states navy. this is "in depth" on booktv. >> december 7, not 41, a day of infamy. a japans diplomas were -- japanese planes were swooping down or pearl harbor. they dropped bombs on naval bases, civilian homes and schools. submarines took part in the attack. in an our the battleship arizona was destroyed. nearly 2line planes were

destroyed. and that sunday morning the pacific fleet appeared to be completely immobileized we this sneak attack. >> it's been 5 -- 57 years since over 2400 american sailors and soldiers were killed in the attack on pearl harbor. now on booktv on c-span2, a three-hour discussion of that day, what led up to and it it's aftermath. we have three authors. eri hotta, steve twomey,y, and craig nelson, ladies and gentlemen, each of you in your book about pearl harbor and that era ask the question, why did japan attack the u.s.? eri hotta? >> my conclusion was that they really didn't know what they were doing, to be act. the didn't really have a coherent decisionmaking process. nobody was responsible, they

felt, and nobody was brave enough to step in and say, well, this war that they are contemplating was crazy so let stop. i think people felt that somebody else should be blamed for that kind of cowardice. the military dictatorship but felt that they had to keep up the appearances for each other so that it was a complicated system of sort of passing on the responsibility to each other and everybody backing off. >> steve twomey? >> mine is the same. almost a leap into an abyss. i was in attack more and more of hope than of actual strategic calculation. you need to remember that the attack on pearl harbor is a

small part of that japan was doing that day across the pacific. we knew what was likely to be appearing elsewhere. the philippines, the dutch east indisease, their primary objective and pearl harbor was an added element because they thought that the pacific fleet was the only thing in the pacific that could interfere with their plans elsewhere, but basically the idea that they do win this war was on a fairly shaky foundation. >> craig nelson. >> i think the great example of what we're all talking about comes in the most written about japanese man in history cam ken

caminiti they saidout can't attack america. he is so vocal that the rest of the navy is fearful that he will be assassinated and is assigned to stay on a battleship to keep that from happening and at the same time he's doing that he's planning the attack on pearl harbor. he has threatened to quit the service twice before that happened. so he is fame obviously called the reluctant admiral. and the attack on america was

the reluctant japanese. >> host: dense 7, 1941, oahu, 8 al. what hound. >> i found one over the most thrilling parts was to hear the very first americans who were attacked, which is the japanese air crews came in over the north, and as they did so, they came across three little california servicemen, saying farewell -- their last day after a year of being stationed in hawai'i. they were going to return to california on the 8th and on this one final day they decided to use their pilot's license to rent hyper cubs, little tiny canvas airplanes and these were the first americans taken down by state-of-the-art japanese zero fighter's on their way to pearl harbor,, and it's astonishing but those are the first american casuals. >> but at 8:00 a.m., as the flew over oahu into pearl harbor. >> you're seeing 96 ships in the harbor bee anything them. you're seeing the average age of the servicemen is 19. so everyone there are little tiny kids. they have no idea what is about to happen. a favorite quote was i didn't even know they were sore at us and that's how far from knowing what is about to happen is happening.

the japanese created took nothingal advantage with -- technology al advance if submarines and torpedoes that struck the target instead of being stuck in the mud. shaded of the art shells to drop from 5,000 feet and those hit the powder magazine in the arizona and take them apart. you see them -- where they rave is the famous north shore of his and they say i can't believe we're looking a nation of peace and about to turn it into hell. >> steve twomey, the subtitle of your book is "the 12 days to the attack." what happened in those 12 days. >> the reason for selecting that time frame is that the japanese attack on november 26th, from

it secret assembly point at the far northern extremity of 'japan. it would take them 12 days to get to hawai'i, little over 3,000 miles. and during those 12 days, the united states was collecting clues of one kind or another that something big was about to happen. i mention we knew that japanese forces were moving towards the southwest pacific. we knew that from chinese codes -- commercial ships. very hard for japan to mask this moment. we never knew about the advancing fleet that is also part of this military offensive. during those days there was considerable effort accumulating

that something was about to happen. in fact, if i might, 75 years ago today, december 4th is when washington formally warned its outposts on guam to start burping secret documents and destroying the code machines. that's how much we anticipated something was going to happen. along the way, of course, judgments were made, decisions were made, many cases incorrect ones, and the result was the end of that period, december 7th. >> host: was the fact it happened at pearl harp harbor a vice? >> pearl harbored a long been discussed as a target of a japan attack, even before a declaration of war. all through 1941, the nave where was discussing the possibility of a surprise in pearl harbor. start oat with the sect of navy, frank knox, write ago to his coward part in war department

