship has been studied quite a bit. there has been a lot written about it. but it was clearly a nuanced the men respect each other. we tended to focus on the points of division. i saw flaws in china. when he feels jefferson was made a promise when he feels he broke the promise washington takes a personal.

his own diary which is interesting. >> a big round. >> the conversation that came out. good research to be done. i great storehouse. hindered -- younger graduate

students. now, like washington and get paid for doing this tonight. yeah. so, that means you can help out. do that in an orderly fashion.

>> don't even have to read it.

..

thank you, mr. chairman. i just want to take a moment to offer my deep condolences and solidarity with our allies in belgium across there and across the european union. this morning's first attacks are not only attack on the people of brussels but against europe and civilized people everywhere who condone such horrific acts of terror. in your written testimony you at five evolving challenges that are driving the department of planning and budget. i want to focus on the fifth challenge countering terrorism

overseas and protecting our homeland. in your written testimony you outlined objectives to defeat isil and you say the the most important to protect the homeland. with that in mind please provide the specific steps the department is taking to coordinate with its interagency partners to protect the homeland and what action congress need to take to bolster those initiatives, funding, legislative. you mentioned the development of trans-ritual counterterrorism strategy. could you describe the pillars of that and how it complements current efforts to deny terrorists a safe haven from which they can train and launch these kinds of attacks for example, here in the homeland? >> certainly. and thank you for the question. i will start and ask the chairman to reinforce. you're right, our mission of protecting the homeland which we need to do at the same time we

fight overseas to be isil is one we share with the intelligence community, with law enforcement out at all levels. and also with homeland security. we work very closely with them. through transport we have a command which is precisely that mission which is to protect the homeland by working with other interagency partners. -- northcom. we have plans to reinforce them if they request it. we support them all the time with equipment, technology, intelligence and so forth. it's a two-way street. it's a very smooth working relationship, the chairman can elaborate more of that. one thing about your particularly ask you to elaborate on is your second point. one of the things that i am looking at in connection with

what the so-called goldwater-nichols issue is strengthening the role of the joint chiefs of staff and the chairman in precisely this way, the trans-regional coordination. with combatant commanders. they are excellent but their focus on particular regions. i look to the gym and he doesn't excellent job of this, a policy resources in making sure the different ones are cooperating, northcom any other combatant commanders. >> to be specific what we did back in november we asked special operations command to take the lead. not for special operations perspective but because they did have connective tissue in each one of our combatant commands incapable of doing this. to begin development of a trans-regional terrorism plan encountered violent extremism. we been working at that for a couple of months. we had a meeting on friday

afternoon were i can think of the joint chiefs and all combatant commands to look at it. critical to that is having a common operational picture across all of our combatant commands. that's the first part. the second thing is have an assessment process that integrates with all see trans-regionally into a single vision that the secretary of defense can see. at the end of his comments, a process to make recommendations for the prioritization and allocation of resources across all combatant commands so much like we're trying to provide pressure across isil in iraq and syria we try to do the trans-regionally at the same time. so we are very focused on that. you asked a specific question about what we do and to improve our interagency, and i would add interagency and international cooperation, which is very critical. within the interagency we meet routinely and the secretary and secretary kerry lead the effort speak we do deep dive issues on resources or foreign fighters or

intelligence sharing. with regard to our partners we have a very promising initiative in jordan were we have i think up to 15 nations to participate in an information and intelligence exchange to help us just on the problem of foreign fighters. those processes are necessary. there's a lot of walls for us to break down in order for us to be effective. that's what we are in the process of doing. our trans-regional plan is designed not only to integrate our capabilities across the combatant commands but also with our coalition partners. >> thank you. i'm interested in the jordan initiative and i will have my step follow up if that's possible. thank you. >> thanks, mr. chairman. appreciate the panelists. the attack this morning reminds us we are still at war with an evil, determined enemy that must be defeated. earlier in the testimony today we had discussion about

restoring deterrence as well, peace through strength, and i'm interested in hearing first from general dunford. the rand corporation has published a study limiting regret, building the army we will need. and here we are talking about the er i initiative. rand concludes will need three armor brigade combat teams and a social forces to restore credible deterrence. i'm interested of whether or not you agree, and if you don't get what you think is necessary to restore the credible deterrence. and for both the secretary and for the chief, i have a bill, bipartisan bill over 40 core sponsors, which stops the drawdown or the army and the marine corps. that's the total army, the army, national guard, army reserve, into active duty marine corps and the marine corps reserve. assuming that that would come

