of people mr. connolly pointed out, here's the headline matcher union sues to get fired worker back on the job after the deadly incident. this was another incident where falsified reports happen. you are still pursuing keeping that employee who falsified records come you want to keep unemployed? >> mrs. comstock you have to understand that we have what is known as binding arbitration and the arbitrator decided this employee should keep his position. i believe even in his findings there were some evidence of statements along the line of the culture this company. >> on the culture and i think this would be helpful for all of us to do on a bipartisan basis. i'd like to go out with your track worker and come out with you and see what the process is because i don't understand. seems like nobody has ever read get this. people say there are records and

you are making accusations that people are asking to falsify. is anyone familiar with ipads headphones? do you have these things? you all have them? i understand there is very easy technology where people can come out and report this amber portwood's going on there. if you record that the timestamps on it there's technology that other transit services use. they come in and show this. i think i would protect you in your work or is because it would show that you were on site at a particular time doing something and if somebody said you did and you would haven't proven your hand in that representative warden would never go away. you would have to track system recorded and i don't know, are you using any type of physical report instead of the paper report? >> we have been recording her investigations. >> would the to have a sowing mr. mr. jackson makes a report

saying they would having did something and they falsified it is is not back-and-forth finger-pointing. we should have evidence that shows what happened. we have the technology. this is 2016. this isn't hard. do you use that at all? >> we are not allowed to use that. >> why not? >> i'm talking about having some type of technological thing that records what you are doing, not your particular phone but technology. >> we are not allowed to have any type of electronic devices in our work song. >> i understand that it you want to on the phone. >> any kind of electronic device meaning electronics to record something. see that i'm talking about recording the work. >> again the workers are not allowed to have any type of electronic device.

>> mr. wiedefeld i think we talked about this at the last hearing because we have people come in with that technology to do that. is that being looked at? >> it is not only for individuals out there but individuals were driving over the system and supporting it electronically. we are pursuing that right now. .. they say companies go bankrupt two ways. slowly and all at once. seems like the same thing happened to mature. across time about decades of bad

decisions we've got to the point that it everything has collapsed upon itself. the differences if a company has a reason to exist it goes through restructuring, brings a new governance, new management gets new capital. it begins the path of turnaround. the problem we have with metro is there's no obvious forcing folks to allow that to occur. it's not a company with multijurisdictional enterprise. the jurisdictions will continue to fund it at low levels. it will belong, it will be able to do the restructurings it needs to and it can't change the governing structure. ultimately, by cutting through the stuff that we have discussed your today that is where this has to go. we have to get to a point where

there is not a change of management, think the general managers doing a good job. that part of the turnaround is occurring. but were governance has to change, no disrespect to the current chairman but the metro board governance model has failed. where we need new governance the gentle lady from virginia and i have a proposal to do that. we need to restructure contracts that don't work. we need a new strategic plan we need new money from the stakeholders. that has to occur in some kind of forcing function were all are brought to the table in the metro because clearly it has a reason to exist and then the turnaround can continue. my question to the chairman and general managers what can we do to accelerate the occurrence of that day. that they which i define as a day the governance model changes were in a model to restructure and only with those things occur will the stakeholders put more money in the have to, what can

get us to that day as soon as possible? that's what's in the best interest of metro and the various stakeholders including the constituencies? >> thank you. i happen to a with both of you. if you remember the original suggestion of getting rid of this sport and having a five-member board was my. through a lot of fanfare back in the day but now the federal city council has adopted that model. what they're suggesting is that the federal government, congress would draw support of the metro contract. if they were to do that it then collapses. although jurisdictions are are out and you have to start over again. my suggestion is a 16 member board is not workable. doing the best i can with what i have for the comments here today come all this including myself and debbie and parochial because we do. a55 person board like the d.c. control board of local people but here's the catch. it's not the number come about

first five persons is the best number with a certain our powers like you're talking about. the control board had the power to excess money from the treasury. >> i've seen those proposals and whether it is that are similar, with all involved change of government restructuring and more resources, what can get us. now they're floating around in at the situation were to my mind and he is better than what we have now. what can can get us to that day? it's not an enterprise that one day it's out of money and files for bankruptcy. what can get us to that day? the federal city council has that legal outline if council withdraws its support from the contract. that will be be the triggering mechanism where it collapses and everybody is worse at that point to get back together and restructure the system. the structure from 40 years ago doesn't work. just like the dedicated source. it has to be part of it. the other five major systems have 1% sales tax, we don't have

it. all that has to be new board, new tax, all of that. you can make the system works. >> does a general manager have an opinion on this? it is fairly compact. i think the mechanism to attack this. >> ideal back. >> i think the gentleman. when my friend just yield for one observation? >> it's complicated. it's also complicated, i find it ironic that the district of columbia that talks about taxation without representation which i support would nonetheless favor system and metro that would take away representation for the people that take pay the taxes. in virginia's localities not the state that pays the operating subsidy. you're going to find pierce resistance to those taxpayers to lose their representation.

>> i'm not proposing any specific governance model, new governance model, restructuring and more resources, 50 different ways of doing it. >> the chair recognizes gentleman from wisconsin. were you going little different place somewhere we been so far. just a few months ago i september 13 there is a train that came to a stop outside the north station. apparently for a while there is no communication between the operator of that train and the roc c. could you comment on that, even prior to that time there's concern that they could not contact the operators. so not only to the train stop but but there is no contact between the operator of that train of the central location, can you tell us what happen there and whether you think that's appropriate?

>> one of the issues we have is once the operator leaves the cab there is no communication with the remaining six or eight cars. so there were some issues around that and so that is a personnel issue that were dealing with, did they follow the rules at that time? when an incident occurs and if there is only one employee on it once they leave that you've lost ability to communicate near walking through a crowded train depending on what the conditions are and you're either talking, we do have megaphones in the cab that there to take to try to help with the communication but what we have to do is figure out a way to get the rock to train where the operators no longer in the. >> as i understand there's no communication between control central and the the operator that train, that accurate? there was some but it was not done according to the policy they should've been following.

