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>> i would target every federation council that voted for the annexation of crimea. it doesn't get as much attention. at a certain point i think you need to look at additional sanctions. i've been told by some of the administration, the russian central bank, look at gas, kit off tbas to ukraine twice in the height of winter in 2006 and 2009. if we started going after the head of the fsb, remember, he came last year for the counterviolent extremism

conference, to me it's hard to fathom how we would have the head of fsb coming to washington. we need to widen the swath of the officials that are involved include every member of federation council and go after businessmen who are thriving. >> david, your sense as a republican on sanctions particularly in the house. i know you can't speak for everybody, give your sense. is there continued support for sanctions on ukraine going forward working the women drattic president or working with a president trump, how will that play out in terms of republican politics?

>> this is not a political football issue. same with ukraine-related sanctions. >> i think that will continue regardless of how the senator or the house go. i think there's strong support in the congress for ukraine and i think the sense in congress is that to help ukraine you need to tighten the pressure on russia. >> -legislation ready to go. >> there's a variety of measures, there's a lot of support. they support pressure on russia although i completely agree with characterization there hasn't been enough and we don't see a failure of sanctions but a failure of maintenance.

legislation that exists, there's calls, there's a tinny chance that there could be a lame duck passage of more measures from congress this year, more likely next year. the challenge, though, is that there are a number of ideas and i think this is a concern, a real concern that this idea doesn't just flow on congress but elsewhere but linking the economic leverage such as this applied pursuant to ukraine related sanctions with measures to try and pressure russia over syria, linking the two which i think is a really concerning idea but members of congress would like to run with and other people too. you see the commingling has been said. one of the reasons why it was easier for the eu to roll over, contemplate rollover of economic

sanctions come the turn of the year is because those in europe who would have been more comfortable with exploring alternatives to rollover, kind of roll back. i think the commingling of the two areas has already begun conceptually and negotiating going forward. i think it would be a tremendous mistake to link them. there's no clear off ramp. we get into a version of the iran problem we have where iran says, wait a minute, you've removed nuclear sanctions but there's still so much in place that it's very difficult for other people to do business here. >> one quick thing. i would also like to see the congress ban participation of russian privatization by definition if western entities

participate in privatization, they are giving money to the russian state because it's state-owned enterprises. that freezes up money for ukraine to go after ukraine, syria, i don't think western firms or company should be involved in privatization in russia. they need the money. we shouldn't be helping putin carry out aggression in military action. >> i think the issue that for both of you saying the sanctions if they're going to work, they never work by just imposing sanctions in the country and the country changes mind on policy. if they work, they work part of broader strategy, diplomacy, engagement, trade, military pressure, we saw a lot of the things brought to bare in the iran deal. as you know, we start linking

the sanctions on ukraine with syria, they only get to a situation where it's not clear exactly what we are negotiating on, why would we list the sanctions on say if russia makes progress on ukraine and the whole things becomes more muddled. but i would also caution on the same note against some of the further sanction that is david is suggesting. if we start to sanction basically everybody at the top of the russian federal government, we cut down our opportunities for diplomacy and engagement and that means that we can't eventually find a way out of this mess. >> can i -- sorry. >> if we prevent all american companies from investing or trading with russia, all american banks from doing business with russia we run into the same problem. you end up with economy and

opportunity for engagement and trying to find diplomatic solutions to problems go away. >> sometimes diplomatic solutions aren't there. i don't think we've suffered from a lack of engaugement with russia on syria. it's not for lack of talking with each other. the russians don't acknowledge that they bombed a humanitarian convoy. it isn't lack of engagement. the questions for critics that i would ask, if not sanctioned up, then more john kerry meetings in geneva. i don't think that's going to solve anything. if we see something is unacceptable and i hope everyone in the room would grow that russia's invasion of ukraine and illegal annexation of crimea is unacceptable. what are we going to do about it?

