booktv. alberto gonzales discusses his time as attorney general during the george w. bush administration. his new book is called "true faith and allegiance: a story of service and sacrifice in water and peace." and he is interviewed by brent kendall of "the wall street journal." >> host: alberto gonzales, currently in law school dean, former attorney general and counsel to george w. bush. texas state supreme court justice and the author of a new book, a memoir recounting his life both in texas and working for governor bush. here in washington. welcome. >> thank you. good to be here. >> let's start with why the boat, why now. what motivated you to write it? i know many of your colleagues have written books about their time there. what prompted the book? >> guest: you know, something i've been working on for many

years with obviously several distractions in the interim. i thought coming up on the 15th anniversary would be a nice mark to try to hit somebody by the fact that you are right, there've been several memoirs written. people space-bar this has been out there and i thought it might be important to that night. for my sensei but obviously there's been a lot written and said about me. some of it true, some of it true. i wanted them to get my perspective about the events that shaped me in their lives as well. >> it was certainly an action-packed time when he served in texas and here in washington. briefly before we get into that, the first part of your book you talk about likely pass both in texas and in washington said in law and politics were an acquired taste for you. i thought it would nice if you could just talk people through briefly where you came from and

how you got yourself in position to serve. >> share. i grew up in texas. i grew up in a poor family. there were eight of us to the son of a construction worker who had a second grade education. my mom had a sixth-grade education comes that we were pretty poor in this mall to better balance. you are right, the politics of law and things that we didn't talk about or think about. richard was to play centerfield for the san francisco giants because willie mays was my hero and i've really loved baseball. when i graduated from high school, even though it's a good student i didn't have much encouragement to go to college and so i enlisted in the air force and guard station in alaska were in a coupler for his graduate who saw something in the encourage me to get an appointment to the academy, which i did.

from there and that the academy because eyesight failed me. i wanted to be a fighter pilot and transferred to a small private school in houston and air to harvard law school and after graduating went to work in houston at a big law firm for 13 years and during that george w. bush and that changed my life. >> let's talk about that. you were in private practice and you say in the book to you that a little restless doing that. you so they gravitated towards politics. but soared as guided you in that direction? you what really motivated you? >> that was priceless. i wasn't using my law degree. i got involved in organizations in houston, texas. organizations focus on hispanic issues. i thought that i wanted to make more of a difference with the

lives of other individuals. with a lot of great mix. that to be involved in some very important event in houston and that is how i got to know governor in 1994. >> he felt the republican party was a pretty natural fit for you. you didn't agree with everything the party stood for, that she thought the party promoted church as his side and better represented or hispanic values. this is one of the themes he returned to several times in the book. i'm curious to what your views are at now that we've had a heated and highly unusual presidential contest we are still in the middle of. are your views on the party that immigration, has your views changed and how do you view

things are going now? >> i am a lifelong republican. i still believe in the values of the republican party. the party isn't defined by one individual or the experiences of one individual. like some republicans, i have sent their about our nominee. at that equal if not more concerns about the democratic nominee. makes sense for my loyalty, my affection and respect for the party hasn't changed. i think we are still early in the presidential cycle. that is why we will have debates that we can become more educated about these two candidates. i want to see them standing side by side and i will make up my mind as to who is best for my gift to serve in the white house, who is best for me and my family and all of those who do the same. they should look at the person they believe to the dark country. >> at one point in the book you quote a speech that president

bush gave in which he said fearful people build walls, confident people tear them down. was that in any way a deliberate commentary on the current political debate or not? >> guest: , no it was for commentary on thinking the president bush. it is one of the reasons he was so good in outreach to the hispanic community. they believed in him and they feared him i think that's the right passenger for them with the right message and the right tone. it was rather commentary on president bush and his ability to reach out to the various communities in this great nation. >> host: alaska to top briefly how you met and got to know the governor and then president bush who clearly headed off with right away. i wanted to read one passage from the book here. amazing command of important issues in a face-to-face conversation nearly impossible not to like him. i start to get.

