make sure that we don't become france that we are inclusive in a way but we can do it. we've done it before. the good news is that a lot of the structures of government there is going to be a new program. you long for sensing let's had civil society take care of this let's function as a nation. and let's understand that there has to be a sense that you can buy long you have to want to vote. you have to be part of the civic framework. if it will to say what you

think. and you have to have a stake in the future there. and that is what happened in europe and it hasn't happened here. that is our challenge. and i think we have started to turn that corner. we are we're desperate for some creative ideas. >> very few people in the unites states know about these topics more than you. you started with guantánamo. thank you for joining us today thanks a lot. book tv and the look at the campaign issue of fighting terrorism continues. the next author on foreign-policy plane to the

edge. the age of terror. >> for saul it's a is a very fine book. i want to start right off with a couple of interesting chapters in the middle. one about pittsburgh in the history of growing up there in the same neighborhood for many years in what it's like to have a family in the midst of espionage. i thought you might want to say a word about those. >> thank you. i did not have a chapter on me in the book. what about you. i went ahead and put one together. i put it near the end.

it is tied to a speech i gave at duquesne university after i was director of cia. it is my alma mater. and how i brought that with me to cia. the catholic liberal arts education. wonderful broad culture he based education it was kind of value -based. and then it was in pittsburgh. you know as well as i do. even though it kind of has a white-collar white-collar economy now it still has a blue-collar style of life.

before he was somebody. before the war he was traveling to the nazis visiting pittsburgh it is pinned to a bulletin board just across from downtown pittsburgh. they characterize the city masterfully. this place just places goes to work. that is what brought me up. i wanted to i want to talk about meta- data. they used to be the case back on people just wrote letters in longhand and put stamp on

them. i think there was something called a mail watch. it would let the government tell the post office if you see anything coming here we want to keep track of the address and the return address and the postscript and the date. if they sought it getting a lot of mail from a well-known mop yet mafia figure it would take further steps. it strikes me that both which you deal with early in the book it something that you dealt with. and with respect there had been a lot of misunderstanding when you are keeping track of the government.

they're also reading the message. can you help clear up what's been going on. the public got stampeded into what i call the darkest corner of the room. i blame a lot of that on how they covered it. we should embrace a little bit of that responsibility ourselves. we probably could've been more forthcoming and we should of been far more agile telling our story and explaining what we were doing. the outside of the envelope. that's a look at the outside of the envelope. the fact of your phone call who you called and for how

long also smith versus maryland. the court held five-three. just like the outside the metadata had no expectation of privacy and was not constitutionally protected. so, when we gathered all of that data in after september 11 they then a limited access with the foreign intelligence act. it was not constitutionally limited it was limited by statute and after september 11th the president using his article to commander-in-chief authority decided that to the degree they stop to the commander-in-chief and doing that you have to be

unconstitutional because it was limiting his article. that has the -- stood up in court. the president has a constitutional authority. so we gathered the data i think we could have gone along with it but out of respect for american privacy didn't we gathered the data we put into a lockbox was just lying there we do not try to create relationships. frankly common practice. when we got knowledge of what we called a dirty number we have never seen this before. this would was really worrisome. i wonder if that has ever called the united states we

get to go to the transit and say were in new york. once a week. we then get to say so who do you get to talk too. i have now completed my explanation of the program. that is all we did. there is a nervousness out there among many far right i just don't want the government having the ability to abuse it. >> no good deed goes unpunished. and have you pushed your authorities to the ultimate legal possibility he might of gotten less of an angry reaction. i am on a panel keith alexander is with me.

and eric schmidt from google is there. were talking about this. he is to understand how powerful metadata is. we don't do that. did any of those numbers call that one. google and amazon together along with some other companies like this they know a lot more about you what sites you visit and so forth. there was a lot of folks you should know better. even after someone may have tried to explain it and then they really get interested in that they can click on the number and get the contacts of the call.

that is a laws of physics. you can't do that. let me turn you to another easy gordy i had been in many discussions about this and i'm curious as to your views and largely clear the press the navy seals in our special forces many of them perhaps most are water boarded as part of their training. >> when i came to cia my deputy was water boarded. and then there is also the case that some journalists and authors back during the peak interest in this head themselves water boarded so they could write better articles.

