reporting directly from respected countries? >> if you don't mind, two weeks another probably get away from the issue of budget resources, what we need except to say if you ask the journalist do you need more resources, the answer is probably not going to be no. so that's the first thing. but yes, i see two things being a tremendous opportunity for us. one is the necessary reduction of overseas assets but america and to be pretty much all american and western european news operations all over the world. and also the pouring in of similar assets by those we might consider our target audiences. and so i think putting those two things together mean that if we use our resources wisely and well, which i believe that we are, can and should be doing i think that we could use a basic

piece of an asset that we are given and use it to our great advantage. .. mick >> so glad to meet you. >> nice to met you. >> so i'm sure it's too early, really, to answer this, but do you have any sense how much of voa audience and can you take a little bit about the implications of digital first? >> yeah, i'm afraid i can't give you a precise answer to the first question. i know it's something that's being counted in our services

around the building and needs to be counted much more robustly because it's what we need to know. i think you can safe i will say if you look at the projections of the way people will be assessing not only news but information commerce, you know, all kinds of things, conversation around the world, it is going to be -- it's going to skip over all the intermediate steps and go right to districtal, largely probably digital on future phones, not smart phones because that's the way the inexpensive way spreading throughout the less developed world. it's a thing that we absolutely need to be thinking about, readers, listeners. i'm trying to figure out a word to call it. it's just audience. where our audience is. in terms of precise percentages, it varies quite substantially

where you are. and then you next. the gentleman next. >> thank you, bryan carlson, retired as well. i often wondered -- i heard a radio report on an event in bangladesh and it was done by chief in london. now, if i have my geography right, it's like something somebody in alaska to talk about an event in richmond. do you think there's room for cooperation? now you're on the government side but you used to be in the private med aside. is there room for more cooperation and collaboration with american media and vice versa? can you find arrangements where you can find really good stuff to post to los angeles times or

something and can american institutions use the correspondence the way here picking up things from the guardian correspondent or whatever? >> i think that's what i meant how in the old days we saw people as competitors and strove to distinguish ourselves and you didn't want to talk to your competitors. i would say that you see that far, far less and i think there is an opportunity for us to do this. i don't see in this time of limited media resources why you want to have five different, six different news services giving you exactly the same picture of the exactly same event. my where had for voice of america is tell me how you're going to do it better and doing it better doesn't mean, you know, a much more nicely crafted first paragraph. it means tell me what your value add is going to be. what are you going to give your audience that reflect it is richness of our knowledge of our

global audience, and if we can do that, then we should go first. if we can't do that, why waste our time. why waste your time doing something that anybody else can do? you know, there's certain things that are so-called commodities news, that doesn't mean that so many things that the basic simple news that's being produced by our services around the world, these are not commodity news. there's nobody else doing this. that we ought to be doing in a have robust fashion. if there's five or six different sources of it, all of them pretty much the same, i think we should move into something that where he can use intelligence, expertise, deep knowledge of countries that we are involved in and do really amazing work. that would be my view. >> my joe johnson, i'm instructor at the foreign service institute. my question is also about collaboration but maybe with other organizations. i've noticed a number of very valuable reports in the

washington post, for example, with the center for public integrity and other ngo's, i wonder if you have heard of any venture that is the voa would undertake with outside organizations, the nonprofits that have educational or research, some related purpose to your journalism. >> now, this is interesting. you would call the center of public ngo, i would think of it as a journalistic organization and it was one of the major conduits of the panamá papers. it falls right under the umbrella of this gentleman's question. i think when i talk about what i like voice america to do, i'm simply reflecting back what everyone else is already doing. this is not something i'm discovering. so execution is going to be everything. i don't want to -- i can't

overpromise. i'm just telling you what's the med island escape i see coming from the outside and where do i see everyone else going. in some way we can benefit being able to piggy-back from everybody else's pain and suffering so we don't have to go ourselves. i went through enough pain and suffering in my previous job. [laughter] >> i also had the privilege of working several years at voice of america with language services. a request and a question. the request is when you talk about the themes, the areas of coverage that have large audiences and potential audiences abroad, entrepreneurship, women, one other area is learning english. one of the most popular in voice of america is learning english division or section and then the

learning english programs, you mention it had russian service, mandarin, but more broadly, the question of english as part of doa has gone back and forth in very drastic fashion over the last 20 years or so in different directions. so how do you see english fitting in to the voice of america? what should be the role of voa in english language content? >> well, you just added a qualifier there. english-language content. if you're going to cover the united states, you're probably going to do it in english. there probably is not a way you could cover voa directly. and so i see the english language that has value going out to the rest of the world because a fair number of the rest of the world does, in fact, speak english.

that's good. i see it for many we could and knowing what the audience wants and demands and using our abilities of english-language service to report and develop beats, the subjects of beats, i see them converging on some subjects. i see it as incredibly useful partnership to both have the equation right in the same building. >> hi. >> you guys have a lot of questions, man. >> former npr crowd. >> welcome. >> jeff rosenberg, one of my jobs was head of npr worldwide, which is the international distribution side, doesn't come as david can tell you, doesn't come to the attention of the

government unless it's occasionally has some friction with the government. >> that's an interesting way of putting it. >> fortunately, that hasn't happened in quite a while. but my experience does bring to mind the question i thought i heard early on that you -- i thought i heard the word commissioning. did i not hear that? okay. maybe -- commissioning. >> not commission in a commission, causing things to happen. >> commissioning in something someone make some things for you. >> yes. >> good. all right. the point being there, i was very pleased to hear that slide by because the experience with particularly the bbc's domestic product in radio and television, that is the product that's being turned out for them by very, very talented people.

there's any number of radio programs on radio 3 and 4 and 2 in the uk. and then in the united states in the last ten years there's been an explosion in the output of independently-produced audio material. i think everybody is familiar with the occasional podcast that goes viral. and there's -- there's really a tremendous amount of talent out there. there's things that have been created for domestic audience and internet audience that might be of appeal or there are people and/or organizations who could be turning out. murray mentioned the cultural side given that they're not going to create a great many new staff positions in the coen

building. people to work that side, and, of course, that would apply to language programming as well, would you see that as a possibility? >> yes. [laughter] >> i apologize too for what we call a german question. [laughter] >> you did great. >> thank you, i'm ken, also retireed foreign service, i would like to follow up which is including american culture for content itself, if you recall reality check is pretentious, every time you listen to the radio, most of it is music and most of it is pop, people don't listen to npr-type radio

broadcast which is what we're used to hear in the washington area. could be a vehicle for voa to get into the audiences and sound like international radio. >> there's a wealth of expertise out here in the audience that i'm definitely pleased to listen to. i'm glad because you're giving feedback. >> my first term during service was in nigeria, i didn't know what voa did until i learned that most of the sagel set the clock by news newscast. >> doesn't that give you goosebumps? >> resources invested and the impact that those resources have and i hope as those decisions get made even in regions that

perhaps are less populated, although they're approaching 100 million now, the thought is given to impact and not duplication. >> and let me pause here for another unpaid political announcement. this is aspirational, this is durational, i do not want anybody to mistake this. this is not going to be easy. i've been through similar things at other news services. news services are big historic, storied traditions dedicated workforces, plenty of resources. it wasn't easy there. it's not going to be easy here and i just -- i'm reading david's mind over there. i'm sitting there and watching, he's saying, yeah, right. good luck with that he's thinking. i know what he's thinking. [laughter] >> i want to make sure that you understand that the old saying, no plan survives the first

battle, we are going to have a lot of that. it's going to require a lot of help, a lot of patience, a lot of foreberance and good will because it isn't going to happen overnight. >> former journalists, back on the hill again now, just we wanted to emphasize two things you just said, there's a lot of expertise in this room and good will as well, i hope that you can consider this a community that you can call on because a lot of folks here have been through in various positions what you're about to go through or going through now and some are still in it looking around. you have a few of the international broadcasting colleagues, too. now that i'm back in congress as a staffer, i can tell you that the atmosphere in the hill is not going to get any easier,

while you look to make changes, i would like to advise to look to speaking to members of congress who represent the people who work for you, that coalition can be very helpful in supporting you, not just the ones that are directly involved with foreign policy. >> thank you, that's excellent advise. how about -- how many more do we have out here? one, two. >> connie, still a reporter, there's a lot of good people out there. i had five years of freelancing. i find the voa reporters are the brightest in the world and the ones that work in the overnight shift should be looted. it's very difficult. i mean, i know you can get it on the internet, but what about changing the charter and good luck?