looking back i realized it wasn't about politics. i would've supported george w. bush had he been a democrat. how did you get to know each other and how did you forge this kind of bond? >> guest: well, my wife tells us in 1998 serapis speaker weatherford president. i don't remember the meeting but i remember a night to 93 he announces a running against amateurs, a proper governor of texas. as fast or hispanic leaders in houston so he could meet them. i was happy to do that and i remember i really liked him and thought he had no chance to make amateurs have reciprocally rob. again, two weeks after the election i got a call from one of my partners say he may just turn for the governor elect. he asked whether or not you would be interested in being his general counsel. two weeks later i sit down with governor elect bush and talked

about what he expected of me. i had questions about the job and at the end of the conversation i asked him, i have to ask you why me? you don't donate. he relayed the story back in the team 88 i did go up to washington and i interviewed for some positions in his father's administration. i ultimately declined. other suffers a junior level positions at hud and va, but i wanted to stay and make partner in a firm. the firm never had hispanic partner. i thought that making partner and give me more opportunities in the future. i said no to his father. george w. bush tells me turned on my old man for a job and that the economy radar screen. that's how we got to know each other. we didn't know each other before then and i believe the lead for george w. bush, the son of the president, my story resonated with him.

i think he took great pride that someone with my background could achieve the things i've achieved in his spare instrumental in some of those achievement. >> host: before we turn to your service in 10, in texas who served as counsel and then became secretary of state and then governor bush appointed you to the texas supreme court. there is a chapter in there when you talk about your court service. it becomes a theme in this book that you are frustrated by the way democrats treated you during your service, but also expressed frustration in the way some conservatives treated you during your time. one of the early example is his tenure service on the supreme court in the cases you had to deal with the texas abortion statute dealing with parental notification. can you speak to let those cases were about and why he felt like this became an issue in which

some on the conservative side felt unjustly -- were skeptical towards you. just go right, the texas legislature passed pro-notification statute, which allowed a minor female to get an abortion through judicial bypass by going to a judge if certain conditions are met. for example, mature, well-informed, so they were three conditions laid out and it fell upon the court to try to interpret what the legislature in tandem passing the statute. again, this is not about abortion. it was statutory construction case in terms of trying to discern what it is the texas legislature intended when they created these exceptions to a minor notifying the parent.

as a parent i would want to be informed of this kind of decision. i wasn't crazy about the statue, but nonetheless the legislature created these exceptions and i have to wonder that decision by the legislature. so there was some tension among members of the court about how broad to interpret those exceptions. the fact that i did not interpret the exception as broadly as some would've liked in the conservative wing i think hurt by standing and can server did circles. again, i don't support abortion and i believe in the rights of parents to know about the health of their daughters in the decisions made about a serious procedure like an abortion. from my perspective, it wasn't my role as a judge should take that into account. my job was to understand and to serve what is the legislature and tended then they passed the statute. >> host: would move to washington. president bush wins the

election. he decided to leave the state supreme court and join him in washington. was that a difficult decision are pretty much a no-brainer when he learned that a fast you would be joined in. driscoll is very happy beat on the court. a lot of speculation obviously during the campaign about who from texas might be going to washington. as several friends tell me you are for sure going to go. i was very happy beat on the court. in september at a conversation with clay johnson, the president headed up the transition. claim that they know with serious interest in me going to washington as counsel. i talked to my wife rebecca and we both agreed that would be an opportunity we could not pass up. for the remainder of the campaign, we watched carefully how the campaign went in knowing

the outcome would fundamentally alter the true trek three of our lives. u.s. whether or not there was a hard decision. not really. we have the opportunity to work in the white house as a seniors after for someone that you know well, somebody was that they believe will be good for the country that made the decision actually quite easy. >> host: obviously you come to washington after september 11th attacks have been and that changes pretty much everything that we will get into that in detail appeared before where do i. before we do i. what took up on a couple of areas after you come to washington. being a texan at this point your new president bush well but was not part of the washington establishment which you talk about several times in the boat. he mentioned one time early on again there was speculation that perhaps he'd be a supreme court appointees someday.

you tap multiple times again about some conservative southern suspicion of you. he mentioned a speech in which they boot you out one point and there were also some heated discussions within the assertion on a supreme court case on the high court was looking at the university of michigan affirmative action programs in which it took weeks if not longer to work out what the administration position was going to be in in the end you are satisfied with it but also felt perhaps may have damaged your standing somewhat with the some conservative circles. can you talk through that briefly appeared >> sure. there was a lot of speculation about me going on the court. a number of publications about the fact president bush wanted to put an hispanic on the court for the first time ibm has sort taken now as good as the contender given by relationship with the president and given my experience on the texas supreme