>> their concerns before that that they were not getting all the operators of's that right mark. >> that's correct. note your reason there's no communication is at the operator got up and began walking through the turn? >> yes that's what happened and that's what they should've been doing. >> in other words were they unable to communicate with the passengers otherwise? >> you can communicate to the passengers when you're the cat. but we have problems on that issue as well because if we use different series of cars were put together they don't communication doesn't work. so that's an issue were addressing. once they leave the cabin affect all the have now their walkie-talkie and a megaphone and because of lack of communication some passengers got tired of waiting and began walking down the track? >> there is definitely frustration and given the current conditions i think that is what occurred.

we never recommend anybody leaving the car. that would be like if you're frustrated sitting on tarmac on the plane taken the slide down, it's just not acceptable. >> were you aware, was any employee aware that these passengers were walking alone down the tracks? >> yes. they were just outside the station. other employees were there and walk into the car and that's when they saw the individuals leaving. >> was the third real on at the time? >> yes it was. should somebody been hitting the panic button? the people try to get them up on the walkway to get them away from that that's what caused the delay because the we had to inspect to make sure that nothing else was out there. >> another question, i know the

problem is lack of money. i know any big organization today one of the problems we have is health insurance costs. what does the health insurance plan to we have for the employees of metro what is the cost per employee per year? >> i can get you the details, there's two levels of healthcare, one is for the nonrepresentative employees which is about 2000 employees and the others about 11000 people, 11000 people is the negotiated settlement to the process and the other we have more control over. just recently we reduced the cost cost of that system by basically charging employees more. >> how many nonrepresentative employees? 2000 so 13,000 people. people. what is your cost per employee? >> i don't have that number. >> about 18000, 17, 25? >> i don't know. the gentleman would yield i actually have some of those numbers. i could ask about them

because i have some idle 75% of the cost of metro's wages and benefits is my understanding. the information you have given us is the average salary for example for controllers over the years was between 77,287,000. in the starting base salary was 71, because i was overtime and is much overtime there is one controller who made $216,000 because of overtime in one year, 216,000 this is the information that metro gave us. so there's a policy where the people, my understanding is that when there's overtime the people who had the most seniority and this is in the contract for the high salaried employee who may be about to retire they get the

first dibs on the overtime so in your last three or five years you are able to run up your salary get a $216,000 salary and that over time is tied to your pension income is that correct? >> the gentlemen's time has expired you can may be reclaimed for one quick question. the question i had an animal people know it, it's not a matter of given the employees more of the cost of their health insurance although that sometimes necessary. it's what type of plan to have is a market-based or that sort of thing. was hoping one of you up there would be able to tell us what is the overall cost per employee both employee share in the employer share of insurance. is it 18, is is it 25 comments at 22? what is it anyone of you can tell me.

>> i don't know. >> i don't have it. >> it's just amazingly incompetent for none of you to have any clue what that is. >> mr. rita field, thank you for being willing to get back to the committee. if you'll get you'll get that response. the chair recognizes ms. coleman for five minutes. >> thank you. that it is a little concerning to me that a person with a base salary of 77 to make 87,000 dollars $7000 per year could have overtime as an operator and make over 200,000 dollars a year? what is that person sleep? that's scary. just can ask you a couple of questions because i like to know what you think you need in order to make this system operate efficiently and effectively encourage people to use because i think public transportation is

important. do you have a comprehensive plan that lays out all of the things that you need to do with your cars, your tracks come your electrical, whatever? >> we do. the fact on all of those levels both on the track in the cars is our biggest focus. we haven't for buses in our transit service. a big part of it is working with the union employees and getting to some of those core issues. >> so there's a plan that goes for five years, 1010 years? >> we have an overall plan but i'm focusing on the remainder of this year to get to some of the core issues we need to address immediately. >> but to get the system in good repair, you have a longer term plan, right? >> yes. >> do you anticipate a certain

of money that you need in order to accomplish both long-term and then incrementally get to that long-term? >> we have a program for the next six years with both operating and capital what we recommend. >> to have what you need? or is there running deficit questioning. >> we have a deficit on the operating budget of 290 million. we need to have a balance budget so i propose a way to get there that the board is considering now. the capital side like any other the capital needs are much larger than what we have available. we have identified a total need of $25 billion. that is a capital program that were proposing at 7.2 billion to chip with those issues. >> so if you have seven-time sixes what? you have a 7 billion-dollar plan

for six years over six years. >> so what is going to be her deficit there? we'll have a deficit on the opposite operating side of the equation. on the capital side uis have more capital needs then you can afford. >> but were really focusing on the fact that your infrastructure has not held up the weight should therefore has been injuries and loss of life and things of that nature. that is where i'm trying to focus right now. >> right. we believe for for the upcoming year that we have enough dollars to move in that direction to bring the entire system to what we call a state of good repair and get it to a base level. >> okay i don't think i really know the answer to my question but i will yield my time to my very eager collie care. >> i think my friend.

mr. evans talked about utilization, cost and loss of a certain line in the system. do you maintain an actual cost, loss, or revenue gain for each station, or each line of the system? >> what we do is manage as a regional system. this way we look at it. >> how is he able to disaggregate the silverlight from everything else and declare that it's going to cost something projected into the future? >> i don't know what numbers there were thrown around. >> let me just ask this, if were going to go down that road, this committee, with permission of the subcommittee chairman wants to see data on every line and every station. if organist are talking about closing space on gain or loss,

we are all ears. we are all eyes. and we'll be participants in that, i assure, i assure you. we want to see that data. secondly, you were talking on the board about the affluence of certain parts of the compact. you made reference to jurisdictions i represent in terms of their meeting household income. was that a predicate to changing how we finance the operating subsidy based on median household income and the ability to pay rather than utilization? or physical presence in a jurisdiction? >> you all have my comments are directed at getting the attention of maryland and virginia that we need a dedicated funding source. >> but why would you pick on the median household income and affluence. what what was the

relevance of that? >> what i was is fairfax county is the second richest county in america in arlington is the sixth and yet we cannot get a funding dedicated source to metro. >> and this goes but to i think your comments are reckless. let's take fairfax county, it's 400 square miles, how big is your jurisdiction? >> 62. >> , stations you have? >> 40. >> 40 and 62 square miles. if you take out the silverlight fairfax have for. if four. if you're generous, five. in 400 square miles. it's a very difficult task persuading our taxpayers to increase their subsidy, let alone the fruit over a dedicated source of revenue they're not served by metro. that was the genius of the silverlight to finally give service to the airports which is

a federal responsibility we are buried. secondly to anchor anchor the largest jurisdiction and the wealthiest jurisdiction of the stakeholder metro. i urge urge you to contemplate that the next time you decide to talk about the relevance of metro my jurisdiction. thank you. >> the chair recognizes a gentleman a gentleman from virginia for five minutes. >> thank you. i want to thank you as we've done today for making the hard decisions. to govern us to choose and you clearly have made these choices. you are not able to address in your spoken testimony but in your extended written testimony talk about the speed restriction by the national airport. many my constituents who use the yellow and blue lines question whether restrictions in place so soon after the work has been completed. can you explain when those will go away or why they're still there? >> it had nothing to do with the condition of the track.

