ramping up or speeding up of these attacks? if you take -- after 2011, a lot of material that al qaeda put out on encouraging much more systemic, instructions how to do it. granted most of it was in arabic and french so the man in yemen -- but you see this phenomenon in the u.s., the speeding up and see it in saudi arabia today. many more lone-wolf attacks. why now? it's not as if there was no encouragement, no direction, no instruction before, and -- al qaeda was every after 9/11. you can't find as much now. very little. >> i think one answer to that is the pressure that isis is under

in its strongholds in iraq. that may be contributing. they may be calling out and looking to people overseas to conduct attacks because the four -- before the u.s. and iraqi forces were going after their strongholds, they seemed content to be building the islamic caliphate there. so i think that's a contributor. and then secondly, i would just say, you probably have the issue of copycats and that's probably what we have seen over the last few weeks, is copycat type of activity. >> i would agree with all of that. i add one other thing, as isis loses actual territory, their caliphate is becoming more of a virtual caliphate online. >> i agree with the two

speakers. as isis loses territory, they're extending their activities overseas. but i think we should look at two other factors as to why terrorism is extending so rapidly across the middle east. one is political, and the other is economic. politically, 17 governments have no physical legitimacy. except tunisia, which is a democracy, but the rest of them are disintegrating states, and economically, we have 30 to 40 percent of the young people between the age of 16 and 24, according to figures of the international labor organization, are unemployed and likely to be employed anytime during their lifetime. there's nothing for them to lose except to make some sacrifices.

>> next question. dr. murphy right here. >> lone wolves. i mentioned to a cowl -- a couple of you before i have been watching ever since september 11th for a pro american or anti-terrorist rally by american muslims, and i have yet to hear of a single one. if they would organize something like that it it would do a lot to diffuse the attitude of americans towards muslim. suspect some of the muslim leaders are afraid of being taken out by isis if the try something like that. >> i can't -- >> the same sort of thing. not a rally -- you get it. >> i can only speak about american muslims bum if you read the arabic papers, find numerous

articles on a daily basis, disassociating the arab regimes from terrorism, condemning this act of terrorism and concern about the rise of islamophobia in the west and how it will affect the relations between the arab countries and the western countries. anyone else? okay, we have right -- there in the back. >> thanks. i've heard from several people dissatisfaction with the tomorrow "lone wolf" partly because it's too broad and includes loonies and these are not lone people. the ones we're concerned with apt the loonies. they're the ones with the shared ideology and the shared loyalty to some islamist or terrorist movement.

so it seems to me we're talking about a self-organizing isis adherent or self-organizing islamist terrorist or some variation on that, and i wonder if all of the several people who are dissatisfied with the term "lone wolf" could get together and come up with a better terminology that doesn't divert us and minimize the issue and at the same time doesn't distort the issue. >> i'd like to take a stab at that. not so much on the terminology of "lone wolf." but in terms of how we looked at lone wolves, we said, yes, they must have an ideology and a political objective but doesn't have to be anyone else's. the unibomber. we would cull a lone-wolf terrorist. he had a political alleged, operated alone and used violence to try to further his objective.

and anders breivik in norway, the one who mounted a shooting attack against the student camps, summer camp. he had his own individualized ideology but he had a political objective. so i want to distinguish between some of these lone wolves do have their own videoedology. others have borrowed an isis ideology or white supremacist ideology or an antiabortion ideology. just depends. >> basically talking about single issue, and again, there's alexander tried point out, it's not only the religious inspiration or direction, but also the antigovernment, let's say, motivations.

or the racist, let's say, or right-wing and so on. so, it is a broad, i think, -- that encourages people to rise up and, of course the copycats, as jill mentioned, before -- let move on to one more -- i saw in the back. the other person. >> hi. paul from the potomac institute. i want to respond to claim there have been no muslim community rallies that are anti-terrorism rallies. the was one held in lon den yesterday and today and there are a few articles on that and i pulled up a "washington post" article from -- titled

"anti-terrorism rally in washington." >> yes, please. right here. >> the deputy chief of -- if i'm allowed to make a brief answer. >> why don't you come up to the podium for a second. it's okay. >> that's a unique honor. thank you. i have a bit of difference with the terminology, particularly when we say foreign fighters. the word "fighter" i'm not at all comfortable with. fighter is a very positive word.

bangladesh, earned its independence through the war of liberation, and we call them freedom fighters. don't -- i do not call a terrorist a fighter. these are isis terrorists. al qaeda terrorists, or any organization, whether it's muslim brotherhood, these are terrorists. the reference to what happened in bangladesh, certainly unprecedented, particularly the attack in the catholic restaurant on 1st of july. and the way immediately the photographs went to the social media. but social media practiced particularly by these elements is certainly not a democracy. it's demo-crazy. we need to really look at that

very seriously globally how to -- i wouldn't use the word control but -- if i may cite an example what wellis was saying. what do we do to prevent, if i understand you correctly, sir, post event analysis of course it can go at any length, any depth. before hand, what could be done? certain things we perhaps need to look at. among the muslims globally. it's debatable but roughly 50%. not a very impressive figure. in some statistics it's even up to 60% of the illiterate. the literacy is 40%. 72% of the global population, being muslim, produce basically five percent of the gdp.

so, there are figures that we perhaps need to look at carefully. and analyze before hand. i'm not a religious person. that's all on the eve day, after the fasting month, i just went to see, not really say my prayers, just to see what is happening in one of the congregations. what i saw was very important. the prayer was held in a -- and next to that was a synagogue and the voluntary officers, their parking lot, for their muslim friends and brothers and sisters who came there to pray. we need to conceptualize that.

their interfaith unity, bonded, how to strengthen that. religion in many people's and scholar's opinion has been very divisive since the very beginning of -- since the very inception. that's the reality. we need to reckon with it and address it. to address that we need to do a lot of research, but a very valid point by professor wallace, certainly agree, we need to do the research, how to prevent this before it happens. let us try and invest our resources more into that. muslim brotherhood and islami reference made by lisa, i beg to differ with the notion that they are actually political parties. they are not political parties. they're terrorist organizations

that must not be confused as political parties. if we continue to allow the public political face to be used and utilized by these platforms, we know what is going to happen. islami is in bangladesh, about four percent of public support. i'd be the last person to see that entity going to what other organizations, like muslim brotherhood did. that's not our goal. terrorist organizations must be branded as a terrorist organization. there is a fear, a narrative, that if those organizations are banned legally, they would go underground and perhaps create more offshoots and create havoc

in this society, and we really don't have the time to -- i'd be very happy to be -- by any of the members in the audience and the distinguish el panelists. i can discuss that privately informally, but i do not think that to buy that narrative. i have one question for the panel. anybody can enlighten me. what we have seen, particularly in bangladesh that most of the terrorist were from the weldy families, out it's not only in the ma -- the poor segment of the society. they were in private schools,

