such an approach also reflects the general premise that the united states has a legitimate interest in setting the specific substantive and procedural rules that govern access to data for its citizens and residents, but does not have a similar specification and imposing the specific rules of a warrant based on probable cause when a foreign government seeking to access data of its citizens outside the united states, so long as certain baseline protections are in place here notably the u.s. and uk have a draft agreement that would allow you and k law enforcement officials to do exactly what i'm talking about directly compelled the production of communication content from us-based providers in certain circumstances, but this can't happen without legislation. i know it's a hard time to predict what's going to happen in congress over the next few yearsyears, but i would say i tk this is and should be an issue that crosses party lines, and

congress has an important chance to design a rational and comprehensive approach to the question of law enforcement access to data across borders, addressing both the question is u.s. government reach and also amending its laws to allow foreign governments increase access to u.s. health data according to baseline privacy protections when certain conditions are met. in my view, these jurisdictional rules should focus on things like the location of the nationality of the target, rather than the location of the data. at that spirit to take these steps will of negative consequences for our security, our economy and our privacy. thanks. [applause] >> actually urge everyone later as you head for the reception to grab a copy of her excellent paper on this topic.

i want to invite our final panel discusses to the stage. last year we started a new tradition advocate of surveillance conference by having a prominent civil libertarian in a case of the foundation have sort of an extended not debate but really dialogue with and efficiently intelligence community, in this case it was becky of an essay and without that yields such interesting results that why not repeat the experiment. see what happens when you can. two people caregiving about privacy, jua one will still an a critic come one working within the intelligence community and see what they think are the important issues of the day to talk about and, of course, introduce our discussants and moderate the conversation we have another cato surveillance conference tradition of sorts

who has been a can get each of these since even before it was called the savannas, so we did our first post snowden full-day conference of the national security agency, pulitzer prize winner charlie savage whose nationals could be reporting for the "new york times" is absolute essential to understand what's going on in the intelligence world and this book power wars is an absolutely invaluable guide, the most thorough and comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of what intelligence security policy under the obama administration has emerged to be. i will turn it over to charlie to introduce our panel spirit can everyone can be all right? so here we are at the end of this conference and we are also three years, three and a half years net into into the post snowden era. we've been living under the usa freedom act for 18 months now we are heading into another

reauthorization year for the fisa amendments act, and it's sort of a great time to wrap up the day and the year to some extent with an overview of where we are and what we might be going across three or four different cuts of the savannas were. so to help me do that with me today, i have two great guests. one is our -- alexander joel to my right, od nigricans played in the bowl since 2005 when office was set up and is also the chief transparency officer. and he began his career as a jagged attorney in the army at beginning of the mill to a work as attorney in the private sector and after 9/11 he decided to rejoin the government in the cia's office of general counsel before he moved to odni in 2005.

and i think we're talking in the green room before we came out here, i asked alex, something that something just wasn't resnick item editor link of what is a you told me? >> i swim every single day how do you have time? >> we have to wake up real early in the morning spin out early? >> around 5:30. spin where do you swim? >> primarily the sport house in queens spin why do you swim everyday? >> it's good to stay in shape. i found that actually the secret to come at the swimming instruments exercise, if we're going to have this conversation about swimming, the key is audiobooks. if you have a waterproof ipod and listen while you are swimming, the laps go by fast. >> you are the last person standing at odni was been in the role the entire time? >> i think so. i haven't done a full audit but i believe so spirit my other

guest is jennifer granick, director of civil liberties at stanford center for internet and society. teaches internet law at stanford law school. she served as a civil liberties director of electronic frontier foundation from '07-'09 -- 2010, sort that you are the author of her forthcoming book from cambridge university press called american spies, modern surveillance, why just get what to do about it from which sounds like his audience might be interested. when is a book coming out? >> the beginning of january it's about surveillance and general all written for an general audience. endeavor to understandable and accurate and give people kind of the framework for thinking about the savannas policy debate with a definite civil liberties that spirit when asked to something about yourself you told me you are and if this is for something called tech -- >> it's one of those hand-to-hand combat of videogames and in japan, san

francisco there is a video arcade that is only beat against that of an imported directly from japan. so my daughter really likes it because there is a character that is a kangaroo. she's always the kangaroo and in the kangaroo and i beat each other up. i think it's good therapy probably as well as a nice pass to spin what character do you play? >> i just go around. but i can tell you that my other daughter was playing her and she got this one character and my daughter said to her, the women are always skillfully dressed in his things and the men look like demagogues. my daughter beat the computer that was playing the really masculine looking guy, and my other daughter said t to her, yu are so good, you beat that guy and you are barely even wearing a shirt. [laughter] >> all right. so let's get into it. part of what this audience wants to walk away from this conference with an deep dives into all different kinds of weeds that one of the resort able to do these deeper dives in

a way that we were not able before, 2013, we have an annual conference about savannas and there's a lot to talk about is because we know so much more about what the government is capable of doing, what the rules are, where the rules are being obeyed and so forth then we did before the snowden leaks. from your vantage point, especially chief transparency officer which is a role that didn't exist before a year or two ago, how has the odni and the cia changed, seen the value of what is talking to the public about what it does? >> right. i been in the committee which values secrecy and we were sort of built for secrecy. we hire people based on in part based on their our perception of their ability to maintain the confidentiality of information by the government. we have secure facilities, secure system. we do do a lot of training

around keeping secrets and that's important in our business because of course as i said another context a fully transparent intelligence service would be fully ineffective. our effectiveness depends on the people, the adversary not knowing how it is we are using different techniques and sources to discover them and detect their activities but when you come from a culture it's very difficult to sort of get people thinking about being more open in public and transparent. i've been doing this as you pointed out since 2005, and never before have i experienced a community that is as engaged with the public as we are now. we still have a waste ago. i think think one of the lessons that certainly i learn and a lot of folks learned in the last three years is you can have as much oversight as you can design and put in place. we have all kinds of different oversight structures that can be complicated. i call this a system of many

layers with many players. we had inspectors general, gene, lawyers, my kinds of officers but we also have oversight committees and we have a foreign intelligence for work. all of these entities have clear personnel that can see information in a classified effort which is critical i think for our democracy to the people who are in an oversight capacity to have a clearance to see the things that we're doing in a classified manner. you can have these rules. you can have oversight and that's necessary, but not sufficient. one of the lessons we learn in the last three years is you need to add an additional element which is transparency. it's not easy for the intelligence community to do it. it takes a lot of time, effort and attention, but i believe that this is an enduring value that we have learned in the last three years. you have to find ways to be more open about what you do. >> let me follow up on it

briefly. i certainly as a reporter who was covering these things, asking questions and filing freedom of information act is over, noticing odni as the controlling entity for how the response with snowden was gone to play out became gradually more willing to a from the essay what's going on, not to fight the foia case, to say okay, you can have the document, just let us redact him. i appreciate that. i'm not sure the public is going to endorse the way you just suggested that it would. i think other parts, and correct me if you disagree disagree, thr parts of intelligence community that were not forcibly exposed like the surveillance world was, such as the central intelligence agency, never went to the cultural change. and what of the things i've been thinking about lately is that the usa freedom act, one of its provisions, was that the intelligence court, the fisa court, had to make public when

it has made its novel and significant interpretations of surveillance law. and the provision doesn't say going forward. it just as, ambiguous, and just as the government shall make so it is raised a question about whether fisa court opinions that are not significant, the way not to between 1979-2015 must also now be made public at least in summarized form. the obama administration has taken the position in court that no, it only applies going forward. if there is a new culture of transparency what that justification are rational purchasing yes, here is an important thing from 1988, you can have it? >> so i think, i won't get into the legal discussions regarding the interpretation of that particular cause and in the context of whatever, wherever it is being discussed at the moment but i can just say more generally, it is our intent to go back and look at all the

significant opinions. that is something that is happening. whether or not it's a statutory requirement, it is something that we are portraying right now. one of the point i was making at a different form is when you look at transparency, there are different reasons to provide information to the public. some of those are in response to medical or legal requirements. had the usa freedom act. we must comply with the usa freedom act, and that acts as a part position mechanism on what it is we do. another one is freedom of information act. ..

