[applause] >> i want to join strobe in welcoming you all to this important discussion. is the united states losing china to russia? the title of the event is not intended to echo the american debate over who lost china, in the middle of the last century, but it does remind us of the fact that improvements in u.s.-china relations in the '70s and 80s provide many advantages between other states as they strive to win the cold war. but today the trilateral relationship between the united states, china and russia has profoundly changed. u.s. relations with china and russia both seem to be deteriorating. meanwhile, china and russia are

strengthening their strategic partnership, or even something or someone would call closer to an alliance. some strategic thinkers in the united states have began to worry about what they call an uneasy triangle. chinese analysts have adopted a new term called the new freaking them. [speaking in native tongue] to characterize the situation of today and try to extol its implication. now, are we entering a new cold war? what serves the best interests of each of these three powers? is it a risk for the united states to be on funding with both china and russia while confronting other challenges, such as isis and north korea?

unfortunately these important questions are not being adequately debated in the united states. even during this heated campaign season. part of the rhetoric should not overshadow they need for discourse. we have three excellent panelists to share with us their insights and perspectives to address these important questions. ambassador roy on my right is not only -- but he also specializes in soviet affairs and served in moscow as strobe they can come in the heat of the cold war. he served as ambassador to singapore and indonesia, the people's republic of china and also as a national, also as an assistant secretary of state for

intelligence and research. my colleague, fiona hill, director of the center on the united states and europe and the senior panel and the fellow programs at brookings. in 2006-2009 she served as national intelligence officer for russia and eurasia in the national intelligence council. echo off of the best selling book, mr. putin, she is one of the most sought after commentators on russian and eurasian affairs. last but certainly not least, yun sun is a senior associate with the east asia program at the simpson center. she's also fellow in the african growth initiative here at brookings. prior to these positions she was a china analyst for the

international isis group facing beijing. a research really covers a wide range of topics. she's really an expert on the china africa relations and african development and also east and southeast asia. and, finally, signed a russian relations. so welcome you all, three penniless. each of them will get 10 minute remarks followed by discussion that i will moderate. and then out of that we will open the floor for q&a. so we go with this order, ambassador. >> thank you. good morning. first to comment on the title. the united states never had china to lose. [laughter] if we did lose it, it was long ago before i joined the foreign service. i think it would be more

accurate to ask which country occupies the favored position in the triangular relationship. in the sense of having a better relationship with the other two. it was the united states for a long time, and now it's china. some people, the improvement in russian chinese relations to the collapse of the soviet union. but actually the gradual normalization of relations between the two countries began long before that. in the american embassy, which had just opened up in beijing in 1979 after the establishment of relations, we detected a warming trend in russian chinese relations back in 79 and 1980. it was reflected in the fact that border problems between the two countries that used to take months to resolve all of the

sudden it could be resolved in a day or two. and also the chinese have been concerned from the very beginning of the relationship dating from president nixon's visit to beijing in 1972 that the united states was trying to stand on chinese shoulders in order to get at the soviet union. even though we had a binding element in the u.s.-china relationship based on the common concern about the soviet threat, chinatown that we were using china against russia, and this gave them an incentive to want to have a better relationship with russia. it was the intervention of the russians in afghanistan that held back in the threat. but it resumed again as soon as the russians begin their withdrawal from afghanistan.

so we need a long-term perspective on the relationship in order to understand the dynamic that was going on. certainly the disintegration of the soviet union in 1991, which was occurring right at the moment when i was presented my credentials to the president of china, and we spent, our discussion was not on u.s.-china relations but what was going on in the soviet union, and both of our information came from cnn. because there were very dramatic developments taking place on the television screen. but the collapse of the soviet union and the reemergence of deng xiaoping pragmatism in china had removed the element of ideological rivalry from the relationship between beijing and moscow. from china standpoint the collapse of the soviet union was a very desirable development. obviously the russians had a so a different perspective on that development. but regardless of these contributing factors, the rails

is that russian chinese relations are probably the best in modern history. -- the realities. the two countries have a good reasons for strategic cooperation. they are both opposed to a world dominated by a sole superpower that isn't one of them. they both feel threatened by u.s. unilateralism, u.s. interventionism, and u.s. support for color revolutions. but they always both suspect the united states is out to change the political system in the countries in ways that we prefer that they did not appreciate. their economies are complementary. russia is a supplier of military goods, energy and raw materials, and china as a supplier of capital, consumer goods and equipment. they have a common interest in not having central asian become a breeding ground for terrorism.

so these common factors are sufficient to hold in check russia's strategic insecurities caused by the rapid rise of china operate at the very moment when russia was declining as a major power because of the disintegration of the soviet union. another factor is these common interests hold in check china's latent ambitions to consolidated position in central asia, south asia and the middle east. neither country sees its interest as served by forming a strategic alliance against the united states. the statistics speak for themselves. although the sino-russian trade has increased 20 fold over the last 25 years, reaching a level of $100 billion in 2014, the reality is that u.s.-china trade is about six times larger.

china doesn't forget that. in other words, the economic relationship with the united states is fundamentally more important to china than the one with russia. chinese investment is pouring into rush and there's essentially no reverse investment from russia. so that the hundreds of billions of dollars of foreign direct investment in china that has speed along its economic develop it doesn't come from russia, it comes from the united states and western countries and neighbors of china. until w. came -- the ukraine crisis in 2014, i think you could accurately characterize russian chinese relations as strong, healthy and friendly. this was reflected in public opinion polling in both countries which was very different from the period when i served in moscow, when russians were i to be suspicious of the chinese.

but the chinese consistently rated russia as the country toward which had the least suspicions. the united states, japan, even south korea ranked lower in chinese perceptions. you had considerable easing of the public attitudes in russia or china but not to the degree that was taking place on the chinese side. but after the ukraine crisis, i would characterize the relations as friendly, close, but unhealthy. because russia has been forced uncomfortably close to russia through china because of the confrontation with nato over the ukraine issue. as a result russia now has to go along with chinese initiatives that russians are inherently concerned about and suspicious of.

this is not a sufficient factor to undermine the strong ties based on their strategic interest in not having a world dominated i've interventionist united states. but it means that this is not a relationship in which is an equal sense of mutual benefit emerging from the relationship. so the ukrainian development is a very important factor in the bilateral relationship. for example, the russians were very suspicious of china's drive in central asia and most recently reflected in the one belt-one road initiative. and it was in 2014 that they ended up endorsing the initiative, and that's after the ukraine crisis had emerged as a russian official commented privately to me, we had no

choice but to go along with the initiative. so that reflects the change in the relationship. former deputy foreign minister of china had an article in the fort affairs magazine in january or february of this year. it provides a pretty good description of relations between china and russia. noting both the positive element and the underlying concerns on each side. she pointed out for example, that she called it the relationship as, let me use the right terminology. she called it a stable strategic partnership, not a marriage of convenience. complex, sturdy and deeply rooted. okay, that sounds pretty good.

