the american jihadists that very few generalization, young men dominate the picture but beyond that, exceptions from the stereotype were too many to ignore. many were not jobless losers, many many were not criminals are particularly young, and there is quite a few examples of women involved in relation to plots, historically speaking. i decided to focus on the roles and interpersonal dynamics rather than social profile. for this purpose i developed an ideal type model of a terrorist cell. it is based on my interpretation of what they said and did an how others looked at them. i distinguish between the entrepreneur, the prodigy and

what i dubbed misfits. the seventh sell on the side here matches this pattern almost perfectly. as i see it. the entrepreneur is more resourceful than the others and he has been radicalized to political religious process to activism, reading, discussion, in some, in some cases most intellectually, not only reading g hottie ideology but other types of literature. he his committed to manipulating people. this is he has a talent for manipulating others. the entrepreneur is the one that binds together the various components of terrorist plots. he builds the cell, recruits and socialize and he functions as the link between the cell, transnational network and

conflict zones. the entrepreneur is the one that transnational lies is the phenomenon. he bring structure and organization to the other types involved. the prodigy a is a very similar to the entrepreneur and he is usually a functioning at the second in command where he has certain skills that the cell needs for some purpose. for for example technical help. for that misfits are drawn, he is the outsider, he may suffer personal crisis, have experience a problematic childhood, come come from a broken family, may have traveled in crime or maybe into drug abuse. for the misfit terrorism becomes a way out from despair

meaninglessness, and a sense. there may also be an element of cleansing oneself from sin especially when you come from a traditional muslim background and you have done things that does not conform with islam in a sense. so it becomes a turnaround operation. the victor has no characteristics behind the social tide to insiders. it could could be a brother, brother-in-law, friend, or role model that draws the victor into the cell. so for the social networking community, it attracts the and puts pressure on them to come forward with the practice and activities and i ideology of the cell. i find in the last two categories, the misfits in the victors there more ideological element seems important. there's adventurism, culture

aspects that attract them and so forth. this to me gives three main powerful ways to the terrace sell. ideology grievance and community. it is also this deconstruction of a cell helps to explain why seemingly ideological youth and acting according to the ideology of groups such as i al qaeda. it also has bridge the gap between models that betray the phenomenon as leader level or leaderless. a dichotomy. here leader lead and leaderless aspects converged within the cell. so you have both leader lead and leaderless aspects but the leader lead aspect is more important in shaping the actions of the cell.

even though we only know the contours of the paris brussels network for now we recognize the pattern. most misfits and foot soldiers, and entrepreneurs in coordinating roles. both within the attack sell itself and also in the surrounding network. this illustrates and into interplay between social and ideological drivers and between bottom-up and top-down recruitment dynamic. it usually starts at home but it is given direction and capabilities by actors abroad. attackers do not differ from control groups the main difference is there tied to transnational jihadists and they

have come under the influence of entrepreneurs. the key ingredients for a terrorist plot to occur. so when i emphasize this i say that no terrace sell forms in the absence of the entrepreneur which may be an exaggeration but makes the point clear in such a perspective european jihadist report by terrace growing their motivation from corn foreign conflicts. this makes the threat more external than internal. a more organized than many assume. networks emerge and behave similarly in different countries under different circumstances over time. to me this means would explain the jihadist terrorism in the international conflict dynamics it is more significant than

locals, societal conditions such as the level of integration and socioeconomic. i question about talking about a homegrown threat. and i don't believe much in the loan will immigration pattern and level of an immigration are poor in indicators of who might become a terrorist. i think i'll stop with that and leave the floor open for discussion. thank you. >> thank you all ask a few questions and then we'll have the might go around and get some of your questions. before we dig into a few of particular cases and historical examples you talk about lately there has been this debate or