they went to private universities. one even studied abroad. and this is something new. it's not only in bangladesh but also happen in other parts of the world. why this radicalization is attracting those young, bright, brilliant, wish educated -- well-educated, muslim youth? any thought on that? thank you. >> this certainly -- your question deserves a special seminar, and we're not going to

go into it except to say, as i mentioned before, before me, nothing is new. i think the concept that if we only eradicate poverty, then we eliminate terrorism, and the weird examples going all the way to carlos in terms of the background, the affluence of those who became involved in and became leaders, and there are many, political and sociological and psychological reasons for that. but i really think the key is that we have to expect the unexpected. from both the lower echelon of the community, to the upper echelon of the community, and

therefore we shouldn't be surprised again by the surprises, and when professor wallace indicated that clearly we have to try to prevent, we learned a lesson of the law. and the intelligence community; we just had an event here last month. sharing intelligence. so it's not that we surrender and we don't have some of the alternatives and some of the responses, so, again, academically, i think you are absolutely right. we have to go into that, but again, in the interests of time, we have to conclude this so-called. we're running much further than academic -- and we're going to ask now general gray to have the

last word. >> why me? >> well, i need a loader. that's why. -- i need a leader. that's why. >> i want to thank the scandal the audience as well. it's been a super set of discussions and viewpoints and the like. i couldn't help but think that cultures are really important here, and i think we have to understand the cultures of america and the free world as we know it today, and the democratic environment, and related governments and like, and the cultures we have grown up with. and understand very clearly there are other cultures out there which are maybe equally important and certainly different. we will never get to first base in this entire challenge without understanding the cultures, the arabic cultures, the cultures of

the middle east, the cultures around the world, and the languages and the like they speak. i'll give you a same example. it's extraordinarily difficult, if you are intercepting or listening to social media conversations by terrorist activities activities and people with isis, call it what you want. no matter how great a long linguist you were you canned under what they're talking about unless you understand their cultures. the word are different. the languages are different. the meanings are different, and what i call the jenner, the generation of people that are doing this for the most part are totally different. i happen to be a big optimist and proopponent of the younger generation. i think they're good. i think they're smart. think they're quick, and i think we better start listening to them and understand how they

learn and how they do things and how they believe. this is a whole new educational environment, and old guys like me ought to stay out of it because we don't understand. my old commodore computer doesn't hear social media. so we have to get smarter elm we also need to under that you're never going to -- america in particular, we like to be risk averse. we like to get rid of all uncertainty. that's ludicrous. you're in an uncertain world. and you're going to be in an uncertain world, and you better learn how to operate in chaos, and make uncertainty your friend. you need to also understand that one of the first things you have to do strategically is identify the enemy and get with it. and this business of dancing around this topic is ridiculous, and the sooner we get over this kick and decide to determine who these enemies are, and what

they're all about, and how they think and what they're trying to do, and begin to strategize appropriately and completely and with adaptive techniques and the like, we aren't going to make much progress. so we've got to get our act together here, too. you got to know the enemy. know how he thinks and that's how you defeat them. we are still neofights in the information warfare arena. we have to learn how to harness information and use information. you may be talking today about lone-wolf type of things but me whole environment is here. information warfare, cyber attacks. all of these kinds of things are critical today, and it's part of the whole maneuver, thought process, we have to include this thinking and the like. so we have a lot to do here, and we don't have to do it alone. we got allies and friends, and

the other thing is, the american public, for example, just an american seminar today for the most part -- but the american public needs to learn how to play the what-in -- what-if game. used to tell my marines years nothing the guerrilla warfare environment, we need to get street smart. we need start thinking about things. it's the marines that came from the east side of chicago that were always playing the what-if game, with one eye, where are the cops? they never stepped on any booby traps and bombs. the people who triggered the booby traps and bombs in combat were from states like nebraska, 5'10", blonde, letters in football and baseball. these street smart guys didn't do that. i was to get across, learn to play the what-if game. get street smart. this business of seeing and talking, it makes a lot of

sense, and so we have got to be much more observant and we have to do much more along these lines. so with that, i think we'll wrap it up today. thank you for a very good afternoon. thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> hillary clinton kicked off a

three-day bus tour today after formally accepting the democratic presidential nomination last night. she and her running mate, tim kaine are in philadelphia and harrisburg, pennsylvania and will be in pittsburgh tomorrow before heading off to ohio. for more information on pennsylvania's role as a battleground state we spoke to a reporter there. >> good morning, pedro. thank you for having me. >> could you tell us about whern pennsylvania stands right now is?? it red, blue, mixed? >> guest: well, i mean you may know, your viewer may know, pennsylvania has not voted for a republican candidate for president since 1988. so, you would think we're a blue state. but polling this year has been a little bit different. polling shows the state pretty tight. there was a suffolk university poll that shows hillary clinton up nine. but i spoke with frank luntz, very widely respected republicac pollster yesterday.an he says his polling has it

within a couple of points. he thinks it's going to stay that way, and believes that the state is in play. more than any other big state. so, it's going to be a tough race, and i think it's evidenced by both campaigns. hillary clinton today and tomorrow, doing a bus tour across pennsylvania, as you just mentioned, donald trump is in pennsylvania. both conventions, got a lot of -- the delegations from pennsylvania, in cleveland and in philly, got a lot of attention. so i think everybody you talk to says the road to the white house this year goes through pease.ho: >> host: what do you think is changing the makeup of pennsylvania so that you're seeing this reflected in the polling numbers. >> guest: economics. it's always about the economy. in a state as big and diverse and formally important in manufacturing, mining. there's almost been a reverse of political demographic of the state. in years past the suburbs of

philadelphia tended to vote republican.el now they tend to vote democratic. in years past, the suburbs of pittsburgh, allegheny county in the southwest, was always blue collar, democratic, reagan democrats. now they're voting republican. in 2012, mitt romney carried every democratic county surrounding allegheny county, which is pittsburgh, and this year, when people voted in our primary -- we have a closed primary, meaning that you can only vote for the party for which you are registered. this year, the county with theth most switches from democrat to republican, to vote in the primary in april, is allegheny county, which is pittsburgh. so there are some signs that donald trump has more support here than past republicans in the last six elections. >> is mr. trump taking advantage of this by a ground game in the state and how does that compare to hillary clinton?

>> guest: it is tough to gauge yet. hillary clinton will have a phenomenal ground game. remember, she won this state in the democratic presidential primary back in 2008. she beat barack obama by nine points. her husband has won the state twice in presidential elections. she has always had a presence here. she has family roots. her father was born in scranton, where donald trump was this week. demby every measure, demographics, history, registration edge, she should win the state. and you know how well organized her campaign will be. trump is new to this and we'll see. whether or not he can put together something to compete effectively with that. >> host: what are you looking from from here on out as far as the campaigns are concerned? you talked about the changing instances in your state, turkly what are you most interested in following as a columnist, looking at this election?