court. there was concern or skepticism and it was very visible concern about my credentials and my views about certain issues like abortion because of parental notification, those that i rendered, but also because of my perceived role in the michigan affirmative action cases. i think the perception out there was i was supportive of quotas that i wanted to upload the michigan programs. but that was just not true. i felt that the university felt that a university program felt that the university program in the law school program were both white quotas. they put too much emphasis on race and therefore was unconstitutional and could not be supported for that reason. for whatever reason, the narrative was the family supporting the programs and that just wasn't the case. it is also supported the michigan programs. that wasn't the case. in the end what i promoted was

that the president wanted. he did not want to be on record opposing affirmative action. if the courts wanted to say that race could never be considered in a decision by universities, he simply died out to the courts. his position was these programs are too much by quotas and therefore could not support them. >> host: he thought a middle ground in those cases there is difficult discussions who wanted to take a stronger position that diversity was not a legitimate educational goal. the administration is carrying the day on that and we ended up with middleground ruling for those cases from the supreme court in obviously we had these issues back before the supreme court and the recent university of texas case which i'm guessing he was a pilot. in the end, what are your thoughts on how the law has shaken out in that regard?

speed that quite frankly, this is where president bush was. his view was is probably okay given the circumstances to have raised is one consideration. the educational experience is enhanced for having different background. obviously it is unfair if you give race so much can the duration that is the overriding factor. so where we are today sent a president bush would support. i'm comfortable with it although i clearly understand that many conservatives still believe it's inappropriate ever should consider race as a fact to render the constitution. the supreme court at least today has two agree with that position. >> so moving now to national security and september 11th attacks obviously it back immediately shifts the industry

should focus. you know, the attacks were a shock to the nation and raised a whole host of legal issues the president hadn't often had to confront and some never at all of those landed on your desk. they're several weekend dive into. i suppose the first is let's talk about the capture of detainees after military operations started in afghanistan and where to put them when they were captured. not surprisingly there is a good bit in your book about the decision that how detainees at what time of day you said recently it was the best of all the not very good options of what we could do. obviously this is a complicated issue and to point out that president obama despite his pledge at gitmo has not.

i wonder if you could speak to the decision-making process they are as time has gone on in me that were time to think about what your reflections are at this point. >> eval and the fact it was a difficult decision could be considered a number of options outlined in the book and also conclude the best option was one time ago. that was the recommendation of the national security council presented to the president. president bush without recommendation. president bush did not want to be the world's jailer. he wanted wonton about closed as well. the problem is they never give a viable alternative that we kept captured people. those that we kept captured, we had to keep somewhere. we could give them a viable alternative. when his term ended the obama administration came in with the pledge to close guantánamo. he was apparently never presented with good options and

for that reason guantánamo remained so good today. it is a decision that both bush and president obama has struggled with because of the very nature of the type of people these people are in the very nature of the war on terror. >> host: the decision to not find a way to have been here stateside, at the end of the day do you think that was the legal consideration or political consideration were the primary driver there? just go and say they were both import. we are still in 2001. we are capturing people. new york is still smoldering from the attacks. we just thought that politically the american people would not stand for the government to get in these dangerous terrorists. that is a political consideration. but once they set foot on american soil, we work on clear,

the laws were unclear about what rights but that clarification and the court, without a safer course of the two house and at guantánamo bay. >> host: in addition to where to house them, there is obviously heated an important discussions on how to interrogate them. in the book, some of these people were hardened terrorists and not likely to just tell you information because you asked him the question becomes how to try to get them to divulge things they don't want to divulge and were ecstatic with the line is between legal conduct and illegal conduct. the cia and the defense department did a vacation during this time. there were a lot of difficult debates on some of that and you say rightly or wrongly used because sort of the public faith

for a lot of doj recommendations they are. can you walk us through a little bit about what the cracks of some of the space-bar? >> guest: that he began by saying former senator for current senator chuck schumer has publicly said in the judiciary committee hearing that they would be in kids is where he thought it would be appropriate to torture someone in order to get them permission if that person was about to go off in new york city. president bush took a different approach. his view is we will not engage in torture. we have an antitorture statute. it would be unlawful to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering. it doesn't outlaw specific techniques. i just quoted what the law says. it is the job of the lawyers to try to take that language and provides guidelines before the interrogators at the cia. it took about four months.