the test for torture is not simple and clear i don't know any other things called torture by anybody such as that is done by journalists to see what it's like. there has to be something a bit different about waterboarding which might put it in the same category that you put sleep deprivation into. in some difficult circumstances as a potential payoff in saving lives could be substantial. of the waterboarding in the same way do you think of that or not. you're right.

i talk about this in some depth in the book not because i wanted to self justify all of the waterboarding was done years before. but try to create a historical record. i do make the distinction that there are some things everybody agrees is always wrong. then he has you have some things over here that nobody has any guess about. the knee of this body of steps in the middle way over here. it's on the edge. so when i say and i repeat in the book to judge whether or not waterboarding is ethical, moral legal appropriate you need to understand the totality of circumstances in which you find yourselves. and even once you digested this they can really differ.

i was part of the administration when we took it off of the table but that's because i have different circumstances. at a better knowledge of their threat profile. they have actually taken some steps so i removed it but that was no judgment on what have gone on before when people ask me what would you have done i repeat this in the book. i think that i never have a make that decision and for those who are quick to criticize they might want to think god to someone else stepped up and made that tough call. in an infinite gray area as you know.

there was a dispute about whether or not he been the only person who was water boarded a substantial number of times whether or not the waterboarding of him produced information from him that did in fact help lead us to the courier what is your view on that. >> it would be really nice to have this golden thread they are threads. but there's hundreds if not thousands of threads. so, to hit a couple of data points. it wasn't waterboarding that made them talk it was sleep

deprivation. having said that there is a difference before and after the eit's this was totally a defiant. he was more cooperative over here. in fact he gave us large volumes of information including information that helped us on the courier. let me give you the way i explained it again in the book. i cannot imagine any operation like what happened taken place that did not rely on the shoppers food warehouse that we get from those 100 plus

detainees. it was like an encyclopedia al qaeda's. and now we see ease of once you find them. you pointed out it's very hard. to be able to kill them along the pakistani border that is something that is doable technologically for us now in ways that has sent really ever been before and as a result we've killed a lot of people that if we capture them we might get a good deal of information from them but we can get information from them if we can't sometimes use enhanced interrogation methods.

on the tough side of the spectrum that you described. they can't get any information. it seems like an odd use of time. we've been quite the catch and release. but i'll walk you through this. we have made it so legally difficult in politically dangerous to capture and hold someone that we seem like we just defaulted to the kill option. if we have our successor john in here were still in the cap churning business. and he's probably speaking his heart also. if you just look at the

numbers since january of 2009 i probably had more figures appear them had people that we have captured and held for american intake irrigation. do they apply to what you are supposed to do with respect to terrorist or in ignoring the fact that were at war work with terrorist movements. it's one of the things that i really tried empathize. if you are not treating as you would in the criminal justice system then you're acting in a lawless way and when i try two-point out we have multiple legal structures under which we can operate. it's very useful i don't give that up. we can use that. but you also have the laws of conflict. you have to presidents say we are at work with these people.

if we gives more potency we can operate in any particular operation under the laws of our own conflict. >> one more easily characterized term weapons of mass destruction. i'm curious about why we got into the habit of talking about that instead of talking about each weapon independently. you turn them into powder, you can have a huge volumes that once they are liquid in powdered form in the back seat. they are many factually completely different and people get confused and talking about that with the

government has never tried to make this clear. why? >> one of the underlying themes i tried to address that despite your inclination in my were looking out for your welfare that never really worked in it really doesn't work in today's society whether such a high demand for transparency. if they can continue to do what we did than the cost of doing business is more transparent. that is not tending to the change in changing political culture. you are actually telling the nuclear dispersal.

we price it much more precisely. it's very important if one is enriching uranium up to 20% which is what you need for some medical uses you have done about 90% of the work necessary to get it there. it is a geometric progression. and i think there is a lot of misunderstanding about that people being relatively relaxed about iran having some

20% enriched one timer. that is another subject that has never been clearly explained effectively if it has been explained people don't pick it up. i am uncomfortable at the plan of action but i have a chapter i don't think we would have bought the steel is not like we have a better idea either. this is been a problem. >> it might've been better to cap -- to have kept the sanctions. this is a very difficult problem for us to deal with. and one last thing in the

progression thing one reason i'm comfortable with the nuclear deal is that if it works and if it does everything we wanted to do and no one cheats that's what they do. maybe not. because they just wait ten years there will be an industrial strength nuclear power never more than a few weeks away. let me ask a set of questions that people always ask me and i imagine the sq which are your favorite spy novel and movie and whether or not any of the movies have anything to do with the reality it is in

the espionage world. it's often hard to find. there is a film several years ago with the surveillance. see that movie. as far as i'm concerned it's as good as they get about what really happens in intelligence. one of the reasons i wrote was to pull the veil back and let people see into the nature into their own security services. i've been around the world talking to these officers and i never met jack bauer.