necessarily drive a lot of the machinery that has to be in place to provide the classification which can be very painstaking. you have to go line by line to determine if there is a risk to national security, what that risk is, bring in the experts, et cetera appeared part of what we do is not only looking not responding to those mandatory classification, but also looking to be more is, to say what it is we can do to explain ourselves to the public and in that regard we have been engaging with a civil society can the civil society, getting their ideas and requests come in trying to figure out what's in the public

interest in what we can do to better inform public discussion and i do think that's enduring. no matter what agency you are, with all experience the very significant and vibrant discussion and debate about the legitimacy and i think intelligence agencies all got the message that we have to figure out a way to be more proactive and strategic going forward about the information we provide. >> let me turn to jennifer. the most significant event weakens beyond the horizon for surveillance is the scheduled expiration of the end of 2017. of course there is no expectation that it will not be renewed, but it is an opportunity for amendment and extra provision. what are the three big issues and takeaways that people should watch for? >> one big issue directly in

response to alex's comment is about transparency, but i would put it a little more broadly, which is accountability. i think that while the intelligence community has come a long way from where it was less common it has not come far enough in terms of revealing information to the public. there are secret interpretations of key terms and intelligence laws that the public doesn't really know what they mean or how they're been interpreted and hinders our ability to understand what kind of surveillance are inspected and whether we support the surveillance and whether they are adequate. >> the reauthorization bill to solve the problem. >> everything ecstatic current negotiation to expire so it's going to be more.

particularly people want to know what the definition of conceit surveillance turned sour. what does it mean to target? what is the interpretation of the u.s. person? what kinds of materials does the government treat as protected by recent lx patient privacy? all of the sites that collect tronic stuff depend upon collecting information to which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. we have this ongoing debate about the recent personal private information with the public doesn't know exactly how the government treats it and if they treated as having an execution of privacy are not in either the staff you have to protect her it's not subject because it falls outside the definition of electronic surveillance. e-mails, we still don't really know 100% for sure that e-mail is protected by the fourth amendment here to read about

documents stored in the cloud? >> better information can come out about how government understand power and what is the role reformers want to physically but also commit part of this bill? >> there are two big things. one of scope in the others' usage. section 702 allows targeting for any foreign intelligence information without a warrant. warrantless surveillance for any foreign intelligence purpose. foreign intelligence is a very broad category will be on national security and counterterrorism. and so, what that means there's two things. number one, it means that when american top to foreigners who are of interest in these

categories, our communications are wiretapped as well and it means that foreigners who may be target or talking about targets, they get picked up for the very broad category also a night has an immense amount of international consternation as people realize that our law is collecting on man without a warrant in this very broad way well beyond what their national laws is necessary and proportionate or whether the surveillance means the standard. >> we are only talking about collection inside the united states. when the u.s. government goes to at&t and look in the world. the nsa has forever been a broad gathering of foreign intelligence. >> this is where they go to u.s. companies for surveillance on internet and saying to these

beloved remnants can i get information about users and the economic problem is obvious that people don't want to use companies that have to give over information without a warrant to the u.s. government. the problem for americans as broad as well. we have learned there's a vast amount of american private information in these databases. >> the allowable scope is what? >> national security, counterterrorism. you see that as politically possible? >> i don't know. i live in san francisco so it's like a whole different world. i think that there is people telling me that even though there is a chance for republicans in control of both houses of congress, i find that in some it's hard to believe. that was a time where people are

paying attention or thinking quite the opposite. this is a time to restrain government discretion and make sure that robust rules and checks and balances are in place more than ever before. >> the other thing to mention is usage. what is bad and that intersect? >> so, once information is collected under section 702 from the company, without a warrant, that warrantless collection goes into a database in the fbi which is the law enforcement and domestic security agency has access to the raw data in a database and what they are allowed to do is to search, they call it query because it's a constitutional term, to search the database for information including looking for information about american for criminal purposes. this is the loophole because

ordinarily to get access to the information you have to show probable cause, getting more and execute the warrant to the regular criminal procedures, but what is happening here is by creating a vast database of information as american communications of foreigners, then you have said database the fbi is allowed. the restriction would be either don't allow it at all. we collected this information and use it in that name and tell doing and ran at the very least you have to go and get a warrant to show you have probable cause as opposed to the latest now which the fbi can access for assessment which is basically tax-free. >> not to put you in a stock, but can you articulate the rebuttal, why has the government resisted the idea that at least in the criminal investigative

world if an fbi agent wants to look in the database to see if an ordinary criminal private messages have 30 then collect dead, the fbi agent not to be giving a warrant before trying to pull that up. >> i have to take a step back and address this more broadly. first of all, i certainly agree with some of the points you are making about the transparency of legal ruling and legal definitions. that's a priority we have to be more transparent about that. in terms of the scope, the scope is foreign intelligence to find. the actual conduct of the targeting of foreign intelligence purposes under section 702 is subject to a rigorous process. we have the national intelligence trademark. >> let's assume i was

communicating with the legitimate procedure, foreign intelligence target, someone who knew about this thing. why shouldn't an fbi agent have to get a warrant to read my private message if i'm the one who's interested in and i am the one his query. >> i'm trying to lay the foundation. >> we will go through many topics. >> we believe the original collection is targeted at a legitimate point. we are not getting knowledge your e-mails. on that e-mail communications of you and this carefully focused foreign intelligence target. if there is a situation where you need to find out whether or not an american involved a terrorist incident that the united states is in communication with somebody we have collected on, that's the rationale. you need to move quickly.

you need to identify whether recurrent hold the communication information that could help us from happening in the future. >> that sounds like you're searching on the name of the terrorist internet searching on a american. >> it could be an american who's involved in some terrorist incident that we want to see these getting instructions from abroad. >> you think the government of the government of the other requirement if other requirement is there their seclusion for a last-minute security crisis? is there something snappier is it just why should we constrain our powers. there's never been data that was gathered. >> so, essentially because you don't know and we don't want to constrain the intelligence services from being able to do that. from a privacy perspective, and understand it can turn. we do try to put in place policies regarding oversight documents and queries and the reason for the queries,

providing oversight on the queries and reporting anything. so i understand the concerns. we feel like the current structure. >> can i say something about that? >> until we know how many of these backdoor searches the fbi cannot and the volume information, there's no way that's like an internal assessment. the public lawmakers need to know that in order to say we like to say we don't like this. it's not just an emergency. the intelligence community won't tell us they won't count and congress has asked many times how many doctors search is the fbi is conduct teen and we don't know. the information they get from the company from the companies is kept for five years and there is no document and there's no

faxing is to be shown to a judge in order to get it. it is really kind of like taking a damage. [inaudible] they did not require the fbi to do that. we understand that's been a request from the hill as well as civil society organizations we deal with an fbi is trying to figure out how to do that. >> a understanding about by by the fbi can't do it is when you're an agent, you do a database search. it's a federated search that hits all the database in the selection and brings back results. but that means -- what does that mean? every search by an fbi agent at all times in some ways commented that research even if 99.9% of them never bring back anything.