it had to do with a near miss out there. certain parts of the system we have very tight curves. that is an s curve. so when we reduce the speed it was a line of sight issue. we look worked with the national park service to remove a tree to bring that speed back up. and then we are instituting an electronic technology so when workers are in one of the blank curves they are alerted to train is coming and more importantly the operator knows that someone is in front of them. once that is in place we can bring the speeds back up. we just want to make sure that they're not in danger. >> thank you. much as been made about the state of the culture and the hardest thing to change the most important thing, how long do you think it will take, what are your steps to change the culture and i can mr. jackson, do you

see the union as a willing partner in these culture evolutions? >> i do see the union as a willing partner. just just go us to look at the union statements over the last few years, we have been asking for this i believe since 2009. maybe even before then. i do know that during come i can't remember the year week got it right now we have been saying this for a while, that the authority has a serious culture problem very serious culture problem if something needs to be done, can't get done by management spin in their way out of this safety culture problem you can't to supplant discipline your way through safety. but if we sit out the union union and management come together. i believe we can fix the problem. in my professional opinion i don't even believe we need the

fta to do it. all we need is the traitor. >> i miss the general manager the same question about culture, difficulty, time normally partners. >> i know we have willing partners. i've met with hundreds if not thousands of the employees and their very proud and a lot of things you're see now is the result of the safety culture taking root. it's about three weeks you we had an issue with the 4000 series that was raised by middle manager person that said there's an issue here and we pulled the cars out of lead on the trains. a lot of the speed restrictions have been occurring over the last few months are coming from line employees and that's where should. that's what we want to promote. i believe with mr. jackson there's been a culture for decades that has the ball. and i'm not going to turn around

months but i think there's been a concerted effort for management labor to do that. >> cheermac, we've given given you a hard time today because of your comments about wanting the blue line to be closed for six months or cutting rail service but didn't contribute more money. and just last week the notion of not can can to doing the base. i know you're working hard and passionately about dedicated sources of revenue, but how do you respond to all of these statements which seem to deepen the parochial divides and perhaps further undermine writer confidence in the system. >> thank you. actually i think you take the same as one by one. what i found when i came to mature and became chairman is a lack of awareness because of

metro's fault, nobody else's fault to in this whole region of how bad the situation was. the operation side was pointed out by chairman michael. we're just celebrated a leaving by one of the great times and metro. the whole thing was a wreck and nobody knew it. the finances when i walked in there cannot believe what i found. we hadn't had a clean audit three years. everything was in chaos. what i tried to do was raise the awareness, starting out with close the blue line for six months. we needed to do something to fix the lines. the. the safe track program is a follow up on that statement. the statement of a control board for metro has been adopted by the city council. all of the statements which were inflammatory at the time proved out to be what metro needed. and i have to say were not even close to fixing this thing. there's a lot that needs to be done.

but i will say this, we are light years ahead of where we are a year ago. enormous progress has been made. >> we recognize the gentlewoman from new york for five minutes. >> it's good to hear that progress has been me. i want to look more closely at the capabilities of the federal transit administration and what it brings to the role as the entity with responsibility for oversight and safety. like to begin with -- how many safety inspectors does fta currently have? >> we have a team of ten people working on her safety inspection. we have 24 people total involved in lamont inspections and oversight. >> so ten people in 2014 what are the 24? or they are in detail from other

agency? >> there's a combination of 13 employees and contractor employees in detail is from the federal railroad administration and the federal motor care administration. >> , and he -- to have? i can report back. >> to have any that perform the safety inspection responsibilities and if so how many? >> i'll provide that for the record. >> chairman heart for the purposes of comparison, how many rail inspectors does a federal federal railroad administration have? >> i'm sorry i do not have that number. i will get back to. >> and when fta conducted oversight did does it have federal regulations to refer to? or it regulate metro based on the standards that metro has established for itself? >> at this time we force metro standards. we hold metro accountable to carry out its

standards. >> and his fta working on a rulemaking regarding federal standards for transit operations? >> yes. >> and what is the status? >> the past year we have issued for safety regulations, one related to this date safety oversight, one related to testing and another that is our national safety program which is the overall framework for carrying out the new authority that congress gave it recently and in the coming months we have tumor regulations we are. one is the public transportation agency safety regulation and the safety certification training regulation that's ready for issue. >> and for the purpose of comparison about fra, does it hold the railroads it regulates to establish federal rules or to the standards that the railroads established for themselves?

>> there's a clarification that's warranted. our understanding that what the federal transit administration is not regulation but voluntary safety standards. the fra puts out regulation which means you must do this or you cannot do that. there's a large distinction there between the two activities. i'm not sure under the circumstances were fta's attempting to be a temper about it i'm not sure they would be eager to create an entire infrastructure with regulations and inspectors to find out if the regulations are being followed. they're trying to see the states take the function over sooner rather than later. i'm not confident they will ever want to create that infrastructure that we think is effort that the fra already has. . .

>> >> did the ft a produce regular reports and how often are they produced or to make specific changes in the metro operation of the funding or the findings of these inspectors but.

