democratic president : reduced to the evaluation of people not wearing black robes, the red and blue robes. that's going to change our justice system and not in a positive way. i think the president is hopeful that there will be a horse correction implemented, probably not under -- course correction -- not under leader mcconnell's leadership of the president is hopeful it is one that can be fixed and it is something i think will send an

important message to the american people about how our laws come even at the highest level, are applied without regard to partisan affiliation. >> and on another subject you expect the paris climate deal to be officially, become official this week in terms of the 55 country signing on? >> i don't have an update in terms of -- what we've said is we expect this is an agreement that would go into force before the end of the year. i know there's some reporting out of europe indicating a substantial commitment would be made to the agreement there that would allow the agreement to go into force, but i don't want to get ahead in the announcements that need to be made by individual countries as they consider fulfilling the commitments they've made in the context of negotiating. [inaudible] >> it would be historic.

the president has talked about how this is the first time we've seen 190 countries come together and make a series of significant commitments despite climate change. what's also significant is these kinds of multilateral agreements that are negotiate under the auspices of the u.n. typically take multiple years, if not decades, to enter into force. and the fact that this agreement will take effect in less than a year is not just an historic accomplishment, it's an historic commitment to fulfilling the terms of the deal and away the enormous positive benefit for the plan. the president has been clear this agreement is merely the first step but it's important because it codifies the structure that commits countries every five years to making new commitments about steps they can do to more effectively and more comprehensively fight carbon pollution.

so initiating this process is enormously important. the fact that it is on track to take effect less than a year after being negotiated, i think bodes well for the long-term impact that this agreement can have of protecting the planet. okay? gregory, i'll give you the last one. >> speed we will leave this briefing to go live to a discussion on the current state of arms control between the u.s. and russia. the brookings institution is hosting this discussion on history of nuclear deterrence. it's just getting underway. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> ladies and gentlemen, let me see if mic is working. can everybody hear? their 80s. it's working now. i'd like to welcome you all to brookings. just would like to let everybody in august of that you were on live tv. we have colleagues from c-span to overhear, so please be on your best behavior we will try to be from the podium as well. i think we also some colleagues from iceland tv as well. very pleased to have your. because this is obviously a very special event to mark the 30th anniversary of the reykjavík summit in iceland. i'm fiona hill, director on the senate the united states and europe, and it's my great pleasure to be a today and had

the opportunity to moderate the panel of three extremely distinguished people who all have their own connection to this summit 30 years ago. 30 years ago i was just starting off at university watching all of these gentlemen on television and wonder how this is all going to turn out. it's quite common for the younger people in the audience, just think we might be in 30 years time. you just never know. we actually are using this occasion to get ahead of another big anniversary which will be coming up at the end of the she which is the 25th anniversary of the collapse of the soviet union. we can be sure there will be lots of events related to this, of the fall of the republic of slovenia including the russian federation. after the end of this year. we thought reykjavík was an extremely important anniversary and we would like to welcome to the ambassador of iceland, very pleased you could be here with

us in the front of the audience. because reykjavík was one of the key events that led up to the end of the cold war. it was one of, the key meetings between detroit and the soviet union and the whole succession of events that prevented -- preceded the fall of the berlin wall. we have a two panel again. the first panel will focus on the significance of the summit itself with three people who were there. and the imports of the bilateral u.s. and soviet effort to walk back from the brink of nuclear confrontation their the second is going to be moderated by my colleague angela stent, is going to hone in on the general issue of arms rejection and arms control after reykjavík and success -- arms control for new relationship between the soviet union and the united states and between russia and the united states over the last three decades. obviously, development over the last couple days have put that back on the agenda again with russia pulling out of the plutonium disposition.

sometimes i think my colleagues -- the little precedent, he insisted on holding the event on this day on october 4 and am wondering if you knew some else's could happen on october 3. it puts the whole agenda of arms control and the concentration between russia and the united states suddenly back at the top of the agenda in the news again. i want to begin with them with a little bit of stepping. not everyone will remember, some people in the audience were probably not one thing, it's worth reminding us the 1980s were years of hiding the cold war confrontation and there was a real risk of nuclear war. i just want to go through a few quick points and turned over to our panelists for discussion of this. we had a detente between the united states and the soviet union and europe, soviet union in the 1960s and 1970s. but by the 1980s soviet union was convinced that the united states are becoming clear and

present danger. they were spinning all the time poring over yes defense budgets, global u.s. military society can american airports and sensitive soviet borders, some familiar like what we've seen today. segments by top white house and pentagon officials like ken edelman, increased operations by the cia in afghanistan and elsewhere. by 1981 the kremlin leadership was convinced the united states was a nuclear threat. march 1983 was a full-scale. this is just a few as president ronald reagan had announced the developer of the strategic defense initiative, or star wars, to launch its ballistic missile defense system that was supposed to shield the united states on the soviet nuclear strike. to which his move from leading g the kgb to been rather busy becoming the general sector of the soviet union, head of the soviet state in 1982 accused ronald reagan of plotting a nuclear holocaust.

