have been anointed, not appointed and that's a problem regardless of where your politics life. host: of next we have justin calling in from ohio on our republican line. good morning, justin. guest: good morning. i want to say that my comment-- i think justice ginsburg did donald chubb a huge favor and mitch mcconnell. is the merrick garland nomination and if it's any legal advantage for the democrats i would just say she completely neutralized it.et .. effective it is as a political tool, but i think she just tossed it. guest: i think that is true and no, asee garland going, she turned to him on the list of political statements and that this is not a good thing.

heart of the problem here is this corrosive effect of justices becoming celebrity justice and they seem to be speaking primarily to your base and liberals go to the american constitution society and they throw these audiences. i tell these i've total ownership with these things together can look to come you're not doing a good thing for them or for us by having these events. you see the corrosive effect. they are human beings so they gf for the audience in somereason i respect.t. this is like the old model. it's like john paul stevens who spoke to his opinion. most people wouldn't recognize him if he walked down the street and he's one of the great justices. i'm not taking away from justice ginsburg. she has an extraordinary legacy. that's what a tragic is she tarnished an extraordinary legacy with what was officially unethical act.

>> host: hat calling in from independent line from pittsburgh. you were on with professor jonathan turley. >> caller: thank you. i have a general comment, italy about the american people. and i myself being a citizen and ashamed, ashamed of the american people and the attitude they have and the lazy action when it comes to getting up and going and voting and knowing who your candidate are. you get what you get because you do nothing. and that's why the country is in the shape it is in today host the okay. you have a reaction? >> guest: i think people are getting more involved and that's a good thing. what i worry about is tha is tht the anger grows as partisanship

grows, the blindness growth. i think if i was to make one change in this country if i could do it with a magic wand, it would be, growing up in chicago i remember my father saying the worst thing you can be is a chump. don't be a chump. i think the american people have become a nation of child's. that is, we buy this two party t state red state phenomenon and we do all issues that political lives. that's exactly what washington a wants. it wants us to walk away from scandals and see it though because someone apologize. instead of creating real reform the framers believe we have that power. they gave it to us. they wrote a constitution not just for times like ours. it was during poisonous political times.s, we can to send that. we can actually find we have more in common with each other than perhaps our politicians. we can get things done. it takes the bill for people to step back and breakthrough this red state blue state phenomenon.

>> host: speaking of politics and the election, you talk about which candidate is more nixon like. he wrote it has taken all suggest that the democrats have finally, nixonian figure in the post-watergate period. they have reached the more compromise that nixon waited unsuccessfully for republicans to some 71% of democrats want clinton to run even if she were indicted. explained that more. what makes hillary clinton nixon like? >> guest: i' i am surprised by these polls the democrats are saying even issues -- a few shows this type of fervent partisanship that comes into play. i have been critical of both donald trump and hillary clinton equally. my columns have criticized both of them.

with hillary, the thing that surprised me is this nixonian aspect. she has a serious problem ina dealing directly and fully scandals. it has a nixonian aspect. her inclination to suspend, is to go to a nuanced position as putting a good spin on it. but also her staff around her worries me. that is, you wonder where's the john dean in this group. who's going to walk into what president clinton and say you can't do that, or what you are doing is wrong? i think it's a serious concern when you see the public saying i don't issues criminally indicted. that's the sort of nixonian aspect to it.thes look, these are the two leastid popular candidate in history of modern politics. i know there's going to be 30% on either side, republican and democrat who don't care about this. but for the rest of us i think we have a legitimate moment where we can say how did we get here?

how is it possible that the two most unpopular presidential candidates in history are the two main candidates being offered in the united states? that should trouble us. we are, in fact, have a democratic system and yet thiste is we see this anger where lik people feel detached. they feel like there's nothing they can do. i think that's what we arear looking at. >> host: bill our democratic line from louisville, kentucky. good morning, bill. >> caller: good morning, how are you? professor, to be completely honest, i don't even know where to start after hearing you say different things you said. my first inclination was to call to speak to you about your that every day. it seems you are living in a fantasy world because -- niobe t. there such turmoil over the next justice that's going to be picked is because nobody knows it's a political thing.

that's the reason mitch mcconnell has taken the stance he has taken, is because he wants to give his opportunity, and possibility that trump can win, then he will help that trump will take a conservative, somebody that will do what the conservative ideology is. >> host: let's give professor turley a chance to respond. >> guest: i may be living in a a fantasy world. i admit i feel more often i feel i'm more comfortable back in 18 sit down and today quite frankly as an academic. it may be a fantasy that we can actually unite around certain principles. what i would say is what you just said is exactly what folks in washington are hoping that a people do. democratic and republican.ng they want everything to be treated as raw politics. it's true this selection comes down to politics because of political body, the senate, have to confront them. that doesn't mean that this

process needs to be political. that's what's so disappointing. and that is we have come to accept that everything is politics. that principles are naïve. even a fantasy. there was a time when we didn't think principles were a fantasy. there was a time when without ethics or something you should require, then you should expect as a citizen. once really crushing to me is to their citizens that are clearly involved like yourself who are single, that's just fantasy now. that's naïve. it's not naïve. what we can demand from our government but we can't do itt unless everyone come to the view, that is not fantasy to require ethics. >> host: up next we have, charlie calling in from kentucky. good morning, charlie. >> caller: that morning. i think the biggest disappointment to me, when i was going to school i thought the supreme court would judge according to the constitution,

according to the rulebook and call balls and strikes. what we find out is a justice admitting they're willing to put their thumb on the scale and it calls into question their decisions been polititutionally-based or politically-based? would that carry the law of the land with it? >> guest: you know, in defense of justice ginsburg, i believe that she is ethical in how she writes opinions, that she tries to get it right. they all do. people to say i can't believe those justices on the right, look out of always go in lockstep and ignore the justices fo the left who tend to vote together. the other side always looks political and ideological and your son looks like it's subsistent and thoughtful. the fact is both sides are following a jurisprudential view. we should want them. we should want them to be consistent about how they view the constitution. i don't want to cast any aspersions on the legacy of

justice ginsburg. i have disagreed with some and agreed with others. they are all well-written. she's a very strong writer ont the court with a vision that comes out. but when you say how do we trust her opinions in the future, i will say this. out. i think that she is in significant trouble if she were to sit on a case like a bush bu v. gore that might come out of this election. having said that it would move, potentially move to new zealand rather than face a president trumka i think is legitimately a basis for people to say unique you recuse yourself. >> that brings up a point brought up in an article today by "the wall street journal" which says despite her comments that should be more circumspect iin the future, that doesn't in the matter some songs cannot be unsung and the comments she made have raised permit questions about her ability to fairly adjudicate many potential cases.

host: while you said you don't question her judicial, our own ability to adjudicate cases in these cases come if there is another bush v. gore, cases involving donald trump, is thato a problem treachery is a couple of quibbles i would have with the editor one is the word path to, to have come to recuse herself. recusals are left entirely to the justices..l' more often than not they dismiss what our strong demand for recusal. we have that are both conservative and liberal justices where many of us believed you should recuse yourself because of financial interest or other types of connection. they often dismiss those. so she doesn't have to recuse himself if that's what we need enforceable code of ethics. more importantly when it comeses to recuse yourself in a bush v. gore, i would be surprised

if she think that she could sit on such a case here but beyond that i don't think she will recuse yourself and a not entirely sure that when you're looking years down the road, just because case involved a president trumka i would expect her to recuse himself prospect jonathan turley, law professor at georgetown, thank you for joining us this morning. >> guest: thank you for having me. >> watch live coverage of the republican national convention beginning next monday in cleveland and saturday night at eight eastern, we'll take a look at past republican conventions including the contentious 1976 republican convention in kansas city started with the rules that were proposal would require resident gerald ford to select his running mate prior to the balloting process. we will feature speeches from the convention from president ford and former california governor ronald reagan. >> we have just heard a call to arms they saw that platform. and a call to us to really be successful in communicating and

revealed to the american people the difference between this platform and the platform of the opposing party which is nothing but a revamp and a reissue and the running of a late late show of the things that we've been hearing from them for the last 40 years. [cheers and applause] >> the 1952 convention in chicago with dwight eisenhower. >> you have summoned me on behalf of millions of your fellow americans to lead a great crusade for freedom in america and freedom in the world. i know something of a solemn responsibility of leading a crusade. i have led one. >> known for his military career rather than his political expertise he was selected as the republican nominee and he laid one in 1952 election. at the 1996 republican convention in san diego. pass national conventions, saturday night at eight eastern on c-span.