a lot of discussion about how much the law would allow. most people don't understand the genetic decentered into the convention against torture, we agreed to criminalize conduct constituted torture. the convention also talks about cruel and inhumane treatment is different than torture. torture is the highest form of pain inflicted on individuals, meaning we could do something that may be cool, maybe inhumane that doesn't necessarily mean that it's torture doesn't necessarily mean you have violated the antitorture statute. that is sort of the context of what we had to deal with in trying to provide guidance to the interrogators. i don't mean by writing this book to try to convince anyone that will be dead was not torture. many people made up their minds that make it. i understand that.

i merely meant to describe in this boat our efforts to try to get it right. sometimes we got it right. sometimes we didn't get it right from abu illustrator best for the requirements of the constitution and the laws passed by congress. >> host: at the end of the day, the administration decided that the bar under international law was lower than what you all thought it should be in terms of some of the types of enhanced techniques that were permissible, correct? >> guest: the bar that was lowered was in the definition of cruel and inhuman treatment. there were certain courts do it and interpreted those words to be triggered if you put someone in a cell that had open bathroom or put someone in a style that didn't have a window to the outside but that would constitute cruel and inhumane treatment. so they took a reservation when

the treaty was ratified that the language would mean only the combat which shot under the circumstances. the united states did take a different position with respect to obligations as to what would constitute cruel and inhumane treatment. poster you say to protect president bush and the presidency that you made the decision not to inform him on the details about the types of enhanced interrogation techniques being contemplated. why is that? >> the first chief of staff and i had many conversations as counsel. was to keep things that might damage the presidency of the president not a white house. typically in the controversial issues with respect to

interrogation, both andy and i recognize this to be controversial. what would really be important is whether or not it is necessary and the fact is that is that awful. when i spoke to the president about this, if you have a conversation and told them in my judgment on going to tally going to tell you is it's lawful in effect to and in fact necessary. he could've asked any time for that information. we would have given it to him. we felt comfortable at the outset simply knowing where a geisha outset simply no interrogation and misconduct that it had been carefully struck by the lawyers in putting john ashcroft and lawyers at the department of justice and the interrogators at the cia were competent this was an individual that were of high value and have information that there is no other way to get the information about an indian attack. with these parameters in place the decision was made to go

ahead and move forward with this interrogation without providing the information of the specific details to the president. >> you say in the book after deliberation on what types of techniques were permissible when the cia began the interrogation that you have the mixed emotion of the process. can you talk about this a little? >> guest: sometimes in government you get involved in making decisions or giving advice on policy. and sometimes you have questions or concerns about the policy. my job as a lawyer however was to not let my own moral views influence that legal interpretation of the law. that policy as an hispanic from a border state. i have very strong policy views related to that decision. and it might convey those policy views, but i would make it clear

that there may be used as a matter of the mma essay appreciate your views. you're a valuable member of the team or you might say you're elected, with the lies. as selected by the american people to decide that the policy is. sometimes i struggle with difficult policy decisions that i worried about how it might affect the long-term reputation of the presidency comes to long-term reputation of george w. bush. again, my job as a lawyer, my permanent possibility is to tell them what i thought the law required and what the law is allowed. >> host: despite some of those concerns from reading the book, it seemed at the end of the day that you decided that these techniques were effect given the endeavor was the fact that ms some of the memos they provided

a legal basis for doing some of the things became highly controversial after they became public, you know, that those may have had damage to the reputation of the department. at the end of the day, you feel like the interrogations were legal and vital to protecting the nation. is that a fair conclusion to draw from the book? >> guest: i think so. i think there were others who have testified under oath as to their effect if ms. and their value in keeping america safe. again, the senior leadership of the department of justice and the white house at the time. i remember having conversations with the attorney general john ashcroft who assured me this had been reviewed by the senior leadership at the department. that was enough for me -- was it an easy call? absolutely not.

it could reasonable minds differ? absolutely. they were seated they and again i accept they were controversial given the circumstances and the the times in which these decisions are being made, yes i stand there with the administration did. ..