>> thank you very much, thank you. i accept every ounce of good will that's sent my way and i'm sure that i'm going to use every ounce of it. one more. anybody? sorry, somebody beat you to it. >> i guess i'm the last person, david henderson, former cbs news. i started in radio as a kid over arlington, virginia doing a saturday program in the voa. about a hundred years ago. [laughter] >> but i love your use of the world cooperation. i would also say collaboration. you have within voa, which i have been very curious about wonderful organizations like radio europe and outstanding people, is there any economy of scale to use some of the resources with voa?

>> absolutely. i'm looking right over your shoulder at one of my new colleagues, that's exactly one of the things that we have been talking about doing, how we make the best use of the resources that we have and not overlap any more than we have to. absolutely. >> one more person. i can't resist putting him on the spot. david ensore. [laughter] >> what advice -- >> yo can watch the rest of this on our website. we take you live to the hudson institute for a discussion on balancing privacy and security, you'll hear from two different perspectives, one a former president of the civil liberty union and one that worked for the reagan h.w. bush administration. >> on july 6th, jeff, the former president of coalgate university and president of the museum will

be speaking about problems on the internet. we hope all of you can join us for those events. we would love the welcome the c-span audience. we have a wonderful program today with two leading speakers in america on issues of civil liberties and security, we will -- they're going to divide the time between them on my -- on my left and on your right is nadine strossen, she's in my view leading and most articulate spokesperson of civil liberties in america and i think that's an understatement, she is a frequent speaker both here in

washington and around the world and we look forward to your comments today. david rivkin is one of the most prolific writers. i think he's probably the most frequent columnist in the wall street journal, writing variety of topics usually relate today constitutional law and the role of the federal government and he is -- in fact, it was one of his many columns that sparked my interest in putting this event together today. just kind of randomly we'll have nadine speak first, she'll have about 20 -- no, 15 minutes and then david will follow with 15 minutes. 10 minutes after that, then i will have a few questions and then we have questions from the audience.

if our online viewers or our c-span viewers have questions, what is the -- [inaudible] >> at hudsonevents. we are happy to take questions from the audience. with that, nadine. >> many thanks to you harold for the introduction and for arranging this program and thanks to all of the audience members for your time and interest in this important topic. i'm glad to once again share the podium with david rivkin, we've debated each other about this issue several times since 9/11. one such debate was for the intlg -- intelligence scared series when we addressed provocative question, better more surveillance than another 9/11, well, not surprisingly

before the debate, most audience members voted against another 9/11 and hence for more surveillance, however, i'm proud to say that my debate partners and i persuaded almost 20% of the audience members to change their mind, so we ended up winning that debate. notably one of my debate partners on that occasion was bob bar and i think it's notable because he was a conservative republican member of congress from georgia and notably one of david's teammates was andrew mccarthy, the federal prosecutor who led the prosecutions of the 1993 world trade center bombing and other major terrorism cases and that is notable because recently andrew mccarthy has been speaking out strongly against excessive government surveillance as have others who have held top counterintelligence and national

security positions. they maintain that national security and personal privacy in our online communications are mutually reinforcing and correspondingly that excessive surveillance undermines privacy. i would like to quote a couple recent publications by some of the former officials. first one from andrew mccarthy, as i mentioned the former terrorism prosecutor of national review of which he's a contributing editor, the comments were triggered by the recent apple-fbi controversy. they address fundamental points about government limited power either to constrain individual rights or to conscript private business. as andrew mccarthy wrote, our rights to communicate and be free from unreasonable searches preexist law enforcement's capacity to intrude on them.

it is law enforcement's burden to evolve technological surveillance capabilities that can be deployed in a manner consistent with our rights. the constitution's point is to limit government's ability to intrude on liberty, not to limit the scope of liberty to government's capacity for intrusion. again, former federal prosecutor, former debate partner of david rivkin. let me post a op ed from officials, mike mcconnell, former director of the national security agency, william lynn, former defense -- deputy defense secretary. for several years they have been writing that the chinese government poses a serious national security threat through its massive theft of intellectual property, technology and business

information. they, therefore, advocate encryption to protect against such cyber exploitation, they do recognize obviously as former law enforcement, security officials, they recognize the serious concerns that the fbi has raised that such encryption will allow criminals to keep information secret. we believe that the greater public good is a secure communication's infrastructure protected by encryption without building any means for government monitoring for three reasons. first, this would protect individual privacy and business information from exploitation, second, requiring u.s. technology providers to build access for law enforcement will not prevent malicious actors from finding other technology providers who will furnish encryption.

finally f the -- if the u.s. makes demands other nations like china will demand the same. no principle basis to resist. they therefore conclude as follows, strategically u.s. businesses are essential to u.s. national security interest, therefore it is essential to protect u.s. business from economic espionage and that strategic may well outweigh the tactical benefit from making accessible to western authorities. let me summarize the theme that i've been developing so far. our debate topic raises complicated nuance issues. balancing liberty and security, privacy and security is not a zero-sum game and expert positions do not follow patterns

such as factors of political views, whether their backgrounds lie in national security or civil liberties. let me again, quote, michael from a debate i had against him at the federal society national lawyer's convention when he was homeland security secretary under president george w. bush. i've quoted this line many times because i so completely agree with it. he said, we cannot live in liberty without security, but we would not want to live in security without liberty. again, i coldheartedly agree with statement, i devoted my life on advancing civil liberties and i have never felt liberty to be more endangered, including my own personal liberty to be more endangered than when i was in a country that lacked basic security. so while i was loading up for today's debate, what i found

most terrifying about government's to expand surveillance was not only encroachment on privacy and free speech as negative as those are, but i am also at least aster fied by the prospect that we vamp up surveillance will make citizens more vulnerable to crime including terrorism and sabotage as explained by technology security experts. i have to confess, i'm a patriot but i do not share patrick's famous statement, give me liberty or give me death. i happen to believe that i should be alive in order to enjoy my liberties. so i want to quote a brief that was filed in the san bernardino apple-fbi case by a prominent respected group of security and expert. they detailed the various

serious security risks that would result from forcing device manufacturers to facilitate access by u.s. law enforcement as the fbi, of course, was seeking to do. now, exactly how serious the risks are depend on exactly what the manufacturers would be forced to do. as the security experts explained, the worst case scenario is consistent with what the fbi was arguing for. the worst case scenario would be if apple were forced to sign the custom code that the government wanted to force it to design and if that code is capable of being used on any apple device with the same operating system. let me quote these experts, if that los angeles -- leeks the public danger would be catastrophic, i phones and i pads are not only used by general public but airline

pilots, police and president obama. experience in history leads to the conclusion that forcing a company to undermine unproduct security would imperil not just the cybersecurity but also the fiscal security of worldwide users. in sum, weakening protection far from advancing security concerns to the contrary may well have a net negative security impact. we've also seen repeatedly how government overstates how important surveillance is even for specific short-term security goals. examples include the two recent high-profile confrontations between the fiduciary duty -- fbi and apple, the one i already mentioned. the other one involved an iphone that was used by a brooklyn drug dealer.