with the necessary resources or operations so that we don't hollow out the force and a couple of modernization that goes with it, i'm interested in your assessment on how that would impact the risk that we currently have, given the fact earlier testimony mr. secretary, you talked about where we are today was based on a series of assumptions which have changed. so how would this posture act is enacted with the necessary resources, how do you assess that would impact the risk, and how might these additional land forces be a raid to do with such things such as the er i? >> i'll start, for the chairman on the two issues, first with the armor brigade combat teams, the chairman can elaborate but, i want to go into operational plans. we are developing our

operational plans for the defense of nato territory against both ordinary attack in what i called earlier hybrid warfare. and we are developing those plans and requirements that come from them. i'm not familiar with a particular report you cite, but that is not a necessity as a consequence of russian behavior. with respect to army and marine corps in strength, the chairman can speak to that also. i'm sure the chiefs have as well, but just in the army and marine corps, their emphasis to me and the preparation of this budget has been on readiness. and get in strength plans to come down from the levels they were previously, and their priority is the readiness of the force not changing those goals. i concur with that. chairman?

>> we've made a down payment what we need in europe and, of course, it's not just about army forces come is the aggregate. nber i think you know where that armored equipment and head quarters and other units that are part of our stocks. we pay for a constant presence of another brigade combat team to be over there for exercise and assurance for partners as well as it turns. with the overall number is that we may have a year or three years down the road i couldn't speculate. i don't think the rand stud stus wildly off base but again to me it's a function of not just look at our present and isolation but look at the aggregate of joint capability that will do what we need to do which is to deter. with regard to the industry issue, my greatest concern is, in fact, that we have balance in the force and we have not only the right force structure on the right capability. you exactly what you are going to grow the force we need to

make sure that the infrastructure supports that. make sure that manpower supports that, make sure the equipment modernization supports that anthony operations, maintenance dollars that will allow us to train as well. all of those have to be adjusted at the same time otherwise the force gets out of balance and that's where our focus was on capability overcapacity. the reason is we felt like we're getting out of balance. we did have the right amount of training, equipment in place to make sure the units we had read the highest level of readiness possible. >> thank you, general. let me say just for my colleagues and for the record people watching at home, for the record, we are on tap to draw down our land forces to pre-world war ii levels. we have general milley here last week, and he describes the array and the mission set and given the changes to the assumption as high risk, given the fact we turn this off it takes three to four years to get the combat readiness restored.

i think this bipartisan bill, we need to summon the will, give it enacted. with that i know my time is expired. thank you, chairman. >> mr. scott. >> thank you for being here today. your statement warned expanding iranian influence and increasing capability in the region. in your assessment is iran more or less capable today militarily speaking than they were the day the nuclear deal was signed? >> congressman, i believe iran was spreading the light influence before the light influence before the agreement that i think they're capable of doing it after the agreement. i haven't seen any measurable increase in the capabilities but again i'm under no illusion about what their capabilities are what the current level of activity is across the middle east. >> have you seen any change in their behavior? >> i have not. with the caveat their spreading malign influence before the agreement. >> no the of $150 billion to help them spread it.

if there's been no change in behavior then certainly by concern is the world is not more safe but less safe with them having that money. just a couple of quotes from the president. today after two years from negotiations the united states together with our international partners, animosity a stock coverage of long-term deal with the rand prevented from obtaining a nuclear weapon. offers a new direction, different path, tolerance and peaceful resolution with conflict. another quote september 10 of 15, this is a victory for democracy for america and national security of the sake and security of the world. and then the budget that was presented and i agree with the budget statement, iran's activities continue to post a threat or interest in dallas in the region to combat those threats. the budget continues efforts to

iran accountable for to destabilizing behavior by advance preparations foster come original partnerships and planning to preserve the president's options for any contingency. so one statement, september budget statement five months later. what is the defense department into medicaid, what is a clearly going with somebody iranian ballistic missile program? >> well, thank you for that. and you're right, the nuclear deal with iran was about their nuclear efforts program. if implemented it will know whether it's a limited or not, will keep them from having a nuclear weapon. that doesn't stop them from having of the capabilities and exhibiting the behavior that consensus. one of those is ballistic missile. that's why we are strengthening our ballistic missile defenses in the region, in europe, to

defend our friends and allies, our own forces that are deployed there. that's why we had aegis afloat and that's why we have beaches ashore. that's why we have our other partners procure those same missile defenses from us that's why we help israel with its defense against short-range rockets, both the iron dome system and the david cicilline system. they are developing the arrow system against longer range systems. we helped him without so we're doing a great deal in the missile defense area in that region. >> if i could quote james clapper, director of national intelligence, what he said on february 9, iran probably views joint comprehensive plan of action as a means to remove sanctions while preserving -- preserving nuclear capability.