the motivation by come of the guys given by the lawyers, and so that anything can be dangerous because the criticism of lawyers, the notion that a lawyer is going to be investigated or prosecuted for the legal advice is a detrimental. that discourage lawyers from doing their job and exercising their best judgment. who's going to want to provide legal advice if they think it's all because, for fear that they're going to be investigated and prosecuted? you accept the fact you're going to be criticized. lawyers disagree and, obviously, critics of the administration are going to be perhaps critical of the decision maker the administration. and notion because of the vice you've given you will be

investigated and possibly prosecuted, i think that's a dangerous place to be. >> host: another big issue arguably bigger than the interrogation would be classified surveillance programs that the administration move to enact after 9/11. obviously, after the attacks they were concerned about intelligence failures an examination of what the country could do to prevent things like this from happening again. there are large chunks of the book that go into this, and if you can walk us through. basically you explained in the now declassified portions of this that there were three baskets of information that the administration collected and used to try to better keep an eye on potential terrorists during this time. if you could walk us through a little bit about what the three baskets were, why they were

important and then we'll talk about the one basket became something of a flashpoint was some of the doj officials when the officials came in. >> guest: let me begin by saying it took the government about almost two months to clear this book precisely because of these chapters relating to the terrorist program. i want to be careful about what i say because the government still cares very much about what he said publicly about these activities. obviously i don't want anything that compromises what we did or where we are collecting. i can say that, because of that reason the media portion of book that may not be as clear as i'd like them to be. i was very clear in the initial drafting of the book but because of request by the government things became less clear. there may be portions of this

particular area which people may read and that i really don't quite understand what happened. i can say there were three activities the present authors. one related to content collection, phone conversations that were international and where an intelligence officer of the training believed one person on the call was a member of al-qaeda. that's the only program, the only basket that was publicly exposed by the "new york times" i think in december 2006 at everything else remained classified for a number of years. the second basket was a collection of telephone metadata. the third basket was a collection of e-mail metadata. all that's been disclosed before this book and really publicly was that the dispute that occurred between white house and the department of justice did not have to do with content collection. we were not listening in on innocent americans phone calls. it have to do with something completely different, and so why

don't i stop there and maybe going to of the questions you might have about this particular subject? >> host: sure. as i understand it, the metadata becomes part of the disagreement in the metadata, we can talk and 20 people all about bit about what metadata is emma basically uses information to them help you target where you need it to be looking more specifically for communications involving potential terrorist, correct? >> guest: metadata is not content collection. if you take your telephone bill, some people still get telephone bills, no less the calls he made and the phone numbers of youth called at the date and time, that is considered metadata. the supreme court has said that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy and metadata. it's not protected by the fourth amendment. there's no constitutional issue. the question was whether not in a collection of metadata are you violating a statute, in this case, the foreign intelligence surveillance act, which how

certain communications can be captured, collected by the cover. that was the source of the dispute between the white house and the department of justice. i might mention, this is a very important point, the dispute centered over an activity which attorney general ashcroft had approved for two and half years. we were rocking along doing fine, and then in march of 2004 he gets ill and it goes to the hospital. the program is reauthorized by the president every 45 days or so. in connection with that reauthorization is a signature by the attorney general saying that the program is lawful, there's no legal impediments to moving forward the program. the program is about to expire. werwe're coming up on this 45 dy window and general ashcroft become sick and goes into hospital. so the duties with respect to the department of justice of running the department and the

authorization of the program going forward falls to the deputy attorney general james comey. >> host: and at this time we also had new people in the justice department's office of legal counsel, correct, to a differing opinions on the legal justification for parts of this program than the earlier opinions that were provided speak was yes. when i look back at the disagreements that existed amongst the lawyers on thursday she's relating to terrorism, they all related to the scope of the president's -- the president's resources, primary sources of worked out, take action. one is express constitutional for. for simple the constitution as the president can fire one. that's expressed to the second statutory authority. when congress passes law tells the president you can do this, the third is the presidents inherent constitutional authority. some people believe inherent

constitutional authority should be limited or absent a more expansive view of that authority. as commander-in-chief during time of war for example. so the source of the disagreement centered on differences of opinion on the scope of the president's constitutional authority as commander in chief in a time of war. >> you mentioned general tomm -t ashcroft was sick in the hospital, deputy attorney general was stepping into issues and there was some heated discussion between him and some people in olc and you'll in the white house, which led to coming up all that office in the book called the into the hospital visit. i will let you walk us through that, and then just read, i will let you walk us through the visit in and of also note you have a section in the book where you say that virtually every description of this event has

been inaccurate or skewed. if you can tell us a little bit about the event and why you think, what and why haven't been portrayed directly from your viewpoint guess but we have a dispute activity. now the deputy attorney general jim comey avenue folks at olc believe, we have one activity that general ashcroft have signed off for two nephews. and i believe they cannot find a legal basis for it. and so we're coming up to the inner of -- the in 45 days. president bush will make a recommendation and shattered them. he wants to tell the congressional leadership that's what is going to do. we invite the congressional leadership to the situation appeared to receive a briefing about the program, they receive a briefing from the vice president about the program is basically advise the congressional leadership, we have a problem with the department of justice.

