>> there are a lot of things we prefer the russians do that they don't do. that has led a situation where russia is more isolated than they been quite some time. dataset consequences for their broader economy but at the same time it has not prevent us to coordinate on some areas including nuclear security with the russians in the way it enhances both our countries national security. the iran's agreement and the recently imposed sanctions against north korea are the two best examples of that. those things could not have happened without russia's constructive participation in the process.

>> sort of like having to use not at -- can imagine that? if such an enormous nuclear program and have had for years. then not taking part of such an important summit seems to be a myth. >> we would welcome russia's constructive participation in all this but it has not affected our ability to advance the goals of our two countries. let me give you come a couple other examples. the united states does work effectively with russia to secure some nuclear material that is in you pakistan. obviously, -- uzbekistan. >> is this iran by chance because i don't know much about that nuclear richard but i do know that the russians have worked effectively with the united states to safeguard that major you. i don't know it's current status but it's another example of how the united states and russia to work together even if it's not in the context of the security summit.

the other thing i would observe is russia's agreement early in president obama's tenure to sign onto the update of the star trek the that has a positive impact -- this s.t.a.r.t. treaty. we are able to cooperate with them on a whole range of nuclear issues that are high priorities for the united states, even the russia unfortunately has chosen not to participate in this year's a summit. >> the supreme leader in iran says that it's the time of both missiles and dialogue making the comment of like to continue their missile program despite the fact there are major limitations base of the iran nuclear deal. what is your reaction to the supreme leaders, and? >> well look, my understanding is as of today france, germany, the united kingdom and the united states submitted a report to the u.n. security council, to

the u.n. security council. documenting how iran's ballistic missile activities are inconsistent with u.n. security council standards. and we are going to continue to hold iran to account for the. you will recall just last week the united states announced a new set of sanctions that would be imposed on iran for their continued violation of regulations applying to their missile program. and we continue to be serious about that. we have announced next month the president will be traveling to saudi arabia where the president will be meeting with saudi arabia and other gcc countries to discuss our ongoing effort to coordinate our interdiction efforts. we know that iran is trying to illicitly ship and acquire technology that could be used to advance their ballistic missile program. we continue to look for ways to

coordinate with other countries in the region to prevent that illicit behavior from continuing. and so the president has made this a priority, and there have been consequences, including economic consequences, for iran's failure to pursue a program that's inconsistent with what's envisioned by the united nations. >> the consequences would not impact the 150 billion assets that were unfrozen and completion of the deal, greg? >> the 150 billion number is not one but we can avoid that argument for now. our concerns with iran's ballistic missile program is something that we have long had an outcome first to reach an international agreement to prevent iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon did not address our long-standing concerns with iran's ballistic missile

program, except the reason we are trying and committed to successfully completing this agreement to prevent them from obtaining a nuclear weapon is we were mindful of the fact you're developing a missile program that would make the development of nuclear weapons even more dangerous. so that's why we'll we made this a priority. but no, to answer your question directly. know, our ongoing concerns with iran's ballistic missile program and our efforts to counter it will not affect our ability to continue to implement the agreement that will prevent iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon that could potentially be placed atop a ballistic missile. >> final one from me, the fbi apple story. should the american public from the white house perspective have any presumption of privacy from law enforcement? >> yes, absolutely. the reason they should be confident in that part of this is because there are laws on the books that are followed by a law

enforcement and national security officials to protect the privacy of the american people. in fact, the president led the effort in congress to reform some of these surveillance programs to give greater confidence and inspire greater confidence on the part of the american people in our ability to protect the american people's privacy even as we undertake the necessary action to protect our national security. the whole debate about, between apple and the fbi and the kind of this investigation was actually taking place not between the two of them but in a court of law. because there is a judge that was providing over this debate to ensure that the privacy of the neck and people was protected. and that is the way our system should work and that is why people can have confidence in their right to privacy. because we know that there are laws that are on the books that are followed by our national security law enforcement professionals to protect the privacy. we have a whole judicial branch

that understands that they have a need to interpret the law to both protect our privacy but also to keep us safe. and that is essentially in the mind of the president exactly how this process should play out, okay? >> just on the isis again. it seems like it's a unique moment because all these world leaders -- you mentioned there's some things the president thinks the coalition should be doing more, like the europeans of sharing information. is there anything else, what else specifically are the shortcomings the president thinks need to be trumped up in the coalition to move this whole situation forward speak with let me answer that in a couple of ways. let me point out the counter isolating the president will convene later this week is something we've been planning since the beginning of this year. so even before the brussels terrorist attacks. so this isn't in direct response

to that but, of course, the attacks we saw in brussels will only add to the urgency that's part of his meager i just want to make a part of a clear. more generally you've identified two of the most frequent tasks we make up our iso coalition partners which is improve intelligence sharing and improve efforts to secure the turkey-syria border. i know that secretary carter has talked at some length about more significant military contributions than some of our partners could make to our counter isil campaign. the are a number of requests that we have made related to gathering intelligence about isil's financing activities, and our efforts to coordinate on that have been very useful but there are some instances where we put our partners could do more. i'm confident that someone like

brick mact or could you be more detail, wish list if you will release the request list that we have put in front of other members of our coalition at what we've got to do is to capitalize on the expertise of our partners in certain areas to effectively integrate it into a broader counter isil coalition to maximize our efforts. and so we can see the g20 deals. >> on the military part, is the president convinced this effort cannot be won without significant ground to present? >> well, let me answer that, well, the president has been clear -- >> some boots on the ground. in principle i think the u.s. strategy has relied heavily on airstrikes. now we've had paris, brussels, so what is so forth. and there's been progress as you have rightly noted but in terms of fundamentally, does the

president think that there has to be a significant ground military troop component to ultimately destroy isis that is not there now? >> well, our strategy when it comes to making military progress against isil and recognize that's just one component but clearly a very important one, that strategy has rested upon the notion that we need to build the capacity of fighters inside those countries to fight for the security situation in their own country. obviously, situations in iraq and syria are quite different. with a pretty effective, we've received effective cooperation from the iraqi central government who is committed to the site. and the united states has offered them significant financial assistance to carry out this fight. the united states has offered significant training assistance to enhance the capacity of the fighters to carry out this

fight. that are even your special operation forces that are offering some advice and assistance, even as these iraqis forces carry out military operations. there is no denying that their efforts on the ground are greatly enhanced by the precision airstrikes that are carried out by u.s. and coalition military pilots. that is our strategy and that is why we been able to drive a isil out of about 40% of the populated territory that they previous occupied. the calculation in syria is different because we don't have that effective cooperation with the central government in syria enemies of the united states has had to put a small number of individuals on the ground to try to organize the efforts of fighters on the ground that our focus on taking the fight to isil. we have made important progress in that regard driving isil out of kobani, indicating to take some steps that would sever the

link between dhaka and mosul. >> -- raqqa. [inaudible] >> or an effort to get mosul back. so in the syrian contact as you point out it's different is still the believe of the magician that can be done by enhancing the capacity of troops without the significant foreign component? the ultimate question is this the president going to say to the coalition come look, if come look, everyone doing this with got to send troops in now. >> i think the presidency is that, at the core of the fighting forces on the ground has to be individuals were fighting for the own country. we've learned the lessons of naprosyn that kind of strategy. so it doesn't mean that there could be other ways for other countries to contribute to that effort on the ground, and i would defer entirely to