it was palpable throughout europe as well as the united states, and during british workings to test nato preparation for soviet nuclear strike as we now know thanks to the declassification of british archives, queen elizabeth ii actually drafted a world war iii speech. she had an address that was in the arcades only revealed a few years ago basically urging britain, as one might respect, to remain united against the madness of nuclear war. this was drafted the same time president ronald reagan made his very famous evil empire speech on march 8, 1983, about the dangers posed to the united states. things were pretty that 1983. they got worse at the end of the year. the soviet warplanes intercepted and shot down a south korean airlines play, believing it was a u.s. spy plane as a slave from

alaska to seoul. the whole idea of an impending nuclear world war iii was reverberating around pretty much every world capital. 1984, just to run up to these events, ronald reagan, one of the most infamous hot mic incidents international affairs we need help on u.s. public pressure rated just before a live broadcast in california my fellow americans are pleased that today that i signed legislation that will outlaw russia forever, we will begin bombing in five minutes as we now know from declassified soviet archives, nobody got the joke and complete panic set in in moscow. only when these gentlemen -- after march 1985 when mikhail gorbachev came into power the thing started to calm down. in november 1985 in geneva in the kill gorbachev and ronald reagan held the first meeting between soviet and american leader, the first meeting in

seven years and then begin the process leading up to reykjavík good start to put all these tensions aside. the reykjavík summit 30 years ago was a key part of that process. it would also ultimately to the signing of 97 intermediate treaty, inf treaty. and lithograph 19,911th s.t.a.r.t. treaty. as we will hear, the summit seemed to be a bit of event. it's in the aftermath of again and of those cold war familiar senders of spy expulsions from u.s. embassy in moscow and the russian embassy here, steve pifer who will be on the next panel was asked in the u.s. embassy in moscow bit and spent most o of the time having to fil in for vital personal staffer who have been expelled and tried a truck in getting him and analysis of russian political military affairs and, of course,

you as a journalist nick who later became a professor of journalism was arrested and imprisoned in a soviet jail. that was all that was going on. but behind the scenes at reykjavík things were quite different as we will now hear from our panel. we first of all have to get this off brookings president, strobe talbott, who is covering reykjavík in this capacity at that point as washington bureau chief, "time" magazine. we also have our good colleague and friend marvin kalb who is a veteran cbs and abc news correspondent their ugly you were the anchor for me to process those many other capacities at that time, marvin. then we have distinction a diplomat kenneth eighth amendment's just published a book, "reagan at reykjavík" at its onset outside the editor of the you probably saw the beginning. and ken was there with president

reagan behind the scenes with soviet general secretary mikhail gorbachev t the head with it soe of the atmospheric and observations on stroke and marvin, ken will tell us what really went on behind closed doors. thank you very much for joining us. it's exciting have such great panel and to people who were present at the event. we are very much looking forward to what you have to say. strobe, overdue. >> thanks, the unit. that's a terrific set up for a really story, and i think those of us who were there including of course marvin and ken, knew that there were some possibilities, but it don't think any of us had even an inkling of how far to these two leaders are gorbachev and reagan would actually go your ken is the only person probably in the room but certainly on the podium

was behind the closed doors. marvin and i were trying to listen through keyholes, if we could find any. i'll come back to that in just his second. but just to fill out a little bit of what fiona just said. this was still fairly early in the personal relationship between the president of the united states and then it was the general secretary of the communist party of the soviet union. there were signs that things might warm up. the geneva meeting that happened the year before was, the atmosphere to pretty good. and they certainly were better than the relationship or the nonrelationship between president reagan and and drop

off not to mention chernenko. but we had no idea as we got onto the press playing and headed to reykjavík, of all places, if i can say that, mr. ambassador. by the way, the site was actually up it because it was more or less halfway between moscow and washington. so neither leader had to go too far in the direction of the other, was sort of the idea. and it was october obviously. it was blustery. the little house, i guess can we see that and they can't? okay. i checked this with the ambassador before who confirmed that it was reputed to be wanted -- quantity.