but she said the changes in international relations since the end of the cold war have brought the two countries closer together. that is self-employed chinese way of saying that you his behavior since the end of the cold war has driven the two countries closer together. at the same time she acknowledged that china has produced, china's rise has produced discomfort among some in russia. and in discussing that issue she noted the following points. there's still talk and russia of the china threat. at 2008 poll by russia's public opinion foundation showed that around 60% of russians were concerned that chinese migration to russia's far eastern border areas would threaten russia's territorial integrity. 41% of russians believe a stronger china would harm russia's interests. russians are worried that china's competing for influence in their neighborhoods. i've mentioned the hesitant in

supporting the silk road economic belt initiative, but on the chinese side former foreign minister, deputy prime minister fu ying note as well, some chinese continue to nurse for grievances regarding russia. despite the formal resolution of their border disputes which have been settled by both sides, with compromise on territorial issues, chinese commentators sometimes make critical references to the nearly 600,000 square miles of chinese territory that is ours russia annexed in the late 19th century. so there is no question that china was unhappy with the russian behavior in the ukraine. while china stopped short of direct criticism, fu ying in her article noted that the foreign ministry spokesman, spokesperson in beijing spoke up saying that

ukraine's independent sovereignty and territorial integrity should be respected. this was after russia had already separated off crimea and joined back into the russian federation. this from china standpoint was a horrible precedent. because when he was the president in taiwan, he had come up with the ideas of holding referenda on taiwan, on u.n. membership for taiwan and other sensitive issues, and beijing was strongly opposed to using such referenda which is viewed as a sort of dr. witt of trying to stimulate into pendants appointed thinking in taiwan. and here is russia using a referendum in crimea to separate territory that russia had formally recognized as part of the ukraine and don't get back together with russia.

so this was a bad precedent. secondly, the russian armed intervention in the eastern part of the ukraine to prevent key of from restoring central control over its eastern territory brought to mind the u.s. cia backed intervention in tibet during the early stages of the cold war, and china's nightmare is that foreign powers would try to intervene inside china and export separatists sentiments in areas such as tibet. so in other words, while china didn't formally criticized russia over its behavior, it clearly had very deep reservations about having these types of international precedents established. so let me conclude just with a brief comment. when i was attending a trilateral conference among

u.s., russians and chinese shortly after the ukraine intervention, and the chinese who had been very circumspect before and commenting negatively on russian behavior, and generally treating the sino-russian relationship is all sweetness and light, at the very opening of the conference one of the chinese look at the russians and said, your actions in ukraine have implications for east asia. this was a way of reminding the russians that they were behaving in a way that affect the chinese interests in a negative way. having sat in on numerous conversations with both russian leaders, because of my relationship with dr. kissinger, high level o russian leaders dot meet with me independently, have also been in numerous meetings with high level chinese officials because of my status as a former u.s. ambassador or

an activist and boucher and partly because of my relationship with dr. kissinger. i have not been in relation with the russian leader to which they have not expressed concerns about china. and i've not heard a single statement since the collapse of the soviet union from any senior chinese official expressing strategic concern about china. so that tells you something about the way the relationship has changed. it's a good, close relationship based on their import strategic interests between the two countries. but from china standpoint it's the result of positive developments that have strengthened china's position in the bilateral relationship. and from russia's position, china is acting as a good friend in need, but they still see china's rise as posing a strategic challenge for russia that they are deeply concerned about. thank you plustek. >> fascinating. [applause] >> thank you.

very copperheads and analytical account and we'l we will go baco some other excellent points. fiona? >> that was so copperheads and that i think we could go out for coffee actually. >> you don't have to go out. >> we are very privileged to have ambassador roy here. as you can your from his tour de force it often takes a back so long in this relationship, we couldn't be apart from stroke, have a better interlocutor and opening presentation for this. as i was sitting listening to them, i also wondered why we didn't call the title losing russia to china? as you scope out the events of this decade dating back to the 1960s and taking us through the various efforts of russia and china to engage with each come it became very clear that

we been of such dramatically different trajectories in these relationships. the u.s. and china obviously having a rather difficult relationship but a very carefully managed one at this juncture. at least we hope so. and russia and the united states now going almost full circle in 30 years. you mentioned the efforts of the 1980s of china and the soviet union to work out the relationships. if we think back to that period, of course gorbachev had some bad timing in his visit to china with tiananmen square in 1989, but the juncture of 1989 looked quite hopeful for u.s. and soviet relationship the we seem to be on a very different path from where we would expect ourselves to be now. we do have this strong juxtaposition but i think we also, we could've had this title, is the united states losing russia to china, or did we already lose it?

as you mentioned this is the, relationship between russia and china that has a strong strategic elements and i think adequately outlined all of this. we see china and russia having very few differences in international organizations. they both have very similar perspective on the united nations. both very careful about the positions they hold in the u.n. security council, a great deal of coordination in positions there isn't a third might be some differences. both of them have taken advantage of the bricks organization and setting themselves as leading players in that can also the g20 and many of the organizations. there's the shanghai cooperation position that china and russia set together that has aspirations for a larger role in international affairs. you didn't mention that but it does come out about the relationship the two of them up in trying to forge into neighbors in central asia.

i think one issue we should bear in mind although we very much focused on this strategic triangle relationships, but we're not in the nixon era anymore. the recent presidential -- ivan fong like an it would lsaps all of reporting and the convention. we found nixon raised and many other different perspectives, not just the form of nixon to china that you've raised. but this is a much more complex world that we are in. this is not just a relationship among u.s., china and russia. any other place and i think he also started to bring that out in your presentation. the rise of china especially economically since 2010 against the backdrop of the global economic and financial crisis, and the eurozone crisis has changed everybody calculations. if we start looking for a few both in the asia-pacific region

and also in europe you see everybody is factoring china and everybody is factoring china and india get away. in many cases sometimes to russia's detriment. it's not just an issue for russia perceives its relationship with the united states against the backdrop of the relationship with china but our russia, the united states and other countries are managing their own complex relationships and trying to figure out also pivot toward asia and china. if we look at the asia-pacific, japan is also in the process of trying to figure out how it balances its relations with russia and also china. russia has proposed to the japanese behind the scenes the creation of a new asia-pacific security arrangement. many of you will be very well aware that prime minister abe of japan has been very eager and improve the relationship with russia at it is a couple of major points that are obstacles in that relationship.