ambassador mcgurk and secretary carter to discuss exactly what they would envision, but the truth is, we know that there's a very small number of u.s. military personnel on the ground inside of syria that are contributing to that effort. they are not on the front lines but they sort of like a very valid role in offering advice and assistance to this alliance of fighters on the ground in syria. are there more robust military contributions that could be made by other members of our coalition? i wouldn't rule that out but the principles we are dealing with is the core of the fighting force on the ground can and must be people who are fighting for their own country. >> on the judge garland nominations come is anything that's happened that is give you more hope and optimism? i know that was the meeting --

is there anything else that you can point to that's progress towards moving this domination forward? >> i would direct you to the public comments made both by senator kirk and senator collins in the last 24 hours, that i think would sound strikingly similar to the sentiments you've heard me and other administration officials articulate about the sense of a fully the constitution of the senator kirk said he observed when you just say you're not going to meet them and all that, it's too closed minded. it's a pretty direct rebuke of the statement from the senate majority leader and the chairman of the senate judiciary committee who said they didn't intend to meet with this individual. senator grassley has will be so expressed some openness to that and we are working to schedule that within. senator collins was even more direct but she said that she was perplexed, her words, by the position that was taken by senate republican leaders.

she said it just seems to me to be no basis in saying that no matter the president nominates, we were not going to consider that individual. so i think that does represent, i think that does serve as an illustration that more than a handful of republicans are pretty uncomfortable with the position that they have adopted, vis-à-vis chief judge garland's nomination to the supreme court. >> no more from commitments, meetings, nothing that is on the books that we did know about? >> nothing that -- >> the grassy median and still not scheduled? >> it is not scheduled at this point but we are working to schedule it. but look at the are now 17 republican senators that indicate an openness to meeting with them. you will recall in the hours after justice scalia's untimely death, leader mcconnell put out a statement ruling out any sort of consideration of the

president's nominee. i think the service is a significant erosion in his come or in the republican party's position. i also would note there's been a not insignificant erosion in the senate republican poll numbers, that we have seen the american public expressed some concern with the republican insistence that they're not going to fulfill their constitutional responsibility i think the american people understand this is not a principled position. it is a political one. senator johnson, republican from wisconsin to admit as much a he said the senate would be treating a republican president's nominee much different than they are treating president obama's nominee. they're doing it now because they've been substantive objection to chief judge garland republicans say that you get in on he was nominated by a democratic president. that's not the way our system is supposed to work. there is ample data indicate most republicans are

uncomfortable with that kind of contention, and that's the case will continue to make and that's why we are i think that's why we see the progress we have made. it's not at all unrelated to the fact that the president has appointed someone whose qualifications are beyond question. we have appointed somebody who understands that it's his responsibility under the law, not to address a political agenda and that something is demonstrated over his 19 years on the bench which by the what is more federal judiciary experience than any other supreme court nominee in the history of this country. >> one more. [inaudible] what is your reaction? >> i have to admit i haven't been following the ins and outs of this legal place closely so i don't -- look, at least in terms of that's a legal case come i haven't been following to i don't know if he has made bail yet, for example. that was a joke. you guys are no fun.

walking active telling you will have some fun today. [inaudible] >> that's my question is what is your reaction? >> will look, here's the thing, there is no denying that the kind of actions and statements we've seen from this campaign is completely outside the realm of acceptable behavior has been observed by democratic and republican president over the course of our history. so i feel confident in doing something that i always loath to do which is express a view i'm confident even president georgee w. bush would agree with. this as well but because this is the prospect mr. trump raise. i'm confident that neither president obama nor president bush would tolerate someone on their staff being accused of physically assaulting a reporter, lying about it and

then blaming the victim. that is completely unacceptable behavior and i'm confident that i know for fact it's not something president obama would tolerate and i feel confident in telling you that's not something that president bush would tolerate. i'm also confident in telling you know what particularly surprise that that is being a mr. trump doesn't just seem to tolerate, he seems to encourage. [inaudible] >> i suspect that based on the types of principles and commitment to values that despite our political differences made clear that assaulting a reporter is wrong, assaulting women is wrong, and the accusations that have been raised about corey lewandowski's conduct go directly to those core values. and i get unhappy for president bush or some who works for him to say this on their own i'm

confident day, despite a may disagree on the range of issues, i'm confident he would agree with me on this one. >> one other come related question. donald trump said last night that more country should have nuclear weapons, including japan and south korea, that speed i guess we will not invite him to the nuclear summit either last night. >> -- [laughter] >> which a response to the suggestion of our country should be developing their own nuclear weapon? >> well, that prospect would be incredibly destabilizing. and i think the best way to sort of view this come will come i think ar are a couple of differt ways to view it. let's do it through sort of the prism of examining the situation in north korea. might have a policy of the united states, a policy that a strong suppor supporter by the d international committee companies that we should denuclearize the korean peninsula. so mr. trump's suggestion that somehow we should encourage our

allies in south korea to develop nuclear weapons is directly contrary to a policy that the united states has long pursued and to strictly country for policy that the international community has long supported. and it's hard for me to imagine why it would be a good idea to give the north koreans any justification for any incentive to further accelerate their nuclear weapons program. doesn't make any sense. and what protects south korea and japan is knowing that they have the steadfast support of the most powerful country in the world. at the united states will stand shoulder to shoulder with them as they confront the nuclear menacing from north korea. they rightly take great comfort in that, and it is why it's particularly important that our country is led by a commander-in-chief who

understands the consequences of his words and his policy decision. >> image in the process of doj for reviewing clemency. [inaudible] thanks to "usa today" we have a letter about all kinds of roadblocks. no event involving access in the white house. is the white house doing anything to address that? >> i think there are a couple of concerned raise and some of them are not inconsistent with concerns that we can. the first is we would like to see that unit of the department of justice be given more resources to do their work. and in the president's latest budget proposal there's a significant increase proposed for the budget of the office. more generally, we have seen a steady ramping up of that office is the ability to review applications and send recommendations to the president. and we've been pleased with the improvement we have seen.

that includes some of the work that was done by the previous leader of the office. she deserves some credit for that. but what the president is interested in seeing improvement and building of the momentum that has been built up, we are and how to confident in the current leadership of that operation to fulfill the president's promise. >> the council said these individualities are no substitute for broad reform. is the administration de-emphasizing individual clemencies? >> no. not at all. in fact, that president is serious of a using his executive authority try to correct injustices in the system where they are detected. but the best way to do this is for the united states congress to work in bipartisan fashion to pass the kind of criminal justice one that would aspire greater confidence to the american people that our criminal justice system is more effective in bringing about justice. >> i want to go back to the

apple an fbi case. the fbi was able to access this phone. to our reports apple wants to know exactly how they were able to do so. we were told this was an interagency decision. we are to those discussion stand at how involved is the white house going to be? >> well, i am not aware of the status of those discussion. obviously, there will be, we value the important dialogue between the government and technology companies. we obviously value the cooperation that many of those technology companies have linked to law enforcement as they do things that make us safer. we talked about some of these examples. we've enjoyed important cooperation with technology companies, for example, in shutting down chopper naqvi at our ability to work with those companies only enhanced our a building to stop the spread of that crime.