in both cases the fbi insisted over and over again that it could not access the data on the phones unless court's took the unprecedented step making apple design that would let the fbi break into customers' devices. in both cases those claims turned out to be unfounded. first in march the fbi announced that it had found an alternative way to access san bernardino phone and also found an alternative way to access the brooklyn phone. we saw the same pattern with the national security agency, nsa, concerning the metadata collection programs of all telephone call that is edward snowden brought to light. we now know thanks to recent

disclosure the fbi claims that this drag-net surveillance of us innocent americans was the only effective means for keeping track of suspected terrorists, and i'm quoting from their briefs. to the contrary, though, the independent analyses of that program have concurred that the nsa's communication surveillance has not made any contribution to our counterterrorism efforts. that was the the conclusions of both high-level communications in 2014, 2015, first the president's review board on technologies and also the privacy and civil liberties oversight board. in the briefs that the nsa has

been filing in the open federal court proceedings in challenges that are being brought by the aclu and others, nsa in contrast to the overblown statements about how essential the program was and open court where those claims are subject to rebuttal by an adversary to review by the public and the politicians and the press. in that contest the nsa is making the modest claim that this program can complement other programs and may advance counterterrorism efforts. a federal judge richard lee commented the hypothetical endorsements are not exactly competence inspiring. so no wonder he concluded that such a limited possible security benefit could not justify the huge costs to privacy and

freedom of speech, not the mention the security dangers that security experts are also flagging. so judge leon has issued two major rulings striking down the metadata program unconstitutional. those are noteworthy because he is a respected conservative. the supreme court has long recognized that government surveillance of communications chills or deters our fundamental first amendment freedoms including freedom of speech, press, religion and association. so the court has long held that such surveillance must be subject to a specially strict standards even when it is undertaken for national security reasons, indeed, specially then as the court has explained, though the investigative duty of the executive may be stronger in national security cases, so also

is there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protect its speech including political dissent in national security cases. in fact, multiple recent studies have confirmed that our awareness of government surveillance has a demonstrable chilling effect on expression in particular reducing the expression of known -- nonconforming minority views. this kind of censorship in the shadow of surveillance is pronounced on the people who support has communication surveillance necessary for national security and to say they aren't bothered by it because they haven't broken any laws and hence they don't have anything to hide and yet there's impact on their self-censorship of views that they perceive as being in the minority. i would like to quote the lead

researcher for the study, professor elizabeth, surveillance is enabling a culture of self-censorship that further disenfranchise minority groups. surveillance, therefore, undermines the internet's ability for platform for open deliberation. well, given the complex, nuance factors at stake, i would like to suggest a general and -- analytical but i'm not taking an absolute position here anymore than the united states constitution does. no doubt, we are going to have many disagreements about the technological and perhaps we could agree on the pertinent issues that we should evaluate.

in the u.s. this also often takes place under the fourth amendment which protects us from unreasonable unwarranted government surveillance but now i would like to invoke the similar principles under international human right's law because they are a bit more elaborated, a bit more specific in detail but completely consistent with fourth amendment analysis. first, the government has the burden of supporting any surveillance measure by a detailed and evidence-based public justification. second, any such measures must be set out in public laws that are precise, transparent and none discriminatory which constrain discretion and provide effective safeguards against abuse. third, surveillance must be subject to prior judicial authorization. fourth, surveillance measures must be resorted to only when

necessary to achieve an enumerated important goal, in other words, as we often say in the u.s., the least intrusive means available for achieving that goal. fifth, must not outweigh any harm that they cause including harm to third parties or network infrastructure and security. and finally, measures should be overseen by an effective impartial and independent civilian oversight authority. in conclusion, too much post 9/11 surveillance has not conformed to framework and sadly has been the worst of both worlds. it has made us less free but it has not made us more safe. thank you very much. [applause] >> well, all right. >> i also wanted to thank harold

and hudson and the dean for coming here today. i'm going to speak here and hopefully we have a good debate. let me go a little bit broader and there are points in which nadine and i agree and some where we fundamentally disagree. let me walk-through assessment. at least i'm glad that nadine did not contest as some of the folks that are oppose to surveyance would not disagree about the threat. we are facing a serious threat ranging from low wolf packs to terrorist organizations. don't need to be profound about it. every one of you reads newspapers. you have isis, numerous several organizations and you've got

serious problems with level of attacks using weapons of mass destruction and we have been lucky in many respects. we have mass casualty attacks certainly in places like paris and brussels, we have been much more fortunate in american soil and we can talk about why that's the case, but we've had san bernardino, we had boston. we are quite vulnerable again to attacks that would spoil your day if you have to be caught in one, that would fundamentally degrade the quality of life and imperil our national -- i should say, we are very vulnerable as a civilization. there are people that write wonderful stories about it. i don't want to scare you. attacks of our transmission infrastructure may well leave

large portions of the united states not able to have electricity restored for days and weeks and it's not just a question of not having heat and air-conditioning, the question of not having transportation because, of course, all of our vehicles get fueled using pumps fueled by electricity and not even national guards coming, et cetera, et cetera because we all depend upon transportation for mobility. so we are facing a serious threat. now, fortunately for us despite some folks in this country doing lone-wolf stuff, but the enemy is operating at military will call long lines of communication or not very clear hierarchy but frankly not the greatest, thank god for that, planners of the

world and that means that one of their areas of strategic vulnerability and also including the fact that they're not easy to disearn among civilian. we have no shortage of volunteers. so, yes, we can degrade them overseas using drones and various attack methods but fundamentally communications. so we have to disrupt their communications. we have to learn how they communicate. now, that's good news because, again, we have technology that can help us to do that. the bad news is we live in a world where people are very anonymous, not the bore you with history, it's actually much,

much easier to be lost in this world, don't carry internal pass ports. most of us does not know our neighbors. it's very easy to get lost in a place. it comes every time you investigate some attacks like san bernardino and boston. so the good news is despite this tremendous given the way we live , rent apartments, rent cars, pay for meals, pay for lessons, there's a lot of fingerprints you leave, fingerprints. lots and lots and lots of electronic footprints which can be only discern if you engage in surveillance.

and by the way, with all due respect to indiscriminate surveillance, by very nature you need to have surveillance of the entire landscape. in terms of hunting, you need to be able to look around because you don't know where t prey is. i understand in the law enforcement context you do have something first to start an investigation, below probable cause, reasonable suspicion, you go to magistrate. it's sometimes challenging. i get all that. but it's utterly irrelevant in the counterterrorism context than to say as some poll incomes the hill like rand paul, well, indiscriminate is bad. it has to be indiscriminate, number one. number two, i will perhaps shock a little bit by saying we have to surveil more.