there has to be some kind of consequences for egregious behavior, if not sanctions, then what? >> you're basically that sanctions aren't that leveraging, they should suffer consequences, but the question then would be are these sanctions that we have in right now the most effectively of doing that and some particularly in russia military modernization, technology transfers from the west, that's already impeded russia's modernization a little bit. long-term strategy to punish russia for what it's done and prevent it from doing the same thing in other countries then the sort of high-level individual and entity sanction that is we have in place right now. >> okay, i would like to remove your proposal in privatization, there are some ideas that will

not work. like privatization and the other stories like sanctions on russian oil sector when you prohibit russia access and drill. okay, with the price of dollars, $45 a barrel. [inaudible] >> so you may prohibit americans and europeans but they are not going to buy. what you would -- what you can do is to impose in providing loans to russian government. do not allow american and european investors to invest. in 2015 and 2016 all domestic finance was financed by foreign investors.

russian investors they have reduced holdings of russians but foreign investors have financed budget. the same -- [inaudible] >> it was official ban while in september the ban was removed, 70% of the russian federation was purchased by americans and europeans. first make what works. just ban and providing finance with russian government. it's much more effective. >> i agree with that, but western investors would buy if they thought it was a good investment. i don't want to rely on the good consciousness of western investment leaders. i want to make them understand it is illegal to participate in privatization.

that to me is the main goal. not to provide any infusions of new money that would free up the ability of kremlin to carry out military actions. >> i would recommend to any foreign investors to put russian government toward privatized. [laughter] >> speaking of things that are illegal, back to companies in businesses, there's a lot of russian money that flows west ward as well and finances lots of things in the west. there are a lot of laws that we have in our books against companies engaging in all sorts of activities. it's not a russian example. in the session the other day, which has had huge banking fraud as people know, it turns out all of that money was funneled

through banks and member of nato, member of eu, city of london is very dependent in all sorts of financial flows so i'm wondering what -- shouldn't we not just be thinking about sanctions imposed on russia but simply upholding our own laws and some of our own institution companies enablers of the same type of activities that we are trying to prevent the kremlin from doing. >> i think what you are talking about is one and the same. u.s. sanctions apply to u.s. jurisdictions, so u.s. companies, they can't apply currently. that -- both goes to the point of what u.s. companies or european companies can do in russia or with russia but it also, of course, can apply, authorities are all there for what russian entities can do in the united states, a certain

bank in the united states shall not do business, a certain kind of business. so in the continuum of escalation of sanctions and i sure hope you're thinking of a whole lot of things before we get to central bank or that kind of incredibly strong sanctions in there, that's all the space that hypothetically there would be restrictions on u.s. persons, legal or national persons doing business or hosting business with russians entities. that's obviously an opportunity for the eu as well. you mentioned london for major source of russian investment. >> you make the u.s. case but much of the case is about europe. i'm just wondering, do we see a potential there of splits between how the europeans are approaching the issues, whether enforcing their own laws or whether we are and is that potential that the ultimate

effectiveness of the sanctions regime dissipated because of our own internal differences? >> it's already an issue. the fact that another distinction between the u.s. and the eu sanctions that in the united states sanctions are created in a central manner, by our federal government and they are similarly enforced and monitored essentially. however, in the eu policy is created but takes place at the membership level which means that it is dependent on the the political will and the capacity of the member state to carry it forward once it's in practice and it should be no surprise that the debate about whether or not sanctions are a good idea or ruled over is an excellent proxy for what is allowed or, you know, officials may look away within their own jurisdiction.

there are companies interested in circumventing so as to avoid detection or scrutiny. >> okay, we are going turn to question and answers. i will come to you in a second. one last lighting round here. put you on the spot. first hundred days of a new administration and congress, what should we do with sanctions regime? what does the united states do? >> to increase economic cost aggression in ukraine. >> signal immediately to europe that they should roll over sanctions, not just for six months but for longer period of time in order to try and see the ground for a coordinated transatlantic strategy which is essential. >> sanctions will stay in place

and if necessary will done unilaterally. i would like to see europeans. it's hard to get agreement. >> sometimes, yeah. [laughter] >> make a concrete offer to the russians very early on that we will list the majority of sanctions regime and be specific about what is in exchange for the full completion of the process and explicit and that would hopefully help negotiations. >> okay, so we are going to turn to the questions and comments, please keep your comments brief, if you have them instead of a question keep the question brief. if you can identify yourself briefly, we have microphones. right here. >> good morning, alex, new resident at the atlantic council. i think the discussion has revealed that sanctions are imperfect weapon.