a similar statement could be made about human trafficking that many human traffickers have turned to online and so should be tools to try to market their criminal activity. we've been able to work effectively with the technology companies. we been able to find common ground in the past on these kinds of priorities and certainly when it comes to a national study of the united states and the ability of terrorists to carry out acts of violence against innocent a drunk americans, we should be able to find some common ground of there. we are hopeful we will be up continued our coordination not just with apple but all technology copies in a way that doesn't undermine anybody's basic commitment to privacy and robust encryption. out all the president himself a city as a strong believer in the robust deployment of strong encryption. >> does the government have a responsibility to alert compass like apple -- theoretically

affect millions of people? >> what i can assure you of is where interest in a just dialogue with technology companies. i can't get into the status of any ongoing conversations but i can do it as a matter of principle we value the kind of cooperation we've received from technology companies. it is not required anybody to capitulate on their daily herald values or on their business model. what -- acknowledging where our interests overlap we've been able to make important progress that has protected the privacy of the american people while also protecting the national security of the united states. that kind of cooperation would not be possible without an effective dialogue. we are committed to that dialogue in general. that dialogue will continue but i don't have an update for in terms of whether discussions are as relates to this specific matter. >> senator grassley this week said democrats would eventually force a vote.

is something the white house is a service or considering? >> i pointed to the public, to senator kirk in senator collins as illustrations of the discomfort o and some republicas are experiencing as relates to the position on confirming chief judge garland to the supreme court. actually think the quote you just make it is probably the best illustration of how uncomfortable republicans are with their position. it seems strange that chairman of the judiciary committee would be suggesting that the judiciary committees constitutional responsibility to consider the president supreme court nominee should be circumvented by democrats. the truth is the judiciary committee and the chairman of the judiciary committee should just fulfill their constitutional responsibility. that's the way this process should move forward. i know republicans have suggested while they don't want this process to be swept up in

presidential politics, it's a little hard for them to make that claim when they suggest this decision should be made into without an opportunity to play presidential politics and determining the next president is going to be. that doesn't make sense t but te best way for us to prevent this process from being further polluted by partisan politics is for the president, first of all, to put forward an individual who is of compass that unquestioned credentials but, in fact, that's exactly what the president has done. is put forward somebody with a strong track record in 19 you 1y to get on the federal judiciary of fair-mindedness and fairness, and a commitment to interpreting the law of not advancing a political agenda. that's what even republicans have described him as a consensus candidate. that's the best way for us to reduce the political pollution around this nomination.

and that means republicans also have a responsibly to fulfill their constitutional obligatio obligations. republicans have a much better case if the president has put forward somebody who was unquestioned credentials but it was geared towards specifically trying to influence the outcome of the presidential race, or trying to drive up turnout and provoked a big partisan political fight. the president didn't choose that path to the president chose the path of choosing somebody that even republicans said was a consensus nominee. and even in the last two weeks republicans promised to treat the prices dominate as a piñata come if most republican senators have acknowledged -- guitar do argue the fact that chief judge garland deserve a lifetime appointment on the corporate his credentials as a public service to this point demonstrate that he is clearly qualified for the important job. but i'm not suggesting they

should just take the president at this site or even judge garland at face. the president put forward chief judge garland's nomination probably within four or five weeks so that there would be ample time for the senate to conduct their usual process. and that includes giving chief judge garland the opportunity to testify before the senate judiciary committee. i described as an opportunity and make a sort of center. typically those hearings are pretty tough. you on camera for hours at a time, testifying under oath and are facing tough questions and republicans about a range of complex legal issues that us and the consequent for the united states. that's an arduous process but that's what it should be. that's the arduous process that any nominee should have to undergo. and the president is confident that after chief judge garland goes through that process, but in the minds of the megan people and the members of the united states senate, that they will all arrive at the same

conclusion, or they should arrive at the same conclusion the president did which is chief judge garland would serve with honor and distinction on the supreme court and that's what we believe the united states senate and particularly the members of the senate judiciary committee should get to work. [inaudible] a viable option? >> right now what we believe should happen is that the senate judiciary committee should do their job. i will be honest with you, the fourth senator grassley mentioned this at a town hall meeting in a way that apparently was unplanned and not carefully thought through, i could realize there was a discharge petition process on the society that may be my own size. -- site. that is not something that she's consideration because there's ample time for senate republicans to actually follow through on leader mcconnell's comments to get congress moving again. there is no reason that it would operate under the timeline that previous supreme court nominees

have in the last 30 years, that chief judge garland should be able to get a hearing, and a fair up or down vote before the senate goes into recess. and more important before the supreme court begins their next term in october. if the senate doesn't do that we will be encountering a situation that is unprecedented in at least recent supreme court history in which one judicial vacancy actually has an impact on two different supreme court terms. >> thank you, josh. one question. does the white house there is congressional affairs office offered to any of these republican senators such as senator collins, kirk or more rant of kansas or is this all spontaneous? is it news to you when you make statements like this as it is to us or have they been talking to the congressional liaison office? >> i can do the white house was

in touch with every office of every united states senator in advance of the president announcing chief judge garland was the nominee. the president takes a quite justly is responsible to offer advise and consent the and the if statement indicating their willingness or even desire to be with chief judge garland in, we followed up with them to schedule those meetings. so we have been in touch but i feel confident that senator kirk in senator collins are articulating their genuine opinion on this. >> the other thing is iran. on january 28, signed an agreement, i believe signed by president rouhani himself to acquire 118 airbus is that presumably are going to be used for commerce and business. is there any evidence at all that this has benefited u.s. business in the last three months in anyway?

>> well, i guess i would encourage you to check with the commerce department. the art whole range of regulations that prevent extensive business ties between the united states ever been. that's because of concerns about the way iran continues to support terrorism, the way iran frequently violates the basic human rights of the people. the way iran continues to develop ballistic missile program the way iran can choose different our closest ally in the middle east israel. and that's left iran pretty isolated. now, they've got some sanctions with because they follow through on their commitments as a part of the international agreement to prevent iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. we didn't trust. we verified they follow through it the significant limitations that remain in place on u.s. businesses doing business with iran have not changed. and will not change until we see iran began to pursue a path that demonstrate a commitment to

comply with basic universal or at least international principles about human rights and terrorism and their military program, okay? andrew, i will give you the last one. [inaudible] the administration position that assad should step aside speaks what we've said is president assad should step aside because until he does we will not see an end to the political turmoil and chaos that has been in place in the country for far too long. it is because of president assad failed leadership that we have reached this point. that is the root cause of the violence and mass migration that we have seen debate is also the root cause of the terrible atrocities that have been committed in syria and hundred of thousands of people who have lost their lives as a result of

president assad failed leadership and that's why we continue to believe that we're e not going to resolve this situation until president assad makes it a clear commitment to leave. >> you seem to be more specific on the topic you said it would be a nonstarter for assad to be involved in the transitional -- >> i think what i said is that it will not, that the chaos and violence and turmoil inside of syria will not come to an end until president assad has left office. that has long been our position, and it continues to be. okay? thank you, guys. [inaudible conversations] >> as you heard of josh earnest discuss the 2016 nuclear security summit is in washington, d.c. this week with more than 50 nations taking

part. leaders will discuss how to prevent nuclear terrorism and the smuggling and proliferation of nuclear matthias. dignitaries are scheduled to arrive tomorrow afternoon. the summer will kick off on friday morning. this will be the fourth and final summit of its kind. >> and next, frank rose confesses to get a state for arms control, verification, and compliance discusses what's been done to improve nuclear security for america and its allies under the obama administration. from the wilson center this is about one hour. >> good morning. i'm jane harman, president and ceo of the wilson center, and delighted to introduce very important national conversation on the nuclear summit and beyond, progress or regress. i would like to welcome some of the smartest people in washington to this audience but also welcome any who are watching this by other means,