>> c-span makes it easy for you to keep up with all the latest convention development with the c-span radio app available as a free download from the apple app store or google played. get audio coverage of every minute of the convention as well as schedule information about important speeches and events. get c-span on the go with the c-span radio app. >> people in city leadership, the fundamental thing that cd needs to be able to provide to host, the capacity to handle this. cleveland have had political conventions in the past. they came may become if you're unsuccessful in 2008 and he told at the time they lack the requisite number of poker rooms but basically you need to have 16,000 hotel rooms, enough

nearby venues people what places to go before and after the sessions. and other than that, i mean, the big factors was his fund-raising and be able to actually local communities are expected to pay for these things to some degree. they fell short in 2008. what they've done since then was a big win as they built a convention center, the county government actually used a sales tax hike to pay for it. it has a thing like six rooms, 32 stories tall. that was the big one. found out in july 2014 i think i got a phone call shortly before reince priebus one tv. since then it's been accelerating some of the public works projects have been in effect. one of the things you guys will see is there is a public square downtown which is like a public park that's been made into more of a park than it used to be. there's been a lot of road rebating, more kind of run-of-the-mill things that were they want to make it look nice.

there's this convention economy that springs up and follows the conventions as a go from town to town. there's been a soldier for better part at 18 months. we've been trying to basically get restaurants on board with them to help broker events and stuff like that. i think for a lot of them and let's have someone like that helping that i think they're flying blind a little bit especially because road closures were very recently announced they did not what kind of security restrictions would be in place, not i think that a lot of the places downtown are ready. i think they're expecting to be very busy with private events but i think it will be hard to know what to expect intelligentsia. a big partisan trying to recruit the number of police officers did they have been secretive about that so it's been kin kinf difficult ascertain exactly how it is perceived. there's been some obvious signs where they're having a hard time to get police to agree to do. some of it could've been just been getting blood because a lot of attention it's attracting and all of the intrigue but clearly

they're having trouble meeting some of those early numbers they're trying to reach. it seems it has quieted and we think it will be all right. it will be one of those things where at the end of the day people may not even notice it was an issue but it was a challenge. they been recruiting, training officers to be ready. they've been spending federal grant they received about $50 million on equipment, things like vehicles, things like personal protective equipment, basically riot gear and medical supplies and things like that. we had a lawsuit filed by the aclu. that was basically resolve but we expect that is going to be a number of groups that are going to be following the official parade route quoted quote parade, past downtown, past the cleveland indians ballpark but other than that it's hard to know because there's only as the

tsunami protesters and you don't know until they arrive. to be a lot of interest in this years election. cleveland is a pretty easy spot to get you whereas in tampa in 2012 it's kind of the corner of america. i expect will be a pretty robust presence there to be people set up in a couple of the parks downtown. cleveland has said there's no barriers to people if they just want to approach the actual physical perimeter itself. because just people thought the streets but again i guess will find that when it comes. the cab was have a victory parade and that brought around 1 million people downtown. things were totally backed up and close to a. compared to that i not be so bad. went to the big things that will be nice is we do have a real system and so were as super backed up with a parade, it should be up and running for the rnc. i expect a lot of people will taking public? >> guest: . a lot of people be avoiding

downtown. also accept love people will steer clear of downtown as much as a kid. because of cleveland's reputation amid a lack of reputation they don't really think they will see much when they get it but what's calle goo play with this it does offer like a walkable urban lifestyle, a relatively small area. there's a good food scene, a lot of good restaurants and bars that will be new to convention space. people will be impressed or they might have been low bar to me that clinton is a pretty fun place. >> we are outside the quicken loans arena and this is the facility whether 2016 republican national convention is going to take place. we are standing on level four of the quicken loans arena and where in one of the suites, normally a hospitality suite which, of course, is being converted for broadcast purposes for c-span.

on this level the are some hospitality suites for guests but there are also about 30 broadcasts media suite. i was involved in the early inviting them i see to get a decent suites for the media, get that chair, which is the normal. it's about what we normally do. and while we get the total number they are actually assigned individually through an intermediate process for the house where television gallery and c-span did very well with you in this location. delegates will be seated facing all of them facing the stage which we call the podium. we call it the podium complex. while that seating chart has not been announced, it usually is kind of a fan shape with people all facing as you move out, they face inward toward the complex and we have aisles, the center aisle and side aisles so that people can move and media who

have four passes can move and whatnot. so we will see that next week when a plan comes out and win the seats go down, and when a state sanctioned which shows what the states will be seating, all the callable come in and take place and you really get a view of the. the are a number of stand up rod kast positions, and some of those are at floor level on each and, ma on the end zones. then the are two huge network anchor booths at the far end for cnn and nbc. they opted for those positions. it cos costs more to build obviy than the others. three others, fox, abc and cbs, are in a level up in what were handicapped seating areas where they have built on them and with other ample handicapped seating elsewhere of course. so you have the broadcasters up here, ma we call them nonnetworked, that means you are

not one of those five. they may be affiliates of some of those, in other words, and then we have those same groupings withstand positions on the floor and some upon the level in handicapped broadcasting areas, too. so they are everywhere. down on the floor, if you can see them come with our two major side camera stands and those will have television pool camera on the front tier and still photographers on the upper tiers your the same way the big center camera stand if you can see from here, it faces the podium. it will have to pool camera television cameras and our health protection camera on the front and in the upper tiers of the still photographers. the press seats are in. they are fixed positions, you know, with tables and electrical and internet capability all built in and they are now decorated with the red, white

and blue and the stars. they look real fun. with the states can reflects a trend that started in 1996 in san diego with the steps in the front. those steps were put in and the podium that we call the stage was lowered somewhat to give more feeling of openness you're not like a 10-foot high battleship approach we look down on your delegates. that has endured a. we've had steps in every design since then. this particular design was brought to us by executive producer, and the designer from los angeles, and another designer from new york. they have done this for us before and are experts at it. you can see it has large screens and it has lighted steps. what we are seeing today is a tremendous way we can very look of this with lots. lunch. notches on the steps but

everything, the lights can change many colors throughout the stage. as you will see people will incur from one side and make their speech, and then they will exit from the other side. there is a small bandstand to one side where a house band will keep the flavor and there could be some other entertainment. we mentioned the lighting grid and other things that hang. i think the lighting itself is 140,000 pounds which reminds me, when we went into the houston astrodome in 1992, and it had been built very rapidly and there were no records to show what the ceiling would hold. the most they ever hold on there was 40, 50,000 pounds and we're going to hang at least 125,000 pounds. so we had to do all these major studies to see that it would hold our weight, and we did. it was also an acoustical disaster for a convention type