both of them are interrelated in fact that one is the fact japan and russia have yet to conclude a peace treaty since world war ii because largely someone block of a territorial dispute over what the japanese call the northern territories and what russia calls the islands that were seized several of the islands in the southern part, seized by the soviet union in the closing days of world war ii. there's been many japanese attempts and russian attempts to resolve this issue. we are in another phase of this which is driven by external factors. the japanese are very much concerned about what they now see as an existential threat and the worsening of the relations with china, and opened of russia as a counterbalance. rush would also like to counterbalance the united states in the asia-pacific but also to china in the future. as you've already said, there are worries and concerns that russia has not just in its shared neighborhood in central

asia but also in the asia-pacific region. in 2013 the russians and chinese engaged in some naval maneuvers which have been repeated on a number of locations and get ther condition naval maneuvers and ameritrade. after the maneuvers in the asia-pacific region, a chinese warships to a scenic route back not directly back to base and went over the top of japan through the sea and scared the be jesus out of the russians and the japanese. you can see after that point in 2013 the chinese were quite open about this. they had not notified the russians about that was the chosen wrote on. it's also international waters but you can imagine going north to go back to japan rather than going north to go back to china and around japan instead of going south got some attention. we saw an uptick in russian

interest in closer relations with japan. we can see there's a lot of complexity in this relationship. china also launched an expeditionary trip by one of its massive icebreakers into the arctic again go into international waters but very close to russian territory which is close to the arctic as moche dashed as most of russia lies within the arctic. the russians were quick to try to close up international waters to present perhaps an expeditionary trip by chinese military vessels into those waters. so which time you see a very quiet every significant reduction from the russians reflecting the concerns that you raised in your introduction. so that's the asia-pacific. quite a lot of complexity there. rush and china not just thinking about the relationship of the united states as a player, not just what happens in korea and both the relations with the

north and the south of the, factored in. you talked about eurasia and central asia. it's also in europe as you rightly mentioned, ambassador roy. there's been a turning point in time and russia's relationship over ukraine that china has made it clear quite frequently that it doesn't always like the activities and behavior of russia and the european space. not only to china make its displeasure felt over crimea in 2014 but during an earlier war in the broader region with georgia in 2008, you may recall that russia made the step to recognize the independence of the two secessionist territories of georgia, and china most notably did not. and, in fact, china provided cover later in 2008 for the central asian to also resist recognizing the independent

states. it was a meeting at the shanghai cooperation organization in central asia with considerable pressure on the central asian states at that point to also recognize independence of the states. at that summit, the shanghai cooperation organization, the central asian managed to resist and then quickly through doing this with the support of china behind the scenes. so again there's complexity. there's also been from the russian port of you a bit of an unseemly rush like european countries both east, western european countries, the united kingdom, france, germany, serbia, greece, l. los of countries to sign onto chinese infrastructure initiative and to seek chinese funding through the asian infrastructure investment bank for high-speed rail and road linkages. .. fiona

>> an environment and i think it as a much larger problem and we are trying to really figure out what is happening here. [applause] >> thank you. thank you so much for putting the relationship in broader,

political readings and looking at the various countries and when you measure the title i cannot help but laugh but when we send it to you, but now i am glad you mentioned it. >> i am just glad i had something to say. and leaning forward, different countries have multiple perspectives on that issue. so we use that to try to convey information. >> thank you very much. it is such a great honor to be on the same panel with distinguished guests. i cannot claim the expertise you

credited me for. i consider my job to understand the logic of foreign policy for developing countries. so i will provide what i understand as china's perspective of the recent developments in the russia-shcha relations. western observes see an emerging multi culture alliance aimed at changing the existing international order or they would dismiss the intimacy as needing expediencey. neither reflect the relationship.

in china it is the converging of national interest despite the presence of competitive elements. at least from the chinese perspective they partnership with other alliances or alignment with other alliance and believe it is possible and could be doable especially if china and russia agree their overlapping strategic interests outweigh the diverging ones. china russia relations have been in talks since 2013. he and russian president have met 17 times since early 2013 in private and various other meetings in which the two

countries have partnerships and that include the brits and g-20. so they are seeing the world through similar lens and reach similar conclusions about their country's strategic position in the international system. they both believe their countries are in an advantage via the united states putting the belief that russia's brief power ambitions are being undermined by the west and he tried to reassert moscow's interests in the region. on the other hand, china sees the u.s. rebalancing to asia as the denial of china's specific space in the region and access to western pacifics and at worst an attempt to campaign china. >> the ukraine crisis provided

additional momental for closer ties. for china, the crisis forced the united states to refocus some of the attention back to europe from asia. they have more leverage via russia as russia's vulnerability and isolation increw -- increases. in addition, moscow has become at least seem s to become more willing to cooperate in sectors that rerestristricted. the two sides confirmed the progress they have made and will make in the eastern route of russia which is expected to become operational in 2018.

russia's largest crude oil producer also reached several deals with chinese companies including signing of 20% stake of this unit to beijing and 40% stake of this eastern petro chemicals to can china and a joint development in russia's far east of a petro chemical plant. russia signed the agreement with the aero space corporation believing the pave the ground of the rd-180 bucket sales to china. the regional dynamics have made moscow more open-minded and accept china's economic

initiative across central asia. china understand in the early days of the initiative, they had a strong suspicion but nevertheless given the initiative by the central asian countries and the possibility of benefits it could bring to russia, russia seems to be more open minded and interested in what russia can gain from the initiative especially in terms of in infrastructure development. we know they have committed part of the financing for the moscow high-speed railway. if success, the project could mark the beginning of a new page of russian infrastructure

corporations. it is also to connect and integrate with your community in order to prevent exclusive or chinese dominance. it is nothing new for china there are certains about russia in china and vice vers because it a peril of location. the chinese will remember however much we dislike the united states it is russia to took most of our loss of territory. similarly in russia, there are voices warnings against china's territorial ambition that lead us to chinese migration. putting nationalism in china is perceived to be aimed at the west and at china. some chinese observers

spectilate that is the reason why russia is reluctant to sell core technology to cline china and open up the economy to chinese trade and investment and allow for more chinese participation in the russian parties. within south and southeast asia china is suspicious of countries like india and vietnam. they believe the interest in lower prices of the energy resources and interests in stakes of oil and gas assets in russia differ from that of moscow. the repeated hiccups are an example of this conflict. china's economic slowdown for american and the diverse --

energy -- sources of gas from central asia china is hoping to have a better negotiation about a price for a measure of goods and join the development in russia but this is not necessarily what russia is interested in. nevertheless, the chinese continue to make nice with russia and as they have at least acknowledged we have worked close with russia. there are many concrete benefits and factors have been managed but not eliminated. they can be managed though. this is particular two. when china feels they are dealing from a position of strength and a couple points as the chinese analysts like to make, including one with a 3,000 mile long border, russia has the

more impact over chinese's immediate security. this was emphasized by the madam as well. of all countries, russia shares china's strategic interest the most. they have foreign policy issues and aspirations that make them targets of the united states fl both feel their strategic spaces are being suppressed by washington so therefore china and russia share an interest in quote quote maintaining the balance in the international politics and creating a more just international order. it is also apparently poingant for the united states. among all powers, russia and

china both have similar ideology. both reject western and military intervention, there is common ground for consensus. the fourth point is that russia and china are specifically complimentary for each other. russia, in terms of foreign policy style, the chinese feel that russia is good at confrontation while the chinese are good at maneuvering. one is exporter and one is importer. one has natural resources, the other has the money and the cash. the last point about the border, despite disagreements or complaints inside the chinese policy community from time to time, the consensus in china is the border has been settled for decades so no one should realistically to reclaim what

was given to russia years ago because that case has been closed. as russia and china survey their geographical landscape there is a lot to look into. however, history caught them the alliance and the former relationship damaged both sides wisdom of a similar arrangement. that doesn't mean russia and china will not align issues on thick things of common interest. it will help the security and economics of china and russia and it is a benefit to maintain balance of the world order. a china and russia that are against the west and maintain a distance from each other would be more effective than an alliance relationship. last but not least, a major