there's truth in fiction as you know. i wanted to show a little bit of reality. taking that and now moving into the realm of fiction the best written piece on cia i think is the first article agents of innocence. it was reviewed on cia website. i still remember one of the lines. it's a novel but it's not fiction. and no relationship to the other. in the furthest thing possible. he was a remarkable officer in station and i think knew him slightly when he was killed this is not exactly a

biography but it's close and it really does have a feel for what it's like to be an officer. i signed the book. in the no more visual medium. one is homeland. there is my short summary. that's never can happen. but the background is right. obsession, focus mission. it brings really true. let me pull out zero dark 30. and there is many things in the that are artistically correct but are not factually correct.

a say look. they say for example there is a straight line in the movie between enhanced interrogation getting there. in real life it wasn't like this. it's like this. alleged cia interrogations over the top that said we weren't very nice to a couple dozen people. artistically correct. and then you have my it was a team effort. it was not an individual effort. again artistically i won't tell you the team that got been lauded they were assigned to women.

in the interrogation at least in terms of literature for me ask you this. as you and i know and a lot of other people know of course the cia grew out of a military organization. .. >> recruit informants inside al qaeda. that's actually, why can't hollowly and how we get this right. it is actually actually insider code that i use personally. when they get it wrong i say okay, you you really don't know

what i'm talking about. it's a great tip off. >> i had a guy who did that wrong in a -- what about the issue of whether what we do in the intelligence business can be characterized by something very different than one might say, offices and the military and specifically special forces, they are trained to kill. but they do not lose track of their reality and go killing their comrades and colleagues. it virtually never happens. whereas in the intelligence business, in a way officers are

taught to lie, cheat, steal for your country. they lie about who they are, they cheated still to collect information and collect information and so forth. i have had difficulty getting people to depart from political correctness and to admit that as what we really do or what officers in the intelligence service do. and the clandestine service is why, cheat, cheat, steal for their country and that is one reason why when those things get distorted from time to time because almost none of us have ever killed anybody heavy been taught to be special forces, but some of us know a little bit about what it might be like to fear but once in a while. if we know that, that is why spy officers are so intriguing because it's often about the myth application of those skills

to doing something you're not supposed to do as distinct from doing, using them in espionage. so right in the middle of the book i actually take take this issue on, head on. i be getting -- begin it and the line is, when you're operating outside of the law you really have to be honest. i thought very quickly of saint cia doesn't operate outside of the wall law, at least not outside of american law. then i go on. so i mean this from the heart and i give certain anecdotes in the book that the moral responsibility, the moral weight you place on someone to act the way you just described is an

incredible difficult burden. i talk about going down to the farm for graduation after field training course. in talking to the graduates and actually telling them about this moral responsibility. i say you will cultivate sources, when people agree to cooperate with you they are placing their they and their fate of their families in your hands. you may be the only face of america these people ever see. never forget your moral responsibility that you have embrace by recruiting this person or that person. and so jim, again i stress this, we can stand the stakes because we are outputting out there on low probability shots as you well know. we don't get get any of the easy burdens. we can stand it. but we cannot stand dishonesty. if you have an officer who is not totally candid candidate you

have no use form. >> it's a demanding profession. >> let me turn to iran. you said it was about 80% of your focus on one point. >> with proliferation. actually the president-elect with proliferation's focus is on iran. and i asked the questions previously and i'm describing this in chicago in december 2008 i have to say 80% mr. president or mr. president-elect. >> there is that in there is the formulation of using the initials of three things you focus on counterterrorism. what you say? >> people use to ask me what is your priorities here? and i respond with with a well it's like washington ever bet soup.