general austin march 8, 2016 come we have not seen any indication that they intend to pursue a different path. i think he is talking about with regard to their malign activities, not specific with nuclear, with regard to general austin's statement of there. but i, just a few things that they have done since then, aside from what they did to our sailors, they've continued to test ballistic missile. october 11, 2015 detested and degeneration of surface to surface missiles. the u.n. stated this test violated resolution 1929. they launched another medium-range missile. on march 8 several missiles from multiple sites. the iranian general commits the program stated revolutionary guard court said will not give in to threats.

the time it was to have changed our commitment to the department of defense at all. we remain posture and committed to defending our friends and allies, our own interests in the region countering iran's malign influence in all of these areas. it's good if it's supplemented which it is being so far, at eliminating the nuclear danger. but for everything else we remain full speed ahead and on course for what we were doing last year, the year before, and those programs are just building. we have a major commitment. >> my time is expired. i just don't understand why we would not have included other threats in any type of deal that gave him $150 billion.

>> the gentleman's time has expired. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i like to talk about our current rules of engagement in our theaters of operation. i have service members were leaving the military and coming to me saying that this is dangerous, we are not able to engage in a way that will allow us to defeat our enemy. i understand the need to try to keep down civilian casualties. i get that completely but i have a concern with protecting our enemies more than we are those that we are sacrificing to try and save. that's the real concern. throughout history we have people have given their lives so others can live. with what we see taking place my concern is every time we let an enemy go because of our very restrictive rules of engagement, hundreds if not thousands of more innocents are killed. they become fatalities because of genocide. are we really winning? and sweat like you to address

our rules of engagement by mary so many complaints about. >> we assess and read and assess them all the time, including but they strike by strike basis. so your question is very apt, very appropriate we try to balance those things, and we do it every day and we do it in a very practical way. >> when was the last time we changed them? >> we modified all the time. let me ask the chairman to explain. >> i'd like to distinguish between rules of engagement and collateral damage. those have been considered a bit and some of the discussion. i've heard the same thing. i want to make it clear the rules of engagement are enduring. anytime one of our young soldier sailor edmond and marine is in harm's way and it's a hostile intent and you can possibly identified an enemy, they can engage. that hasn't changed. there's no restriction to do what must be done to protect themselves. with regard to collateral damage we make an assessment.

virtually on every time we engage. right now we start with a baseline of zero civilians, but i'm here to take if we have a target that justifies an expanded view of collateral damage in a particular case we will make that adjustment. so to your question when was the last time we change, i can assure you it was this morning but it was not a sometime in the last couple days were general austin made a decision to expand the number of something casualties that might be incurred in a particular target, given the importance of that target. what we have tried not to do is make enemies of the very people we are trying to protect in places like iraq and syria. we try to make sure that the entity we don't become the enemy. we are fighting with our values and at the end of the day five, 10 years from now when this war is over it will be because we won the war of values and ideas not because we dropped the bomb in one place or another. >> i understand that's a very

fine balance. i personally would give my life so my family could live if that's what it came down to. my other concern comes to come are we in any way, shape, or form can work out an international or system of justice for those that we detain? we are not even with the timmy mcveigh. with domestic terror and that it was a to situation where the end of the work we signed a peace treaty ever signed -- and return our pows. we are releasing people from guantánamo. some are returning to the fight. do we really have a formal system of justice? we are a country of laws and we have a system of justice and i think that's an expectation. i haven't seen us going in that direction. >> thank you. we have various possibilities for detention if we take a prisoner. it is lawful for detention. there is detention by transfer

to another country. we did that, for example, in the case of the raid were the custody became the government of iraq, and that we have a possible criminal prosecution in article iii courts which has also been exercised by the united states a number of convictions. with respect to guantánamo, what you see is the reason why we are looking for, i personally support this, a place to detain those people who are in guantánamo bay, but they make it clear, the people who will not be safe to transfer to another location. i will not sign off on their transfer to another location. for just the reason you described. that's why we an alternative detention facility for law of