thing because it wasn't not for spoken word at floor level. there was an echo in there. if you said something loudly at floor level, it echoed throughout the place in some capacity for 17 seconds. the sound would go to some other crevices and come out like an echo chamber, louder than it went in. we had to deal with that, too. that brings us to the fact that these sports arenas are more modern. >> live now for discussion on u.s. policy towards series you. zalmay khalilzad will share his views at the center for the national interest. live coverage on c-span2. >> i'm joined by two speakers and one commentator, zalmay khalilzad i'm certain many of you know, paul pillar and dmitri. let me say a few words about speakers and then about the

format of this program we're going to have this morning. ambassador khalilzad who has just written a really fascinating book called the envoy, from kabul to the white house, my journey through the turbulent world has, in fact, been america's ambassador to afghanistan, iraq and the u.n., and has had a distinguished academic record as well. so he brings both diplomatic and academic knowledge to this subject. paul pillar was for many years the national intelligence officer in the cia covering what was then called near east and south asia i don't know what is called today but clearly critical part of the world. he also has just published a book which i do not have hand

out to show the cameras but it's called why america misunderstands the world, which is sort of a critique potentially about how our unique geography, our unique history means we are not the best disciples of world history. and then our commentator is dmitri who is the president of the center for the national interests and noted expert on russia, as you'll hear in a moment. and here i must put in a plug for the magazine, the national interest where, this month, dmitri and jacob who is the editor both have excellent, fascinating essays. one by dmitri on putin's russia and one by jacob on stalin's diplomat, which is worth, they

are both well worth reading come and get you to do. so now as you know we have advertised today's event as focusing on the crisis in syria that is reached new levels of intensity, and particularly diplomatic interests. as we speak secretary kerry and mr. labrador as i understand our meeting in moscow. we will get to that issue in a moment. but the first if we do anything else we thought it would be interesting and relevant to ask our three speakers literally to take 30 seconds, two minutes, just to give their first impressions of what the tragic events that happened yesterday

in nice means for the war on terrorism and the responses that europe, russia, the united states and the middle east itself, how those responses may or may not change or whether they should change. because of this event. i'm going to ask dmitri just to do that quickly, comment on the nice issue and then we will turn to the big event, syria. so tell us what you think about nice. >> well, first of all thank you for the plug, my book. i appreciate that very much. as far as nice is concerned, we don't know enough to make a definitive or even semi-definitive judgment. was this person tunisian french

influenced by daesh? did have a relationship to any terrorist group or not? we don't know that yet, at least not that i have heard. second, was a self radicalized or driven by some extremist ideology, which one? but at this stage given what has happened, the use of a truck against civilians on the street is extremely difficult challenge that it poses. what do you do with regard to the method that uses. in some ways you and i talked about earlier, it's probably one of the worst case you can imagine. and i'm sure all of us, given

our two big events that are upcoming, the republican convention and the democratic convention, are going to go to extreme measures to think of all kinds of scenarios, and added to it, this potential use of a car to deal with it. but i do think if it is self radicalization are related to daesh, it makes the issue of syria and iraq in the issue of counterterrorism, and what do you do both domestically and in terms of policy towards these groups, that much more urgent given the political season that we are in. >> thank you very much. paul? >> as usual the interpretations and analysis out there on the pundits pages outstrip the facts as we know them as was quick to

point out. there's not that much we know so far. he also correctly points out that if our concern is with particular methods of operation, really there's no limit. you don't need anything high-tech to kill a lot of people. i would put this instrument in the same general category as basically what we've seen over the last month or so is due -- in that collectively there is not one simple explanation. the actual explanations come if we knew everything about each one of those incidents, probably spans a range of some that have some sort of connection with the events we're going to talk about later in the hour, others that are matters of people who have the own agendas who have latched onto the ice is named or to some of our other concerns about terrorism to do what they're going to do anyway. i would commend for your reading as the best intrepidity of

roundup of these events of the last several weeks the peace my friend brian jenkins had earlier this week in the hill, and bryan concludes i think quite correctly that although we have an appetite for simple explanations on these things, it's just isis or it's just mobile for its is something else. more likely it's a messy set of very different circumstances with each one of these. >> thank you, paul. now, syria. there's really very little i can say to introduce this terrible subject either i sort of skimmed through the thicket before i came here this morning -- figures. one source suggests that already since 2011, 6.6 million internal

refugees, 4.8 million refugees who left the country primarily to jordan, lebanon, turkey and europe, and by all accounts anything between 300-470,000 deaths, and counting. and on top of that an administration whose policies toward syria has gone through many, many zigzags and they guess is right in the middle of a zag or is it the right now as we speak and dmitri will have more to say about that in a moment. but absolutely as zal said, syria is going to be one of the key issues that the two candidates and their sparring

partners are going to be confronting in the upcoming presidential debates and the election in november. so without further a due, i'm going to ask zal to give us his views on what on earth is going on in syria, is there any good news, do you see a solution? you have had enormous experience dealing with these issues in the region, and we look forward to hearing what you are going to say. >> well, thank you again. i thought i would do two things. one, to add to what you did in terms of additional consequences of syria, besides the humanitarian, this terrible humanitarian loss that the syrians have suffered, to point

to the importance and urgency of this issue. and then to talk about kind of policies and what's going on, where might one go. the process may be to set the stage for dmitri's contribution, say something about u.s.-russian cooperation. this conflict obviously as we know has had many national security applications as well to us, the west, to the region and to the world. first i think it is unquestionable that the growth of daesh, isis, terrorist organization as a unique almost terrorist organization with a territorial base, with a concept

for how to organize the world, with a worldwide appeal and recruitment in the thousands from all over the world, with the virtual information empire in many languages reaching to the world. and with the ability to inspire individuals in other parts of the world that are unique these sites its brutality some of which is shared with some of the other groups i think in brutality. it will be slightly more unique than others but not by much. but with these other categories it has been quite unique. it is also generated a population movement because of

the sectarian factors. and at times because of actual policies some ill intent to push populations out, even send them to other places, it does have an effect obviously on europe in particular. it does increase the fear, the reality of terror, islamist terror globally. it has brought russia back into the region in a way that wasn't the case for a while. it has become kind of a proxy, a regional player. and there is a risk that the proxy war could even become a regional, a direct regional border there is some probability of that. i would say not very high but

you cannot exclude it. and it may be help redraw the map of the region. so this has been not only a humanitarian, from a humanitarian perspective, serious, heart wrenching crisis but it is the crisis with many serious complications already and with potential to produce even more. so what do we do, what can i say what to do? first, i think that the urgency of dealing with the terrorist groups is one high policy priority. and i will talk about what our objective should be and how we prosecute them to achieve that objective and what do we do

about syria itself. that you are related and it is some question of in what sequence does one pursue it, which one is more important and what timeframe, short and longer term. i would think on terror it's very important to thank both immediate and longer-term. in terms of immediate, what we've done is already some progress. i think i've seen figures as high as 45% of the territory that daesh used to have. not only in syria, but iraq has been liberated. second is that the number of foreign citizens or individuals coming to join the group has decline. i've seen figures as high as perhaps declined by 75% compared to the height of the period

where foreigners used to come. and there are efforts to push against both daesh but also against more. we will come to that tactical american-russian strategy to deal with it. my sense is that we need to look at, and i advocated to take the areas that daesh and al-nusra control to take back. had to do in a specified timeframe i think six months seems would be unreasonable go goal. and for the united states, and this could be done by the coalition perhaps even with russia, that we pursue or use the afghan model that we did against the taliban and

al-qaeda in afghanistan as a method, a combination of local forces and regional forces with heavy u.s. air power and with special forces with the afghani forces to take over territories, remaining territories such as mosul and raqqa and other areas that are there. the sooner this is done, the better. and i would think there are ways that we could accelerate and expand it. the administration is moving towards some of that. we have heard the deployment of 500 additional special forces in iraq, intended for that but we have had a successful model in taking, arresting territory from extremist and terrorist groups