>> guest: whether or not the republicans can take advantage of the strongest message they have, which is they represent change, she represents a continuation of policies and practices that have been in place for eight years, and the administration she was part of. if the republicans and particular through trump personally can take advantage of that, the state's going to be very, very competitive. and the second thing, pedro, is which campaign can convince pennsylvanians they actually will provide long-term employment in a state that still is further back in recovery than most other big states. the recovery that many states are seeing in the economy just hasn't come yet to pennsylvania. so, again, the election year is going to be driven by economic issues, and the campaign that has the most convincing case will win the state. >> host: jump on that a little bit, then. o

how do issues such as trade play out amongst pennsylvania voters or mining of coal play out amongst them? >> guest: obviously very strongly. particularly in the northeastern part of the state, the coal region, and the southwestern part of the state, where manufacturing was very, very heavy. so you are absolutely right, those -- the trade issues are going to be very important. >> host: john baier, a columnist. how often do you put out a column. >> host: normally twice a week in the last two weeks, every day. >> host: you can see it at philly.com for more information from our guest. thank you for joining us on the phone. >> guest: thank you for having me. have a good one. >> donald trump is campaigning today a wings over the rockies air and space museum in denver. we'll have that live for you at 9:00 p.m. eastern on our companion network, c-span. with the conventions both wrapped up the focus now turns to the upcoming presidential debates, september and october.

watch september 26th as hillary clinton and donald trump hold their first debate at foster university in hempstead, new york. also debates at washington universe in st. louis and the university of nevada las vegas. watch on c-span, listen on the c-span radio app and get video on demand at c-span2.org. >> donald trump and hillary clinton made the republican and democratic national conventions a must see on tv. ...

that's this saturday evening at eight eastern and sunday morning at 10:30 a.m. eastern on c-span, c-span rated app and c-span.org. >> booktv on c-span2, 48 hours of nonfiction books and authors in the weekend. here are some featured programs this weekend.

>> there was a great deal insi inside. the image of a number of men chained to their cell doors with her hands between the legs which was essentially forced standing which was an enhanced technique. donald rumsfeld at some point said he spent at his desk all day. i can tell you seeing someone in a force state and position has nothing to do with standing at a standing desk. it was torture. >> and sunday night --

>> go to booktv.org for the complete weekend schedule. >> panelists at the brookings institution discuss current relations between the united states, china and russia including russia's suspected role in attacking democratic national committee e-mails and on china's relationship with russia impacts the united states. former u.s. ambassador to china stapleton roy is among the speakers at this nearly two-hour event. >> i want to welcome you all here this morning i see that most of you are dressed properly for the weather outside. i look for to take off my tie and jacket in due course. i also appreciate that even though we are in the dog days of summer, that so many of you come out to join any discussion of a particularly important and often changing triangle in the

geometry of international relations and international security. i'm talking about, of course, the relationship among the united states, soviet union/russia, and china. and so many of you know, back in the first decade of the cold war, the government here in washington, and many other governments around the world, thought about the monolith of the sino-soviet relationship. they thought in terms of a kind of access between moscow and beijing. yet that having already incentivized the united states to begin in the 60s its

misadventure in indochina, a great relationship between the soviet union and china was already very much changing. in fact, in 1961, really before the buildup of american forces in indochina, the chinese communist party denounced its soviet counterparts as revisionist traitors. and then in 1969, of course the relationship came to blows, particularly in the form of the border war along the rivers. now, the nixon administration, of course, sal in this crisis both the danger and an opportunity, and particularly and opportunity for a double breakthrough in form of détente

with the soviet union and the opening of china. flashing forward to today, which i think has kind of a theme about as we look around the world, and that theme is back to the future. on the surface it would seem that a rambunctious russia and an assorted china are making common cause to thwart u.s. global security policy and we can u.s. alliances in parts of the world that they regard to be there years of influence. that's the backdrop for our panel. we have three colleagues who are associated with brookings, cheng li who is director of the fort and china center. fiona hill who is the director of our center on u.s. and

europe, and sun yun who is at the simpson senate but is also an alum the other brookings institution and still has an affiliate with us. but i want to particularly thank our special guest, stapleton roy, though i think i met when i was a very, very junior reporter in the moscow bureau of "time" magazine in 1969. and i'm sure he gave me great insight and wisdom on what was going on, on the soviet and chinese border. he went on of course to be one of the most distinguished diplomats of his generation, and i would say of pretty much any generation, a revered ambassador to the prc, and also a good friend of brookings over the years. so now i'm going to turn the proceedings over to cheng li to get this conversation going.

uninsured there will be time to bring you into that conversation yourself. [applause] >> thank you so much, strobe, for those extremely insightful remarks. and for taking part in today's session, despite your very busy schedule. i understand that you are probably on call for some import meeting, so feel free to leave anytime. also please state if you can. i think probably the audience will have some questions addressed to you. you can continue to share with us your wisdom. it will be hard to find a really better person than you to offer a historical account, and also the future outlook on u.s.-china, russia-china relations. when he was a rhodes scholar at

oxford, he translated chris childs mammal into english. during crucial period of the cold war -- chris childs memoir into english. he served as deputy secretary of state and ambassador at large on the new independent state following soviet breakup. early in his career as "time" magazine correspondent, strobe covert nixon and kissinger opening of china. in the wake of 19:89 p.m. incident he wrote a highly article entitled how not to break up. only a few weeks ago when we're together in china i witnessed strobes engaging dialogue with chinese leaders as chinese public intellectuals discussing the challenges and opportunities

presented by ongoing changes in the global geopolitical landscape. strobe, your expert knowledge and your vision are truly invaluable at this perplexing time in global affairs, especially regarding major power relations. thank you so much. and we have another round of applause. [applause] i want to join strobe in welcoming you all to this important discussion. is of the united states losing china to russia? that title of the event is not intended to echo the american debate over who lost china, as in the of the last century, but it does remind us of the fact that improvements in u.s.-china relations in the '70s and the '80s provide many advantages

to the united states as they strive to win the cold war. but today the trilateral relationship between the united states, china and russia has profoundly changed your u.s. relations with china and russia both seem to be deteriorating. meanwhile, china and russia are strengthening their strategic partnership, or even something or someone will call closer to an alliance. some strategic thinkers in the united states have begun to worry about what they call an easy triangle. chinese analysts have adopt a new term, the term called the new three kingdome. to characterize the situation of today and try to extol its

implication. now, are we entering a new cold war? what serves the best interests of each of these three powers? is it a risk for the united states to be -- sodomite with both china and russia while confronting other challenges, such as isis and north korea? unfortunately these important questions are not being adequately debated in the united states. even during heated campaign season. part of the rhetoric should not overshadow indeed for sound strategic discourse but we have three excellent panelists to share with us their insights and perspectives to address these important questions. ambassador roy on my right is

that only a -- but he also specialize in soviet affairs and served in moscow as strobe will mention, in the heat of the cold war. he served as ambassador to singapore, indonesia, the people's republic of china, and also as a national, also as the assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research. my colleague, fiona hill, is director for the center on the united states and europe and a senior fellow and he foreign policy program here at brookings. from 2006-2009, she served as national intelligence officer for russia and eurasia and the national intelligence council. a co-author of the best selling book, mr. putin, fiona is one of the most sought after