weekness of china and russia ties lie in their economic relations which is fragile and influenced by external factors. another trade with russia only marks the total trade. last year this bilateral job rate jumped by 20%. this trend continues this year. during the first three months of the year, the commodity trade dropped by 12%. the drop of natural resourceess, the depreciation of the russian currency and the chinese economic slowdown' relate to the

trade relations. i will stop there. thank you very much. [applause] >> another excellent presentation and you articulate so wonderfully. you have your own view on that and i am going to ask you later on. now we enter the question period. i will first offer a general question for all of you and then i will have a question for each of you. general question is do you see the emerging of a new cold war? a triangular relationship

managed in a more cooperative way in a conflicting manner? both ambassadors, especially her article, in that article show wrote i quote from the chinese perspective the relationship should not be considered a game in which two players go against a third. do you think that her description is feasible? these are the general questions to each and every one of you. who would like to begin? >> i think it is feasible. and quite frankly i think that we undermine our diplomacy when we try to think or behave as though as we try to manipulate

into a triangle relationship. we have reasons with russia and china to predict a cold war but i am not up on the cold war but i spent years as a diplomat during much of the cold war serving in places like beijing and russia. the tenure of the relationship with china is show different from the tenor of our relationship with russia and the soviet union during the cold war that i shutter when people talk about a new cold wear in u.s.-china relations. russia never had hundreds of thousands of its best and brightest students flooding our university. at that point, you cannot go to

china without encounter u.s u.s.-educated people at the top levels of the communist party, at the top levels of the universities, at the top levels of the business community. it is a different relationship. and let's not forget until recently we were getting along fine with russia. president bush in the early stages of the administration, as you recall, looked into putin's eye and thought this was somebody we could get along with. when we decided to intervene in afghanistan, russia facilitated our hostile actions as opposed to opposing. at the moment we are inclined to demonize putin and one can list everything there but i would like to read the federalist papers and in federalist 63,

james madison said one of the reasons to pay attention to other countries is because it is a corrective to when you are being caught up in domestic passions over a particular issue and it is wise to look at the views of the objective external world in order to control your passions. it is worth bearing in mind that three of the leaders who get along swimmingly with putin are prime minister of japan, the leader of china and the president of south korea. so if we can't get along with putin, let's bear in mind, that countries with whom we have close relationships, including alliance relationships, do not find him a type of person they can't deal with. that doesn't mean we don't have serious differences with russia but it means we should not attr attribute the differences to the

personality of the leader of russia who has, all of countries involved in the ukrainian crisis, the highest level of poplar support were the position he has taken as opposed to any of the other countries, including the united states. so i consider this is an issue where skillful diplomacy and steers us away from a cold war relationship with russia or beijing and i think that we would greatly benefit if we could get ourselves back into that favorable position in the triangular relationship which we occupied for several decades. >> thank you so much. >> well i think this underscores why we benefited so much from your diplomacy in the past and perhaps we might be able to learn a thing or two in moving forward from because i couldn't

underscore enough the importance of thinking about the factors at play and things in a broader perspective looking forward. this is a very different dynamic as we have outlined from the cold war. this isn't a struggle over ideology. i think as you outlined from the chinese perspective there is not much ideology at play. it is a different perspective on running the country and engaging on foreign policy but we have to manage the differences in perspective here and that is the art of diplomacy. i like what youdz about china and russia maintaining distances from each other. acknowledging of their differences in their own perspective but maintaining that distance at the same time they aligned. and i think that should be a lesson to us. we are not going to be particularly close either to china or russia for a variety of

different reasons. we have a much closer relationship with china as ambassador roy outlined in terms of people-to-people contacts. it isn't based just on the size. there is a convergence of economic interests. with russia, we have always had a difficult relationship. we have sat down in many ways on this and i don't want to go into this in too much detail but we don't have that bases of deeper trade, the commodity driven nature of the russian economy is similar to ours in many respects, and we don't have the same interest in trading with russia as we do with china and others. people to people ties have been

tenious. people in the united states don't favor a relationship. we have a lot of russians work in the united states but we don't have the same numbers of americans in russia in the same way now that we have students and business people going to china. we tend to get obsessed with the strategic elements of the relationship. perhaps we could take a leaf from china and think about different ways to have a relationship with china. one of our presidents running has a different perspective traditionally about sharing those relationships which would involve changing the alliance structure in the asian pacific in particular and not just to mention in europement but none the less it might be an opportunity to think fresh. if we are concerned about

getting into a new cold war relationship, which i agree is avoidable, then perhaps this is the time to start thinking about how we might change that. and bearing in mind there are different ways. both with russia and china in the asian pacific are different. so i could not agree more with the importance of thinking about this differently and avoiding that scenario. >> i will be very brief i agree completely are ambassador roy and fiona but i want to make three points. the first point is we all say we are against the cold war thinking but the cold war style thinking is prevalent in our countries. we hear, for example, the

chinese government and the chinese analysts always claim that we should be eliminating the cold war thinking in international relations. but when they say that, you can use to deal with other powers. so there is a factor of their own belief in such judgments. i don't think it is cold war or ideolo ideolo ideology driven. the confrontation is not at the same level of the cold war and your articles and publications argue this is important and the two countries can't afford to get into a confrontation or another cold war scenario.

the engagement by the united states and the dialogue is open and we have ambassador roy among many others and those people manage the direction of the bilateral relations. we know the chinese leader proposed new power relations since assuming office in 2013. but there is this idea that nee relations between schichina and russia because the two countries maintain disagreements and keep their differences and prioritize the suit of cooperation on practical matters. so there is a calling in the

ar articulation that the united states should learn from that and deal with russia in a similar matter. but china and russia do see a common threat, the united states, and the u.s. doesn't have the same luxury on issues of principle matters. so whether that is applicable in the case of the united states remains to be seen. >> thank you. now for time concern one question for you each. the question for the ambassador is you mentioned about putin how important has the personal relationship between putin been to the current final russia relationship? and these two leaders are similar some think. what, in your reason, are the major differences between putin

and the sitting king? and what is the differences mean for the united states and our policy toward these two countries? >> you want me to answer this? in one or two minutes? i think that as i outlined in my opening remarks, i didn't base analysis on personality but on what i considered the underlying strategic factors that were affecting relations among all parts of the triangular relationship. you don't have an option to pick the leaders that other countries end up with. it is nice if you liked them and you find them easy to deal with but if you don't like them and

don't find them easy to deal with you still have to deal with them. president nixon didn't go to beijing because he liked chairman mao and found him easy to deal with. you will discover it wasn't an easy relationship but the president thought it was in the national interest of the united states in order to have a better relationship. he dealt with the chairman on hat bases. i think both president putin and the king are reflecting the national interests of their particular countries in dealing with each other. i think both of them recognize that they are leaders who face domestic issues they have to deal with and importance

convergence so i think they respect each other as leaders. but i don't think it is the chem stree that caused the change in relations. i think to a significant degree it is u.s. behavior that caused these two countries to find there are common interests that have created this improved situation in the bilateral relationship between the two countries despite the imbalances between the two countries and the inequality of the suspicions that exist on each side in the relationship. >> and any major differences between them? >> yes. i think that ping did not approve of putin's behavior in ukraine.