that works relatively well. whatever you say afterwards about liberation part, so i would recommend that. for the longer-term i think we face a huge challenge even if we succeed against daesh and al-nusra in the short term, assuming we follow this model, and what do we do about the people who are part of these groups. particularly the foreigners who are there. the numbers that i hear, the wide range from a few thousand to as high as 25,000 range. as they dispersed given the experience they have, this could be, posed huge security terrorist problem to places that they go to for some time to come. we need to have developed a plan

and a strategy for that. the of the issues what did you about liberated territory? because there is a risk given the discretion that ramadi has already expressed. mosul may be also damaged in the process of liberation your if we don't have a post-liberation strategy, which gets me into the syria part of the problem, and that as the other come a deal effectively with the governance, sure. and as we saw in the case of al-qaeda in iraq, which we liberated the areas from defeated more or less was succeeded by some daesh which was a lot worse in some ways and a bigger problem. we faced the potential for something, group or groups

succeeding beige if these issues are not dealt with. that could be as vicious or even worse. so we need to think about liberation, what to do, what to do with the people and what to do with the area so that something worst doesn't happen. that gets into this syria issued in relation to this. i think the establishment of the legitimate government in security is vital for the longer-term struggle -- in syria passionate against terrorism from syria and associate with syria. and that the absence of a political settlement that produces a more legitimate government can put into the hands of terrorists and extremists.

and not solve it and enduring way could achieve a tactical victory but in an enduring way, which is should be our goal, with the problem of terrorism and extremism. there are lots of ideas as to how this could come about, how long does the shower stake with what is the transition like? which the structure of the state that might come? some would argue like myself historically in the eastern empires or superstates that existed, federal structures, a lot of our economy locally, the notion of modern states, centralized unitary is relatively recent, typically imposed by outside power to it. maybe that will be part of the solution. whether you have a center, what

is composed of and how you do otherwise to satisfy alawites in syria as well as other could be part of the solution. now, let me say two or three of the senses as the tactics of how we proceed. i think cooperation with russia is important. i have been in favor of seeking common ground with russia with regard to extremism and terror. but i think it's very important in the this cooperation that takes place with a clear understanding of the goals, and the goals have got to be not only counterterrorism which is very important but also the broader settlement for syria and the -- as part of the broader

goal. my fear is that if it isn't that way, that w we will not solve a terrorist bomb in an way but at the same time it will be costly for us as we would be moving away from this, the broader stabilization of the series of which is i under interest wouldo be unlikely unless there is a political order and causes more problems between assad and allies in the region, we feel an uncomfortable and perhaps a lot of mistrust of the u.s., in part because of how we have dealt with syria besides iran, and that would make the problem much worse. so i would hope while we should pursue this goal and we should cooperate on al-nusra and

daesh, it should be in the context, in the structure of over all understand about the future of syria and the issue of the political transition. now, the issue of terrorism and settlement of syria also requires original understanding. brush and the us are important. perhaps we can help facilitate -- russia and the u.s. are important. i don't think we will succeed in terms of our twin objectives, syria and counterterrorism without an understanding among key regional powers, particularly among and six, iran and saudi arabia. those three powers are involved in a proxy war with regard to the future of syria, and given

the risks they are already facing and future risks, there is room for joint diplomacy by us and russia, to facilitate a settlement that can be acceptable. i would think if we and russia reached an agreement first, then with the arabs, then with turkey, iran being tactically perhaps brought in at a later stage may be more workable and may produce results and, therefore, there is no need for us to repair some of the strained relations that we have with our allies. on health as we talk with russia that we keep our allies in confidence and make sure that that gap that existed come this trust gap doesn't widen. we also need to the longer-term because the roots of this conflict and the terrorism issue, longer-term approach to

the order in this region, would have to regional balance of power but also, this is a region which is the most under institutionalized. and now the players have changed. in the airport yesterday the arab right was the dominant but now we have two other external, besides israel, two other external to the region players have become very important in keeping, structure turkey at a red. you need a structured, this is something we have rush and perhaps china and others to talk about an architecture for the region that builds confidence that regulates, facilitates mutual acceptance and some rules and back in addition to a balance of power can let this

region make progress to greater stability. >> thank you very much indeed. very thorough and interesting suggestions. paul? >> i.t. some of the major realities that have been facing the obama diminishes with regard to the syria problem and would face any policymakers are the following three. one, isis is losing. zal mention some of the metrics on that with regard to your territory laws and recruits and so what i would say that's reflection of a number of things. the loss of support of the devastation of the rule of rule. their lack, absolute lack of allies and the fact that in the end they have a message that simply doesn't have appeal. i think this trend was perhaps punctuated earlier with a front-page article in the "washington post" which was about the isis is preparing itself and its followers for

losing all of your territory, other so-called caliphate in syria and the right. second reality is that a significant moderate arab opposition in syria simply has not materialized in the way that many expected or hoped it to. this was perhaps punctuated sometime back when poor general austin had to get to the congressional committee there were five people, fighters that were emerged from the multimillion dollar program that our defense department had going for training them. most of the gains on the ground against isis have not come from such ballots. it come from kurdish militias or from the regime back in recent months by the russians. that in turn reflects a wider trend we've seen in other civil wars in which the more extreme elements tend to shout out the more moderate ones. fighting an internal war of the is a rather extreme way to pursue political objectives as

opposed to peace waste so that shouldn't surprise us. the groups that have sometimes been used to pad out the lists of supposedly moderate opposition groups are not really all that moderate or unthinking of -- and their lack of moderation i think is indicated by not just what they have said openly that we could identify as ideology but the very fact they become so closely aligned on the ground with the al-nusra front of which is the al-qaeda affiliate in syria. a third over all reality i would highlight is the assad regime is not going anywhere anytime soon. this is a reflection partly of the internal sentiments and sources of support among many syrians who don't necessarily like the assad but look at the alternative, the feasible alternatives and have decided that they would be even worse. and, of course, it also reflects

external source of support, most notably the russians and iranians with the russians in particular playing a role that has made a difference militarily over the past year. one of the problems in our discourse on policy about syria all along has been a lack of clarity about goals and trying to pursue more than one thing at a time. they counterterrorism side of things and then the aspiration for regime change. say all you want about how the assad regime's policies have encouraged extremism which is true and that the regime has made a use of the of extremists on the other side to argue that the choice is between us and the terrorists, that's true to a large extent as well. but the fact is to posit regime change in this situation, it is incompatible in important ways with the goal of being able to counter a disabled terror groups, including but not limited to isis. and yet we asleep in her overall

discussion, and this is it included the obama administration, into the assad moscow motor. after the syria rebellion broke out some five years ago. i would suggest that matter only so much of habit and a reflection of the same general tendencies the result and intervention in libya, rather than more careful translation of current realities in syria. this realization has set in with some other important relevant foreign governments and the fact that it has i think makes it all the more pertinent for us to clarify our thinking along the same lines. one of them is turkey. the turkish prime minister earlier this week made a statement that talked about the need for his government to have some sort of improvement of terms, relations with the series in government and that will represent a reversal of what turkish policy has been over the

last couple of years. that is part of and the prime minister put it exclusively in these terms part of turkey's more recent overall efforts to clean up its relations on several fronts which have included with russia and with israel. and the one with russia has a lot to do with syria. indeed, it may, in fact, could be a preliminary to more active turkish intervention of an anti-isis sort beyond its southern border, which it could do only if russia in essence condones that sort of turkish action. and in just a couple of days ago there was a report that the iraqi prime minister has said his national security advisor to damascus with the letter that said among other things quote the war carried on by the syrian and iraqi armies is one, unquote. i think president obama has

realized these realities that i just described. even go so far at least his administration has not officially renounced the assad moscow id. it has clearly backed away from it at least tacitly. he seems realize the work itself rather than any particular political or ideological coloration of the regime of damascus has been most responsible for the instability and extremism editors and. high-fives have been in power for decades. his father took power in 1970 but it was only after the civil war really got rolling that isis got a great boost that it did by moving from iraq into syria and taking advantage of the violence and chaos. i think our president realizes escalation of the war is likely to do more harm than good and for the remaining six month of his term we are unlikely to see major departures and what we've seen in u.s. policy over the last several months.