not only would i restore the metadata collection, i would couple it with comprehensive data, all sorts of databases which, again, not a new idea, somewhat unfortunate name of total awareness program which was briefly kicked around after 9/11. did not last very long, but i will tell you and we will hopefully talk about it more, but the notion that you can really intelligently assess the value of effort in sort of simplistic terms, how many terrorists plots did the meta collection is a silly question? i used to be a defense analysts. it's like asking what is the role of, you know, a particular

subset artillary capability. you bring a variety of assets to a task. yes, you do want to invest money in some things that have relevance, nobody in the military context subjects to that type of answer. you cannot. use your standoff ammunition, troops on the ground and you defeated the enemy and people engage research afterwards and come up with get get generalizations but you cannot justify anything well by requiring the government to prove beyond all reasonable doubt. i would combine and reassure in a second, i would engage in most

wide ranging surveillance of all publicly available data, because, look, the good news is that if you put things together and i will tell you in a second how you do it in computing, but if you put things together, if you're looking at, for example, fingerprints in the snow, terrorists are bad guys, do strange things, you know. for example, mr. farook went, san bernardino attack, went for some target practice. we go to target practice. when i was younger i enjoyed target practice but typically i went to the same target range because i chose one i was comfortable at. he went to multiple target ranges. well, that's kind of weird. that's one little data point and let's say, you know, he

engagedded in other types of behavior in terms of what establishments he frequented, what he bought, what type of phone calls he made, not talking about content, but that's important point. so if you put all those things together, you can get some meaningful number of red flags. not a certainty that somebody is a terrorist. red flags would enable otherwise scarce law enforcement resources to be deployed appropriately and to bring to bare, reasonable basis to go look at things which is all you do. and by the way, surveillance has to be accompanied by vigorous use of human, particularly in the area of resource, local

police does it. you cannot do it with millions of people to look at and we don't want to be profiling people based on religion, have this type of surveillance is the only way to prioritize law enforcement resources. i also think that frankly even if the other benefit -- and i've used this term before, the other benefit of doing all this stuff, again, important term in military art, what it does is you are putting pressure on the other side, you are forcing them to operate not in the opt male -- optimal mode. it's making sure that they don't all get together every time they want to. if you are surveilling, they're not going to communicate in optimal code and not have the

same information density, they are going to communicate through channel that is have coding and decoding. it has value. that's what the military does. it's not all about killing people and breaking things. all of that results from the widest possible surveillance, cognitive computing. something i'm interested for other reasons. we are assembling and with meta data, for example, you can figure out who is communicating with people in a terrorist list, but what do you do with that? well, if you look at, you know, computer and various other things and what ibm is doing, we are very close to the point where cognitive intelligence, machines would be able to analyze data to precipitate

these types of patterns and then say present to their human overseers, there are 50 or 60 tale signs that this person needs to be investigated. i don't get there. basically it would not work. i've written suggesting that i don't think that back doors and mandatory decryption keys should be provided -- shall not be provided by the risk of penetration by bad guys is worst than the benefits of reading this information. basically that data stream is going dark, ladies and gentlemen, and it's very simple even if you force old technology companies, am or companies

overseas to provide you those capabilities. you can generate your own encryption. so it would not work. it's not worth debating. interesting thing, however, is that being able to discern that somebody is using the strongest probable encryption, customized encryption, not the commercially provided encryption is an interesting tale tail sign. i'm using the strongest encryption and it does have tail-tail signs, why the hell was that? that's one interesting sign among other signs that can be used to precippate out potential things worthy to look at. the thing that depresses me the most is when i hear that there

are terrible abuses, i don't know what the hell they're talking about. some are better than others, but the government -- we better remember that, they don't do things perfectly. they don't deliver medical care right, they don't deliver in national security well either. there's always debates and disputes and people on each other's toes. but by any reasonable historical standard, thinking about all the bad things that happened in the aftermath of world war i and world war ii and cold war and witch hunts, what abuses aside from hugely overblown stuff.

i wish i could put it more robustly like snowden, has anybody been punished, repressed, lost jobs, lost tenure, put in prison, had accounts frozen? i mean, the worst thing is the so-called lovent that turns out, our intelligence agency is operating with tremendous amount of oversight both internal checks and balances where fbi is looking at nsa and fbi is looking at nsa. the first thing that can happen, ladies and gentlemen, aside from all the speculative nonsense that use the program to spy on their girlfriends, wives to see if they were cheating on them. they were punished. i'm not saying it's a good thing. that's really horrible abuse by

putting somebody in thumb of scale of liberty in in order. nothing like that happened. nothing like this is likely to happen. now, in a deem probably correctly noted that there are some people that are deterred by age of massive surveillance that the government engages in and adversely impacts their speech. i'm all in favor of having exercise of our first amendment protected, associational and speech rights. i litigate a lot in the space. i get it. if people are unreasonable fear about something, like vaccines, 20-30% people that they kill, absurd view. you should be combated and overcome because vackization --

vaccination is good for you. gets people comfortable to the degree of government involved. you know, the funny thing to me and i do a lot of regulatory law, the government is far, far more able to hurt individuals and companies in spaces that have nothing to do with terrorism, uncovering alleged health care fraud, environmental violations, security violations. i'm not an antigovernment, i'm not. but not only can the government be clumsy, vindictive. that's why we have laws to go after officials who have done it. far worst things, believe me, happened in other spaces we are not touching today. the counterterrorism and national security system is heavily regulated besides level political accountability both in executive branch and congress and judicial.

that is good. i'm in favor, having more detailed briefings, frankly having members sign a piece of paper attesting that they have been briefed so we don't have memory failures. you have a sense that classified briefing about surveillance effort, you heard about it, if you don't like it, say something now, if you're not saying something now, six months later, i wasn't there, i didn't hear it, i didn't understand it. it would be a good thing. but it's good, there are no problems fundamentally here and one final point as matter of policy but also matter of law, judiciary should be more involved, makes no sense either policywise or constitutionallywise.

judicial role is essentially and signing off on warrant applications, that's it. they're not supposed to -- yeah, warrant commission to investigate this or some other commission to investigate that so you can have a chief justice participating in private capacity not as a judicial justice of the united states and judges, a good friend judge that loves to write about national security. i would submit to you if there's even today is probably operating beyond its proper constitutional remit. far removed from approving warrants, but doing it more of that is a bad idea and let me tell you. constitution aside, having the judiciary participate in

something that ain't judicial doesn't do any good. it only gives cover to political branches, only defuses responsibility and accountability. congress be accountable for it overseas, well -- and it comes from both critics from surveillance, meta collection. who cares? no one think they are an article of free court comprised of federal judges. so let's not sort of idealize over the notion if we put a bunch of judges it would make it better. bottom line to you new york, no fundamental problem and we should have a serious education campaign that tells people that the problem -- one final point, but i don't understand for the life of me, we live in an age

where people almost happy to expose the innermost thoughts and private observations with facebook and twitter and this and that but hundreds of people who submit all sorts of information to commercial entities that get credits and goods and benefits and there are some regulation there, and i'm not saying -- but do it as a priceoff existing in a modern world of doing well. now, there are some people who don't do that. it's a very distinct minority. for the life of god, why are people much more comfortable doing all of that in a situation that there's a lot less oversight. there are definitely abuses in the private sector. why is this different?

.. the answer is zero. thank you. [applause] >> well, i disagree with that last conclusion that the answer is zero. the answer is every single person in this country. but more important than my likes are those of the federal judge richard leon here in the federal clerk for the district of columbia. again, a respected conservative who granted injunctions against the nsa's indiscriminate

surveillance program because he concluded that the mere existence of this program, even without independent abuses and its purposes, the mere existence and use of it against all of us innocent citizens were simply trying to communicate online was itself an abuse of the constitution. as he said, i cannot imagine a more indiscriminate and arbitrary invasion then this high-tech collection and retention of personal data on virtually every single citizen without prior judicial approval. surely such a program and infringes on the privacy of the founders enshrined in the fourth amendment. indeed, i have little doubt that the author of our constitution, james madison, would be aghast. and for anybody who is a student of american history and constitutional history, we know that above all else what the

framers detested about the british rule and british tyranny was the so-called rates of general assistance, decade precisely, purported to come authorize officials to engage in indiscriminate surveillance. by the standards of the nsa this would be rather trivial coming to your physical space indiscriminately rummaging through your papers, as many people have commented. james madison and others would have rolled over in their graves if they can imagine the infinitely more intrusive pervasive indiscriminate surveillance to which all of us are subject every single communication. every single thought, every single association, financial transaction, health information and a full treasure trove of information about us that has been subject to the

indiscriminate surveillance that judge leon found that two find unconstitutional. however, there is also been specific abuse even be on the secretive at best deceptive at worst exemptions of the program. as david of many defenders of the program to which is to assert that it was subject to oversight by other branches of government. how meaningful is that oversight, given the shroud of secrecy in which it was cloaked? the most notorious example of which being director of national intelligence james clapper testifying before congress in what he later admits was a bald-faced lie, that this program was not going forward. he first retracted and apologized by saying, well, that was the least untruthful answer

