elect. you know what the official structure or the beginning looks like. you know there are cochairs of the transition team, there's an executive director, maybe two executive directors. you know the economic advisor, who their policy advisers are and so that can help you to become organized and there's also stories that every transition has in terms of coverage. the people who will help include the candidacy and they will help shape who the top staff is. one of the stories you want to know during the transition? is the chief of staff going to be, who are going to be your top picks for the top tier of the cabinet positions and thesecond tier of the cabinet positions if there is any top tier and second tier . these are life, you have to figure out what your priorities are, what are you going to be covering? are you going to cover everything, are you a politics reporter who's going to be looking at the incoming administration and their relationship with congress or are you going to be doing foreign policy? what your b interests are and

how they overlap with the transitions the team are going to be making are important and the other thing to keep in mind is that there are two parts to any incoming president. there's the campaign, the transition and the new administration. >> summit you will never see again. they're there for that interim to do a job. some will be on the administration, some are political people who will not and there will be some important players in the administration who never had any role in the campaign but probably fewer. so this position i think it's key not to forget about the players who are in the campaign both from a staff perspective and from an advisor or kitchen cabinet perspective, a lot of those faces are going to regroup when it's time to create a chain of command and the power structure. >> jackie? >> i will go quickly since i'm cleaning upand i agree with what others have said . i set up three rules for transition and one is that it should be started by now

because the campaign, that wasn't always true, it comes over time as they make the past transition. the other issue is to be completely, intimately knowledgeable about the campaign promises that candidates have made and the third is to know who these people are behind the scenes who are responsible for coming up with those policies and the people, we used to be reporting all the time people like, who are you hearing might be treasury secretary? people are out there talking about this for months. so one example is getting back to the transition between george hw bush and bill clinton is i had been covering congress for the wall street journal which goes to the point that a lot of people are either, if

they're not going to come to congress in two the administration at top cabinet level, these are typically secretary or just under. people on the hill are going to know who's in the running or who's being talked about. so i in november, starting in october 1992 i had started doing reporting on who was the senator for texas and on the senate finance committee which i covered and one of the people i heard might be treasury secretary in the clinton administration so i had my profile already. i had names, some of them i know from early december so i was 10 days early so when i was in the birthing room and undergoing contractions, i was on the phone with one of my colleagues. anticipating, literally dictating from my notes that i have on lloyd benson, the treasury secretary. i got a joint call on that

one and on the next one, clinton to george w. bush, i was intimately familiar with george w's tax cut plan to the extent he had details so that was like, his first priorities and the first thing he went out with so i sort of had already someview of the politics of that , the democrats, sort of that they were considered the democrats from southern states in particular which no longer exist but they were willing to play ball for george w. bush so i was ready for that debate when it came.they were like, don't report a transition in a transition, you report months at a time. >> we are about to have a change in power here in washington where either party candidate who will enter the white house as shall we say a

storyrelationship with the press .sometimes outright, sometimes not. at sometimes showing the press, at times using the press to their advantage. what tips would you give to our audience here and watching on c-span on how to deal with that? with the end? >> let me confirm that neither of these candidates are friendly with the press which is fine, they're not your friends. my experience, one of the ways it complicates the relationship in the election collecting as much information that i'm doing before i go to them because there's always the danger that they will assess what you have collected and go to a rival organization and that tidbit of news you you are trying to pair out and so i tried to collect as much , when it's bad for them . but i had story ideas and

i've pitched story or ideas or hey, i'm working on this and they realize it's a good angle for them. and they go to somebody else but i'd recommend collecting as much information as you can before you go to the people who don't like you. that can have a decision on avoiding bad things, it can be leveragedfor you. you walk into a competition and say no, i know this . this garbage, you and i both know this is true. so that's very helpful. that's the one tip i would give you is start working on your story far away from the people in the process. >> margaret, how do you navigate issues of access when for a lot of folks in the paul miller program probably are going to be in the press room every day at the white house or not necessarily up on the hill during transition. how do you navigate who has

access? >> even when you are there every day it doesn't always matter. a lot of what happens, this is probably true of life in general but really true at the white house is that it's not personal and it's hierarchal and it's what they think they can get. do they consider you a friendly news organization? do they consider you a news organization that has readership and is trying to reach readers that fortunately may have more of a ideological, simpatico with them. how many decisions, financial audience is more of a socialist audience, whatever, fill in the blank area so to some extent whether they like you, if they reallydislike

you, they will just go to someone else who they like in other news organization but if you don't like you, it's not personal. are they going to get what they think they want out of you? you can be sitting in the front row or second row where you can be on the hill every three weeks . most probably doesn't matter. my number one advice would be no matter what it is, screw them. and number two, it's about what you want to do. your ex ex instance are better than you think even if you are not on the inside and if you are not an inside player, in the pool every day, if you work for a regional paper or you work for a news organization that does not completely compulsively all the time coverage , maybe don't compete in this same airspace or water, and you know what i need? compete like olivier said where you can do yoursourcing outside of that building . and trust your own instincts. you don't need them to validate what you see . >> go to them at the last

minute and get a comment, if you are doing good stories they will pay more attention to you but even if they're paying attention it doesn't mean you're ever going to get the flow or the first phone call or that first conversation so just look for stories that you can get and access is great when you have. but you only need it to do certain kinds of stories. if you are not going to get it, you are not going to get it, you have an under editor who understands and do what you can do. >> before i open up to the audience i do want to get a dialogue between you and our panelists. before i do that, let me ask this. it's a question about unfinished priorities. we saw in the obama administration issuing new rounds of actions side to restrict travel in juba and now travelers coming back to the islands to bring back those famous cigars and the rom. are we likely to see more of those kinds of executive action as we near the end of the obama administration?

how do we go about the issues that could come up in these final days and how do you parlay that into stories in the first hundred days of the new administration. >> i think you get most definitely more rule-making, this is something president obama has relied on for much of his second term because it's clear the republican-controlled congress which for the last nearly 2 years has been completely controlled once the republicans want to completely controlled by republicans and the republican-controlled senate in 2015. i think he's done most until time has run out so he's done most of what he's going to do. margaret might know better because it's been over a year since i was covering the white house day today and yet the danger of executive

orders as the white house was the first to acknowledge is that they can be overturned. the one thing that president obama is hoping a lot of cases including whether cuba or climate change is that there will be so much that industry in particular has already done in support of that it would be hard to turn it back without alienating or angering republicans own business allies so in that sense they hope that it will be harder to turn back then people think what donald trump is promising a wholesale sort of erasure of the obama executive orders. >> maria, to some extent it matters who the next president is going to be. resident obama will have some time to figure that out between the election and when he runs out of time finishing the executive order so obviously if you have a

president from the same party whom you are friendly with and serving kind of a third term or continuity, in the on the one hand it might embolden you to do more executive orders because the next president is more likely to hurt them, on the other hand if it's a political hot potato, do you hand it to the next president who is your ally? >> that has consequences for their ability to govern so you are weighing a different set of circumstances whereas the next guy coming in , if it were to be hostile to everything you stand for, you would have almost like a flip side of that decision whichis you i loaded up and forced to guide overturned everything or do i say , that's more trouble than it's worth for my party in the long run, i won't do it that way there's these situations to watch where the issue is for people who are unable to resolve with congress that closing resisted trying to make

things a super controversial epic off the charts executive order and i don't know, what you think. i just probably won't. >> not exactly on executive orders but one along these lines that a good story is who is in, who is out in comparison to the obama white house. obama's white house constantly clashing with the teachers unions yet clinton came out early in the campaign and endorsed her at a key time so it will be interesting to see what's the relationship with that group . i think with the new president there are so many different opportunities to say, to look at who's getting the attention, who's getting what they want in other ways as well. >> hand is getting ready to go up and ask questions. if you could please when you ask your question if you could tell us your name and your news organization, that would help our panelists as well.