except for the one you development, that's what is being negotiated right now with the russians and we'll hear more from nietzsche on the. i basically agree with zal's comments but let me lay out a couple of pictures that i should lay out the facts. based on what was leaked about this proposal it was to provide a joint implementation group to be based in jordan that would be staffed by russian and u.s. tactical air and intelligence specialists and to maintain, the primary aim would be at the al-nusra front. which i would suggest is a worthy target for any such effort. in addition to a committed against isis. isis may be losing but al-nusra has not been losing most recently. we can't say the same thing about his position on the ground. if anything it is probably solidified that position. and relevant problem to date has been how the al-nusra

element, take a in the northwest of the country, have been working very closely including physically closely with some of those other opposition elements mentioned earlier. the russians have complained with some justification that contrary to some assurances that we try to get in connection with what of those partial cease-fires earlier, we haven't managed to persuade other opposition groups to back away from the close cooperation with al-nusra. .. the primary blowback, so it probably makes sense to move with something like this even if it falls short of the further goal of getting russia to lean

heavily on assad with regard to final political arrangements and an eventual syrian settlement here we have heard his sources of resistance to the raposo-- proposal within the administration. they seem to be powered mainly by a reluctance to let go of the assad must go sentiment and also a natural understandable inclination to think of russia as an adversary, which is making art diplomats and we still have major differences with them in other places like ukraine at. >> i think obama also realizes that to take out isis and to use that sanitary term we hear so much does not solve the terrorist problem. there are all those things about what do you do with the liberated territory. at their implications ground presence and nationbuilding after military operations cease.

terrorism under any label whether it's isis or someone else is not to our advantage and we can expected to persist if there is chaos of the shorter length afterwards, so i think a probable goal for our current policy makers until january 2017 is continuing erosion of isis and its position and doing something more than we have been able to do so far particularly with understandings of the russian. some of the longer term issues on syria are ones that the next president will be facing and that we will be talking about well past next game or we're going to get used to the idea that even if and when the caliphate on the ground in syria and iraq is the more there will still be plenty of international terrorism including such as we saw, including attacks i would

suspect claimed under the isis label, which has more or less replaced that al qaeda label as the brand name of choice of people of that ilk and this whole fact is going with the idea that what we do with liberated territory will probably increase the pressure to accelerate the diplomatic track in trying to talk more seriously about an eventual political summit and as for those futures in damascus and the future of the assad regime a couple final points pick i think we will have to be conscious in the next of ministration will have to be conscious. first of all, of the relative stability compared to what we had seen in the last five years that we have had with most of the time of the assad in power. this is included relative quiet remarkably so on the goal on front and i have to think our israeli friends are looking at the events across that front

with mixed sentiment. assad has been the devil they had known and has represented less uncertainty with regards to security in that area than the devils they are not as familiar with and the ones that have come to control some of the ground of the last five years. we should also be conscious of the overall-- let's be frank very bad record of results of regime change during the era of that arab spring and before with tanisha being only a partial exception although we should note it was a tunisian. this does not mean that bashar al-assad will personally stick around for a long time. i don't see his external supporters including the russians and iranians having a stake in him personally. his longevity in office is not a necessary condition for those external supporters who maintain the other objectives and interest they have that are pertinent to syria. there is also plenty of signs of

the last couple of years of internal discontent with assad within the community. we've heard a lot about decentralization of power and i agree with what he had to say about that as well and i think anything approaching even a modicum of stability in syria to new years from now, three years from now, five years from now will have to involve some sort-- form that looks like that that won't be a matter of who controls a horrible central government in damascus. finally, i think we also had to be ready for the scenario of the next few years in which the syrian civil war is a somewhat similar to the lebanese civil war in the 70s and 80s, which trundled on for almost a decade and a half until there was even more josh didn't than they have in syria today. >> thank you very much. now, we will turn to demetrius and comments. paul, do i need to move?

>> thank you very much. thank you for inviting me to the panel the last moment because secretary carries trip to moscow. it's his fourth trip in moscow during one year, so-- [inaudible] >> after looking at what's being discussed in moscow and reading the reports, it looks like maybe there's less than meets the eye. let me say first, this war started in syria in march 2011. it last for more than five years it's a horrible human tragedy for the syrian people. i think it was discussed by both of our speakers eloquently and clearly. i think it's also a huge tragedy for the region and the

stabilizing turkey. it creates a challenge to american credibility in the region that's a huge political problem. we do not quite know what awaits different terrorists, wolves, not so long wolves, but clearly without it delicately, the syrian war does not help intensive dealing with the problem and anti- american terrorism. that much i think is clear and is widely accepted. which is less clear is how do we get out of this, but in order to focus on the let's remember how we got here. that is civil war in syria that started five years ago is clear that the roots of civil war were primarily domestic. just to start with a minority

that regime being aligned with iran which-- [inaudible] >> what kind of man bashar al-assad is. at the opportunity to know his father. precedent assad senior, had i put it delicately, he was not a very nice man. when there was a rebellion in the syrian city in 1982, i was writing a column for the christian science times when i was in syria. i had seen what they were doing to that city. they surrounded with tanks and artillery and the destroyed most of it and that was the end of the rebellion. precedent assad senior was a tyrant, a very brutal tyrant,

but he also was a man who was a respected by many major powers and leaders including the united states. as a man with whom we could deal with, with whom we could negotiate and was he would cut a deal, we could rely on him keeping his commitments and you remember how he cooperated at the time with the nixon kissinger administration and the roles he played with disengagement etc. and the israelis disliked him. but, they had a grudging respect for him. i yet to find anyone who trusts bashar al-assad. i yet to find anyone who worked with him who would say that this is a man with whom we can constructively conduct business. having said that, this is the

syrian leader we got and either we should have a plan how to get rid of him or we should find a way to work with him. all-- to is not a power in ways we cannot accomplish by their test military onslaught, but i disclose see-- diplomacy. daesh-- bashar al-assad. [inaudible] [inaudible] [inaudible] >> assad would be allowed in the

negotiations. that negotiations would lead to transition. that transitional government would be quite on thomas in the presence. there would be elections. i have heard from officials in moscow the lead inevitably lead to a solids the parts are. a senior associate to vladimir putin told me that assad is a butcher them yourself and a interested in keeping human power. the russians will also say that they did not control assad and they did not want to create an impression that they were giving up one of their own clan, so they went to the tube geneva and let process work. took then hillary clinton decided to interpret attempts of the geneva conference.

she agreed with the goal states and i don't want to put all of the blame on hillary clinton because clearly she was under very serious pressure from some of our best allies, but she demanded that as a precondition for the conference there would be on agreement that assad would be leaping power in the russians said, well-- second, can she deliver assad, particularly. you remember that iranian american relationship at that time was even more problematic than today and that iranians were supporting assad. most said listen, it's not only what don't want to do, as though we can do. assad at that time army was to celebrating and he was under

much greater pressure than today to accept an honorable departure. that did not quite work out. here where we are today. we clearly have a mutual interest with moscow to settle the conflict in syria. it creates terrorism, which is dangerous not only to the united states and our allies, it's creating a presence in russia. quite a few isa spider and senior commanders came from russia, so the russians, like united states, see this challenge. to put it mildly the russians-- [inaudible] [inaudible]