war detainees. we need to be extremely careful about that and that's what i would like to find an alternative location. >> i would also like to see a more clear system of justice. my time has expired. >> mr. langevin. >> thank you, mr. chairman your i want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the committee today. we of per sheet -- we appreciate your service generation. we thank you for your service. secretary carter and general dunford, over the past decade the departments had to reconcile the reality of emerging great power, competition with the size and composition of our own military today. secretary, i highly commend and very supportive of your vision for the third offset strategy, and look forward to seeing how that unfolds and look forward to being supportive as we make that transformation. he on that as we did on what the architecture of our future

fighting force, what should the balance between forward deployed power insufficient search ready reserve capacity look like across the service is? >> first of all thank you for your support, third offset and so forth. it's an important part of planning for the future. i said this is a budget that tries to turn a corner, and while dealing with today's threats also look at 10, 20, 30 years ahead particularly to hide and potential opponents -- high-end. so thank you for your support. i'm sorry, the second part of your question? >> as we evaluate the architecture of our fighting force what should the balance between a forward deployed power

insufficient search ready reserve capacity look like across the service is? >> i will start nab chairman can pitch in. it's important to have forward forces, because they are the first page of the response to the crisis, number one. number two, they are being there is a way of working with friends and allies so don't have to do everything ourselves so it's important part of the building partner capacity capability. but what deters is the full weight of the american military that would arrive on the scene after those initial forces had engaged. i think that's what we would talk about deterring opponents, what deters them is not just about what's right there in front of them, what deters them is the full weight of the american military that will arise. so our surge forces are a critical part of this deterrent. no one should measure our

deterrent capability of what we have forward presence. that's an indication but it's not all story. >> getting that balance right is dynamic come and to ensure you come every year we gather up all the combatant commanders requirements for both the crisis response and assurance mission as was what the need for major operations plans, contingency. we make adjustments annually to make sure that we get that balance right between those forces that are forward deployed from fort engaged on a day-to-day basis, providing a access, making sure we're prepared to respond to crisis and also making sure the residual capabilities and capacities on the bench are prepared for major contingency. when you ask which the right balance, it's a constant process of evaluation to make sure we get exactly what you suggest that we should do which is get that balance right. >> thank you, both of you. going back to the third offset strategy and became very supportive of that as

technology, game changing will help provide us with the advantages that we need, special on cybersecurity which i've been a strong plan on and other technologies, but how do you believe would best direct our investment and our policies to assure the progress that we made toward achieving a third offset strategy is sustained into the next administration? >> i think in this and in other matters, the strategic logic behind our investments this year, behind this 17 budget is intended to point the direction towards the future. so we have crafted it carefully, and i think that both the needs it highlights in terms of the five challenges, and what we put in motion, special including these technologies are so compelling that i'm confident they will continue into the

future. >> secretary carter i've been one of the biggest proponents of cybersecurity as critical or fighting during my time in congress and i believe it's imperative the services understand the cybersecurity requirement before the my comes to beauty programs and weapons systems in order to avoid serious cost impacts and schedule delays. how are we managing cybersecurity at the enterprise level and incorporating cyber technologies into program requirements. i guess we'll have to enter that for the record. >> thank the gentleman. ms. walorski. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, mr. secretary and general dunford for bigger. following up on the question, are you working questions to close the guantánamo bay or changes to cuba speak with i am not. >> are you aware of any discussions to close the naval station at guantánamo bay or transfer to cuba?

>> i am not. >> your department oliver a product in february entitled plan for closing the guantánamo bay detention facility. this document failed to address the specific elements required by the ndaa. therefore, this committee has did the requirement has not been met. in this document there were three options ally for handling future detainees on a case-by-case basis. one was prosecution, too, transfer to another country, or three, a law of war detention. yet in recent testimony senior department of defense officials testified that there is a requirement for a long-term detention but quote they do not know where long-term prisoners would be housed. which i think this is troubling testimony considering we currently do have a location. my question is prior to conducting operatio operation we capturing individuals is either intended or possible do you have

to determine which of these three options as appropriate? >> generally speaking, we do. and have, and that has worked out. and with respect to the report, if i could just respond to that and the question of location, we were not specific about location. the reason for that is this. the optimal location for a lot of were detention facility will depend upon several things that we don't know right now. for example, we don't know whether congress is going to respond to the idea. if we can do it quickly then we will probably take an existing facility and tried to build on that. if we have an alternative, if we have a longer period of time, we may build a new facility from scratch your it will depend upon the number of detainees that we