>> will make certain fbi agents are about to see the result without getting permission. >> to know if agents have asked permission ever been tonight? >> we are working to rid the thigh. if you look at the opinion on the november 2015 court opinion in the procedures on the record, addressed that issue. the query process was inconsistent with the cons to tuition. the court held that was consistent, that they decided to order fbi to count the number of times a return resulted in a query situation. the fbi has been implementing that order and it's one of the things -- >> do think that in the net?

>> i hope so, yes. >> as if all the searches? >> the one the court order to be disclosed. >> i don't know the internal architecture of how the fbi has a database. experts have said it's not a big consumer science hurdle to say they were this many queries for data came out of this particular database and it has to be treated in a certain way. >> have you seen the data even know you can't talk about it? >> i can but i won't talk about it. i won't speculate. >> let's move on to executive order, the internal executive branch rules for surveillance that is not regulated by the foreign intelligence surveillance act. pfizer regulates collection from a wire on domestic soil or the one communication is domestic. it does empower data and intercepting stuff from fiber-optic cable abroad.

the foreign to foreign communications intercepted in the united states. huge swathes of what the nsa does is not covered by fisa. this -- the reason for the architecture as it was designed in the 70s persistence in which would have been your state here, what happened there stayed there. now in the internet era, and this is explaining the last session. stuff that happens here is found there all the time. that is one of the reasons for why the fisa amendment that allows collection of foreign or data without a warrant reform that came under pressure that arose because of the internet. stay with alex here for a minute. one of the wrinkles arising out of a greater understanding of fisa has been an awareness that agencies have increasingly common sense 9/11 been engaged

in sharing raw data with each other. data that has not had privacy protections put on it yet to screen out the names and irrelevant personal details. 70s to be the nsa only would have this or the fbi would only have it to disseminate the government they would have to process it in a protection measure. after 9/11 there was a desire to tear down barriers. maybe someone would have been redacted because the nsa person didn't know it was a clue. there was a great effort to share raw data, which now goes -- is known to go to for agencies. fbi, cia, national counterterrorism center and the general counsel has talked publicly about how there's also been an after, which is eight

years now to develop the procedures that will allow data to collect it under 12 triple three rule also to be shared with the cia and fbi. we don't know what the rules or limits are going to be, but this has been in the works for eight years. bob said in february that it was imminent. where are those procedures? you think it's going to happen before the administration latest? >> i think we're on the road to getting something finalized. >> government take times, but is there some issue and what is that? >> guest: the government takes time. just to give under section 2.3 of executive order talks about protections for retaining common disseminating u.s. personal information and intelligence agencies can share the information with each other because everybody has guidelines designed to protect the

information. >> the executive order in 2008. >> the change was in 2008 they added to change from 1981 they cannot be shared until they decided to disseminate it and a reporter something like that. in 2008, the decision was made that for the kind of intelligence information, that could be shared pursuant to procedures by the dni and approved by the attorney general the secretary of defense. if a large number of years. not like when we signed it, we attacked 2.3. it's been going, so we are -- the basic structure will be the information can be shared pursuant to an elaborate process with the agency and has put in

place structures and processes that essentially look at their protection under their rules. >> the big difference between fisa surveillance with or without a warrant, it has to be targeted. you are the king of one specific person and if someone is communicating, at his side as well. with a permit will collection to vacuum up the whole type because it's supposed to be happening for foreign intelligence purposes. we were talking about the fact research loophole in terms of fisa. they would get all of it. they received the legitimate foreign intelligence target. the sharing constraint would not

exist if information is backed up. can you tell us, can you preview the question which is both a let the fbi query u.s. person data for criminal purposes once they get access to the collections. >> just to clarify the question, if we are to do surveillance targeting any american no matter where in the world, we are required to get individually score. >> to the extent that the collection is not targeted. this is what i wanted to say the way we do targeting. targeting is something that is specifically described for section 702 but also have been for triple c. there is a process by which

intelligence agencies go to identify to the extent that targeting can happen we put in place a process for limiting the use of bulk and basically we are saying we have to tailor our collection. and still obtain the national security information. we can do things in bulk. nsa still operates under 18. and their implementation of the detail requirements. they are supposed to also narrow as much as they can when they think there would be significant amounts of people involved. so there is a narrowing. if they are going to do a query,

they must get attorney general approval based on probable cause. i won't comment so broadly speaking. so they are trying to the policy directive handles book collection. one of these purposes and some of the purposes may be criminal with a super national level. do you want to critique anything he said? >> a couple things. one thing that is that concern us that we are ready now about

target is we are thinking a lot of people think about targeting as a particular bad guy. but targets can be the french government for targets that operate internationally for foreign intelligence purposes and a latin american information because they end up being part of the take they are. the rule we had to adequately correct people when the targets are a major because the collection and that being so broad. we have a lot of reasons where you need to show probable cause

and we've seen the head of prominent groups where terror has been title i targets for which they're supposedly probable cause. there's reasons to be concerned, but i think one of the things to be extra concerned about is we are about to have a change in the administration and these are executive branch are related rules. executive orders. they don't require congress and executive orders can be kept secret. targeting provisions we don't know what they were until edwards noted that gun, but they made provisions for the fisa court, but the ability to oversee statutorily limited. >> be for return to looking forward, i do want to get to that. let's stick with the theme a lot

of americans. but it's also a nationalistic frame. our staff is let's drop that frame and think about it from a more global perspective. they have privacy rights or does it come from archives edition. we mentioned earlier for people are familiar, but that was not from an american perspective but from a global test. >> as i said, there is this international outcry from people who are not americans, beginning to get a sense of the scope of u.s. surveillance directed at them for opportunistically gathering their data.