>> here our interests coincide. we want, not just isis, we went to do it in a way that would not benefit bashar al-assad. the russians would not mind at this point for the destruction of these terrorist groups and at the minimum they told 22 look like people who are surrendering bashar al-assad. we have to understand where we stand in our relationship with russia. the relationship is bad. the administration is talking about diplomacy with moscow meaning that we don't have any linkages, we get most cooperation where we have mutual interests, but where we don't believe we have mutual interests , we will continue to

increase sanctions and move infrastructure into all the baltic states. we are talking about basically acceleration with russia-- [inaudible] >> administration was actually more successful with this diplomacy than we thought was possible because vladimir putin and his foreign minister upped their point, agreed to play ball on those steps. they took a position that they are open to cooperation with the west and with united states all the while they were blaming the united states for the confrontation they were basically saying we are open for business and yet, you have sanctions against us, but we out of pride do not demand the end of sentience as a precondition for any different arrangements and yes, the russians were

saying they were interested in cooperating with american military at syria-- [inaudible] [inaudible] [inaudible] >> the problem starts in our interests are not the same. can you have at the same time more and more adversarial relationship and to get russian cooperation on issues that clearly are not an interest in the most difficult for them like giving up president assad and is a proposal that secretary kerry allegedly brought to moscow is a way being described on the basis

of administration and on the basis of-- i was told this morning by russian official there were two components with proposals. one, cooperation with the united states against isis. that proposal was meant from what i understand with almost non- qualified enthusiasm. that would be a victory for vladimir putin politically and show russia is not isolated and that russia still a great power, perhaps almost a superpower. the other side of the proposal is that russia should ground syrian air force. will, as you know much better than i do, this is a very difficult for death or because there is a battle and a syrian air force is playing a major

role and this is a battle which as many believe that this military, but political dynamics in syria and for russia to tell assad, ground your airport-- air force at this clutter-- article. is very difficult for moscow particularly because it's not just a question of ironic, but the iraqi government such a telling the government's will, you're doing a good job supporting the assad regime because the iraqi government is inundated by shiites, but we are asking moscow to put it mildly very heavy lifting in the context of general deterioration of american russian relationship. there's another problem here. the problem with russian elections. parliamentary elections in september and what is the

connection? will, we know how the elections are going. vladimir putin's party will do well, but he decided this time to have a relatively honest election. relatively. by that, they don't mean someone is real enemy of vladimir putin that what they would be allowed to take part in the elections. they dictate heavily who is like to take part. what they allowed to do, however , is to have relatively almost completely-- [inaudible] [inaudible] >> she moved against all

regional governments who are suspected to falsify the results why is it relevant to hear? because vladimir putin with great difficulty explaining to the russian people after all of their politics how is it that president assad is losing ground in syria and conversely for our ships to replace a sides airports with russians own airstrikes. that would not be popular either it would be very difficult for the administration to get a deal with the vladimir putin on the basis of this proposal. the other problem with this proposal this that there are a lot of people in washington who don't quite believe that a lot of people in moscow who don't quite believe john kerry and what i believe that it is a lot

of people in the administration are saying russia's foreign minister is charming, but we do not believe on the basis of our experience that he has the power and sometimes even the knowledge to have influence over russian military deployments or russian military actions either in syria or ukraine. in moscow, a lot of people around vladimir putin particularly people of so-called power agencies are saying john kerry does not have real ability to deliver on his promises to moscow. he negotiates deals, but does not look likely that the american military would cooperate with him in terms of providing full assistance to russia in terms of any joint military action against any groups, rebel groups and that

the way the united states would likely define who would be legitimate targets would exclude a lot of groups, which russia considers terrorists that leads me to the final point. i think that for this negotiation between the united states and russia to have a chance we have to make our own choice. what is our priorities hear? is our priority isis and-- more is our priority to remove president assad from power or at least not to allow him to improve his position in syria? this is not an easy choice because again, we are not a free actor. there are a lot of countries in the region who do not want to see an arrangement which would benefit president assad, but at the end of the day we need to be

able to make difficult decisions my ascension is that this would be a job for our next administration. >> thank you very much, all three of you. now, we will open it up for about 25 minutes of questions and comments. there are some ground rules. first, when you are called upon which the microphone because without the microphone we won't be able to hear you around the world. secondly, even though i may know who you are please state for the record who you are and where you are from and thirdly, please be relatively brief in your question or comment. >> former us ambassador to syria. i agree with almost all of what

i have heard here today, but i also talked with a lot of people who would not agree. so, let people myself for moments in their shoes. even allowing that assad may be able to hang onto power with russian and iranian support an american questions, how the festival i syria in that as was pointed out you have 11 million people into refugees or internally displaced people, perhaps dimitri could comment, but it seems to me that russia might not mind any of these 4.8 million syrians are in turkey and europe remaining there to trouble me tell countries and the like. but, how do you put humpty dumpty back together again since

what we would consider is a legitimate offer seems so weak particularly as was pointed out in terms of military forces on the ground, which are not united in any way. so, you commented on that a bit, ambassador khalilzad. what you said is all correct. but, how do you do it? >> now, would you like to say a few words or all of you? putting humpty dumpty back together again. that would be very hard, clearly , but i think diplomacy, the job of diplomacy in my view sometime it is to make-- to have choices like dimitri said and sometimes it's to find common ground where you can address the problem. i believe that that's why did not get into the issue of bashar

al-assad and when he goes. the issue of constituting a legitimate government in syria that has broad supports has got to be part of the diplomatic conversation. if it didn't, in my view then an exclusive focus on going after the terroristic opposition would be very difficult to sell, but it has been that one could escape, but it isn't going to solve the problem of terror in my view from syria. it's going to only lead to more terrorist groups. i have experienced this first hand. we did indeed with ending the civil war in iraq and in doing way. we defeated al qaeda in iraq, by

the time 2008, they were largely neutralized. but, because the political problem was that the result. in fact, some steps were taken backwards by prime minister maki the second term, it led to in combination with syria with bigger terrace problems. my discussion with the russians would be, let's have a convincing alternative arguments that addresses these issues. so, how are we going to solve this problem of sunni arab extremism and terror if we don't address this issue. now, it should be creativity as to how do we sequence it and what is the process for doing it , framework may have been a good way to do it. there may be alternatives to proceed, but my judgment is if

we are serious about counterterrorism not only in the short-term, but in the longer term, there has to be a political settlement that establishes a legitimate order that allows refugees to come back and it still will take a lot of effort of cooperation to rebuild that states and it wouldn't be easy. it would be difficult phases. there will be violence, but i think without that we will have this problem may be in spades down the road. simental, dimitri. >> certainly humpty dumpty will not be put back together the way it was before this all started. and we have to resist the tendency to think of this in black and white or nothing

terms. i think some of the things we alluded to earlier, more than one of us about decentralization of power, of recognition of who controls the real estate in various parts of the country will have to be part of the formula. i think something that recognizes and gives appropriate weight to the fears without necessarily zalmay khalilzad-- bashar al-assad being the guy on top. .. some to move back. we might have at the more realiic goal during the next few years something we would more describe as a frozen conflict.