>> we have done targeted investigation of the key problem areas for example, track maintenance and then conducting day-to-day inspections 300 daily inspections that resulted on the investigation, a 251 corrective actions and of those and those that were assigned by the state safety agency. >> for a very quick one-and-a-half minute. >> the information that you provide one and the

department metro and and 19 of those according to the statistics is that correct greg. >> i don't know and what we have not been able to get me need to give it comparable data. but a very difficult thing. my husband is the teacher in fairfax county. so this will the county has the referenced with

firefighters and police veteran not making to madrid 60,000 they often have graduate degrees. saw a guy to get the comparable data. many names and information ex-im bank anything to say to that to back that up complex you are made under oath today because if your web employees are exploited we need information sought ask you to provide names of places and incidents and kovach can get that information and i will make my request again that you could take is on the web tour once a week can understand what they are cold to do.

these are people from the data that we have compared to one metro are paid considerably higher you are aware that mr. jackson won quick. >> their salaries were negotiated. >> high interest and but they make $55 an hour comparable to the $30 an hour but the ad davis-bacon track labor makes 23 and your employees are paid considerably higher. would you agree quick. >> kelso they have to redo the work that they have done behind those same

contractors. >> so even the u.s. 42 miles per track you still are paid more but you could not quite say it looking at this data they are paid more and there are more of the? you don't acknowledge that? to make a lasting for quality? >> no. i know your union isn't under investigation renowned >> we are not under investigation with the election was not properly held? >> could someday provide us with the informational and the salaries? you make claims that you are paid publicly outside of this hearing but they are not paid more than the average one but there would

be considerable salary increases that is why the city council has said it is not sustainable and why we need to get rid of the binding arbitration and makes it difficult. >> also to the witnesses

some of you may wish was back but with no further business before the committee but this hearing is adjourned was. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] the specs some of the members of congress were talking what about these reforms that our ongoing? >>.

>> what about what you had done internally and i really do believe that. does the ensuring like this do anything quite. >> it definitely helps me to understand where they're coming from. but they all recognized to see that reinforcements. >> do you agree from the outside? >> no. customers have come up to me to say continue you are doing a can see it.

>> cemetery in des explained that this situation is in the u.s. vice huge deficits. >> do agree you are guilty of the parochial underground and what? >> no. that is the duty to represent our jurisdiction so we all fall into that trap.

>> cabbie you talk to the heather council members of the two year deal then you backed away to talk to the mayor spec and that we have put out a statement and if that was they want to go back to 3:00. so few cow of the children then it will be 1:00 when closure. >> so then that is still the deal? that is a deal breaker by. >> we still have to talk to the chairman to see if he is on board can. >> that want to represent the city.

>> based dog the comments today this members of congress still feel that these discussions are quite good. so day at of people getting upset about that. >> what about all this public excoriating quick. >> led to the metro riders take away from the bickering that is going on and the report yesterday about falsified inspections? what do people make of this? to make bills are to use separate discussions. i have encouraged my bread marvers to be rubberstamp to

discuss the before it -- they did nothing to say we will get to the bottom of this sort change the people who are not working but then somebody gets his job back so i a agree with the chairman when he said king you just fire them to lie and falsified records? i would do that tomorrow but can we with the process. thank you. i am losing my voice. i do not feel bad. >> in red options to save

money which is one of many discussions are you confident with the ability but also supporting that general manager? >> and then to make them understand. >> what do you take away and then to attack about those problems and then recant

work together to make care for? in in this. >> but we have others who have to focus on as well. >> to you think. >> but to fix the track we have heard in new jewel said we have heard.

>> one more question. >> [inaudible]

[inaudible conversations] c since a quorum is as the committee to consider listed 2385 pending military nominations. these nominations, five nominations or six days short of the committee's requirement for seven days. no objection has been raised. i recommend the committee way the seven-day rule in order to

permit the nomination of these officers before the senate adjourned. the 114th congress. is there a motion to favorably report the military nominations? all in favor say aye. the committee meets this morning to receive testimony on the oversight acquisition testing and employment of the letourneau combat ship and module programs. we welcome our witnesses who are key officials responsible for acquiring testing testing emplod overseeing these programs. honorable programs. our bucshon stackley assistant secretary of the navy for research development and acquisition has been the navy's executive since 2008. vice admiral thomas roden commander of naval service forces is responsible for manning, training and equipping navy's server should see the honorable j. michael gilmore the operational testing and the valuation has been senior

advisor to the air defense for operational testing and evaluation of weapons systems since 2009 and mr. paul francis energy director of acquisition and source management at the government accountability office his 40 year career with gao is focused most on this than major weapons acquisitions especially shipbuilding. lcs is an important yet all too common example of defense acquisition gone awry. since the early stages of this program have been critical of fundamental lcs shortcomings in here we are 15 years later with an alleged warship that according to dr. gilmore's assessment can't survive a hostile combat environment and has yet to demonstrate its most important warfighting auctions in a program chosen for affordability that the gao has reported has doubled in cost with a potential for future overruns.

like so many major programs that preceded it though cs failure predictably from an inability to stabilize requirements and roofs date cost estimates and unreliable assessments of technical and integration risks race made worse by repeatedly buying ships ignition packages before proving they are affected and can be operate together. what is so disturbing is that these problems were not unforeseen. in 2002, the navy first requested congress authorize funding for the lcs program. after reading the plan that two armed services committees said quote lcs has not been vetted through the pentagon's top requirements. the second article of the joint requirements oversight counsel the navy strategy for the lcs does not clearly identify the plan and funding for development in the valuation of mission packages upon which the operational capabilities of lcs

will depend. despite such serious concerns it will not come as a surprise to many members of this committee, to the congress that approved funding for lcs and in with the navy awarded the first lcs construction contract in 2004, it did so without well-defined requirements, stable design realistic cost estimates are a clear understanding of the capability gaps the ship was needed to fill. taxpayers have paid a heavy price for these mistakes. the lcs was initially expected to cost $220 million per ship. the cost of each ship has more than doubled to 478 million and we are not through yet. the lcs needed combat capability and countermeasures were supposed to be delivered in 2008. that capability is still not operational nor is it expected

to be until 2020. 12 years late, 12 years late. today 26 ships in the lcs fleet have either been delivered or are under construction or are in contract. in other words taxpayers have already paid for 65% of the planned lcs inventory. lcs combat capability supposed to come from three mission packages countermeasures, service war for an anti-warfare. taxpayers invested more than $12 billion to procure an lcs fund and another $2 billion in these three mission packages yet for all this investment all three of these mission packages are years delayed. practically none of the systems having reached initial operational capability. so far the lcs has fielded only the most basic capabilities a 30-millimeter gun with a range of two miles and ability the