and necessary but not nearly as sufficient response to the challenge we face from russia. in response to concern that sanctions may be having a counterproductive effect, i ask the question where would we be without any sanctions, what else do we have in our tool kit and i think that political symbolism should not be underestimated, but in terms of the concern of whether they're actually changing russian behavior, it's hard to prove a negative. we don't know what russia might have done where there are no sanctions but equally it hasn't rolled back concerns that precipitated the sanctions, so i will broaden the debate because the discussion appears to revolve around sanctions or rolling back. i would like to ask the panel what are the other measures that could be taken, one of the things that i think russia is rather good at, a sort of trump

complement, that putin has this ability to throw marbles on the diplomatic floor and have us all scrambling and takes us by price and put us on the back or broaden the issue. we thought we had an issue in crimea busieden it's syria. what could we be doing to change diplomatic setback and get more engagement, more serious efforts to address the conflict that give him over countries, more aggressive action at nato, change his calculation, banning participation in supporting events, for example.

>> david from the hor group, i would like to take from a sectoral, vpk and the general staff. 2020 plan has not been fulfilled in large measure because even though it's fourth generation weaponry the missing high-tech components are western. we know the minister of finance tried to reduce the budget. the cost to circumvent the sanctions are being buried. my question to you is, when we talk about what's important to putin which is the rearmorment plan not just the 2020 plan, the

western equivalence. i would like to hear talk about the plan and isn't that, in fact, a huge success for sanctions, thank you? >> okay, right here. >> actually a segue to the gentleman's question about the military modernization. we do not have since the end of the cold war, young participants here was an organization that coordinated the block on exports of military and technologies, whatever the sanctions are trying to accomplish now, there

is no one address for that. when i brought it up with the senior state department official he responded that we did not want to, quote, institutionalize the cold war, unquote. regardless of whether you think that there's a cold war or not, what does the panel think about having an organization that will bring together not just native members but our nonnato partners such as japan, australia and others that would block and event this technology that is necessary for russian military modernization to move russia or to move to countries like we saw with the example of armenia. thank you very much. >> thank you. >> so we have questions. should we broaden the discussion, include sanctions of broad e debate. should we narrow the discussion and talk about specific sectors,

and should we institutionalize the response whether it's the cold war or not to have some more systematic way of organizing ourself from this. i'm going to ask everybody to be brief. don't feel compelled to answer every question, just what you think you can add to and start. >> what could the west do? you have diplomatic solutions that are set talks. [inaudible] >> they can go 24/7 with with limit. economy sanction you might increase and you have -- [inaudible] >> putin is a man who thinks about hard power and not soft power. if you want him to learn the lesson and understand you, you to use hard power, not soft power.

he has education of kgb. nothing about soft power there. for long-term effects, very good question, a very good question and i would say it's important for the whole industry, it is not measurable in the short run. we cannot measure how the technological gap is growing between russia and the west in 2016 but definitely impacts russian economy overall but mostly -- not because of the west, because of putin's decisions, he decided to build economy, he decided to build -- invest huge amount of budgetary reserves in -- [inaudible] >> he spends money to build isolated economy and that will prevent him to deal with generational weapon.