many of which are in the back of the room. seven years ago president obama delivered a major speech in prague, promising to fight for a world without nuclear weapons. to get the work done he brought leaders from around the world to washington. hosting the first nuclear security summit here in 2010. south korea then took the baton in 2012 and benevolence in 2014. this week in 2016, the summit is back in washington, d.c. and it's time for a status report. to manage the nuclear file, the united states needs to walk and chew gum, to quote, to recall a comment about former president gerald ford. death threats are not one size fits all. we have to keep our eyes on great powers like russia. we need to watch regional pariahs like iran and north

korea, and we need to ensure that terror groups never get their hands on nuclear material, as isil, in belgium lastly. the conventional wisdom today looks a lot more like, a lot more like it did in 2009 when president obama launched his conversation. many believe the risk of a planet destroying exchange has gone down while the threat of a single attack by kim jong-un come al-qaeda or others, has gone up. but i don't think we can rule out a major conflict. what keeps me up at night is the risk of miscalculation, the accidental clash between the u.s. and russia, perhaps our syria. or pakistan and india that escalates and that leads to places neither party intended. many regions, we all know this,

are ready to blow. the use of a radiological weapon of any kind in syria could become an international crisis overnight. and if the world's responsible nations, the grown-ups in the situation room, can't manage these risks, then that's the ballgame. as usual the wilson center is ahead of this problem. nonproliferation is one of our so-called length of excellence. and today's conversation is led by our top expert on the issue, robert litwak. tonight is our vice president for scholars. he handled this file on bill clinton's national security council and is the author of iran's nuclear just one of the go to monographs on this subject. today he moderates a conversation with brilliant thinkers and very good friends. want to thank a special friend, ambassador bob colucci, call out the honorable frank miller with whom i serve on the defense policy board and then embarrass

assistant secretary of state frank rose for joining us. frank, back in the old days, was a member of the start of the house intelligence committee were i served for eight years. he was a member, card-carrying member of team harmony and we have a saying that you can join team harmony time you want, but you can never leave. so we may think he works for john kerry but actually not so much. in addition to us these to workr frank miller so go figure. but to you, robert gallucci and both france and we are delighted to hear. you know a lot more about the subject than most people that i've got to say the guy who knows the most is the moderator. please welcome rob litwak. [applause] >> thank you, jane. good morning to everyone here, and to those viewing on c-span and other networks are the

format will be i'll ask our distinguished panel is a set of questions covering major topics for half an hour or so. and then we'll open it up to the audience for your questions. let's begin with an overview. it's now been almost seven years since president obama's landmark prague speech. it laid out an ambitious arms control and nonproliferation agenda. but today's world looks very different than that in which the speech was delivered. how do you in hindsight view the jackets of the speech and its legacy? let's start with frank rose. >> thanks so much for having here and it's a real pleasure to be on stage with frank miller, robert gallucci and yourself and thank you congresswoman harman for having me here again today. it's kind of like the hotel california, you can check in but you can never leave. over all, rob, i think over the last seven years if you look at the balance sheet, we have done

a lot to improve nuclear security for both the united states and our allies. for example, in 2010 we signed a new strategic arms reduction treaty with russia, and i'm happy to say that despite all the challenges that we have with russia today, implementation of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty continue to go well, on site inspections in both the u.s. and russia continue. we continue to exchange notifications of the movement of our strategic forces. and the bilateral consultative commission, a body created by the treaty to work through difficult implementation issues continues to meet and continues to work through difficult implementation issues. through the recent joint comprehensive plan of action with iran we have cut off iran's path to a nuclear weapon in a

verifiable manner. and through the nuclear security summit process, we have locked up significant amounts of nuclear material. i saw one estimate through the efforts of the nuclear security summit. we have locked up or secured enough nuclear material to create 150 bombs. so on the positive side of the ledger i think we have made good process. however, we do have some real challenges. as congresswoman harmon noted, the relationship with russia is fundamentally different. in 2009 when the president took office we had hopes of developing a strategic partnership with russia. i think those hopes are no longer there. initially, russia has been using increasingly harsh rhetoric with regards to nuclear policy. and that is very, very concerning. and third and this is why they

spend a lot of my time, russia has violated the intermediate nuclear forces treaty, which was ratified of the u.s. senate and russia, the soviet union, excuse me, in 1988. that limits the production and testing of intermediate nuclear weapons, missiles, excuse me. in what we determine two years ago is that russia over the past several years has conducted several tests of a crowd launched cruise missile that are prohibited by the treaty. now, we've been spending a lot of time over the past several years to try to bring russia back into compliance with the inf treaty through diplomacy, but to date our efforts have not been successful. however, we continue these efforts. however we have made it clear to the russians and two others that

we will not allow russia to gain advantage from its violation of the treaty. so overall i think we have made good progress but i think we have significant challenges, special with regards to russia into compliance with the inf treaty. >> frank, bob, how do you view this balance sheet seven years after the prague speech? >> i would basically agree with frank. i think the signing of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty was important not because of the numbers. if you look at the numbers, the bomber counting rule, the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty allows more weapons than the bush administration's treaty at moscow, but because of the established the basis for reification. when you do reenter -- verification you increase transparency and that increases stability the nuclear security summits and the focus on material isn't terribly aboard were.

jcpoa if it continues success into the future has been a tremendous gain to start to defuse a very dangerous situation. where i would fault the administration is that it was very late to recognize that come with the exception of united kingdom, the other nuclear weapons state did not buy into the prague agenda. it took several years for the administration to get it thinking around that. part of the administration that still don't understand that. second, a failure that in conjunction with the first point i made to push back against putin and the nuclear saber rattling. third, despite frank's very valiant efforts to push back against the ins violation, he's been undercut by some of his seniors who at the same time he is pushing to get the russians back into compliance with the treaty are saying, but really we are ready to talk about a new

strategic arms committee, thereby signaling it may not be that important. and, finally, the administration shares blame with theongress and the budget control act for failing to do anything seriously about modernizing our strategic forces for the bulk of the administration. if you look at the fact that strategic opposition programs have been delayed for a significant russians and the chinese are fielding such, that creates a series of problems. it's a mixed record i think. >> bob? >> first thank you, jane. thank you, rob. it's a pleasure to be with my colleagues. generally we think about the topic, i think we think up three boxes, thinking analytically the first box is sometimes called vertical proliferation, and that's the arms control stuff that's traditionally gone on between the tried and the soviet

union, now the united states and russia. second box has been orthogonal proliferation and that is essentially proliferation to new countries. think north korea, think iran. the third box is nuclear comparison which is usually have that much to do with nation-states. in the first box, if you accept my three boxes, in the first box i defer to my colleagues but i think i look at this i and see that we have made significant progress with the last major arms control agreement that it was a good deal for us, a good deal for the russians, but they give for the planet. i see the politics as overwhelming for the progress in that area. politics, that's shorthand for putin. i don't know what one does at this point with respect to that i don't think we're going to make much progress as long as the political relationship with the russians is as tedious. but that's not bad.