see tcp row counter terrorism, counter peripheral elation and the rest of the world. that is not happy description. there is a lot of stuff in that rest of the world and we are coming at a distant third to terrorism and proliferation because they are so demanding. that is my honest assessment of where we were. iran has distinguished itself by being number one terrorist sponsored state in the world. and by line a great deal i think , which is i understand it from their point of view it is recommended not just tolerated. i think it is important for people to understand what happened with respect to the

issue of whether i iran was or was not in the process of reacting to iraq or was in fact in the process of building up itself in such a way to dominate that part of the world. saddam clearly was worried about iran as a result of the iran-iraq war. one new report suggests that the interrogation of him by george pirro, fbi agent, a very effective interrogation indicated that he in fact did not have weapons of mass

destruction but he did everything he could to convince the rest of the world that he did have them in order to deter the iranians. that of course had reverberations inside the americans. could you talk about that. >> there is so much to look at. one of the things i stress is that iran was the second most discussed topic in the oval office. terrorism and you talk about other stuff and we did talk about other stuff enough that it was technically number three. it was terrorism and then it was iran. president bush used to ask me two kinds of questions on iran, one was a straightforward mechanical question, how much uranium do they have and how much are they enriched and so on. and then the other question he gave me and i related an incident in the chapter there, the other question he gave me is how do these guys make decisions ? i always one of the nuclear question because this is incredibly opaque society and it was very difficult for us to penetrate. i tell the story that president bush was a little impatient.

i had a good relationship with him and i think he had some regard for me and i had a great deal of affection for him but he showed anger couple of times. one time he said look, i get it. north korea is the closest ally but for god sakes we have tens of thousands of americans going back and forth between los angeles and toronto every summer. how come we don't know more. and the answer is it is a tough nut to crack. we have a good security system and i don't think many iranians really understand how iran makes decisions because of the different power centers there. >> i want to turn to the new york police department. you had a fascinating and positive, and effective relationship with them. for most americans they tend to think of the cia that operates

over and yes, they have offices in the united states and you're going to some place in america that americans don't usually go and you want to overtly. i'd be glad to come back from me and marr in chat from someone who works here, that's not compensated, that is just what it is it is everything overseas where as domestic, fbi crime deal with it. how did the cia get together with the new york police department and why, and what was going on? >> this. >> this is part of the legal ambiguity that permeates the book. i don't mean legal ambiguity about what is lawful and not lawful. what i mean is the rollover century. we have decided to protect her security and liberty

by putting things in separate boxes. the one over here, domestic over here, for an over here, intelligence over here, law-enforcement over here. the intact of over here. the intact of 9/11 were right on the scene. right between foreign and domestic law-enforcement intelligence. so i tell the tale that out of moral responsibility, we had to close that scene. so congress, actually wanted the fbi to be intelligent service, that is a cultural here. in addition, we always knew new york has been a special case. new york is certainly in america, it is not always of america. this is a truly international city. one third of the population of the city was not born in the united states. >> one third, still i realized

it would be the case in the 19th-century. >> the police force is as twice as large as the next largest police force in america. it is twice as large as the chicago police force which is larger than the los angeles police force. we're talking about a a great scale. so ray kelly under mayor bloomberg had a very aggressive intelligence program and we actually thought it was within our responsibilities to try to support. we set up a tight liaison relationship with the nypd. they did things that was controversy, this mosque crawling and other things. i would never recommend what nypd did hear for cleveland or milwaukee. but this is different. this is a special case. so we worked very hard knowing that new york was a special target that we would have a special relationship with the nypd. and dave : points out there --

there are 17 -- >> we know a lot of people like dave who did what they did during those times. i want to ask you about a couple of cases of protecting your people. we have both run into this. we caught -- on my watch but several members of congress and the senate were particularly upset because no one was fired over it and it didn't matter how many times i explained that the people who probably would have been fired were all retired and you cannot fire someone who is already retired. i could not get that message across. the times are often out of joint. you had to deal with issues that arose before you

became director and beginnings of sums that did not manifest themselves until after your director. i was particularly intrigued by the case officer, the woman who had wrongly identified -- tell us about what happened because i thought it spoke greatly to your credit how you handled it and it's interesting. >> thank you for saying that. in fact when it was happening i thought it was an easy decision. now when i look back on it i thought it was an easy decision but it appears to have been controversial. i spent a lot of time on it because it suggests, what's the right word gym? a a moral dilemma, moral pressure, conflicting pressures in an agency. to get to the point, we looked up someone, actually the