many people felt this is a major positive results of the disclosures as a presidential policy directive then it does a couple things. one thing is that permits the use is to which you can put signal intelligence to the six major categories. weapons proliferation. and it still remains the question because if you're targeting cnn, and to collect everything you can inside is gannon, is that targeted? they're still questions about how that's interpreted and what that means. it does say to people if you are collected in this way, we will use it for the good national security thing. >> but was unprecedented about

that? >> that information notice collected could be used for whatever. >> there is no sense that non-americans have privacy information protected by rule. >> also free expression interests, to gather a politically freedom of religion and all of these others that may have been protected for americans. there is nothing for foreigners. this is an effort to say to foreigners, if we use your staff, it is going to be for a good reason. >> then he turned to alex. you live in this world. since we've been for under two years now, do you -- in the world of drugs, i know that the agency in the military under the presidential policy guidance that limits their ability to

fire outside of the battlefield and is very thought of of wanting to get out from under this. does it impose -- >> do you have any other questions? does the surveillance community who are the six categories broad enough? >> there are two other critical exceptions to make. or safeguarding personal information that is the basic without getting into the details the agencies have to apply comparable protection to disseminate non-us person and we have to put in place policies. we have published those policies. policy makers they are taken

into account the risks involved with foreign government and other risks that were part of the formal structure review. [inaudible] is part of the review process we would have the human rights organization, up in terms of that would be something you would weigh in and we talked to human rights organizations about the general abuse i'm not. -- general abuse i'm not. >> and intelligence service around the world if you are a democracy, the main concern is they are focused inward.

that's why jennifer and colleagues and others are focused on what we are doing regarding our own citizenry and around democratic process. are we interfering with a functioning of our democracy? one of the lessons in the 1970s was its imports may turn outward. the culture of the intelligence community has been be very careful in the united states had anything to do with u.s. persons. unless you fit one of these narrow categories are constrained and legal procedures. it was to some degree a change in thinking now why you're turning your view outward, protections we put in place for u.s. persons for all the reasons we said, we also have to think about everybody regardless of nationality.

at the same time if you read how a disparate and how we try to divide it, if it's within the course of business for intelligence services so it's nothing they would view as extraordinarily burdensome. >> to some degree. they also reflect on the internet data happens on specifics chop of the planet which have different regimes even robust democracies and different rules tried to share data with each other across international lines were one system doesn't line up well with

the other one. just got to try to resolve the issue. what is the sort of one minute take away of what it does and why it's important. >> the european union still has the regime and under that regime they regulate the data flows that leave the european union member states and basically requires the other country have adequate protections for privacy to what the european data protection regulation requires. since 2000, the united states has negotiated with the european union said that american companies could bring data out of europe into the united states called the safe harbor. more recently, the european court of justice of what they negotiated and founded it and basically overturned a to reenter into the united states

government to come up with some arrangement for the companies to bring data into the united states and the tear in to some sort of desperate as principles. and what is now called the privacy shield. the european negotiators. one thing important to understand is a very complicated situation. 20 member states for now. when they formed the european union and they are lying treaties they retained for themselves authority over their own national security. the european privacy rules do not apply -- do not directly apply to the member states, so what you see going on within the european union member states each other a way of intelligence oversight what we do and what

they do is not part of that discussion. the privacy shield is us explaining to them about her various instruments and documents as part of the package. >> one of the issues that civil libertarians is why do i -- why should i as an american gets a civil liberties if i am overseas. when i do business for internet giants all located here in the u.s. the reason why the safe harbor was struck down was because the

european court of justice said that section 702 does not comply with european standards because it allows the warrantless collection of european data produced by foreign intelligence reason than that it's not necessary and appropriate under their law. so it was struck down a negotiators have come up in the privacy shield will be reviewed if you look at the privacy shield and you read the decision and it's very clear there's a mismatch there. with all these additional procedural things about where somebody who happens to learn that they are great by having their information mishandled can go through this process and that kind of thing. but if the court was serious, if

the problem is the standard under seven of two falls short, privacy shield is nothing to address that. i think that is something also many to consider an upcoming section 702. it is very important to have the data exchanges because lots of american customers come from the e.u. and reuse services that we need to have the trade. a lot of people depend on it. if you don't pay. it will be saying you need to give european citizens and subset of assurance they will not be warrantless wiretap without a cause beyond the united states foreign intelligence interest. >> we have five or six minute left. we'll have time for a question too. a microphone will be brought to you. like enron before before we go to that. looking forward to a trump

administration assuming you stay in your position that the director of national intelligence. what are you going to be watching for in the first year? >> i think within a new administration there's a period of time where they need to understand what it is we do and the value that you add and how we conduct ourselves. a lot of the changes we've been talking about here do have it. the reason we do the things we are doing now is because of the condition of the global environment, public expectations and that are going to go away. in order for us to be effective, we have to be committed to the kind of transparency initiatives we've been talking about to engage in with folks here and civil society more generally and our friends in europe to understand our concerns and how they can address those concerns. the kinds of things we've been talking about are part of a

culture of what it is a will remain the case of the administration. >> the national security the states will endure. sometimes that might be happy from a libertarian perspective. >> the department of civil service and national security professionals have learned values that may include or be more transparent. >> we publish two separate sets of principles that embody what i think we are as an intelligence community. those came on in 2012. they talk about truth, integrity, diversity, so these are core principles that i didn't embody who we are and of course the transparency it is a

fact of life these days. they have to find ways to be engaging on these issues. >> and 30 seconds, what do you think about what's wrong? >> fisa was passed in 1976. the transparency staff alex has been working on a something that's happened over the past couple of years. if you look at the history of surveillance, the history of political abuse. what you see his father is, but that's not true. our experiences in this moment in time. but the story of surveillance is a story about a collection of political abuse. i am not optimistic that things aren't going to change. we've had problems, but those problems could get worse. one of the biggest problems we have is the amount and the kind of things we rely on for accountability and for fairness that are discretionary within the executive branch in secret.

as long as you are relying on discretionary secret things i let the people of the microphone >> thank you. i'm an investigative journalist. i would like to pose the question or the problem of incentives that are built into -- >> can you speak closer to the microphone. >> i would like to pose the question incentives built into the problem of accountability and the and all the other values discussed here. the assumption so far and i'm not being critical has been the cia and the nsa are essentially inherently disinterested parties the reality i would suggest is there are two incentives built

into the problem and perhaps disturbed that picture. one is the fact that there is a power equation there. the more collection of intelligence that infringes on personal freedoms and so forth gives greater power to high-ranking officials. >> what is your question? >> the other one is potential conflict of interest in terms of profit. we know senior official said the cia and nsa, particularly in the cia have gone back and forth between their public positions and private concerns, which have interest in particularly technology. >> have to cut you off. you have a question? >> the question is is that not a case there is a conflict of interest here built into the situation where senior officials have an interest in technology

which does tend to be in fact collecting bulk. >> is there a conflict of interest as senior surveillance officials and the private sector and want to have more spending on power. >> i haven't seen any hint about myself. the people i've been dealing with their focus on the tenets of critical part of what they do and why they come to work so i have not myself. one last question from anyone else? i've been hearing all day how the fisa court is essentially the oversight on what is taking place inside collections. to usaid personal opinion is that the judges at a level of understanding of the technology

and method that allowed to make a fair decision on what is being done. >> you are a lawyer. i pay qualified to understand what they're looking not? >> the one thing we don't see their opinion and they are developing. some of the technology is being his is complicated. but from the stuff we see, they have misunderstood or misapprehended programs. in 2005 and, eventually pairwise about 702. the court was surprised to learn that the way the government was conducting the correction ended up grabbing the relevant communications as well as domestic communications which were about the foreign intelligence and the court hadn't known that before. the understanding of the program