ability to launch and recover helicopters and small boats. the service package was five years late. the mind packages 12 years late to the anti-submarine packages nine years late. the navy failed to meet its own commitment to deploy lcs frames with these mission packages in part because for some reason navy leaders prioritize deployed ships with no capability over completing necessary mission package testing. in other words the text areas have paid for and are still paying for 26 ships that have demonstrated next to no combat capability. this is unacceptable. and this committee wants to know secretary stackley who is responsible and who has been held accountable? i'd like to be the first to say congress belongs on the list of those responsible. we could intervene more forcefully and demanded more from the department of defense and the navy. we did not. as long as i'm chairman of this

committee will. mission packages are not the only problem. keeping the lcs underway has also been challenging. despite eight years ago in 2008 the navy continues to discover quote first of class problems. 16 since 2008. we continue to discover quote first class problems. since 2013, five of the eight lcs deliveries have experienced significant engineering casualties resulting in lengthy periods. amazingly despite nearly no proven lcs combat capability and persistent debilitating engineering issues in design and operation the navy is charging ahead with an ambitious plan to keep most ships deployed half the time station around the

world far from support facilities in the united states. in contrast most navy destroyers are planned to be deployed for the united states far less than 25% of their service lives. the rush to put warships forward in singapore by 2018 without proven combat capability and to maintain a deployment tempo more than twice that of destroyers is a recipe for more wasted taxpayer dollars. although the lcs will deliver some capability the nation still need to capable small surface combatant that addresses the lcs 's critical shortfalls including the ability to attack surface ships with multiple missile salvos defend noncombatant ships from nearby noncombatant ships from air missile threats conduct long duration missions including submarines without frequent fueling an exhibit robust

survivability characteristics. the recently concluded lcs review was long overdue and it yielded from missing initiatives. i am concerned of several critical assumptions of the program are not challenged including excessive operational availability goals and sufficient in-house technical support were lcs unexamined manpower requirements and transitioning to a new small surface combatant. forcelli the department defenses curtailing the lcs program and down selecting to a single shared design. given the cost overruns mission package testing testing and thef engineering failures reducing the size of this program is a necessary first step and i'm prepared to go even further by taking a hard look at any further procurement of ships until all of mission packages free to ioc. lcs the navy to explain to this committee the american taxpayers

why it makes sense to continue pouring money into a ship program that is repeatedly failed to live up to its promises. the lcs continues to experience new problems but it is not a new program. that's why the department's leaders must not delay in reconciling their aspirations with the lcs. demanding accountability in reducing the size of this program. >> thank you mr. chairman today want to join the chairman and welcoming director gilmour and secretary stackley and mr. mr. francis to the committee this point to testify on the littoral combat ship lcs program and we are thankful for your service. a fundamental architecture separates changes in the mission package from changes that would disrupt the ship design and construction. in the past where there were

problems in the combat capability on a ship it was almost inevitably causing problems in the construction program that changes inside the mission package should not translate into a ships potential. however since the mission package and that -- her divorce from each other we have now discovered a new set of problems. while the shipbuilders had problems earlier that is not being a big issue. the shipbuilders and ship workers performed well under this contract since then so we have built 26 of the vessels was not a one of a single mission modules has passed all operational testing. they'll see combat capabilities largely resides in the mission package in the navy will have to operate the lcs vessels for several more years and a

relatively benign circumstances waiting on combat capability to complete testing. chairman mckay and i wrote to the chief of naval operations about the lcs program in september which raised a number of concerns. we asked that the navy consider reducing the planned operational availability of the lcs to a sustainable level received the navy can support deployment availability before expanding availability to 50% under a blue gold concept to the cno responded to the navy is going to continue to planned for availability with the blue gold concept because that's what the navy needs to support the optimized fleet response plan. i believe some of the problems they're experiencing with lcs vessel is because we got too far in front of ourselves by trying to deploy ships before they were ready which in turn reduce test. saying that we will attain a will attain the 50% deployment availability goal for lcs because that is what we need

makes the optimized response plan achievable rings hollow with me. sounds a lot like previous assurances that they would be no problem in shifting from the original alfie is lou gold content to a a3 cruise for every to ship concept which has now been found wanting and now we are back trying to make the blue gold concept work it in her letter to chairman i asked the navy to establish a land based propulsion machinery control test site because the navy is not providing sufficient in-house engineering capable support for the lcs program to the cno responded that the navy will consider land-based control test site at some later date but not now. i'm willing for the moment to work with the navy to play out this to try to enhance support but i'm concerned that lcs fleet material support will suffer without such a facility when such support is available for other navy combatants. the chairman and i will ask the

committee for review of the manpower requirements of the lcs to validate or revalidate the quantity and quality of manpower apartments to determine if additional personnel are assigned to perform damage control force protection maintenance and other duties. the cno responded the navy celsius reteam have assessed the requirements that i would just say i'm skeptical that the lcs would have had sufficient time to do much more than decide how to allocate which space would be available. such an allocation process would not constitute the manpower requirements that i had in mind. finally the chairman i suggested maybe should start planning now to pick your begin delivery to a new small combatant as soon as possible in 2020. the cno responded the navy will address the future small surface combatant at some later date after the navy has completed analysis of the future fleet requirement. and stand cno riches and a time

to review overall requirements however i believe in the navy begins a program for follow on small surface combatant that should have weight repeating what we did with the lcs program where we are in such a hurry we did not take the time to go through important parts of acquisition process such as deciding what the requirements are deciding how much they're willing to pay to achieve those requirements and programming at a time for the manpower in the programs we needed to support the program. if the navy which allow we may face similar urgency. thank you mr. chairman eyelet forward this hearing. c we begin with you director gilmour. welcome dr. gilmore. >> i apologize, thank you mr. chairman senator reed members of the committee. as you pointed out mr. chairman although the first lcs was commissioned in 2008 the lcs program is not demonstrated effective warfighting capability

in its originally provisioned missions by the navy requirements. surface warfare lancaster measures or mcm and anti-submarine warfare. increment service worker mission packages on lcs see france as in my stability in the ship defending itself against small forms of fast -- although not against threat represented numbers of attacks attacks. abilities support maritime security operations such as launching and recovering boats and interdiction operations. however when was yielded as part of the next increment of the surface warfare package its capability should improve and it will be important to solve the problem testing with that have enabled us to discover so many of the problems. in a june report based on the ti

concluded the lcs deploying the countermeasures package would not be operationally suitable if called upon to -- that testing demonstrates the lcs package did not achieve a sustained area clearance rate of a legacy systems nor can they package the use to reduce requirements for clearance rate even under ideal conditions achieving 1/2 of those requirements which are fraction of the navy's forward plans. the ship as well as line countermeasure systems are not reliable and all the systems not just a remote system and the multimission vehicle have been recently canceled that significant shortfalls in performance. ..