that he was concerned about the japanese attacking peril pearl harbor. and that theme kept coming up in a report in march of 1941 in which an army general and a navy admiral pretty much theorized exactly what would happen as if the i that gone to the future and seen what could happen. they foresaw an air attack on hawai'i from a force that we never would have detected. so, a surprise attack on pearl harbor in theory was not a surprise. the reality was a surprise, however userry hotta, what was 'like in 1941? >> let's. that japan was already at war in 1941. of gamed in this conquest that

started -- exit plan already in 1937. japan start fighting china. trying to conquer and it they conquer cities but don't quite get the whole huge country under control, and they kept saying that they are winning and leaping from victory to victory, which was really true, but they were not winning the war. so, people starting to wonder this war that was supposed to be quickly over in one month, after four years hasn't really ended? what going on? i think that most acute sign of this prolonged war that they didn't know, where it was going, was the hunger. the rationing system went into effect in april 1941've, and the

main target was the rice, which has a huge, sake credit place in japan diet. they don't anything else to eat. rice is the thing. and as long as they have rice, they're happy, bit they don't have this rice. they have to do with this subgrade imported kind. even then they have to dilute if we poitier ore something -- potato or something. that started in 1941, but by the fall of 1941, all the major metropolitan cities had to deal with this rationing system which must have been scandalous to them and also quite a worrying sign. they can't really question the authority because they already in the semi war economy and not really an independent -- since

1931, the newspaper, major newspapers had been very friendly with the military and they'd been trying to boost the circulation but launching this jungowistic campaign, supporting the war effort. answer you start that self-censorship it's quite difficult to turn back and say, from now on we are criticizing you. so, 1937 it got escalated a notch and by 1941 there were more regulations and people must have full suffocated and uncertain and japan was in china in the summer of 1941 and that was retaliated by american embargo on oil.

it was not total but de facto total so they fate -- they were told that japan was cornered into this impossible situation of economic plight. only because they wanted to survive well and wanted to be great leader of asia. they also wanted to believe they were doing this for their asian nebraska neighbors as d -- asia neighbors at well. that was the official rhetoric since 1941, so hey have the this emotion since -- but also one key to -- it's always life each day, asking -- and just move on and secure enough for the family. >> host: why did japan attack china in 1937? >> because the -- well, for a number of reasons.

bravado has something to do with and it fear of bolshevism from the nobody and the sent of being cheated out of the rewards of imperialism, because japan arrived too late. all the rest of the powers had reaped benefits from imperialism in china and were happy to keep it divided until they realize that perhaps this very westernized and very kind of charming canning could i, -- chiang kai-shek smooth be the next leader of china so they decided to keep it unified, which japan didn't like. that was the japanese state. so they felt that they were the ones who should be protecting chinese and by extension asian

interests, and it's not the america. it's japan's backyard. they evoked a sense of moral doctrine and fit they had a special regional interest. >> host: craig nelson, how significant was it when fdr moved the naval base from the pacific to pearl harbor? did that threaten japan? >> not really. fdr was convinced he could get them to calm down with their a&m biggs -- am missions against our friends the chinese. they felt the chinese were our friend. he was convinced he had to fight two admirals, richardson, and kimble, and richardson lost this job for fighting with fdr.

he thought it would make japan nervous itch wanted to add to eri's portrayal that one of the great conflicts its the united states is look to go japanese leader like the nazis. a unified force 0 fascism. behind a come dictator and a common way of life and economy. none of which was tour. the japanese go changed hands 15 times. the army was fight being enough navy. the navy was fights within fighting win within its itself. one of my points i felt was that it's very difficult to provide a defense strategy against an enemy that lost its mine. >> host: steve, twomey, the geopolitics had a big role in

this. >> yes you. can't separate was about to happen or was happening in the pacific from what was happening in the atlantic. the fact of war in the atlantic was paramount in roosevelt's mind in terms of using american resources to keep the british in the war against the germans, and in fact, by the time of pearl harbor there was a shooting war in the atlantic ocean. american naval ships were escorting british convoys to britain. roosevelt has given orders to shoot on site any german surface ship or submarine they encountered and that was happening. a couple of mesh destroyers had been sunk with loss of life prior to pearl harbor. so his focus was the atlantic and was stripping ships from the pacific fleet in hawai'i, much to the ox of admiral kimmel, the

commander in cheap of the pacific fleet, and the last roosevelt wanted wad a war in the pacific, because it would affect his ability to help the british. the british were getting sustained in part by the resources coming from the far east and any war was going to disrupt that chain of resources. plus, the american navy would shift ships from the atlantic to the pacific if there was a war there. famously at one point, roosevelt wrote to someone dish think a member of his cabinet -- saying, i simply don't have enough ships to go around to fight a war in both places. and his preference was to keep it in the atlantic. but,ese, geopolitics was major reason for what was happening in the pacific. >> host: welcome to back to on c-span2 and our mom "in depth" program. we have one author or one topic

discussed for three hours with your phone calls and your social media comments as well. this month it's the 75th 75th anniversary of the attack only pearl harbor. >> 62,000 veterans are still surviving from war to. -- world war ii. >> you can join or facebook discussion at facebook.com/booktv, or tweet us,@booktv is our twitter handle.

that's how you get through. we'll get to your callaises quickly as we can. let me tell you about our the authors. error eri hotta, heir book is called "japan, 1941". she was barn in tokyo. le steve twomey, ex-book upped called "countdown to pearl harbor." he worked at the "washington post" for many years. and has taught at new york university in the city university of nick, and craig nelson, his become is called "pearl harbor from infamy to --" he also rote rocket men, the first men of the moon, and all

authorize of the first heroes, the extraordinary story of the doolittle raid. eri, who were the major players in japan leading up to pearl harbor. >> there's a half and it's quite -- it's a handful. i it's ironic you asked the question because i thought all the japanese counterpart countries like germany, italy, or mrs., the uk, they have famous figures, key statesmen. i think the problem with japan was that they really didn't have effective leaders. they had a handful of fairly ineffective leaders who, by the sheer force of their weak personalities, remained in power. and i think the utmost example is hirohito. >> host: emperor.

>> he basically -- outside of the real decisionmaking process, because he is not really supposed to interfere with politics. he did feel he had a veto power, but he was reluctant to use it, according to his post war confession. >> host: could he have stopped pearl harbor? >> i do. many people disagree, but i think the fact he felt he needed to explain why he didn't intervene and exercise the veto power immediately after the -- a few years after the war, that's very telling because the probably felt that he needed to explain and probably could have done so. his reasoning was that he thought if he didn't go along with the joint decision of the military ask civilian government that was put up to him to pursue diplomacy and military or would

be in peril, we be undermining the military. probably felt there could be a diplomatic breakthrough within the time frame, which is could optimistic in hyped -- hindsight because somebody necessary the government, prime minister conway, who was prime minister of japan, after four years leading up to the war. he is another weak, ineffective leader who managed to per peat e pet wait his bauer of his weakness and indecisiveness. he was from the second family of japan, also like then second emperor because he was a prince, and the felt leadership was

beneath him and he thinks if he makes a mess, someone else will cover for him. he escalated the chinese war in 1937. allowed a very bombastic and rather maniacal to reach an agreement with chinese weapon didn't pursue the opportunity to back out of that infamous alliance when they had a chance of operation -- when hitler attacked soviet soviet union, and that would have impressed on the american mind that japan was really serious about the peace negotiation with washington. he didn't pursue any of that. then the went ahead, okayed the occupation of southern indo china which roosevelt was

really -- he said he felt like he hit a cold bath or something like that. i don't know the exact quote. he was making -- japanese reply to this proposal he -- roosevelt came up with, which is really conciliatoriy. if japan decided to withdraw from southern inindechina. roosevelt prom melsed the whole -- the history for that region. he -- roosevelt wanted to make indo-china the switzerland of southeast asia. he tried not to link the chronic china war problem with the most recent indo indo-china niece

occupation so konro would have a chance to save face. he didn't pursue that. he again made this deal with the military, okay, i'll let you mobilize for the war and continue with if this bombastic rhetoric but if you let me talk to roosevelt in person and have a conference, possibly in hawai'i -- hawai'i kept coming back as a mid-point of the peace conference location. and i think he believed it was possible because roosevelt seemed quite keen to do it. we never know how truly engaged was but roosevelt was not adverse to this theatrical statesman ship where great things were -- like with churchill.

>> host: craig nelson, you're nodding your headest about roosevelt -- >> is the great moment in pearl harbor history because konoya, the last civilian prime minister that we have, was very sincere about setting this up and really did all of these manipulations between the japans girlfriend. one thing youlift left how is how he liked to eat and he was followed by a geisha carrying a giant pot another boiling water and he pointed out a fish and she would pick it up and swirl it in the water and then put it in his mouth. he was -- spent the first team being very prowar and promilitary, and then became prime minister again, and he became antimilitary, but the roosevelt administration hawks saw that previous position he had killed and said, number of this -- we can't take this

seriously. and konowa of had a -- ship standing by to take him to alaska, and then the roosevelt administration passed on it. if he had pearl harbor would never happened. >> whoa did they pass? >> i don't the trusted the japanese, the secretary of state, and his vote was the decisive vote. he ambassador in tokyo, joseph grew, was pushing for the meeting very hard. he thought it was a sip veer -- sincere author and thought it was nothing to do by agreeing to an a conference but hall wanted to know almost up front one of those soviet american summit's everybody is decided long before the get there hall wanted to know exactly what the outlines of the deal were going to be, and when he couldn't get that he was determined not to have that

meeting. >> host: well to mark the the te 75-inch history, american history tv is joining "in depth." it is on tv every weekend. now, for viewers interested in american history, and want to know more about pearl harbor, you can watch next saturday, december 10th, american history tv on c-span3 will happen its december 7th sailor from both baby harbor and the world war ii memorial in washington, d.c. the fdr speech to congress requesting a declaration of war. all live on american history tv

on c-span3 next saturday. we're live here and glad our american history tv audience is with us as well. we'll put the phone numbers up on the screen and take questions from viewers. roger frock ohio. >> caller: i'm glad your talking about this, there's a story i heard in the 60s i've been wondering about. supposed he it was told by a guy who was a poe pow in a pow camp and was supposedly high up in -- anyway, the japanese invaded manchuria and the russians has troops to prone protect at the country, and the japanese and

nazis were attacked at the same time, forcing russia to run a two-front war. they would then -- >> host: rock onlier, all the of our authors rite about that. craig nell sewn. >> when the soviets invaded -- when the nazis invaded the soviet union the japanese war taken aback. that had a treaty with stalin and a treaty with germany and thought they were on top of the world, at this sort of closure point. they thought they would be their own united nations. and they were completely taken aback in and in the negotiations in fact over and over hear hall says hitler turn on -- he's going to turn on you. >> mike on c-span 2. >> caller: okay.

here we go. my newed is this japan diplomatic code were bron by the time this war was started so the fdr administration knew what was going on and i understand at that time they american aircraft carriers had been sent away from pearl just before the attack occurred. so, the japanese war attacking military targets. so, it appears nat admiral kimmel and his men were being betrayed by the roost administration. the american response was to attack civilian darks and drop napalm on cities of tokyo. what is your group's response to that? >> host: steve twomey. >> he raised several points there. i can good through them quickly.

we did break japan's diplomatic code and had been reading the messages between tokyo and washington for about a year. butted at no time were there any indications that baby hash pour was a target -- pearl pearl harbor was a target for an attack and there would be know reason to tell washington that war was coming and where it was start, particularly confusion within the japan government who was doing what. the second point is regarding aircraft carriers and this is automobile cited as evidence that somebody knew something was coming. the two aircraft carriers in pearl harbor were away on december 7th but were dispatched on specific missions. they could kind of behaving like fedex.

they were ferrying airlines to american outposts in the pacific. they were not told to get out of the harbor because anyone believed an attack was comping. it was pure coincidence and actually was in fact extremely fortunate. the third aircraft carrier on the west coast and had been there for some time. so, the idea that they were ordered out because they any an take was coming is not a creme credible target. >> the civil domain if think unfortunate that the civilians got bombed over and over in japan but you have to understand in the context of the history of civilian bombings and how japan figured in that picture as well. danicka had a lock -- the

western world was shocked by the nazi bombing and then japan followed shoe in china. it bombed major cities in china during the china war. so i'm not excusing the civilian target but it's part of the total war that japan itself was prepared for -- thought it was preparing for, even before the declaration of war was decided, within the japanese organ, people were asking what if tokyo gets woman and that was in the front of their mind. >> i'd like to address this simply by explain that general -- excuse me --ard admiral kimmel received 56 millions of warnings about the japanese from washington and received additional warnings about the japanese from his own staff and he received warnings from british intelligence in the pacific some of which are still not been declassified, which he

did not pass on to washington. so the conspiracy theory is that roosevelt withheld some other messages and if only kimmel had received those messages he would have doning in. can line up kimmels inexcepts or inaddition and misbehavior and look like he was in league with the japanese. it is completely imapplause able in every single way. >> host: admiral kimmel didn't have a job much long after december 7th. >> if thought the was treated quite well by the roosevelt administration. he himself removed his starboards from his shoulders and demoted himself. in short, then placed on the retired list. they kept their salary and their pension, they kept their title

at the time but were not in charge of nip. so i thought they were treated very well officially. but then want happened is the court of public opinion accused them of being responsible, and they weren't responsible. this japanese were responsible. and that who is we have this for 70 years now trying to get their -- descendents trying to restorery reputation. >> host: willy from georgia. willy go afternoon to you, sir. >> caller: i'm on? >> host: we're listening, sir. >> caller: i know -- i can see the twisted steel itch stayed in the war until the end and we -- and the question is want to ask, how far is nagasaki from -- we took the tenth over there. >> host: what was your role in world war ii? >> caller: in the navy. >> host: what was your job?

>> caller: i was a machine gun iron the uss hamilton. >> host: that was during -- what years did you serve? >> caller: it was from '43 to the war was over. >> host: you mentioned you went through baby harbor. it was still a mess in 1943? >> caller: still a mess. still had twisted steel. out of the water. and captain wanted to show us what happened and we were quite young he was very emotional, telling us that the comrades down here and we are going to -- entombed in arizona. and the showed us and stayed in until the end of eye war. >> host: have you been back to visit at nail 75 years? >> no, i haven't. i haven't had that transportation to good, you know

what i mean. saw on the tv at the memorial, so at my time, just a hunk ol' steel, twisted steel, poking out the water. at pearl arbor. >> host: thank you for calling in. anybody want to respond? >> it is even today a pretty moving place to go, and you cannot be moved by standing on the platform that is the arizona memorial and gazing down at the arizona. so, i can't imagine what would it would have been like in 1943. even more graphic and telling, i think. >> want to remind, if you are a world war ii veteran or lived threw this era we want too hear from you. 202-748-8202.

steve twomey, how long did the attack last and what was the damage? >> guest: well, it's interesting to note that in military terms, the attack really wasn't catastrophic in retrospect. the japanese, as we talk about earlier, did not find the american aircraft carriers in the harbor, which proved pivotal in the coming months of the war. and they also did not attack the infrastructure of pearl harbor, the drydocks and the tank farms which were quite visible and without which the fleet could not sail very long because hawai'i does not have any natural resources that a navy neededs. doesn't have oil or coal and has to be brought from the mainland and although oil was sitting there. in many of the ships atlanta war damaged, actually were repaired and found their way back into the war. perhaps most notably the

battleship west virginia, one of the eight that was in the harbor, wound up in tokyo bay on the day of the surrender in 1945. had been repaired and fought through the war and the battleship nevada, whose story is among the most heroic on december 7th, actually was off the coast of normandie on june 6, 1944, for the invasion of france, providing bombardment cover for the invading troupe -- troops. so strictly in military termed the attack was not as great as our minds tell us. psychologically it was an overwhelming event in american history and obviously still is. >> host: what was the reaction in japan? >> i thing one that surfaced over all is one of euphoria, just because they were fighting

this war in china, which had no end, and now they attack western power successfully so, so that they could justify the war they had been fighting in china as a war of liberation from the we were powers. as well as to show that -- i think the engrained sense of inferiority was tot racism and imperialism and colonialism, we tend to overlook nat nowdays but i wails great and real -- was great and japan in general are conditioned to think a lot about the color of their skins and they couldn't change it, were ashamed. so it was there way of demonstrating to the world, though thought, they did heart ande they could be brilliant as something. of course, surface elation may not be an indication what people really felt inside because mothers had to send their kids, boys to battlefields and might

never come back. some people knew about the we were prowess and industrial output that really far outweighed japan's. so reasons to fear which i -- diaries are telling what he was thinking about and he had this really cool mind and eyes to say that this is not going to last, and really didn't think that they can win it. even on the day. >> host: has your book been translated into japanese? >> i translated it myself. i really recommend it to anybody. the pain of birth twice. but i'm glad i did it because everything gets -- not everything but quite a lot of things get lost in transitions and the nuances get miss

mistermed -- misenter e interpreted and if you speed the language, writing the language you have to it yourself. >> host: so it's for sale in japan? yes. >> one other thing. one prize call asia-pacific prize which was humbling to me because i thought everybody would be very touchy and think why are you writing about the war? i could not have been wrong. maybe the government didn't look my interpretation but there were enough readers who were receptive to my writing. >> host: i apologized for not having in independent n front of you. you would a phrase in your book can talking about the japanese character issue guess in sense where one is the face and one is the real meaning. >> face and the inner voice.

