let it go and have them rejoin the family of american citizens with full rights. >> there've been some studies showing private prisons are not really cost savers in arizona actually cost $1,600 more per inmate per year but to me the larger question was not just the effects that it has and the cost that it has put the fact that we incentivized some companies to take away the freedoms of some americans is there something inherently problematic with that and legislators should be held accountable for that? there may be a model that saves taxpayers dollars and does appropriately administer a prison system and if there's one thathere isone that works we sht preclude it. >> we are going to the voting rights next. so what would you do to improve the voting not just in florida

that nationwide the continues to see the effect break havoc in this country. what will you do to improve the voting and there it is again. i would like to see open primaries everywhere. federal voting holidafederal vor registration in 18 years of age we have joel here to join us. >> you will hear it again. and the automatic voter registration. >> let's start with the congressman on this money and if you can be specific on the primaries of the voting -- >> i think it is a great solution we should have been in the state of florida. i think republicans should embrace this because we can grow the party by embracing the conservative solutions that

appeal to independents and those that are no party affiliations so i would say yes to the open primaries and on the other issue whatever makes the voting more accessible and successful so we have greater participation. >> congressman. >> first i have to introduce legislation for this purpose as i indicated before it introduced more than any other member and i introduced the bill for democracy david makes the federal elections in federal holiday and gives people an opportunity to vote. we have a lot of people in my district that worked one job, maybe two jobs and sometimes even three jobs and they work on tuesday so it makes it hard for them to vote. another thing in favor of is in colorado tintolerant of a meal y single voter a ballot. you can either use it or go and vote on election day obviously you can't do both i think that has elevated the turnout enormously just as it has an organ which is a mail-in ballot only. beyond that we have to accept the fundamental idea that it's

fundamentally wrong. i favor a constitutional amendment that declares the right to vote. apart from the cases of murder or sex crimes. we have first-class citizens into second-class citizens and that's wrong. when you served your time you paid your debt for society should be able to build and protect yourself in the political system and have the same rights as everybody else. >> host: congressman johnny did you find a problem if they disenfranchised a significant percentage of some folks in the country if they don't have the voter id? >> jolly: personae that reasonably and responsibly wants to do so. i don't think we have time for

another questions we will go to closing statements. congressman will go first. >> grayson: and divided to have the opportunity to address the issues of the day. you will notice that paper versus plastic never came u out and the choice of diet coke versus coke zero is not a debate in my house. finally the american people get to see what it's like since there are members of congress. struggling with the great issues of today this is what it is all about. it's the way politics want to be. we shouldn't be talking about how much we are sweating or how big your fingers may be. [laughter] on that issue we have not [inaudible] [laughter] it is florida. we are both struggling with this issue. the issue is rising inequality in the country. we want people to be at the

beginning, that we have economic inequality, social inequality. people are struggling to remain in the middle class. so, the question is whether you are talking about a student loan or social security, whatever it may be. what are you going to do about it and what have you done to fix it? my organization i mentioned for research committee have been awarded a get out every year. they give to the person that stunned the most and i helped name the award. i want to win that one day. i want to be the same champion as claude was in florida for an entire generation or more. florida needs a champion for seniors and workers and for you. >> host: congressman. jolly: thank you. it is warm in here not because of the context of ideas. i tell you what, every single day i tried to lay it out on the line. when i opened up this debate tonight, i said i've been

fighting for florida for two years. i asking for the opportunity to continue to do that again. our veterans need better health care. let's give them the choice where they receive it. when our soldiers don't have an increased its figh let's fight . when we have children ready for school at investing student nutrition, dropout and reintegration programs and making the ged more affordable and accessible for people who want it. and yes, when the president is wrong on issues of national security i and on overregulation that is reducing services and is crippling an economy and parts of florida that need it the most, let's stand up and say there's a better way to do it. i started by talking about the stuff packed. it's probably no better reform that we can do right now. get congress back to work. this context of ideas that we've had tonight is what we should be giving his candidates and members of congress, so i introduced the stuff packed. it's why we have the site to ask people to join us in the

movement more than a campaign. thank you for tuning in and be opening debate coalition and each of you for participating tonight. this has been a great night. thank you. >> host: thank you gentlemen, congressman, so very much. we have so much we didn't get to that that proves the strength and the debate of the questions. i want to thank both of the congressman for being here in the open debate coalition. our partners, americans for tax reform and progressive change institute, and for everybody who submitted questions and for the nearly half a million votes that we got to decide which questions were answered them as a thank you so much to the public that followed along. >> host: if you like the style of debate and want to ask questions going forward at the presidential level and congressional level throughout the country, but in order to do that you have to impress the representatives this is the right way to do this. you watch and get your family and friends to watch. if you're on facebook right now,

share and like it and otherwise, go to floridaopendebate.com and make sure everybody gets the word on this. congressman, thank you and for all of you at home watching, thank you as well. ♪ of the program.

this is one hour and 15 minutes.

the committee meets today to consider the status of the 35 joint strike fighter program as we preview the fiscal year 2017 budget request. i welcome the witnesses. under secretary defense for acquisition technology and logistics frank kendal, director of operational tests and observations doctor michael gilmore, program executive officer for the f-35, christopher bogdan and director of acquisition for the management for the government accountability office, michael sullivan. that f-35 joined strike fighter program is the largest acquisition program and the department of defense history. the full capabilities of the aircraft will eventually provide are critical to america's national security. our ability to detour our potential adversaries around the globe and if necessary respond with overwhelming force to any

future conflicts that may require military intervention. at the same time, the f-35 performance has been a scandal and a tragedy with respect to cost, schedule and performance and it is a textbook example of why this committee has placed such a high priority on reforming the broken defense acquisition system. the f-35 schedule for development has now stretched to more than 15 years and costs more than doubled from original estimates. the aircraft deliveries amounted to no more than a trickle as a result of the original promises of the program. the original f-35 promised 1,013 f-35 . of all variances would be delivered by the end of the fiscal year 2016. in reality, we will have 179. because the air force marines and navy were all counting on

the f-35 that never appeared, combat aircraft into the strike capacity shortfalls in all three services have reached critical levels, severely impacting readiness and ultimately limiting the department's ability to meet the requirements of the defense strategy. in the fiscal year 2017 budget request, dozens more aircraft are being deterred from future years defense plan resulting in a situation where the last f-35 will be delivered in 2040. i cannot fathom how this strategy makes any sense. purchasing combat aircraft with a 40-year-old design in my lighf all of the testimony the committee has received about how our potential adversaries are rapidly catching up with and in some cases matching america's military technological advantages. the problems with maintenance, diagnostic software the fuel

system problems and structural cracks from the service testing and engine reliability deficits, limitations on the escape system that caused the pilot wage restrictions in the potential cyber vulnerabilities. this list is as troubling as it is long in a long last we are approaching the end of the wrong nightmare known as chemical, the currency. the ill-advised simultaneous testing production of the complex and technologically challenging weapon systems the department estimates will end up costing the american taxpayers $1.8 billion. many questions remain, such as the total number of the aircraft the nation should buy or can even afford. the cost of the future upgrades to keep the aircraft in the face of an ever evolving threat and the management of the administration of the so-called

joint program the general bogdan himself admitted they've 20 to 25% commonality across three variances as compared to the original goal of 70 to 90%. the f-35 a., b. and c. are essentially three distinct aircraft with significantly different missions and capability requirements. the illusion of the joint is perpetuated by the structure of the joint program stifles the proper alignment of responsibility and accountability of the program that is so desperately needed. there's also questions as to when the system development and demonstration phase will actually be completed so that an initial operational test and evaluation can begin. originally scheduled to conclude in 2017, we have every indication to schedul the schede pressures like the extend sdd well into the fiscal year 2018. i'm very concerne concerned thae

department may attempt to take shortcuts by deterring the mission capability content into the leader blocked upgrades and by doing so change the fighter once again by delaying the necessary capabilities. the f-35 was designed to replace multiple aircraft of the services. that's why he operational testing and evaluation must be of such a high fidelity. there can be no question in the mind of the american people that their gigantic investment in this program will pay off with greatly improved capabilities that far surpass the mission capabilities of all these individual combat aircraft. the congress will not likely allow any more of these legacy aircraft to be retired from service until there is no doubt the f-35 can adequately replace them and nor is the congress likely to entertain a blocked by