macedonians picked up someone in the he looks suspicious. we did our check and we thought he was a particular man we're chasing and we looked at it to the best of the ability and decided this is someone we really need to talk to. he was taken to a site and interrogated. the agency was actually slow and acting after it realized this is not the drone you're looking for. this is not the one that you're looking for. it took several months but finally released him, gave him a few dollars and sent him on his way. that part of the story actually bears a second looking because often we didn't act more quickly and so on. but the inspector general asked me to focus on the analyst to had actually made the decision that we need to talk to this person and take custody of him. in the dag wanted me to farm and accountability goal and i said

absolutely not. as a director he did this. as a director you are responsible for the overall health of the agency and the success of the mission. i said if i do something for creating a false positive i will be teaching every analyst in this agency that the one thing you have to really make sure you avoid is any false positives, which would then be that we will be playing back in order to be safe and we would probably have more true positives get through because if i do a false positive i could bad things could really happen to me. if i skip over to positive bad things might happen but they won't happen to me. and in conscious how could we cut possibly do this. i just

said no this is just not going to happen. by the way they analyst are some of the best we've ever had who would i put on the jury of her peers? >> yes because she didn't have any peers. >> it was easy for me but you had this urban legend of accountability for mistakes. jim come again this permeates in the book. he walked into the concourse and he go up the stairs and go to the back of george hw bush, you look to the left and there is a mural of lady liberty. it's the nation's first line of defense, we go where others cannot go, we work in a very narrow space that nobody is asked to work in, no one else is allowed to work in. we work in a space and look, i was doing a thing downtown and

they're talking about global situation and i do my big hand little map thing and finally someone is actually resident in the city people in the says to me, general on a scale of 0 - 10 how would you rate cia analysis. i pause, and the, and the first thing you have to keep in mind is we don't do eight, nine, 10. if you can get to eight, nine, or intent they're asking the department of commerce a question. department of commerce a question. they are not asking us. and that's what i try to say remember about pulling the bill back. what actually happens inside their security services, world people, extraordinary only in that they are asked to do extraordinary things. >> very good. i want to ask you who that you worked with really stands out to

you as somebody who would go the extra mile to help get the right thing done. i tell you who mine is, charlie wilson, the congressman. so the house appropriations committee we would have never gotten the predator without charlie. he would move some money around, not breaking any laws or anything but being on the appropriations subcommittee for defense he had a lot of flexibility in the combination of the directors flexibility together with the real flexibility that he had made it possible for us in high would sit there and move 500,000 from one account to another, because we were talking about big money here. but if we had to do it right he was just terrific. my example, what is some of yours? >> i've not thought about this

deeply but if you come to mind and i don't mean to be self-serving to the administration but someone like steve hadley the national security adviser, week i can have a straight forward conversation with him and i will call up and say i have a decision to make and it's mine. so so i will make the decision but i want to make you i want to know that. and in essence, i don't know that i was even inviting him to be a sounding board, i was just giving him warning that i might be jumping over the side here and you might have to be pulling me out. he was forever stable. forever willing to cover your back. i got invited to meet the press one of tim's last shows, god rest his soul. so the public affairs officer coming in and he says meet the press here and i said oh can i

switch in a call up stephen said i've been invited to be on meet the press with tim russert this sunday and he said good, good luck. no political guidance, no left and right hand mondrian's, just good luck. so he had the kind of confidence in the agency to me that allowed you to stabilize things and seven and oh eight. and my deputy, i got selected to be director in the process, there's a phone call and john was up in new york and he said i want to talk to you. the presence gonna want to talk to tomorrow night. okay. i got a pretty good understanding of what was so i literally, i walk out to my outer office and i said find

steve kappes. he had retired in a bit of a non-happy incidents at the agency. they tracked they tracked him down at a railroad station in london. i got in touch with stephen i said steve thomas mike. mike. how are you doing? would you ever consider to be the deputy director of cia? and he says to me, will that would really depend a lot on who was the director. and i said i am not at liberty to discuss it but i am am the one making this call. and he said i will get back to you. about two hours later after he talked his wife he said okay. if you're going to be number one i would be happy to come back. we had a wonderful relationship. i talk about these meetings, yuma 5:00 o'clock meeting and these are operations, you're