is different and it was so complicated they never knew they needed to tell the fisa court. we've also seen opinions that are really subpar and we've seen ways in which the court has approved things without bothering to read an opinion or explain the decision-making. the court is of real concern and that is one of the reasons there is the provision for a legal advocate before the court. i think one of the refined people are pressing for us to not only provide an alternative legal argument so it can really consider the issues better, but also provide technological expertise because so much of what ends up happening is technology. >> so the court is consisting of 11 federal district court judges and in my experience they take

their job extremely seriously. we are looking to publish additional. they have a pointed the amicus. so each individual fully convergent, i can't speak to that. technology moves quickly even for a technology advisor, that person would have a bunch of stuff to keep up with. they take their jobs very seriously and perform duties professionally. >> we out of time. thank you for this wide-ranging discussion and i hope you enjoyed your broader day here. we will turn it back over. >> thank you two charlie and are discussed charlie and r. discussants. our final speaker before we release you to the world and our

happy hour is stored to the dock or who of intelligence or surveillance law and look over the history an obvious crisis points and pivotal moments, somehow mysteriously the doctor showing up for the titanic and the battle of bull run. there is a prosecutor in the 90s when the courts were beginning to tame the wild west of cyberspace by interpreting law in this new domain and in 2008 when the predecessor began turning over information in response to what some might call a general warrants, and indeed remains the only private

attorney to actually argue in front of the very secretive foreign intelligence report. most recently when fbi and apple got into a tussle over their attempt to provide access to encrypted iphone drives, once again, mark was there in the scalloped apple secret weapon. use again very much someone we are glad has been at all of these points win or lose. the founder and the generally been stressing character who's now going forward will continue in front of the caller is one of the amici created by the freedom act that provide. please join me in welcoming.

[applause] the peeling on the other pictures. thanks for having me here. it's been an interesting day. it's been interesting to talk about surveillance issues through the prism of the upcoming trump administration. but i'm glad i'm delivering closing remarks because very many people in the spring that i want to thank the people who worked hard to make sure nation's intelligence gathering program follows the rule of law. they are going to be more important in the upcoming years. but many speakers before me, my remarks are my individual capacity not speaking on behalf of clients and the amicus group at the fisa court. there are some restrictions on what i can discuss but i will do it the best i can.

for those of you who weren't paying attention to the self introduction, and the last eight years argued in front of the court of review. the first time must defend name yahoo! in attacking the constitutionality of the protect america act which was the precursor to 702. the second time was earlier this year but the foreign intelligence court of review. i was challenging the constitutionality of dialed digits after the phone call is completed to make a second call a rancher personal information on the government was collecting not under the authority of the pen register statute. as julian said, no one else has argued, so the bad news is of course i am going to. the good news is no one can claim a better record. i've done other things as julian pointed out. i've argued for transparency in reporting on national security

process. i challenge gag orders in the district of maryland for providers who have an sl or want to talk about them and they declassified arguments are not the only time i saw for the government in secret. the apple case is really about efforts to make sure that providers and manufacturers are going to become agents of the government in helping turn people's devices again then. that is something i'm very worried about happen in the course of the next four years. i want to start with a positive note, which is the vast majority of their work. it's behind the scenes. but it's counseling clients on the provisions of the electronic communications privacy act for the fisa statute and match the data they have with the type of process the government needs to get. on this work, i represent literally dozens of providers. this is crucial work.

it is not high profile. it's not as you read about in the paper, that the vast majority of the process the government is serving his routine process. they are serving a correctly. it's not controversial. it calls for proper data, but providers understand what data they can give back when they received a search warrant in pen register orders. the fbi does not do a good job explaining it. the fbi doesn't say by the way here are your options in challenging this if you want to challenge it except for the statue for the bulk of my work and my career is figuring out what the government is entitled to get and hope providers give it to them. the reason i mention this is for balance. the provider service as kate keepers and it's imperative that government follow their procedures in order to get data

and providers follow proper process and he said talk about why he spent much of your career on these cases and why you may privacy data a centerpiece of your product base and why did you have 25 lawyers deal with it. it's a good question because you don't stop and think about it every day in the simple answer and probably the answer in this room is way out what to do some thing that matters and i've always thought this matter. and i still believe that and i believe that more today even then i did one month ago. because being a gatekeeper for consumer data for technology companies is somewhat ironic for me to play that role. i started my career as a prosecutor at the department of justice and i spent a lot of time teaching fbi agents how to gather electronic evidence and how to use the existing authorities in the telephone

world to get the data available in the internet world. and what i saw was there were very few lawyers they could turn to together by either winners this sounds were hacked very many trying to figure out how to get it. for a brief side i never told people, this part of my practice started in 2002. i had met in order for the conference at the commission and i said if you ever need it via some figuring out what to do when the government comes calling, let me know. six months later, two hours after my son was born, she gave me a call and she said -- i'll describe in my own terms, but essentially holy by the government in a child case, the case they want no part of the most lawyers want to stay away

from. the fbi submitted an affidavit that turned out to be false as to what type of material of the members of the yahoo! group about when they join the group. a lot of prosecutions and convictions and guilty pleas have been based on the affidavit. they're trying to get it right, figure out exactly what information people did care. but the government didn't want to listen. they didn't want to jeopardize the pleas that it happened. they didn't want to listen because they didn't leave yahoo! because they believed their agents. so yahoo! turned to me for help. the government was powerful. hoping potential pornographers was not a welcome consequence. but for them, the truth was important in standing up to the bowling of the government, even

though it's a difficult place for any company to be fighting with the u.s. government usually is, especially in a way especially in the way free and bad people is difficult. that they wanted to have that site and that's how i got started in realizing the government was taking some liberties in what they were doing to secure the doj i have been a paradise. okay, so without personal bio, what is it like now? it is still difficult to be in the center of the sites. in any given week, my clients can be criticized for not helping the government and even those doing so would be an extraordinary measure to weaken the security of the base is merely because if they want to look under every rock when there's no real expectation of finding something or they can be criticized for helping the government to match like yahoo! was recently involving when they

they -- when clients to fight, when providers challenge orders that they are often not able to talk about. i wasn't able to talk about the fight. besides according to fascinate until after 2013 after the disclosures they were being unfairly criticized and give the government access and when nothing could be further from the truth. the companies think of this is a no-win area for operations for them. so with the background and with the things i've done and seen and as we close today's conference, i thought i would talk for a few minutes about the things i am most hopeful about and most worried about for the next four years. i will start because assured her. in the years after disclosures, we made progress on a lot of

fronts. much with regard to transparency and the procedural aspects of litigating the foreign intelligence surveillance. before the freedom i testified in front of the civil liberties and oversight board that litigating was a lot like sending a letter to santa claus. he didn't know what happened to it or where it went and you never really saw the whole process. we are in a different world. the process is vastly improved if there's a public docket and happily for the court of review there's access to decisions from the court because the u.s.a. freedom i are getting 2008 there was one decision that had been declassified and published. there were no rules to follow. there's physical space for the court to meet when i argued in 2008. as a courtroom in rhode island. now there is a court for amicus

to work. there is a group that's been appointed under u.s.a. freedom and are used and it's not merely the process it was before. of course there's me and for the people and is actively using it. two people were publicly appointed this year. there's more transparency because there is reporting now, at least advanced by the service providers and their procedures to challenge gag orders. ..