have and that we plan for. it will depend upon the structure of the military commissions process which is something which is set in statute by the way. for the very reason we have to discuss this with congress come and we submitted this plan, let me be clear, it is forbidden by law to do this now. so we need your concurrent. >> i understand that i am very familiar with the law. >> the reason the plan calls for a dialogue between us and the deal is that we can't select the optimal design a method for the optimal location and, therefore, fully do the costing until the conversation has been have. i hope you will give it consideration. i've said and i believe this, i think would be good to put this on a path to being dealt with by the time the administration's

changed. >> and i understand i apologize for interrupting. we have talked about this for months but two things. the american people look at this as i did as a very dangerous precedent that we're looking at potentially bringing these terrorists with blood on her has already killed americans back to the so which i think is reprehensible. secondly, we reminded again with his mom this morning in brussels that it is an active war on terror and i consider three hours and the first question the chairman asked was about strategy and things are supposed to be, head over to congress in february and they still haven't. i look at this, we are still waiting for some kind of a detailed plan that the president said would be made available. my question is, is it possible that due to such factors as bureaucratic obstacles, delays in time to come inability to negotiate with another country, that opportunity to conduct a capture operation would be launched? with this issue because of the presence desire to close guantánamo ever inhibit a

question on these attacks were doing with isolate and engaging with them the issue of like let's not go there because we don't know and we don't want these long-term prisoners? >> that's not occurred in my observation. let me ask the chairman. >> though, congresswoman. and, frankly, that would be one of the first things i would ask if we were asked to do something, if it's going to be part of the decision-making to go after an individual is what's going to be the disposition of the individual. >> what is the answer comes back, we don't is long-term situations now, what is the answer comes back and says we simply don't know, or gitmo. it will is in operation right now that isn't there. i thank you, mr. chairman. >> mr. byrne. >> we are here today with the tragedy, tragic for the belgians, a tragic for the world. isis has taken responsibility for the murders of this morning. we had a marine was killed last weekend in iraq.

i know you feel that personally. we have a law that we passed the national defense authorization act. it required you to submit to the congress by february 15 a plan for defeating these people. i know you told the chairman that it was imminent. the statute says you shall do it by february 15. you are in violation of the law. with an average american is a violation of the law there are consequences. would you care to explain to the committee why there should be consequences for your failure to follow the law that was signed by your president? >> i already explained that that report will be in front of you eminently -- >> that's not my question. the statute says you shall do it by february the 15th. do you not agree that you are in violation of that while? >> we are prepared, we're going to is that that report. it's taken some time --

>> i'm going to ask you again. do not agree you are in violation of the law? >> we will have the report to you shortly. >> i don't think that's a satisfactory response. when we pass a law around it means something. people's lives are at stake. i don't think it's -- it's not too much to ask that you comply with the law that we pass and the president signed. it's not sufficient reduce its imminent. you need to give us a plan now. let me ask you about another report. you are also required to submit when the president put forth his budget a 30 your ship a plan for the navy. you didn't do that either. it's a statutory requirement. why didn't you submit the 30 year ship plans because i don't know about the 30 -- with a number of a statutory plans. we work on them very hard. the many, many, many of them.

me ask mr. mccourt casinos the status of that one spirit i think the process is also nearing completion. >> under the law that was supposed to be submitted with the president's budget request. the existing ship plan we've got calls for 52 littoral combat ships. you not amended that plan. you've requested 40. as sick of the navy has told us in this room he needs 52. he has told us there is no study to change that. his assistant secretary for acquisitions since there is no navy study or analysis that would change that. you have no 30 year ship plan to change that yet you try to elaborate change in the budget. what is your basis if you know 30 year ship plan that updates the 52 request, windows no navy, what is your basis for reducing the ship request from 52 to 40 on the lcs?