it is very clear. china has concerns that were adversely affected by having the president of using a referendum and destroy a country that they recognized before. china is sensitive about these factors and it is fact we have not mentioned. the areas where china needs action the united states is more of an important player than russia. in other words, our relationship with russia is not going to solve the taiwan problem in the way beijing would like favorable on and china is behaving in the south china sea in a way that russia cannot be entirely supportive because russia wants to have the good relationship with the vietnam.

the final border clash in 1979 was a function of the japanese having thrown out the china leaning in cambodia and vietnam leaning and the fact that vietnam and the soviet union concluded a defense agreement that ping thought was a threat to china's interest and wanted to teach vietnam a lesson. so that was the closeness of the soviet japanese relationship at the time that was a contributing factor to the border clash between china and vietnam. these are considerations you have to bear in mind as background factors in the relationship. >> my question for fiona, both you and the ambassador mentioned the education changes and the impact to people's diplomacy. i want to follow up with a specific question. before that, let me share with

you some data and currently there are about 20,000 chinese students studying in russia while over 300,000 are studying in the united states. fewer than 5,000 russian students study in the united states and only 138 u.s. undergrad and grad students study in russia. about 14,000 u.s. students study in china in the same year. based on my research the current and upcoming chinese leaders assumed russia to the united states and and with the exception of a few generals study in russia. here is my question: is that

really showing our title is stressed and we have much stronger ties with china than russia because of the impact of this strong bond with foreign students and exchanges? the later question is from russia's perspective, or putin's perspective, with this number, can he really trust the chinese or the chinese leader? what does it mean for our policy? >> this is a very multi ended questions. let's start with the practical bases. the language study is in many respects utilitarian. when you are studying a language it is not just for the importance of getting across a

cultural understanding but it is often pragmatic reasons. i can see a lot of younger people in the audience. you have probably been thinking about these questions. russians, back in the 1980s, when russia was in a demand, the united king joined in, and it was in the news. i didn't expect i would have a job studying russians but i am encouraging my younger daughter to study chinese and spanish at the moment. so chinese and spanish are global languages but not particular for the united states an awful lot of jobs -- i am thinking she is going to be on a panel in 20 years applying china's spin or latin america but i imagine more of an opportunity to get a job. and i think that is what a lot of people are thinking about when they make these decisions.

a relatively small number of russian students are here but there are an awful lot of russian immigrants in the united states and a lot of russian workers who have learned english back at home in russia where english is very well studied but extraordinarily hard. i was always amazed at how well the soviet students i met spoke english and there are tens of thousands of russians working in the united states especially in silicone valley. there are lots of other places that russians who speak english can go and use their english not just the united states because english has become a global language. so that is the motivation for chinese studying in the united states as well. it is not just about learning about the united states but it is about being in a global marketplace. the brexit in europe and

everyone goes back to speaking french as some of my french colleagues suggested we will have a lot of chinese students rushing out and retooling another language. i think of course also providing a bases for shared economic understanding. i don't think that explains everything completely. i do think that the economic relationships are more dramatic. i think if you reduce the interest in the united states has been more pragmatic about the relationship with russia. as we see less of a necessity for figuring out different, more creative ways about managing this, europeans by contrast don't have that luxury as some mentioned about the united states having to make different calculations. they also have the power of

location and the closeness to russia. they have more people-to-people and russian students study in europe more, often in english speaking environments and they have to manage that relationship differently. so i talked about the difficulties in that relationship and the various situations. there is one sort of key elements where president putin is different from many of the world leaders and the fact that it is the title of the book i worked on, putin is a career intelligence officer. he is deeply suspicious of everybody. he admits this. he said i am a spy and once a spy always a spy. i don't trust people. there is a very high bias about this.

none the less, he will always be suspicious of all of the relationships and always wanting to check and make sure no one is trying to out-maneuver him. he wants to hedge and keep options open. the world is deep in concern. with the united states, we remain, for now, the main opponent. we have considerable concerns about russia just like the chinese do. the crisis in ukraine and the n annexation of ukraine has been a huge problem. the united states is concerned about these violations of international order. in one area, it is one area we have a common perspective but perhaps for different reasons with china. i think as we think about these relationships for the future

again, we have to think about yes, some different perspectives of the personalities but also how we factor in the relationships and don't just see them in this bilateral arrangement. each time we have to think about these broader calculations and given the united states role it is incumbant upon us. >> excellent. last question, you provide an overp overall assessment about how china sees russia but in what ways are various groups like chinese leaders, public interests, the military, general public, perceive russia? do you think they perceive in

the same way? or very much divided? this divide is determined why what factors? pro-u.s.? or kind of the more anti-u.s.? or something else. could you you go a little specific to talk about the specific -- how the chinese feel on these issues and the dynamic of the views in china. >> i will try. we think the policy community, i agree ambassador roy and fiona, that the disagreements seem to be local. it is a personal preference and historical context. it is in the interest of china to align interest with russia but they acknowledge there is no eternal fence or enemies only eternal and perpetual national interest. at this moment, it is in china's

interest to work with russia and they will do so. maybe in the future when the conditions change, i don't think they have a problem changing the nature of that relationship either. it is just the completions have not arrived yet. we think the public opinion is a little more diverse than this context among the policy folks. the public seems to be hanging on to the historical issues more. public scule scholars in china talk about the territorial loss to russia historically and there are nationaly -- nationalists who argue russia should be more open minded on opening the energy sector. and they feel also that russia should be more tolerant in this

bilateral relation given the strategic advantage. we think the chinese public opinion, there is this tremendous admiration that they feel the russian leader has achieved what the chinese leaders have failed to achieve in the international politics which is respect and the ability to assert the nation's position and protect the nation's interest. so, there are callings for chinese leaders to learn from putin which i am sure you know. russia has been able to argue with that without getting too severe consequences so chinese

should learn from them. the chinese opinion about russia is different than the policy coming to perspective. >> thank you very much. now the floor is open. first identify yourself please limit your question to one question. thoroughly i refer to what they call the triangle side. it is really based on peace. >> thank you. gill roseman, my question is about the dismissal of ideology as a factor. it is not the old communist ideology but don't we need to think about issues of national identity and in the chinese's

response to ukraine even so much of the chinese writings talk about the u.s.' responsibility, and the color revolution and this was an identity challenge to russia and they defend russia in terms of how it had to respond to the u.s. the second part of this really is despite last year's down turn in final russian relations in terms of great russian disappointment with a lack of investment and high hopes of 2014 being dashed by how little actually happened, for instance in bringing together the silk road, hasn't something happened more in this year? for instance the reaction to south china sea ruling and the reaction to the thad deployment decision? aren't we seeing