and that's where everything went on. as the weekend developed we began to get briefings from -- ken, i kevin and if you did any of them yourself. i think actually secretary shultz came out at one occasion while things were looking pretty good. it sounded as though it's going to be actually not just a placeholder for a more substantive segment later in the year, but big things were going on in the house. and we at "time" magazine usually closed our weekly magazine on friday night so that it could come out on monday morning. and all of the signals were positive, so we had a number of photographs of reagan and gorbachev smiling and looking

triumphant, one of which was i think david took it, was all ready to go. i had written the cover story. my editor, somebody you may have heard of, walter isaacson, back in new york was helping me put the finishing touches on it. about 4:00 in the afternoon that sunday, 4:00 on sunday when the magazine was supposed to hit the streets, the next morning george shultz came out into the press room, and you could tell from his face, you could tell from the tears that were in his eyes that the whole thing had collapsed. this led to one of the more exciting moments of my journalistic career. i had to get on the telephone

immediately called walter back in new york and sent the equivalent of baby, get me rewrite. and i started dictating what we were hearing from george shultz and others who told us why the talks had collapsed. the word laboratory kept coming up him and i think i will say that for you, ken. and so we managed to flip a happy story into an unhappy story. we found unhappy picture of the two leaders come and week out "time" magazine into your hands about 7:00 the next morning. but that's not really anything more than background and color. what i think is really important about what we're going to be talking about the next little

while is that while it was a busted summit, it showed the degree to which these two men getting, by the way, a lot of pushback from their military and their political advisers. these two men were determined to, rather than having the united states and the soviet union constantly looking over the brink that would take us into global thermonuclear war, they were serious about not just arms control, but massive, massive reductions of the arsenals of the two countries. and even though the reykjavík summit didn't achieve for reasons having primarily to do with sbi, it did create a kind of come if i can put it this way, a launching pad for the

arms control agreements that were reached during not just the years but for decades that follows, which will bring us to a melancholy present where so much of that progress, unfortunately, has either been stalled and is going to be very, very hard to pick up on. so with that i will turn it to my traveling companion acting those -- who always was wearing a red tie by the way. [laughter] i just put on a tie for all of you, but, incirlik didn't have a tie on when i was rewriting the story over the telephone to walter. over to you, marvin. >> thank you very much, strobe. and it's a pleasure to be with you guys on this bill. i have covered many

soviet-american summits. it was my great pleasure to do so. there were great stories, for someone who had spent much of his life either in russia or studying russia, i was hosted by what was going on, and most especially with the arrival of over chop on the scene. -- gorbachev. reykjavík to me was an enormous disappointment. i think it was a summit you could almost say that shouldn't have happened. and i appreciate what strobe was saying, that it did set certain things up, but two men were that close to something that was truly historic and could not pull it off. and when you look at secretary shultz his face when he walked out, it seemed as if you just been informed that his wife and children had died in an automobile accident. he looked awful.

and as a reporter you look at that any new eqa to any advanced work at all, you realized that gorbachev was trying to reach out to the west. he was aware that three of its leaders had died within the previous four years. he was a young man and decided to do something different with russia. and so very quickly initiated a program that was called -- the idea of reforming russia, and his vision was that you can hold onto communism if you could somehow reform a system that was broken to the truth of the matter is, it was so broken that you could not continue, and reform wouldn't work, but he did know that. and he started in january of that year floating the idea of eliminating all nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

a number of people in the city, i remember, i will not mention names but some of the people said a lot of propaganda, a lot of nonsense. that might've been the truth, but that's what he said and he put that out there. and then the following month out of the former soviet office came word that the linkage that had been a soviet requirement and always agree but come here and have all or nothing, they pull back from the. they were saying maybe you could get one. and then behind it all was the awareness that afghanistan was a monstrous headache and an obvious defeat, and how did the soviet leader acknowledge that to his people, 13,000 soldiers have been killed. how do you acknowledge that to the mothers and fathers? it was a tough thing, you begin to -- waivers came in he said this is a bleeding wound and we've got to end it. so he was aware.