i saw a couple hands getting ready, yes. >> i had no idea what i'm talking about but you were talking about the executive orders coming out to overturn the executive order, another executive order. is this coming from the white house and it is there any way they can do that quietly? usually we see a couple releases under new executive order but when they come in and they don't like something that obama did, they tried to keep that? that she overturns some of his if you wanted to. >> anyone want to get some insight on how executive orders are overturned? there's also the courts. >> that's what i was going to add. i don't think hillary clinton , and it wouldn't be her first priority to overturn some of these obama executive

orders certainly. donald trump would and george w. bush did as soon as he came in. i meant to look this up last night and in particular there were things that he, that goes to executive order but he withdrew the united states from participation in international organizations, help me out here. >> he reversed the arsenic in the drinking water. >> right, that's what i was trying to. >> on his last day you put up two executive orders they were designed entirely for political gain on george w. bush including the, regulating the levels of art and arsenic and the drinking water was going on on the city language with, now in planning, that's a question and we of all people are not

going to cast any aspersions on people who ask questions and make them seem like they might not be experts but the courts are one way legislative action is another and there's an interesting one which is a good issue executive orders they don't tell us about . as this president has done. so that could conceivably be a path to overturning some things without necessarily knowing the challenges, that's difficult. we could have the agency that are affected would have their own interests and talking to reporters, congress whenever they are briefed,b. so it's hard to do but they don't have to be make a big announcement. >> isn't there another situation of congress with some lesser exception? >> obama signed an executive order in the drug program. >> but that's an exception. >> they later signed another executive order. tell us about, the drug program largely? there are ways to do this that are less public than

others and that's one of the challenges uncovering the transition is going to be how do you find out? >> is national security. >> primarily national security where they can hide it. they can do this on a saturday and make it harder to report, harder to get that report to really picked up by the public. >> one other thing that occurred to me to be aware of, from one president to the next is that george w. bush pioneered the use of declining statements when he signed the bill. he would have a signing statement in which he basically said i don't agree with this part of it so i'm not going to endorse that part of it and it was challenged but it's stands and democrats criticized it very strongly but, one of my colleagues at the boston globe wrote a story about this from the bush administration that one of a surprise. obama was a credit but he did

far less expense than bush but he had issues signing statements thatindicates where he wouldn't feel like endorsing the law. a president trump let's say , is legislative counsel could look at some of these pass laws and see what leeway the previous president left him by way of these signing statements. >> again, this also is heavy in the realm of national security which tends to be where these models are. >> certainly without white house support on it, this picks up on something that we at the white house press for, it becomes so routine. we didn't see the story there we were all aware of it, we all talked about it. which i think , really if you setaside as part of the law , this is something any aspiring reporter should be aware of. there are plenty of stories out there just sitting there in plain view , the more specialized core might not realize the story. >> they're not access stories

unless it's some legal expert who's a complete nemesis of the administration who figured out that it's going on. >> before i go to the next question, our panelists have talked a lot about getting to know people who are involved in the transition and getting to know the people up on the hill who support either presidential candidate. how do you do that in a hurry in the age of multi platform journalism where you may need to send a tweet, do a snapshot, class.com and by the way there's this thing called the next day's print edition.you have some experiences there obviously political, what are your tips to background in a hurry? >> sometimes you have to figure out where they're going to be and find them at a public event, even if you

can get 10 seconds with that person thatcan be critical so they at least know your name. that's one strategy. there's always the basic reporting , asking them to get copy, sometimes people are willing to do that. just keeping track of someone's schedule can be an important way to do that, a political way to find somebody and just hand them your card. >> in the old days when i would cover transitions on the hill and in congress, i use to keep files on every texan when i was working at the dallas morning news washington bureau. maybe joining the administration just to see what he or she says but i can't do that anymore in the digital age. but other questions from the audience. anyone? in the back. >> she suggested we should askyou about this and i'm very curious about this. >> the ultimate access , really. you all look too young to remember but in real time,

president george w. bush did this in afghanistan in 2008, i was part of the press corps and we had this joint press event with then iraqi prime minister nouri monarchy in one of the residential palaces and as they sat there at their two podiums, the american press is sitting where you guys are coming iraqi presses where you guys are there in a small black object sailed over our collective heads and the president avoided it and after determining it was not the kind of small objectyou would assume we realize it was a wingtip . a shoe, anyway and the minister had hurled the first of two shoes at president bush. you can probably find this on the internet. we allkept our eyes on the president after that . two things i would tell you is that this guy is a

potential problem. and the other is that if you waited another 90 seconds, he would have hit the president of the podium. he dodged it, he's a fairly spry guy but a minute later, he would have been sitting in this high backed chair with high arms and there was no way he was going to get away with it. >> yes. jim carroll from university of maryland. >> just an antidote to that time, white house christmas party after that incident, i asked the president in my two minutes with him if he had heard a lot ofjokes about it and he said no, the guy who threw it was a shoe need . >>

he was pretty annoyed about it. they understood, they understood the press corps is going to focus on that has been the most remarkable element but they were not particularly pleased with it. >> we wanted to give a lot, jacqui, go hand. >> there was a question over here. sorry. >> so when you're looking at how to approach coverage of the transition, is there any differences you can think of between a sangari transition and the opposite party transition

and how you approach that? >> good question. analysts? >> there's obviously more continuity. they would be more continuity. well, in this case it would be more continuity. probably not in every single case but if you look already just between the obama white house and the clinton campaign you can siege is on the campaign side so many commonalities. like john podesta worked for bill clinton and he was at center for workers which is like the clinton campaign in waiting. he was on obama's transition team. so there's a lot about continuity. clinton's communications director now was at the white house and then before then she was a longtime democratic and before the issues of the clinton white house. so any case of obama to clinton you see people who went from bill clinton to obama to clinton campaign who would have a role in clinton world. obviously, a transition from

obama to trump would be completely different. i can't think, i can't think of anybody. >> i was listening in the last they'll don't call stood and and needed mcbride agreed either to be more tension with the democrat the democrat or republican and republican transition than different parties. and that is, i didn't really agree but i defer to them, especially media was then part of transitions, but i think if al gore had been elected president that might've been, there would've been some tension because after their initial bromance between president clinton and vice president gore early in the administration and to the campaigns, by the end of the administration there was so much tension in effect gore did not really want bill clinton and

i think to his everlasting detriment did not want bill clinton campaigning for them. i think it would've been. it would've been one where that would've intention. the most attention i've experienced or covered was that from the clinton, well, allegedly clinton, there's a dispute, clinton to george w. bush with the staffers took a double used off the keyboards and a lot of them dispute that are least dispute how widespread that was. >> the reason they sent intraparty stuff, when it was famously terrible transitions was reagan into george h. w. bush. if you talk to people who are actually legit, all they do is transition politics, they will do every time that was a terrible transition. there were a lot of people in the reagan administration who assumed they would still have the same job or be promoted and they were not. they were shown the exit. that caused a lot of talk about.

there were some policy changes as well. that's what those folks were talking about. the one i covered very close it was clinton into w. the thing that struck me was h how, fairly transparent the bush of ministers was because they would want to talk about the changes. they would want to talk about, this was true under clinton. it is not to under this president. it was policy, personal, all these other things. they were aggressive talking to us and about revealing things. even those executive orders which i thought it would be a little cautious with, nope, we're pulling it back. we are going to take it down. so i wouldn't say there's any one hard and fast rule for whether they are better or worse but certainly the w felt relatively open in a way that they were changing things around.