i could give. later on he retracted even further and apologized for having lied. so they cannot be meaningful oversight without truthful information. and david, from one of the pieces that you wrote recently, i think we agree on this, that for the sake of making congress itself accountable and helping congress to make the surveillance, the executive branch surveillance authority accountable to we the people, there should be much more information sharing back and forth about this. in terms of the supposedly control that was being imposed by this supersecret one-sided fisa court for an intelligence surveillance court, that court itself is hampered i the one-sided nature of the proceeding. and even the limited amount of

checks that the court which is been very criticized for being essentially a rubber stamp for every request for surveillance authority, has been heavily criticized because it is so strongly oriented in terms of the judges who have been appointed to it, people with prosecutorial and law enforcement background. so it is especially telling that even the court, even without hearing advocates of privacy and civil liberties, even without having judges the background of advocating privacy and civil liberties, when even that court has strongly critiqued and sanction the nsa for, not to put too fine a point on it, lying to the court about what it was doing. let me quote a couple rulings by, that have now come to light as a result of this notice of disclosures to lead to freedom of information act efforts by the aclu, and others.

first i'm going to quote by 2009 ruling from judge walton. the court had imposed some trivial, i mean not at all sufficient by the standards that i laid out, but some minimization procedures, to in the indiscriminate nature of its surveillance. and here's what judge walton said. he said the nsa had engaged in systematic noncompliance with minimization procedures over the past three years going back to the inception, the very inception of the program in 2006, and had also repeatedly made misrepresentation and inaccurate statements about the program to the fifth judges. consequently judge walton concluded that he had no confidence that the government was doing its best to comply with the fifth orders. he composed a six-month sanction. nonetheless, the record of

failure to comply, even with the limited controls that were imposed by the fifth court persisted, so that brings us to another angry order from a fifth judge in this case presiding judge john bates. in october 2011 commented on the government had misrepresented the scope of its targeting of internet communications. he said quote, the court was troubled that this is the third instance in less than three years in which the government has disclosed a substantial misrepresentation regarding the scope of a major collection program. so so much for the lack of abuse, supposedly so much for the effective oversight, supposedly. now, to turn from an airy we strongly disagree to do in areas where we disagree, i will turn,

agree at least in part to the first point that david made, and that is the seriousness of the threat to national security that this country faces. i take those threats extremely seriously as a philosophical matter and as a practical matter. i think it is noteworthy, however, that going back to 2013 our top national security officials have emphasized as the number one, the number one national security threat that our country faces is not terrorism, serious as that is, but it is, in fact, threats to cybersecurity. so cyber threats, i'm quoting now from this is an article from february 12 of this year, reporting on the testimony that director of national

intelligence jim clapper -- james clapper provided to comment on annual worldwide threat assessment of the u.s. intelligence community, and he was accompanied in the congressional hearing with other top current officials of the intelligence world. and they named cyber threats as the top global threat facing the united states. which is exactly why you see this constellation of past and current national security counterintelligence and defense experts saying that if we allow government to get back doors to our communications to engage in excessive communications surveillance, that is feeding what is the number one threat to our national security, far from making us more safe. they will, in fact, do the opposite.

i also have to say that in terms of in addition to the government's intentional misleading of the american public, setting up in secret a program that violates the most core constitutional principles, not to mention legal statutes, in addition to judge leon have been repeatedly held that the mass nsa program violated the fourth amendment to the constitution. and this second circuit federal court of appeals which is based in new york, in a lawsuit that was brought by the aclu, unanimous panel of that court concluded that without even reaching the constitutional problems that the mass nsa surveillance violated, congress' statute, the relevant section of the patriot act. as indeed even members of

congress have called themselves the lead authors of that section have said it was never our intent, certainly the language doesn't say and it was never our intent to authorize this kind of indiscriminate surveillance. so double whammy unlawful violating the federal statute and violating the u.s. constitution. but beyond those abuses that consists of violations of law, violation of our rights, we also have a problem of lack of government confidence to protect us from hackers, from cyber criminals, from fever -- and even cyber terrorist. we could call this an abuse for the government to act in confidently or negligently? it bothers me whatever label you put on it. just in 2015 alone, the federal

office of personnel management was hacked to the tune of 22 million personal records, talking just one year, last calendar year. hackers released beyond government, the private sector has also been vulnerable and made all of us vulnerable. hackers released 32 million accounts from ashley madison, a site that it is me with so let me explain that it facilitates adultery, and hackers also infiltrated and from. the irs and even the director of the cia. but even with out intentionally views, we are also vulnerable as a result of negligence. i've got to wrap it up so let me just end with a question. david said he thinks the standards that are imposed under u.s. constitutional law and international human rights laws before the government may engage

in surveillance are too strict. i would like to ask them what standard he would advocate instead. show he's not going to get the government and absolute free pass with no justification at all to engage in violations of both privacy and security. thank you. >> i will be very brief. first of all, into law, complicated, it's a complicated area but let me assure you that the fourth amendment does not mean what nadine and some of our colleagues say it means. in order for the fourth on an to even apply, and awesome series of disputes as to whether a not a warrant is required for any government acquisition of information which has a result expectation of privacy. reasonable expectation and i'll explain what that means. or is it only the case that you have to obtain a warrant which

may be used for prosecutorial purposes. but aside from that interesting debate, it has to be something which give legitimate -- plenty of cases, ladies and gentlemen, dealing with complaint side doctrine. if you put out information in the public domain, you have no reason to expectation of privacy. you may have expectations if you privately but it is not reasonable and it has been brought out over the years, decades i and cases like some foolish people, who should not be in my mind couldn't be cultivating drugs. don't put a cannabis plant in the window because when a cop walks biases said cannabis plant he does not need a warrant. it is in plain view. the same thing happens by the way when, it's interesting how little people understand i'm afraid, nadine to how much stuff gets applicable to content. you can have a third party subpoena by the most junior state prosecutor investigating

something having to do with the way you run your nursing business. get in and get all your e-mails, all your service providers and going to get -- the disputes about that but they will read all that stuff stuff and it turns up on e-mails that you are planning a bank robbery. they would even get you though that's not the purpose. happens every day. okay? lots more acquisition by this information. by the what if you entrust information to your service provider, goes up into the cloud, it ain't a legitimate explanation of privacy. we could debate it back and forth but something you need to realize. i think nadine is much more of a tea party person that i am. government is a clumsy piece. it does most things not very well. the degree of criticism that nadine is referring to in those two opinions which are

unfamiliar with, is nothing compared to, i can give you a hundred cases where this circuit and the circuit and the judge and the department of agriculture. and the department of transportation at fcc and ferc and every other agency, for cheating, not on this, not doing that. that's how the government works. it so that people get prosecuted and go to prism. the judge is basically participating in the process. they are not oracles of delphi. they are expressing give you the intelligence oversight statutes are very complicated, ladies and gentlemen. back in my days at doj and the white house i used to deal with some of the. they tax the minds of most brilliant lawyers on all sides, okay? people disagree about it. so the fact that it judges discreet but whether or not, you

know, nsa and play with some minimization order or some acquisition order eight, i'm going to say they were wrong. they may not all be right. i don't know the details. but it ain't unusual. not a sign of some horrible practices going on, okay? two final points. she's not mention anybody who was punished incorrectly, who suffered, okay? because it is so such examples. they don't exist. and again compared with normal regiment of our great government, which i love, no administration -- the national security area is pretty darn clean. if you don't like that, then you should all, go support tea party or donald trump and turn everything upside down because believe me, believe me, the fda,