i'm teaching at georgetown right now so maybe a, good grade. the second box from the proliferation box, iran for me the many, many things wrong with the iran deal. but there are many things more right with the. it's way better than not having to deal and i give a solid a. not missing the fact we legitimize enrichment in the country should not be enriching uranium. notwithstanding the fact we really don't have the kind of transparency we would like to have. all that is true. those are nontrivial but compared to where we would be without that deal, which is i think looking at iran with nuclear weapons, or essentially a conflict in the middle east, this is a lot better and the president deserves and the statistic great credit for that. i can count pretty high grade on that, on the first half. the second half of the second box is north korea. not so good.

the north korean case, as we say, it is not like fine wine. it doesn't get better with the passage of time. it actually has gotten worse. the north korean case does not look like pakistan in the sense that north korea has 10 to 100 nuclear weapons. it may have a to talk or so nuclear weapons but that's a syndicate number compared -- it is achingly this summer to get it will build more weapons, eventually make the delivery systems with income the range. this is not good. one might ask are they not deterred the american nuclear weapons? yes, they should be. the public as we actually don't know what this young man who runs north korea thinks. or if he thinks about nuclear deterrence and whether we should have, that he understands the limits.

i worry about the north korean case. north korea policy has failed. it failed begin in the clinton administration. i have something to do with it. it failed to the bush administration and a failed in the obama administration but it failed in this is where the nuclear armed north korea actuating nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and i sort of unapologetically. the third box, the one i spent more of my time on is nuclear terrorism box. and on that i am something of a critic. i will stop after making a simple point that generally speaking are two kinds of materials when you stick a nuclear weapon. one is highly enriched uranium. the other is plutonium. the administration has focused over the summit on highly enriched uranium. it has not focused on plutonium. plutonium is achingly come and what's worse, may accumulate in a kind of step function with the

introduction of reprocessing plant in northeast asia. if that happens, then it will be a game changer in terms of, to use anothe another metaphor, thg pole in the tent to terrorism, the ability to acquire fissile material. i work mostly not about a third box. >> thanks, bob. very useful. the linkage, the complex and subtle linkages between these levels i think is underscored by this conventional wisdom that jane mentioned in her opening remarks, namely that after the cold war you had this conventional wisdom the risk of great power nuclear weapons exchange is had decreased substantially but that the risks, so-called rogue state or terrorist group might obtain and use weapons has increased. let's discuss both sides of that equation. does that conventional wisdom still hold? frank miller. >> i think first bob's point

about kim jong-un is an important one. we don't know. we really don't know. and we hope and assume that he understands nuclear deterrent. but that is a huge question. unfortunately, that very rosy predictions from the global zero group in 2012 and the notion of the u.s.-russia war was virtually unthinkable. have not come to pass and it's going quite badly the other way. the rise of putinism, the khrushchev like statements emanating from putin and his closest circle, the dangerous military activities using strategic bombers to fly into other countries, airspace, the exercises which assimilate openly using nuclear weapons against his neighbors. and the really massive modernization programs that the russians are involved in, along with his highly touted and questionable, deescalate

strategy, suggests that the russians view nuclear weapons different than we do. you recall this nuclear torpedo that leaked a few months ago, as a terror weapon. again it's not that way we think about deterrence. so one has to worry about the russians think about nuclear weapons and one has to worry about putin's propensity to use nuclear forces at short notice. the actions in crimea and in eastern ukraine and, indeed, the use of military forces in syria shows he reaches for those. so i think that is a question have to deal with again. >> let's get at this question, let me turn to frank rose, building on what frank miller said. to look at the strategic nuclear piece of it which is really your centerpiece of their portfolio at state. a year after the prague speech anthe new s.t.a.r.t. treaty was concluded cutting the number of

nuclear warheads from 1550 the point also reducing, since then as frank miller referenced there's been a down turn in relations with russia as well as china. both of these strategic advantage are engaged in vigorous modernization programs. so the question is, do these developments signaled the end of great power arms control as we thought about it speak with rob, let me start by saying this. and it is this. russia did not sign the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty in 2010 because they believe in a world free of nuclear weapons. in my view, the russians signed the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty for two primary reasons. first and foremost they needed to maintain strategic parity with the united states. given their economic situation around 2009, they could not afford to maintain the levels in

the 2002 moscow treaty. and secondly, what is, this is the point that frank mentioned in his comments, they value the verification and predictability. so i think it's really important to note that the never kind of bought into that vision for further reductions here furthermore i would also argue if you look throughout the last 25 years at democrat and republican administrations, we've had an over arching objective of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our defensive strategy. the exact opposite has been the case for russia. russia puts a lot more emphasis, and the emphasis has grown, a nuclear capabilities. i was asked why is that. and i said, and i would tell people sometimes you need to take a step back and look at russia's over arching strategic

situation. quite frankly it's not a great place to be at. first, they have few, if any, allies. the united states has friends and allies all over the world. second, there conventional capabilities have gotten better as we've seen demonstrated in syria but their capabilities are not on par with the united states or our allies. third, they no longer have the strategic weight of numbers. if we look throughout history, we talk about the russian numbers, steamrolling through europe. they are losing several hundred thousand people a year, population, one of your colleagues has written quite about the demographic challenge with russia. forth, and this is a big deal, i would say they don't have a modern when he first century economy. when you think about russia, think about what the export a size oil and gas.

not much eric then on top of that on top of that they have a very robust shine on their southeastern front. so the question comes, given that strategic situation, what do they have to maintain their security? i would argue nuclear weapons. and so i can given their strategic situation they are of the few, i believe and i think the record is very clear, that nuclear weapons play a key role in their deterrent strategy, much larger role than us. .. i think the jury is out. i really do believe that despite

all the challenges in our relationship, at some point we will come back to the table and talk about strategic stability with russia. that doesn't necessarily mean we would move forward with another bilateral arms control treaty but i think it is in our interest as frank mentioned for me the reason why i support the new treaty isn't as much about the actual reductions and the predictability. it may not be in the rest of the administration that we will. however, one of the challenges out there is this whole issue of non- strategic nuclear weapons. if you look at the resolution of the ratification to the new treaty for those of you that don't know what this is, this is the legislation that the senate uses to give its advice and consent to a treaty that says very, very clearly the next time

the executive branch comes to the senate asking for our advice and consent on the treaty with russia, it needs to take into account bond strategic nuclear weapons and quite frankly, i think to date the russians have expressed very little interest in the weapons transparency or non- strategic nuclear arms control. now in his speech in berlin in june, 2013, president obama proposed that we one the one third reduction in the u.s. and russian strategic arsenals but he also had a proposal on the table for reductions in non- strategic nuclear weapons and i've would see at the time the russian response was less than

enthusiastic. i do think at some point we will come back to the table for the strategic stability issues. the chemical weapons convention seeking the final act in the agreement. so they decided not to participate or observe at this point in time. we are going to lower the tensions and reenter the agreements that we saw previously. so at some point if it happens in your future.