>> >> with the equipment. no matter what equipment is loaded for this seat frame components impose significant constraints for example, to be fully mission

capable 24% of the test period they both fall short of the unreliability requirements have the engineers your chance to compete that 30 day mission that is a requirement without critical failure of a sub system necessary for wartime operation. they also revealed significant deficiencies now the navy is developing plans to take actions to correct these problems with the severity until they're fully corrected. in closing i want to emphasize the importance of realistic testing only through testing of the emission packages on and aboard the ship that the significant problems and shortfalls i discussed revealed.

in fact, accounting review team emphasize the reliance on the shore based testing provided a false sense of system maturity. similarly only with realistic testing was the inaccuracies of those tactics. therefore my strongest in most important recommendation to you and to the navy to find and execute of the mission packages and lcs as we go forward. >> mr. chairman ranking members of the committee thank you for the opportunity to appear today to address our program. with this somewhat like to make a brief opening statement and have my full testimony enter into the record.

eight index service anti-submarine areas with the overall balance structure is a replacement for three legacy service ships about one-third the size of the thrifty was class destroyer designed for missions that the destroyer is not equipped police or could not be performed by the small combat ship for its ability is. it has greatly reduced procurement cost in manpower in fact, the procurement cost is one third and also the man by our requirements lcs was built with high-speed ability damage control and combat systems including a 57 million member -- surface-to-air missiles in the new horizon

missile that the navy is adding for long-range service targets. in addition it carries the missions planned for each ship's deployment this service warfare mission package a.m. adds an armed helicopter and a vehicle for surveillance and surface-to-surface missiles the other package has sonar that operates in sonar with the helicopter with sonar and torpedoes the counter mission has unmanned service and unmanned water vehicles with sensors and systems to detect and neutralize underwater mines. the four cornerstones i'd like to summarize the is the shipbuilding program as the committee is aware the program was initiated with unrealistic cost and schedule estimates within

incomplete decide an extraordinary budget overruns were result subsequently was restructured damp production placed on hold to verify design quality in weakness and authorization to approve the design changes was up that the four-star level would. the oversight at the shipyard was decrease the acquisition strategy to compete while long-term contracts under fixed prices mendez the industry made significant investment to improve productivity and quality. as a result the cost has greatly improves that the current ships are the of living at how often m performance has stayed within the budget and the quality of each ship has improved as if measured by the inspection survey.

and performance continues to improve. we have implemented some plum -- similar rules across all shipbuilding although we could not get out front of all programs to design production and testing has strolled into place. and second, the emission packages the strategy is to incrementally introduce systems as the package when it is mature and ready for deployment. lcs has the unmanned aerial vehicles the 30 mm gun system and now the harpoon device assault and we are currently integrating the hellfire missile and support of testing and as a result

year entr'acte to complete in 2018. and next mission package is the anti-submarine package it has been demonstrated to greatly exceed that of any other sensor system afloat. we are in the process to build us a developmental model before replying to see in 2018. their relative success stories benefit from the lcs package approach as the navy develop systems it is important to leverage the modular design and be able to do so in rapid fashion once they are richer. we are headlong into challenges to develop these capabilities that our central to what is arguably one of the most were funding

gaps of the counter measures the requirements of lcs are to identify those that are specifically exceeding without putting the ship for the sailor into a the minefield the cm warfare package helps with the helicopter carrying the laser mine detection system and the airborne neutralization system to destroy them below the surface it we are ready to deploy a. the unmanned aerial sensor to detect those objects that are close to shore is on track to be tested in 2017. with the work forceful fear is the highest in durance unmanned vehicle which we have relied upon five to achieve the high a area clearance rate required for our plans with the needy is

satisfied as demonstrated with developmental testing we expect further improvements with the ongoing upgrades. but the unmanned vehicle is the remote emission vehicle has built to meet liability requirements despite redesign elements we stop testing and assigned the independent review team and the results of this was threefold. local finance -- confidence of the vehicle or higher confidence through processing to reduce the of risk of the mine detection sonar as an alternative and recognition the long term solution that they would operate with the unmanned underwater vehicle if technology can support that

and as a result we have restructured that packaged utilize the unmanned service vehicle currently being built to the mine detection sonar this vehicle is scheduled to commence 2019. the third cornerstone addressing the performance of the ships and operations as well as the detailed preview i'd like to phaedrus the readiness in the total lcs has operation up report metrics consistent. however for the past year five ships have been operational impacting by a engineering reviews and command investigations to assess the root causes for each of these casualties.

one was design related. in the manufacture was required and operation deficiencies traced to the gear as a clutch failure design modifications happened as a result and is tested and will be incorporated into future ships prior to delivery. the manufacturer is being held accountable. >> you'll have to summarize here we have a limited amount of time. >> kisser the manufacturers are being held accountable but that was due to the cruise leaving the procedure but with corrective actions going forward with the operational procedures remaining to casualty's we are reviewing all procedures

not just the ship builders but manufacturers and the navy standards to ensure we have the right procedures in place them properly being carried out by the shipbuilders and in the repair yards. those specific cases this shipbuilder is paying for those repairs. more importantly we do need to raise the level of the engineering design to that of the standards to have a comprehensive engineering review we will provide findings to the committee. the fourth cornerstone is transition we have revised the plan going forward commencing in 2019 the intention is to transition from lcs to incorporate the surface or mission

capability from lcs going forward reworking bad design today and as we complete this design before we proceed into production we will conduct that readiness review to ensure the design is complete and ready to go in and open the books to participate threat to review process. the yankee for the opportunity to discuss this program and i will answer your questions. >> and chairman mccain ranking member mckean and i am honored to testify as the commander i have the privilege of leading sellers to take the ships to sea they are the center of our professional universe and my frequent visits to the waterfront give me a