>> there is very much a strong view the united states has been driving many of the up surge and uptick in insurgency. the color revolutions and the arab springs are not the case here. we could have done a lot more getting back to the questions

posed earlier and the responses by ambassador roy in managing those perception. the color revolutions in georgia and ukraine in 2000 there were instances of u.s.-foreign policy professionals laying tenses. i remember thinking this was a stupid rule and the united states doesn't have a role in this and we are not in the business of exploiting the process. we did ourselves a disservice in helping foster the idea we played a role in this and haven't been quick to address the misperceptions. i think we have to be better in political communication. we have a real problem in our own hands and don't manage these issues especially well. it is a challenge.

because of what happens in the united states, we will be seeing this for a heck of a long time. i think we will have a serious challenge in dealing with the issues head-on. it will take diplomacy and it is going to be difficult. i think it is a factor in the political screen. >> you can also tell to whom this question is addressed, please. >> thank you. i am with chinese news agency of hong kong. my question is for ambassador roy. in the past two weeks, we have seen a lot of meetings between the u.s. and china. you know susan rice is in beijing right now. and also, we see both sides are

trying to lower the tensions because of the south china sea. considering the g-20 summit will be held very soon and in which president obama and president putin will be participate. how would you expect the triangle relations to involve after the g-20 summit? china will see the summit as the bigger role in the international agreement. and secondly do you expect the u.s.-china high level exchange mechanisms will continue if donald trump is elected? thank you. >> it is a good question. the first part.

it is very easy to see that china and the united states have very difficult issues we need to manage in the bilateral relationships. issues that if mismanaged could push our relationship in a negative direction rather than positive. certainly the south china sea is one of them because it involves territorial issues and territorial issues are always sensitive between sovereign states. at the same time, our mechanisms for dialogue with china are the best we have ever had. we have frequent, not as frequent as putin and jinping

have, but they will spend hours in discussion so you can get beneath the surface of issues and not run through talking points. we just had operations over in china and i can't believe that they didn't discuss the south china sea and have exchange on it. the channels for communication between china and the united states are wide open and we are utilizing them. i think this is the most effective way to try to deal with the full range of issues in u.s.-china relations because every time our presidents get together they issue a joint statement talking about 50-plus

areas of cooperation between the two countries none of which get the highest b bit of attention because all of the focus is on big issues such as the south china sea or the deployment in south korea. my sense is both countries are serious in wanting to manage the relationship in the way that will not let it drift toward a hostile relationship and that is the way it should be. as for the second part of your question, i defer to my colleague. it is the job of the chinese embassy to analyze the domestic process not omine. >> yes, i think we are all trying to avoid getting into a presidential campaign. i think that overall these broader factors are very important. whoever is elected president

here in the united states these are how the choices are being to be framed by these factors. i think just one very quick point on the channels, i think this is really where there is a major difference between the relationship between the united states and china and in the united states and russia which is we simply don't have the channels in the relationship with russia. part of that is because russia is a bit of a one-man show. it is a bit difficult to be purely a one-man show in china because of the size of the body and the large presence of the communist party in china. i guess putin is a more populus figure but that pails in comparison with what happened

particularly since 2012 with the put theputhe n presidency. when putin came back for the third period it made politics more about him. we have difficulties in structuring that relationship. the reset was about the different layers and structures setup to manage the relationship. it wasn't just about the two men on the top. given the nature of the russian relationship, it is unlikely president obama and president clinton will have the same frequency of meetings. there is less to talk about and less difficult terms to talk about. who wants to be sitting in an environment where all you are doing is -- whereas, ambassador roy is saying there is more to talk about between him and

obama. this is one issue moving forward about how you create new mechanisms and channels so that russia-u.s. relationship can grow. and the china-russian relationship doesn't always have this either. it is still a top heat issues as well. >> this young lady right here. >> thank you. last friday, the democratic national convention, their internal e-mails were leaked with made public. some people say this was probably supported by putin because it was published by the russian hackers. what do you think of this possibility? >> we waited so long for your

question. >> well, so, unfortunately, i have been spending so much time reading the democratic national convention e-mails i cannot get to my own. i am looking forward to my e-mails being wikileaks so others can respond. we frankly don't know who hacked the dnc files but strong suspicion is it is russia because along with china the russians have the strongest capabilities, well the united states, of being able to undertake this kind of operation. even if it does prove and the fbi and others are looking into this, there has been an awful lot of inquiry. this isn't the first news of the hack.

this took place several months ago. we had one leak related to the trump campaign. the timing is not accidental, let's say by wikileaks, or anyone else to release concern caches of information. this was timed for this release to the high points of the convention where bernie sanders was going to be appearing because of the e-mails that were leaked were very much related to his campaign experience. so, again, it is not old news, there is an awful lot of investigative reporting to find the different groups behind this. there is strong suspicion they are directly related to russian intelligence, different parts of russian intep russi russian intelligence but there is no definitive proof. the question is if it is russian intelligence why would they do

this and this goes back to the comment of russia and putin and the world few is they expressed fears of being in competition with the united states. and back to the question about the perception of color revolutions. there is a feeling the united states tries to influence domestic palmacy and weakness and -- policy -- and might be interested in the business of regime change. ... between the u.s. government officials during the ukraine crisis, there was a telephone conversation between a state department official and the u.s. ambassador to ukraine that was put on youtube. a very sensitive moment in that

crisis. that created a great deal of controversy. suspicion it was the russians. in many respects we shouldn't be surprised because when the russian perspective, i can president putin is a mission of the fact he was a kgb officer. he takes great pride in russian intelligence. you might remember when the story broke the russian sleeper agents, the infamous and a chaplain who became somewhat of a media darling, although glamorous young woman was revealed to be a russian spy, putin met with of all publicly when they return. fewest osha and the fact, a great deal of disappointment i imagine they have been uncovered but no shame in this at all. putin makes no secret of the fact at any point that he relishes russia's prowess. did not admit to this. in fact, in many respects a

great degree of ambiguity because make everybody nervous. we are all sitting here wondering. there's an intimidation factor about this. why would you show your hand because there's a great deal of tactical surprise. this is not to say we haven't hy definitive proof but we should not be surprised at this kind of activity going on. and again the russians take pride in the possibilities of intelligence services. >> great. >> i'm a graduate student in international affairs. my question is about we hear a lot about the u.s.-china, or use russian relationship regarding serious anorak and everything going on there but china is absent from that domain.

i'm curious as to how do you think some sort of an attack and that would change the outcome especially given that chinese tend to think more long-term than united states and probably russia as well. thanks. >> the question is, there's a lot of attention to the russian factor in the syria, isis, isil, daesh problem in the middle east. china is very concerned about domestic terrorism. they are take the concern about terrorism, the links of the uighurs were the are some external organizations that claim to be trying to stimulate resistance are separatist forces in the area.