they believe the president doesn't have the authority to do this so watch out. can we get legislation? they also know, we can do the legislation without cover my sink the existence of this program. they leave that meeting basically informing us go forward. does the consensus we should continue to show we should continue. after the meeting that cheney, myself and others go to the residence and meet with the president. we tell the president about the meeting. there's a decision made that we should go to the hospital in the form joe ashcroft of the results of defeating. being a former senator the king was that would carry a great deal of weight within and he would be persuaded to go ahead and continue the program, an additional 45 days into it to all this mess sorted out. and so anti-car and are directed by the president to go meet with the attorney general. we heard just had surgery. it was a serious illness but we heard have been walking around

that day. nonetheless, we on two occasions both as he walked back from the residence through the rose garden and then while we were in incident on the way to the hospital, we both talked about concerns we have about joe ashcroft not incompetent. we didn't want to be accused of taking advantage of a segment. we both agreed we would watch very carefully and if anyone of us uncomfortable that he was incompetent that we would not ask anything of them. we arrive at the hospital. we introduced ourselves as a winner to talk about something important. basically just ashcroft spoke for about 10 minutes talking about cases did of what the problem was and what he been advised that ultimately he said, but all this is, it doesn't matter because i'm no longer the attorney general. and so at that point if there was some additional conversation, and we left without ever having asked the attorney general to do anything and without ever having the opportunity to leave until the attorney general about the

meeting with the congressional leadership. i have testified about this under oath, and also testified to the inspector general about what happened. so anyone wants to question my veracity about what actually happened in a hospital room, i mean, there's no basis of questioning because he cannot testify to it under oath. we without the direction of the president. we were there to inform the attorney general of the meeting with congressional leadership and ask whether not he would be willing to continue to sign off for another 45 days, an activity which you'd prefer to a half years. as soon as w he learned he was o longer the attorney general, he does of his illness -- posted which he did not know at that time? >> guest: did not know, and, obviously, when we got back to the white house and from the president that if the attorney general during the time of war was not in command of the department of justice, he was understandably very upset.

do i wish that that incident that never happened? yes. in the end i i think it has hurt both of us professional. the story of course the election, then it is that andy and i went to the hospital to take advantage of a sick man, and you know, this is just not true. we went there with direction from the president. as soon as we learned he was no longer the attorney general we left. >> host: one of the things about the account that i find pretty remarkable, you see in the book you are so focused on general ashcroft that you didn't even realize that jim comey was in the room at the time. >> guest: i know that's hard for people to understand, but it's true. the room was dark and you used to people being around, cabinet officials and then run the president, members of the security detail. made i just as it was part of a security detail and i didn't pay attention. i just focus like a laser on

general ashcroft. his wife was at his bedside, and that's all i focused on. i had no idea until he got back to the white house that jim comey and jack goldsmith was also in the room. quite frankly if i had known that, i probably would have stopped outside the hospital room and wanted to talk to them, but, you know, it just didn't happen. i just did nothing else but to be clear the administration wanted the justice department to sign off because they had previously, the president could go ahead without justice department acquiescing. but it was a more dangerous task for the present it at the end of the day did administration made changes to the program to accommodate the doj concerns, correct? >> guest: not so much, politically mighty dangers. i think it's always dangerous politically for president to

ignore the vice of the department of justice. was more important was our billy to continue this activity, relied upon the cooperation of third parties, telecom carriers. without the signature from the department of justice, much more likely they would not continue to operate. that's what is important to try to get that signature. going to joe ashcroft was something, again, it was extorted act to go visit someone in the hospital we were under, it was an extraordinary time. sure enough the next morning we had, we all woke up in america to enacted train bombing. over 200 spending your to were killed. we were very worried about what was going on at the time and that's the reason why we went to the hospital. >> host: in the book i was under the impression i left with the impression you were from hard on director comey in the book.

i'm including some of the testimony he gave before the senate after he left doj about the hospital room incident. and you say that the way it's been told, damaged your standing in your career. do you still have frustrations about this? do you feel that the director has done you a disservice and in what he is account of these events? >> guest: i want to say this about director comey. on his sacrifice and sacrifice by his family to serve as deputy attorney general, u.s. attorney and now, of course, as fbi director. i'm about that. we simply had a difference of opinion. i wish i had a hard time understanding that given the circumstances, the fact joe ashcroft has approved this for two and half years, but all we're asking for was additional time to review the legal issues. this is a time of heightened threat reporting. why not wait, just renewed for