>> first there's been a push with some muscle behind it to try and help europe become more energy resilient. i don't love love the word energy independent and there's no possibility that europe can be unreliant on russian resources but tremendous amount of work in infrastructure building or market deregulation to try and handle which will give a fewer soft cards or economic cards to russia and that is a good idea for many reasons. this is just one of them. the second one i would suggest to make it harder for -- harder than it is now. much harder for russia to acquire -- excuse me, military technology, that's where i was going with that. and some restrictions exist and much more that can be done including level of material and

equipment that come from nonrussian manufacturers or provai -- proveyosr. one that came and is link financial and criminal penalties of sanctions with the commerce trade controls on certain kinds of material and equipment which makes it much more expensive and criminally expose to violate the sanctions. so you could do a lot more than that. that tool hasn't been taken out of the tool kit and furthermore push to try and restrict the provision of military equipment to russia in its military modernization plan and other armorment.

>> i think that was the biggest mistake the president made and it was the president because everybody else supported providing assistance. i'm a republican although i brag about it these days than i used. the president himself has failed to go to ukraine. that's a disgrace. for a president not to show flag, solidarity to a country attacked by russia, he hasn't gone to georgia, we are doing the right thing with reassurance initiative sending forces to the baltic states and poland. i support what nato has been doing. there has been steps done. but the president himself cannot delegate either the chancellor merkel or to joe biden, he or

she, the next president has to be personally invested in these issues because frankly that's where putin is going to be watching and listening. >> emma. >> the risk of broadening even further -- [laughter] >> this is higher discussion has been based on the premise that we should be pushing back strongly against russia and i'm not entirely sure that that's the case so i think there's a good case for some of response for sanctions but i also think the question that what are actual interests in resulting ukraine crisis, what are american interests in syria, they are far less than people have suggested and when we talk about whether we should use sanctions or other actions, we have to put that in a cost-benefit calculus, what does it cost us to do this and some measures particularly, the

sanctions regime creating and we could end up making a costly for ourselves going forward by creating a new cold war dynamic, we too rarely also ask ourselves what are the actual costs of our sanctions for american companies. we've had the discussions almost entirely premised of the national security where we should be discussing it but we haven't talked about the costs for american companies, the cost for american banks in implementing the sanctions and abating by them and so when we are talking about creating response to russia, we need to come with approach, balances, actual costs in doing so so it's not more costly than our interests actually are. and so i would argue that some of the responses that the panelists have already mentioned seems like technology transfer in the military or energy realm, those are relatively costly sanctions that could pay dividends in the long-term but

when we talk about large-scale financial sanctions or, indeed, sanctions on gas pumps, those would be costly in the short-term and probably not as effective. >> can i just say with 10,000 ukrainians killed, iranian complicity with the budapest memorandum of '94 which was an important deal that got ukraine to denuclearize and respecting ukraine's sovereignty and integrity, with ukraine on the front lines, if you ukraines don't stop the russians, the russians could go elsewhere and they see us as weak, they might go into a nato ally and if we don't defend nato ally, then nato is dead.

to me that under scores our interest. we have an absolute interest in stopping putin and helping yuik -- ukrainians stop putin. it has been bad enough before russia invaded and intervene and it's worse. >> 30 seconds, rebuttal. >> i obviously disagree in the interest particularly in syria. that's a debate we can have later. >> right. we easily expand to how to deal with russia. i'm trying to keep us on the sanction's topic. let's try to -- with our next round stick with our topic here. we had a question right here. you have to get a microphone and say who you are.

>> george from the atlantic council. i would like to follow up on the lady's question about different mechanisms. i would like to raise a question about what are we trying to accomplish with sanctions? are we playing a role of a parent who is punishing a child for bad behavior? are we pretending to play the role of a therapist who is engaging in behavior modification and hoping that people will despite centuries long habits will change their behaviors or are we trying to deal with a threat, a threat not just to ukraine but a threat to the west? >> okay. >> one extreme to the other extreme and i would like to hear your views on what it is that we are trying to accomplish with the sanctions and what kind of goal we hope to achieve?