clearly if the linkage emerged between isis and uighur terrorism, the chinese would take this as a top priority issue. there is cooperation and intelligence exchange among countries that are concerned about this, and i think china is part of that process. but i don't expect that china would become interventionists on those issues because of its concern over this type of terrorism, but they would probably step up cooperation with countries that were in a position to uncover intelligence that would be useful to china in dealing with any potential internal threats that were connected to that. but china tends to be critical of intervention in other countries and issues, and while

china is getting a lot of attention to try to strengthen its ties in the middle east it is not yet in the position of wanting to actually commit chinese forces to intervene in those areas. >> okay we will pick up a few questions. in the back, the three gentlemen. >> think it very much. i'm with the national bureau for asian research. might question is about the one belt-one road initiative and the integration with the economic union. it seems it's progressing slowly as the professor mentioned. can you talk about some areas of success that has been in this area, whether that's in russia or in other countries in central asia? >> we take, yeah. >> arms control association. one aspect of the triangle between china, the u.s. and

russia is about each of these countries can annihilate the other two with nuclear weapons. my question really is, given china's slow but steady increase in its nuclear capabilities, which seem to be oriented almost exclusively at defending itself against the u.s., how does beijing think about the russian nuclear threat? isn't below the surface or is it about as lonely -- alarming to them as a u.s. worrying about the british and french nuclear threat? >> maybe the gentleman in the back. both of you. both of you. >> david winnick csis. my question is really for all the panelists. yoyou, you have laid out a situation where china seems that the tainted. any specific recommendations what attracted you to try and

swing that advantage towards the u.s.? >> last one. >> graduate student in international affairs at university of california-san diego. my question is for ambassador roy, and what do you think of the phenomena that american residential candidates always speak ill of china and russia a lot during the campaign but after getting elected they are more critical than the fact we do with china and russia? thank you. >> this is including donald trump. [laughter] >> one belt-one road initiative i agree. i think the integration of the two frameworks are progressing very slowly. the most we've heard about the discussions that the two governments and to top leaders have had about the integration,

but my suspicion is that some of the project the chinese are contemplating with both russia and central asian countries are going to be categorized under the cooperation category or the integration category between the two. that should not be too difficult a task to complete. also a very short comment on counterterrorism and the question about china's involvement in central asia, south asia and middle east. i think the attack that happened in china so far by uighur population have already motivated chinese government to take a more serious attitude towards the cooperation on counterterrorism. it has its role in these regions. although there is a problem in the process because i wouldn't name which country it is, but in the process of such cooperation is not discovered that if china

has most motivation, most interesting cooperative with these governments because of counterterrorism, then what if the incentives for the government to eliminate that problem so that we can no longer solicit the chinese cooperation in this regard? so we hear the chinese talk about at least privately that some governments are cooperative with china but they are also not cooperative with china. >> do you have a comment on the nuclear issue? >> the nuclear issue, the dialogue is ongoing between not only china and the united states but also china and other nuclear power. chinese policy coming to perception, russia's nuclear weapon is targeted at china so there's not a calmly -- commonly shared question. >> ambassador, your friend dr. kissinger also on a number of locations talk about china may not have leverage in

relation in contrast to the cold war. the u.s. has leverage. they want to address the question? >> i will briefly comment on this. i agree with this on the nuclear missile issue. the are two ways to defuse threats. one is to have a power position which enables you to deal with the threat, and one is to simply create a political relationship in which the threat is not a relevant factor. i think in the case of sino-russian relations at the moment, china is simply not concerned about the potential of nuclear attack on china, and china has a nuclear deterrent in case that judgment is proved wrong. this is not a subject that keeps chinese leaders up at night worrying about it. the question was, how to deal with the triangular relationship and get the united states back into a favored position.

simple answer your question was not the united states can manage our relations with china and with russia in such a fashion that the national interest is served having the united states back in a situation where we have better relations with those two capitals than what they have with each other. at the moment that's not an easy task but we got to be thinking in those terms because, again the manipulative concept of managing foreign policy has the same detriments that you would have in a social situation if a friend was considered only interested in manipulating your friendship so that they could gain some particular advantage. you do not advance your diplomacy by giving the impression that your sole purpose in having a relationship with an important foreign country is so you can use that country against some other country. i know a lot of people think

those ways and i've read articles that talk about how we should be manipulating china against russia and russia against china, et cetera. it's bad diplomacy. leaders are skilled and diplomats are skilled at figuring out that you are trying to manipulate them as opposed to accomplish something positive. u.s. elections. why do we criticize china during elections, and then behave differently after the elections? there's a simple answer. candidates are interested in getting elected and, therefore, they tend to not think about the consequences of what they are saying. their calculations are, will assist the to get the votes necessary to come get me into office. the u.s.-china relationship is based on national interest. that's why president of democratic and republican persuasions alike, after the

election campaign is over, have tended to come back to a common understanding that a bad relationship with china is not in the u.s. national interest and that would benefit from having a more constructive relationship with china. that dynamic i think we will discover in the terms of the current election campaign in the united states. if the candidates choose to criticize china, they will discover if they are elected that u.s. national interest requires a relationship with china that cannot simply be based on criticism of them for the way they are and the way they behave. so i would expect that dynamic to continue to play. >> we only have five minutes left. let me take a couple questions. >> voice of america. we know that russia and china have both expressed their opposition's to the deployment

of the tent system. china has said repeatedly that such a deployment would undermine china's national interest and also destabilize the region. wondering if they think there's some validity to such an argument, whether the united states and south korea should take china's position although more scarcely. actually imagined there could be a chain reaction if china does think that way and i think they might, it does not say the opposition from the might do something about it. >> let me answer that. life is filled with contradictions. chairman mao in his wisdom wrote a learned article on the correct management of contradictions. the north korean nuclear and missile development programs

have created a potential contradiction, which is that it is placed under threat to important u.s. allies in northeast asia, south korea and japan. at the same time the most effective countermeasures against a missile threat has the potential to degrade the nuclear deterrent of both china and russia. so how do you deal with that problem? the answer is if you don't deploy the thet, you will be increasing the risk your allies because of the concern of the degradation of the deterrent of countries that you want to get along with. i think the way the united states has handled that issue in close consultation with south korea, which has clearly demonstrated it wants a decent relationship with china, is to

make the deployment because the threat from north korea is greater than the potential degradation of the deterrent that china and russia against the united states. that is clearly not the outcome that either beijing or moscow would have preferred. but they are very aware of the fact that this was not simply a unilateral action or a bilateral action united states and its allies. south korea and china and russia, it was a measure aimed at north korea because of the inability of the international community, including those particular parties, to be able to deter and halt and rollback the very, very dangerous nuclear and missile developments in north korea. so this is an issue which is a very troublesome but it is

manageable because it represents a contradiction, and i think all of the parties understand that it's not simply a unilateral action directed against them primarily. >> we are coming to the end of this program. i learned a great deal, stroke, particularly for my colleagues who really spend, share insights and analysis, and particularly i want to go back to your point about the diplomacy and bad diplomacy. and also we look at china's perspective is ever-changing attitudes toward united states, towards russia to i think this reminds us that we should be wise, we should be foresighted, and also we should avoid some countries think they do not have any choice but to the confrontation of policy or form

a kind of alliance against the u.s. interest. also, i particularly want to thank my colleague that when i send you e-mail back usage of like 500 e-mails having to look at. so again thank all of you for coming to share with in such. this is a really interesting debate. i assume that democratic party's -- watches c-span. so i want to end with that, and thank you. i want the audience to join me in thank you for coming here today. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> today is day three of the democratic national convention with the theme working together. president obama is tonight's keynote speaker. vice president biden will also address attendees. coveragcoverage will start toda0 p. eastern with a preprogrammed. you can watch on c-span, listen on the c-span reader app and get video on demand at c-span.org.