vacuum cleans records from pharma companies with a lot less, accusing administrative subpoenas, with a lot less oversight but a lot less standard for dissemination. and ferc does it, epa, everybody. if you don't like this, absolutely the way our government functions. the essence of reasonable risk assessment is to look at things across the board. there are things that present greater danger. that's okay with me. the final thing about the threat, look, there's no connection i know of, any technical person i heard tells me in simple terms between cyberthreat and the kind of surveillance on talking about, on encryption nadine and i agree. we don't need to go to the there's no connection between the government collecting the metadata and combining it with

other information in the public domain from dozens and dozens of public databases and using computing to precipitate out subjects. it's a straw man on charges they. the classical strawman. i think the government should harden up as much as possible but nothing to do with it. besides that's not an issue. the final point is this. i don't care if terrorism is not the one threat or number two threat. it is a huge that. that's number one function of government, and only game in town, ladies and gentlemen, we have surveillance. we did not have as cold where. we do not have our agents penetrating those organizations. any intelligent professional will tell you that. and believe me they don't decide, we don't have guys defecting from al-qaeda or

isis, sadly, they don't seem to be that driven by money. they believe in really bad stuff so we don't have that. and by the way, we don't interrogate folks these days much about the that's not politically correct what ever the standards are the only damn dancing we have to get at them is surveillance. if we don't have that we have nothing. we might as well wait until we get it the next time and the next time and the next thing. again, there's no problem, no crisis. i for nothing that suggests otherwise. thank you. >> i know i don't get response but i would like to give it david a little present to on his position. he's got the fringe benefit of having a picture of president obama on the little tin which shows president obama with a headphone and a listening device, nsa approved and they

are wome lemon flavored. think of me when you suck on them. >> i will when i put them in my desk. i'm sure everyone has enjoyed this effort as much from this as i have. i have been looking forward to this for a long time and i've learned a great deal. we don't have a lot of time to come a lot of time to complicate the moderator's prerogative and ask the first question, which goes as follows. if i were a martian and i just landed in the united states and i want to find out, wanted to find out something about nadine more about david or about some class of people who might be suspected terrorists, really about anything, and i had some ideas about how the world works.

i don't think i would go to the federal government to find out. i would go to any number of private companies whose internet business model is surveillance, plain and simple. they surveil, collect information, retain information, use that information to they know far more about practically any of us that i'm sure the federal government does. what the internet has done, one of many things that it's done is it's changed the way information is used. david, you mentioned several times on the government is very clumsy, not that good at a lot of this stuff. the private sector is really, really good at-bat. they probably, if they want to monitor this got out in san bernardino and you told them, well, tell us who's been going to different rifle ranges and different things, i am sure somebody knows that.

and yet there is an entirely different role, both of you said the government is different from the private companies or private entity. and yet i think the relative scope and control of information that the government has relative -- as well as the private sector i was a 30 years ago, the government probably has more information than the private sector does. today i think it is vastly the other way around. and i just wonder how does that enter into thinking about surveillance? >> can i go? you are making my point. one is uncomfortable but let's, running to the would get if we don't let's be reasonable about it. one of the things that bothers me is that people do not possess the given concern into continue more. to put in, yes, we about this threat but is not below my fear of being eaten by piranhas. it's not in the private

surveillance company. you can go if you're knowledgeable on jumpers and particularly and you can get more information about any one of us today than most of you would realize the you can get unlisted phone number. you can get mortgage documents. you can get a picture of your house. it's all there. since we accept that, we have to look at what the government can do as part of the same broad narrative of our tolerance for the lack of total privacy. and then i understand the government can do worse things to you. not necessarily. can do horrible things to you, believe me. you have to look at what is being done, what the risks are and what are the safeguards. once you put into perspective there's nothing to worry about. so that's one of my limitations.

>> this is one of the reasons why i think that the party would not welcome me, david, despite your endorsement, which is as a civil libertarian but not libertarian. i do believe that government can have a positive role to play precisely and protecting our liberty and our privacy from violation by powerful private sector entities which are not subject to constraints under the united states constitution. so the aclu and many others have joined in supporting legislation at every level of government, regulation, and every level of government to constrain the power of the private sector to collect, use, misuse, store, et cetera our private data. now, and, in fact, very recently escc did announce that was

moving in a direction that i think you've criticized, herald, forgive me if i'm wrong about that, i'm right, subjecting to regulations internet service providers that in terms of the ability to reduce our privacy to misuse our information. on both subjects, government and private sector ability to invade our privacy, again, i'm not an absolutist that i don't know anybody who is. what we are asking for our meaningful constraints in the government's fear, that means that the government has to have as a constitution demands to individual suspicion. has to be independent oversight beyond the executive branch of the government itself through the independent are accessible in the private sector i think one of the most important

constraints is transparency and consent. that we should have an opportunity as consumers, we should have to opt in to affirmatively any situation that is reducing our privacy, and it should be a meaningful option. we should not have to give up being on the online world. choose between that and privacy. that is not a real choice. >> we have time for just one or two questions and let's start with the gentleman in the back. [inaudible] -- political aspects of this, why is it that conservatives who generally believe in what they used to call true constructionism another called originalism, that especially with regard to the 10th amendment, the constitution

reserves to the people in the state and its all power not specifically granted to the federal government. what is it that conservatives see in the constitution of florida for the government to do things that are not spelled out in the cost of tuition? why is it that liberals are inclined to come in general, go along with increased government activity but not when it comes to surveillance? >> i suppose the question was addressed to the a list apart but i would say with respect, i think of myself as a constitutional lawyer. that's my life, my vocation i don't understand the question. the government i understand limited enumerated powers, article i ice understand, believe me i do but clearly -- the government we can acquire information in pursuit of variety of purposes that are within the legitimate domain of

both federal and state government. .. back to my cannabis plant in the window analogy, if this information ain't the one who -- if you take machine gun and erect it on your lawn, you can not be very upset that the local police would come and you know, for some kind of ordinance against it, federal law still on the books against machine guns would give you hard time and arrest you probably because you did it, okay? you have a choice whether or not to put a cannabis plant in the window and put out a machine gun on your law. you have a choice whether or not to give your otherwise private information to -- metadata, metadata ain't private at all.

this is information generated by your service provider in order to bill you. okay. it ain't private. certainly not private to you. it is a business record of your service provider. with all due respect to the notion that the framers madison, esteem grately would be upset but if you walked out in your local pharmacy store in boston and ordered, you know, eyedrops in presence of not only pharmacist but five other people neighbors standing, that private information which is warrant is required. one final point. i don't understand again is idiosyncratic thinking. intelligence acquisition on international level happens all the time in local police work. briefly, local cop or detective to be respectful i think something bad may happen. let me kick the tires in the neighborhood. who heard what, strange people driving around.