report regarding the paris and brussels network that security services in the analytic community perhaps really miss the boat and that there is an organized system of cells directed by foreign fighters who had gone to syria and come back and directed quite specifically by isis. given your research on the history of terrorism in europe, do you think it is correct to say that there is an analytic or security service failure and not identifying publicly at least, earlier that this was organized and more top-down that it might've been thought? >> i think the european security services have been well aware of the historical evolution of the network. they have worked on the cases

for many years and disrupted many networks they kept track of the people were going to the conflicts over early during the outbreak of the syrian war. i think the main issue here is that the scope of the phenomenon grew so large that the services were experiencing capacity problems. i don't think there is an analytical failure, i think the services were well aware the threat is not owned by independent actors but from quite high levelized localized networks. and in today's network how much is the extent that is being driven by -- have other

conflicts abroad, -- >> i think the motivation cannot be left one conflict only. like the network it has evolved over many years, many of the people travel to syria when the conflict broke out there were already pre-radicalized during the 2000 mainly of the iraq war. but of course, there is no doubt that is the main course for the jihad he network today is what is going on in syria. in against the coalition.

>> so in our research at new america, one of our findings is that the u.s. contact seems to be very different from what you point out. we haven't really seen anywhere near the same extent, form fighters returning from previous conflict, it's mostly driven by meat and mediated online. what you think different between europe and the u.s. in your opinion? is that geographic, cultural, as a network not extended it? i think there is a huge difference regarding the strength of the network and the historical network. when we are comparing europe and

the u.s. they have also been historically and in many cases and important figures have been spending time in the u.s. and have been acting as propagandists and so forth. but the level of it is, the scope of it all. i think their similarities and differences between the european scene and the american scene. and of course geography as you said it is very important because one of the main reasons that we now have or had up to fire form fighters in syria's it's easier to go to the

conflict so. >> let's pull back, some of the historical cases, why did algeria become the central beginning, was it the particular connection was it the intensity of the conflict? what makes that after the afghan war initial? the algerian war was symbolically most important mobilizing for the jihadists at the time. especially the community of militants in london. they're spending most of their resources on supporting the militants in algeria,

particularly the gia. they were support networks in elgin for finances, propaganda and recruitment. they did that did that from the very start of the conflict. over time as the leadership changed among the algerian gia, they became more and more set on punishing france and deterring france from interview interfering in algeria. that is when the campaign was ordered in 1994 which ended with the first bomb attack in paris. what is fascinating when you look at from a historical perspective you see those people that were involved in those attacks were arrested, they spent time in jail, they came out again and melted into the

network and started recruiting others, working as entrepreneurs in making the phenomenon sustains. >> in your chart to refers to the algerian war to a prolonged period for there's few if any -- sort of late 90s and that it begins to pick up again. can you explain a bit about the reason why it look like a peaceful time in terms of jihadist. >> that's interesting because -- says something else about the scope of the phenomenon. were talking about a variation between three or four incidents,

it's not like a huge and honest phenomenon. when the network is disrupted after the activity level will go down for a bit. and then it will pick up again when you have new mobilization because they find new causes to mobilize around. >> before we turn it over, can he talk about the pakistan connection in the mid to thousands and what the role of the conflict in pakistan was, how that is and whether it disappeared and shifted to isis? >> the pakistanis dominated the

phenomenon throughout the two thousands when al qaeda and affiliates were operating camps. there was also successful efforts by the jihadists to mobilize among pakistani and pakistani youth in the community surrounding -- in london. it. think one of the events of the history of the jihadists in europe that kinda shows the military means can have an

effect against the networks because it affected the activity and also the past excuse by the militants. when al qaeda came under severe pressure, and aspect that was when it was called the shift toward more single actor operation. although the people operating were not necessarily a lone wolf. it was all part of a strategy of the group being under pressure. >> let's take some questions will start with gentleman here. >> in your research, did you take a look at financial and logistics support, how how is that organized and where does it come from?