so anyway these are the positive notes and i don't attribute it all to the snowden disclosure but i attribute to the key roles in the department of justice and other federal agencies in the last administration. i do believe people were trying to do the right thing on this

transparency side to make it more i would say open place and a place where there is another side to be heard. but the change of administration take mess to the four things i'm most worried about, and here they are. one, i think it's possible that time for meaningful, positive surveillance reform may be over. we will effectively have to shift in a civil society playing offense to good defense. so the past several years many had of us have been working to make sure there are meaningful check and balances to executive branch in checking foreign surveillance and it has been a difficult fight. we've made progress. but now is when the value of those checks and balances will be tested. and tiff to say i was a little bit satisfied it and a little bit disturbed in this morning's session to hear my adversary matt olson say he couldn't imagine the government ever being led by a president trump. and then he suggested that had he been able to imagine it he

might have reviewed discretion a little bit differently. i was satisfied to see it come aired to what i've been always saying but iftion disaupon thed with his failure of imagination it should not have been that hard to fathom. president nixon was not that long ago. how soon we forget and failure of imagination can be costly and find out next four years how costly they were whether we got enough reform such that key institution that we put into place will save us from really bad outcome over the next four years or whether we're left in a position where -- the appointment of a few trump loyalist and key government positions especially in general counsel ranks will remove the discretion of remove checks and balances that we got an return us to an area of discretion. i don't know if we made u enough progress but i'm worried that we didn't and people who were responsible for us not making that much progress wish they could go back and do it differently.

speaking of which carey had said this morning an i wanted to comment on this that will be a wasting of time for civil liberty community to spend a lot of us resources spending we authorization because it is most regulated area of government surveillance and jennifer suggested there's still a fight to be had on 702. i probably agree and this is unusual a little more with carey on this one. the civil liberties community, the society has to pivot an change its focus a little bit rather than improving places where there's already institute pize disa court we have to put our faith in fisa court who will uphold rule of law and we have to be more individual is lent in areas where there's discretion like under 12333 so we have to not, we have to recognize we're not going to get everything we want on 702 reform but we're

pretty good there and we're in dangerous places elsewhere. that said, i do have some comments about the fisa court and second thing i'm worried about. there's a growing trend in the fisa court jurisprudence as a solution to everything. generally the court does not see a problem with overcollection as long as min myization and use restrictions follow. the touch stone of all of their decision seems to be reasonableness, and the case law that is developing suggest that they are note sympathetic to argument it is for prior judicial review by a detach and if neutral magistrate so we're effectively in a world of collect everything and figure out the rules for it later and if rules are reasonable, it is okay. and ting that job for advocates over next couple of years is to point out the problems with this approach. collecting and maintaining vast quantity of data collected outside the traditional framework of the fourth amendment becomes too tempghting resource for government to dip

into whatever they want and not just talking about back door search loophole but in part we're building vast collection of data and when i argue this case if 2008 the general of the united states -- stood before the court and when the court asked what the harm was -- and in how these people could be affected by surveillance of nothing bad happened to them, this was general said that's right,s there's no database of incidentally collected information. d.o.j. is note maintaining database to collect information whether or not that was true at the time it is not true now. we know there's a database of a lot of distinctly collected information. and 94,000 targets of 702 orders and a 2015 according to d.n.i. report and if each one of those talking 10 people conservative estimate there's a million u.s. person communications sitting on ta-ta base from one year that government can query. so this is a job for civil liberties community more than it is the company. the companies are pretty good now and want to fight to make sure that data doesn't leave

their doors when it shouldn't. but once it goes out, the further use of that information is not really a fight that companies can and have taken on and they lose the unique standing they have once they've collected it and produced it so it's for the civil liberty community to focus on. okay, two more things i'm worried about and then i'll pause for questions. i'm worried that encryption is still being viewed as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. during the russian hacking of the dnc when all of the plain tech e-mails came out, what didn't we see? end to end secure communication and signal messages, this should be the wakeup call to point out that for all of the claims that encryption is preventing the government from seeing the important communication between the bad guys, actually quite good at securing the communications between the good guys. and that a key message for coming out of the russian hacks should be that end to end encryption is actually important to keep our country safe.

not just protect privacy of communications between individuals. but to keep our country, we need secure communication. i'm not sure that's going to be the take away but i think it should be. it really drivers home the point that a lot of the technology companies are making in technologist it is two different types of security and the way i like to think about this is different between camera and locks. if we know that someone is threatened to steal something valuable, we put it behind a locked door and we try to secure it. we don't just send cameras to watch it. this all that will do is tell us who took it but won't keep it safe. encryption will keep the communications safe. yes we won't have as great visibility cameras won't work as well but secure the communications infrastructure. so i think -- i think russian hacks are a real wakeup call for that an all of the hacks that we've seen show that we're generally failing as a society on the protection side.

we're not failing so much on catch the bad guy side and so the choice that we're faced with is do we want better secured system that bad guys can also use, and we have to catch them some other way or do we want to have less secure systems but better visibility? and as i said as matt blaze has said it before, we can't really have it both ways. and as my friend jennifer pointed out when people told the last administration that, the administration said we don't really believe you. there's got to be another way. this is a problem we're going to face over next four years. the new administration shows propensity to not believe science at all. they don't believe that science of climate change. they don't believe forensic involvement in hack hadding and not likely to believe that building back doors will weaken rather than strengthen our national security. they've shown, at least in early disdain for evidence base decision making. and that make me very worried when society stop listen to its sthises and disregards evidence,

it's in trouble. and i hope i -- my concern about this are overblown. finally, i'm worried that the government will work to turn ubiquity of home technology against u.s. citizens. five years ago this concern was kind of quaint. it was about whether the government could turn on microphone or laptop on our computer and spy on us and when this was posed fbi director comey he said, you know, it is a good idea to put tape over the webcam when it is not in use. as a society, we've moved well past tape over the webcam. you know houses are filled with the internet of things we have thermostat and drop cam and ring doorbell we driver connected cars and if the early sales for black friday and cybermonday are to be believed everyone is going to have amazon echo or device in our house and rule on when government can can force providers to activate devices are just as unclear as rules work for e-mail and text messages back in 2001 when i

left d.o.j.. so if there's one thing that i intend to work on in next four years is working with providers of the technologies to set clear rules on what they will and won't do when they're faced with third party requests so that our consumer technology is not turned against us as a new vehicle for government surveillance. all right was that dispeacessing depressing enough? [laughter] let me close then with one kind of perverse note of hope that goes back to first panel of the morning. in the fight that apple had had with the fbi over unlocking phones, a lot of public sentiment was pretty split. people seem to think that u.s. government should be entitled to get whatever it needs with a warnght but understood it was a problem if a foreign advocate regime or leader could turn data over to them and inconceivable words of princess bride to most people except europeans that u.s. government itself should be locked out of the data for fear to use it bropperly but people