werther multiyear procurement scheme until the initial operational test and evaluation is completed. in a positive milestone decision is to commence the production both of which i understand are scheduled to occur in fiscal year 2019. the department appears to be considering managing the f-35 follow-on modernization that is estimated to cost over $8 billion for the first block to upgrade within the overall program. this is incredible giving the department dismal track record on these upgrade programs as the modernization upgrade will show. i see no evidence that the dod process has improved to a level that would remove the need for the separate nature defense acquisition program that would enable close scrutiny by congress. moreover, i expect the department to use fixed price

contracts for the modernization effort in order to protect the taxpayers. the program's many stalls there are some positive signs for the f-35. the marines declared a operational capability in arizona and are preparing for their first f-35 overseas deployment next year. air force personnel at the base in utah will fly and maintain aircraft preparing for the air force this fall. david for the latest lots of the f-3f-35 a war fighting successfy with a reliabilit the reliabilir fighting capability as compared to the earlier aircraft. general bogdan has since steadily pushed down the aircraft procurement unit cost with liability metrics on the rise and each aircraft delivery possessing increasingly effective war fighting capabilities. all of this is a testament to the hard work of military and

civilian personnel inside of the program today. they are doing their best to overcome this kind of decisions taken long ago and they are having success in important areas. however, there is a lot of development to complete in the program and when it becomes a potential for more problems and schedule delays and increased cost this committee will remain steadfast in its oversight responsibilities to ensure that the war fighters get the capabilities they need on time and at a reasonable cost. >> thank you very much. >> hold on just one second. since the koran is now present i ask the committee to consider the list of 920 pending military nominations including a list of the nominations of the general brooks, usa to be commander united nations command u.s. forces korea, general-purpose usa to be commander u.s. european command and supreme allied commander europe commander general robinson, usaf to be commander u.s. northern

command or north american aerospace defense command paid all these nominations have been before the committee is required the length of time. time. is there a motion to favorably report these 920 -- >> so moved. >> all in favor? the motion carries. senator reid. >> thank you mr. tremaine. i join you in welcoming the witnesses today. we are grateful for your service. thank you very much. today we will seek a better understanding of the progress that the person is making fielding the joint strike fighter, wit,, with actions thas taken to inaugurate the problems in the program, what is the best judgment available of how the actions will be preventing problems in the program including additional cost overruns and delays. overall the production program has been delivering unexpected cost reductions and aircraft wants. however, we still have to complete the system developed and the demonstration on the sdd program is expected to deliver in the war fighting capability each of the three variances of the f-35.

we may not have seen all the potential schedule changes. since not all of the present difficulties are behind us. according to the testimony although the marine corps declared the additional air force plan to do so later this calendar year, the f-35 system remains immature and provides limited combat capabilities with the start of the initial operational test evaluation just over one year away. doctor gilmore also assesses that the f-35 program will not be ready until the calendar year 18 at the soonest and these assessments are of concern. several years ago we required to estimate the initial dates for the capabilities as the variances in the marine corps declared them last year in july and the air force is scheduled to declare later this year and the navy is scheduled in 2018. the marine corps was based on a

version of the program into the air force declaration will be based on the block three software into the navy declaration will be based on the block three software version. until recently in order to support the dates, the program office has been working on the versions of both blocks three e. and three f. of the software simultaneously. the block free software depends on having a baseline for the block three. the contractor team working on multiple releases of software, the correcting issues and achieving software stability has proven elusive. working on the practice simultaneously was intended to save time at that time was lost in the projec project have to be because of mistakes made in the concurrency. in the past year they lost work on the software until the problems in the block three. the software could be sorted out.

we need to understand what effect this may have on the overall program schedule. beyond that we are planning for the upgrades in the capability to the development efforts for the block program that will likely be a multibillion-dollar effort and we want to make sure that we do not repeat past mistakes. beyond the sdd program, there's there isa larger issue of the co sustain. these estimates are that $1 trillion. we need to understand what the department is doing to reduce these costs. if we do nothing we reduce the risk of allowing the cost to sustain and support the f-35 to reduce the funds available for the investment in the future. the committee has been a strong supporter from the beginning however we must continue our vigilance so that there is a balance between f-35 and other important dod acquisitions. thank you for calling the hearing mr. chairman. >> i welcome the witnesses.

>> thank you chairman. minority leader, members of the committee, i'm happy to be here today with the judge to put an executive officer for the f-35 program as well as doctor gilmore and mr. sullivan to discuss the status of the program and the president's budget request for fy 2017. in opening comments i would like to discuss my own involvement in the f-35. it will provide more detail on the current state of the program. my first exposure to the f-35 was in the fall of 2009 as i was awaiting confirmation to be the principal deputy undersecretary. i was briefed by a member of the staff and my reaction at the time was one of surprise in the long period of opening the reduction of approximately ten years. a very high amount of concurrency in the program as you mentioned, the crazy this case the development of the production. it was one of the highest editor

for the riskiest that i have ever seen. the production started in 2007 well before the design could be confirmed in testing. i later called the decision to the acquisition practice phrase that seems to have stuck. in early 2010 also before i was confirmed the program manager was replaced by new program manager was the admirable a very seasoned and competent professional at that time the f-35 went through a review and as a result of the cost increases and as a result of the review the program is based wi based wind as it is now and has ever since. in 2010 the predecessor ended the use of the contracts for production starting with lot number four. in the fall of 2011 i became the acting undersecretary. one of my decisions was to bring and replace it. he's proven to be a highly competent program officer.

in the fall of 2011 based on the early operational report from doctor gilmore's office, i commissioned an independent review of the staff program focused on the design stability of the program. at that time the extent of the open design issues and the currency cost for the retrofitting aircraft that was produced later led me to seriously consider halting the production. based on several considerations i made the decision to hold the production constant for the next few years and to assess progress before increasing the production at the plant. under the lieutenant generals leadership program has made steady progress for the past four years. the cost of development have remained in the baseline. production costs are steadily decreased making the cost estimate each year. the cost of the sustainment has also been reduced by approximately 10% since the program was based wind. there've been a few months of schedule slips primarily due to software complexity.

while i do continue to monitor the program and conduct annual program reviews, the f-35 is no longer a program that keeps me at night. there are some design issues that still need to be resolved and the test program is about 9% complete and i do expect additional discovery. i wouldn't be surprised if the major services at the point. our task now is to complete the program and achieve for the air force later this year an in the navy in 2018 and complete and separate the many partners of the customers as they become operational over the next few years. we also need to move forward in the follow-on development. appreciate this committee's support for authorizing the funding of the work. the f-35 is a game changing system tha but our potential adversaries are not standing still. current integrated air defense systems, air to air weapons and electronic warfare must be continually countered.

we must continuously improve the system to keep pace with emerging threats and i think the committee for its support and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you general. >> chairman mccain, ranking member, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity today to discuss the program. the purpose today is to provide an honest and balanced assessment of where the program stands today. that means i will tell you the good the bad and the ugly and tell you what my team is doing to reduce cost, improve the performance and meet our schedule commitments. the lightning is a vital importance to the security of the united states and is the program executive officer and director, i'm committed to delivering an affordable and a reliable and sustainable fifth-generation weapon system to the war fighters and those of our international partners and foreign military sales customers. overall the program is executing well across the entire spectrum acquisition to include

development and design for my flight test, production and fielding, base stan they stand , maintenance and support and building a global systemic enterprise. the program is at a pivotal point it is now rapidly changing, growing and accelerating. we will be finishing our development program in late 2017 and begin a transition to a more efficient follow-on modernization program. we will see the production growth delivering 45 aircraft in 2015 to deliver over 100 airplanes and 2018 and up 145 by 2020. additionally, the next four years we will continue to stand up with 17 operating bases over the world. we are also accelerating the creation of our heavy maintenance and repair capabilities and supply chain in the pacific, european and north american regions creating a truly global sustainment capability. the program is not without risks and challenges as these come with any program of this size and complexity i'm confident the

current risks we face can be resolved and we will be able to overcome future problems and deliver the combat capability. this program is not that it has no programs but rather it discovers problems and implements solutions and improves the weapon system and at the same time it keeps the program on track. we've been doing that a number of years now. let me highlight a few confessions. last year we began the training at the air force base in arizona where a blend of defense and partnered instructor pilots are helping to train u.s. air force and other pertinent pilots and air force is now receiving f-35 at the air force base in utah and training is underway to ready its first combat f-35 squadron to be operational later this year could also the united states marine corps is successfully flying into deeply into the sites for training and droppindropping a shooting lifes with the f-35 be today.