commentators on russian and eurasian affairs. last but certainly not least, yun sun is a senior associate with east asia program. also a fellow into african growth initiative here at brookings. prior to these positions she wasn't that china analyst for the international crisis group facing beijing. and her research really cover a wide range of regions and topics. she's really an expert on the china africa relations and african development, and also east and southeast asia. and, finally, sino-russian relations. so welcome you all, three kind of us. us. each of them will give a 10 minute remarks, and followed by a discussion that i will moderate. and then after that we will open

the floor for q&a. so we go with this order, ambassador roy. >> thank you. good morning. first to comment on the title. the united states never had china to lose las. if we did lose it was long before i joined the foreign service. i think it would be more accurate to ask which country occupies the same position in the triangular relationship in the sense of having a better relationship with the other two. it was the united states for a long time and now it's china. some people, the improvement in russian chinese relations to the collapse of the soviet union. but actually the gradual normalization of relations between the two countries began long before that. in the american embassy which

had just opened up in beijing in 1979 after the establishment of relations, we detected a warming trend in russian chinese relations back in 79 and 1980. it was reflected in the fact that border problems between the two countries that used to take months to resolve, all of you said could be resolved in a day or two. and also at the chinese have been concerned from the very beginning of the relationship, dating from president nixon's visit to beijing in 1972, that the united states was tried to stand on chinese shoulders in order to get at the soviet union. even though we had a bind element in the u.s.-china relationship is on the common concern about the soviet threat, china felt that we were using giant against russia.

and this gave them an incentive to want to have a better relationship with russia. it was the intervention of the russians in afghanistan that held back that threat. but a resume again as soon as the russians began their withdrawal from afghanistan. so we need a long-term perspective on this relationship in order to understand the dynamic that was going on. certainly the disintegration of the soviet union in 1991, which was occurring right at the moment would i was presented my credentials to the president of china, and we spent, our discussion was not on u.s.-china relations but on what was going on in the soviet union, and both of our information came from cnn. because they were very dramatic developments taking place on the television screen. but the collapse of the soviet union and the reemergence of

deng xiaoping pragmatism in china have been will be a bit ideological rivalry from the relationship between beijing and moscow. from china standpoint the collapse of the soviet union was a very desirable development. obviously, the russians had a somewhat different perspective on that development. but regardless of these contributing factors, the reality is that russian-chinese relations are probably the best in modern history. china, the two countries have good reasons for strategic cooperation. they both are opposed to a world dominated by a sole superpower that isn't one of them. they both feel threatened by u.s. unilateralism, u.s. interventionism, and u.s. support for color revolutions. though they both suspect the united states is out to change the political system in their

countries in ways that we prefer and that they do not appreciate. their economies are complementary. russia is a supply of military goods, energy and raw materials. and china is a supplier of capital, consumer goods and equipment. they have a common interest in not having central asia become a breeding ground for terrorism. so these common factors are sufficient to hold in check russia's strategic insecurities caused by the rapid rise of china occurring at the very moment when russia was declining as a major power because of its disintegration of the soviet union. and another factor is these common interests hold in check china's latent ambitions to consolidate its position in central asia, south asia and the middle east. neither country sees its interests as served by forming a strategic alliance against the

united states. the statistics speak for themselves. although sino-russian trade has increased 20 fold over the last 25 years, reaching a level of $100 billion in 2014, the reality is that u.s.-china trade is about six times larger. china doesn't forget that. in other words, the economic relationship with the united states is fundamentally more important to china than the one with russia. chinese investment is pouring into russia enters essentially no reverse investment from russia. so that the hundreds of billions of dollars of foreign direct investment in china that is speeded up on its economic development doesn't come to russia. it comes from the united states in western countries and neighbors of china. until the ukraine crisis in

2014, i think you can accurately characterize russian-chinese relations as strong, healthy and friendly. this was reflected in public opinion polling in both countries, which was very different from the period when they serve and moscow when the russians were acutely suspicious of the chinese. but the chinese consistently rated russia as the country towards which they had the least suspicious. the united states, japan, even south korea, ranked lower in chinese perceptions. you had considerable easing of the public attitudes in russia toward china but not to the degree that was taking place on the chinese side. but after the ukraine crisis, i would characterize the relations as friendly, close but unhealthy.

because russia has been forced uncomfortably close to russia, to china, because of the confrontation with nato over the ukraine issue. as the result russia now has to go along with the chinese initiatives that russians are inherently concerned about and suspicious of. this is not a sufficient factor to undermine the strong ties on their strategic interests in not having a world dominated by an interventionist united states. but it means this is not a relationship in which there is an equal sense of mutual benefit emerging from the relationship. so this ukrainian development is a very important factor in the lateral relationship. for example, the russians were very suspicious of china's drive

in the central asia, and most result reflected in the one belt-one road initiative. it was in 2014 that they ended up endorsing the initiative, and that's after the ukraine crisis had emerged. as a russian official commented privately to me, we had no choice but to go along with the initiative. so that reflects the change in the relationship. former deputy foreign minister food gain of china had an article in the fourth affairs magazine in january february of this year. it provides a pretty good description of relations between china and russia. noting both the positive element and the underlying concerns on each side. she pointed out, for example,

that, she called the relationship as, let me use the right terminology, she called it a stable strategic partnership, not a marriage of convenience, complex, sturdy and deeply rooted. okay. that sounds pretty good. but she said the changes in international relations at the end of the cold war have brought the two countries closer together. that's simply a polite chinese way of saying that u.s. behavior since the end of the cold war has driven the two countries closer together. at the same time she acknowledged that china has produced, china's rice is produced discomfort among some in russia. -- rise. in discussing the issue she noted the following points. there still talk and russia of the china threat. at 2008 poll by russia's public

opinion foundation showed that around 60% of russians were concerned that chinese migration to russia's far eastern border areas would threaten russia's territorial integrity. 41% of russians believe that a stronger china would harm russia's interest. russians are worried that china is competing for influence in the neighborhoods. i've mentioned the hesitant in supporting the silk road economic belt initiative, but on the chinese side, former foreign minister, deputy prime minister fu ying note as well some chinese into beginners historical grievances regarding russia. despite a formal resolution of their border dispute, which have been settled by both sides, with compromises on territorial issues, chinese commentators sometimes make critical references to the nearly 600,000 square miles of chinese territory that czarist russia annexed in the late 19th

century. so that is the question that china was unhappy with russian behavior in the ukraine. while china stopped short of direct criticism, fu ying in her article noted that the foreign ministry spokesman, spokesperson in beijing spoke up saying that ukraine's and attendance sovereignty and territory integrity should be respected. this was after russia had already separated off crimea and joined it back into the russian federation. this, from china's standpoint, was a horrible precedent. because when he was the president in taiwan, he had come up with the ideas of holding referenda on taiwan, on u.n. membership for taiwan, and other sensitive issues. engaging with strongly opposed -- and beijing strong a post

using such referenda which it viewed as sort of a backdoor way of trying to sting the independent minded thinking in taiwan. and here is russia using a referendum in crimea to separate territory that russia had formally recognized as part of the ukraine and joining it back together with russia. so this was a bad precedent. secondly, the russian armed intervention in the eastern parts of the ukraine to prevent kiev from restoring central control over its eastern territory brought to mind the u.s. cia backed intervention in tibet during the early stages of the cold war, and chinese nightmare is that foreign powers would try to intervene inside china and exploit separatist sentiments in areas such as tibet.