>> the basis this this, this is something that we decided all jointly and that the joint requirement, that we were going to buy 40 and 52 littoral combat ships. the littoral combat ship his successor, it's been good at what it does. it replaces -- better than the coastal patrol craft it replaces what 40 is enough. the reason we made that decision is that we thought we believe and we are convinced that the money is better spent on ships that are more capable. we are looking for more capable and lethal ships as well as more ships in the navy, and we also -- >> where a short analysis? >> we get analysis in the course of preparing the budget. >> where is it? >> we get a lot over the course of -- >> shouldn't it be in that speed we can provide that to you but the point i'm making is a very important strategic one, which

is when the chips that are more capable and more lethal and more high-end. is one of the things of fiscal budget. exactly the point you raise is -- >> if it so important why would he give us the ship plan speak with i'm sure the shipbuilding plan will reflect that. >> you are supposed to give it is when the president's budget was submitted. you and your staff may not think these laws are important, but they are. people wonder why the people of america are angry right now. they are angry because people in washington feel like they are above the law and none of us, i'm not above the law and you are not above the law. deficit plan for the middle east and give us some sort of analysis that's different from the navy's analysis on reducing the lcs request. >> we will provide those repor reports. >> ms. mcsally. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you, gentlemen. secretary carter, could you prioritize, and they have a lot of choices to make and priorities to me, no medium or

high the fight against isis in the next five years? >> its extremely high. >> about the pirate of ensuring that if we do send our troops into harm's way to have the best capability for close air support should they come under fire? >> close air support is a critical part of the joint capability. >> how about african-american who is to eject or shut down or isolate i it personal if you ned a basket of those overhead for combat search and rescue to get them out of there, low medium or high? >> combat search and rese is a must-have everywhere we have forces deployed. but as the chairman -- >> i think you would agree. i'm pleased to see that you're choosing not to mothball in a tent in this fiscal year but i'm deeply concerned about the five year plan. they send you sharing this priority are all high. we've mothballed the equivalent

of four squadrons. only nine women and are thus airplanes into than they used to. this water i can do that with another down to 18. they occur in three theaters. south korea, europe and in the fight against isis and i think you saw that firsthand i'm confused about some statements and contradictions in the fight to plan such as want to see if i can figure this out. the f-35 requirement document says the a-10 will be replaced by the f-35. the f-35 is supposed to replace the a-10. we've highlighted over the last year, i have a mini hearings, concerns about shortfalls. we need a fifth generation fighter but when it comes to close air support, the billy to take a direct ability to fly in close combat and be able to survive and their night capability and their digital targeting capability. because of that your operation test and evaluation has agreed

to do a fly off between the f-35 and the a-10 as part of the evaluation of the f-35. we were glad to see because we are concerned this basil increase risk and so we see that there's an improved replacement you say the a-10 will be replaced squadron by squadron by the f-35. seems the outcome is being predetermined. that's my first concern. we have yet have a fly off. we think it will happen in fy '18 or 19 yet you are saying we are predetermined outcome that the tranten under and -- the a-10 will be replaced. we have air force leadership when asked in hearing about over the last week basically says the f-35 is that could replace the a-10. that would be more the f-16 which contradicts their acquirements documents and your own statement. if you look at the air force five year plan to put 49 a-10 in the boneyard in fy '19, 64 after that.

basically they're getting rid of the a-10 a fly off isn't what happened until, won't see the outcome of whether we left the decrease in capabilities until at least a couple years down the line. i'm just concerned about these contradictions. the air force is saying manning is their challenge, that this is the nearest -- newest excuse. you last looked at with hundreds of people that are playing the tuba and a clinic wearing the uniform as opposed to core military capabilities. if we had a mini crisis would tell people to put down the tube and pick up a gun. i'm concerned with where we are but not in these conflicting statements. i would just ask you do you think if we put the a-10 and the boneyard before we have a replacement for the high party mission of the be a risk to american lives? >> what we need in the joint force is the ability to deliver close air support effectively and we need, as you know it's

not just a pilot for mission editor information or as an advocate for joint capabilities ideally we need a transition plan before it goes away. there's no question spirit that made you don't agree putting in the boneyard before even assess whether the f-35 would replace it? >> what i don't agree with is getting rid of the capability without replacing it. what i can say without going into great length as we recently met with all the chiefs, general welsh was there, typically to finish a close air support and to make sure we are looking carefully at the platforms that are being introduced, with gaps will exist, how do we mitigate those gaps and from that if we can't mitigate of the cap how does that inform the program in future. congress has generated quite a bit of interest inside the department and as a proponent for joint capabilities i can assure you a look at this to make sure the joint force have the close air support capable it needs to have.