>> what we see right now is this at the level of the strategic nuclear arms control, russia believe is in its interest because of that it continues to implement the new start treaty. however. in the architecture of my personal view is russia no longer sees value in that architecture put in place at the end of the cold war. and when we look back in 2007 if there is no unilateral suspension of the treaty, but we have seen is a broader picture. they are slowly but surely taking out the building blocks of the architecture put in place

in the 80s and 1990s and if you watch the russian media it is clear there was a merited and that narrative is this in the late '80s and the early 1990s the united states took advantage of the soviet union and russia therefore, we sign these treaties and agreements when we were weak therefore there is no need for us to continue to maintain those treaties. so again you've got a dichotomy. but the architecture, big challenge. >> on the conventional wisdom that the cold war we see some increasingly reliance on nuclear weapons in the strategy in the time of economic stress which is cutting into their ability to fund the initiative that had been under the cooperative threat reduction program that had been a major leg at the

bilateral relationship between the united states and russia and with that i would like to pivot to the other side at the end of the cold war about the so-called relic states and nonstate actors and terrorist groups. this week in washington there is a nuclear summit. they said it was the most urgent immediate threat to and they are addressing it in tandem with other initiatives but there seems to be a disjunction between the threat and response and i think you sort of telegraph this in your opening comments and i would like for you to develop the plaintiff further. >> i would love to. let me say something click first so, the concept here that we would have a look at the non-

strategic weapons we want to look at those and the idea that the russians are weaker in the conventional area. the strategic non- nuclear weapons in the level strike has to do with the incredible and the unique capability to project force anywhere on the planet. in the 24 hours. that's pretty impressive. i can tell you it's very impressive to the russians and

the chinese. and i'm not saying that we shouldn't be doing that and i don't carry any grief for beijing or moscow here but i think that if you are going to talk about why things look work the way they look right now, we ought to look at what we are giving to deemphasize nuclear weapons. we are not deemphasizing them and reading more family and reading more we are emphasizing the weapons and getting new missions for the conventional weapons to take on the strategic missions and we have to be aware of the implications of that if they can't match it. if we do things in the ballistic missile defense and they believe that they need to respond or they don't need to respond, we have to understand the psychology and that is all i will say. >> the chinese and the russians are actually getting advanced testing on the global strike systems and we are still producing powerpoint.

>> they produced and reproduced them to get back to some of the response there are two issues here and they are as you said before related in the case. as we said in the calculation, well yes we really worry about the miscalculation when you think about the leadership in north korea not understanding that because they have the nuclear weapons it doesn't mean that they can engage in the publications and wherever without a response in the public that is is the huge misreading of what they are good for from our perspective that is a huge

misleading. there's another problem with north korea of course and that is they will not understand that threatening the united states uniquely for them to transfer nuclear technology equipment or material particularly nuclear weapons relevant to the technology. so when they engage in an activity like they did in 2007 in the reduction reactor in syria remember it used to be a country, and now we find this situation in which they haven't learned or have any reason to think that any way anyway they learned that this is not a good thing to do that building a plutonium production in the middle east that sponsors terrorism is uniquely dangerous to the united states of america. i don't have any reason to think that is not an act to be

repeated. at that facility doesn't exist thanks to the concept of nonproliferation dot in the future we need to worry about the transfer of material of weapons of technology. we need to because that could lead to the thing i care about most inquiry about most and to answer one of the questions that is the nuclear trigger was an issue. when we think about nuclear terrorism, it is the thing that every president and presidential candidates will say they worry about most in answer to the question they get and what do you think mr. president is the greatest threat facing the united states of america they will say nuclear trigger was on and they should. at the same time, they will not take obvious steps to do something about the key factor. it's not a trick or challenge to

design a nuclear weapon or a simple one anyway. this administration and the ones before it have made great strides locking up the highly enriched uranium and blending it down. the measure is and how much we've done that and how many times we have locked up or blended about there is a lot of stuff left and i would say that we are in the hunt. the reason that we are not simply put is because it's politically difficult because it comes in two kinds of places, and the weapons area in the

nuclear weapons countries and other countries that have acquired nuclear weapons have plutonium but it also is used in the nuclear fuel cycle of some countries to the commercial nuclear fuel cycle and when you say commercial, think large-scale. think of tons of plutonium. but the amount it would take to utterly destroy the city would fit in this class. i'm talking about tons of material in circulation in countries that have plutonium fuel as part of the cycle. not many countries do. france does, russia does to some degree. other countries have stopped. but what is startling is the possibility that japan next year

would have been 800-ton plant that would be producing thousands of kilograms of plutonium and got plutonium would be cycling all around japan fueling the reactors all around the country. what could go wrong? when we think about buying the plant similar to japanese plans from the french, we can see that happening all around china with huge quantities. we are not addressing this problem. we are not addressing it because it is frankly politically difficult to tell the french you shouldn't sell this war by this and you shouldn't start this plant. it's hard, but it should be done. and to say that you are serious about the issue when there is a game changer like plutonium into

nuclear fuel cycle that we are not addressing is to me very misleading. >> the president talked about a terrorist group stealing, buying or building a nuclear weapon and your last comment pointed to the increased amount of material in the tents that opened the door for the nonstate actor potentially that there is a divide on with the capabilities actually build a weapon on a good look at the other two roots which points to the leakage or the transfer with all the bandwidth we've had in the last two years when one thinks about the transfer iran isn't the first one that comes to mind that comes to mind on the transfer in north korea you eluded to that problem and with

russia and pakistan you oversold the negotiations in north korea in the '90s but the bottle up the plutonium program it could take the obama administration that it's not called and the creativity and focus its path to the case thoughts to the case to the north korean case that seems caught up in this tension, policy tension between north korea coming back to the nuclear table if you accept this in the united states and not getting past the impasse, and on pakistan and it is the nexus of the terrorism proliferation further destabilize the area and tactical nuclear weapons so in the last round of questions before we turn to the floor i would like to get first brought up on the iran north korea deterrence i don't even think

about transferring. it's to freeze the program and frank if you want to weigh in on the peace and follow-up we can do that. right now i would like to pakistan as the most dangerous for us but pakistan is right now the country that is building the most nuclear weapons the fastest and the delivery systems are quite diverse to go with it and then it has both the uranium enrichment and separation and pakistan is pakistan. by that i simply mean it is a complex country and has the most

radical interpretation of islam. there've been attacks on the facilities and the response is to worry more about us and the raid on the facilities than the internal threat and that has consequences, so pakistan in the case it is a uniquely difficult and painful one. of course we have a lot of history with pakistan. the case i would say for a while provided that we watch very carefully may be the nuclear part of that. we should be monitoring that the deal and watch it very closely. one of the problems in the deal implementation of the framework wouldn't pay that much attention.

your point about north korea has been very concerned about the north koreans are not serious about any negotiation that would involve giving up the nuclear weapons. i wouldn't be prepared to say that. i think under some as if we can meet the needs in an overall settlement it might be possible that but it is all worth while trying. let me go back to the point that bob made about the concerns about american strategic capabilities. i would agree as we think about strategic stability in the future, we need to factor in the east new strategic capabilities, cyberspace, missile defense

strikes. while i don't think any of those capabilities fundamentally alter the nuclear equation i think the impact it. it's the missile defense, space, conventional capabilities. russia and china have been less so. we have made it very clear that we are prepared to have a discussion with both russia and china on the full set of strategic capabilities. one that i have been involved in the first three administrations now is missile defense cooperation and there've been numerous proposals for transparency that we've put on the table and the russians have rejected all of those proposals. we have been engaged in a dialogue on strategic capabilities. the concerns bob mentioned.