so in other words, while china didn't formally criticized russia over its behavior, it clearly had very deep reservations about having these types of international residents established. so let me conclude just with a brief comment. when i was attending a trilateral conference among the u.s., russian and chinese shortly after the ukraine intervention, and the chinese who had been very circumspect and commenting negatively on russian behavior, and generally treating the sino-russian relationship as all sweetness and light, at the opening of the conference one of the chinese look at the russians and said, your actions in ukraine have implications for east asia. this was a way of reminding the russians that they were behaving in a way that affected chinese

interests in a negative way. having sat in on numerous conversations with both russian leaders, because of my relationship with the dr. kissinger, high level russian leaders to meet with the independently, but i've also been in numerous meetings with high level chinese officials, harley because of my status as a former u.s. ambassador for an active u.s. ambassador and partly because of my relationship with dr. kissinger. i have not been in a relationship with a russian-made and which did not express concern about china and i have not heard a single statement since the collapse of the soviet union from any senior chinese official expressing strategic concern about china. so that tells you something about the way that the relationship has changed. it's a good close relationship based on very important strategic interests between these two countries, up from china's standpoint it's the

result of positive development that a strengthened china's position in the bilateral relationship. and from russia's position, china is acting as a good friend in need, but they still see china's rise as posing a strategic challenges for russia that they're deeply concerned about. thank you. [applause] >> thank you for that very comprehensive and analytical account. we will go back to some other excellent points. fiona. >> that was a comprehensive but i think we could go out for coffee. .. union

>> it is clear that there is a dramatic different trajectory in the relationships. the u.s. and china obviously having a rather difficult relationship but a carefully managed one at this juncture. and russia and the united states are going full circle. you mentioned china working out relationships and if we think back to that period we have had bad timing in 1989.

that juncture led to the soviet relationship that went down a different path than where we are now. so we do have this strong juxtaposition. as you mentioned this has become a relationship between russia and china that has very strong elements and i think you eloquently outlined this. we see china-russia having very few differences in international organizations. they both have a similar perspective on the utility of the united nations, both are very careful about the positions they hold within the european union security council.

they have taken advantage of the brit organization and seeing themselves leading players in that. also the g-20 and many of the new organizations. there is the shanghai corporation that china and russia setup together to play a larger role in international affairs. we didn't mention that but it comes out of the relationship that the two of them having trying to forge in their shared neighborhood in central asia. we should bear in mind here, although we are focused on the strategic triangle of relations, but we are not in the mix. our presidential campaign might suggest we are. we have many other different perspectives and not just in the form of bringing that out.

the rise of china economically since 2010 against the background of crisis has changed everyone's per spectf. we look in the european union and europe and everyone is factoring china in a different way. it isn't just how russia perceives its relationship with the united states against the backdrop of the relationship with china but how russia, the united states and other countries are managing their own complex relationships and figuring out how they pivot toward asia and china. japan is also in the process of trying to figure out how it balances its relations with russia and also china.

russia proposed the creation of a new asia-pacific secure arrangement. many are aware that the prime minister of japan has been eager in improving the relationship with russia. there is a couple major points and obstacles in that relationship. both are interrelated. one is the fact japan and china have yet to have peace treaties because the territorial dispute over what the japanese cause the northern territorieterritories. they are several parts seized by the soviet union since world war ii. there have been many attempts to resolve this issue. we are in another series and this is driven by external factors.

the japanese are concerned about what they see is an existential threat and hoping to have russia with the counter violence in the a asian pacific and they would like to be equal to the united states and china. there are worries and concerns atmosphere not just having a shared neighborhood in central asia but also in the pacific region. the russians and chinese are in joinl naval maneuvers which have been repeated on a number of occasions and most recently they engaged in nashville maneuvers in mediterranean. but the chinese warships took a scenic route back and went over the top of japan through the sea of the horse and you can see

after that point in 2013, you know, the chinese were quite open and you can imagine going back to china and around japan instead of going south got some attention. we can there is a lot of complexity in the relationship and it belongs to the expeditionary trip by one of their brokers and again, international law, because it is close to russian territory and after that the russians were quick at dividing the international sea to prevent perhaps an expedition trip by

chinese vessels. each time you see a quite but significant reaction from the russian's reflecting the concerns that you raised in your introduction. so, that is the asia pacific. quite a lot of complexity. russia and china thinking about the relationship with the united states but what happens in korea and relations with the north and south that become fathered in. we have talked about central asas asia but there has been a turning point and china made it clear secretly that doesn't always like the activities and behavior of russia in the european space. not only did china make its displeasure felt over the an

axing you may recall russia made the step to recognize the independence of the two territories. china did not. and in fact, china provided later in 2008 for the central s asian states to resist recognizing the independence. it was a leaping of the shanghai corporation in central asia from pressure on the central asian states to also recognize independence of these states. and at that summit, shanghai corporation organization, the central asian states managed to make it clear they were doing this with the support. so again this complexity. it has been rushed by european countries and western europe n countries with the united

kingdom, france, serbia, greek, and a whole host of countries signing on to seek chinese funding through the arib, the asian intersection and investment bang for high-speed rail. we have yet to see most of this come to fruit. but russia is increasingly looking less like a player in the economies of the region where it might have been in the past and china is more of ocompetitor in regional economic calculations as well. i want to conclude by echoing what ambassador rice said. there are elements of competition and other players in this mix that we also have to factor. so even though i was suggesting should we change the title to the united states i think frankly none of these states --

it is not all about us and there are many more players and it is a more complex environment. i think to compliment you on your introduction we have understand that complexity. we are trying to figure out what is happening here. [applause] >> thank you for putting the relationship in broader review. we can really look at the various countries big and small and that relationship. also when you mentioned the title i could not help but start laughing. when we sent the draft to you i thought you would change it. moving forward this is something the countries have different

perspectives. they have multiple perspectives on the issue. we try to stir the real debate. thank you. it is an honor to be on the panel. i am not claim the expertise you afford because v. i work on china and developing countries and conflict countries and as our term regimes. i would provide what i think is china's perspective on the recent develops in the russian relations. in the chinese perspective, they reach one of the conclusions about china-western relations. they see an emerging beiji