isn't there a danger to the u.s. might be waiting the red flag while the european economy just goes on moving on normal in their dealings with russia? >> there was another way back. >> thank you. on eu ways of doing sanctions,

a, and then a real question. the comment is just talk about sanctions of six months of potentially counterproductive. there's also demonstrates the flexibility because of the eu is considering sanctions as a means to an end and it's like to i think the debate. it's not just about whether -- when sanctions were. sanctions work when there intentions. when they're not in contention, with a target is pleasure what it is rather than what it does, it's actually not bringing any results and with all the respect to my american colleague we would want the eu sanctions to end up like the jackson-vanik amendment safer 20 years after the end of the soviet union. my question is that if sanctions are a means to an end, the end is clear. we want russia to stop supporting separatist in the east. we want russia to stop meddling in complex endocrine. how do we do that?

what do you think of the proposal which is sometimes voiced in europe about linking partial lifting of the sanctions against explicit our show implementation of minsk? is it something possible or realistic to you? >> the defensive airspace report. the question is what happens to the sanctions regime and any policy towards russia with all oil prices start to go back up again? opec is conspiring to raise them. what happened to our leverage when oil is 100 or $150 a barrel? >> thank you. hollister and, the atlantic council. great discussion. hasn't been any references to iran, turkey, to other countries and the degree to which

sanctions were most effective when there multilateral and not just the west. would you comment on that linkage? >> is not just you -- u.s. and europe. who else? we had a number of questions, different points of european perspectives, let's go the other way. >> let me address the question of our european colleagues in the back. i met the spoken. i completely agree. i think of european method of discussed in section every six month is a very valuable policy tool and it's what prevents sanctions from turning into things like the jackson-vanik commitment or the cuban embargo. the last 50 years and no clear political objective for much of that time. i think that's a good way to view the process of todd we link sanctions outcomes with actual sanctions?

i think this idea that's been proposed that we would link steps in the minsk process to specific sanctions could be a good way to go about resolving the conflict. i think what exactly russia will get in the way of sanctions relief for taking specific steps is probably the only way we see a political resolution to this. that is exactly what happened in the iranian case, the jcc oh ed whitacre but laying out exactly which sanctions would be listed from this nuclear sanctions, human rights, terrorism other sanctions on iran, which sanctions would be lifted, wind and in response to what iranian actions. that's an approach that i think could work with russia. >> first of all, jackson-vanik was incredibly successful. it did free up the emigration of soviet jews. it to stay too long for sure.

idle question that. they were efforts by several administrations to actually graduate russia from jackson-vanik. it took the act to enable russia to get out from under the jackson-vanik because of russian human rights abuses, the congress felt it was right to replace jackson-vanik with new legislation that would go after russian human rights abuses. on partial lifting, it will not surprise you i'm opposed to a given my position we should be talked about ramping up sanctions, not easing sanctions or partial implementation of minsk. as i said earlier i'm not a fan of minsk. i think we should do away with the minsk. should get away from minsk am not ukraine. we should tell the russians sanctions will stay in place and be ramped up over time unless and until you get out of ukraine, period. negotiating with russia is pointless. when they don't even acknowledge the are in eastern ukraine what exactly are we negotiating about?

they haven't fulfilled a single condition under minsk. multilateral, there are a number of countries that are join the eu and the united states, canada, australia, new zealand, japan. iran of course is not going to join. turkey is a complicated relationship in which will have time to go into that but there are other countries that have. what we also to recognize there are limits to how many countries will go along with it. >> to the energy question. the energy question, the energy sanctions, russian sanctions are designed to go after what we might design as frontier our future energy production. they do not, offer the most part energy production development now. so when prices, however what to do is make it difficult for russian energy projects to receive financing to raise money and european and u.s. capital markets.