>> i think the bush to obama was actually okay. i meet on the stuff that matter, like on a national sturdy stuff, on being able to find files and information and stuff. i think the bush team was a class act and the obama team decided to be kind of a class act on the receiving side. i may be glossing it over. >> i was but there was this great irony in that bill clinton bequeathed george w. bush an atmosphere of total, like peace and prosperity, no wars, a surplus for the year of like roughly nearly $300 billion, 1.6 join projected as a surplus for the next five years. and yet clinton, bill clinton did next to nothing to ease the transition to the w bush administration. conversely eight years later he'd bequeathed brought obama to wars and the greatest recession

since the '30s. and yet he did maybe the most spectacular job of transitioning between two different party presidents of any president to date. and the obama people have been very complimentary about, even if they would've may be preferred the other way, peace and prosperity and a crappy transition. >> in a clinton white house it would be interesting to see if the obama people are being picked over the bill clinton people are the bill clinton people are being picked over the obama people or let's start fresh. that's one thing to look at. >> very good point. >> a top white house can all the people, this was addressed on the first built bottom of the people coming in want to blow up some these agencies that trump has expressed dislike for, saying we don't need them? that's another thing to look for. >> let's talk about the other transition that might occur. actually does affect the white

house as well, and that is the possibility that the senate could go back into democratic hands. what are some of the tips you would have about paying attention to congress and the transition? how does it relate to really the change of power at the white house and the fact that we may or may not, depending on the outcome of election day, have another four or eight years of divided government? >> i think when nietzsche i'm looking at and i don't want to get, just good data what issue but it is a big issue at its the trans-pacific partnership agreement. if the republicans lost control of congress, i mean of the senate, mitch mcconnell and paul ryan might figure well, this shows that trump couldn't win on one of his biggest platform issues was doing away with tpp. by pushing it would deliver a

big get to their business allies. their current opposition is against, is over the opposition of many of the biggest donors and their local business constituents. the third thing, reason i could see it is because they know it would put hillary clinton in such a political by even before she is taking her oath of office. she would have to be, she would be expected to be i think at this point very publicly out there saying i'm opposed to this, urging democratic senators to vote against it. it would be, i think it's the biggest thing i'm looking for a fate congress. of course, is also the supreme court nomination. >> it depends on, there's a few different outcomes. thursday out, while clinton wins the white house but republicans maintain control over the two chambers. there's the outcome in theaters out more trump wins the white

house and democrats take over a chamber. that seems unlikely. seems more like one would drive the other. if clinton wins and republicans remain in control of congress, she is on the defense and it's hard to see what she can do without an executive order starting on day one. if her party were to somehow be able to retake both chambers of congress and she wins the white house, you would have at least an initial window where based on obama's experience literally one thing could get done. would be immigration reform or would be something else? if clinton were to win and republicans, and democrats were to retake the senate but not the house, at least the democrats in the senate kind of blunt the republicans in congress and so gives her a little bit more wiggle room. at if trump winscombe if trump were to win, even if republicans still remain in control of both chambers you would have a really

interesting dynamic because there's just so much vitriolic has been created and so much concern in the party about how to handle them. depending on what he would try to do. what we will see on election night is not just to the next president is going to be but it will be a complete roadmap for what degree of not action versus unbridled chaos, you know, there is to expect. >> i agree with that. i feel like it really will, all these policy as with the candidates have made promises, so much of the ability to deliver depends on the makeup of congress. that could really shape what are the priority issues. it is really important. >> olivier? >> as a tip if you're covering presidential politics always make friends with the advanced people. today's advance, the the person who's setting up your files

today becomes a policy by should more. if covering congress always befriend the press secretary. always, always, always. they have more interest in talking because they want to establish their status with you. but just in general because today's deputy press secretary is to morris communications director. there's a fair amount of turnaround. if democrats retake the senate you see some journey people get promoted to more senior positions because incoming senators typically will go and try to pluck staff of some other offices. some of my best sources today were in very junior roles. i'm not saying like people to be used. they are some of the knowledgeable and friendly people you will ever meet in politics. but they are tremendous. they know a lot of stuff to the person who does clips for, meaning the person who clicks the news coverage overnight for the candidate or senator or congressman, that person to market have a completely different job. always befriend those people.

always, always, always. >> questions from the audience. >> this is more about the white house rather than congress, so what is the president for an incoming president taking cabinet officials from the opposing party? what do you see as the potential, potential president clinton picking republican for some cabinet posts? >> that's a good question to someone in the cabinet from the opposing party. anyone want to jump in? >> my experience has been that two democratic presidents have done so, not the republicans, although i stand to be corrected. bill clinton, for instance, that bill cohen, republican senator of me to be his defense secretary at one point, and then, of course, we've already mentioned that bill gates was held over from the bush administration at the pentagon

by president obama. >> i believe president george w. bush also tapped norman data for transportation secretary or commerce secretary. >> that's right. >> can you think of any others where -- that stood out at a time when president bush named norm mineta who was transportation -- >> let me broaden the question a bit. in an era of partisan politics and of fierce partisanship on the hill, particularly in the senate, do we still have this belief that a president's picks will actually get through, or can we expect in the next administration some of these cabinet confirmation hearings to be pretty testy and maybe not necessary to get through on the first of? >> ask chuck hagel. right? poor chuck hagel. gets nominated, as a crappy confirmation process by his

former colleagues are all over him. and then for a lot of complicated reasons ends up spending a lot of time inside the administration. confirmation regard opportunity to bash over the administration's policy. even if the next president wants to send a message by taking some across the aisle i would expect the expense to be a lot more like chuck hagel's experience and a lot less like norm's experience. >> i think again this is a situation where in a matter which of the two nominees is elected. in clinton's case, you have seen, she has coveted the fact number of republicans have come over to support her campaign, mostly in protest to donald trump's existence as a mommy so the kids are ready-made batch. either potential nominees for cabinet posts released a potential kind of undersecretary for whatever, whatchamacallit, right? the upside to having someone

from the opposing party inside your group come if you feel that you trust them is that its information from the other side that you might not have otherwise and it is potential line of friendly communications across the aisle, which can be hard to do if you kind of completely co-op with your own people. i'm having a hard time, but help me if i'm wrong, imagining a direct trump administration would be the democrats that they would have developed the ties to bring on board. i just thinking of anyone right now that comes to mind who's been someone who they've kind of promoted publicly. >> i can't off the top of my head, but your point is right, i think. >> i think there's also, on the subject of confirmation hearings, there's also the unintended consequences. attorney general, the attorney