>> i believe we need a conditional based replacement not a time-based replacement, that we shouldn't be putting any more of these in the boneyard. >> mr. coffman. >> mr. chairman. general dunford, first of all thank you all order service to country. general dunford, how would you assess our combined arms capability today, that we've been involved in counterinsurgency warfare for quite some time although we are denmark and advise and assist role? i'm concerned about just the fact we have not trained for some time, and how would you do this, how would you make that assessment? >> there's a question over the course of almost a decade involving primary counterinsurgency operations, the joint forces to go to integrate come by a combined

arms has eroded we are two-and-a-half, three years into focusing on that once again. are we where we need to be? know we are not. that's exactly what we're focused on both restore full spectrum readiness as well is make a short exercise regenerate the kind of capability we had. >> i'm concerned that i would hope respectively would take a harder look at shifting more capability to the guard and reserve and also not allowing them to lapse in come into being a strategic reserve, and to somehow maintain them as an operational reserve. take a look at the return of requirements, potential mobilizing them on a periodic basis, even in peacetime role, to maintain their effectiveness but i think that we are not taking a hard enough look

prospectively at being able to more cost-effectively maintain our capability, but utilize the guard and reserve more. i wonder if you post a comment on that? >> i concur with you that we need to do more thinking. we are doing or thinking. i think that the simple dichotomy between an operational reserve and a strategic reserve made sense in the cold war. i think the reserve component proved its versatility in the course of the years of war in iraq and afghanistan. and is proving uniquely fallible in some particular areas. i mentioned cyber earlier. that's very important. that's not an itch, it's a exotic that's a critical part of our future. and so i think being created an effective about the use of the reserve component for strategic

effect, not as a strategic reserve and the old core will war since come absolute we are thinking that way when you continue to think that way. >> one of my responsibilities we have a second as global force management. i can assure you right now in virtually every place where we are, the joint force come the guard and reserve are fully integrated. as you know the difference between a strategic reserve an operational reserve is that we would not typically be using them in the kind of, to meet the requirements were meeting today. you can go to south america today, guard and reserve are down there doing partnership capacity. you go to africa, asia, look at bct is better being mobilized in iraq and afghanistan. i would tell you today the guard and reserve ar are fully integrd into all the commitments the joint force had and i would envision that to be the case in the future not just because it helps to maintain effective guard and reserve but because we can't meet our requirements without fully integrating the guard and reserve into our

overall force management processes. >> i do think that the arkham when i look at the personnel across differences between an active duty soldier and guard and reserve member, nondeployed, that they are fairly extraordinary. whatever we can do i think to be able to save money but maintain capability, i think we really need to take a look at going forward. i think the last question, in your view of this attack and belgian, is it a result of the fact that we are making gains in iraq in transit in terms of on the isis and isis needs to maintain the narrative of being ascended in order to attract recruits and money from across the radical islamic world? and that this is a way to maintain that narrative by

striking outside their territory? >> i can't say whether this particular attack as a result of that but we've always said and we anticipate that as we put increased pressure on the enemy in iraq and syria and their narrative begins to erode it is the resources the road and so forth, that they will lash out and conduct terrorist attacks. we would expect the kinds of things we saw in belgium to the result of pressure that the field in other places potential question about it. they will balanced conventional tactics which was seen from the enemy with guerrilla tactics in places like syria anorak to maintain relevance and continue the jihad. there's no question about it. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> i thank the gentleman. if you all will allow me after just a couple of issues i want to touch on right quick. mr. mccord, we talked a lot about writing is in training and maintenance. it is true is another virtual all the money for training, for maintenance of aircraft and so

forth is in the base part of the budget? >> that's correct. the vast majority this, mr. chairman. >> secondly, my understanding is as y'all were putting together your budget request, over $5 billion of that request was, $5 billion on savings, inflation and especially fuel savings. obviously the price of oil goes up and down. you have a very long period when you have to formulate your budget. my question is asked to look at it today, how do you assumptions on the price of fuel measure against the reality of today? is a better or worse than you assumed? >> it is better today. are you talking fy '16 or 17? >> seventeen. >> the prices were directed to

some are higher today. as you know that fiscal year hasn't even started able to start for sometime and we will go a year after that so there's a longtime these prices have told before such savings would be realized but they are lower today. >> i'm just a little concerned that the our assumptions built in the budget and nobody knows what the price of oil is going to be, although it has been going up some in recent days. but as you point out this doesn't start until october 1. i was just wondering how that measured up. 10 usc 153 requires the chairman of the joint chiefs or by a risk assessment to congress by february 15. we heard from the service chiefs that they have provided that input to the chairman. my understand is it's been done and it's sitting in osd somewhere. y'all have any clue about when that might be coming? >> chairman, i can answer that we get completed sometime ago.