>> they went through the most well-documented cases, what she found in her study was basically that many of these cells are self financed. and that is what characterized the majority of the book. at the same time we do not, we work with open sources and they think some of the occiput is is hard or difficult and perhaps impossible to research sufficiently. in general, the terrorist plots

in europe have been quite cheap. it is not a very costly operation. usually they have been using their own means and maxed out credit cards, things like that. in some cases there are transfers to western union another transferring means as well. you do not find many examples which is quite surprising when you have literature and terrorism financing. there were some indications that the latest attackers in paris, brussels made use of other networks but that's not confirmed. >> i understand that the first cartoon published concerning

mohammed and the bomb in the turbine or head covering in denmark and i think that was in 2008. the response to that in the muslim world was a boycott of da'esh products and i understand that denmark actually sold more da'esh hams abroad that you're than they had in the past. but there is no jihadist activity, at at least until maybe their small incidents until last year. what you count the lack of activity in denmark as a result of the publication of the original? >> the cartoons were published in 2005. the first response by bin laden came in march 2006.

where he was actually urging all of the followers to punish the cartoonists in denmark for allowing the publication. as a document in my book there has been numerous plots ever sense. also between the publication of the attack that you are referring to. there have been many positive not been executed, they've been disrupted at an earlier stage in the planning process. when you look at the information about this plot, you'll see that the cartoons have been the main driver. it's basically what would cause the pot in scandinavia to a

level higher than in 2005. >> do you have a of why the cartoon seems to be this single were a domestic issue look at the number of plots rather than a conflict abroad? we would think it has to do with al qaeda decision at that point, they were under pressure. or increasingly under pressure. punishment for people who have insulted the prophet mohammed you can find it theological justification for that quite easily. within the religious sources. al qaeda was using attacks by medieval -- using the propaganda

and statement the prescribed that for those who insulted the prophet mohammed. i think it was very useful tool to recruit beyond the usual recruitment potential. they could recruit more broadly because they could find better justification within islam. >> hi, thank you. looking at the chart you shoulder early about the plots it seems to me there is an honest take about upward trajectory and we have seen comments from many european political officials and security services remarking about unprecedented threat level.

in your view, is there anything european political leaders are security services could be doing that perhaps they're not doing or should be doing to try to mitigate the current threat environment? >> thank you for the question. i think what needs to be done is more of what has been done in the past because the threat you're facing now is essentially much of the same, only wider in scope. there haven't been any shift or at least a very clear shift in targeting, and the tactics used. al qaeda and isis are employing the same ideology and have the stain strategic goal. so there's not so much new.

the in problem now is the number of foreign fighters in syria has reached an unprecedented level. that makes for huge capacity for a potent militants terrorist group with territorial control in syria and iraq. so i think, yes more has to be done across the borders and the efforts to continue to present these from coming under the entrepreneurs and that needs to continue. but more intensively. >> how important is military action in the islamic state in syria? to think there's a territorial

holding, did it shrink or did the training camps are they significantly reduce that this what numbers would decrease in europe or that the increase that was seen in recent years that if it's not serial it will return to yemen, pakistan or even to mystically train now? >> i think it is a question about long-term effects and short-term, think in some cases shows that military efforts against the network and the camp will make them operate differently or less successfully in executing successful attacks. at the same time, the phenomenon generally transnational and i

think isis is facing much more pressure in syria and iraq today. i think their focus and activities will change to other conflicts owns, absolutely. >> thank you. is is there any mention in your book about -- who is one of the leaders of islam in 2003 in iraq but now he is now spending time in prison in norway. what you think, some people criticize the laws in norway that they are too lenient against terrorism. >> ..