we usually don't say nice things about frozen conflicts but there's usually better than the kind of conflict we have now. and that might be at least a way station toward putting a new humpty dumpty back together. >> well, in my book, part of in -- part of the solution may be sitting at this table, including the ambassador. i would send the ambassador to damascus to talk to president assad. it's a remarkable situation that we have really no serious contact with the major partner to the conflict, and when we allow the russians, who we don't exactly view as our friends, and rightly so, we allowed them and the iranians to have a monopoly on negotiations with assad. and while we after five years of this war, that should end.

the experience of how to deal with rather unpleasant characters in afghanistan and iraq, and how to -- when you can look at the three of them but would not mind easing them out as your end objective. i think we should talk as such. second thing we need to do is to have a broader conversation with the russians about our relationship. this transactional diplomacy where we're enemies on one issue and allies on another, that can only work so far. when you have real difference in interests, it doesn't do. in order for this to work, a country like russia need to feel that a real improvement in relations with you is also in their interest, and is feasible as long as they're willing to talk fundamentally realistic priority.

the third thing is to start serious negotiating process in geneva, and to make very clear that we don't have a realistic demands like assad making the commitment to leave at the outset, at the same time we're very firm, as you said, that there should be some kind of settlement in syria, and that is the way we'll say we believe it should work, and we should suggest a structure of the process, which would lead to assad's departure from power or at least create a new political arrangement in syria. it may be an element of decentralization, an element of giving more power to communities, and et cetera. whatever would allow us not necessarily to get rid of assad altogether but certainly to put an end to -- when he is a huge,

polarizing figure in iraq. our problem in syria should that be assad. our problem should be assad as a dictator and that we should focus on. >> congratulations. we look forward to -- >> appointed me. >> and i would have to just add here that it seems to me that if there is to be any return of the 11 millions either inside syria or outside syria, they're not going to come back unless there are very clear security measures and they're not butchered again, and that has to be part of the formula no matter what we do with bashar al-assad. >> thank you. i certainly -- >> could you announce who you are? >> steve, -- [inaudible].

the -- i take the point that these two goals of removing assad from power and defeating isis may be incompatable but we have another perhaps the overriding objective of ending the war, and let me just ask in a fairly pointed way whether the goal to ending the war is compatible with assad remaining in power, and let me -- in asking that question i'll be drawing analogy to iraq. we spent a lot of time in washington talking about what went wrong in iraq after 2008, and i think it's virtually unanimous today in washington what went wrong in 2008 was prime minister maliki. he shifted this government and started governing in a sectarian manner, what you had in iraq is the shiite arab majority disregarding the rights of the sunni arab minority and that gave rise to the situation we

have today. very few people in washington disagree with that. if one were to say, look, let's restore maliki to power, everybody would agree that was a pretty bone-headed suggestion for bringing peace and stability to iraq. why is it that in syria, anyone thinks that assad can effectively bring peace to the country? there are couple of differences in syria, we're talking about arab minority trying to rule a sunni arab majority. maliki didn't credit refugees and kill 300,000 people, but assad has. how is that man going to be able to restore stability, end the war? >> well, ambassador -- [laughter]

>> i have to say two things that may be in tension with each other. one is that maliki was prime minister from 2006 to 2014, if i'm not mistaken and there was moll can i one -- maliki one and maliki two. maliki one, the surge and reconciliation and the unity government was folder. happened with him also the prime minister and he moved against militias and basra and other cities, and we need to look at how maliki one behaved one why and why maliki two behaved in another way. think the key factors were two. one, that withdrawal and he became fearful that the sunni

officers, might carry out a coup in absence of american military presence so he start purging the officers and put political loyalists in their place. and second, syria. he also saw this sunni upraising and thought that the combination of sunni -- iraq and syria may get together and change the map. so, maliki two is, as described -- i wouldn't think of bringing him back. you're right. so, the conditions also matter, put i would think -- that's why because of what points you made, i think we need a political settlement and we need a political settlement with legitimacy to -- have to be taken into aount. as to when bashar goes, as

bashar become the head of the region -- there are lots of issues to think about and -- but has to be a political settlement that gives new order, legitimate si and that everybody can work with because it will be difficult even with that to establish stability and order and -- but without that, certainly would it would be very difficult. agree with you. >> the history of the middle east dictators moving to an amicable settlement is not particularly -- >> promising. >> yes. >> new precedents. >> i'm david johnson. i was -- your comment about needing to have a post liberation strategy -- and doing

an i.d. remediation program in ramadi so have some personal interest. you view this as something that is a u.s. government responsibility or something that should be turned over to your colleagues at the u.n. and told, have a nice day, and for dem -- dem mitt tri, a another of everyone has been spilled about the russian desire to maintain its base in syria and do you think it would be useful or necessary for the u.s. to say some things positive about the longevity of that, publicly or privately in order to facilitate a greater degree of cooperation in syria? thank you. >> first, i think we should accept the russians and shouldn't have a problem with the russians having access to facility.

on the first one, has to be a plan that the u.s. plays in but for the liberated areas, but shouldn't be exclusively ours. others should play as well, and could be orchestrated by us and russia if we do gather or by us and russia through the u.n. or by us and russia witch regional players -- with regional players, but i wouldn't want to take exclusive responsibility on behalf of the united states for the liberated areas. >> when. >> always the case in events like this as we approach the witching hour, hands keep going up. i have four people on the list, and what i'm going to tug is we -- suggest is we take two questions from the floor and then have you answer and then the last two, and we will wind it up. the first person i have now is rob. >> thank you, gentlemen.

fascinating presentations two brief comments -- >> your name? >> rob, the washington institute. first, do think it bears repeating -- everybody appropriately referred to the tragedy of syria the last five years that the assad regime is responsible for 90% of the deaths. there's a sense in the conversation that, oh, civil war, lots of bad guys. we should recognize there is massive imbalance in the responsibility for deaths which doesn't, of course, ease the burden we should have against isis, but in terms of looking at this case we should recognize that. second -- i guess related to this -- it's not self-evident why, as isis loses, if we are

going to posit that isis is losing -- why it is self-evident at this moment it becomes less of an opportunity to bring about the end of assad. one could make the argument that as isis was rising and we needed to focus more on the battle against territorial control, you can make the argument we needed to focus our energies there. but if indeed we have on the horizon the end of isis as a -- controlling territory in syria, then we deal with disparate groups that don't have inherent territorial control-wouldn't it logically make sense we can at least entertain going back to what our prime directive was when this start fled 2011 to address the fundamental governans issue which trigger erred this crisis, which is assad. hi question derives from a very

important comment that you made department mitt triis what john kerry don't bring to the table. thought you would say something else, which is what john kerry doesn't bring to the table is a legitimate fear on the part of the russians that the americans might do something bit it in -- about it in case the russians don't live up to their end have the bargain which the russianses have not done, i argue, without their commitments vis-a-vis syria. when you think about the next administration, you hinted at this briefly, do you recommend, would you recommend, that the next administration be willing to invest more in terms of men, material, resources, whatever to affect the strategic balance? i think it's reasonable to argue the russians affected the balance impressively through deployment relatively mod test deployment of fours.

is this a model for the united states, the next administration? should the u.s. by welling to invest to affect the strategic balance only if the goal is to compel a political outcome? i agree completely with the political outcome that you described as the appropriate objective. >> excellent question. hold it, guys. i want jacob to talk and then you can answer both. >> jacob from the national interests. when i go to these washington meetings, as we're here today, the meeting a few weeks ago, first popped into my head there, donald trump were at this meeting, what would he think of it? i think he would say we're missing the elephant in the room here, that we started and got

into a very abstract discussion of syria's future, but the question i think trump would want to have answer or the average american is, as this syria conflict grinds on, and you have these events in france and elsewhere, as isis is being -- obviously taking severe losses on the battlefield, are we going to confront more terrorism? are we going to become less safe at home, and is there anything we can do about it or are we just going to have to suck it up? is it going to be a constant litany of bloody events that take out 50 to 100 people that are not mass casualties?