in addition, the industry committed to and been have been successfully delivered 45 airplanes last year including the first aircraft produced in the italian assembled -- assembly facility in camry italy. from the production perspective, we delivered it to the 176 of our test operational and training aircraft to date. on the cost front, the price of purchasing f-35 . continues to decline lot after lot of a trend i believe will continue for many years. i expect the cost of a f-35 a within engine and then dollars to be less than $85 million in fiscal year 19. as i said before, the program is changing, growing and accelerating but it's not without its issues, risks and challenges. let me highlight some of these areas and what we are doing about them. oonon the technical front we haa number of risks i would like to mention. mention. at the top of the list of aircraft software and maintenance system known as the

logistics information system. we have seen stability issues in the software however we believe we've identified the root cause of the problems and have tested the solutions in the lab and the flight tests and are now completing the flight testing the solutions. our initial indication of the flight test is positive and have seen software stability improved to two to three times better than what we have seen in the past. at the end of this month i'm encouraged we will have enough data to consider this problem and issue closed. we also experienced schedule issues of the development of the next version of alice version 2.2. i'm prepared to discuss this issue as well as the topics in the system and the u.s. air force initial operational test and recent u.s. air force marine corps development and the status of the partners and customers during the question and answers. the program is moving forward some times slower than i would

like about moving forward and making progress on the last. we are nearing the completion of the development and flight testt in 2017 and revving up the production standing up new bases and growing a global sustainment enterprise and we've also stabilized and reduced the major costs on the program. as with any complex program to new discoveriesthenew discoverid obstacles will of her. the f-35 is still in development and this is the time when the challenges and discoveries are expected. however we believe the combined government team has the ability to resolve the current issues and any future discoveries. i intend to continue leading this program with integrity, discipline, transparency, and accountability. it is my intention to complete this program within the resources and the time i've been given and i intend i'm holding my team and myself accountable for the outcomes on this program. one day your sons and daughters, grandsons and granddaughters will take a f-35 into harms way to defend our freedom,

delivering them the best possible weapon system is the responsibility that i and my team take very seriously. thank you for the opportunity to discuss the program. i look forward to your questio questions. >> mr. chairman, members of the committee, i will focus my remarks on the readiness for the evaluation achievement in the full combat capability. my estimate will not be ready to begin operational test and evaluation until mid-calendar year 2018 at the earliest, that's about a one-year delay relative to the objective date in six months to the threshold date. there's a number of reasons that my assessment. the most complex mission system testing remains as does verification of the fixes to remember significant problems. in-flight stability and mission systems with a new technical refreshing processor has been committed there is recent indications of significant progress in achieving stability although the stability issues while they were being fixed lead

to delays in the development that provide full combat capability. nonetheless, there is good news on the stability print. significant ground startup persist however inadequate perfusion of the information on a single aircraft as well as among the four ship aircraft result in the confusing displays that are still a problem. the shifts will be frequently used in combat to enable the applications that are necessary to deal with the increasingly complex stressing integrated air defense systems into potential adversaries to begin fielding in the middle of the last decade. shortfalls in the electronic attack into the geolocation and countermeasures processed. there are shortfalls in the performance of the system including the situational awareness. the refueling times like those in the legacy aircraft into the lack of a moving target capabilities which is crucial for successful conduct in the

other missions. the lack of display in the critical mission systems components which is unacceptable in combat and there's other issues that are classified. regarding the mission systems, the program has been changed its approach from executing parallel schedule driven software releases to the serial capability-based approach which does take longer but that approach has been validated in the recent achievement of improves stability in the processor. that approach, the new approach allows the time needed to fix problems and as we mentioned it has been validated and the progress recently seen. the aircraft are not invisible. mission systems infusion must work in a reasonable sense of the word. they don't have to be perfect but they have to work to prevail in the combat against the modern and capable and mobile integrated air defense system and potential adversaries since

the middle of the last decade. the ability to prevail against the prince is the key rationale for the 400 billion-dollar program. continue with other reasons that there may be a delay in operational testing time is needed to complete and certify the weapons used throughout the whole flight envelope. the most recent estimates on october 2017 for the f-35 and february 1 the end of may or 25 b. and the estimates assume an increase in the rate at which the weapon tests are accomplished that may be a challenge to achieve. as it has been mentioned, there are problems that continue with the logistics information system which remains immature requiring resource intensive that isn't accessible and under the program's current schedule, the final version of alice 3.0 in full capability production version required in the full combat capabilities will not be released until the first quarter of the calendar year 2018 but the schedule could be delayed by the ongoing problems with

version 2.0.2 which attempts to integrate the engine data and incorporate other functionality and fixes. in the currency driven extensive modifications would be required in the early aircraft that it originally had been bought when it was planned to begin in 2013. the current schedule for accomplishing those including those turning out to be very problematic extends the third quarter of 2019 and the program is working on a approach to pull the modifications to the left and includes taking the production aircraft later for the use and taking hardware from the recently fueled aircraft in the decision on that approach is needed now. there are inadequacies that remain in the programming laboratory that are precluding the ability to generate combat effective mission datafiles enabling aircraft to deal with the defense sites i mentioned and they will only worsen in the future. the schedule shows the upgrades

required to handle the current threats in the calendar year 2020. the program can and has delivered mission datafiles but they are not optimized or tested to handle the fridge because off the hardware and software deficiencies. the programs optimistic schedules for the delivery of a validated with publicly inadequate first quarter 2018, 8 this assumes the functional lab version this month which may be problematic. for all these reasons the delay is in the full combat capability are likely and i want to remind everyone that it will be the most realistic stressing test that will be performed and therefore the discovery of significant deficiencies as was the case with the f-22 is assured. thank you. >> mr. sullivan, welcome. >> thank you chairman, senator reid, members of the committee. i have a written statement for

the record i would like to just take this time to briefly highlight what we consider to be the most important challenges facing the program moving forward. in addition to a written statement, the report to the committee and others which was issued on april 14 contains more details on the program's progress today. first, although the program has managed costs very well since its beach in subsequent baselining in 2012, it still poses significant future affordability challenges for the department and the congress. as the program begins procuring more aircraft, the department is expected to spend on average about $13 billion per year over the next 22 years until all planned purchases or complete in 2040. these annual funding levels will present challenges as the program stacks its funding

priorities against other large acquisitions including the b. 21 bomber, the kc 46 tanker of the ohio class submarine placement, the new carrier and many more. second, the department now plans to add new capability known as block for to the f-35 that is beyond its original baseline capability if it is planning to manage that as a part of the existing program rather than establishing a separate business case and baseline for that effort. this has significant implications as far as the ability to provide oversight and holding the program accountable. the new work as a projected cost of about $3 billion over just the next six years in that price tag alone would qualify it as a major defense acquisition program in its own right. we believe it should be managed

as such with its own separate business case to allow transparency and accountability. third, the software development is nearing completion but the program faces challenges in getting all of its development activity completed on time for operational testing as we just heard doctor gillmor talk about. it's completed over 80% of its developmental flight tests and it's now working to close out the flight testing of its final block of software. the final is critical as it will provide the full capabilities to the aircraft. program officials have estimated as much as they three month delay right now to completing the block three testing in our own analysis indicates that it could be closer to six months and i think doctor gillmor's analysis as he states it happens more than that. getting the development of testing done is critical to

getting operational testing do done. with regard to the technical risk the program has some fixes for earlier problems such as the display in the engine and its working now to find solutions for other challenges, the ejection seat problem and the structure. this cracks in the wing structure. perhaps the biggest outstanding risk for the program today as it has been discussed already is the logistics information system known as alice. as you know, alice is a complex system that supports operations mission planning supply-chain management, maintenance and many other programs. in a companion progra the compal show issues on february on april 142 documented several issues with alis. most importantly concerning the inability to deploy right now and the lack of needed

redundancy at this point. that could result in operational schedule risks in the future. finally, manufacturing and production data continue to show a positive trend towards more efficient production and that's good. the amount of labor hours to build each aircraft continues to go down. the engineering changes that are coming out of the test program has been reduced significantly, and the contractors delivering the aircraft on time or in some cases ahead of schedule. we continue to monitor the measures for the aircraft and for the engine reliability and maintainability while they still fall short of expectations, they continue to improve and there is still time to achieve the required goals in that area. i will close with that and i look forward to your questions. >> i think the witnesses. general, how many military government civilians and full-time equivalent contractor

positions are assigned to the joint program office and what are the annual costs to operate the office? >> if you include the tested edwards air force base which are not necessarily part of my program office pla office taipem just like i do support contractors, the numbers about 2,590 and the annual cost to update is about $70 million a year and that includes paying for salaries and leasing facilities, computers, it, everything wrapped up. >> the information i have is that it's nearly 3,000 into the cost is $300 million a year. 70 million a year to run an office is pretty disturbing.

a secretary, last year included a report language that directed them to either be validate the f-35 total by quantity of 2004 4 for all variants submitted new member by may 25, 2016. does the department intent on meeting this requirement on time clocks spin it as far as i know, yes we are. i was interested, doctor gillmor, you said that it's likely to be delayed. do you have any idea how long the delay would be? >> are you speaking about the ioc for the air force block three fax fax >> yes. >> i think it is unlikely ey will be the objective date which is maybe 2017 on may the 2016 but it could meet its threshold

date which is later in the fall. >> and this issue mr. sullivan, on the processin perceiving of k by. can you provide any examples of a program pursuing a procurement strategy prior to the full rate production decision? >> you are referring to the proposal right now to buy the aircraft. no, i don't have any examples of that. the only example i know of the situation is our multitier procurement which require a lot of criteria to show the industrial base is stable and the design is stable and they are ready to produce. usually it comes much later in the production line. so i don't think there is even any criteria for that.

>> doctor gillmor, in your statement, yo he said of the sae limited and cybersecurity testing accomplished to date has nonetheless revealed deficiencies that cannot be ignored. can you elaborate on that? >> i would be happy to do so in the appropriate forum and the classified information we treat cyber vulnerabilities as the details that are classified as they are significant in my judgment. >> general bogdan, doctor sullivan and gillmor said there would be a delay in the ioc and air force version. what's your response? >> there is many things but reports needs to deliver to them before they can declare. all the things that are necessary for them to make the t decision are on track for

august, 2016 with the exception of alis that's approximately 60 days behind and therefore, i would put the alis delivery which is a criteria for them at about october, 2016 as opposed to one august. they have until december which is their threshold date so i think they will meet the criteria in the period but not exactly on one august. >> this go here 2016, general, limited funds for the procurement until secretary james certified that the aircraft delivered in 2018 will have the full combat capability with the hardware to software weapons carriage. have you recommended or do you intend to recommend that she make the certification? >> yes, senator.

i'm preparing the package now with my recommendation that she make that certification. i needed a few pieces of information before i could feel confident asking her to certify and one of them is the software stability issues that were spoken about before are behind us. they are now and therefore i believe it will be delivered in the fiscal year 2018 with the full capability so i look forward to that now. >> finally given the size of the cost, would you believe that it would be treated as a separate program for the nonrecurring purposes were just as a part of the program? >> i would remind you that is into my decision however, in taking a look at the scen fighte in the current programs as i mentioned in my written statement they need to be scrubbed vigorously so anything that will help in that to bring

clarity to performance the desired performance and cost would be useful so i think that would be a good idea but i would hasten to say that it is not my decision. >> mr. chairman i would like to yield to the senator. senator. he has an engagement elsewhere. >> thank you mr. chairman. i want to thank the witnesses. secretary kendal from 96 to 2007 as the f-35 was under development, dod supported and alternate engine program. the push for the f1 36 was controversial in later years but i'm interested to hear from you and others have thoughts on this. do you believe that the alternate engine program is a smart strategy in those early years? >> the question of the alternate engine i was in my position for the last couple of years.

it was taking some risks and we are getting some costs ou out of that what w but we think that te strategy would be working in their funding some advanced follow ons. if we could fund the program for that it has been a major constraint overall including on the engines. >> i'm particularly concerned about the performance of the f-35 since it was selected for the engine. i'm concerned but looking back on the history of the f-35, the f-16 and others this performance issues and i quote from the department of defense recurring manufacturing quality issues that have been an issue.

can you comment on that please? >> the quality issues that you're talking about are primarily at the suppliers locally and nonetheless it's responsible for the suppliers. in the last few years, we have improved our delivery of engines significantly but early on in the program you are correct we were seeing quality manufacturing issues with them over suppliers and i think at this point in time to manufacturinthemanufacturing ofs much more mature than it was a few years ago. relative to the performance of the engine, today, the f1 35 engine has about 52,003 hours and it's maintaining about a 94% for mission capable rate. that is a good number in the endgame of the program we were shooting for 95% so here we are

less than a quarter of the way through the full maturity of the airplane and we are just about achieving that reliability that we are looking for. however, that doesn't say that there are issues we are dealing with right now and the changes we're making to make it more affordable and more producible and increase the reliability. but from the perspective i've been happy with the performance of the f1 35. >> mr. sullivan, they've talked that their engines have a 2020 requirement, but in your reports last month, the gao wrote that the 35 a and b. engines are about 55 to 63% of where the program expected them to be. can you explain the difference in that assessment? >> i don't know that i can explain the cause of death but we found the engine reliability

and the measurements that we look at in terms of coming up to the reliability growth curve for an engine during the development has been pretty consistently below where they expected to be but i would say they've been improving the last two or three years. it seems like they are beginning to retire some of that risk. >> this is to all the panelists. what is the top lesson you've learned through the f-35 acquisition process that can inform future major acquisitions across the service is? mr. sullivan, i would like to start with you. >> i think the first thing we learned with this is that you shouldn't have a concurrent -- you shouldn't concurrently develop technology with a product and you shouldn't concurrently by aircraft while you are still developing. that is the number one thing. doctor gillmore?

>> f-35 was an extreme example of optimistic if not ridiculous assumptions about how the program would play out. the decision to begin the production before much of the development has been accomplished is a very bad one as mr. kendal discussed. although an extreme example but not unprecedented because the department is typically optimistic, very optimistic about schedules and cost which thebenefits of the program manas who are put in charge of the programs to look like failures from the outside. which is a terrible thing to do to them. >> i would love to hear the other two but i'm out of time. thank you mr. chairman. >> the question i was going to ask me have been answered in the second sentence in your opening statement whe on this f-35 would form the backbone of the combat.

we keep hearing things to the contrary. i remember when the secretary that was just in february of 14 he said, quote, american dominance in the seas and the size because -- the sky is. they said september last year and this is his quote, the advantage that we have from their i can honestly say is shrinking. it's not just a specific problem but it's a significant problem as anywhere. i don't think that it's controversial to say that they've closed the gap in the capability. general, do you agree with that?

>> our adversaries today are full speed ahead in accelerating the development of significant military capabilities both air to air and ground to ground. i believe the f-35 is absolutely necessary now and in the future to give you and the nation options to take an airplane and go anywhere in the face of the earth at the time of our choosing and be survivable and hit a target. i do not believe there's any other in the world can do that today. only the f-35 will do that for many years. >> you're talking about a fifth generation aircraft for both russia and china. it may be right behind a little bit. now when you compare those normally they talk about we will

have a better radar once you give us an idea what the opposition is right now and how specifically what areas we are better. >> senator, i will try to do that without walking across the line of the sensitive information and classified. one of the things folks like to think about when they look at those is that they look a lot like ours. that is a true statement. much of the design of the airplanes came on the outer line from what he developed. >> i understand that. >> what makes us better and specialist with us on the outside of the airplanes. our radar and the multi-centrifuge and into the ability to take information and develop space and provided to the public in such a way that he knows everything that's going on

360 degrees around him. and the weapons to employ the knowledge or what makes it different. >> that's good. recently, they talked about some pretty high facts that are using those a lot more than we anticipated and get in your presentation you talked pretty specifically about the numbers of copies we are going to have in the abn see. most of us here on this side of the people remember we went through this thing with the f-22. 750, and it' then it's good to 0 some odd than 187 ultimately. now, that's quite a deterioration from the original members.

is there a reason you don't believe we are going to experience the same thing? >> i can't assume in the future but the services will do. that's what i will tell you is that the major difference between the f-22 type of program and the 35 are significant in that we have many foreign partners also buying the airplane and if they continue to buy the airplane, the price will continue to come down. >> and that's where you come up with the 85 million ultimately taking that into consideration. one last thing. we thought we were going to have the model that drove and [inaudible] and of course we didn't have anything in france and paris. are you pretty confident we are going to have -- but it's going to make it this year?

>> we are planning a deployment of five f-35, three d. models and one of those being a uk airplane. >> how many will be flying? >> we will fly all of them. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you. i just want to clarify one of your comments. you were talking about the difficulty of upgrading with four aircraft come and essentially the multi-centrifuge and of the aircraft operating seems to be the preferred form of operation. is that accurate? >> that will provide information from the aircraft that must be fused in order to provide a situational awareness that general bogdan mentioned it is critical to the threats. >> and there is a current difficulty in making the systems even if they operate in a single

aircraft operating together. >> it has been a challenge to make it worthwhile. it will paste on what i consider to be the challenge is a hard problem. it doesn't surprise me that it's turning out to be a hard problem to make it worthwhile because you get information from different sensors on the same aircraft as well as different aircraft. you have to have software to sort through that and this is the signal i got through this sensor is the same target as this one on the other aircraft. that is a very hard problem. it's not a matter of just simply writing the code for the user interface. it involves a detailed understanding of physics and propagation othe physics andproo forth. so, that will continue to be a challenge and it will require a lot of tests where you guess the solutions and venues for subject matter experts to try to

implement them and test them and see how that works and that is a time-consuming process. >> do you really get into that issue or is that just simply the aircraft being able to fly? >> the air force is the one just as the marines did fo bid for tr capability of the air force sets the standards for determining what constitutes the sufficient performance. i can't remember the details of what they said about the fusion but obviously, the more fusion capability they have come of the better. it will be limited because it provides basic capability to block the new processor and there were fusion shortfalls that the block three was meant to surmount. >> mr. secretary, from your perspective, what do you think the most significant challenges are? i know that we talked about

alice as a key issue in terms of resolution. any others that you identify wod identify your focus on to deal with than? >> i think it is the leading problem in the air force on time. the issue that was mentioned earlier on the stability i think was a concern that seems to be getting under control. there are a number of concerns just in the pace of testing and how much needs to be done and i know some of the sets the stepse generalist seeking to alleviate some of that pressure that he has. so i think that it is a lot of things that have to happen. at the end of the day the air force for make the decision when they think that it's ready. my experience in the marine corps i think that they will be happy to say they are not going to do that. one of the things long-term as the sustainment course which seems to be quite significant.

can you describe steps that you were taking to lower those costs? we want to ove avoid the cost oe platform on the maintenance operation. >> we've been able to take about 10% of the cost estimate on the baselining and a whole variety of things to do that. we are looking at various ways to structure the business case if you vote for the sustainment and that is a work that is still in progress. we don't want to remain in this for any longer than we possibly have to sue introducing the competition is a big part of it. we are looking for creative ways to work with our partners so that we can do things together as opposed to separately. general bogdan i think is a long list in addition to that. can you give me the top two or three, general? >> featured a fully funded reliability maintaining program about three years ago where we look at every component on the f-35 to determine if it was

maintaining its performance on the airplane at a pace which we needed it. that has proven to be very cost-effective for us so we are going after those pieces that are not performing well and we also have a cost war room where we look at every idea that comes from the field on how to better maintain airplane. a perfect example of that is the original concept for tires and wheels and brakes on the airplane was to ship of it off a contractor somewhere. the u.s. air force and navy and marine corps have that capability today with the systems with the bases so we are moving all the work to them that reduces about 40 or 50% of the cost on the turn time of fixing things like that, so we are going about it systematically to get every piece of cost out of e program. >> thank you. >> thank you, chairman. general bogdan, i wanted to ask you, recently the genital came before the committee and sent the commission capability will

be replaced yet the website for the joint strike fighter program sends that the f-35 will replace the a-10. so can you answer this question for us plaques there is an inconsistency and i would like to know is general welsh right for the website? >> thank you for that question >> first, the structure of the u.s. air force and its fighter inventory is well beyond my purview. so, i won't try to explain what he said or what the decision-making process is for the air force on replacing the air fighter inventory -- >> but i think this is an important question, so if general welsh comes before the committee and says the f-35 isn't going to replace the a-10 can and get the joint strike

fighter website says that the f-35 will replace the a-10 and it's pretty important as we think about the capabilities of the a-10. secretary bogdan? >> i can't speak for certain but i think what he was trying to say is that both statements i think are correct. we will replace -- >> both statements can't be correct. >> we will replace the a-10 with the f-35. that is correct. but the f-35 will not do the missions in the same way the a-10 does. iit will do it differently. the a-10 is designed to be low and slow "-end-quotes to the target that it was engaging relatively speaking. we will not use the f-35 in the same way. so they perform the mission differently. >> select the ask doctor gilmore come if it is going to perform the mission very differently, is it not important that we understand how the two of them compare? so i would ask you how -- will

there be comparison testing with other comparative frames that the kendal is going to replace and hobepleased at how will the operational testing comparing the capabilities the conduct of? >> if i could point out i have the operational requirements document for the f-35 and it says that it will rely purely upon the f-22 for the air superiority and will assume the current f-16 world at the low end of the fighter mixed strategy into the a-10 rules as in the operational requirements. as blix was going to perform the a-10 rule it's a pretty important rule to the men and women on the ground, so what about the fly off to help about go down? >> we are going to do a comparative test on the ability of the f-35 to perform combat search and rescue and related

missions. we are also going to do a comparison test is an integral part of the test and evaluation of the ability of the f-35 to perform suppression destruction of defenses with the f-16 and 18. this operational requirement document has numerous citations to the performance expected in 35 and the relationship to the aircraft that it's going to replace. so the operational testing is consistent with the operational requirements document and it's also a comparison testing is also not unprecedented. there was testing between the f-22 and the f-15 and there's been comparison testing is a purposof thepurpose of the opers including things like tactical vehicles. so, to me the comparison testing just makes common sense. if you're spending a lot of money to get the improved capability, that is the easiest way to demonstrate it to the comparison test with regards to

the cash we are going to do it under all the circumstances that we see is conducted including under high-tech conditions in which we expect they will have an advantage in other conditions requiring loitering on the target, low altitude operations and so forth in which there are a lot of arguments about which aircraft might have the advantage that's what the comparison test is meant to show us. >> i think that's important so that we can understand the capability comparisons. so general bogdan, i asked the question of the general in march as to when do you expect t the d to achieve the demonstrated capability pretty f-35 a? >> the program record has to sdd coming in at the end of block three witches in the 2017 timeframe but a sdd ii is for

the provision weapon is planned for the first increment of the block for and that is approximately in the 20, 21, 22 timeframe. >> that is important as well because the sdd provides an ability to kill multiple targets in adverse weather to something that the a-10 has the capability on so i think -- i hope that is taken into consideration as we look at this comparison. >> the comparison testing will be done with mobile targets and in close proximity to buildings and civilian structures with local targets. as i mentioned, right now, the mobile targets capability is problematic and how much will be corrected and it remains to be seen. in 2022 it will provide a weapon that can actually follow the target. before that in 2020, they may

also help in that regard the current moving target capability is limited. >> i know my time is up with one of the things that continues to worry me is under the air force plan they were all retired by 2022 and it seems to me that these are still important questions that remain that very much matter to our men and women on the ground. thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman and all of you for your service. general bogdan, the report recommends an approach in which new development efforts are managed and they recommended this type of acquisition program for the block for following the modernization efforts however, the dod hasn't conquered the recommendations and plans to improve the block for the modernization efforts in the existing cost plus contracts so if the dod did not adopt the

recommendation would that help eliminate the cost for the block phase of the program? i don't know why any of us don't pay attention to it but by the department of defense does makes no sense at all. >> i'm going to defer to mr. kendal. >> i think we are talking about a distinction that may not have a difference. the label brings with it a want of statutory oversight and what we plan to do with block for is ensure that it is accounted for and we have an independent estimate and that we match it intensively if there is a transparency to what we are doing. >> all the things that are being asked for will be supplied. but if the attitude of the label of the program that is going to bring a lot to the cost and i was hoping to avoid that.

i agree we don't want to put any more cost on top but i would ask mr. sullivan why would they make that report if you thought that it was going somewhere on top of that? >> we wouldn't want to see any bureaucracy on top of it either in fact we did a report last year looking w the kind of cold that our efficiency report for the under secretaries familiar with it and agrees with a lot of that i think. so one of the things we are also attacking when we attack these kind of accountability questions is let's reduce some of that bureaucracy that they have to deal with. but the reason we think it's important here is number one, the dollars involved are such that even according to the current law that meets the threshold for the program the other thing is on the f-22 program, we saw something very

similar when they decided to baseline the new capabilities into the program they did it under the existing program and very quickly a 2 billion-dollar estimate for the development of the new capabilities became about $11 billion there was no track or accountability over it because it was in with the baseline program. >> i appreciate the job that you do and i have to apologize why we don't take your recommendations more seriously. you must have considered bureaucracy versus the cost versus the contract versus the cost had to be significant savings. >> yes and we sympathize with the desire to not have to go through so many reviews and so many officers and comments and everything else and we did the report on that and it was eye-opening for us to see what they have to go through that to me that is not -- they said if

they had to go to a major defense acquisition program it would cause a year's delay in getting the development effort going and i just don't understand why that would be the case. we are doing many things that were required to do. >> yesterday it was announced that we were sending 250 special operation forces too serious. i understand the cost is approximately one to 1.5 million to train one special operator equaling roughly 375 million for the 250. general, you indicated recently that f-35 costs 1.8 million i know what is going to come down to 85 euros by 2019. if we traded ten jets we could increase the size of the special forces community by over 650. now this is after the general came and said that we are about

220,000 short of the ground troops so we are looking for ways to make sure that we can meet the threats we have. that f-35 costs 400,000 committed his $10 million for 2500. as we look at the cost associated with the f-35, we are facing how most of it is ground threats that we are facing infighting. does it make sense if insomuch or we currently depend on the special forces around the world? >> what i want for you is the department has many kinds of choices to have to make to try to balance the requirements with the resources they have. i will tell you that the f-35 is a long-term investment in the defense of the nation and our future adversaries are not

sitting still in the next ten or 20, 30 years we need the capabilities that the f-35 will provide us to maintain our leadership in the world. so, i consider the f-35 is an investment in the future. >> and i appreciate that. we have 2500 is scheduled to be built, correct? >> they will build 2,243. >> so for the aircraft we could 650 special people on the front lines right now flex thank you. >> doctor gilmore come in your prepared testimony you stayed cybersecurity testing has revealed deficiencies and that the full testing of the logistics operating unit and the just ask information system has not been permitted. can you give an overview of the

plan cybersecurity test and whether they are based on the deficiencies discovered so far that you believe the testing will be adequate? >> if we execute the plan my office has been working on in the joint operational test team and the office over the next couple of years, that will be a very rigorous set of cybersecurity tests. the problems that we are running into as you mentioned are the program is reluctant to let us test on the systems for fear that we might damage them and they haven't made provisions of the system is back now and although they are working on that now. so, up to this point and in the immediate future we won't have to test on the systems and laboratory systems our office is making those available and that is better than if we are going all testing as was mentioned at

my annual report and statement. but we need to do more than that. we need to test on the systems and we are also going to have to find a way to do some sort of cybersecurity assessment of the lockheed information systems because the analysts are plugged into the corporate network and we are working through all those issues and over the next couple of years i expect we will have done very adequate testing that we are just at the beginning of it. it. >> and a general, how is the program office working to address these issues? the doctor mentioned to some accommodations but there's still the need for the life testing. how are you addressing all of this? >> what i will tell you today, alis is operating on the dod networks and in order for me to be able to put the system on the networks, it's gone through over the last three or four years

very vigorous cybersecurity testing and certification from agencies outside to include the nsa. so, the idea that the alis today is somehow not tested isn't an accurate statement. however having said that, doctor gilmore is correct. i was hesitant last year to give the operational test community the authority to test into the operational system because we didn't have redundancy in part of the system and of the testing were to knock off the part of the system, i didn't have a backup. we wer were going to back up toy and as soon as it was in place, we would give the operational test community the full authority to test the system as it operates in the field today and that should happen before the end of the year. before the end of the year. >> i would like to comment that we do operational testing as an

integral part of the testing of the systems that have been through certifications and we get into them every time. so i'm not arguing against the certificationscome the feature specificatio, which arespecificf assessments. they are certainly necessary but they are hardly sufficient and commercial organizations such as microsoft have said in the advice they try to provide their customers assumtotheir customeru have been penetrated and do continue mobile red teaming which is what we do in our operational tests. , said the certification to general talks about are certainly necessary that hardly sufficient. >> mr. secretary, overall, what are the lessons learned in this process? what are we applying to other acquisitions in how i and how ie cybersecurity going to be included in the requirements

process? what are we doing to integrate the requirements for the cybersecurity into the hold acquisitions process? >> it is a ubiquitous problem. .. >> not all of our systems like the of 35 during development. we have to integrate the design process as we go. as well as and her business practices. it is a pervasive threat. i

worry particularly particularly about loss of and classified information and it's more easier to abstract and a tack. it's a problem because you wanted taken to the internet's he can order parts and stuff. were working the problem very hard. it's not going to be cheap to fix it. it's not going to be quick to fix it but we have to. >> thank you. >> i know senator donnelly asked about lessons learned from 35 program and what we might take ford into other programs given some of the challenge this program go back to some members high school years. i think we only got through mr. sullivan and doctor gilmore though. i would like to hear the answer to that question secretary kendall.

>> i was thinking as my colleagues were answering, i think it's a combination of thing, at the end of the day having a successful program depends on a handful of things. they are going to be complicated which starts with reasonable requirements and it has to have professional management and power to do his job. you have to have adequate resources, you have to have a system that basically will support people doing their thing. in our system as others have mentioned there is a very strong bias that is built into were structured toward optimism. it's easier to get a program funded of a cost less. people. people on think faster and cheaper and to do more. most of the problems i've seen in acquisition stem from being in a hurry, and being convinced for whatever reason that things will be cheaper, better, faster than they will actually be. my office was formed in 1986 because this problem was so pervasive.

i think we have had a mixed record of success. one of the things i hope i have done to over the last several years is to put more realism into structured programs with more likelihood of success. many of the things we do are incredibly complicated and difficult. when you create something that is never been created before and you do it with cutting edge technology that is a process that has unknown senate. no matter no matter how much risk reduction you do at a time. i think support for sound management, ensuring professionals are in place, resisting the tendency to spend the money just because it's in your budget, and you will be afraid you'll lose it if you don't spend it which is what happened started production. it has to be reinforced throughout the chain of command started with secretary of defense. >> thank you senator. i will not elaborate the optimism piece, are given, i will give i will

give you two other things are. when he set up a large acquisition program like this, you must ensure that the risk between industry and government is balanced properly. if the risk is all on the government, or all on industry, you will get bad behaviors from both sides. so it is very important to make sure you have the incentive structures right and the risk balanced appropriately between the government and industry. we do not at that right at the early part of the f35 program. mr. kendall, under his leadership i've been trying to do that for a number of years now and it is proven to be helpful. the second thing i would tell you that people do not talk about much is leadership continuity. if you have a very large program a very complex like the f 35, it will do no good to put leaders in place that are there for only two or three years, it takes years, it takes them a year just understand what is going on. i would tell you are bigger acquisition program need stable leadership at the top for many

years to help. >> are you talking about uniformed leadership or civilian leadership? >> either once or. government and military personnel are very capable acquisition leaders. you have to leave them in place for enough time to make a difference. to the extent that uniformed leadership is an acquisition challenger personal challenge. >> it is both sir. >> how do you provide the incentives for military person to continue moving up in rank if you leave him in a job for five or six years. >> but that is sometimes what is necessary for very big complex acquisition problems. >> ever for partners overseas and i just don't mean but our security partners generally were talking about acquiring weapons systems that because they are small compared to the united states they worry about playing

with the country instead of a country with the plane. what is the risk that some of the partners in this program face in terms of the cost of this aircraft and the ability to acquire number of aircraft needed to contribute to the program. how many joint strike fighters need a country acquire to have a meaningful to their defense? >> that is an interesting question and i ink it really goes to what each country cares about in terms of its resources and what they care to defend, what i will tell you is even our smallest nations on the of 35 program are looking at two squadrons of f35, the idea that the partnership will be working together to sustain, maintain and train the airplanes is a huge deal for them. otherwise they cannot afford a fifth generation capability like they are today. >> thank you. >> on behalf of the chairman. >> thank you sir. doctor gilmore, i'm concerned concerned about your testimony that the marine corps found a

were not able to achieve aircraft at the unit or intermediate level that would support expeditionary warfare. >> can you expand on this and give your assessment as to whether alice or the automatic logistic information system is mature enough to support the sustained operations of land or shipment based for f 35's at this time. >> at this time, it is not sufficiently mature. there are number of number of improvements in plant as the program was swore to what is called alice three-point oh, the fully capable version that is meant to be available for operational testing and full operational capability. if those improvements are realized they will address a number the issues mentioned in my testimony. but currently, there are immaturity's in the system, there are there are lots of time-consuming workarounds that are required to keep aircraft flying, there's a heavy reliance on having contractors present

again when we move forward to alice three-point oh, the plan plan is to fix many of those problems. there is also concerned that was alluded to when talking about tires that there are still much reliance on sending parts back rather than repairing them closer to the front line. again the program is working on those issues. we will see how alice three-point oh does when it comes to operational testing, my estimate is in 2018. >> lieutenant general, can you comment on doctor gilmer's assertion that with the current number of aircraft plans for testing, and 80% aircraft availability rate is needed to efficiently test on schedule, what would you assesses the current air craft rate and does the gpo current production right be up to 80% by the time the i/o

is scheduled to start. it seems seems as though you're not making that yet you're going to have more challenges between now and then to meet that. how are we going to meet the testing guidelines that are laid out in order to meet the deadlines that you have laid out? it does not appear as though it's possible. can you comment on that give us your thoughts please. >> i'm not quite sure where the 80% comes from but i think. >> in order to have a number of aircraft and the number of tests you gonna do, you have to have 80% operational. >> to finish i/o to, you need within a year. you are correct sir. i sir. i do not believe we will, by the at time iot gets near 80 percent. today were hovering around 60% aircraft ability. the best we best we have seen so far in the u.s. air force airplane at hill air force base, when they deployed this winter they

achieved about a 72% availability rate. what we have seen is our newer airplanes are doing much better, but i will tell you, there is very unlikely that we will get to 80%. what that means is iot may take longer than we anticipated. that would be the major result of that. >> that's interesting we've talked a little bit and i'm good a up on senators questions regarding the a-10. as i look back to the information been provided to us, if you compare the two aircraft today, the a-10, time on station hour to an hour and half, that f35b, and this is from what i can see the plan operational capability 25 to 40 minutes, on station with weapons, the a-10 floor to air service weapon, under to be software, to air to surface weapons, the fuel burn

ten to 20% higher than an f-16, 50 to 70%% higher than in a-10 which would suggest that we need additional capabilities just to service them certain close by those areas. on the gun itself the f35 mrs. the way it was designed in the first place apparently it was not designed with a -- with a 42nd verse. in a-10 with 35 million canted 17 seconds. in a-10 round is double the weight of that carried by the f 35, five, clearly we talk about having a similar mission were talking about doing the job in a completely different ways, is that a fair assessment. >> doctor gilmore. >> yes, the f35 when you're talking about closer support it will do it much differently than the a-10. we are going to do those

comparison tests of the ability to perform between the a-10 f35 as as an integral part of testing. we are not going to say the f35 has to perform task the same way the a-10 does, will let the f35 pilots take advantage of the systems on that aircraft, deals some of the limitations you mentioned as well as they can. and see how all the missions are carried out in terms of the ability to strike tag timely manner and accurately in the report on that. there are numerous arguments about how well each aircraft will do under different circumstances and threats. clearly the the f35 should have an advantage at a higher threat than the a-10 does. so the comparison testing in our report will eliminate all that. >> i'm on a timeline, but secondary candle looks like he wants to respond and in fairness all give them an opportunity. >> thank you mr. chairman. i'm a huge proponent of file of the a-10 i'm an army officer.

it was purpose designed to be close air craft. it was a very good design for that purpose. if u.s. it to do in order air, it's hopeless. the f35 design is a multi-aircraft that can do a variety can do a variety of missions. air dominance, strike, and closer support. it does close air support differently, doesn't have the features that you mention, those are all real numbers but what is different now than at the time he was conceived is the munitions. a wide variety of aircraft to put a small bomb work exactly where wanted it to go. the air force today does like

air bombers today. so times of change. if we could afford it, i think everybody would like to keep the a-10 in inventory because it is such a good special-purpose aircraft for that one mission. but given the constraints we have on both the size of our structure in the financial resources we have, maintaining a one mission aircraft in the air force which is not something that could fit into the balance we try to achieve. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you for calling this hearing and thanks to all of you, our witnesses for your testimony today. you talk delegation has has had the opportunity to witness firsthand the rollout of the f35 in the air force. as a 388419 fighter wings at hill air force base in ogden, utah prepare prepare to reach initial operating capacity later this year. we've also been able to see the development of the logistics and maintenance function of the f35 a of the complex which has been so effective that they have been called to assist both the marine corps and the navy and the modernization goals for their respective variants of the 35, we're very proud of that the men and women who are working to

train on test and keep these jets in the air are models of american ingenuity and hard work and patriotism it education at its very best. i hope this congress will provide them with the resources they very much need. in order to continue succeeding. in their mission general moan of the main obstacles in the f35 a reach in its ioc goals this year it involves the continued development of alice which is a force used to manage the logistics and supply chain for maintaining the f 35, five, not just now during the rollout but throughout his lifetime. can you tell me how is a joint program office working within industry to ensure this capability is functional and is fully integrated into this weapons platform in a timely and

effective manner. >> thank you senator. the alice system right now at the air force is on track to be about 60 days later than what we had planned. the biggest issue we have right now is getting the maintenance and supply chain and configuration management on the engine, the f135 integrated into the alice system. that it has proven to be more difficult than we had anticipated. because it requires both the backend erp, to talk to each other and to connect with alice. we have since. >> and we have worked across the whole country as well as some of the other teammates and we are brought in software experts within dod to try over the last few months to see where

those difficulties wide. the good news is we understand where the difficulties are, now we just have to go and execute and like i said, i think we're probably going to be about two months late in getting that done. but from a technical standpoint i think we will be a we get it done. >> it's good anytime you can contain a delay and look forward and conclude that because of budget reductions and the inability to retire the a-10, the air force is concerned about a potential shortfall of experienced uniform maintainers to transition to a 35 units and keep the weapon's save and keep them functional. so general, have the air force been able to resolve the problem in the short term. what long-term complications do you see that might still exist that a generation of maintainers

is keeping pace with the process of integrating the f35 into the air force. >> in the short term when the air force was faced last year with a shortage of maintainers for their ioc capability they asked the program office to populate in a terriers quadrant at luke air force base with a contract logistics support personnel and we did that this 62nd squadron on the flight line has maintained approximately 110 contractors as opposed to blue suit maintainers. that gave the air force the flexibility to take those maintainers that would've been at luke air force base and transferred them to hill air force base from ioc. that's just a band-aid not a short-term fix. in the long term i believe i believe the air force needs the ability to move maintainers around the growing fleet of f35's. we are committed to working with

them to increase the maintainers through the schoolhouse and to work with our partners and to work with the garden reserve in the air force who can provide some of that man. i'll defer to the air force on the solution. >> let me ask you one more question. can you tell me did the department of defense originally attend the f35 to be a direct replacement for the a-10 and close air support missions? or was it designed to work with other air force and joint for systems to fulfill the department's needs as well as closer support goes and what's your assessment of how the services will be able to work together to meet close air support needs through integrated joint operation question work. >> what i will tell you is that over time the evolution of the way we conduct close air support in the department of defense has evolved. it is no longer single airplane

out there talking to a ground controller and dropping a single weapon, it it is a much more integrated fight, it is much more reliant on multiplatform and multi- communication systems with ground and air. given that, the f35 in the future, today and in the future will have the capabilities to seamlessly integrate into that network to perform close air support. >> thank you very much. >> senator lee, the the chairman is on his way back to the second vote on also told that senator bloom and senator kane are coming for questioning. at this point if i may, we'll take a short recess, perhaps just a few moments until the chairman returns. we will stay in a recess until he returns. [inaudible]

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[inaudible] [inaudible] [inaudible] [inaudible] [inaudible] [inaudible] >> let me once again on behalf of trimming can call the hearing to order and recognize senator gave her his question.

>> mr. gilmore, one of the concerns i have been and it has been touched on in the searing is the length of time this a platform is expected to serve, roughly 20 years mark, 30 plus years from initial inception, i inception, i think back to any product that i may have bought in 2004, i was originally thinking of senator graham's flip phone, i would not want to be flying that in 2040, are we building upgradability into this airplane so that it can keep up with the times, in other words is it designed with that in mind? >> well, i will defer the details to general bogdan. this aircraft is going to be much more upgradable than the f-22 was. but having said that, we have

already identified a need for an upgrade from the current from the now being installed technically fresh two processor which provides additional capability relevant to the processors of the aircraft to this point, we have identified a need to an upgrade for that, technical refresh three process. in this program moving from one processor to another is not nearly as arduous a problem as the f-22 when there is a lot of software developed that was developed with features that were tied very specifically to the processors in order to maximize capability. it's still not a trivial matter as been demonstrated recently by the stability problem that we now hope have been resolved with a technical refresh two processor.

upgradability is being built in but it doesn't mean it is going to be trivial to execute. >> general, quickly what is your thought, are you ever get to be able to upgrade this airplane so it is not going to be absolute in 2025? >> i believe we will serve, there's a few points to make. one is when we do replace the next version of the replace the next version of the computer or the brain of the airplane, we are requiring open standards and modular open system architecture which will allow for the incorporation of the sensors and new capabilities much easier. second, when we first originally designed airplane we knew many of our partners and customers would want to put unique weapons on the airplane so we have created a system that will allow us to integrate multiple kinds of weapons on the airplane rather, it trivial but in an easier way.

from both of those perspective i believe the airplane is adaptable and grovel. the third as many of the capabilities inherent in the airplane today that make it special or software-based. therefore in the future as new capabilities, unlike electronic warfare in electronic attack, will be able to upgrade the software and an easier way. >> i think this is got to be an important part of our acquisition processes were buying 40-year-old assets, the submarine, mr. secretary kendall, was was the attempt at joynes in this project a mistake in retrospect? >> that's a good question senator. i think the honest answer is, i'm not not sure. i was president at the inception it started out as a technology program, it was instituted by one of my predecessors on the staff. we are now thinking of the fallout aircraft for the navy and air force, i don't think were going to repeat this.

first i think the design parameters are going to be different for fall aircraft of the services. we did get some benefit and commonality but there is very little commonality and structure, so i think we could still get some of those without having to have a single program. >> you could get benefits in terms of common? >> common sensor systems and so on. so i think those could still be achieved without have a common program necessarily. i think you'd have to make that decision as your plans for modernization and acquisition became more real and material as to whether or not it paid off or not. i think it is astonishing to me frankly that we haven't been able to keep this program together for so long, keep the three services fully committed and keep all the international partners committed. we have two that are on the fence right now but at this stage of the game everybody is still inches pulling all that off is not a small achievement.

that's very hard to do. i think we have to think very carefully about that. the more complexity complexity you have in a program the more risk you have. i don't know the savings are necessarily worth that complexity that goes witit. >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you. i think you all for being here today and for your insights on this very challenging program. it is as complex as it is critical to our national defense. we should expect on this committee and the american public should anticipate that a weapons platform of this complexity will also have bumps in the row. in its development and research. i take it none of you would disagree with that basic proposition. despite that bumpy road at some point the f35 as as a whole has

already made significant advancement in a number of areas and in particular the f135 program provides fifth generational power capability to the fleet. every reverent flow rate contract as i understand it for the 135 has been has been on or below cost. the recent announcement of the lots nine in ten will bring the price down another 3.4% from the lr ip eight. today the 135 conventional takeoff and landing engine toss costs have been reduced by 47% since the initial flight test engine. the engine cost has been reduced by 34% in the same time. this a real achievement. in addition they have already

identified technology and improvement options that will increase the thrust, durability and fuel efficiency that could save billions of dollars for this program. the f135 is meeting the key f fy2020 milestones. again, my again, my understanding or mission capability and reliability. but the fact that are accurately stated. >> it's very accurate. >> all that said, i know questions have been raised about the f135 performance and i take it from your testimony that quality has not been an issue so far as the supplier performance

have been concerned. >> two or three years ago i would've told you i was worried about that. i will tell you that pratt & whitney have done a good job at standing up a quality organization within the military engines that have dug down deep into their supply chain and helped improve that significantly. >> their supply chain is a lot of it based in connecticut and i can tell you from my experience in connecticut that that our suppliers and manufacturers have recognized the challenge we face for this century, literally this weapons platform will be critical to our national defense. we we can look back and draw lessons and we should from the challenges that cause that improvement to take place. maybe even the overall conceptual framework as you suggested should there have been

more individualization of the platform for different services. but i can well recall that the conventional wisdom not so long ago was the services should get together and collaborate and the by a single fighter and that was the wisdom does your of contracting in its day. now maybe lessons point in different directions. i hope we will learn lessons from this experience but there has to be a recognition that this weapon platform will do things that no fighter engine or platform has done in the past, would you agree doctor fillmore? >> the investment ranking is large and the need that we have is large to deal with the

threats that currently exist. if you have 35 does not succeed, we'll be in a purple. we have a common national interest in making sure it succeeds. >> yes yes. >> would you agree mr. sullivan? >> yes, we definitely need to have this moving forward. this is the the fifth generation. >> think mr. chairman. let me just say in summary that it has been a scandal and the cost overruns have been disgraceful in this committee and our authorization responsibilities we will take whatever actions we can to prevent a reoccurrence. it it should not take 15 years and still not have an aircraft ioc. with the cost overrun after cost overrun. so i guess my question finally mr. sullivan to think that we have learned the lessons and

taken sufficient measures to prevent a reoccurrence or do we need to do some more? >> i think there's always room to do more. i don't think we have learned all the lessons yet but i would say that if you go back five or six years from now, go back to say 2010, we are not seen as many of 35's or these big programs with requirements that are not achievable so i think were learning some lessons that way. some could could be because of budget constraints, some because of the work congress has done and frankly i think the department has done a good job of trying to implement and drive down into the culture some better practices, they talk about better buying power initiatives, we have a long way to go though. there's though. they're still way too much cost growth in these programs. were not