beijing-moscow alliance aimed to change the national order or dismiss the russian intimacy. but in the chinese perception meerth picture accurately reflects the current nature of the relationship which in china is understood as the convergence of the national interest despite the presence of alleviating elements. from the chinese perspective they assert often, the chinese call it a partnership with other alignance or alignment with other alliance it could be possible especially if china and russia agree their overlapping strategic interest outweigh their diverging ones. china-russia relations have been on a positive trajectory since

the president took over in 2013. he and putin have met 17 times and in venues in which the two kouptries have relationships. they include the brits, shanghai corporation, and the g-20. -- countries. they see the world through similar lenss and reach similar conclusions about their country's strategic position in the international system. they both believe their countries are in an advantage to the united states. putting belief that russia's great power ambitions are being

undermined by the united states. china sees the u.s. rebalancing to asia as a denying of china's strategic space and an attempt to contain china. the ukrainian crisis and the declining of russia bring closer ties between beijing and moscow ft for china, it focused the united states to refocus attention back to europe from its pivot to asia. they enjoy more breathing space with the u.s. and more leverage via russia as russia's vulnerability and isolation incrose -- increased. in addition to strengthening china's hand in energy negotiations, moscow has seem to

become more willing to cooperate in secretary sectors that were previously resisted. putin's statement of beijing and the two sides confirming the progress they have made and will make on the eastern route of the russian gas pipeline which is expected by both countries to become operation in 2018. russia's largest crude oil producer reached the center with the chinese companies including signing of 20% stake of this unit to beijing and 40% stake of the eastern petro chemical to can china and a joint petro chemical plant int russia's far east or cmpc. and they signed an agreement on

the aero space and aviation corporation which is believed to pave the ground for the russian sales of the rd-180 engine to china. beijing believes that the the regional dynamics have made moscow more open minded and helping china's initiatives across central asia. china understands they are in the early daze after 2013 and 2014 there was a strong suspicion about the initiative in the traditional sphere of influence. nevertheless, even the favorable reception of the initiative by central asian countries and that the possibility of actually benefits that it could bring to russia, russia seems to be more open minded in what russia can

gain from the initiative especially in terms of infrastructure development. they committed financing for the moscow high-speed railway. if successful, the project could mark the beginning of a new page of russian infrastructure corporation. russia is trying to connect and integrate with a euro asian community in order to prevent exclusive or chinese dominance. it is not knew for china there are confirms about russia in china and vice versa because it is the peril of location and history. the chinese will always remember however much we dislike the united states it is russia who took most of our loss of territory.

similarly in russia, there are forces weighing against china's territorial ambitions that lead to the chinese migration. putting nationalism in china is aimed at the west and also aimed at china. some observers speculate that is the reason why russia is reluctant to sell core military weapons to china and reluctant to open to trade and more participation in the russian parties. within southeast asia china is suspicious of and antagonized by russia's strategic and military ties with countries like vietnam and india. china believes it inches in lower prices of the energy

resources and interest in fixing oil and gas assets in russia fundamental fundamentally differ from that of moscow as the energy exporter. so there are hicups in the western route and that is an example of the conflict. china's economic slow down affected the demand for energy and given the diverse forms of natural gas from asia china is hoping to have a better negotiation for natural gas and join the development in russia. but this is not necessarily what russia is interested in. nevertheless, the chinese continue to make nice with russ russia and as they have acknowledged they have worked with russia. strategic alignment with russia has concrete benefits and

factors can be managed. they cannot be eliminated but managed. this is true when china views it is dealing from a position of strength and russia is at a strategic advantage. a 3,000 mile long border russia has the most impact on national security and vice versa. it is not desirable and up likely in the future. this point was emphasized as well. the second point from the chinese perspective of all of the countries russia shares the strategic position the most. both have domestic issues and foreign policy aspirations that make them targets of the united states. both feel their strategic spaces are being suppressed by washington.

therefore, china and russia share a common interest in quote "maintaining the balance in international politics and creating a more just international order "that message is important for the united states as well. a third point is among all powers, russia and china probably have the most similar. both are interested in an economic development path, object to the military intervention and west n revolution. the fourth point is that russia and china are strategically complimentary. the chinese are good at maneuvering one is exporter and the other is importer.

one has natural resource and the other has the money and cash. the last point about the border despite disagreements or complaints inside the chinese policy from time to time the consensus is the border has been settled for decades. so no one should realistically expect china to reclaim what was given to russia years ago. that case has been closed. history has taught them the parables of alliance. -- perils. the former alliance relationship damaged to confidence in the wisdom and similarity. it doesn't mean china and russia would not align their position and issues they see coming to. such an alignment really has the security and economics of both

china and russia and it is in their views it is beneficial maintain the world order. they maintain a distance from each other would be more effective than an alliance relationship. last but not least, a major witness of russia-china ties lies in their economic relations which is fragile and subject to easy influence by external factors. it very much lags behind the political intimacy between the two. while china is russia's second largest export destination and the largest import supplier, bilateral trade with russia only marks 2% of china's foreign trade and last year this dropped by 28% including 19% of russia export to china. this trend has continued this year so during the first three months of the year, the

bilateral commodity trade dropped 10%. the deprecation of the russian currency and the chinese economic slow down constituted to the slow down however in the long run how do you improve the trade structure between the two and diversify their industry trade is a question beijing and moscow are trying to answer. i will stop there. thank you very much. [applause] >> really another excellent presentation. you are so articulate i misperceive you as the spokesperson for the chinese government. i am going to ask you about your own views later on. now we enter the question

period. first a general question for all of you and then i will have a couple questions for each of you. general question is do you see that the emerging of a new cold war? there was an article in foreign affairs and it was written i quote from the chinese perspective, the relationship should now be considered a gain in which two players go against a third. these are general questions i am asking each and every one of

you. >> i think it is feasible. and quite frankly i think that we undermine our diplomacy when we try to think or behave as though our goal is to manipulate the triangle relationships. we are reasons with both china and russia to not have the relationship drift toward a hostile type of cold war relationship. i am not an expert on the cold war but i spent 45 years as a u.s. diplomat, much of which was during the cold war, serving in places like beijing and russia, and with all of the problems we

have in the south china see is so different than during the cold war that i shutter when people talk about a new cold war in u.s.-china relations. russia never had hundreds of thousands of its best and brightest students flooding our communities. you cannot go and not find people at the top levels of the business and other communities. it is a different type of relationship. and recently we were getting along fine with the russians. president bush in the early stages of the administration looked into putin's eyes and thought this is someone i can

get along with. at the moment we are in clined to demonize putin and one can this everything that is there but i like to read the federalist papers. in federalist 63, james madison said one of the reason you should pay attention to the actions of others is because it is a corrective who when you are being caught up in domestic passions over a particular issue and it is wise to look at reviews of the objective external world in order to control your passions. it is worth noting that three people that get along swimmingly with russia are the president of china and president park from