what we want to do is bring in come teach together in the tank to discuss with the secretary. we did that a week ago monday. so we now have got to secretary and i should be coming over right away. i mean, it is complete. we worked on it pretty hard this time and what you see is a different organization construct. will look at each of the five challenges and get after in a meaningful way the risks of sosa with each one of those five challenges. than what i would call it cost-cutting risk of the joint force. while it has been a couple of weeks late now, hope you'll find it worth it. one of the reasons why we kept it a little bit longer was we could have an opportunity to do a face-to-face with the chiefs and the secretary, and we did complete that last monday. >> i do think this is important, so i look forward to it. it is significant for the committee. if i could just make an offer again to both of you. it has been one of michael's, and i've not been as successful as a wanted to to reduce the

paperwork burdens that congress put on the department. so few reports come at a briefing can be done, at one time report rather than a recurring report. i would offer again if y'all want to submit to us reports that you think are superfluous or over burdensome, not worth the time and effort, give me that and i will definitely look at it. because i want to continue to reduce the unnecessary, or less than necessary, paperwork burdens that congress put on the department. at the same time as you've heard today, what's left we are serious about. and so time is important. again, we talked about the isis report, come up with reprogramming request that we don't have a strategy on where it's happening. so i'm trying to be calm have fewer things but serious about the ones that we have. please tell me and gave it to me about things you think are

unnecessary, but at the same time as you've heard some of today, i think there is frustration when the law is not complied with. finally, general dunford, i saw an open letter signed by several dozen retired military, other notable names, at the time was right to we look at goldwater-nichols of 30 years ago. and we need to be serious to significant changes were in order. although they did not detail what those changes should be by the way and nobody. so i want to ask you your view, i know there's a fair amount of interest about examining and perhaps modifying the goldwater-nichols requirements. please tell me where you think we are on.com i if it needs to happen and then suggestions you may have. >> thanks chairman. first of all i do think there is

an imperative for reform at this time and i think it's a result of a change in the character for. the basic nature of war in my estimation doesn't change. the character of what has changed. by that specific i mean most of the crises and contingencies we have today transracial, cut across multiple combatant commands. multi-domain, sea, air space, cyberspace, undersea and multifunctional. ballistic missile defense, special operations and so forth. that has changed the nature of integration of the joint force and, frankly, the requirements for the second debate timely decisions in a transracial multi-domain multi-functional fight. the more fundamental areas we need to look out for change with regard to goldwater-nichols is, number one, making sure secretary does have the ability to make decisions in a timely matter in making sure does have the ability to integrate the joint force in that transit regional multi-functional fight. it requires in my estimation the

joint staff to take a different approach of strategy and to ensure we write strategy for example, if a problem since we spoke about today. so it isn't just an aggregation of operations plan if we did with russia or china much of a strategic framework within reach -- within each of those are met. i think the strategy needs to be refined in or to provide a framework within which all plans are developed at the final piece of that and execution is the sector's ability to prioritize and allocate resources in a timely manner for a fight that is ongoing and multiple combatant commands at the same time. as we think about reform, we should focus on the character of war and what reforms are necessary to make sure we can fight in the 21st century. what i've alluded to our fundamental changes in war fighting in the 21st century that i think we can reinforce and optimize the joint force ability to meet with some very fundamental changes and i'm prepared to make those recommendations to hear. hear. >> and may i just second that? that's exactly along the lines we were thinking, wha but i oveo

earlier. obviously, we need your support and that requires a statutory change, but those are the dimensions to which i'm looking to the joint staff, the joint chiefs of staff especially the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, given the changing nature of warfare. >> i'm anxious to see what you suggest, even if it's not all the reforms that some of these other folks are pursuing, but obviously with the market for this committee and about a month away for us to have time to look at it we want to see it promptly. >> i'm planning that, quite soon. it will involve the capabilities the joint chiefs of staff and the chairman, while preserving the independent military advice that they provide to me and the president. >> good. thank you. thank you, all three, for being

here today. getting stands adjourned. -- the hearing stands adjourned. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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.. >> thank you, mr. speaker. the tax cut was gained in inheritance tax 4 billion cuts and hang out with the people or does doesn't fit there into it yet again. >> can i remind the honorable gentleman that there is 70,000 scholars with the corporation. he says he opposes that.