>>

>> with the drifter types after you thought about it is what would people do most effective leafhopper? what would they do in order to prevent those petty criminals from coming into contact? do you think the onus lies on getting those entrepreneurial figures one means or another away from them or what you hear often is look building a football pitch is not the key but

then i think maybe it is. the beta little more football in their lives so what is your thought how you prevent them for -- from falling into the orbit? so looking at the interplay cd to introduce the measures from getting in contact with the organized circle to contain the hour entreprenuers. that is highly difficult because many of the

activities are not possible and do not break any rules. that is the challenge of don't really go. >> you show examples of spikes and the times that our lower so i am interested in policies that reduce tension it is asymmetrical power dynamics. to suggest policy recommendations.

>> and that doesn't work specifically on counter measures. with up policies. but what policies would reduce? of course, we see that interference in the muslim countries but that is just how it is because that is what the militant groups have said they deal in

response to that so we need to think about when and how when it conflict. i am not taking enough of the role of the socio-economic because these are the factors because it affects the pool of potential recruits but at the same time. >> host: now pass the push the magic button and the terrorist threat would remain because we're talking

about quite limited network operating of the conflict zone with the extremist as well. but in my work at that llord emphasis to see what kind of large scale policy change we can do. >> my question is two parts. talk about the history of tourism with those numerous

attacks in europe the last three so what history exactly so why do they target backcountry specifically because they trouble from syria to greece

is there is a part of the research that has started even before when it started in syria there were hundreds of people but is anything done to stop them george just those ago from the middle east? >> of course, terrorism in europe has a long history by the irish and ira and other groups as well but my work focus is on the attacks with

the specific time period and also in my work and they haven't looked at the activities of the foreign fighters tuesday with their doing in the conflict zone. but i think they are improving by be our is becoming more and more difficult for the fourth fighters and they have

dropped dramatically in recent times it was very easy to get to the conflict zone. but it wasn't discouraged and also of the atrocities of the syrian regime. which affected the number of people going.

in then they continued to international terrorism. then to go to the conflict zone. id from that ideological perspective to go against a of ruler in the muslim country. so there are some threshold's that contributes to the international terrorism.

>> was there any conflict that you were surprised to see? and they may be wrong but it looks like they didn't produce much with all shibani. >> that's true and there have been some examples but then there are national attacks in the region and at least one of the cartoonist

but i was more intrigued of the week -- of the leak to bosnia. because many foreign fighters with their with their foreign fighter experience having been involved in europe. >> iran that covenant of securities? >> the coveted of security is the ideological conflict with some of the militant networks. it basically says when the

muslim lives in a muslim country when it is not allowed to attack that particular country of less there are three criteria to engage militarily against a muslim country to insult the profit muhamed in this long. this is a concept then receives not to have had an effect but in in january as a pack from the followers

but it has affected after that. >> i m curious what you see in terms of trends and if you sense in the deeper trend of the deal logical for rhaetian because while there is continuity there is also the increasing intensity of that ideology that makes it almost impossible for that scenario

so is a particular nation intervene? are they buy other political policies that is insulting islam in a way calling for retribution? supplicants to the historical backdrop with the conflicts that you've described is there an accelerant which has to do with an increasingly tolerant that is more normative then it has been so what do you see in the future of patterns and should syria simmered down?

>> and as we know it with any particular new or ideological trend. it is quite similar and within different groups of the ideological landscape in the muslim brotherhood. with those politically

oriented for leaders and also to be more extreme and a purist. at this point with any political current on the landscape at all. on what type the state of evolution but they are quite similar with the ideology to justify this attacks in the same way.

>>. >> why are you so dismissive of wolf? >> because bill lois wolf craze is the sense of all a tile or unpredictable threat that is crawling out of the woodwork. it is a with the threat that i have studied even though they operate quite independently under the influence they usually have

interacted with people. the test the intelligence service those to operate alone has to do with our understanding and to now much of the debate is completing -- conceding that phenomenon. but it is not identical. one of the most important things i want to do is

distinguish between these and try to use the same counter policy to work against foreign friday or extremism. >> any concluding remarks? >> thanks for talking with us. >> i'm sure if you answer any questions. >> thanks for coming. [applause] [inaudible conversations]