with a rise in energy prices it may mean russian companies can finance more off the balance sheet and have to turn less to the eu and the u.s. so that is a clear area where sanctions must be addressed if the political will is for them to continue to a lot of pressure. to the point about what's the goal for sanctions, on the designed to be used for signaling, for deterrence and coercion or argument to be a method or strategy for punishment? i think the adjective that is people break on the issue, you, to do that. i am definitely in the camp they ought to be used for coercion, deterrence and signaling which necessarily means you must make sure the object of the sosa with the sanctions updated, and that is a clear offramp or a path for de-escalation. and that requires creative

thinking. we've seen, we have a couple of great examples where that has not occurred. cuba is by favor one where that is not occur for a long period of time. in a dynamic political and private it is essential that occur in this instance. i have full confidence that will need to be advocation of some sort or an evolution to the minsk set of requirements in order to keep the objective current overtime. there's no way to know ahead of time what the look like. finally, on the from central europe, the partners, it's deathly true that europe is split on how wants to engage with russia on energy issues. nevertheless, if the main transit hubs shift, if the countries receiving energy from russia directly change a bit,

what does that -- these changes lead out in the cold a variety of russia's mir neighbors, including ukraine and others. so what should the united states or europe view be towards how to strengthen, how to use the leverage of their community as they block? that if russia succeeds in dividing its energy, to european energy consumers, it comes out ahead on that particular fight, if you will, makes things more difficult for european unity and transatlantic unity on energy issues and others when dealing with russia. >> it's to stop ukrainian russia russian aggression in ukraine. the last point is given control

of the russian ukrainian border to officials here. just do it. that's it. there is a special position in european union as it is implemented, sanctions will be removed. after six months, before six months, and the us administration supported this idea safe we join the decision of the european union. [inaudible] while i completely agree with david that any negotiation adding contingency, please supplement, for example, to bullet points and we were move sanctions and give government, i don't know, bullet number five. it's counterproductive. it's opening space for bargaining while it does not solve the problem. the problem is to stop aggression from russia and ukraine. that's very simple and there is no interpretation. finally, in ukraine in case,

there is no easy process. the experience of a rent, iranian sanctions, demonstrate very well that sanctions work if they are escalating. in case of iran sanctions were escalated when resource of central bank were frozen, results of all iranian residents were frozen and, in fact, that's how to a great extent, russia, i would say if we waive sanctions on iran come and russia, russia's no more than 5% of iranian sanctions. there's a great, great way to go and unless the west indicates it is decided in this way, putin will not go to the negotiating table. i would emphasize that are not on the european financial sanctions. it is on the u.s. financial sanctions and american

institutions cannot give financing while europeans again. what is important in alliances i would say of course i don't believe u.s. can influence china to join western sanctions. but i believe that west can influence israel. that's from a technological point of view. it's much more important than the alliance with china, with india. >> just one point. it's not a that difference but, in fact, the eu, the commission are probably heading towards a settlement on the use own case against the entrance of the eu's version of antitrust laws rather than really go after them. there will probably be a settlement. that's a very different out,. >> it's procedure. >> you say that to a lot of american companies that have

been under eu's antitrust and it looks different. there's some potential there for dissidents. we've had a range of views, lively discussion, very good. the thing that always comes back to me is despite a you might think about it, how you use sanctions really depends on your own agility. are you agile as the government to adjust either tools come to the off, tv different things. can you do it quickly and real-time, ma or asia system lock you into things that make it cumbersome and do not achieve your own goals? no matter how you think about their effectiveness, if you are not agile as a government or as a coalition, a lot of that sort of dissipates. anyway, everyone has been good. audience the participant. hope everyone is happy. we're going to go to the next session, but please first -- what's that? 30 minute lunch break but please first, thank our participants.

thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> -- and with the coke

institute and with -- who else? sais. my task is made all the more difficult by the fact that we have had such excellent panels so far and have gotten into the area of policy rather than diagnosis, although the discussion of sanctions of course with both policy and diagnosis. i'm going to try to -- i've had the pleasure of talking to each of our panels in the past. i'm going to try to approach the moderator wrote little differently. that is, some very quick rounds, a snapshot of what they do should be done differently or the same in the next administration. secondly, go into a very brief period of analysis of why one of the driving factors. thirdly, and most important