general waited a long time for her confirmation vote in the senate, in part because the senate was mixed up in a political issue that had nothing to do with her, right? >> that goes to a point i was going to make that makes this upcoming round of confirmation to differ from those in the past. confirmation to become increase we polarized over time. when i first started my career, a president was given deference in putting his team together, and trying to oppose our bust the nominee was a very, very rare thing. it's far less rare and now you have the situation, ryan, you may know more about this than i do in terms of how it is going out now, but the republicans under mitch mcconnell are still smarting from the fact that harry reid when he was majority leader changed the filibuster rules so that you could get through federal

judges, other than supreme court judges, on a filibuster proof process. so they have exacted their revenge by slow walking or even blocking other nominees that president obama has made can't even two very uncontroversial places or people that passed unanimously out of committee. i think that the republicans whether they're in the minority or majority in the senate will continue to do some of that. >> ambassadorships have become one of the favorite hostagetaking slightly. >> so look for confirmation fights. >> when these presidential picks come up for confirmation hearings, sometimes we will hear that someone's nomination is in trouble because they haven't paid their taxes or they didn't follow the rules regarding a nanny and how to report the income.

what are some of the documents or records that our audience should be looking for when names come up for cabinet positions? are there ways to look up their finances or anything like that? >> it's very hard. they have to turn over tax documents to the senate finance committee and the senate finance committee has unique power, and some of its staff has unique power to review the tax documents, which are pretty sacrosanct when it comes to federal documents. what i've tried to do in the past, staff and members are bound not to talk about it but there's ways of just asking around like do you see any trouble ahead for so-and-so? there's a lot of the papers that we don't be deceived, but that shouldn't stop you from trying. >> olivier, you were nodding your head. >> there are some foreign gift

stuff. i voted peace about john brennan forgets when he was nominated to lead the cia. i had a weird obsession with ford gives to american officials. also really importan a portly te the big fat committee questionnaires on questions of policy and ideology and the rest of it. sometimes the trouble can bubble up from there. a committee will submit 250 questions and one of them is answered offkilter at the committee will hopefully stay reporters to the offkilter answer. so yeah, there are ways, but asking, that's a great way of phrasing it, do you see any trouble ahead, kind of question, that's absolutely your friend. >> tell the i inside he found the foreign gifts for the cia director. >> the committee actually attach them come if i remember quickly, kind of a random press release. they attach of the financial disclosure and a couple pages of the financial disclosures were

foreign gifts, al-qaeda member what they were now. i'm sure you can find it easily if you do an online search. one of them was an insanely lavish clock that he got. but so, you know, i wasn't steered to it at all. just my own weird quirky obsession that got me to it. but they do release this stuff. i will say that on the questionnaires you can tak duple on the opposition party to be like, what's question number 145? there are two ways. there's a regular standard disclosures of where you have to have the patience to go through it and then there's the more helped along kind of thing. >> there's the majority and minority staff and depend on who's in charge and with what, he was want to know either the legislative director or communications director for both sides of the committee staff. thing if it's someone who has a resume, a background that is all public there are other things that are beyond what's going to get submitted.

already disclosed. ideally what you want is the stuff that doesn't get disclosed to the committee. its previous tv appearances. its previous job that was a negative file a disclosure form for that and maybe there's something under that didn't turn up in the latest disclosure for. once you know it is, if it's somebody really interested in you can kind of do-it-yourself and see what you can find. >> your next panel with someone for the center for responsive politics will also go with yeahu can find out about actual presidential transition costs, which will have to be made public after the election. we have time for just one or two more questions. anyone in the audience? yes, in the front. >> i'm with c-span. i was wondering how the supreme court is factoring into the transitions? our people lobbying both campaigns to be a nominee? do you expect that secretary clinton will continue with judge

merrick garland's nomination? >> you're asking me? let's put it this way, she does has not committed to doing that. to read what you will into the i know what i would read into it. it's not just that there is one vacancy now. it's that if you just look at the demographic table, next present lot whole bunch of those. it's always been baked in the cake for republicans, right? is that lame-duck period going to be a period where if clinton wins you think your merrick garland is like the safest big you can get, you should just go with the? or is anyone still so entrenched at this point it's just not going to happen, you know? but she has not committed in any way to renominating him if this year comes and goes. >> let me ask the panelists. do you see anybody in the current obama cabinet is likely

to be held over or who could be held over in a democratic presidency? >> for example, i come the education department and john king has only been the secretary since the beginning of this year. there are some stakeholders in education would like to see them stay on, so that's one possibility. >> i've asked about this and a couple of cases but having got a clear answer some don't want to go too far. i've wondered about jack lew many as a time for treasury secretary because hillary clinton loves him. she objected when barack obama brought him. he had been at her, she had taken him to the state department and when obama cracked in two be omb director, she objected. i mean, she objected knowing she was going to lose but she objected. on the other hand, jack lew desperately wants to get back to

private life and reconnect with his wife in new york and spend more time with his grandkids. but i think going back to a confirmation fight, i think you see some fights, there may be people, certainly mr. king who will want to stay on and perhaps provide some continuity. continuity. i was just what is the supreme court thing, i have anything, two things. the fact that trump has put up some innings is unusual. that's never been done before. -- put out so many names. i can do think hillary clinton would try, what pushed merrick garland for the supreme court. he's gotten the highest ratings ever from the american bar association panel. the biggest thing, he's not as liberal as some of the democratic constituent groups would like but more important he's 63, which is over supreme court nominee that the next president as i think you said is

going to have a number of supreme court spots to fill. she's got so much on a plate coming in as president. it makes sense to me because the republicans have indicated people like orrin hatch and others how much they respect and like merrick garland. i would make the case that she goes with them speed why do you think she's kept her options open? >> there are some constituent groups that would like to see somebody more liberal, because she doesn't maybe want, maybe disadvantage him, that if she gives him her blessing, republicans who might otherwise be inclined to vote for him thinking we are going to screw hillary clinton and just not let her put some more liberal person on the court, we are going to -- >> it makes sense. so keep open the possibility will be someone else worse. >> exactly. >> we have time for one more question from the audience.