he was under incredible pressures. he was trying to do something different, and the stage was reykjavík. and for a reporter there, you realized this was a big deal, although we were being told by our briefers, not ken, others, that this was just a set up for what would be a gorbachev visit to the united states the following year by a reagan visit to moscow. and yet behind the scenes, as we will hear, they were discussing things that were unbelievably important to the world and to the two countries. gorbachev was it there with that idea in the final analysis of eliminating nuclear weapons, all nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

the president was fascinated by the idea. reagan, despite the image of being the conservative not get along with russia, reagan wanted to get along with russia. he wanted to get along with everybody. but more or less on his terms. and reagan had a romantic attachment to sdi, to what we in the press call star wars. that romantic attachmenattachmen t was complete. there was total. and if you have a choice at a certain point in that negotiation of saying, maybe we could both agree on eliminating all nuclear weapons by the year 2000, but, gorbachev wanted first elimination of the idea of sdi. that didn't work. and then there was the possibility of a compromise. reagan wanted the ability to test metal in the laboratory but also in disguise. and gorbachev was bigger -- in

disguise. gorbachev was prepared to accept the idea of testing in the laboratory, but not in the skies. but they would not accept it. so at the end of the day what was explained to us by secretary shultz and by others later was that yes, this was possible, but the president would not yield on sdi and, therefore, nothing was possible. and that to me is company, so what was given a journalism long, i just think back of what it now, absorbed with writing of history of russia and the soviet union, and about ourselves and our dealings with russia, you think back to that time, my god, wwe've had nothing quite like it since or before. and how fantastic it would've been if one or the other have been able to make that final

break with advisors who kept saying no, easy does it, boy, don't go too fast, don't go too far, any president who really wanted to do it, everything in hollywood in him, moved him to make a big sensational statement, but he was in love with sdi and, therefore, he couldn't pull it off. and that sounds to me like a sad story and i'm sorry to have to report it. [laughter] >> with tears in her eyes as well i suppose. i met of the issues we should mention that the summit, chernobyl and gorbachev had just come straight out, secretary-general on in his term, this devastating accident and the civilian nuclear complex which has had very large effects in iceland, like many other countries in northern europe,

have been under the plume of radioactive material that emanated from chernobyl. that would also -- server for gorbachev been thinking about this in different ways. so ken, marvin has portrayed some of the motivations and ideas of reykjavík what was it like behind the scenes? >> marvin was saying this was a very sad event. i'm going to tell you why it was a very happy event, and stroke told us why it was a very amazing event. the most amazing is to say monday when we got back there was "time" magazine with that picture on the cover and thinking my god, this is a printing and distribution an editorial triumph in the first order that was floating out there. >> there were some grammatical errors in there. [laughter] spin i thought there were errors of you rather than grammatical, i overlooked. rather minor. but as marvin said, the

gorbachev on the scene was an amazing change. starting in 83, there was brezhnev's death and the newly replaced by andropov and than 14 months later, andropov died and then chernenko was there and help with two arm chairs in every room, and he died. carol and i were very good friends of the italian ambassador if he was on the us is going to chernenko's funeral. and i said why i think that? he said, i bought tickets for the entire series. [laughter] solutions to going back and forth from those. so i thought to get a happy story, marvin, and to cheer you up which is less than what my in life, to cheer you up -- >> you have been an utter failure. [laughter] ..

>> >> amazingly isolated it is thought to be haunted and is now called the haunted house but is this a beautiful house on the outskirts but and there was a big event for the 30th anniversary. so to go back and see that

my wife does not like me to say this but it was the greatest weekend of my life. [laughter] with of frill but real quick mrs. "time" magazine and we have a collection man of the year when he will be happy to know with the reagans signature. >> it is like a are in bed to go was -- a dual rather than shooting each other with a thermonuclear yvette bass was a very scary time

as was pointed out in this cover story, man of the year and looking very somber. when you can see the size of it i will give you a quick to were the upper left chamber is the american chamber where we were waiting with the president and the of bright bedroom was the soviet parlor and that part in between was the demilitarized zone. [laughter] but on the laugh was the main floor where the two met they've met 10 in after-hours. at all about you by never met anybody for one weekend 10 and half-hour's. without talking points this is the most j. when either was in office may be when

your president of united states or the general secretary of the soviet union but everything of the talking points do this sort don't do that. commack as you are one free-floating. the likes of which will never be repeated. it was the smallest bubble ever made the room inside the room there were eight of us in the bubble gm shoulder to shoulder the doors were opened and the president of the united states was there and i thought if i will stay in the bubble and i will then i'd better give the president my chair. so for the next before remittance i was leaning against the presidential means listening to what

gorbachev wanted to do. >> is a business world and not this universe. -- miss universe but she was to isolate and and crowned the month before i thought it would make a great cover for my book. the publisher thought it was of little off. [laughter] fifty shades of i.c.e. or something. [laughter] the search engine. the prime minister of vice land in his bathing suits talking to a young tom brokaw who want to do interviews. i felt ill-equipped. they thought with the opening of the senate and there were 11,000 members there.