up next a tour of political fest at the pennsylvania convention center where many exhibits of american political history are featured include a replicate of john f. kennedy's air force one. >> we are at the corner of 12th and arch in downtown philadelphia, potential of a new convention center. added hopkins as a spokesperson a volunteer for political fest if you love politics intruded this is the place to be. >> this is the place to be. we are standing at the pennsylvania convention center right here at 12th and arch in philadelphia and this is open to with seven locations across the city. open two delegates, open to the public. we encourage all philadelphians and visitors to come visit. we are excited to share this. >> what will people learn as they walk through? >> philadelphia history, american history, the history of democracy in the united states, american presidents and just everything that you just want to know if you are political

junkie. >> will go inside the let's walk over. this is the c-span american presidents exhibit. part of the streets we did a number of years ago and let's talk to the vice president who's responsible for this exhibit. what do you think people will take away from its? >> it's important put everything in perspective with history. as people are looking at who to choose for president is people to look at our history and take that into perspective and think of the bigger picture of overtime but make a difference in who you choose. >> in each of these banners get information about each of the presidents. first lady's, sometimes get more than one spouse and some fun trivia about the presidency. >> this is an original collection or we have our original portraits. in addition we have asked about the mental photos come in partnership with white house association. that are interactive.

you can watch little video clips for each president and some audio recordings of presidents since the age of the audio. >> tremendous feedback from those of been here. what kind of reaction especially maybe among children who walk through? >> they really like it. it's very visible, very tactile. they can touch things and look at things and can't interact with it and feel like they're getting a better picture of history come alive for them. >> the birthplace of the constitutional right here in philadelphia. >> right in philadelphia. writer at the pennsylvania convention center where we are delighted to be parted with the political fest as the official media partner. >> with c-span, we are in the main hall and adam hoskins, what is in your? >> what are the biggest also be the jfk replicate air force one fuselage.

inside you can see, the only original replicate of the fuselage the rigid case of a missing from 1953. we have a voting two-time exhibit where you have voting booths throughout the history of the united states. we have a real replicate of an office as well. excited for people to come and see it. >> is there a favorite exhibit inside? >> i would have to say the air force one fuselage. we have lines 20, 30 minutes alone. >> is this a chance of getting exciteexcited about politics any differently? >> absolutely. it allows people to engage directly with the political scene, learn about the history and get ready by the election. >> we are now inside the car used by john f. kennedy in dallas, texas, just before he was killed. tell us about this incredible vehicle and the history. >> you cannot imagine today the

white house borrowing a private car to take the president around but when he was in texas they had a series of parades with the official limousine. he was to fly into fort worth the night of the 21st. they were not going to do a bridge so they went ahead and flew the official car to dallas for the parade the next day. so they borrowed this car from a ford dealership and this was sam snead's car. they brought him from the airport at carswell air force base around 11:00 on thursday night the 21st, he and jackie. the next morning he came out and spoke to about 5000 people in the ring. he went back in and made his last speech at the chamber of commerce in dallas, pouring rain. using only one who didn't have a jacket and hat on really. so the car and all the fool -- film footage of the car has the top of.

the sun came out during a speech so they decided to put the top down and erode the 12 minutes from the hotel to carswell insight on the streets lined with people. he gets out of his car, get on air force one, flies tended to dallas and with in and out of getting out of his car he has passed away. this is the actual mask or he got out of. this car traveled for years as a collector car. then it's been in storage. i bought in october 2013 to give back to fort worth for the 50th anniversary. we parked it in exactly the same spot at the same hotel. congressman from texas who introduced kennedy at a rally outside that morning was there for the 50th any get over to the car and he remembered the car and kennedy getting in the car that morning. >> so he sat were we all right no? >> exactly where you're sitting. jackie gets in the car, moved to the middle. governor calmly gets in the sea or i'm sitting in president

getting that were your city. since it's not a big presidential limousine they were all acting. she squeezed in between the president and the governor. >> this is really incredible. >> nothing has been changed. it does have a new paint job and will work on the engine. the car runs. nothing has changed. a lot of great photos of them in the corporate antiwar all, there was a picture of jackie looking to the left, andy warhol did one of those composites were duplicated the photograph of her in watercolors. >> we are adjacent first alternate exhibit that includes the last telephone that john f. kennedy used in texas. >> yes. the white house always put telephones and for the president that were secure. it was so late when they guided their exhausted but the art society had decorated the room with picassos, beautiful things and they didn't even notice until the next morning. so the president made one last call. he called the lady at the art

society to thank her for all the artwork for the room. it's the last telephone call he made at the time since they didn't have portables. he then gets into this car into the airport and onto delicate a lot of pictures of those phones sitting on the bed stilts in the room. >> a lot of pictures from november 22, 1963, as well as the tide used by president kennedy. is there a story behind that? >> this is one of the ties he gave dave powers, one of his advisers. it went up for sale in 2013. and the shoes that she wore one of the paris, i'm sure she took multiple sets to paris. we have also the last invitation to the white house which was november 20, an event that the president attended an event he throughout the morning of the 21st. >> adam hawkins says to no one exhibit is a replicate of the fuselage of air force one is also yours. what's the story behind that?

>> this airplane was used, it was just a red airplane, 707 boeing and was used in some hollywood sets. so it was here in 19, or 2000 for political fest. it was the nixon airplane. after the convention i bought the airplane from a hollywood company and converted it to john iskander to exactly the way it was the day that he was flown back to washington, d.c. this is a traveling quarters for first lady jackie kennedy. this is a copy of what she wore that day with the pink pill box hat. flowers. we have a tv going inside showing the arrival in dallas in black and white on the tv of that period. >> do you remember that they? >> idea. steve, i was in the sixth grade and remember the principles wife to me by and telling the teachr so big you could see it was very serious and she announced to the

class that president kennedy had been shot. we did not know he had passed away than. 30 minutes where she came back and said that he was dead. it turned the world upside down for four days. tv was nonstop. we grew up, and my family, we love john kennedy. he was our hero. so that affected me so much that i wanted to be involved in politics. i started collecting kennedy campaign buttons. i have 1.4 million campaign buttons now. and to airplane. i have a reagan air force one also. it went from button collecting to a traveling show of the presidency. >> this is one of the iconic photographs from the day as it landed at love field. mrs. kennedy, the president of when you look at that what are your thoughts? >> it's 20 minutes before the end of the innocence of camelot.

they were young and beautiful, and it just, everything changed. everything change. the innocence of what the world was like, and then we lose martin luther king and robert kennedy of years later. it's like we live in a different world than that very moment. 20 minutes later everything has been changed. >> we can hear the recording in the background of walter cronkite announcing the assassination and death of president kennedy as we make our way inside this replicate of the 707 used november 22, 1963. where are you right no? >> i'm sitting in the president's seat aboard air force one. yet the staff in this room. there was a sofa in this is where you would have all of his meetings with staff, the secretary of state, robert mcnamara. so this wasn't the command center basically for air force