lots of money passing hands, maybe this, maybe that. you can assemble that information. you don't need probable cause, that is not warrant, looking for for and talking to people in the public domain. only thing we're talking about, nate nadine and i doing same type thing in different sphere of electronic surveilance. that's it. why is it acceptable to go in local bar well, have you seen anything strange happen? you heard people talking about robbing a warehouse. okay, who were they? did they recognize. that's all kosher but doing the same type of data development through surveillance, electronic surveilance then you can go kick the tires on specific people you identify is somehow prohibited by fourth amendment. it can not be. >> i disagree with most of the details david laid out but i will try to go to the core of your question. your name was edward, right? which is, why do so many conservatives depart from the

text of the constitution and the original intent and, some liberals do likewise depending on what the particular issue is, rather than consistently trying to honor both the text and the original meaning or understanding of the constitution. and i have some comfort to offer you which is, that on a number of very important recent privacy cases in the united states supreme court, before justice school yaw died, when the -- justice scalia died and the court had nine contentious individuals split 5-4 and even being more fragmented, we had a number of recent decisions all nine of them came down very strongly in favor of privacy and strongly enforcing fourth amendment guaranties. the most recent example being a

case called the riley case from 2014 involving cell phone searches and strikingly all nine of them held that it was unconstitutional to extend to the digital world a judge made exception to the fourth amendment that had been made for seizures, searches and seizures pursuant to an arrest when basically the law had been that fourth amendment standards aside, if somebody's arrested you can seize everything that that person has on his or her body and the court said no, we are not going to extend that to cell phones, given the wealth of private information that's available on those phones. and i thought it was really, remarkable that all of them from the most liberal to the most conservative, came down to really respecting the words and meaning of the fourth amendment. i'm going to read you just one

line that they agreed on. we can not deny that our decision will have an impact on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime. cell phones can provide valuable incriminating information about dangerous criminals. privacy comes at a cost but, privacy is protected by the fourth amendment. so take comfort. >> can i just add one thing, very briefly. the irony here, i don't disagree with this decision. i understand what they were doing. let me assure you, that once government gets somebody in custody, local police most likely, it is a fool's errand to get a warrant. in fact, i dealt with a number of cases we're fighting to suppress a warrant. gets a warrant is so easy peas sy as my niece would say. no great comfort obtaining a

warrant is just not true. the problem again arises not in the context of somebody's been sustain into custody and, okay, so you're not going to automatically on your own go search for his or her cell phone. you are going to get a warrant from magistrate, fine, two hours, three hours tops. it is not knowing out of millions of people out there which ones deserve closer scrutiny by law enforcement. that is the at the heart of counterterrorism, okay? has nothing to do with law enforcement scenarios. context of law enforcement we can be afford to be far more pontilius, go way beyond fourth amendment, again, very lenient. i'm all in favor of tougher standards for warrants and subjecting individuals who submit warrant applications that are a little frisky to personal liability, however if they're state or federal officials. all in favor of it, it's a good thing even if some bad criminals go.

it ain't the same in context of counterterrorism because only way you get at the people unless you went away until they strike or you get lucky because you run into somebody before he pull out a gun or blow himself, all you can figure out which one out of million, hundreds of millions of people need to be looked at more closely. there is no other answer. now ask nadine, i keep hearing i will balance it differently? how would you do that? how would you know who needs to be investigated? you don't! you don't unless you do that kind of surveillance. >> i, let me just point to a long history that free data, what has been called the golden age of surveillance. if you ask anybody now in law enforcement or counterintelligence, are they better off now than they have been in the past? they would say, yes, they have an infinite amount of

information about us and have been successful in foiling many counterterrorism plots, not to mention other law enforcement problems through the use of the techniques that are completely consistent with the fourth amendment. right after after after 9/11, former fbi director william webster was opposing extended government surveillance power under the patriot act even before we realize that the government in secret would extend that power even further beyond the plain language of the provision. he said look, when i was fbi director, he was also cia director, we were able to foil, he listed the number of plots through using good investigative techniques. we did not need to jump over, i'm paraphrasing him. we did not need to jump all over people's privacy. in fact the 9/11, the bipartisan

9/11 commission which looked into what caused the terrible tragedy on 9/11, what steps could be used to prevent another such tragedy, that kind of analysis was not done before the patriot act and this expansive surveillance power was rammed through with almost no debate, almost no hearings. but after the fact they looked into it, guess what? that bipartisan commission did not say we need more surveillance power. no. they flagged the problem that i thought david you indicated you might agree with, which is not that we can't gather the information but we don't have the capability, we're not investing sufficient human and other resources into analyzing this huge massive data that we already do have. so yes, we can have an effective protection against terrorism. nobody wants to be vulnerable to terrorism, certainly not me. >> respect this is not true.

the 9/11 commission report is available. talked at great length about the so-called wall which is one specific manifestation of the data sharing that are rooted in obsession of privacy, but nadine, i respect you greatly, can you just in 30 seconds how would you find somebody like mr. farook. let's forget about the stuff like normal investigative techniques. how would you find another mr. farook, unless you look at communication, not content, unless you look at my electronic footprints in the snow to see whatever telltale signs bringing best cognitive analytics possible, if you massage the data you can come up with enough parameters show you deviation above the baseline, doesn't mean the person is terrorist how would you do it? how would you do that? >> do that as director of national intelligence has said with individualized suspicions. >> how would you know?

>> data experts have said that the data mining that you are advocating, david, is junk sighens. that it is not an effective way. >> how would you know about the suspicion? a lot of these people are lying low until they freakin' attack. what individualized suspicion are you going to have? going in a bar start bragging i will kill a bunch people? some will but many will not. how will you get individualized suspicion in the modern world? how? >> well, i could stay here all day. >> i was hoping audience member would get to answer a question which i felt censored. >> i promised our speakers we would be done 11 minutes ago and, nadine you have a plane to catch. so, please join me in thanking our speakers today. [applause]

[inaudible conversations].

[inaudible conversations].

>> some news from the presidential campaign today. that john kasich is dropping out of the presidential race. "politico" reports senior campaign advisor says the ohio governor is suspending his campaign. "politico" also reportings that governor kasich had long ago been mathematically eliminated from clinching the gop nomination outright but had hoped to emerge as a consensus candidate at a contested convention. governor kasich had been scheduled to talk with reporters this morning at washington dulles international airport before a day of fund-raising in maryland and virginia but the campaign canceled that briefing and scheduled a news conference for 5:00 p.m. in columbus, ohio. we plan to have that live on our companion network c-span at 5:00 eastern time. also later today president obama travels to flint, michigan, to meet with local officials and residents about the water con too many nation crisis in that city. he will speak at flint northwestern high school.

you can see that live also on c-span. it is scheduled for 3:55 p.m., just about 4:00 eastern time, again on c-span. >> both iraq and afghanistan i helped both countries with their constitutions being facilitator of agreement on key issues among iraqis or afghans. your influence is considerable. heads of state or government very anxious to meet with you when you asked for a meeting. >> sunday night on "q&a," former u.s. ambassador to afghanistan, iraq and the united nations zalmay khalizad, discusses his memoir. >> we saw extremists such as zarqawi exploited, although we corrected it toward the end of the period i was there bit surge and by reaching out to the sunnis, by building up iraqi

forces, by establishing a unity government, killing zarqawi at the end to bring about security, violence was way down but unfortunately when we left, and the vacuum was filled by rival regional powers pulling iraq apart, violence escalated and we have isis now. >> sunday night at 8:00 eastern on c-span's "q&a." up next a conversation on genetic engineering and synthetic biology. we'll hear from scientists working on glowing plants, hornless cows and three debio printers. they discuss ethics of altering human embryos, cloning and gene-altering technology. this event hosted by a group called, shaping san francisco. >> yeah, welcome to c-span. welcome to the vast audience that sees c-span programing across the united states and across the world. we're very happy to have you all

with us at our shaping san francisco talks. this talk tonight is on sin threatic biology. diy meets big capital is the title we gave it and it is really borne out of a long interest i've had, in way roots of shaping san francisco is community participatory history project but was rooted essentially in a critcan relationship to technology. we started in the mid '90s during big boom of interactive multimedia and kind of way before there was even web 1.0 really. we were already working on this project and we've gone through quite a few iterations. we've lived through endless rounds of hysteria that technology will save us and take us to the promised land and so on and so one of the interesting topics for me is try to think about what is the moment in history that you're living through. it is very difficult to get your head wrapped around that. so tonight's topic was really a chance to take a pause and invite people who are thinking about this and really busy