that bottom line i agree with you we need to factor these into the strategic discussion however, our russian and chinese colleagues have been less than i would say enthusiastic about engaging in those discussions. >> i will make three points very quickly. i worry very much about the case in addition to the accounts of what bob said if they believe that it allows them to carry out acts of terrorism on a large scale and be protected from them then that is a very dangerous assumption. with the young the young leaders father there was a better chance to come up with the deal and i'm

not so sure. bob was getting the grades and i would like to give an a+. they not only learned a lot a enjoyed this. so, finally he got around to asking the question of pakistan again and i want to expand that and i mentioned that one of the miscalculations could be this endless feud between pakistan and india and the fact that both of them know and the fact that both of them have small nukes.

it could create the chance of miscalculations or what about pe plus i? >> that's what i was talking about that worries me because the response to yet another major terrorist attack will be some sort of a conventional action when the army said it would meet with nuclear weapons. that one worries me and it is out of my control. >> that's to make up for the conventional asymmetry in the south asia. it is the deterrence by punishment and denial. it is a cooperation dealing with

the hard case of pakistan and how do you modulate the policy where you have a deterring threats to focus their attention like mike don't even think about doing it but you don't overshoot on the punishment side and they wouldn't cooperate to do prudent things to secure the weapons. >> there is only one kind of deterrence and it is punishment. it's a matter of definition and helps to answer the question that but he was also a structuralist. >> you know too much.

>> the pakistanis, it is redlined. but the pakistanis have tried to make clear is a compromise of the sovereignty for example would be crossing a red line and they believe that using nuclear weapons on their soil shouldn't bring a retaliation from the scenario we all worry about. indians don't believe that simply crossing into pakistani territory with conventional forces should trigger a nuclear response. it's been that kind of thinking of back and forth that we all worry about the miscalculations going on.

is improving relations between the two countries that would have a lot to do with a civilian narrative in pakistan and that the only threat they face comes from india. the only opportunity that they have comes from the indian economy so this is very hard to fix this problem. >> thank you very much. we are aware they receive as

much attention to a dirty bomb. they take the burnout fuel. i'm wondering is that something that we should be concerned about? there is a conventional wisdom. there is a designed weapon that was used on hiroshima and used on nagasaki that cannot be made for the plutonium and the second can be plutonium.

it's much easier. they can only do the first time. so that means they can only make a weapon a true yield weapon. if they do not have the plutonium of a certain percentage and instead must suffer through the handicap of designing a weapon with even isotopes that 242 then they will get enormous and they will get the ignition and it will be terrible and therefore since it has more of the isotopes that kind of fuel that would be processed in japan or russia

that the only kind of stuff available so the end of the day the conventional wisdom says the plutonium thing is self-limiting it doesn't fit in the first design and it won't work in the second to sign. now, the problem here is that his technical nonsense. would you like me to explain why its technical nonsense? i can't. >> question. >> i want to address the second and third -- >> can you identify your self? >> i am the former chairman of the tennessee valley authority if i claim to fame is i'm a friend of jane. in the second and third, you

mentioned the political difficulties but isn't it time to use plain english and face up to the fact that there is no thing such as the peaceful atom and the nexus of the problem is that we promised people all over the world nuclear power plants and we continue to advocate nuclear power in the country when are we going to include in the discussion of the subject the fact that we continue to advocate the pathway that is an atomic power plant. >> there is this dilemma that there is a source that's going to come from the nuclear piece of it. why can't we offer cooperation in solar wind and storage instead of nuclear power. >> that is one way to go.

other is access to the reprocessing that could make it safer. >> right now nuclear energy provides maybe 19% of our capacity in the united states and something like that for a while. my own personal view is that if we didn't have to have nuclear energy that would be great. it is carbon free. i've been on a different track than the one you suggest giving up on the energy and saying i want to give up on that which is uneconomical that's to say the plutonium recycle reactors and closing the back end of the cycle is crazy in economic terms apart from the terms i've been talking about.

there is no such thing. you get energy and it's how you organize that energy from what we are talking about here so i'm with you on that. but the argument i need here is a difficult argument to make. it's become much went difficult if i come out against nuclear energy. i am willing to say you don't have certain problems if you can have energy from the sources. i get that and that's fine with me i will go as green as we can support that but in the meantime if we have to make up almost a quarter in places like france it is like 80% of the capacity you're not going to throw that out tomorrow morning so in the meantime i want to say let's

enjoy in the way that is the safest as possible it isn't economically crazy that's all. i think that is an easier argument to make. i don't have a problem with you making that argument is not it's not going to be my new. >> and the nuclear issues and there's one issue i want to get to in this question of the nuclear force modernization of the country and under the stockpile program the united states is refurbishing its nuclear arsenal and the critics claim this program will make nuclear weapons more usable by decreasing the yield and their position in the administration resists this claiming that it is maintaining an existing capability. clarify this issue of modernization versus refurbishing. >> let's go back to 2009 in the

speech. one of the lines people forget about is that president obama in the speech made it very clear he said, and i quote, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the united states will maintain a safe, secure and effective deterrent and this is important for a couple of reasons. number one, two reassure our allies around the world who don't have nuclear weapons that they don't need nuclear weapons into second, to maintain strategic stability with countries like russia and china. the administration published the posture review and it was very clear that we would end develop new nuclear weapons. we would refurbish existing

warheads but we wouldn't provide them any new nuclear capabilities and that remains this administration's policy. and i would argue that if you look at the refurbishment policy it is consistent in the nuclear posture review. with regards to the delivery vehicle this is the new submarine, as well as the ground launch missile here's the challenge. most of these platforms have been operating well past their service lives. therefore, in order to maintain a secure and effective arsenal, we are going to need to modernize the platforms. we don't have a choice. as the commander of the strategic command mentioned in the speech a couple weeks ago at the center for strategic and

international studies we have run out of time and therefore, i believe then again, the modernization of our delivery platforms are fully consistent with the 2010 nuclear posture review as well as the presidents 2009 speech. >> people conveniently forget the way to get to a new start ratified was the president also endorsed the modernization program that was critical to getting votes in the senate to ratify. i won't go through the laundry list of systems that they are putting more systems in the field right now, in the field and in the water. the new u.s. submarine won't hit the water until 2028. the new bomber in the late 20s.

so there is a lot of catching up to do and we are not provoking. third point, from 1985 until 2001 i directly oversaw, i directed the u.s. nuclear planning. i interacted with two presidents and multiple secretaries of defense. it is a complete fiction that an official would say that is a low weapon. the notion of crossing crossing the threshold is the most serious decision and he would recommend and it doesn't enter into that if any president were forced into the nuclear weapon, the president would use a nuclear weapon in the arsenal that was most suited, but to suggest that modernizing the force leads to the increased

possibility for any president from any secretary defends them any secretary of state. >> it would be strategic and in the past there were capabilities that provide flexibility in terms of the dollars. final question to one of our residential fellows. >> thank you. i'm a fellow here at the wilson center and work on the history of the iaea. thank you for this interesting panel. i have a question that relates to something that was strikingly absent from the debate. is it because it is not a priority at the moment or nobody believes that it will be ratified by the u.s. soon?