but those on the far right i'm not sure bet he is doing an interview. a very small room he is starting to sit down right there. and then showing him doing great and then coming to a book party at t11 it was beautiful. the president and gorbachev and then you can see to translators that were simultaneous and the note taker that is important because george washington university put the notes on line. the american notes and the soviet notes from the summit that is something i did not know what the time.

because there was a garbled 10 minutes recap but in these notes you see the back and forth and they are very very interesting with those 10 and a half hours here is the house where we met. i was disappointed because there was a concert downtown with a street festival of was looking forward to that which your pearl is back in the audience as part of our group, we met at 8:00 at night, we took of break at 315 we adjourned at 620am, i have never done an all-nighter.

event to accomplish more to have seven and a half years of negotiations be. we did not do much with imf because the two presidents not only like to talk about it and that was one of the remarkable parts of the tent and a half hours the one the more jacked up the other and to promise from reagan. it was just flecks of fantasy on both sides. this is madoff on the left to later committed suicide when the soviet union fell.

this is sunday afternoon. and with the late rush testament -- russia summit was supposed to end but they thought because they were back and forth they would go into overtime. the president comes up at 3:00 in the afternoon on sunday and sits in a corner to say i will go down one more time. that sent. promised nancy i would be home for dinner tonight. we said nancy knows where you are it isn't like you would stop at the bar on the way call. [laughter] there is 127 journalist. [laughter] he said i know but i told her i would. so we are going over that. and don regan and george

shultz and a good-looking guy showing his bedside right there is richard perle that was before i died my hair to tell you the truth. so trying to come up with words to bridge the gap. it was fundamental and to confine to the laboratory by reagan did not want that confined. now over 10 more years through 1996. it came up as marvin mentioned as the advisers

robert all over the place. that is sent exactly what happened because ronald reagan knows what he wanted. i don't think there was time over the weekend. he knew what he sought and that was pretty enough for him. they went back and forth it is wonderful to read the notes and the transcripts of the soviet no takers it is a case study of leadership that last half-hour when they were trying to bridge the gap and a start to talk about the situation to begin each other's shoes. reagan was talking up a problem gorbachev might have with the kremlin how-tos of its and he started to talk about reagan's problems and it was beautiful. they were pleading with each other.

, on. reagan was the best we had seen you went to the ambassador's house for u.s. staying in he was just walking back and forth about what might have spent his handler at the of miller center from the university of virginia just as nancy was going into surgery and was educated. and star wars sinks the summit title think that was fair. i think gorbachev trying to sell that at the end of the

summit not on sunday morning but you are right that was at the center of the controversy. allotted details could be filled and give it for halloween coming up for a thanksgiving what came out of it? three things. this is signing the imf agreement in the white house and december 1987 for the summit basically the zero option of the opening bid for the negotiation with

from 82 and with the class of weapon system of the soviet side and american side it was a great deal with 5500 warheads facing the capitals of europe when reagan came into office that was signed in the room of the white house. on the strategic level one not down to equal levels real reductions for strategic nuclear weapons. this is important with all other arms control but i

thought were a bad idea limited the growth of nuclear weapons as they started to have a decline that is why we changed the start. fourteen pdf with the strategic arms talks with production the have about one-fourth in terms of the nuclear stockpiles. it continues through clinton and then obama than the

third and thing i would do did that contribute to the end of the cold war? i have heard a lot of argument with the causation of science in any case i personally believe reykjavik is that it minimized no nuclear cries it is remarkable to think that before t11 the idea to abolition that they have full singers sing about and 90 people write about with nobel. with things like that it was

not mainstream. but after reykjavik was ronald reagan as the poster boy for the number of keys participants that includes ronald reagan that includes those who knew more about what business than any of us. with chairman of the joint chiefs as the american ambassador to russia. and henry kissinger who became cray respectable movement after and because of reykjavik. but the main argument when i would make is how did that happen?