real-time feedback of what we're getting right and what we need to address. the committee's support has been strong and consistent and we're moving forward with the more lethal force. small surface combatants of the key role to play and with the lcs program is the cornerstone of the effort. it is sad and number of setbacks and the leadership team are aware of we are pursuing solutions to our improved operational availability of the ships and you have my assurance that for the first time in 25 years bearing is competition this statement underpins my entire approach . it is my job to examine

every aspect in those changes that reflect the environment of the of future . they must be prepared to not only impose control but also be prepared to have control of the others those capabilities will bring the fight those capabilities are in high demand by the fleet commanders specifically with respect to mine countermeasures and anti-surface warfare they form the basis of the conventional deterrence posture that puts our cruisers and destroyers we have learned quite a bit and those options provided so

those challenges is encountered over the 60 day review which was then number of straightforward changes into the program as we increased. i am confident we're on the right track well delivering critical war fighting capability there is work to be done and i join the secretary to commit to continuously improve these necessary components of the forge your questions firms to make it morning mr. chairman i don't have a slick statement i thought i would just talk to you for a few minutes if that is okay. the bottom line on the lcs

as we have talked already we are 26 ships and to the contract and increased dildo know if the lcs can do is to robert over last 10 years we have made a number of trade and downs higher promises and construction delays module delays reliability problems with lower capability. to adjust your accommodate a lesser performance of the ship except a number of worker rounds more shore support we have dial down the concept of operations and produce a emission expectation for the ship. it will be 20/20 before all of the modules will work. for doing my own math i think the first contract for the first ship in 2004 or

five but is 16 years from the first contract to when the ship is finally tested with all modules to me that is aircraft carrier territory. so the of miracle of lcs did not happen. what did happen? i think when the navy started off and had a good plan to build two ships that were experimental using commercial yards and designs because they had a rough construct and they wanted to use those ships to see what they could do with them and it was a good idea. in 2005 things changed when the navy decided they could not just tops with to experimental chips but they had to go forward with construction. in my mind that is when it went from experimental program to a ship

construction program and as with any construction program, once you get into it and the money we'll start to turn the business of budget san contracts and ship construction take precedent over acquisition and oversight like design, development, testing and cost. personnel switching to oversight come on any major weapons system the most important milestone is when the legal oversight framework will kick in with the approved baseline for, your requirements, of operational evaluation the selected acquisition reports all kick in at that time.

usually we have the milestone when it is approved for the first ship but with lcs the decision was made in 2011 after we've already approved the block by 20 ships and constructed most of the first four. the cost growth that occurred on the early ships was grandfathered in to the baseline of the program much like today if you look at the selective acquisition report you will mancini much of us gosh -- schedule for cost areas because of the grandfather clause. so those were produced before the decision to keep pace with the ship. so what we had in my view is a highly concurrent strategy on and all the class of ships.

i think of pitcher for the oversight for the frigate program is concerned is it will not have milestone decisions are have a separate program. you will let have those projections the selected acquisition report. some of the key performances have been downgraded to the attributes that to maybe they will make said decisions on what is acceptable. i will wrap up by saying the ball is in your court if you approve the fyi 18 budget if current plans hold, with the approval of 12 frigates, in my mind, you will be russia again to have up front

approval were the design is not done, we don't have the independent cost estimate and it is not understood by the way those modules still have not been demonstrated "seal team six" day will be told me irrigating great prices that the industrial base needs this. id my view for that by a is a pretty loose construct for accountability. you don't have to say how much your savings or held accountable there is an instrument that is called multi-year procurement the abel moonves and davey was able to do that for the four submarines then you know, your savings in test through the stability of the design and is a commitment before the forget we will use the same contracts as we know

how will they work. but with the industrial base we have seen a lot of decisions made but we did not think we would create this because of commercial firms. but now my question is have a lead done enough and is in a time for them to come through for us? can we get one shipped on time or one ship delivered without the serious reliability or quality problems? that is my question. once approved your oversight is marginalized. what you'll be hit with thin the future is a great prices but we have to protect the

industrial base then you can change the program and i assaying that you can. it in the first-ever site question will be the program that has doubled in cost but has yet to demonstrate its capabilities worth another $14 billion of investment? that is assuming a ripping goes well. if you do think it is worth it, my counsel to you and the team is have the navy to competition and to make that the major acquisition but petition be based on the demonstrated performance and

if you did and then decide at that point. you have one shot left to preserve your oversight power and my advice is take the shots. i can assure you it will not send the earth off the access if you do but it will send a signal what you are willing to our progress and what you are not. >> secretary, ronald reagan use said you paint a rather rosy picture but the fact is that lcs was initially expected to cost 220 million per ship before this committee it has now doubled

470 million. the first lcs combat capability countermeasures' was supposed to be delivered 2008 that capability is still not operational and is not expected to be until 2020t. serving as the executive behoove is rorer the doubling of the cost of the ship and not mislead the difficulties. >> hoodoo a is responsible. >> so who was responsible? >> reference to the ship that number dating back at the 2004 timeframe we would agree that is unrealistic.

>> know why would not because it testified before the committee that would be the cost per ship in retrospect we see it was unrealistic but at the time this committee and congress which approved it it was on the basis of $220 million per ship potatoes 478 million and 12 years later peddled think the committee or congress would have approved it mr. secretary. >> i am selling that number was unrealistic. >> white? why was unrealistic? >> i agree. it was led to believe it would cost 220 million not dollars was an unrealistic number put before the congress with to appropriate but the results going $700 million each. >> who gave that information to the congress?

>> i would have to get back to the records to see who testified that was directed from the top down i can tell you the naval sea systems that was the number put in place says they cost in to break down what they could not and we have the experience of what went wrong. >> en then sunk into the remote vehicle that program is canceled due to unsatisfactory performance the navy for related the countermeasures for nearly a decade the gao has reported they were buying the system before approved by

dr. gilmore reported that they were not affected so why did they recommit in 2010 after the breach showed the case for the system to continue development? >> going through that process we looked at a couple key things. one was the performance issues we were having none of whether or not we believe we could connect - - correct liability issues. >> obviously you could not. >> we failed in that assessment. we did the redesign effort we did not go back to build a new vehicles in accordance with the design we took the existing vehicles to backfit what fixes we could end to that to task. >> obviously that did not work because it has been abandoned. >> qsr.