what is your opinion on that, i think it is a question for the whole panel or whoever wants to answer. thank you. >> there was a panel a few months ago that the secretary talked about and at the conclusion is that it would take a great deal of groundwork in the country to get it ratified but it hasn't been taken. second of all, if the ratification would bring the treaty into effect, that would be a strong argument for pressing ahead. it won't. the countries that will not join the ctbt isn't going to come into effect as a basic fact and third, the united states is obeying the moratorium since under the bush 41 administration

so people off to focus on the intent and not the ratification process which will not bring about the entry into force. >> let me make a couple points. i was working for frank as a special assistant with the ratification debates began. there were two questions that the opponents raised. first, that the ctbt wasn't verifiable and a second you couldn't maintain without testing. i think we have made a lot of progress since then and what we have seen in the international monitoring system, we have dramatically improved our ability to monitor the nuclear explosions in furthermore i think that the directors that have certified this every year since the late 1990s is that we have been able to maintain

weapons without testing. however, if you look at the u.s. senate, dd% of the senators senators that are now in the senate were not present during the ratification debate and as debates and as frank noted, there have not been a great deal of discussion about the benefits of the ctbt. so instead of the ratification at this time, what the administration is focused on is an education process, discussing the merits in the public but more importantly the merit with members in the senate many of whom are not cited in particularly knowledgeable about the specifics of the treaty. >> we are going to get you the last word. are you optimistic or

pessimistic than you were a decade or more ago? [laughter] thank you for that long answer. i would like to thank all of those in attendance today and viewing c-span and other networks. [applause]

>> [inaudible conversations] we look at the governments handling of the issue from health experts, former addicts into the u.s. senate including comments from president obama and the presidential candidate

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>> in my view, confirmation hearings no matter how fruitful and thorough can provide sufficient basis for determining if a nominee merits the seats on the supreme court. >> a thoughtful senator should realize any benefits barring an ideological component from the courts are not likely to outweigh the damage done to the institutional standard. it even goes on ideological opposition to a nominee from one end of the political spectrum is likely to help generate opposition to the leader nominations from the opposite end. >> those were some of the programs featured this week on

c-span. >> our 12 part series explore stories and constitutional drama behind that decisions in history. >> john marshall in marbury versus madison said this is different. it is a political document that sets up the political structure but it's also the law and we have the courts to tell what it means and that is on the other branches. >> it's the fact that it's the ultimate presidential case exactly what you don't want to do to be the >> who should make the decisions about the debate the supreme court said it should make the decisions about those debate. we look at the cases that limited the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the newly enacted 14th amendment to only those spelled out in the

constitution. the slaughterhouse cases. former commander of the u.s. africa command retired general william cape was joined by diplomats from the middle east earlier today. they had a discussion on combating terrorism and the also talked about strategies and lessons learned for fighting threats from groups such as isis, al qaeda and boko haram and the role of the international community hosted by potomac institute university center for terrorism studies at washington this is about two hours. >> ladies and gentlemen, i am michael swetnam for the policy studies and it is my honor and privilege to welcome you today to the seminar on terrorism in the middle east and africa. i'm sure many of you were most of you are aware of the international center for terrorism studies headed by the

professor's pe levin alexander that for many decades has been looking into aspects of terrorism, its cause and how we can deal with it. for the last almost 20 years, the center has been at the potomac institute and its it's been our great privilege to host the seminars the international senator has produced at least one academic volume if not three or four per year. several reports every year. we have many examples including this one today that has just been released. on russia and asia it has been the center's focus for as i said a couple of decades to look at how terrorism has been used as a tool to disrupt societies all around the world and look at how lookout held by governments and

cultures have dealt with it and look at what has worked and what has not worked to document that in the setting such settings such that the lessons learned from dealing with terrorism around the world can be studied and looked at and hopefully will improve the capability for dealing with it. in keeping with that tradition and trend, the the professor yonah alexander brought today once again as always one of the most distinguished and experienced panels of individuals who've dealt with terrorism and its various forms in the middle east, africa and europe. so, i think that you will agree with me that we have an opportunity today to hear some of the best lessons learned and interact with those that have dealt with it on the ground and strategically in the governments and the communities and hopefully increase the knowledge and ability to deal with terrorism.

i would like to personally thank professor alexander for the decades he's allowed me to work with him on these types of issues. he is probably one of the greatest academics in the world and we are very privileged to have him not just with us here today, but in the world as long as he will stay with us. with that, let me introduce the person who needs no introduction to the crowd, professor yonah alexander. [applause] >> thank you for your introduction. the main influences that we cannot deal with the challenges with our international collaborations, so i would like to also welcome the diplomats

from the countries and the media and academics and so on. let me first introduce the panel briefly and then i would like to make a few quick notes and move on. next is general gray as the 29th, donned of the marine corps , and he was also introduced the keynote speaker sitting next to him. then we are going to have a presentation from the embassy of lydia.

next is the chief of mission and then finally also we have another distinguished diplomat who is a political counselor at the embassy of the egyptian embassy. we cannot discuss the discussion without the academic so we are delighted to have the president of the center from the strategic studies and general gray as always will have the last word. now, just a couple of footnotes in terms of academic work mike

mentioned, this year alone, we had the discussions that the international press club on the international cooperation in combating the ticker but some and we also dealt with the sunni shiite divide dealing with the challenge in the middle east and beyond dealing with nato and so forth. now, we have to remind ourselves that terrorism is only one of the many challenges we have to consider when talking about the security challenges and clearly, the natural disasters and academics is also i think a

grave concern as we have seen with the crisis in africa and beyond and so on. obviously, we are going to focus on the man-made disasters that we see daily. and we are asked to keep in mind that no community and no country and no region is affected by terrorism. yesterday we had a plane hijacking in a egypt although it isn't a terrorist incident as we know, but the modus operandi at least try and suss the challenges that we are facing. and someday obviously, we felt

with a grave concern what happened in pakistan or really exposed again and again the ugly face of terror. in other words, there is no end to the imagination of the terrorists and the list goes on and on all the way from paris to brussels and california and elsewhere. so, i think that we have to keep this in mind and the trends that we see particularly in regards to the expansion of the islamic state according to the record

that we could follow from the united nations and the intelligence communities that are close to 40,000 volunteers and fighters throughout the world that would join the islamic state or daesh. this is actually much larger than those volunteer fighters who join the mujahedin in the soviet union. what is the concern that we don't always realize is the threat that is generated in the region as well as the size throughout. in fact, out of the 40 identified groups around the

world that are partners in terms of declaring religion and providing support to daesh, we find that about 20 of them are in africa and in this connection i would like to mention again it might already refer to what is being released today that deals with a threat throughout the region. i'm not going to go into details because we do have with us the general who will deal with some of these issues. this map tells everything that one has to recognize in terms of the analysis of the nature and

the intensity and the impact. in other words, for many years we were very concerned about the al qaeda especially after 9/11 when an increasing number took place and somehow they didn't recognize the signs. they were the first country that was victimized in the 1990s after the mujahedin came back from afghanistan to algeria. but today it is basically every country in the continent all the way for the sympathizers of daesh. so in other words, we are talking about the so-called

caliphate and if you have an opportunity, try to read that report and the general will go into some details. so again, the threat is growing by day. this week as we know right here in washington, there is a summit on the nuclear security and our representatives from all over the world, africa, asia, so on have the issue of the nuclear terrorism, so it is only a matter of time. it isn't if, but when we would

have to face the nuclear trigger breast incident. and we have to be concerned because even according to the reports we know that daesh had some intentions to target the nuclear facilities and so on. so with this introduction i'd like to introduce the great american general gray. [applause] it's my distinct privilege to have an opportunity to introduce a great warrior, american, and someone i just know you are going to be delighted to listen

to. no matter how smart you are i predict that you're going to learn something. general kip ward has been a distinguished army officer for over 40 years.