>> let's say the democratic senate getting voted in an secretary clinton ends up being the next president, do you see the lame-duck session pushing through merrick garland? if so how is that going to affect the employment process? >> one thing in the lame-duck session don't forget we have to fund the government for the rest of fiscal 2017, so that's one issue. anyone in the panel want to tackle that question about merrick garland in the lame-duck? >> not going to happen. not going to happen. they got roughly three weeks, right? they've got to fund the government. there are a couple of other bills that senators are much more attached you related to health, health measures. i don't know that three weeks be enough to keep the government open so the idea that they could also hold senate judiciary committee hearings and also set up a vote and somehow overcome the objections of senators who were virtually sure to try to

block this nomination, i would be stunned. if not impossible but i haven't heard anything notably from mitch mcconnell's team that lets me think that merrick garland gets a vote in the lame-duck. >> i agree with that. >> there's also the absolute fact that it's the republicans have almost said the next president should have the ticket and on that note i just want to thank the panelists further time and insights. we've had a very good discussion this morning and i hope that you find it valuable as you listen to your next panel. i like to thank the c-span audience at also the sponsors of this program, the university of maryland, philip merrill college school of journalism, as well as my colleagues at cq roll call and the national press foundation. thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

>> here's a look at what the candidates have been doing today. hillary clinton cast her ballot in new york accompanied by her husband bill. she told reporters waiting outside that she did vote for herself and is a humbling experience. donald trump vote at a local grade school in new york city. he arrived with his wife, daughter, son-in-law and his granddaughter. republican running mate indiana governor mike pence begin the day with a bike ride with his wife in indianapolis. later governor pence cast his ballot at st. thomas aquinas church when he met his wife years ago. she told in i voted for you. and democratic running mate senator tim kaine was up and up early to vote tweaking this, i want to be first other point a 99 year-old minerva beebee to the it looks like i need to eat used to being number two. >> election night, tonight on c-span and watch the results of any part of a national

conversation about the outcome. be on location of hillary clinton and donald trump election night headquarters and watch victory and concession speeches and key senate house and governors races. races. starting labor day pmd schnell throughout wednesday. watch live tonight on c-span, on demand that sees them.org or listen to our live coverage using the free c-span radio app. .. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> it appears a moment or so before the discussion not passed to peace on the korean peninsula. the korean-americans studies institutinstitut e here in washington d.c. we will tell you about our coverage tonight on the c-span

networks of the election results. of course will have the election night results at 8:00 eastern be part of the national conversation about the outcome with concession of victory speeches and that will be on c-span.org. we will certainly a better simulcast of the cdc's coverage by peter man's bridge, the host of the cbc national live on c-span 2's starting at 8:00 eastern. down not

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> well, before we start --

[inaudible] [inaudible] >> good afternoon, everyone. thank you for joining us today. i know we are competing with election day and i am impressed that we have a good turnout and thank you. thank you for your boat for

ambassador gallucci. i am president of icas and i would like to welcome you to the icas for a special symposium 2016. it is wonderful to have ambassador gallucci with us again today. since we last spoke at the spring symposium about korean peninsula issues in may of 2610 years ago appeared right in this room, welcome back, ambassador. many things happened since then in and around the korean peninsula for the last 10 years. many ideas and theories have continued to flood in the way of possible resolution for the korean peninsula issues, yet no promising signs have yet to be formulated. then, the most recent development that captured much

of our attention on the informal dialogue between the u.s. team led by ambassador gallucci. one of our most highly respected democrats in north korea expert the last quarter-century nsa chief architect of the name and 94 agreed framework. for the north korean side, the air who is the highest-ranking north korean official engaged in such dialogue. today we are delighted in privilege that ambassador gallucci has generously accepted our invitation and joining us and he will share with us his end site index. from the median and his vision towards the peace in the korean tenant to laugh and the region at the dawn of the new administration in the united

states. as far as the preceding today after the presentation of the ambassador, there will be a q&a session between ambassador and discuss and plan on the floor will be open for the audience for your q&a. our discussions today are all icas fellows. nonresident come in senior associate. william brown who made me stand in line at the voting booth at the moment. he is at georgetown university. [inaudible] strategical analysis at mitchell institute. and tom kean who is also joining us a little bit later. and columnist of korea times. and larry nacht, senior

associate. and with that, and enjoy the program and let's love god ambassador gallucci. -- let's welcome ambassador gallucci. [inaudible] >> thank you, dr. kim for this great opportunity to introduce the honorable robert gallucci. ambassador gallucci served as foreign service for seniors until he was last in july 2009 to become president of john d. foundation. appointed team in 1996 after 21 years of service in a variety of government focusing on international security. as the ambassador at-large with a special envoy for the u.s. department of state, he dealt with the threat posed by the preparation of ballistic

missiles and weapons of mass destruction. the chief u.s. negotiator during the north korean nuclear crisis of 1994 and served as assistant secretary of state for political military affairs and also as deputy executive chairman of the u.n. special commission overseeing the disarmament of iraq following the first gulf war. he earned his bachelor's degree at the state university of new york and his masters and doctoral degrees at brandeis university. ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming the honorable robert gallucci. [applause] >> banks. good afternoon, everybody.

i am pleased and honored with this invitation, happy to be with you as noted it has been 10 years. i wish i could say it was 10 years of progress but that would be appropriate under the circumstances. notwithstanding the title and i didn't stop him, i am going to mention all employer. there was a small group of four of us who traveled the 20 hours or so to meet with north korean delegation for a couple of days and that was just about three weeks ago. a word about that. for the dpr tayside in that

meeting, i think one of the main things they wanted to do was to explain to us why they were concerned about u.s. policy. and specifically why we were there, which is to say they did not wish to meet with the u.s. government. that is why we are medium as i'm sure you know the track to mode rather than both the track one. from our side, we explain what we understood to be the washington newbies days on north korea, north korean policy. we focused particularly on the dangers, the threats that we could see to the threats are dangers to the region and to the united states. we did not represent anyone

except ourselves so we didn't issue any warnings. only observations. the key question i think on the minds of the representatives led as i think by the vice foreign minister on, the chief question is what should both sides in this discussion, u.s. and dpr kate, what should they expect and what should they want to have happen early next year in the new administration in washington? i think we could usefully talk about that. you have a distinguished panel here. you are all it's clear to me

have been around the block on this issue. this is not your first rodeo so we can have a useful discussion about that. what i want to do with my time this afternoon is lay out what i think are six key questions that are for me at least the most important, the most timely for consideration. all the questions i want to ask are framed in terms of what that translates beliefs and then we will give the subjects. let's try this out and see if it works. first question. does the dprk believe it own narrative on recent history? in other words, what do they think caused the collapse of the agreed framework of 1994 and brought us to the events that began in 2002?

they have inherited. what do they think that to the failure to implement the agreement of 2005 and 2007 and 2008? what happened? what do they believe was the role if any of the dprk in the construction of a plutonium production reactor in syria which was destroyed by the israelis in 2007. what is their explanation for the failure of the leap day agreements, the events of 2011 and 2012. the question i ask is does the dprk believe its own narrative? my answer to that is incredibly yes, they do.

let me be clear about this. i have no doubt that the dprk acted inconsistently with the terms of the agreed framework or to put it in the vernacular, cheated on the agreed framework with fair deal to accept uranium enrichment centrifuge technology and equipment from pakistan during the middle to late 90s and into the next decade. i have no doubt that the agreed framework excluded their service reference to the north-south declaration on denuclearization. that is not their view. that is my view. i'm asking do they believe their own view? i'm saying i think they do incredibly. i have no doubt that it was

north korea's overbuilt young beyond alkyl buyer in syria. they say it was a nice. i say it was them. today, some of them believe north korea is innocent of that? i believe some of them actually think they didn't do that. i have no doubt they did. i have no doubt that over the last decade or so since i last spoke here, the dprk bears the principal responsibility for both sides adopting postures that both have characterized as strategic patience. in other words, i believe they bear most of the responsibility for the failure for engagement to succeed between the dprk and the u.s. side. but for whatever it's worth to you all, i believe also that

some in the dprk believe their own rhetoric on history. they have been wronged by the united states of america. what i'm trying to say in the first point is room for a possible misunderstanding between the dprk in the u.s. side. one of my favorite movies is cool hand luke and there's a line in the movie are the bad guy says to the good guy, what we have here is a failure to communicate. this is supposed to be irony. because it wasn't a failure to communicate. i am not telling you all that is going on between the dprk the united states of america is a failure to communicate. i am not saying that. i am saying that a misinterpretation of recent

history, there is room for misunderstanding and i think there was none. that's one of the things i conclude. does the dprk believe that when it achieves the capability of making an icbm with a nuclear weapon that could reach the continental united states will change everything. answer i think dangerously yes they do think that. they think everything will change when they can threaten the united states, continental united states within icbm with a nuclear warhead. some in the u.s. defense community would agree.