south korea. if we cannot get along with putin let's bear in mind that countries with whom we have quite close relationship, including alliance relationships, do not find him a type of person they cannot deal with. that doesn't mean we don't have serious differences with russia but it means we should not attribute the differences to the personality of the leader of russia who has of all countries involved in the ukrainian crisis the highest level of support as opposed to any other countries including the united states. so i consider this is an issue where skillful diplomacy can steer us away from a cold war relationship either russia or beijing and i think we would greatly benefit if we could get ourselves back into that

favorable position in the relationship we occupied for several decades. >> thank you very much. fiona? >> i think this underscores why we benefited from your diplomacy in the past and perhaps we might be able to learn a thing or two moving forward from your remarks, ambassador. i could not underscore enough the importance of thinking about the factors at play and things in a much broader perspective. i think as all of us outlined and you outlined there is not much ideology at play. there is a different perspective on how you want to engage. there is a little differences in

perspective but not the act of diplomacy. i really like what you said about china and russia maintaining the distance from them and maintaining the distance while they are align. and that should be a lesson to us. we are not going to be particularly close to china or russia for a variety of reasons. if you have a closer relationship with china as ambassador roy outlined with people to people and it isn't just based on the sheer size of china but much more of a convergence of economic interest. with russia, we always had a difficult relationship. i mean we sat down here in many different settings in bookings and many different ways so i don't want to go into too much detail but we don't have the basis for deeper trail and commodity driven nature of the

russian economy is similar to ours and we don't have the same interest and as we do with china and you japan and other economic ties. there has been a lot of outward migration from russia to the united states but it hasn't created a group of people in favor of the relationship in the united states. we have an awful lot of russians working and studying in the united states bite don't have the same number of americans in russia in the same we now we have students and business people going to china. so the relations at the grassroots is missing and we tend to get upset but perhaps we could take a leaf out of the approach from china and think of different ways of managing the relationship with russia. we have an opportunity for a new

chapter with our presidential elections. we don't know how it would turn out. one of the presidents idea would involve changing the structure in the asian pacific not just europe. it might be an opportunity to think fresh. if we are concerned about get into a cold war relationship, which is avoidable, perhaps this is the time to start thinking about how we might change that. also, bearing in mind there were so many other players in this and we have to think outside the triangle about how we manage relationships, how we factor in japan and korea, two close allies to the united states, both with russia and china in the asia pacific, for example. i could not agree more with the importance of chinking

differently and avoiding that scenario. >> i will be brief. i agree completely with ambassador roy and fiona. i want to make three points. the first point is we all say we are against a cold war style thinking but the cold war style thinking is actually quite prevalent in our countries. we hear, for example, the chinese government and the chinese analysts always claim that we should eliminate the cold war thinking in international relations but when they say that my reaction is you have the most coherce in dealing with other powers. the effects are in my judgment and i think the point is the cold war thinking does exist. but i don't think it is cold war. i don't think it is

ideology-driven and although the dispute and disagreement are intense the confrontation is not at the same level as it was during the cold war. and many articles and publications argue the relations between the u.s. and china are important and the two countries can't afford to get into a confrontation or another cold war scenario and that the engagement by the united states, bilateral dialogue channels are also open. we have ambassador roy and among others managing the direction of the bilateral relations. the last point i want to make it that we know the chinese leader has opposed a new type of power relations since assuming office in 2013. but there is idea in china there is a new relation between russia

and china. the two are able to main their their disagreement and keep their differences but proi oratize the pursuit of corporations and more practical matters. the articulation was right that the united states should learn from that experience and try to deal with clihina and russia in similar manner but then that is very easy to say because china and russia see a common threat which is the united states and the u.s. may not have the same luxury on issues of principle matters. so whether that is applicable in the case of the united states remains to be seen. >> thank you. for time concern i want to have one question for you each. the question for ambassador is that you mentioned about putin

and about jinping and these leaders are quite similar it turns out. what, in your view, are the major differences between putin and jinping? and what do the differences mean? >> you want me to answer this in one or two minutes? i think that as i outlined in my opening remarks i didn't base my analysis on personalities but on

what i considered to be the underlying strategic factors that were affecting relations among all parts of the triangular relationship. you don't have an option to pick the leaders that other countries end up with. it is nice if you like them and you find them easy to deal with. but if you don't like them and don't find them easy to deal with you still have to deal with them. president nixon didn't go to beijing because he liked the chairman and found him easy to deal with. if you read the transcripts of the discussion you will discover it was ant an easy relationship but the president thought it was in the national in the to the united states to have a better relationship with china and dealt with the chairman on that basis. i think both president putin and jinping are reflecting the

national interests of their particular countries in dealing with each other. i think both of them recognize that they are leaders who have serious domestic difficulties they have to deal with and important foreign policy interest where there is a convergence between the two countries. i think they respect each other as leaders but i don't think that it is the chemistry between putin and jinping that caused improvement in china-russian relations over the decades. i think it is the changes in the world's situation and to a significant degree u.s.' behavior that found the countries to find there are colin interests that have -- common -- created this improved

relationship between the bilateral relationship between the two countries despite the imbalances between the two countries and the inequality of the suspicions that exist on each side in the relationship. >> and the major differences between them? >> yes, i think jinping did not approve of putin's behavior in ukraine. it is very clear china has concerns that were adversely affected by having a precedent of using a referendum to separate -- essentially to destroy the territorial integrity of a country russia had formally recognized the territorial integrity before. the areas where china needs action, the united states is a

more important player than russia is. in other words, a relationship with russia is not going to solve the taiwan problem in a way beijing would look favorable on and china's behaving in the south china sea in a way that russia cannot be entirely supportive of because russia wants to have that good relationship with vietnam. let's not forget the border crash in 1979 was a function of the japanese having thrown out the china-leaning in cambodia and the fact that vietnam and the soviet union had concluded a defense agreement that jinping thought was a threat to china's interest and wanted to teach vietnam a lesson. it was the closeness of the soviet-japanese relationship at

the time that was a contributing factor between the border crash between china and vietnam. you have to bear in mind these background factors. >> my question for fiona, because both you and the ambassador mentioned the education and diplomacy changes. i want to follow-up with a question but let me share data first. there are 20,000 chinese students studying in russia and over 300,000 are studying in the united states. in 2013, viewer than 5,000 russian students studied in the united states and only 138 u.s.-undergraduate and graduate students were in russia. in the same here about 14,000 u.s. students study in china. these are the numbers.

now based on my research the current and upcoming chinese leaders very few of them study in russia and they went to the united states and some of themselves studied in the states with the except of a few major generals who studied in russia. here is my question: does that reinforce our title for this panel is correct? we have much stronger ties with china than with russia because of the in flux of these strong bonds? the other question is from russia's perspective, or putin's perspective, with this number, does he really trust the chinese or chinese leaders? or what does this mean for the policy? >> this is a very multi headed

question here. let's start on a very practical basis. the language study is, in many respects, a utilitarian form of education. when you study a language, it is not just for the importance of getting aggressive cultural understanding but an investment in the future. i can see an awful lot of younger people sitting in the audience who have been thinking about these questions. i studied russian back in the 1980 because the soviet union was the in the news and i didn't expect i would still have a job studying russia but i am encouraging my younger daughter to study chinese and spanish at the moment.