forget that it was a surveillance abuses of the intelligence a rat tugs in the united states under president johnson and nixon in late 70s in the finding of the church committee that brought about the need for reform in the past. and given the rhetoric of president-elect trump during the campaign cycle in position of some of the cabinet appointees is no longer a farfetched notion that u.s. citizens need to be protected from abuse from the u.s. government and not just foreign government. and that atmospheric difference that you heard in the first panel of the day may end up making somewhat of a difference in the surveillance debate in congress and in the courts. and for the sake of all of the people in this room and for sake of the rule of law, let's hope so. thank you. [applause] okay [inaudible] because we're really up against the time limit i will suggest that folks here that want to ask more questions --

take the opportunity to do so while we prepare to atrium for some snacks and drinks folks watching us on our website or via c-span you have to supply your own alcohol. but you're welcome to join us in spirit. thank you all and please thank all of our speakers once again -- as well as i should add our conference staff and kiyana graham and who did actual hardwork while i stand up here and take credit for organizing all of this, join me in thanking them again and please join us outside. [applause] [silence]

this week on c-span tv it is prime time and tonight we look at books about american history. beginning at 8 eastern, it's the general versus the president. macarthur and truman at the brink of nuclear war. and then black call hoon from civil war to civil rights with one african-american family also the winter fortress,ic mission to sabotage hitler bomb and close with the most blessed of the patriarch thomas jefferson son, and each night this week on c-span2 starting at 8 eastern.

♪ [applause] thank you, thank you. >> the presidential inauguration of donald trump is friday january 20th, c-span will have live coverage of all of the day event and ceremonies. watch live on c-span, and c-span organ and listen live on the free c-span radio app. ♪ and look now at preparations for inauguration at the west front of u.s. capitol where donald trump will take the oath of office to become the nation's 45th president on january 20th at noon eastern. the vice president also takes his oath of office. that will happen just before the president. [silence]

[bell ringing] joins own tuesday, january 3rd for live coverage of the opening-day of the new congress. watch the official swearing in of the new and reelected members of the house and senate and election of the speaker of the house. our all day live coverage of the days events from capitol hill begins at 7 a.m. eastern on c-span. and c-span.org, or you can listen to it on the free c-span radio app. coming up next here on c-span2 a conference on the security issues facing latin america and the go politics of the region following at the time of fidel castro. also hear about how president-elect donald trump might approach u.s. relations

with latin america. >> okay, well i think we ought toe get started here look like weather has held a few people back. but we have a -- many my humble opinion a superb group of people here to talk and jpt us all on latin america and what the situation looks like and what some of the real challenges are. it's it shall it's interesting when you go back, i remember about 18 years ago or so when we undertook a terrorist a big step on international and regional security concern and like out of that, one of the big studies was on latin america. and if you read through that report an the leak -- like in 1999 while some things have changed, i was togs to some of our colleagues here earlier some things have changed. the situation is that certainly

better in peru, and it has certainly optimistic potential in columbia and the like. in some ways the situation in venezuela is not even as good as it was then. so many of the, many of the thoughts that came out then are applicable today. and that's sort of way it is. so sometimes i guess it is a good idea to review our history and know where we've been so that we can talk about the future but any rate enough that. let's get started. it's your privilege to introduce our superguest program -- are you are ready? >> thank you. >> make it quick now we're going to finish on time. >> can i have three minutes? >> you can have as much as you want. >> well taken me more than three minutes to introduce -- [inaudible] but the good news is that with

with this privilege it is the bio so you can look at this for some details. first, before i will follow what the general said i will introduce first the panel. then i will follow with a few foot notes afterall i'm trying to be an academic. but -- so next to the general, first margaret right here is one known, but i just will mention one or two -- she's a former director of the center for atmospheric defense studies at the national defense university. very distinguished institution. also she was a staff member the

u.s. senate fund relations committee, and very distinguished academic experience as furlough as the center analysis and also a professor and now at georgetown and she also served at the hopkins university and so forth. and she's a wide range i think officials that she dealt with over the years all the way from the security sector reform military civilian relations, processes humanitarian issues. these are some of the issue that, obviously, will come up today she was educated in

indiana university, and northern western great institute. [inaudible] and also georgetown and elsewhere, it's london school of economics et cetera, as bs they can read your background attar that leisure. but what is really important, she worked on many of this issue she lived in mexico center of america and so forth, and i understand maybe it's a secret but she's writing a book on a dream maker with cold war i think there are many important lessons to learn. we look forward to read the book.

and next order is our current book the guard incidentally we have loafers there. so we have to be very care of the what we're saying, but in the interest is of transparency the lawyer -- the distinguished lawyer he's a partner of a firm -- [inaudible] specializing in national, criminal low enforcement actually we discuss topic today and i think it would focus more on international corporation of law enforcement and so forth. so has a wide experience latin america with individuals, entities and governments and around the world.

is very distinguished i think -- sr. prolific and currently is international investorment, reporter. next to him is another lawyer but a friend. your friend -- [laughter] [inaudible] from spain. with whom we have to work on some of the issues related to the challenges in spain. but also the interregional i think relations in america. and it was the governor of the country, et cetera. but also he's involved in some legal activities related to latin america first at the interim american bank. development bank an currently is providing consulting services.

so this -- we have, of course, general grey who made very brief opening remarks. but wait for his less closing remarks. but at any rate, colleague is the chairman of the international law institute, professor georgetown law school and so on, and our colleague for many, many years very distinguished background. you can read it -- all about that. so i think we have a terrific panel. we have also a very knowledgeable of governmental officials who contribute to our dialogue today and we're very grateful to them.

we're also appreciative to assist them for recording this, focusing on discussion because the education and to make sure that it is credible information that is a time when journalist and the media are struggling with fake information or so-called information -- [inaudible] before it. so we're grateful again for c-span for bringing the event to the attention of the audience in the united states and abroad. now, the purpose of this semithat-- seminar is to deal with multiple challenges, security challenges depends on this definition what

does it mean, security again general grey referred to some. but it goes all the way from organized crime to terrorism again all the way to organize group like -- [inaudible] and so on. and, obviously, states terrorism, terrorism from what we're going to deal with and so on. besides that, obviously, you have the question of immigration, sometimes refugee but immigration i think is or more appropriate economic development, human affair issue, right of women, and also the interregional link between latin america to africa in terms of trafficking.

all of volunteers, quote, un, quote, terrorist or joining this islamic state of the al qaeda and, obviously, we can go into some of this details. if i may, general, just for transparency and to provide a general context, i would leak to mention very humbly that since the 1950s particularly as the outcome of the so-called human revolution under the benefit festival, at that time i was a graduate student for the page of columbia university and then through the proven missile cries one of our established

colleagues dr. ray klein who was deputy, the director he actually briefed our president john kennedy to show the evidence. they thought russians in government at that time and in cuba. and subsequently i was fortunate to work with him on the involvement of the soviet union in latin america of which go back to the 1930s, and afnght of activity of the cubans so this was one experience in regard to cuba and i'm sure that the issue of cuba is going took discussed particularly as a result of the new administration that will be

dealing with cuban relation of american relations. the second experience i would like to mention is argentina very briefly. all the way from the dirty war between 1976 to 1983 about seven year for our young, i think, may not be familiar about that few be i think it's important to look at that background in terms of the lessons learned. in other words, the program at that time was refreshing of the rebel or so-called revel of terrorist that were conducted by the government, the forces at the time the torture and other practices and messy violations of human civil rights. and so forth.

and so i think one is to look at that particular lesson and then i on a personal level or professional academic, i had the opportunity to be involved in the investigation of the attack on the jewish center in buenos aires the attack, 85 people were killed and more than 100 people were injured, but the point is both -- [inaudible] and iran were involved. and the story is not over even two decades on the run when the prosecutor, for example, a few years ago, three years ago or so or two years ago was assassinated alberto. so what is particularly event is

not concluded. the other -- the other experience that i think has to deal with, of course, the general mentioned is columbia. the bachelor's degree -- bad news is that it was actually a battle for about -- half a century. the good news is that, of course, the president santos just a few days ago received the conclusion of we have to look at this as when and finally one more i think experience that we will have to look at in terms of the relevance, implications for security let's say, else security is brazil in terms of the zika epidemics and we have the opportunity to work with the brazilians on some of their

olympics as well. so with that broad, i think, outline, i would like to begin to discuss the challenges the security in latin america and we ask professor margaret to provide some general overview and then we'll deal with some specific case studies. would you like to come here or whenever is more convenient for you. >> if this works. this microphone is on. yes. >> okay, well first of all thank you very much for the invitation to participate in this discussion because i sometimes fear that the kind of attention that quality of attention that

is given to the latin american region by our government and by our population is way below what needs to be -- [laughter] paid and certainly appear that that may be the case in the incoming administration. i would take a point of difference with you professor alexander and perhaps with the title of this seminar. i'm not sure that the passing of fidel is going to have much difference -- make much difference in the region. cuba has its own problems. it's going to have to do very definitely with an underperforming economy with a

new government and the question comes not right now. but once raul castro passes from the scene. what happens to the internal politics with the -- within cuba. but the rest of the hemisphere does suffer from some profound insecurities some listed in the 2003 multidimensional security declaration which s.w.a.t. to bring attention to the human security side of the security equation, the rights of personal until, thed -- the need for safety in our community and so forth. so i think that the the insecurity or what i call the insecurities of the region are

the ones that are beginning to be of concern in the region and to which we need to pay attention. obviously, drug trafficking is one. transnational organized crime that facilitates drug trafficking, but also the profound and we're seeing more and more profound corruption in many of the governments. the failure of their legal institutions really to function efficiently, effectively well. the failure of governments to exercise the basic tasks of managing financial sector providing education, providing health, providing transportation, encouraging good jobs, and so forth are the things that really are going to

plague the region. and i think this -- the place we need to put a lot of attention is the focus on governess. the world bank many years ago undertook to try to understand why with all of the money that the bank was putting into africa, countries didn't develop. and they came out with a very good document, this is a long time ago in 1992 called governess in development. but we haven't gone very much beyond the document there. what is government? what governance? the rules regulation, laws that yield good results in the execution of pass of government. and the economic, efficient

employment of national resources and a governance management in the public sector, rules that people follow and the defectively limit or promote activities. and the services that the state requires. one of the problems of the latin american region is that the crime and violence, the corruption the impunity is contributing to what i'll call community decay. separation of families. one the of the reason there are so many gangs and gangs are the family for young people in central america or in the slums of rio is because they're

parents. their aunts and uncles have left for the united states to get a job when jobs are not available in their -- in their country. the central bank of el salvador several years ago did a survey and found that young people, teenagers -- main goal as they looked forward was to leave el salvador and go to another country come to the united states especially in order to get a job, get away from whatever their environment was -- was providing. but this -- this community decay, the fact that the people don't trust the police, the fact that the police are so ill prepared even resourced and train that countries are calling

in their military without training them in urban operations as wed -- we had to learn in the united states. so this trust community decay, family decay, contributes to lack of trust in the state, lack of trust in your neighbors and so forth. and is leading to the formation of substitute families, gangs in -- in many of these city ities in particular. the availability of the gang organization is leading to contradicting to drug trafficking to profound extortion across particularly central america. many of you may have seen the

two penny gang story in "the new york times" i believe are "the washington post" recently on the extortion that was in "the new york times." yeah. the describing the activities of the extortion activities of gangs in central america. what governments are not providing, donor institutions are seeking to provide. community activities that will provide an alternative life for some of these youth. but you can't, but the govern themselves because they're largely ineffective are not necessarily adopting some of the suggestions that usa you had that america bank and others are suggesting.

there have been some good stories is on the u.s. border of mexico has had a kind of a resurgent mayor who took it upon himself to really address the problems of local community coordination and looking out for activities in -- in the different parts of the community and resolve a good bit of the gang violence in that community. but they're far too few of this kind of activity. because of the violence, neither the local elite nor the international community is investing in the region, and if you don't have jobs to look for. the family doesn't have jobs, the parents leave.

the kids the to leave in order to join their families, this i don't know many of you may think back to the time that i served in this -- in the foreign relations community, committee -- we had the caribbean basin initiative which was extended to stimulate international investment in central america, the caribbean and so forth. there was a time that all of the your t-shirts were made in haiti. and -- but it was a brief time. and because of violence, because of lack of good government, the industries have left. and they're not going to go back unless countries are going to be able to resolve some of their problems. now, there are some good things that we need to talk about.

first of all, the countries are beginning to corporate amongst each other central americans have signed the alliance for prosperity in the northern triangle had is hopefully beginning to promote the coordination of efforts particularly economic efforts, but board or control effort, law enforcement efforts amongst the three countries. and begin to put down this -- this level of violence, the volume of drugs that move through the region and so forth. i'm reminded that general keen who was the deputy commander of u.s. southern commands and the u.s. representative in haiti after the earthquake as a result

of his experience as a the new c2 is coordination collaboration and i think that's a good -- a god -- good way to think about what the generally poor -- poorly integrated countries are beginning to do and beginning to see that they -- that they need to do. they are also working on a military side. there is quite a bit of positive collaboration as we saw in the response to the haiti earthquake. all of a sudden peru and chile are holding long-term enemies, are holding disaster response exercises jointly. that's very positive. but where the militaries are cooperating much more, other elements of government, the

police, the courts, the border control and so forth are not doing nearly enough. an we need to see more of that. i think we also need to look at what's going on that's bad and good. already mentioned venezuela. that's bad. how is venezuela after this current crisis passes if it ever does -- going to put the country back together again? how do you put humpy dumpty back together when a government has -- has totally underlined legal tradition, changed all of the laws and so forth? brazil is mentioned -- is i remember as a young one, so i have special interest in what's going on in brazil.

but the indemic corruption that occurred in brazilian government needs to be ended by the very people who are profiting and taking advantage of opportunities for corruption i.e., the legislatures, the politicians and so forth. this is going to be hard. central america is, obviously, a problem. weak government, corruption, impunity and so forth. the columbian peace process is a positive. columbia has one of the stronger governments, unfortunately, that government didn't do very well getting out of bobota and the main cities. it has to extend the capacity of the state to remote areas.

it was fascinating that the -- that the referendum in support of the peace accord was defeated by low turnout in precisely the areas of the country where support for peace and end of violence were the highest. but they were also the areas of the country where the government reached less, less well or not at not at all. the -- you mentioned argentina and its dirty war but i think that is something that has passed in argentina. argentina, chile both countries with military dictatorships particularly nasty probably have some of the best chances to reestablish good and effective