they think u.s. vulnerability to a new third country with nuclear weapons will offer our relationship in fundamental ways. i don't. they do. i believe the u.s. deterrent will remain credible vis-à-vis the dprk, just as it has been vis-à-vis russia and china. i believe the u.s. deterrent in southeast asia and soul tokyo will remain credible justice are extended deterrent and nato has remained credible vis-à-vis russia and before that the soviet union. but here comes the interesting part. what will change is the dprk's

vulnerability. ladies and gentlemen, even those of us who are opposed to preventive war was support, indeed insist on a preemptive strike if we judged in north korean strike against the rok, japan or the united states has been imminent. do you see what i'm saying here? preventive war, no. preemptive strike, yes. and what the north koreans will achieve is that they will create a vulnerability that they do not now have when they get that capability. i am arguing here that the dprk

security may be fatally compromised rather than enhanced by this capability that they are so dedicated to achieving. the third question. does the dprk think that its current nuclear weapons capability, the ability to strike the republic of korea and japan with holistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons will deter the united states and its allies from responding to provocations in the dmz or at sea. the answers to that question i think possibly yes, they do think their nuclear weapons capability gives them this deterrent.

i believe they are wrong if they believe that. but i think they may believe that. the united states and russia have long experience going back to the time of the united states and the soviet union with nuclear weapons and with deterrent. but we know mistakes are still possible between us. but the question that i am posing is what does the dprk think nuclear weapons are good for besides deterring an enemy attacking them with nuclear weapons. or to put it differently, when is the threat of the first use of nuclear weapons by a state credible, particularly when the state is dealing with another

nuclear weapons state. what good are nuclear weapons to the dprk is the question? my answer is they are only relevant. they are on the useful when national survival is at risk. it's certainly not useful for small games. they are not credible. they are not useful to protect them against retaliation for incidents at dnc or at sea. as it turns out, my answer really isn't. important. kim jong's answer is very important and i worry he may expect more of the nuclear weapons capability than good appreciation for deterrence would warrant. forth questioning.

does the dprk thinks that if a new administration in 10 and were going to get one begins by proposing talks about talks, negotiations rather than immediately seeking tougher sanctions. do they believe that would be a sign of weakness? answer i think maybe. let me be clear about my own view here. i would like to see the new administration in the united states face office in january 27 teen and consultation with the rok and japan. i would like to see the new administration pretty early on, maybe after a policy review

seeks talks about talks with the dprk. with only one condition and that is that while they are talking, there will be no test of ballistic missiles are nuclear weapons even at the very preliminary stage. those of you who are very attentive on this issue will develop that one of the candidates, secretary clinton has been quoted as saying that is not what she would do. and i know some who advise her belief that a different course would be more prudent. something i would call the iranian model where instead of seeking talks early on, you immediately seek tougher sanctions earlier on in order to

create the right state of mind of pyongyang. show your toughness first so that talks would be a way of releasing not pressure. so that is an alternative view. it is not mine. i told you what mine would be. this question is on the minds of those who will be in the next administration and i believe it deserves thought and discussion and i hope we can have some here. the fifth question, and does the dprk believe it can keep its nuclear weapons program, it can keep its nuclear weapons program still negotiate a peace treaty, dan did the u.s. rok exercises and sanctions relief.

in other words, does the dprk believe it can take its nuclear weapons program off the negotiating table? i believe it is a sure whether it could do that. i would note that some who are in this administration now certainly believe they will. they meaning the dprk will never give up their nuclear weapons program. if we went around and asked everybody here to comment on that, i dare say at least half the people say they will never up their nuclear weapons program. i believe by saying that, you give the dprk hope that they can keep it. my view is we should destroy

that hope. explicitly, we should not repeat, repeat, not settle for a freeze on their nuclear weapons program unless the freeze were simply a step to denuclearization. to put this another way, i am opposed to talks with the dprk that they take their denuclearization off the table. i believe to engage in talks they cannot buy agreement ahead of time produce denuclearization would legitimize the nuclear weapons than i am opposed to that. sixth and final question. does the dprk beauty that can resist international pressure to

improve its human rights behavior? as with the previous question, i believe the dprk isn't sure it can get away with that. i can tell you from first-hand experience that they are concerned that the phrase improving human rights behavior is code for ending the kim regime. our position i believe should be the following. that we cannot address legitimate dprk security concerns unless we ultimately reach a political settlement and probably one that includes a treaty of peace. and since i believe that, i do

not think therefore that a political settlement of that type of that weight as possible unless the dprk adopts basic internationally accepted standards on human rights. this is not -- this does not mean they have to accept an american-style liberal democracy. it does not mean at the end of their whole system. it does mean over a period of time substantial changes domestically. but i think that is the only way out of our current issue mission by negotiation. ladies and gentlemen, i am going to stop right there and assume that you all now will carry the weight. thank you very much.

[applause] [inaudible] >> i am going to do that. >> ladies and gentlemen, we going to get into q&a session. please, who has the microphone? all right. there was quite a sustained question numbers six through the other way around one. first crack, joe. >> thank you, dr. kim for hosting this program particularly with the honorable ambassador who was made dean school of foreign service and it's been an honor to participate in a program with bob gallucci despite the fact he raised very, very perceptive and disturbing questions for those of us who don't live with the issue day after day.

i found the answer to your first question, bob. the most disturbing one affects all the others, that is their perception of reality. it is one thing for regimes to disagree on motivation ideology, that type of thing. when we get down to raw facts and they actually believe certain facts did not occur when the rest of the world knows they did occur. their grasp on reality is highly suspect and their motivation and actions in the other contacts of questions you raised seems the bull and unbelievably dangerous. so i wonder, given the fact you say this detachment from reality, how can we rely in any

other areas where they don't see the world as the world is, not just as we see it, but the weight object really is. >> show, and i don't descend from your drawing that conclusion from my comment. in other words, i think this is not good news that their perception of reality is so much different from our perception of reality. i was really driving that question towards one sentence in that they believe they have been mistreated. they have been wronged by us over these years. so their characterization of this captures that of the

aggrieved party. i presented my own view so you didn't confuse me with the dprk. i don't share their view. but after having listened to them and we didn't, by the way, spend a lot of time on history because i didn't think it would be functional or useful. but we spent enough time i got the message and you may know that three years ago steve bosworth and i have met with then with the new foreign minister in berlin for a two-day session. i had the same impression then that as we say they are smoking their own stuff here. they really believe they characterization of history. what that should tell us is not in my view that we should not