round, and i want to say plenty of time for that, is going to be okay, what does the policy look like? is it going to be something like containment? is it engagement? this is somewhere between restraint as is put in the time of our panel? if they tall mission so, tall order so, therefore, i'm going to spend very little time introducing the panel. you know their main, their attribute on the program. their main affiliations now i probably have lost the important things that want to say in addition to that. first of all, i'm going to go in, well, in alphabetical order and i'll ask you each to raise your hands when i say your name. judy ansley come in addition, above all assistant to the assistant to the president and deputy national security program, she has extensive

expert on capitol hill where she rose to the level of staff director of the armed services committee. she now serves on the institute, u.s. institute of the board of u.s. institute of peace. give you more perspective on where they come from in terms of where their perspective is. evelyn farkas, so she's a nonresident fellow of the atlantic council but very importantly until just the ago was deputy assistant secretary of defense for russia, ukraine and eurasia. before the shed wide range of extremes on security issues both with the u.s. military on capitol hill and in the think tank world. john herbst is director of the eurasia center. the junior partners in the endeavor. and, finally, john, i know when because we worked together at the state department for time.

one of the most distinguished career professionals of this generation working not only on russia, so mythology russia, eurasia but also the middle east, all of which are highly relevant to our discussion today. finally, william ruger, vice president of research and policy at the charles koch institute as he points out is also vice president for the foundation, the charles koch foundation, so a very busy job. he's a veteran of the war in afghanistan, important to note in the second extensive academic career in areas we are talking about. so i said i wanted to discuss, organize the discussion three phases. i'm going to ask each of you in probably inverse, if you promise to give it less than one minute or one minute and two seconds in reverse order -- >> he warned us, these very strict. >> to answer at the same time to questions, to what extent should

the american next american president change u.s.-russia policy, or to what extent should it remain the same? and connected to that in his or her first 100 days what specific actions or declaration should the new president make on some of the key issues such as syria, ukraine, cyber attacks, all the things already discussed. then we will go back to socratic questions analyzing why, why do you justify. go ahead. >> i can do that in one minute no doubt. small quest. i do think there should be changed by think we need to step back from the particulars of russia for a second and moved to the question which should guide the particulars which is what role should the united states played in the world, particularly in terms of our ran strategy. to me our grand strategy should focus on making america safer. that means we should have a defense capability second to none. but the policies we have been pursuing oftentimes go under

the, primacy of liberal hegemony is a, i just don't think of and working so they're not a good guide for action had nor should they be. i think we need a more realist center approach to the world and russia that has a laserlike focus on america's safety and our vital national interests that's more provincial about using the m. of the time we just heard about. adequate realization of the problem of unintended consequences and it going of, lest ignoring of constraints. i think that's been one of the problems with our approach to rush is that it hasn't been all that realistic. we need to ask some key questions about russia or -- >> if we as question, what did national what does the president in the next 100 days? >> i think you should ask these questions, or she. you have to think through carefully what is required and possible as opposed to what is the ideal?

and i think american voters have talked about what it should be that goal, that kind of cloud in the sky goal as opposed to thinking about what can actually be achieved. once realistic, what are the constraints, how is the world going to get a boat or the particular country? i think we have to think about how our actions will be perceived and what the consequences will be. nato enlargement has been a prime example of ignoring some of those potential -- >> so the policies of the president should be very different if i understand reckless? >> exactly. >> so first of all i could think ahead about your question but maybe on the russian context. i'm happy to talk about more general if we have time. i think we're to continue to deter russia, that much is clear. i think we need to do more to deter russia and i won't go into

the details unless the time in second round. so certainly that would include doing what we're doing is a native context, i think that has actually been sufficient to deter russia but we need to keep doing that and consider whether we need to do more. probably the ares i we need to do more is in the air defense arena and also in the maritime arena. there's been a lot of emphasis on what we need to do on land. so continue to deter russia but more robustly. any outside of native context considering giving lethal, i'm an advocate not just for considering but actually giving lethal defensive weapons to ukraine, georgia and moldova who have no data article v guarantees so the least what to do is give him those weapons. second at think we need to continue to leave the door open for cooperation with russia. this is something general breedlove mentioned but let's be realistic. i'm also very much a fan of the -- much more rational, realism