>> seems rather similar questions. so, who would like to go first? >> let me address rob's question first. one thing, as long as isis is still there, the regime has its big talking points between us, the terrorists. let me say a couple other things. your question, rob, seems to presuppose -- what was your term -- prime directive prespouses regime changes, always going to be there, and i would respond, where exactly do u.s. interests lie? i think it's a lot easier to argue that when you have a beast like isis or like nusra and the things jacob raises, which i'll comment on in a moment, there are some pretty clear interests we share with the russians and a lot of others. they're very defensible, whereas the political coloration of the

regime from damascus does not rise to the same standards, and you make a point about the balance of deaths. well, the fighting started five years ago. it wasn't a matter of the assad regime, with all of its aspects -- dimitri gave us earlier history under assad terror, butchering people for the last 46 years. a war started and it's been a very destructive war as a result of insurrection. i have to make a couple other points. jacob asked, what would trump think about this? one thing that was going through my mind is what president obama would say in response to the drift of your question that, we're almost there with defeating isis so let's divert our attention to this regime change business. i think of all of the criticisms that's been lodged against obama

about iraq and the whole line of argue. we took our eye off the ball when then-isis, whatever -- al qaeda in iraq was almost defeated and we took our eye off the ball and now we have isis. seemsseems to me the same critim could be made against what you're saying here. and finally in terms of affecting strategic balance in favor of whom? who is the alternative? bash -- bashar al-assad or the five guys general austin recruited? and on jacob's question i have written repeatedly on the theme that we shouldn't equate terrorist threats, whether it's in washington or new york or nice or wherever, with bad guys controlling real estate on the ground in some distance sandy

place like syria, iraq, or afghanistan. it does not work that way. the bad news is even when the caliphate is no more and there isn't as many states, we'll still have a lot of this stuff. the only kind of offset going news is that insofar as as isis is seeing more unequivocally as a loser, maybe that's the way mr. trump would put it, they will attract fewer semi radicalized people to do terrorist acts in the name of isis. i have to balance that with some bad news again, that even if you don't have the isis name out there even if it loses its appeal as a brand it's had, you're still going to have all the other sources of radical behavior, and that guy who drove the truck in nice still might have driven the same truck. >> briefly, gentlemen. two more people to go.

>> on rob's question, i would say we need to have -- first we have to -- daesh and nusra, we have to accelerate -- the sooner they are defeated, their better, from my perspective. but for the table to be set for political legitimacy to come, i would -- i agree with you we have not played that card in a way that incentivizes the bashar side or the russians and rein iranians to bemer flexible, and therefore i would -- for example, favor taking down bashar's helicopters and planes if they flatten population centers. i would do that. i'd put that on the table.

i think then you will get in -- more cooperation because right now john kerry is in a relatively -- i'm sorry to say this -- not in a very good position. we have threatened a few times this is the last chance and if this doesn't happen. so his credibility is problematic right now. so on that -- on mr. trump, i would think that he probably would favor the first part, accelerate the move against the terrorists. the afghan model i mentioned and set a timetable for liberation of territories, within six months of my presidency, mosul, raqqa, awful these places will be done -- all these places will be done, and second is that you obviously -- the fight will go

on and have to review some of our domestic situation policies to see whether we're hardened enough. what do we do when we know someone is interested in daesh but hasn't done anything or she hasn't done anything yet. what do we do in that environment? on the issue of guns. what do we do on a whole range of other things. you move against but other things we don't do anything. i think we need to review what the steps are consistent with a constitution and laws. what else could be done, because this problem isn't going to go away anytime soon, even if we make progress on syria and progress in syria would be helpful. >> to answer your question, if we had all put more position -- moderate position which could identify and i would certainly be in favor of that but if we

are talking about groups associated with al qaeda being likely beneficiary, that for me would be much more problematic. i agree with ambassador on everything except our option to attack assad's forces, particularly his air force and his helicopters. >> when the threatens population centers. >> when you threaten whatever -- unless you don't threaten the united states and the american allies, because russians has 400 missiles which are antiaircraft missiles which there are, and russia made 300 missiles which have already provided to the assad regime there would not be particular consent about our motives. and that what the russians and the syrians would do, if we exercise this option, when you start thinking about what kind

of escalation it can start, whether it is something that we really want to experiment with, solicitation of assad, and there is nothing i can say positive about assad whatsoever, except that he so far has never attacked the united states, unlike isis. now, for me, it's not a preferred solution. a preferred solution for me is a different solution. a preferred solution is to look at our historical experience in the nixon, kissinger administration, outmaneuverrerred the russians in the middle east, and specifically in syria, making deals with local leaders, obviously with president assad, and the president of egypt and with president assad of syria, and if you start a process where all, i think, agreed is the right way to negotiating political progression in syria,

and that political process in syria will not work without very strong economic assistance which can be provided only by the united states and our allies in the gulf. that would provide us, if that process starts, with very powerful leverage, not only to avoid future attacks on civilians but reducing the russian role in the region in that kind of competition, one economic factor would be important,. >> we have two more questions. one here and one here. >> i'm an attorney in washington, dc, and my question in some ways is suggested by what dimitri just said. have been wondering, hoping for some insight on the internal political possibility of life

after assad, and that also invites the question about the possible role of the military, and i'm going to live it as an open ended question for some general insight and facts about what you see. >> thank you very much. the last question here. >> with defender of the national interests. my question actually was about the use of american military power, which i think ambassador already addressed and dimitri also somewhat addressed. we can probably skip that. >> okay. >> well, you will have an opportunity to ask -- answer any questions you feel like but particularly the issue about the military would be an interesting comment. do you have any insight into the syrian military. >> i don't have detailed insight but just make the general, not

very helpful response, that in the whole set of permutations of different forms of political settlement, even if it's just over a piece of syria, a piece of damascus or the heavily allied peace in the northwest that the military forces that have been fighting this war on assad's side can have like military forces in much of the rest of the region, a political role. it's not -- we don't think of our military that way but i think we have to think of it that way as far as anything approaching our political settlement in syria is concern, and i would just allude to my earlier comment that there have been ample indications of discontent among those doing the fighting with the leadership of assad so there's daylight there that could be used. >> do either you've have any

last minute communities? >> my question is less about the immediate stage, and political exploitation or -- i'm talking about something longer lasting, and some kind of equilibrium, something that can settle the area down for an appreciable period of time. >> 30 seconds. >> well, first i want to go back for a second to what dimitri said. that would be my last resort kind of option because you have to set the table for negotiation that incentivizes, and even in the -- as you correctly point out the nixon-kissinger maneuver there was military dimension to their maneuver, and i would also look at understanding with russia as another way to deal with the issue but i wouldn't exclude some u.s. -- yeah.

right. now, on the russian -- on the syrian military, i think depends what the settlement is. it may be that the settlement would have a significant central forces. it may include some -- as a confederation element, will have their own security forces to deal with, and in kurdistan and the federal constitution i helped negotiate, peshmerga was recognized as responsible for local security. i think we need a consensus politically both among iraqis and other key players for restoring military state, whether it be a large security force at the center or is it again a decentralized system and the security forces are -- maybe

there is a national army but a lot of local security forces to maintain order. >> thank you all very, very much. this has been an extremely, i think, informative and well-articulated session by our three speakers and by the commentators. i have to confess, though, that i leave here not particularly optimistic that there's going to be any resolution of any of these issues anytime soon, and, therefore, can confidently guarantee we'll be back in this room or another room with a new administration going over much the same ground in 2017. thank you all very much. >> thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations]