they would better -- decide what is the policy outside of -- the second thing is, we have talk about what would -- in case another attack helps, what would u.s. do? with all these efforts efforts f diplomatically isolating pakistan, my question to the panel is what do you think pakistan will do if it is coronerred? >> we are debating it so i don't think there's a problem there let's go ahead. >> my name is karen fisher. i'm current live not associated with anybody but just returned from nine years of livering in -- livering in kashmir and 20 years in india and my question is to -- i'm really very happy

that you brought the modi context in this debate because i think there's a lack of understanding of the radicalization that is happening in the area as a result of modi's prime ministership, and there are couple of -- my questions are such. in the last couple of days there's ban new army chief appointed in india, and there's been a huge argument about why he was selected, because there were other people higher in seniority. and from what i can understand, based on the writings by people i know, he was selected because of his experience in covert operations and asymmetrical warfare. now this take mess to the whole issue of -- and i'm wondering to

what degree is the u.s. concerned that india in addition to surgical strikes and other things, they have increased, may actually itself get more involved in working with nonstate actors and destabilizing areas within pakistan because there is a lot of debate about this. and one more question. >> could be move on and i'll come back if we have time. ten mint minutes away. >> we had a third hand -- right there. >> i was a field officer with the michigan g.o.p. and i -- you talked about the -- i cap remember -- you talked about how our issue is just management instead of solutions and that's what we should aim for. don't see our next administration playing the role of a moderator.

and in that case where the pressure would be on to us take a certain side, into do you think heightened interest in the issues of india and pakistan would evoke a sort of heightened interest from russia in order to kind of turn that area into a powder keg? do you think this would evoke a reaction from russia to sort of turn -- force us to take a side? >> sure. want to take the would would pakistan -- >> i want to responds -- respond to both. would not recommend that we pursue an approach that isolates pakistan. it's not possible. hand happened in the past decade. it's not really realistic. the modi strategy of kind of building anti-pakistan sendment

as a take tick, not a strategy. it's not possible. pakistan is way too connected and diplomatically to the u.s. and the region. it's not possible. so, i didn't hear that from anyone up here. i don't think any of us would advocate for that. there's great harm in that and great harm in eliminating all utah assist -- all u.s. assistance to pakistan if you want a stable relationship. want to be on the record saying that. russia's already engaged in the region. always have been. have a long history limit think that the china-pakistan engagement that we see in this closer embrace will bring the russians in more. they are -- have expressed some interest in the economic routes that china is pursuing in pakistan and building off on that to pursue their own economic interests. think a lot of that is more organic and independent of

whatever the u.s. chooses to do. >> can i maybe pick up on the covert one? i think you have seen an interest in india now for several years to develop more covert and special operations capabilities it could use against targets in pakistan, where l they by terrorist targets or state targets or further sow something sort of discord and violence. that's i answer option we addressed in our book analysis of the things that india could do, and i think that what we see there is thatted the risks for india are probably lower than employing the army or the air force in a more direct force way. but it also raises a lot of questions how you connect that to a strategy to change pakistani behavior. in part because if it's covert

you can't claim credit for it. you can't do that in domestic discourse which seems to be increasingly important for the government. maybe those may be seen as illegitimate and undermine the diplomatic isolation strategy that india has in place. you can see that temptation and i would predict that we'll actually see more of that, but my question would be is there a case in india where people think that will led to some change or just merely punitive and part of this unstable equilibrium across nuclear capabilities. >> thanks them to isolation of pakistan question, i agree it's both greatly unrealistic and also undesirable. you can't turn pakistan into north korea. that's ridiculous i do think that there could be some benefit

in pakistanis themselves asking questions about why other neighboring countries, including bangladesh, and afghanistan in particular, but a they started out being so oater are so vocal about pakistan being part of the solution. the fact that the policies they have pursued have independently in my view dish don think this is modi gipp -- beginning up i think -- have come to the conclusion pakistan has not been a very helpful actor and has been a harmful actor. if there is an internal conversation in pakistan that looks upon that and sort of asks the question, take is away from the india-pakistan relationship, which tends to be -- that would lead to policies which would he help. >> i don't really read too much into that in terms of the army chief.

the indian army chiefs are completely under political control. which general has which specialization, more they chose this guy, like this general, it was bit of a controversial because he superseded two other general maize have stirks he's got great experience, and this is what it is. don't think -- don't read too much into the choice of a particular general in terms of signaling policy. i look at other things signaling policy including things like modi's speeches. >> just wanted to jump in. i see it as probably something of long -- tit-for-tat, for future bargaining on a lower scale that has been talked about. i think it sort of counterpressure to something going on in afghanistan, maybe in kashmir.

imif you look back to 2009 that's correct expectations are -- india mitt be doing there and the scaling is so low into even if there is a activity it's not having a dramatic effect as say what is going on in afghanistan. states can be involved in providing material support to nonstateactorsomes in so many different ways, start from passport to army and craning and that we have an effect on the conflict. and basically if the indians were trying to do this seriously you should see a much larger scale of activity. they have demonstrated cape ability ford this in the past in bangladesh sri lanka.

>> i think the last round, the two hands here and then we'll come back to the panel for a final word. >> my name is -- i'm from the london school of economics. a lot of the ideas you have take about are premised on the path there's sickents public -- that manifested in modi government come back into power in 2014 and is not a confrontational government. a year ago in pakistan, a mainstream center came into power, even though support for the -- militancy is endemic in pakistan, there's a political fan necessary station on one side -- manifestation on one side and not the other. >> the final question here. >> my name is -- i'm from pakistan. a ph.d candidate. my apologies in advance but the

impression i got is that the india -- pakistan is can do all their terrorism, radicalism, so none of you talked about coverage -- none of you talked about -- who was he, what was he doing and you talk that pakistan should change its behavior but my understanding is, is that it's the big brother that needs to change its behavior and in south asia it's india, not pakistan, and the political describing, even the indian politicians are asking for evidence. if there are surgical strikes, where is the left. >> last word of the panels, the questions and anything else you want. >> very brief. i will led you take the question on the nationals if you want. i just think that pakistan's national security policy, as

it's been constructed, at least for the past decade doesn't work for the country itself. it's much more dangerous and more violence, attacks against the state internally. i'm not talking about india. the nonstate actors involve in the process are also involved in afghanistan and now. so that's the common link and that's what i'm focusing on right now, during my time at the policymaker in the u.s. government. that's what we were kind of honing in on, and that's the -- the india-pakistan relationship has tons of problems many of which will just by bilat program and the u.s. doesn't have a roll until it's needed but i think if you want to focus on pakistan you have to question, do these policies work? is it in our interests to continue whatever engagement we have with nonstate actors and in our interest in the context of the region and the united states

and uk are looking at this with deep concern especially with isis and other jihaddist elements finding private support networks in pakistan, whether the state is involved or not. so this is a much bigger issue than just india not being responsible or pakistan being the bad guy here. >> so two things on the modi election, one, from my understanding, the main reason state are sponsored exist surveys he was elected on the issue of the economy and management, stewardship is the prime reason for that. afghanistan has a history of working with nationalist counterparts and making progress in the peace process. so, the dialogue with the government for many years, this is his government was a government that laurened the nuclear test and had a driving

national intent behind that and still the opportunity for making deals and sometimes people think the hardliners and nationalists are the ones most likely and capable of making such deals. you look at the israeli israeli-palestinian -- i think that it doesn't foreclose -- just but modi is a nationalist, doesn't foreclose the process of having a dialogue. >> on the last question, about us focusing on groups and behavior in pakistan and why that's a problem, think this goes back to something that she suggested earlier, which is that the narrative that pakistan has portrayed here in in the last several years doesn't carry much water at this point. i'm not saying that's right or wrong. think it's analytically important point that the extent that reflects policies in pages that here are not seen as carrying the country forward in

a positive direction makes it harder for the u.s. to engage pakistan in a productive way that's unfortunately. >> modi was elected be india's mr. development, better economic management. but that was what he sold himself as primarily but he also satisfied an indian craving for a so-called strong leader and one element of bag strong leader is the idea that modi would not be pushed around, and i attended several of his campaign rallies in the runup to election and even though the focus was mostly on johns and inflation there was never a speech where the didn't mexico the weakness of -- mention the weak novembers the government when it came to be slapped around by pakistan.

so they were both elements in it. the economic aspect was dominant but he is a strong leader that is what his -- he sort of styles himself as. the indian version of putin or any of these sort of -- erdogan. take your pick. anything that erodes the since of him being a strong leader, which is why i argue he would respond, backs very politically important for him. >> thank you. was -- to finally end the panel on time but missed it i'm sorry to those who we couldn't get to. let me wrap um quickly by saying my standard line after these events, theresen a black and white here. and it's so complicated and complex, that drawing simplistic conclusions will be dangerous so i leave you to decide what sump

total of the conversation today is, and also often accused accuf being a pest pessimist and try to be a opt miss. it management may the most -- it point out as i challenge myself to think about this. it's an odd rivalry intractable but if you think of the major outstanding problem, each one of them has a solution that is known. you can look at kashmir, you can think about where you end up. somewhere around that four point formula. you can think about -- pretty much known. third, even terrorism i would argue is intrinsically leaned to these paces and which one is handled first and second. but it would challenge all of to us think through whether it is

really as impossible as we think because at the end of the day nobody can disaggrieve that an india-pakistan normalization solves everybody's problem. and think more boldly than perhaps we have in the past. with that, please join me in thanking the panelists and thank you for union us flash... [inaudible conversations]

>> coming up tonight on c-span2 its booktv in prime time as we talk with politicians about books that they had written >> this holiday weekend on c-span, here are some of our

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>> watch on c-span and c-span.org and listen on the free c-span radio out. spirit british prime minister teresa may testify before the house of comment earlier about the uk's pending exit from the european union. this was the first of three appearances she is expected to make in her first year as prime minister.

>> okay. i think we will begin. prime minister thank you very much to give evidence this afternoon. where a break right foot think parliament is also very grateful that you are agreeing to these sessions there could i just have confirmation you're going to continue the practice of your predecessor with three a year stick with yes, indeed, chairman. i. i am happy to do three. >> bearing in mind the defense likely to take place at the end of march. you might be sensible to push scrutiny of the triggering of article 50 or proposed triggering of article 50 and any accompanying government documents after the spring recess and then we went to meetings right at the beginning and one towards the end of the summer session. >> that may very well be sensible, chairman. i suggest perhaps we will be able to talk about possible

dates. the committee by the view as to when -- it will be quite busy in the run-up to the end of march. >> yes. so i don't think it's going to be realistic or practical for either of us. i think that would be a more sensible arrangement. you indicated before and that you'd want or two remarks come introductory marks you wanted to make your why don't you make those now? >> thank you much of it. i just want to make a few remarks i hope will be helpful to the committee but before i do that i would just like to take a moment to reflect on the reporting his acumen from berlin yesterday and we have seen very vivid images on our newspaper and television at the think they shocked us all. i wanted to express our condolences. i'm sure condolences of all of those with whom were and always been affected. we hold them in our thoughts today. i just thought it would be helpful to set out a little bit of what we've been doing in the months into the referent of

preparing for negotiations on brexit, which is putting the machinery of government in place. my first act was to establish two new departments, one for international trade. this puts in place the mechanisms necessary to marshal the important work that needs to be done to make sure our departure is a smooth and orderly as possible but we are taking all of government approach to the issue and departments in all areas affected by withdrawal. machinery is working well and i like to think of it and fall for stepping so quickly to have two once the result was a with many case with other interested parties including business and reps from the ultimate decision. ministers have met more than 130 companies since july. they have attended roundtables in different sectors and joint 12 more around the country. met all the major business organizations that are part of the uk do about the particular concerns. also personally arranged meeting

with business leaders on our engagement with the devolved administration because we approach negotiations, we want to have a truly joint approach. i been able to meet or speak with the vast majority of european literature on a bilateral basis and those discussions have been positive and constructive. throughout this process as you know i been clear i will give a roman fashioning a running commentary on our approach. >> except perhaps except before the liaison committee. >> sorry spec except perhaps before us speak i think negotiations are negotiations and if one wants to get the right deal one can't give a running commentary to everybody. i expect some searching questions from committee on this. seriously, negotiations will be challenging and with any international negotiation they will require some give-and-take. but where possible i have two

give reassurance to those of legitimate concerns. as i said will get the best deal for those who want to trade in goods and services with european single market whilst guaranty will make our own decisions as heavhubby control immigration or our laws and new jurisdiction over the way we spend taxpayers money. though we are leaving the eu where not leaving here. i want other cooperative relationship that close friends and allies in joy. i expect us to continue to work alongside each other on issues such as crying as he could do a cooperation helps safe. as you know and you alluded to in your opening remarks, chairman, i said that trigger will -- the government will trigger article 50 before the interview. will publish more information about our approach before article 50 triggers. i would be making a speech early in the new year setting out more about our approach and about the opportunity i think we have as a country to use this process to forge a global britain that

embraces trades with countries across the world. one last word i wanted to say it's important we understand the wider meeting at the referendum results and respond accordingly. wasn't just a vote to leave the eu but to change the way the country works and the people for whom it works for ever. that's why my government also embarked a vicious program of reform to ensure wealth and opportunity spread across the country and enjoy -- ambitious. i think the reforms are an essential part of our plan for post-brexit britain and other forward to going into more detail about those early in the new year. >> thank you. the detail will be looking forward to this afternoon i'm sure. we will begin perhaps on one point you made it you said you don't intend to extend the article 50 process. do i take it from that that it's the government for an intention to let the eu by april 2019, and by that, we should take that to

mean the great repeal act will have therefore come into effect and that by 2019 in april that direct applicability of law and ecg rulings will no longer pertain in uk court? >> chairman, as you know the time to i've set out that we will trigger article 50 but in the march next year. the treaty gives under article 50 a two-year process without discussion about withdrawal and the framework of the future relationship to be undertaken. that will take us through as you indicated to march 2019. i fully expect us to be able to operate on the timetable that has been set out in the treaty. that's a matter for negotiations

but i fully expect us to be able to operate an effective the commission -- >> in all that i heard a no, may be the case that eu law continues to run in uk. perhaps i misunderstood. >> if i'm at that specific point. the intention is to introduce the great repeal bill to parliament in the next year, in the next session. so that will be in place at point of which we leave the eu. it will come in operation, at that point -- >> it definitely do? >> that's the intention, of course. the nature as a matter of parliamentary debate but the attention will be repeal bill that will come into effect at the point at which we leave the european union. but at that point eu law will be brought in domestic law in the uk. i think that's important because it gives people certainty at the point at which we are leaving

the eu as to how eu law is operating. so workers rights remain protected and so forth. >> i'm just trying to click on one very straightforward point. by leaving do you mean what is, understood eu leaving, that is that the eu law will no longer apply directly in uk courts? >> when we are outside the european union, we will be determining our laws and it will be british courts spirit and that will be completed by 2019? >> the -- >> in april 2019? >> i fully expect to be able to meet the timetable that has been set out in terms of determination. >> one for the point, therefore, clarification. article 50 provides for a country to leave more than two years after it's triggered as part of the withdrawal agreement.

do i take it from the answers i just heard that you are not seeking a withdrawal agreement that will lead you beyond the two-year period? >> we are seeking to extend the article 50. beyond the two years. in fact, the european commission has indicated that they consider it may be that the negotiations would be completed before two years. but we are not seeking just dark and say we want this be extended, the negotiations, extended beyond two years. i fully expect to be able to undertake a deal within that time. >> and that deal will not contain anything that could lead eu law directly applicable in the uk? >> the intention is, when people voted they wanted us to be able to take control of our laws here when we are no longer a member of the european union, laws will

be determined here in the united kingdom, subject to british law. >> i'm trying to get clarity that that part of article 50 which provides for the scope of negotiation of flexibility on the operative part of leaving is not going to be exercise, not intention of government to try to make use of that flexibility? >> what as you say, once -- what the article 50 allows for is if there is an agreement, the treaty for negotiation of the withdrawal and relationship with european union is extended, an agreement among the 27 and agreed with the member states, in biscuits, uk, then the treaty allows for that. to be extended. we are not setting out to extend

that. we are setting out to negotiate this within the two-year timeframe. >> thank you. >> good afternoon, prime minister. this marks six months of the referendum, just over three months to go to triggering article 50. can you tell us when the governments plan is going to be published? when will we see that? >> as i've indicated i will make a speech early in the new year which will set out more of our approach. we will before we trigger article 50 be setting out as i've indicated more details of our approach. i set the date when the plane is going to be published. but you will hear more about our approach when i speak in the new year. >> can you give the kidney and assurance that the plan when it does appear will be published in time for the parliament to scrutinize it before article 50 is triggered and there will be sufficient time for us to do our

job looking at it. >> i have said as i've said on many occasions parliament needs no concern about its ability all have an opportunity to comment on all these matters. i would fully expect parliament will have proper opportunity people to look at these matters before we trigger article 50. >> what would be your view of a reasonable period of time for parliament to see this play an advance in trigger article 50 which another way of asking, when are you -- >> i still don't have the date when i'm going to publish the plan at a think it's not for me to set out a period of time when i think it's appropriate for parliamentary speaker we will ensure the part of an opportunity to look at these issues. we have a timetable equation of the supreme court judgment that we don't know yet what that judgment will be. if they find in favor of both the government that leads us to one cause of action if the fight against the government obviously the need to respond to the

supreme court judgment. >> is it your intention to assure part of has a boat on the final day when it's been negotiated? >> the part of is going to every opportunity to vote through the great repeal bill on the various aspects of the relationship that we will be having with the european union. >> that wasn't quite the question. the question is when the final deals negotiated, is it your intention to assure the parliament has a chance to vote on that deal, yes or no? >> it's my intention to share parliament has ample opportunity to comment on and discuss the aspects for the arrangement that we're putting in place. we will be going to the negotiations. it's not clear at this point what, i've indicated that my expectations the timetable for negotiating the deal is. it's not clear. it's going to take two parties, european union and the uk to go through that process of negotiation. and so, but we will be ensuring

that as we go through that as i said before where we are able to give clearly then we will do so to speak i'm not quite sure i understand what it's a difficult to answer questions with a parliament will have a boat or not given that we know the european parliament will have a vote on the deal. why can't you say that the british part will also have a boat? >> well, what i'm saying is that there will be an opportunity for parliament to consider as they go through when more details to become available at how this is going to operate. there is a question the timetable in relation to the agreement of the deal an and a necessity, how the timetable operates in relation to european parliament as well. what i'm also clear about is ensuring that when we come to the point where actually delivering on the vote of british people that we will be leaving the european union. >> talking about the timetable, the negotiations would be completed by october 2018 indeed

to provide scrutiny of what has been agreed. do you expect what about complex negotiations about the divorce arrangement and the negotiation of a new agreement about market access and to trade? do you expect those to be done sequentially or in parallel? >> i would, i am working on the basis that we will look to negotiate those in parallel. i think that is what makes sense. it is also actually what is implied by article 50 in the treaty itself which makes clear that you have to know what the framework of the future relationship is before you can finalize the deal for withdraw withdrawal. and, of course, the point at which we exit the european union we will need to know what our new relationship with european union union is. do i take it from that that you are wholly confident it would be possible to negotiate both parts within the time that is available, that could be as low as 18 months? >> it could be.

you indicated michel referenced that, to have a process of ratification. there's also a concern that european leaders have relation to your -- elections take place in 2019. any concern from their point of view to ensure that the arrangements about the kid relationship, the decisions we take about parliamentary election. >> are you confident the 27 member states think it's possible to negotiate a new trade and market access deal in 18 months, given they have reported to her advise ministers, not as you, but they give he picks up from discussions he said with a 27, but it could take up to 10 years to agree a new trade your? >> i noted when i been talking to individual leaders, the willingness from everybody to ensure that we can undertake this smoothly and is orderly fashion as possible and a

recognition from everybody that actually do want to make this arrangement can get this arrangement in place so that people can move on and move on to the new relationship that they will have with the united kingdom. i think there is a willingness they are to undertake this on that basis. >> can you confirm that if it's become its intention to seek transitional arrangements of some sort to cover the period from the negotiation of the final deal to its full implementation in order to give certainty to business and to avoid the exit you were asked about? >> it on the answer in this way. i think when people talk about transition, often different people mean different things by transition. there are some who talk about transition as a deliberate way of putting off actually leaving the european union pick for others transition is an expectation that you can't get the deal in two years and, therefore, yet have a further. to do it. but if you think about what the process we're going to go

through, once we got the deal, the new arrangement, the will of course be a necessity for adjustment to the arrangements. implementation may take place in relation to that. that's what business is being commenting on an argument for. when, as you say, the phrase about not having a cliff edge. they don't want to wake up at a deal agreed the night before and suddenly discovered they have got everything iteratively. so as a practical aspect of how you ensure people are able to adjust to the new relationship, which is not about trying to delay the point at which we leave and it's not about trying to extend the period of negotiation. >> can you confirm the decisions not yet been taken by the government about whether we're going to remain in or leave the customs union? and if that isn't the case don't we had to stay in the customs union in order to honor the commitments that were given to nissan about seeking the situation which they can continue to trade without tears

and bureaucratic impediments? >> on the customs union itself, as i've said in the chamber of the house, this is not a binary decision. the art number of different aspects to customs union. a number of different relationships that already exist in relation to customs union. this is more complex benson leasing are you in or are you out of the customs union? the way i approach this and the way government is approaching this and other issues is to say what the outcome to want to achieve and, therefore, how do you reach those outcomes, rather than assuming only one means to an end or anyone process to an end. as regards the issue of investment, very welcome investment decision to invest, for the investment that was made by nissan, we've been very clear what to get the best possible deal for trading with an operating within a single european market. that is what i been seen publicly. it's what we've been saying to

companies. and also that we want to ensure the competitiveness to the british economy. i think nissan decision to invest and bring the new models to the manufactured in sunderland as a huge vote of confidence in the sunderland workforce that is the most productive car plant in europe. >> can't i just to get back to one answer you gave which sounded quite favorable to the proposal he put forth by business at but particularly by the financial community for some kind of stand still of departure in april 2019 on the grounds of a cliff edge. do i think if the government is going to try to negotiate a standstill or transitional arrangement at that time to give them time or business and the financial community to adjust?

>> i wouldn't use the word standstill in -- >> that's the word that may have been -- >> as i said, the point at which we leave the european union, point at which the relationship is going to exist is clear, then there will be practical issues which have to be addressed. >> but but i ask you something slightly different, which is either to try to negotiate it. >> i was about to come onto that, chadwick on if you just allow me to explain because of what to make sure there's a full understanding of what others think in terms of practicality of this issue for people who may need to adjust i.t. systems and other simple practical matters like that. of course that won't just be in the uk. we'll also be for businesses and other properties within the european union. so as part of the negotiations we will be entering i think the

women need to be a discussion about how those practicalities can be dealt with. >> is that a priority for your negotiation, to try to seek an adjustment. , after? >> is a matter of practicality that we need to discuss with the european union spec is it a priority for you? >> i've set up one priority that i think we should be making early decisions on negotiations and that's in relation to eu citizens living in the uk. >> but speeded part of the negotiations will have to address this question of the practicalities of adjustments to the new relationship once that relationship has been a great win that takes place, of course will depend on when the deal is agreed. that's why you can't say immediately now there's going to be a period of -- >> is it a priority or no

priority? is it a priority, get to sit start negotiating. >> we will set tenets are negotiating, and we will be considering what the issues are, how those negotiations will be taking place. this will be one of the issues that will be on the table. i'm well aware, chairman, of the views and concerns that business have to make sure that they have that ability to have a period of practical adjustment. >> good afternoon, prime minister. when you referred to -- the scrutiny committee has called on our ambassador to the eu, sir ivan rogers, he made some controversial remarks the other day. but complementary to these activities across the board, in current and after that, united kingdom representatives, there

is also this question of the combination with a cabinet office was also had to do with my committee as well. do you have in number 10 itself a fully specialized unit with specialists dealing equally with the negotiating instruments regarding medical as well as economic and trade policies? do they need you personally in number 10, and do they do so? and if they don't, do you think it ought to happen? >> well, i have set up a unit in number 10, the people with expertise in european matters who are both working with other departments, issues relating to brexit but also issues as we have to look at particular decisions as a go forward.

they do see, i i did meet with them regularly. >> and what assessments have you made with regard to the trade-off between your red lines, knowing eu law, prime minister, no adjudication at those aspects of our relationship with the european union you want to maintain? >> i don't look at these things in terms of trade-offs between these issues i and quite the way that is sometimes portrayed. i think what's important is that when we look at these negotiations we take a view not that we are currently members of the eu, we're going to leave, but how can we kind of keep its membership. ..

>> i'm ambitious as whatthe basis of that relationship might be . >> at the end of this process , we will be able to review the devastation but in addition to that , it will be absolutely clear and for the administration from that moment onward would be in the jurisdiction ofbrexit or not from the eu . >> we would have repealed the communities act, that's what part of the great repeal bill will be about and from the point of which we have left the european union, it will be for parliament and the british court to decide on the legislation.>> and as you would appreciate, there

are many people who want us to move quickly in relation to all these matters. i appreciate the timing of this issue but we want to get on with this as quickly as possible because that's what a great deal of the business community and other people in a civil society want to reflect the outcome of the referendum as soon as possible . >> i think it's right that people want the outcome as soon as possible but it's also right the government needs to sort of take the time to prepare for release negotiations. that's why before i came to the minister i thought we should trigger rt 50 until the end of this year. i then looked at the timetable and the triggering was a balance to giving us

sufficient time to have made those preparations and actually giving the 27 time to prepare for their side of the negotiations but also recognizing the public wants to get on with it. >> i'm sure we pay attention as far as scotland's term here but as far as the relationship , you said you would listen very carefully to any additional legislation in terms of scotland and responding to this but do you believe that scotland as a nation from the end of medication should have a cease strategy? >> i've had the opportunity to call the entities to tell me about this with regards to what was coming out and obviously i haven't had an option to look at the paper in detail but i welcome the contribution to the debate. we've been encouraging the

administration to identify their concerns and priorities so that we can take that forward as part of the discussion we are having to ensure we have a full uk view as we go into negotiations. i would expect obviously the welsh government to come through with their concerns that they have and we will be able to discuss this with the structures that we have . >> these arrangements are possibly necessary to be talk with missile for northern island suggests and that's something that could be a feature of brexit, a total uk brexit but will it be different from different sectors? >> one part of the negotiation is the united kingdom approach and the united kingdom relationship with the european union. i think you would refuse an accepted differential relationship which i don't think is right to accept. i think when i first met with

the defense minister, we would look at those issues and getting proposals that would come forward but maybe also there are methods that are impractical in terms of one of the key issues obviously is the question of borders because it will be one part of the uk a border with a country remaining in the european union and a lot of work is being done as to how we can ensure the arrangements really do good for people across that border . >> we've got to talk about possibly the power of scotland following brexit, is there a view that the agriculture and fisheries, does this thing require a looser demonstration of the developments? >> we will be discussing and will probably have discussions on this within the environment about how the arrangements will work where

we have to take what is a framework currently set out in brussels in the united kingdom and rectify the different interests of all administrations and the different devolution's that are currently in place. >> you've always been faithful to the core but if the government refuses to accommodate this differential arrangement for scotland and between scotland, is this with eu interest? >> i don't think there's a need for the government to hold another referendum. i think in 2014, that i would go further than that and that it scotland, and to this point, the government has produced on brexit, if scotland were dependent, then

not only would no longer be a member of the european union, it would no longer be a member of the civil market of the european union and no longer a member of the single market of the united kingdom and that is where much of scotland is the single market of the european union. >> is basically the core idea that most of the farming in the uk's brexit is a strategy in agreement to the very heart of this and it does the nation seek precedents for all others related to the market and the customer's union in addition to the iraqi government considered to be leaving the european union? >> that's a brilliant question. i don't the see these things is fatal between two issues. i think there's a clear message on the boat on the 23rd that people wanted to take control of immigration to the eu but whether it then countries outside the european union,what we also want to ensure is we get the

boss best possible deal incorporating within and trading with the european market . that we are able to continue on matters that are on crime issues and all these issues will be part of the negotiations that will take place. >> prime minister, donnelly with regards to northern ireland, there's obviously a very selective relationship between united kingdom and northern ireland. i think is this the government's position that special relationships should continue? >> we don't want to return to the parliament, the common travel area which covers the sequel has been in place since 1923 and continues to be in place and we are working hard with the governments and republic of ireland to ensure that we can find a solution to moving forward because i think that returns to the past.

>> much of the government, it seems the irish government , it seems that what is usually in northern ireland, there's a lot ofcompetition there and it seems like that should be the case . the problem is there's another negotiating body involved here, the european union. have you seen so far what attitude they will take? >> the indication so far has been that other member states are well aware of the issue in relation to the board of northern ireland and the republic of northern ireland. >> so they will probably be prepared to vary the rules and set a hard order from the european union, whereas say there are rules regarding all countries in the european union are intransitive so there is a degree of flex ability there, do you expect that will continue? >> if the question is to the

extent with which there needs to be differential arrangement in relation to northern ireland and the republic of ireland or come to an arrangement which is not that reflects the wider relationship with the uk will have but i think everybody is obviously, there are a number of discussions taking place about the external border and what arrangements they would have on that board which will involve these formations depending primarily on whether they are in china or not you. >> with regards to the irish systems in the united kingdom, obviously the rights have changed over the years but it isn't busy just to brexit that the citizens of the republic of ireland will if they want to come to the united kingdom and for the moment as you know they have a say on members of the commonwealth. do you think that will continue?

>> the issue of the right officers from the republic of ireland as you say, this is on a different basis and long-standing historical basis from other members of the european union. obviously i've been clear that at this stage to look at how we deal with these issues from other countries within the european union and within the uk and able to reassure. >> it should be up to us once we left the european union how we create systemsof the irish republic . >> it is a matter for i think in relation to the systems as a whole that i want to ensure that we also see the uk specifically living elsewhere being treated on a typical basis. >> and as we move forward , you indicated that it is the united kingdom presumably would not accept any lks of customs or passport checks

between the maldives and great britain. we want to ensure we've got the right arrangement between borders and the republic of ireland. >> as we go forward, how do you see the relationship with the united kingdom and ireland developing after brexit. you think because of geography, great friendships, the republic of ireland might lean more toward the uk and the eu? >> that's for the government of the republic of ireland to say. what i will say is what everybody would accept the premise is that they would be very welcome for the growing relationship between the uk and the republic of northern ireland and i hope for that to be continuing. >> obviously the administration has the ability to make laws themselves area what would the great reform bill and act

, would they be required to adopt new legislation themselves or would all be done on the uk during brexit? >> these are massive details that would be affected obviously by the solution arrangements between each of the administrations so there are aspects of eu which of course our domestic law in the uk. but that is specifically involves government or simply the uk which is a matter of detail from the legislation. >> presumably when it is and acted they would take into the uk or regulations directly or not the movement presumably. >> i do believe that body of law, the constants and the clarity of knowing where they found the relation to eu legislation, what will then be an opportunity for

parliament to be discerning which is a law they wish to continue with, that they wish to change but we will be coming out with a treatise. >> thank you very much. >> can i ask prime minister when you intend to publish immigration control as part of your plan in february? >> we are working on our process of integration. there are a number of ways in which we can address the issue when we feel it is appropriate to give any indications of those details, we will do so. >> and they may not be part of the camera plan? >> as i said, we will address those issues. >> they may not be part of the february land and is the next administration target going to be one of the objectives of the brexit negotiations? >> the net migration target

which was set by the government is set for very good reason, it's going to impact immigration and the effect immigration has on people in this country and we will change that migration target. the objective of the administration is to ensure we get the best possible deal for the united kingdom in relation with european union. >> which you said many times, but is there a tension between what you conclude is in the best interest of britain and part of the net integration control trade and so on , is what makes it possible to meet the next migration target and the next migration target. >> the main assumption that you can automatically extrapolate from any discussions that take place in relation to the net migration figures at some point in the future, as you will note from your time as secretary and now chairman of the select committee, these immigration numbers is not an exact science in that sense in that there are a number of factors that can come into play and are sometimes not

under the control of the government so i would say you can't look at this in the way you are suggesting we look at it, and to what we've been veryclear about is two things, we want to get the best possible deal in terms of relationship with the uk has with the european union . is the single market, we also want to ensure that the british government will be making decisions about immigration arrangements and people coming from the european union. >> the change between the numbers, because you have yourself said on many occasions that the reason you were able to meet your net migration target was the arrangement with the eu but you currently have net migration from the eu of 189,000, and that's got to stand any chance of meeting your net migration target, you would have to get eu net migration down to what, 50,000?

>> we will be putting into place the arrangements that have come into the european union that we believe are in the interest of the united kingdom. >> does that mean that if you conclude that it is not in the interest of the united kingdom to get next migration from the eu down to 50,000, you will ditch the net migration target or will you give the next migration target priority over what is in britain's best interest in thenegotiations? >> this government will retain the intention of bringing net migration down . it's set out very clearly for some time now so we believe the sustainable levels are in the text. but we do not have regulations because of the impact that we believe integration does have an that does have on people, taking those income sales on keeping . >> and there are reasons behind it, the question is what net are you going for? what does your next migration

target mobile or 40,000, i should ask you whether you are planning to meet that net migration target through the brexit negotiations and if so, what are you aiming for on net migration? if you've got to get it down from 189,000 to at least below 100,000, who do you want not to come? >> you've asked me about the brexit negotiations and i've been clear about those negotiations . they wanted us to have control of immigration which in turn controls of immigration people coming from the european union. we also have to ensure we get the best trade and operating within the european union. that is what we agreed to be looking for in relation to the brexit negotiations. the government does have a target, it does have its foundation, it does have intention of bringing net migration down. you are right that one part of negotiations we haven't

been to able to control his migration from the european union. we will be doing that in the future but i'm not stuck on a figure in the way that you suggest . primarily because as i have said, there are many factors that come into the whole process of immigration. there are many factors that secure the movement of people across the world and to and from the united kingdom. i've been clear with my european union colleagues and they are now also clear but one of the things we also need to do is actually working countries like those in africa, trying to make sure that the immigration and economicopportunity is there so people are trying to come to united kingdom . >> it's got nothing to do with brexit negotiations. you're trying to focus on immigration on one area of activity, namely brexit negotiations. what i'm saying to you is how we deal with immigration is a much wider issue.

>> responding to my questions you have a certain kind of intent toward having a figure as a target. however, you've chosen to have a figure, a net migration target for the whole of immigration and you've chosen to stick with it rather than change it when you became prime minister so again, just in terms of meeting the net vibration target, giving that net migration is currently what, 196,000, is that at the same level as it was when you attain home secretary in 2010 so that hasn't changed you how were you expecting to meet your net migration target if you have no place in which you seek net migration and you are refusing to say what your plans are for eu migration? >> what i said is that we will set out and make decisions about the arrangements we wish to have in place for the immigration of people coming to and from

the european union but it is not possible to say that only one aspect of looking at the issue of migration is the only one that you need to focus, on, the only one you need to look at the broader aspect of net migration and that's the whole point, it's a very wide issue that cannot be encapsulated into what the brexit negotiations are. >> one more question, your chancellor, foreign secretary and home secretary and the previous counselor all said that they would actually refuse to endorse the target, specifically your target on net migration . endorsing that target with feuding in it. do you think it is now time to remove feuding from your net migration target? >> you choose the targets, the figures are different from the target but the

target figures are calculated from the usual migration figures as dunes of india migration figures because his and it is an international destination of migration. our country is used around the world. having students in that overall migration figure, what we had seen in the previous 13 years is significantly that the students leaving the united kingdom, that's why something like 900 and they are no longer able to make improvements because they were not focusing on education to come into this country but they were doing the back door from the uk. we have been able to reduce the abuse of the student visa system by looking at those figures and we make an international destination. >> but you don't know how to meet your targets, it's a bit of a mess on immigration. >> thatabuse has largely been sorted out .

it's been a huge success story and they're a major british exporter. quite unlike the concerns you've expressed during the debate here in the referendum . don't you think it might be a big idea to reconsider? >> we use the term, the international definition of migration because it's simple, it's used by countries around the world when they are looking at their immigration system and we use it as the united states does and other countries . >> so it's up in the air. >> we use the international definition and we choose what target. >> what contingency planning has your government done in case the uk or the eu failed to agree on their deal at the end of the two-year negotiation. ? >> we are looking at all the scenarios in relation to this

, obviously how we get into the negotiations, we're going to be able to have an understanding of where the european union is coming from in terms of their destination . they're going to be able to do this within the 18 month. >> i think as with every contingency planning going on, who is responsible for it and on what expertise are you relying ? are you seeking the advice of either expert in the law to make classifications? >> as i said, we are looking at a variety of scenarios in relation. >> and one of those scenarios ... >> the departments have the responsibility but they bring in the next 13, they have within the department experts from other government departments that they also

work with other government entities in communication between the two and where it's necessary to bring in particular expertise, we will do that. >> and will you publish the results and will it be published alongside the changes made in february, march before the session? >> you will see what we published when we publish it if i can put it like that. but you would expect government to be thinking around what various scenarios are . >> and you said one of the scenarios again, is the end of the process. >> it does seem pretty honest tome. >> you are asking me to accept that we are going to fail which i don't accept . what i believe is that we should go to this, what i've seen from the video around the table is a real intention to ensure that we do this in as smoothly and orderly a

process as possible and that we donate the timetable that we set, i had a very good meeting with martin short who has been allocating after the negotiations goal in the european parliament when i was in brussels last week and the european parliament is also ensuring that this isa process that is smooth and orderly . >> it has been reported as complaining to the european commission and council about the inadequacy of the arrangements for europe and the parliament process and pointing out that parliament has to approve it so basically it's a state of logic that is entirely possible for the european parliament to veto the agreement at the end of this two-year process and i'm assuming that your contingency plan that would take account of that possibility area and of

course you are waiting for it. >> we are working to make sure that we get that agreement. as i understand it, the 27 members of the european union at the council have agreed a different way to do relation to the european parliament, they did that at a meeting i understand last week so there will be in the process. >> we're not going down the route of the last government which might find grossly negligent and no planning at all around the possibility that the country leave the merits of the european union. there is the possibility that the european parliament would veto any agreement or despite your best efforts that no agreement is reached between yourself and the council and the commission and if that planning is taking place? >> as i said, we are looking

at a variety of scenarios that could come forward in relation to the negotiation and the timing and what other opportunities would be there. >> we are looking at a variety of scenarios. >> we are looking at all them . [overlapping conversation] but crucially what we are doing is ensuring that we are working with others to set up the relationship so that i have every expectation that if we get that process right then it will be possible to see that covered on ambitious front. >> have you determined what issues will fall under? >> when you say what issues will fall under the agreement in article 50. >> well, it's partly possible that parliament could find themselves on the same track the government has found itself in with no action being taken . that the ability to conclude

an agreement under article 50 terms by a qualified majority is actually in agreement which would require domestic ratification in the council, in other words the extent of the article 50 agreement could be extended. that would be out with in domestic law and other countries and we could find ourselves within 27 in the council and the same position the government is in now. is there any examination of that possibility? >> the plan is positioned correctly, you're saying at the end of this process there may be some matters that are ratified by individual national parliaments as well as by the direct process. that's something we are well aware of and that's something that will be negotiating well aware of. >> and you possibly know what

those issues are or a date by which they will be set? >> i think work is ongoing in terms of great detail but i think that one of the questions that is a matter of your discussion is the question of setting trade arrangements negotiations with the european union and the extent to that matter with the parliament, there's an example of issues.>> with that be, we're probably tossing the former negotiation with the european council, what might be seen as mixed? >> i don't think that's appropriate for the text of article 50. this is a matter that will be added by dictates and i just suggested there will be legal discussions on this. this is a matter on which the

lawyers will be discussing at that point and i think it would be for us to infer. >> the lord already had disagreements on upsetting the timetable with our government in the move to notification with the supreme court. what judgments will you be making about what's achievable under the article 50 negotiations and will you be reviewing this process? >> specifically i want to point out that the timetable by the end of march next year gets us caught out to come forward with its judgment on the government's appeal but i expect to be able totrigger article 50 by the end of march next year . in any sense, we haven't blown the timetable off course. >> but it will be, it is your intention to cover as many

aspects of our future relationship with the european union as possible within the article 50 negotiations. >> within the negotiations we will be having with the european union, it will be a be myintention to cover not just the process but also future relationships . >> okay, what would be the major immediate need of failure to agree to a deal in your view? >> you mean failure to agree to a deal and the european union not having an agreement? >> if we find ourselves in parliament in any deal that agreed on the 27th of the issue? >> i would imagine the process, whether or not they wish to continue negotiations. they would have to agree to that but that would be, i would imagine the next step that we would approach. >> my committee is looking at

parliament issues and capacity issues and you say that the machine of the government and if you have your own advising you personally, you've also set up these separate exits from the eu and also the treasury and each of these have concerning priorities. how would the government satisfy all these different approaches into a single e negotiation policy? >> i've also set up a company subcommittee which is responsible for looking at the eu exit issues. on the trade and the cabinet committee. this is departure on a set of the committees, we've received that approach to the government and of course debates taking place regularly within that committee on the issues which

we are thinking about, trade relationships aspects of legal processes, and so forth. >> what kinds of capacity does the relevant subcommittee have in order to simplify and integrate these communities from other departments though there is a coherent area in the entire committee?>> the committee by the state, the majority of those things will come from section 84 of the european union because it's that department that is briefed on these issues butwhere it is relevant for other departments , they will do so. >> inevitably, the folks who have taken apart will be seen as something of a rider to other departments and who is holding the reins between these parties? what capacity do you or any

office have in order to make sure all these different approaches are drawn into one approach? >> i'm afraid i do challenge the concept that we have a rival department. i think it is the focus of the wars that are being done in relation to train one but it does call on the expertise of other departments and what was clear is we don't get that rivalry, we don't get that duplication between dixie and other departments >> dixie is the cabinet police department that is coordinating the other departments . >> it is the government department responsible for work with the other governments . >> with your authority. >> yes . >> so we will actually negotiate this whole agreement. >> the negotiation will be conducted at a number of levels. obviously i will play in relation to discussions on the european union but the

european union will have a key role to play in negotiations but obviously there will be a lot of technical negotiations and discussions that will take place at official levels. >> who will actually negotiate the eu's new trade relationships? >> that will be part of , that will be part of the negotiation and it will be those who are negotiating who will be part of that but they will bring in the expertise we did in relation to the trade aspects of that. >> what will the price the trade minister actually have aspecial role in that ? >> as we unfold the way in which that trade negotiating should will take place we will bring you expertise, the official expertise and ministers as appropriate from the department of international trade. >> many governments have a single trade negotiator, the

us government has a trade negotiator that deals across departments. do you envision that we have someone playing such a central role or should we have? >> we are currently building up the specific trade negotiations expertise within the department of international trade and we will be making do calls. we will be sending out more clearly. >> does your intention that that should be a fight of the tradenegotiations? >> where it's appropriate . >> we are also looking at civil service in numerous departments starting with the foreign ministers. the institute of government institute of paper suggests governments are having to choose between leaving the pre-existing commitments that were placed on them before

brexit and the brexit congress. how confident are you that there is sufficient capacity across departments to deal with this? >> i'm tempted to say your question mister franklin that i'm surprised they need to deployment them at all to be certain . >> and the chancellor suggested as foreign secretary that the front office is taking over a lot of aspects of current affairs that are taken over by the eu, that would mean to change the layout and capacity, how would the government reinforce its diplomatic network in the eu categories of brexit? >> let us see what the nature of the relationship we have with the european union is. he will look to see in a number of areas where the

european union has been negotiating and undertaking activity on behalf of the memberstates . that's where we do know we need to build up trade negotiating expertise for a significant period of time the cause that is under the european union. we've been obviously contributing to that debate and discussion on foreign affairs within the european union but as we look to what is going to be the uk's role outside of the eu, it's not just about what we do in the nation of european in relation to the member states, it's also how we build up our presenceglobally . >> thank you very much. >> i want to just jump back to one or two portions that we touched on earlier. first of all, we've made a firm commitment on a number

of issues that parliament has voted as least as well informed as democratic institutions on concluding the european parliament about brexit negotiations. in the course of note those negotiations, are you as committed to that as the brexit minister? >> we are committed to ensuring that parliament will have an opportunity to look at negotiations, to be discussing these issues, to be putting these issues forward. as i indicated earlier, were not going to give you commerce on every aspect of the negotiations but we will make sure parliament has the opportunity to be informed. i said as much before that we always will. >> we are very clear that we want parliament to be able to have the opportunity to debate and discuss these issues. the european parliament has a specific role within the negotiations which is different to the role that

the uk plays. there seems to be this idea that somehow we're not letting parliament do anything. we have debate through parliament, we have great repeal bills, it's the whole commitment we get into parliament. we will make sure that parliament has the opportunity to discuss these matters as we go through the negotiations but it will not be doing is setting out in detail on an alibi by alibi basis of running commentary on which this shows negotiations or discussing what the particular discussions are which is taking place. we need to have that flexibility as a government to enter into negotiations on that basis. >> we can draw the conclusions from the response but i have to say for my part i didn't heara yes to the question .

just a couple other points, is it your intention that parliament could arrange on a final deal once the negotiations? >> it was a question put to me earlier and what i said is my intention that parliament should have every opportunity to consider these matters and what i also clear about is to ensure that we deliver on the behalf of the british people which was their vote to leave the european union. >> i gave the answer i gave, chairman. >> in many stages we had at the beginning, you gave that answer to one question that you ruled out seeking an extension to the negotiation. as part of your negotiations.>> i said that if we go into associations, it is not intention to extend that negotiation.

>> but you didn't completely rule out completing the negotiations within the negotiating. . but applying and implementation date at some point after 2019. >> what i said was ... >> it specifically provides for that entry point in 2019 and that is what i amseeking . >> after salt floors three, it's not about the implementation phase, it's about the extension to the negotiations. >> well, i think that's a matter of interpretation . we shall see pride from putting questions from the date of agreement. so that stage of entry into the withdrawal agreement can be after 2019 and indeed it is generally understood by those people have looked at it and that's why i'm asking

you this question. there's a certain clarity about that question. >> sorry, in which case i have misunderstood the question you are asking me earlier, i thought you were asking me about the lessons that the european council agreed with the member state which was extending. >> that's in the negotiating. . you did get a very clear answer to that. i'm asking you a different question. >>i would expect that if i may , i would accept that they negotiate a deal within that period as was set up. it may be the case that there are some practical aspects which require a period of implementation . that is what we will need and not just for us but for businesses on the other

continent but that has to be part of the negotiations . >> i quite understand and so just to clarify, you therefore may seek to use the discretion provided by article 50, sub article 15 to negotiate and implementation date after the end of the completed negotiation, within the negotiation. within a two-year framework. >> we will discuss whether we need the implementation phase whether the point at which the treaties cease to abide may be a different issue whereas you've got and implementation phase. >> the reason i keep raising this question is because what i get from major financial interests on downing street is they need it clearer as to what they want on some type of assurance otherwise they will take preemptive steps now. what i can reiterate what one

large financial institution said, the commission agreed out that i had equated this to the chancellor as well on the basis of this that he sought that all politicians would want to transition. he said that this institution has saved two years is unlikely to be sufficient to complete the changes that are needed, this same document said severe disruptions are causing, that is without this period, causing financial instability and significant costs to the wider economy of europe area and we may need to activate contingency plans at this point rather than waiting until the agreement to note, leading to the eventual instability as discussed earlier in this document. that's what is being

understood to me and the treasury community and ithink to a wide number of mps . that is meeting us today in various ways to press for early negotiation of some kind of transitional arrangement and a clarity that there will be one to prevent the class through 2019 and that's what i'm hoping for equivalent. >> is precisely because we understand the business financial services and other services may need to implement that implementation phase but what we're talking about that and that's a consideration. it may be the government needs a period of time to ensure the systems adjust to whatever the new arrangements are going to be.actually, the difficulty here and uncertainty here, and i accept it's an uncertainty is that the extent to which that is required depends on the nature of the deal that is agreed and the extent to change what is required by

the deal. >> thank you very much, prime minister i'm sure will be coming back to it on many more occasions. we're just going to move on now to help and healthcare for parliament. >> coming up tonight on c-span2, it's book tv in prime time with the politicians with books they've written. senate majority leader mitch mcconnell on his memoir and then outgoing california senator barbara boxer. her book is the art of top. fearlessly facing politics and life. and former oklahoma congressman jc watts, author of dd: seven truths to finding the strength within and we close with virginia congressman dave bratt who two years ago one of primary against eric cantor, second ranking republican in congress. mister bratt is american underdog: proof that principles matter. book tv in prime time on

c-span2 starting at 8 pm eastern. sunday, january 1, condemned will feature a live discussion on the presidency of barack obama. we will take your phone calls, tweets and questions during the program. ourpanel includes april ryan, white house correspondent for american radio network and author of the presidency in black and white : an up close view of three presidents and race in america. princeton university print president, author of democracy in black, how race still enslave the american soul and pulitzer prize winning journalist david meredith author of barack obama: the story. watching depth live from 3 pm eastern on sunday on book tv on c-span2. air force secretary dubberly jean lee james book of the atlantic council recently about the air force resins in europe and the us security partnership with nato, she

was introduced by white house pentagon correspondent.>> before i go any further, i want to give a shout out here, first i want to give a shout out to lieutenant colonel ian fairchild, where are you? these are air force fellow. he's taking a coffee break, that's nice. he's my guy and he's not here. he's here, air force fellow. he's here at the atlantic council and he was telling me on the way and what a fantastic experience this has been for him and if i might say, it's always a fantastic experience for me to come back to the atlantic council because during part of the time i was at sat, i was on the board here as well as i had the opportunity to come back a time or so, i think january 2015 when i had the opportunity to come here as secretary of the air force it feels like a little bit of a homecoming every time i get to come to the atlantic council. frankly i can't imagine a better place to come to on a

morning like this when we are about to have what i hope is going to be an important conversation about the role of the united states generally but i'm going to zero in on the role of the united states air force specifically in the transatlantic security picture. it's an area that i certainly care a great deal about and it's one i think has become even more relevant during my tenure as secretary of the air force which has been for about three years now. i would submit to all of you that the transatlantic security community that is to say, the group of like-minded countries who are committed to nato's vision of a unilateral, free and at peace , are facing greater challenges today than at any time since the end of the cold war. and there's a few trends that are occurring simultaneously that make me feel this way and that are contributing to this scenario. first, is by invading,

occupying and attempting to annex crimea, russia has demonstrated that it is trying to overturn the norms that have kept peace in the region for decades. second, when i was in estonia and ukraine, i heard all about russia's use of cyber attacks and the way they flood the news media with misinformation and fake news and now with the very recent announcement by the us intelligence community that russia acted to interfere in our elections , involving i might say that the rush highest levels of the russian government, that part is an extremely troubling development and one i'm afraid we are going to be dealing with for years to,, reverberations from that development. third, russia is among the countries investing in anti-access areas of denial strategies like integrated air defenses that could allow a hostile act to create a bubble around a certain territory in which they could then dictate special rules to

the detriment of others. moreover, russia has been conducting numerous acts of unsafe chairmanship and showing disrespect for the territorial integrity of others and i'll come back to more on this later. finally fourth, but certainly not least, are violent extremist groups, most notably isis is spreading messages of hate to even as they and other groups like the syrian government are causing a humanitarian catastrophe pushing large numbers of migrants and refugees through europe. our southern european partners including turkey, greece, italy and a few others are focused on the threat to their societies posed by the influx of migrants and refugees along the so-called southern flight of europe just as the allies along the eastern and northern flank are very focused on russia area but this is precisely where the

importance of the entirety of nato comes to the forefront because you see, rather than being a tale of two euros which this could sound like a tale of two europe's to have the southern versus versus the eastern and northern interests but to the contrary, this is a case of the entire region united as a single defensive alliance focused on safeguarding the freedom and security of all its members against any threats. since i became secretary of the air force in december 2013, i had the opportunity to visit and meet with my counterparts in 19 of the 28 members of the nato alliance and in addition, i have had a dance opportunities in finland and i heard one consistent message on all of these trips and that message was that our allies and partners want more training, they want more exchanges, more presence, more operable equipment. in recent years, we have

expanded our presence in africa and europe as a way to reassure allies, to deter aggression and demonstrate the unique capabilities are air force brings to the combined operation, the combined fight area our relationship with nato members and partners are among our closest but today we need to double down in the face of the threats i mentioned a few moments ago. in addition i believe we need to open up an aperture on how we collaborate area we need to develop innovative solutions to the air force and our three domains of focus and those three domains are in the air, in the space and cyberspace and the reason why we need to do this is we need to create the most effective 21st-century security partnership parts possible and i think we're in the process of doing just that. in recent years, many of our nato allies and partners have noticed a major increase in the number of airspace

violations and other irresponsible acts of airman ship on the part of russian aircraft. i mentioned this a few moments ago and i want to come back to it now. fortunately the transatlantic community is coming together in response to these actions. the most visible of these efforts is the air policing missions. since latvia, lithuania and estonia became members of nato in 2004, steam nations have dissipated in this mission which protects the national airspace of our baltic allies of 24 seven 365. the german air force contingent flying the baltic air policing mission in estonia as we speak reported the conducting of more than 30 scrambles between the end of august and beginning of november this year. intercepting russian aircraft that were flying near civilian air risks with their transponders turned off. and i was in finland in october, just after within days of russian aircraft seeing to violations of

finished airspace, one of many such incidents the finns have seen in recent months and indeed, our own united states air force also witnessed similar conduct. among the most notable incidents was back in april when a russian fighter ate an aggressive and unsafe intercept of an air force reconnaissance plane during a routine flight in international airspace over the baltic sea. to me, if you add up all of these different incidents, all of this suggests that joint training and political resolve are extremely important at this point in time because this is the point in time where there's a great deal of push and test going on. indeed, that's precisely what the european reassurance initiative is all about. through eri, the united states air force is beefing up our bilateral and multilateral training calendar with europe and its allies and partners. we are increasing the amount of p position equipment in

the region, you'll, ammunition and other supplies that would allow our forces to respond rapidly in a crisis. we are improving infrastructure in the region that we have many flexible options to further enhance our responsiveness and we are intensifying efforts to build partner capacity with newer nato members and partners so that they can participate in their own collective security , we are demonstrating that we can deploy their dominance capabilities at great distances just like we did last spring when we set generation f-22 raptors to romania and just like we will do once again this spring when we will send f-15s from louisiana and the florida national guard to deploy is the theater of security package to various locations in europe. this year, we renamed the eri the european deterrence initiative to reflect that our presence in europe does more than reassure, our

forces there are part of an alliance package to deter aggression. in the national defense authorization act for 2017, congress reiterated its support for this initiative and for the presidents budget request about $3.4 billion by the way was a tripling as compared to the 2016 amount. since we are talking about increasing our financial commitment to our allies, i have mentioned that a good part of participating in collective security is insuring every nato member has the equipment and training of personnel that they need and that's why through all of my conversations with my counterparts, i have stressed the importance of every country in the alliance putting in place a plan to meet that target spending of two percent of gdp for defense and we are seeing some positive trends in this direction but there's certainly much more that needs to happen, particularly in the case of other countries. one area in particular where there is good news and

progress is been made was in acquisitions of inoperable equipment and here i'm thinking specifically of f 35. we are proud to already be hosting pilots, containers from norway, italy, the netherlands and others for training at luke air force base and now that the f 35 has been declared, capable, we will deploy our newest fighter to europe in the not-too-distant future, and if i were a betting woman i wouldn't be surprised that the f 35 make an appearance next summer. the unique combination of self situational awareness centrifuges will play an important role in reassuring allies and providing deterrents. many of our partners have already said ways they expect the f 35 to transform the battlefield, even the a to ae, the anti-access area of denial environment and make coordination easier through fully inoperable equipment.

>> plus nine other nato members plus sweden and finland. they are all members of this program and they share the operating responsibilities and expenses for the aircraft. the aircraft have been deployed on a board and mobility missios including fairings supplies to afghanistan and iraq to support combat operations, conducting humanitarian assistance missions in haiti and supporting international peacekeeping operations in africa. the capability allows the euro

atlantic community respond quickly to emerging crises that did not fit squarely into combat operations and it also draws heavily upon the expertise developed by the air force as part of our global reach mission. we would expect the trend towards shared assets like the example i just gave you but this trend will likely continue in the future and i think another primary where it may well work is air refueling which is another mission that our mobility forces have a long history in. we fully support nato and her allies acquiring these force multiplying capabilities because it enhances our collective ability to operate together and to respond to all types of global challenges. and by the way, i don't want to be remiss in getting to recognize the important role of nato come in afghanistan. certainly the united states are very appreciative of nato and resolute support and many other nato members who have gathered with us in the anti, and i says

coalition in iraq and in syria -- anti, anti-isis. we are also making strides to bring our mechanisms for cooperation well into the 21st century. nato has now established 24 centers of excellence to assist in developing doctrine improved capabilities and interoperability and experiments on evolving concepts. these centers cover topics from analysis and simulations of air operations. that one is placed in france. we have a cooperative cyber defense based in estonia, intuit airpower competence in germany. these are just a few. there are 24 centers of excellence in all. these centers benefit the entirety of the alliance because they advanced shared knowledge and they allow for the pooling

of resources and also for the avoidance of duplication of efforts. moreover, nato as a whole is acquiring global hawk will be piloted aircraft for isr missions through what's called the alliance ground surveillance system. these global hawks will be based in italy and they will give nato enhanced capabilities to support protection of ground troops and civilian populations in conflict environments as well as border control and maritime security which, of course, is of particular concern among allies who are dealing with this large influx of immigrants and refugees. this capability is important but isr relies heavily on the belly to rapidly collect and use the information collected by platforms into actionable intelligence that can support the war fighter. and that's why nato listed up a combined air operations center in spain, and a deployable air command and control center-based

in italy. and i had the opportunity a few months back to visit both of these facilities and i was very, very impressed with all the work that i thought being conducted there as well as with the personnel wh were involved with these key missions. and finally on space issues, once again we are moving together forward as well. all of us need the best space situational awareness possible and as a result we've begun conducting some tabletop exercises to facilitate closer relationships in this domain which, after all, is becoming much, much more contested and congested each and every day. all of these examples demonstrate how nato and the euro atlantic community has become more vibrant, more vibrant in our relationships in recent years which does not really come as a surprise at all to me. you see, we in the u.s. air force know that we operate best when we train and collaborate with our allies and partners.

the coalition fight is central to the way the u.s. conducts operations at all levels. so the bottom line, we work hard to deepen our relationships our relationships so that we can fly, fight, and when together. the twitter hashtag for this event is stronger without lies and i knew to tell you that the u.s. air force agrees wholeheartedly. and by the way, as you see some of our u.s. airman over the next weeks and months, be sure and wish them a happy 70th birthday. because the year 201 2017 whichs just around the corner marks are 70th anniversary, 70 years since we became a separate service, separate from the u.s. army. use air force breaking barriers since 1947. so thank you very much again for inviting me to speak with you today, and i'd very and i very much look for to the conversation to come. thank you. [applause]

i, milk or issues for the "washington post" and it's my great honor to be a today with secretary james under what we were going to do today is there's going to be a conversation between the two of us for about 30 minutes and then i'm going to open it up to questions. i know everyone in the audience is eager to get the question to secretary james about the transatlantic partnership, russia, and a bunch of other issues. we are going to go ahead and get you all out if you write at noon. as planned. secretary james, i want to start with russia. you mention russia in your remarks as a significant threat. you painted painted a pretty gloomy picture of the threat of the navy from russia. now we know that the russian government has allegedly hacked

the u.s. elections. there have been constant violations of airspace in europe. russia is bombing civilian targets in syria. just to set the stage a little bit, can you tell us about the russian air and space capability and how it stacks up against the united states and its allies in europe? what are the areas we continue to outpace them comfortable. what are the areas where they are catching up? >> first, i would say that the u.s. military is the strongest military in the world. i want to begin with that statement, and survey that is my belief about the united states air force. but we've reduce ourselves, the size of our air force overtime, and so capacity is no issue, particularly is this a multiple things going on a different theaters across the world. you can only be in one place at one time, not to places into times. so capacity is an issue. we are the most technologically

advanced but what we've seen over the last 25 years is that other countries have been watching us. if he can with the persian gulf war one, fight, and he saw how precision and stealth and the enablement of space can together to produce that revolution in military affairs. so many have been catching up in ways that are somewhat worrisome to the united states. of course we want to always be one or two or three steps ahead. we don't want to allow ourselves to fall one or two or three steps behind. we are still the best today but we are concerned about what to make we are investing and moving in the right direction to make sure that we remain the best in the world. as you mentioned we are not looking to pick a fight with anyone, sorting sorting out with rush or with anyone else. but we do look to defend our interests and the trans atlantic partnership has been a bedrock of how we defend our interest for decades, and it will remain so into the future. >> are there particular things

we've seen in russia's activities in places like georgia and syria and in ukraine that have given you particular cause for concern in terms of their capabilities or their intentions? other than the sort of fact that the seizure of crimea, the fact that they are bombing civilian targets in syria speak with other than that, mrs. lincoln, how, how did you like the play, you mean? everything you said it is worrisome. the advent of what some have termed hybrid warfare is also a worrisome development. so this is the advent of more cyber attacks. it's the advent of the so-called little green men that we saw in ukraine. it's creating uncertainty and chaos and 99 what it was all about or that they were really there in the first place -- chaos and the nine -- we in the west, i will speak for my own government, we in the united states care about attribution we don't just throw down on

somebody without having proof. so in a chaotic uncertain situation come sometime it's difficult to get separate and i think that's an area that rush has capitalized on which makes it very notable to me that in this case our intelligence community has called them out and said yes, they were involved at a high level of confidence. so that takes a lot in our government for the totality of our community to come to that. to me that's quite remarkable. >> at the same time they seem to be, there are indications of continued problems in their operations. we've seen that with the aircraft carrier base operations targeting syria. they seem to be using dumb bombs rather than precision bombs in syria. what does that tell you? >> first of all, the aircraft carrier as you point out, to me that was not a decisive factor in the syria operation t. it was more of a signaling, perhaps a message and peer it

did give them some training but as you pointed out it didn't go all that well. they didn't launch that many aircraft. there were not the many aircraft involved and they did have two notable crashes, which thankfully the pilot survived. but it was more the on the ground and aircraft that took off from the ground in syria that is make a difference. this is also a different approach to warfare that you seen unfold with the russian government, the syrian government. they do not make huge efforts to protect innocent loss of life, where as we, the coalition, the united states and our allies and partners, we go to great lengths. we watch and we wait, we extend a great deal of thought and a great deal of effort into the isr, the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and we strike when we are ready with a very, very high level of confidence that we know what we are striking. you do not see that level of care taken on the part of the

russian government or on the part of the syrian government spin let's talk about the european reassurance initiative or deterrence initiative. you name some of the things the initiative that has been able to support in the recent past and certainly seems like all of those are positive for the u.s. and european relationship. at the same time, my question would be, has it succeeded in determining russia from some of the activities that have been problematic regarding provocative maneuvers in european airspace and all of that? is it succeeding as a deterrent? >> i think it is. what we haven't seen is we haven't seen another repeat of what happened in crimea. so i think that's very important. i did have an opportunity as i mentioned in my opening remarks to visit the baltic states. and those who are directly on the border as you would expect feel the most vulnerable. so i believe, i'll just repeat