still tries to engage and understand the many opportunities for misunderstanding or purposeful misunderstanding to be sure an honest misunderstanding, too and we need to be careful about that. if i don't get another chance, i am going to say that we shouldn't let the dprk or a country like that in which we have a history that is fraught, i don't think that the idea of trust solana said for quite a long time. so if we make any kind of agreement, we should be planning on monitoring and verifying under should not simply enter into understanding with an

expectation that everything will be fine. everything between us and the dprk will not nationally be fine. it has to be made that way. you took this as making the idea of engaging the north with this background as being especially challenging and i think you're exactly correct. >> thanks. i love being an engaged ambassador on the framework. i love to make that issue. in your top, i must say i agree with almost everything you say. i would put it a little bit differently, especially this last conversation. she made the north koreans over this one. how bad the object is, very

rational, very organized, very to liberate from pointa in 1984 to now this long, long period of developing impossible things in a nuclear weapon under the constraint of the world out to get them. they are so close to doing it. maybe they've done it. they haven't demonstrated quite yet enough. it is critical for us to see this gap and maybe a year or two or five years they themselves need to convince themselves first and then the south ms to take up this capability. at that point you are right. they think the game changes. not quite yet. i think we have a little bit of room to maneuver. my main concern, my main question on north korea if he didn't address, a lot of people

here look at u.s. north korea. i think it is fundamentally a mistake to look at it that way. we fundamentally have to look at north and south korea. where north korea said it destroys south korea? i don't think they've been up yet. maybe they have. i don't know that. they haven't given up. we've got a really big problem. that is where what you call the deterrence of facts of the nuclear weapons place and you corruptly put out. you said you don't know what they're thinking. i think that is what we need to figure out and convince them very quickly that south korea is off the table. otherwise if you remember back in the 1970s when they had a very large artillery capability against seoul, before we ramped up to challenge that, they were doing all kinds of missions and

south korea if you all remember and they were not getting punished for it. later on in the 80s we showed that we could punish them for it and they stopped. for the last 25 years they have not bought it around. i'm very afraid that once they get the nuclear deterrence, they don't want to use nuclear weapons. they never will. i can imagine the south and us being a lot more nervous. they've got nuclear weapons behind. so if they are still thinking of the south, what i mean is unifying the country. it is a rivalry i don't think the peninsula can tolerate two different regimes on the same peninsula. that rivalry, and told that his defense, i think requires a much more aggressive standpoint from our side. your last point on the engagement part i quite agree. i think we should engage them right up front but not on

sanctions. i'm an economist. i have been watching the sanctions. wrinkly they don't work. the north koreans know that and what were sanctions. that is what they have seen coming out in forever. i would change tack ticks. i would say you are in danger. the regime is in danger. we are not going to overthrow you, but you are in danger of being overthrown. moreover, we need a preemptive different military in south korea that can hit them really fast, really quick and pinpoint it. you know, not a massive nuclear attack, but they need to learn that we mean business and i am afraid this 25 years we've never really done anything tough to them and they've gotten to that yet so it seems to me we could change and get much more up

front, much more provocative, show them that they are thinking of south korea is not going to work. >> so there is a lot there. i'll pick out just a couple of points. the sword of strategic objectives of the dprk i have assumed and i can't defend the assumption, but i understand the lot term objective is the unification of the korean peninsula under a regime center in pyongyang here i understand assume that is their strategic long-term object. in the short term, they would like sanctions lifted. i'm pretty sure about, even though i'm probably very close to your position about the impact of sanctions in terms of their economy. but i think i am certain that

they would like u.s. rok military exercises first tune down and then stopped. i know they would like that. i think they would like as we used to say, to drive a wedge. they did that to loosen the alliance if they could. i think that the question about how we should deal with the north under these circumstances, i came out and my remarks in favor of an early effort at engagement, but a fair question that comes from your comment is

if that doesn't work, then what? i don't have a good answer to that other than containment. there are other words for containment, but essentially that means maintain the regime of some kind, keep the dialogue with beijing operating so that you get some support for the implementation of the sanctions regime, continued the exercises, make sure that the alliance is between a mutual security treaty between japan and the united states in the bilateral alliance between rok and the united states are strong and viable and do that are intensified concentrations to deal with contingencies which may arise. that is the kind of thing i would imagine. i'm just saying i'd like to try engagements initially to see whether it can go anywhere.

>> it is good to hear dr. gallucci. been a long time since geneva 1949. it is fascinating to listen to your assessment of what those trends might do, what the perceptions are, what can be done about them. coming down to a specific area of talking the talk, beginning with the next administration installed in january. what types of talks which you first see for people to follow in line with some of the things

and that's what i would hear about. as you pointed out, some views might hard in the sanctions right off the beginning of the administration so it can -- in their view that is not the way to go. to capture the moment i'm an opening dialogues with north korea eventually go around to say dismantlement of the nuclear weapons and the korean peninsula. i agree that what you said when someone like james clapper says north korea would never give up a lost cause when i pursued the

denuclearization of the north korean program. he is also right, though, when he said a new sort of read that north korea has to keep nuclear weapons as a key to survival and they see these things and of course you affect all of your experiences and your insides from talking with the north koreans and other things. but i want to mention one thing about this whole occasion. i don't think north korea believes it can unify korean peninsula forcefully.

but kim jong ill sad he is mostly opposing to any unification and that is bad evidence that number one because they could not unify south korea as long as there is for lions but the united states and also to match a different system will be long-term through stage of the defect to unification. in the commitment to maintenance with peace on both sides and exchanges and what have you.

they agree during that administration and south korea, but i think, i mean, we heard the report by writing up a report on the talks as to the incoming administration for a transition team and how that has a specific recommendation for the next administration to follow. we don't still know if clinton gets elected tonight that she's going to take, ironically, when he was in the white house,

everything was proceeding well. i mean, he also turned to operate. but one more thing i think is also important to discuss the chinese role and it's not been released with russia but it will be preempted and the real problem the u.s. foreign policy will face will be how we will deal with china with the north korean situation. >> a couple things from your comments and thank you for them. i have a tendency to want to warn about expert stations for beijing's role in solving this

problem. my concern is twofold. one is that the chinese pop up until now figured that while they are not pleased with everything that pyongyang does, they are not sufficiently displeased that they are prepared to support sanctions which might in fact cause such pain that it would destabilize the regime. it's kind of a thermostat on the role the chinese will play from as far back as 1993 and 1994 when i was sans regime a number of times with the task of enlisting the chinese to use their influence in pyongyang. the second reason i am hesitant and a phrase in my mind is that

we should not take the biggest, arguably the biggest and most important international security issue and the asia-pacific region and subcontracted to our major rival in the asia-pacific region. in other words, we should take the leadership on this and not chinese. we will not do ourselves proud. we americans will not serve it with our allies if we differ to the chinese to manage to get in their health. if we can get more help i would like it better. but there is a limit to how far you wish to go in that direction. second, i think i caught the question in their.

is there a connection to the new administration? we promise the representatives that we would come back and talk to people in washington and share whatever we thought we had learned in terms of insides about the dprk that the dprk wished us to take away. we have been doing that. lee siegel in new york city and with the person with the logistics for this meeting and put them in place did do some writing and has shared that writing with various people. i have done several oral debriefing and so we are trying to be good to our word that we gave them all lump ore. i don't want to overstate anything we might have accomplished sharing views and insights if not more than not.