making decisions. very often i would be getting input and i would say okay we're going to do x. i would turn to stephen say are you are right with that? you know i wasn't given the decision to someone else, but just as a friend are you are right with that? and every time we were in the room after a particularly edgy decision and everyone else left the room and steve is they are me. he's eastern ohio, i'm eastern, pennsylvania. jerry think two boys like us would be making that kind of decision? >> steve and i were in the same offer for a time when we tried cases together and negotiated settlements occasionally together. when we are negotiating guess who got to be the good cop i guess who is the bad? >> you had something happen when

you first went to the agency. fort made went down electronically. >> when i first went to an essay. >> an what concerns about the future of the electronic infrastructure of the government and the national security side of the government particularly do you think are salient and what do we really need to do about it? >> actually that doesn't for come first chronologically in terms of a timeline but it's the first chapter in a book because it such a powerful experience for me. in essence, i am director of nsa by ten months and i get a phone

call. it would set a phone call and they said the system is down. and i said what you mean the system is down, what part? all. we were unable to move data, we are still collecting data but we cannot move it, process it, analyze it and so long. we stayed down for a bit more than 72 hours. that means america was pretty much not collecting intelligence for half a week. that is as you know, a very big deal. so signals and intelligence is your skirmish for events coming at you. so he taught me several things.

we better get in gear to modernize our it system, the other is that i have been director for ten months and i knew i had inherited a national treasure. i also knew i was in trouble with falling technologically behind but i have been cautious. this thing goes belly up, i internalize the lesson, there's no course of action i could set out on that would be more dangerous than standing still. so, at actually in addition to the technological lesson i drew from it it was a psychic lesson. move out. and we are going to begin an aggressive program. you know how we sold it? we outsourced it. we gave it to a private contractor. we use the genius of the american industry, not, not constrained by the patterns of american federal budgeting to refresh our it and get us somewhere close to the 21st century.

>> it's very interesting. i've been very concerned about the vulnerability of the electric grid generally to cyber, to electromagnetic polls, both pulse, both the short range and detonated by nuclear weapon up in orbit. there are just a number of things that it could take down, the operation of our electronics and our grid and it would probably hit first and in some ways the most dramatically on our intelligence service. >> i read the manuscript is set okay kind of soup to nuts in chronological and i get all done in a go, i don't have anything in here on cyber and it's a true story. thinking i'm kind of dumb here and i think wait a minute, i have a little snippet a little snippet here there, but no aggregation of the cyber domain. and i sat and started to write and it just gushed out of me in terms of the importance of what you are describing and how much it has fundamentally changed

american life the way we fight morse, the way we collect or protect intelligence, actually when i was done writing that i stepped back from that section and said, this is a detailed history of an evolution that from the outside looks slow but for those of us in government, to get to the access operations office and the national threat operation center into cyber command, i know for most civilians those are just words but fundamentally we built a structure in the u.s. government to conduct operations in the cyber domain and about one decade. that is the speed of light for government agencies. so i really try to lay that out. i talk about moral dilemmas inside that. we can be accused of

militarizing the cyber domain. i don't think that is quite accurate. other people are trying to do, i'm sorry we are better at it and we are more public about it so we do get the accusation of militarizing it. i actually fall back to the cyber domain is a domain, land, air, sea, space, cyber. but nobody complains about navies. a lot of people think navies are essential for keeping the comments,. so market power in the cyber domain but it's a very controversial and i take that on head-on. the last line in the chapter something along the lines of here we are, i was there for a lot of it. and. and now we're going to have to live with the consequences. >> take just one minute and expand for me on your fascinating characterization of the four cia cultures and the fighter pilots, the analyst

being like tenure faculty at universities, the people who make things and operates in the support system essentially is your fellow steeler fans and the science and technology people being -- >> i actually, it's one of the parts of the book that i really enjoyed writing, i think it is called espionage family life in the office. i look at all different aspects in it. one of them is the cia culture, and i set you drive down along 1-2-3 and look at the fence line and you think cia is a singular noun. it's never singular. on a good day it's a collective

noun. most days it's plural. you have each of these four fundamental directorates. now, it's not in the book, it is the book, it is post right in the book but john brennan our successors there. he is trying to cut through those four cylinders. >> exactly but we need to wrap up. >> so multiple cultures and you have to learn to deal with each. >> i love your final quote in one chapter and i will close with that because it it's a nice guide to the way you operate as well as a great guide to people and it said, you're the only superpower in the room but don't act like it. >> that is right. that is my guidance. >> thank you. >> thank you.