in there was no way reagan would give that up. the only thing he could do the most threatening weapons system to ahem and to the world he gave the first address then any soviet leader gave after for a meeting want -- four in beating. but i think it quoted him exactly that they are a threat to the very existence of our country and a threat everywhere. this is a little research from the pentagon. it could be a pimple on the budget or less than that. but throws that up of the

threat of all time. he could get reagan to give up for fbi with of reductions good enough, but it totally failed then the only alternative is to reform the soviet union. once he started the reform that was vastly accelerated with the central committee meeting then with the party of congress the first one since stalin then implemented those reforms that were so sweeping. that is my thesis. i know they will disagree but we can talk about that later. to a three-point so i would make you mcdade a great background what i've learned

to do not pick a fight with the moderator. i would disagree you say absolutely the soviet union feared an american nuclear attack. because of the succession of those statements by reagan. and what we used to deal with every year. into had the same argument every year. and we make the same point every year. and we only just come back from moscow. but going back and forth for basically they were scared out of their mind for the of nuclear attack. the last time i checked, all

the submarines over 90 percent are imported anyone time. we were never have 50 percent of the bombers at anyone time. because the submarines were way over half if he was scared to death why didn't he do anything? they were there to talk about being attacked. so on the point about gorbachev to abolish nuclear weapons and some people in the illustration said it was propaganda. i was one of those people. it to say all the dead soviet leaders before that.

i did not believe that for a minute and not and tell reykjavik to tell you the truth to believe he was sincere after words. looking back now i was wrong to think it was propaganda at the time. but the fact is reykjavik was not the unknown nuclear it did not come from gorbachev but from reagan. but reagan comes up with the idea. i never suspected that he would do that but it turns out he really really was. the last point to is why reykjavik was a failure despite what came from it with arms control and the movement to break up the soviet union.

unlike saturday night with the reductions on sunday morning, they surprised us, he announced they went at zero to the inf systems in europe and we all said holy cow this is never never, before. number two all the strategic gains we made were tied to the laboratory and that was never discussed at all. this was his idea to get that done. how was disastrous news to confront inf to the laboratory and then that is what put sunday into the total tailspin.

>> we may have run the risk to go to far in the description because there isn't too much more in the book as you gave us the blow by blow. so i am sure you do have some comments and redo know that the soviet union to put it blunt their resolve lot of material that is not be the east with us cia of the security studies and through those archives of how the of kgb and counterparts are constantly hounding with ack-ack capitalist in the of west. so they were constantly scouring for any piece of

evidence to be preparing for a nuclear war. >> i am not questioning the material i am discussing if it was sincere. then why don't they take action? there are a lot of robbers be careful. you have got to be careful because the robbers are here. but then they lock the door spinet they launch their own operation at the time. and with t11 butter was genuine fear or what it was perceived in the west. that makes this an important segment so where that led by

know that makes a very important. >> maybe within five minutes we will turn to the future and i don't want to rekindle the argument but i do want to put that on the table at a very important piece of background. so that is one of the reasons of the soviet union of the robust antiballistic missile systems that that person of lyndon johnson hit seven over there ahead of the summit on why he seemingly perverse

principal. and to destabilize that is actually a critical way and is critical to the u.s. position for a long time to limit the antiballistic missile systems. the soviets bought that. and while president reagan sincerely believes that was out of date or just plain wrong, and many of his advisers including those that were with 10 in t11 just did not believe that this was stabilizing or that it would work. that was part of the background in.

>> my concern is the russians were concerned and try to head off the appearance of the system and it wasn't that could have been developed over time but their concern was of the americans at this point. thinking of afghanistan taking place roughly the same time. russia was at that point it was obvious to the russians and the rest of the world. what did the u.s. do at that point? make it easy for the russians to lose or more difficult? with an investment of $10 billion to build up the mujahideen which now we know they're best friends in afghanistan. but also of point where it

is the i.r.a. sdi today? that is a big issue? right? my sense is if i go back to a point because it means a lot to me. these two men actually discussed and they did from the year 2000 at the end of the day you could not do because of the difference of the laboratory with the u.s.-soviet relationship or for that matter and then to use that term armageddon in

1983 and then the presidential debate. and he sort of backed off again and again a nuclear war with cannot be won and ought not to be fought. he is very much opposed but could not bring himself at the end of the day and a starkly and forgive me for going back to my disappointment that stands out as a huge moment we could have won a one way the went to another one. >> we will check further because cost is the issue will be. between obama n and the others saw the light to

bring in the audience to pick up the audience from over here i will take two or three. >> the economist dressed as the demonstrators and underneath it was haunting europe. and the story was to abolish strategic nuclear weapons to make a higher rask with a war in europe either conventional with a limited nuclear war to be confined to the battlefield. one year later they