45 days the general ashcroft would be recovered and he could been waiting. and would be much easier for us to accept general ashcroft used given the fact he had authorized this for two and a half years. it was hard understanding what was motivating the deputy attorney general. i have every reason to believe he acted in good faith. i tried to be -- although i would say -- >> host: something about the passage we discuss his testify before the senate judiciary committee. >> guest: i was going to address that. typically, you know, if you're going to go testify about something from your previous service, particularly on a very sensitive subject like the hospital visit, or particularly if you can a high ranking

official like the deputy attorney general you would notify the department of justice or at least notify the white house. and it was disappointing. it was disappointing to me, disappointed in jim that he wouldn't have the courtesy to do that. you know, i've read newspaper accounts that the concern was that we would try to do something to stop them. first of all i'm not sure we can do anything to stop them, but why would we tried to stop him? no. to me that was foolish and i think sophomoric, the notion that we're trying to do something to stop that testimony and that's why we were not told about it in advance, you become i just disagree with that drama shifting from this topic, jewish how remarkable of the time it was over 45 minut 45 minutes ine conversation of ever talk about iraq it. there's been a ton of ink spilled over the administration decision to engage militarily and what we thought we knew and when it turned out we didn't know later.

i want to focus on for the purposes of you of the book andr this conversation is a debate about the legal authority for taking action in iraq. there's a discussion about the evolution of the concept of anticipatory self-defense, and when it's okay for a country to take military action against another one, not necessarily win this threat or attack is imminent towards you. you talk about a debate internally about whether you're literally need to be in a situation where the gun was caught by your adversary or if you take a broader view in terms of given a potential heightened threat down the road, if that was enough. if you could talk us briefly to the debate. there's a section in your book where in seven to 10 days before military action starts, the president is asking you what

about my legal authorities? are the airtight? after months of debate in very close to the write up of military action, those questions are still being asked, which seemed a party remarkable sort of thing. >> guest: not really. it's a reflection of the fact president bush want to abide by the prosecution, buyout international domestic obligations. i don't find that remarkable at all, other than these were very difficult issues and we worked very hard to get them right. you are right, the lawyers worked many, many hours of discussion, a lot of debate, a lot of disagreement about legal authorities both domestically and internationally. of course, ultimately we got the authorization from congress of that gives the president clear legal authority to use force, the question we wrestled with a lot was whether not under international law did we have clear legal authority. we had the u.n. resolutions that

were constantly violated. in the end we had of course several countries that joined us in this coalition believing that, there was legal authority to take military action in iraq. i'm often asked at a talk about this in the book whether not going into iraq was a mistake. and i think the problem we have in asking the question is all of us to ask that question with a 2016 mentality. we began looking at, with any of the 9/11 attacks, president bush was in the white house, he was present when those attacks happen. he did not want of a civil attack happened again when he was president of the united states. once we learned that iraq had a relationship with al-qaeda and iraq of weapons of mass destruction, might show those weapons with the vatican did he became a very serious issue in the mind of this president. he was not going to allow another attack to happen again. sitting here today with a 2016

mindset, we can't appreciate the pressure and the way president bush felt in 2002-2003 about potentially al-qaeda getting weapons of mass destruction from saddam hussein. so that's the thing that drove this. i don't think the mistake of going into iraq based on information we had. the mistake that existed was in the intelligence in terms of the degree of weapons of mass destruction that saddam hussein had, and then the relationship that saddam hussein had with al-qaeda. that's where the mistake was. >> host: before we leave it, just declare on the legal side of things in regard to international law, you are comfortable at the end of the day that the u.s. views in terms of the longer-term threat from iraq were well supported enough to justify under international law taking action as we did? >> guest: yes.

but it wasn't just us. the lawyers in the united states advising the government. it was also lawyers in the uk and throughout the world to join the coalition. i have to concede it and i know that there was disagreement about this, that there was not international legal authority to do this, but obviously there were lawyers in paris countries who have a different view about that. >> host: we're getting closer to the end of the time. most of your book is not your served in the white house as council the white house as council. if we can transition briefly. the president asked you to go over to doj and nominate you to be attorney general. that ended up being a difficult time. we get about 350 pages into your book i think before we really start discussing some of your doj tenure. but ended up being dominated by the discussions over the removal of several u.s. attorneys.