pruden in our policy. no more wishful thinking with regard to russia. we can keep the door open. we can keep our hand extended in certain areas but we should not fruitlessly run after the russians in the hopes that might cooperate even officially counterterrorism where i actively been one of those people trying to get him to cooperate in the past professional he, and it hasn't worked. so i would prefer to actually have them make the first move when it comes to things of that nature. second, or third rather we need to restart our dialogue on strategic stability issues. general breedlove touched upon but i'm sure others mentioned it as well, but the anywhere there's a greatest danger in our relationship with russia has to do with strategic stability but large just really our balance of military power with russia. it includes everything from cyber all the way up to strategic nuclear. the russians have rightfully so a great deal of fear about our capabilities and that has driven him to change his military

doctrine which we can talk about more in q&a. but i think it very much merit a rational decision -- discussion about why it's dangerous, what assumptions are making in designing their dialogue and also in the military modernization and how they're going about it. so those three things. the fourth one is hold russia accountable. i believe the international community has done a paltry, i don't even know what the right adjective is, but a miserable job holding russia accountable. we are making some progress with regards to the mi7 can shoot down over ukraine in 2014 but on the issue of the cyber attacks against the united states, that's still lacking that i think we have not yet shown that we've taken sufficient action to deter russia from ongoing activity. you're giving me the sun. nonproliferation is not a joke and the budapest memorandum is not just about getting iran to

plan for guaranteed to ukraine. it has to do with the nonproliferation regime. we did it because padilla was ukraine would give up their nuclear weapons. what other country give up now for a political deal with united states and the other guarantors in the face of this failure by the international community to do anything to respond on that front? that still hanging out there. then, of course, obviously the interventions and continued occupations, the violation of the inf treaty. i'm getting breathless. there's a whole long list to this. conventional -- affected because this just about to exercise again with russia and belarus on the nato border. violations of the been the document. and organizations upon has been mentioned very much today. he did work for and i can talk more about what's next 100 days. so that's my quick and breathless attempt to answer your. >> policy would be much different the next administration for the next president follows you just as would be in a different way if wills policies were followed.

the one that has ended up being two or three so to be fair, you can have as many as two or three but if you can keep it to one that's great. >> what appliques laid the specifics to your second question. i think in terms of russia policy, we need to change the dynamics. it's not working now at something needs to change. i think we need a stronger much more assertive approach to russia going forward than quite think of the old adage peace through strength comes to mind. we have to show strength as we go forward. and i think to agree with william, i do think you start with setting goals. i don't agree that the goal should be only what we think we can achieve. i think we set a goal. hev an aspirational goal. and then let's see what steps we can take to achieve it. i would hope the next president will set the goal for europe or the gold that general breedlove mentioned, europe hole free and

at peace with nations able to determine their path and to be secure in their borders. those would be some of the top of goals. i did like your prosperity addition to the. at a think we also have to recognize that we again with a very aggressive russia that doesn't share these values. they completely different values. they want a rubber zone. putin has established as one of his top form priorities protecting russian speakers where ever they may be. there are a lot of them in our nato member countries. 's we have to be very aware of that. this doesn't would break ties completely. this doesn't mean we don't engage. it means we have to be realistic at this set of policies going forward. just a couple of other general points. as we go forward we have to make it very clear that there will be consequences for their actions and that we are willing to take those steps to show that there are consequences.

nato will have to get back to its original purpose. they don't have to be a deterrent force, given where we are in europe today. our nation's the protection and article v is real. hopefully it will not be challenged anytime soon. and i think we also, just an overall thing, the u.s. really has to reestablish his leadership on the world stage. i think a little bit too much rightly or wrongly we are perceived as weak on the world stage and we've done a little bit too much bleeding from behind and i think we need, i think the dynamic needs to change if we are to successfully engage with putin. i would specifics to the next round. >> john? >> i will also start at a high level. in the early sessions today and in this one already, we've talked about what our interests? any conversation has to do with our interests are it's really pretty simple, i apologize if i