working on it, in critical capacities from various points of view, to come together and help us get a grip on big part of the current tech boom. we talk about it almost always in terms of terms of social media, google, things like that. but really big mystery in san francisco, a huge part of our economy is medical and, you know, a large part of that is really rooted in biological sciences. so we have this phenomenon of really huge investment going into that world, changing everything we know about longevity and health and so on and that's part of what we will get into a little bit tonight but there is also this underground that's kind of claiming that same world for, from a hacking point of view and we have somebody tonight to help us get a little bit of a handle on that as well. perhaps some of you in the audience will be able to advance one or more of those threads in the conversation that follows because all of our talks come with lovely people that come and give us our expertise and we open it up to you to participate in the conversation. so the second hour of the night

everybody that is here has equal chance to participate. we'll bring the microphone out to you so your voice gets recorded and you're equally part of the programing and we record all these and save them online, if you haven't already discovered that, all of our talks going back 10 years, most of them, ones that successfully recorded online and hunt through the talks and and this will be on line in day or two of tonight. i will read you quick bios of the three speakers in order they appear. first is elliot hossman, a staffer at center for genetics in society. graduated from san francisco uc hastings college of law in 2015. elliot's advocacy work included money, bail reform and jobs not jails campaign at baker center for human rights. legal aid and impact litigation at tran gender law center and non-profits assistance for artists of color on the front

lines of gentrification in san francisco. elliot's research focuses on vulnerable bodies and populations under surveilance and apart tied, particularly queer, trans, intersects, neurodiverse, disabled and racialized youth n december 2015 elliot was invited along with pete shanks to attend international summit on human gene editing at district of columbia and live tweeted event for the center on genetics in society. elliot will be first followed by tito jankowski, his bio doesn't start with the name so i'm saying that first. bill gates was quoted if he were starting his career he would be bio hacker. five years ago, we, this is tito's voice, opened the first community biotech lab in the world. bio-curious, with the motto, experiment with friends. we're a community of amateur scientists engineers, who are curious about biotechnology. come learn about how this new model for innovation is

reinventing the field of biotechnology and how you can apply this creative approach to your own work. tito janikowski, one of cofounders of bio curious. runway incubator, a 30,000 square foot startup incubator home to 84 start-ups downtown this san francisco in the twitter building, our favorite place in town. finally we'll have pete shanks who studied philosophy and politics and economics at oxford university and moved to the california in the mid-1970 ace. active in a range of local and international political movements while mostly making living in publishing industry, especially on productive side. enjoys craft of book making. here, here, by book making. up palled by you againic possibilities of bio engineering. he is author of human genetic engineering a guide for activists, skeptics and very perplexed published by nation books and is regular contributor to bio political times. so we're excited to have all

three of you. we'll have one come up here after another of the elliot, if you don't mind, take it away. thank y'all for coming. [applause] >> okay. i'm adjusting the mic as told. okay. so i am, so excited to be here. thank you so much for having us, chris. i am really glad we're having this conversation particularly not only in this city but in this neighborhood, right? so the last week we've seen really brutal police violence just a few streets from here. i don't know if you following in the news but i really think we need to think about not only, you know, i'm going to talk a bit about imperialism, a little bit about sort of pioneering values driving a lot of technological innovation today but also how that violence manifests and how we make space, right, for more innovators to come into the city and what that looks like. so, yes, so this is me.

we are at the center for genetics and society. i really want to talk specifically about putting biotechnology sort of in this idea of the empire of technological innovation. so here we go. does anyone know what this is? it is not the death star. okay. [inaudible] yeah, okay. this is a rendering on a computer, this is not the real thing. looks more like a, what is that called, hangar right now. but you know, the economist says that may be the most expensive headquarters in history. i really want to think about this. what is manifest destiny look like in the current moment? you know as we're clearing space, and we're thinking about this is cupertino but this is sacred land. i have want to think about, are we moving from this idea of manifest destiny towards the west and through the web and through big data and now looking

at sort of the manifest destiny of the genome? what are sort of some of these frontiers that we're looking at and what does innovation look like from this vantage point. so i want to kind of, try to piece together i think a lot of the strands that i see happening in our city right now. i want to kind of work through this idea of solutions through technological innovation and tie them from the app for that economy. tie it to some of the work that we witnessed at center, right? which is genetic determinism. the idea that our dna is the code of our bodies and try to pull out some of the assumptions and reductionism of that. and then i want to ask our, is this new moment of technology something where we look at organisms as there is an org for that? do we need, new orgs for different solutions of our lives? so you're going to -- but app for that probably in the news

and i think a lot of this is right like, app for that has been in the news but i think there is a lot of similar values. we look for a gene for that and an org for that. so i will start here. one of the pieces i think that is really interesting, there is a lot of text, you don't have to read it, one thing i think is really interesting, what are the underlying values for the app for that economy? this idea if we could only have this critical mass of bright minds in a room somewhere and if they were working on our hardest problems, then they would come up with an innovation and we would all be okay, right? i think there is almost this, hopefulness, optimism and unilateral solutions and certain very smart mind would work on a global scale. so you know, some of this uses a lot of language of empowerment. democratizing revolutionary that we're sharing things. a lot of this priority tieses customers and convenience and

certain classes over rights of workers and over social consequence that flow from a lot of errant wastefulness of venture-capital, thinking that high-risk is very normal. so trying to you know, we're laying that out there. and then the gene for that. you know, when i was growing up it was very not okay to be gay at all. i didn't come out until i was 24. one of the things, right, when i heard about this idea that gay gene, well that makes sense. finally my parents will listen to me, right. finally it is not my fault. there is genetic basis why i am who i am. on flip side of that right, like what if we found that gene, or thought we found that gene? what could be the flipside, are there consequences? you know a lot of things that we've seen in our work at the society or the center have been sort of almost super absurd genes for that, right?

used to have a column on our blog, biopolitical times, called gene of the week. we kept seeing research emerging. there is a gene for being liberal. there is a gene for being promiscuous. this is taking a turn in regard to behavioral genetics. not only like there is gay gene potentially, it gets kind of risen from the archives of pseudo science, couple years in the scientific journals. i'm not sure about the science, but we also see it in really toxic ways when it comes to things like criminality. there is, there is scientists that say oh there is warrior gene, there is gangster gene and what is the implications of that? what if we do if we thought we found the gangster gene? would go inschools to screening kids or segregate them from the other students? we need to be very careful when we use metaphor like code,

blueprint and map when we talk about dna, this is the reference, right, there is no gene for the human spirit. we are not our genes and, this is this idea even if we thought there was genetic link, that it could be really stocks in pre-adult testing in so many spheres for that. that is the gene for that. i want to talk a little bit about -- oops. orgs for that. i will talk about two separate spheres. this vegan cheese is something tito has been working on so props to tito but i want to, i'm going to link it together with this idea of technological solution but i want to talk a little bit about the, this idea of glowing trees has been really interesting. i've seen this on in the news over the past few years and this idea, what if we could use really exciting new organisms to replace some of the sort of environmentally toxic things we have in our life?

like electrical lighting. trees could replace street lambs. i find that fascinating. this idea of a vegan cheese. take animal out of animal product not only get away from utilitarianism of using animals but moral implications people have with animal products. but i want to turn to the biotech sphere to see how some of these things can be really toxic. with golden rice, i think food writer michael pollen has real interesting comparison on this, i don't know if you have seen the four-part netflix series. it is really good. he has this idea, postwar, we're in america and we've moved from this idea sort of like whole grain flours down at local stone mills and all this stuff, we moved into the commercially processing where we used food we created for soldiers overseas and brought it back into america and we have this pretty -- flour now. we've done it in really commercial way. doesn't have the nutrients the

flush really has. we'll have add vitamins into it and call it enriched flour and tell it to the people that it is better than the original stuff. this is genetically modified rice which has vitamin a into it. it is sold as a biotech solution to malnutrition in developing countries. i want to sit on that idea. the idea of hornless cows that uc-davis is working on. they used this genetic technology that will come up tonight called crisper 9. and there's a variety of ways this is kind of popping up in our agriculture. how can we make our animals convenient for the industrial farming that we do?