and of all the things in the book that you sort of portrait as areas where you feel like there's been a public misunderstanding about some of your actions, this one seems to be near the top of the list. maybe you could talk us briefly through. you said there may been some mistakes in the way that that whole issue is handled but that nothing improper ever took place. >> guest: we did a terrible job in communicating what we did and why. there's a question about that and i have to accept blame for that. but at the end of the day it was fully investigated by the congress, fully investigated by the department of justice. there was nothing improper about these removals. a president, these appointments as u.s. attorneys are very political. they really are. the removals are sometimes political. that's okay so long as the removal is not in order to obstruct an ongoing

investigation. the special prosecutor appointed by general casey of inspector general and congress as i just said all look at this conclude there was nothing improper about these removals. >> host: we get to 2007. you took rather a beating from senate democrats and in the press on this issue. he was a good bit of that and then there was director comey's testimony back on the hospital room visit got to be late summer 2007 and then agenda decision was made that you are having, edit giunta the point where you are having difficulty being effective at the doj injury signed in to talk in the book some about the shock of the facility after being involved in all these years and in a few years afterwards that those are sort of in some ways difficult ones for you because i think use

of the phrase one point greater active given some of the decisions you have to make. would like to talk us through that for a few minutes? >> guest: that term came from headhunters. those were the terms that were used. it was a very tough time and it was, it was going from one or miles an hour to zero to be a cabinet secretary involved in all these issues and all of a sudden cannot be in the cabin and not be the attorney general of the united states. it was a tough time trying to find legal work meaningful legal work. it went to the old firm in houston and a decent the time wasn't right. i talked to several firms around the country about joining them, even as i talk about in the book, i have a harvard law degree, a former supreme court justice, attorney general of the united states, counsel to the president and yet they thought the time wasn't right was the usual phrase i heard, the timing

was just not right. it was, you know, the stories about because we wanted to take revenge john ashcroft and hospital room, about my involvement in decisions relating to torture, about the improper firings of the u.s. attorney, all of these things combined created this image that i was radioactive and that there's too much baggage. some firms donate some of the clients balked at the fact they were think about hiring me. it was tough for my family. thing, just mention my family once. it's very important to understand how difficult these jobs are to the families in particular. i tried not to read any of the negative press about me. my wife read every word. it really hurt her ear still today i think it's fair to say she is bitter about some of the expenses, bitter towards certain people in the way they mistreated me. and public servant shouldn't be

that hard. >> host: do you feel she has taken it harder in some ways than you have transferred no question about it. no question, mainly because she read it all and she knows how critical, how mean, how cruel it was. i knew it was criticism. i knew i was being criticized but it really wasn't, i wasn't aware of what some of the things that were being said. i wasn't aware i was being abandoned by certain so called friends. she was. she kept aware of everything. early on she really wanted me to leave, but she knew that i wanted to stay. president bush told me to hang in there. even though it was hard i did it because he knew i have nothing wrong. but also because the president was saying hang in there, hang in there, friend. so that's what a tragedy. it was hard to leave after going through all of that criticism. finally, we get to the point in

late 2007 and the decision is made that president bush basically said they're going after you again on perjury. he said i don't want to see it happen to you can. odyssey i think you side of the. he was tired of it for me and didn't want me to go through it again post back you say in the book, one of the storylines sort of post administered in typical back and said one of the lessons is that alberto gonzales as attorney general was to close with president bush in one of lessons is you can have somebody in that role who is that close and has such strong personal ties with the president. you rejected this. >> guest: i really do. having that relationship issue freedom and power to tell the president you cannot do this, this is wrong. that put you in a very powerful place. it also, the of the cabinet secretaries when they want to do something, it makes you in a

much, much more stronger position to have a relationship with the president, to be so candid you can say that is wrong, you cannot do that. i totally reject that. i think having that relationship actually made me and much more effective attorney general, even though my critics used it as a reason, as an excuse to be critical of my service. >> host: we will close. i'm curious come it's clear from the book you have a close relationship with the president what is your relationship with him like to take what do you still talk with increased usage towards the end of the book that the president has served kept up with your career moves and things you done since government service. so what's your relationship like with him today? >> guest: when it comes to national, we see each other. when i'm in. when i'm at "outside" magazine. obviously, we don't talk and see each other like we used to wh