chinese and spanish, two global languages, but open up to jobs. i am thinking she will be on a panel in 20 years talking about china or latin america. i just imagine she will more opportunities to a job. a relatively small number of russian students are here but there is an awful lot of russian immigrants in the united states and a lot of russian workers who have learned english back at home in russia where english is very well studiedt an an -- sd at extraordinary level. i was amazed how well the soviet students i met spoke english. there are tens of thousands of russians working in the united states especially in silicone

valley and of course across europe. there are lots of other places russian who speak english can go use it because english has become a global language. and the chinese studying in the united states isn't just about learning about the united states but being in a global marketplace. whether the brexit will have people going back to speaking french and we will have a lot of chinese students rushing out and retooling. but i think we can look at the practical issues. it is providing a bit of a deeper understanding. but i don't think that explains everything completely. i do think the economic trade relationships are more problematic and that reduced the interest in the united states and they have been more pragmatic about the relationship with russia. as we see less of an a necessity

for kind of figure out different, more creative waz about managing this beyond the security of the relationship. i think the independence of what ambassador loy said. the europeans don't have the luxury as someone mentioned before about the united states having to make different calculations. they also have the perils of proximity. they have more people to people and more russian students are studying in europe often in english-speaking environments and they have to manage that relationship differently. i talked at the end about the difficulties and suspicions. there is one key difference where putin is different from many world leaders and that is the title of a book, the

opposite and had crimlynn. putin is an intelligence officer and he is deeply untrusting of everyone. he said once i am a spy i am always a spy. i don't trust people. maybe not trust but none the less he will always be suspicious of all of the relationships and always wanting to check and make sure that no one is trying to out maneuver him. he is someone who wants to be aware and the united states is the main opponent right now. we have concerns and the chinese do. the anaxation of crimea was a

big deal. the united states is concerned about these developments. this is one area where we have a common perspective but for different reasons with china. as we think about the relationships for the future again, we have to think about yes, the different perspectives of the personality and relations of the community but how do we factor in the complexity of the relationships and not just seeing them in the bilateral language. that is an important element in the russian chinese relationship. each time we have to think about the broader calculations and given the united states role it is incumbant upon us to take a broader rer spective like we are trying to do on the panel. >> excellent.

your presentation provides an assessment about how chinese views russia. are there any important slipts n country? and what ways to groups like chinese leaders, the military, general public perceive russia? do you think perceived in the same way? or very much divided? is this divide determined why what factors? pro-usa? or anti-usa? could you talk about the specifics of how the chinese is divided with the diversifying news in china. >> i will try. we think the policy community, i agree with ambassador roy and i

fiona the disenzymes because people see the -- disagreements -- interest of china to allow with russia at this historical moment. although they do acknowledge there is no eternal enemy. there is only eternal and p perpetual natural interest. china will work with russia because it is in their interest. in the future when the conditions change i don't think they have a problem changing the nature of the relationship. such conditions have not arisar yet. public opinion as a little more diverse than the consensus among the policy folks. the public is hanging on to the historical issues more. publem scholars talk about the

territorial loss to russia and there are people who should be more open minded about opening up the energy sectors. that the the chinese energy company perspective. they also feel that russia should be more tolerant in the bilateral relations given the strategic disadvantage. on the other hand, within the chinese public opinion there is a tremendous admiration of putin. they feel the russian leader has achieved what the chinese leaders have failed to achieve in the international politics which is respect and the ability to assert the nation's position and protect the nation's interest.

so there are callings for chinese leaders at a learn from putin which i am sure you know but chinese leadership should be more assertive and learn from the russian experience where russia has been able to do all of these things without getting into tooevere of consequences and chinese leaders who learn from them. the chinese policy is different than the public coming to perspecti perspective. gl the floor is open and please first identify yourself. also, limit your question to one. and i want you to be aware c-span3 is covering live. so first, professor. and i refer to the triangle divide.

it is based on peace. so glad to see you. >> gill rosman, i now edit the oscine forum. my question is about the dismissal of ideology as a factor. sure, it isn't the old communist ideology but don't we need to think about issues of national identity? and even in the chinese response to ukraine so much of the chinese writings talk about the u.s. responsibility, the color revolution, that this was really an identical challenge to russia and they defend russia in terms of how it had to respond to the u.s. the second part of this really is despite last year's down turn in final russian relations, in terms of great russian disappointment with the lack of chinese investment, and high hopes of 2014 being dashed by how little actually happened, for instance in bringing

together the silk road economic belt and the european economic union. hasn't something more happened this year? for instance, the reaction to south china seling in china? the reaction of both to the thad deployment decision? aren't we seeing the possibility of a new upturn because of a sense of what is happening in the united states and their resentiments of the u.s. gaining even ground? -- resentment. >> two questions integrated into two parts, i guess. who wants to take it? >> well, professor, great to see you here and people in the audience, you have done a great deal of service to all of us on this subject and the topic of

japan and broader issues. you are right, one has to be carefully about completely stripping out the ideology perspective. the point we are trying to make is this isn't the old set of relationships and the cold war was driven by a deep intense ideology struggle that was clearly defined. this is much more vague in many respects. it has elements of great power politics. you said there is a degree of national identity but it is not really being defined on the united states side in that way. maybe in some respects it is a one-sided struggle. the united states, for example, doesn't believe it is has been engaging in color revolutions. this as a perspective that is -- is a -- being generated in russia and in china. the united states believes in a matter of cost and it is a very benigned and beneficial thing to be promoting democracy, market

liberalization and general aspects of good governance. it is an intrensic part of the united states foreign policy and part of the european nations and part of the united states aiding in international developments in institutions like the world bank. the united states and our populati populations tend, at least until this presidential cycle, think this was the think you do as a matter of cause. woe don't see it from an ideology perspective. but that is not the view of many inside china and those around putin. putin has the cold war operative and sees the activity as old, cia measures from the cold war period and doesn't see the distinction. there is a strong view the united states has been driving

many of the upsurge and uptick in insurgency or political protests beginning with georgia and the color reb revolutions and throughout the arab springs which isn't the policy here in the united states. we could have actually done a lot more getting back to the questions that were posed earlier and the responses by ambassador boy in managing those per spectf. when the color revolutions in georgia and ukraine first took place in early 2000's we did have instances of u.s.-foreign policy professionals kind of playing kin to these. i remember being at a meeting and thinking this was a stupid move and we should be quick to point out the united states didn't have a role in this and we were not in the business of manipulating and exploiting.

we did ourselves a disservice and were not quick to address the misper exceptioceptiomisper. i think we have to be better in our political communication. we have a real problem in our own hands and don't always manage these issues especially well. it really is a challenge for the future. i think you are absolutely right. we could see an uptick and because of what is happening in the united states we are preoccupied at the moment and will be for a while we will have a serious challenge in dealing with these issues. ...