but whatever it's worth, we have that he had >> thank you. >> thank you, kim. mr. ambassador, thank you for your remarks. it is very useful to hear people talk about what does north korea believes as opposed to what we see a rhetorically and what we see in terms of their actions. i am going to continue and ask you what you think north korea thinks about some additional things. i take them from the current news, which i think is important. one, josh grogan writes in the post this morning that any attempt to dramatically increase sanctions because of parenthetically say i don't think the sanctions against north korea are as bad as they are against iran or were, that he says a chinese really push back on that very hard and they will get nowhere.

i'm curious again, what do you think the north thinks about that? second, the u.s.-china commission will be issuing its report said, the congressional chinese commission and they say that the chinese modernization of its military is increasing much faster than what is predicted by our intelligence communities or our allies in east asia. my interest as we rarely hear this. does north korea see itself as part of the effort to enhance and cooperate with china in terms of its military object is. third, mr. carlin of sis writes that there have been an enormous number of what he calls missed opportunities between north korea and the united states since the framework in 1994 and he particularly chastises the

bush administration of failing to understand that north korea was trying to achieve. i'm curious the extent to which i don't north korea that has been agreed. part of it is we didn't build the nuclear power plants. i'm curious what the perspective not 20 years down the road. where are they? >> i wonder, do you think north korea believes it doesn't have the ability to put a warhead over the united states when it is now put two satellites over the united states including one or the super bowl. second, a surreptitious attack from a submarine or a freighter in which it is not easily identifiable in terms of who did it means that the deterrent to equation like an emp attack kind of goes away. i'm curious what you think, whether they emp commission in a

very lengthy explanation said that the russians had given the north koreans very significant help in developing emp capabilities. and so that to me is very critical. the next thing is to what extent does the missile defense, whether it's that or ground-based interceptors deployed and columnists have an impact on the north koreans. i know what the rhetoric is. i always find it fascinating the chinese are really upset they frozen on relation, all military to military relations over the deployment of. if they are interested in stability in the region, which is what we always say they are, why would they want to give north korea an unimpeded shot with whether nuclear armed or nonnuclear armed direction doesn't have any impact on the chinese strategic system. they know it, but they don't

think so. i am curious the extent to which -- what do you think if they saw robust knowledge of the state department say let's get this thing done as soon as possible and get going. and finally, my friend, my god was my boss at and du and afa and he made a point and interviewing the former tutor of kim jong il in seoul and asked why he thought the north koreans have nuclear weapons. the individual was quite shocked. don't you understand? general dunn said tony from her to us having a very close but the defector. they want to see the united states military and dual use

their nuclear forces as a means of deterrence united states to defend south korea should the north koreans decide at that time to reunify the peninsula with which this gentleman said they thought was normal. i'm curious does north korea still believe that? i think that explains it's not just the exercises they want and the rock of the northwest alliance. the fundamental objective is to say often in a lot of communiqués and statements, always kind of at the end and of course the united states should withdraw their military forces. >> peter, valid for at least seven questions. i scrupulously avoided taking notes. i am going to skip around here if you would just shoot me on

the ones i missed. one of the first questions went to the chinese calculation. i don't have any special insight to the calculation these days other than the other dead which a number of people have for it in about that the chinese -- that one of the reasons if not the chief reason that have been applied to the dprk not having the impact causing the pain that sanctions advocates might want is because the chinese have not allowed the sanctions to work and have provided a means by which the sanctions can be circled rented.

rented. -- circumvented. .. looking like almost any other agency from 30,000 feet. is in the only place in the dprk that appears to be thriving? the proposition is not the only place but maybe the principal place. this would not all be possible without regime. i take from that that we work to do in beijing, even if you take my view that there's limits to what we can accomplish. they're still work to be done. the second question i thought was one that went to, do the

chinese view the dprk's military capability and take up its nuclear weapons capability as part of its own modernization? i would say absolutely not. i think that if the dprk could wave a magic wand and have come excuse me, if the chinese could wave a magic wand at the dprk's nuclear weapons program disappear from the planet, they would wave the wand. that program is a potential source of catastrophe for the chinese because it could end up bringing the united states of america and its military and naval forces right to its doorstep, the last thing the chinese want. if you look at the rationale as the chinese have authored for their modernization program, both from the blue water navy, for what they've done with her strategic systems, the increase in numbers, increase in mobility, this has got nothing

in my view, to do with the dprk. really, it has everything to do with, ironically, the american be emphasis on nuclear weapons that we have assorted not in favor of conventional forces both our conventional prompt global strike and our multilayered ballistic missile defense, which goes to another one of your points, and that is what are the chinese worried about? the award about our radars to begin with. they understand that the system is limited. they may think it is less limited than we claim it is against sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missiles that have reentry speeds of the kinds that they will have and have multiple targeted range vehicles, et cetera. but they are still worried that this is a system that can be

upgraded. a comparable worry to the russian worried about what's happening in europe. they don't take any comfort in hearing president obama talk about the emphasis on nuclear weapons. because they look at the words surrounding conventional and prompt global strike, forgetting we don't have the capability. they worry about the viability of their strategic systems, particularly when compared, excuse me, when combined with a ballistic missile defense. because this puts at risk their deterrent, their second strike capability. for me that explains a lot of what the chinese are about, and how they could have, if you will pardon this expression, the chutzpah to complain to us about offering ballistic missile defense to our allies after the dprk launches a ballistic missile.

instead of complaining to us about that, they might use their influence in pyongyang so there will be fewer missile tests. but be that as it may. the idea that the polls from a nuclear weapon is something that the dprk is interested in is actually not something i have thought about, but i don't think it figures prominently, and i would be surprised if emp cause country is high on the list on the minds of the technologist in the dprk when you think about the nuclear weapons to i just don't think that's what they are about. it may be something we may be interested in by the don't think that's on their list. when it comes to the deterrent

calculations in getting the united states off the peninsula, i want to see if i wasn't clear in my remarks that i don't believe that political american decision-makers in the past or in the future will be deterred from executing their responsibly because the dprk has nuclear weapons. the question about whether it could deliver nuclear weapons now with its mr bmi capability to the republic of korea and japan. let's for the sake of discussion this afternoon stipulate as lawyers like to say that they can. i think that we will not come we united states, will not be dissuaded from executing out alliance responds ability's, and i would want every bit of signaling that we could to go to

pyongyang so they don't misconstrue, and that's what i was talking about, they are misconstruing effectiveness and what they could accomplish with nuclear weapons. y'all may remember that when we first had nuclear weapons in the early '50s, we had delusions of grandeur. we have massive retaliation and nancy aided by john forster dulles with the thought that we could cure everything with these nuclear weapons. it turns out we couldn't. they still serve all purposes because they are not credible. might to be credible we're launching regime change against the dprk? yes. they might but my point was at levels lower than that they are not credible. not to us. but the question is what do they think? and i don't know. >> thank you.

>> ambassador gave everyone a lot of food for thought. i have noted your comments so i will try to be brief in terms of my comments and also a couple of questions. now, ambassador gallucci correctly stated that north korea has formed a major responsibility for what he described as the failure of engagement, with the united states. that is correct. i would add the caveat that the united states also bears some of the responsibilities for failure to realize u.s. objectives in negotiations. we have been not smart in many instances ho