>> for more question. of those major casualties accounting artie's issues of the inferior shipbuilding is a lack of training or something else. >> but combining with the water contamination and the contamination of a main engine would. combined a gear in is teeth read therefore what did he tell you 24 days? we don't know the cost for: 355 days and counting. waterjet failure.

so what is going on? >> alou is held accountable for? studying specifically back nearly part of this year when associated with personnel errors and started to look very hard that the training and qualifications of the men and women serving on our ships to seek if we had shortchanged them with respect to the training that was provided spec they were not well trained somebody is supposed to train them. >> absolutely. >> are you in charge of that price. >> diane in charge of training siam capable of fulfilling the responsibilities. what i did find is that the

training we provided was insufficient in reviewing the two casualties' tough every gatt the school to conduct the engineering school the acknowledgement of men and women and to be deficient but one of the things i directed is import much more of that training to the seller is to serve on the ships. so given the fact we have engineering training and we move to get the curriculum necessary to get the right knowledge into their heads i think we're in a much better place going forward. specifically. >> i am agree we may be but admiral, obie will start

holding people accountable. we're talking about millions of dollars that were failures that use say was a problem with training? who was responsible for the training? but wasn't that anticipated they would have to be well trained to avoid tens of millions of dollars of problems? >> absolutely. and. >> i am glad that we have learned that they made tens of millions of dollars. >> and a letter in the they talk about the replacement is testimony suggests lcs is something that would morphin

to the forget but we will not have the opportunity with given the compressed time frame to do us a testing and approving, if you will. ken you give us an indication of where this program is headed? is said new design for service, that tends corrects if this doesn't have to be up and running? american 2014 we were directed by then secretary hegel to take a review of the small service combatants to come back with a proposal of what was referred to as capabilities. we did that review in the 2015 timeframe and fact the

defense committees we invite them to participate and the plan going forward that we presented in the budget is to plus the service for fear emission package and then to relieve install the lawn of platform with that multi emission capabilities and add to that that the ship is already designed to

accommodate want that was done with charters and and at the staff level and includes very frigid and then with the validation and it the shipyard and then to put those into their platforms. more is going on today with the competitive down select for the future free did design but to invite your

staff to look at the process and criteria and provide your oversight in be one to show that you have the insight before we go further for word. >> and today that is the plan. we don't have a finalized acquisition strategy with the 18 budget we will bring that to present to the congress and. >> i do appreciate all of the comments but i do need to point out talking about the multi-year effectively

what we are describing with the competitive downside is it is based on this bill liu , associate with the detailed design and we are telling them somebody will win this and they will get 12 ships of this free get design. the details whether that is 12 options are free convert that into the multi-year in the future, that is not decided today. but what we do want to ensure that we procured though ships as early as possible going to that competitive process. >> but again for my perspective become it appears the lcs program. >> guess you went from 52. >> dr. gilmore points out one of the things we have to

consider is the ship were literally gets heavier with these systems at but with added 30 pledge but then to keep up with those striker. >> my time is limited so if you have a quick response quick. >> we will add capability which will add weight however the impact on speed is marginal. the requirement is over 40 knots the ships will still be faster than any other combat and to worship one that we have with the added weight.

second, part of the of requirements and design cycle we will not trade off and in fact, as we look put the competitive strategy to put out there, we are not just not going to trade off and maybe i may have some written questions for the panel. >>. >> always talking about cost overruns or the increase and then all the problems the b-2 but then they say it is

all over but in terms of the navy has this been all of this discussion and testimony is unacceptable and frankly when we think about going forward, led lcs there is the periodic time

the navy was with all clean sheet designs in the leadership's. but we're still working through those but that approach is in the rearview mirror. where not going forward so we are leveraging richard designs and mature systems giving us the ability to put this future ship under fixed-price contact lcs. >> you do need to elaborate on that because in 2013, the oceanus hat and engineering casualty's and they get some worse and worse but

mr. francis, we will take

those recommendations to improve but with the fundamentals to lock down the requirements of the design to ensure that we have a competitive approach to the forget all of those fundamentals you would want us to do is in place. >> what about the specific recommendation? >> i agree with civics they don't agree with the recommendation quick. >> i'm sorry what. >> cognition consider not finding anything from the fiscal year and they should revise the acquisition strategy.

>> dyewood disagree with the recommendation. >> for the record when i would like to have both few elaborate what is a better solution we have heard a lot but i read these and he has been doing this for such a long period of time also mr. francis not just on this but on some of the heather committees that i have mentioned. >> i would like to follow upon mr. francis suggestion to this committee it is probably that can be responded by the secretary iran had ruled that one suggestion is that we not okayed the block of price-cutting for the

frigate to bet with that type of strategy due to the industrial base and what type of message would that decision by this committee give to the strategy of other programs? >> i will describe what the block by itself is we will go down to select that forget to a single ship order m. procure 12 we want the shipbuilder to go out to the vendor base and secure long-term agreements so pricing and stability will support the program. >> so the concern is that it doesn't have that type of competition where it would

be warranted is that your point mr. francis x.. >> ashley the competition could be done under the detailed design base. that my concern is oversight once you approve the navy will execute in a do believe they have a good job to lay out a program your opportunity to influence what is done is largely economized once you approve it so your ability in the future to make changes. >> but your explanation apparently it has more to do with our ability to provide oversight? and when you we okayed the block and we let go of that oversight?

>> i disagree you relinquish any response abilities is still a annual procurement. there is no determination of liability that the congress takes that responsibility and you will have absolute oversight of the program. >> that is all well and good but the history has spent we have always had that decision making ability but if you go down the path the next thing you know, what costliest that path. bill listing to this testimony you wanted assurances going forward that we will not continue to

throw money into a program that will continue to haunt us in all the other factors. i realize that you reassure us that with regard to this program but i am looking for something very concrete to enable us to get that product that the taxpayers are paying for aside from your reassurances that there is something you will do that would have that product that we pay for. >> i will go down the list of mike at the start of the program we will not suffer for the requirements. we will not introduce a new design into production to have the cost goes through the roof we will not put them under contract