>> host: did that affect your research and ability to -- >> yes, all the time. what said or not said in the conference proceedings, tremendous, for example, you have to look between lines and it's often more significant what they're not saying. also, you get a sense that the private records and conference proceedings between them you see quite a lot of disparatey. people are speaking from both end of the mouth and triple talking and quadrupling talking ...

>> >> and she was from brooklyn. >> thanks for holding you are on book tv talking about the 75th anniversary of pearl harbor. >> yes. i have the question for your historians. can anybody confirm or deny the actions of the assistant secretary of state of dean acheson? with prospective to

circumventing the desires of our policy of franklin d. roosevelt concerning the fuel embargo that congress passed for japan and? that is my question. >> i can confirm that. is on the backs of fdr there was the embargo to say he wanted to pull japan strings and well as at the conference they used their abilities to shut down the japanese practice. >> host: what had japanese relations mike leading up

through 1941? >> guest: the relationship had been pretty good most of the years with the emerging world powers. in fact, with franklin roosevelt december 6 wrote his famous letter to the emperor seeking and referred to the longstanding relationship that these are the only to countries of strength and certainly the american navy had been preparing for years with the possibility of conflict. most american navy war games

japan in theory and as the years drew closer the prospect of japan would be the adversary. that was obvious to also that long standing relationship gradually in the early san '40's. >> with very hard times around the of world to look back pet that held sway in

their doing that in china and in relation to foreign policy. >> host: what does the phrase tora, tora, tora mean? >> guest: i don't know literally. >> firefighter fighter literally but i don't know why that was used for the signal. >> host: that is when it was first used quite. >> as far as i know. >> is code for torpedoes attack. if they had not gone first then the bombers we're going first. >> host: then we will talk

about captain food she dabbed a first let's hear from sarah calling in from england california. >> caller: listing to the program earlier that there were 1718 changeover cited in of that was china or japan and if they could clarify and but my cousin bill banks in hawaii at the time. >> host: the japanese government's how many were there? in a general sense. >> 1941 she was not usher a that was happening in china or japan quick. >> it was japan.

the main character until october. and to reverse the momentum for war. to give the hard-liners a chance to reverse that. so up until the end -- then. >> because of lack of leadership? if that caller wants to find her uncle or relatives? senate there are two ways.

oneness uh naval heritage history command and the service record and if not write-down how do i find tim? we had awakened the sleeping giant to instill in him terrible resolve. >> originally yamamoto said that the commander in chief by don't know if it is an established fact and he actually said that but it but that reflected the sentiment that would be extremely formidable appoint a poll -- opponent and had

even gone to and i would north western double game he had been an - - appreciation for the industrial power of the united states of the natural resources. that today's states could replace the losses but that was not the deciding vote but it was an inevitable decision that i cannot stop is about to happen so i will make the best of it to the

japanese offenses but making the best of the bad situation for accurately reflects what he thought. >> host: i have to go back. with so few look up we will awaken the sleeping giant yet people claiming that yamamoto said this. in then realized it was made up for the movie tora, tora, tora based on a letter that he wrote hopes. but what i love about yamamoto is that with the momentous battle that he

lost two fingers so his nickname was 80 because a manicure cost 100 set. >> so one of the first interpretations and then they were battling in court. >> to mark the 70th anniversary of these attacks on pearl harbor they have joined for the first hour of "in-depth" they will go away from us at this point but american history is on every weekend and to learn more about pearl harbor joining american history dtb next saturday morning there you

will see the december 7 ceremonies and here first-person accounts from veterans and the speech to congress with the declaration of war and live a few were collins on american history tv next saturday. missouri go ahead. >> caller: good morning. this might be a little different and not the veteran of pearl harbor or will do more to do and actually a korean from vietnam that i experienced in japan caused me to have a greater appreciation for the japanese felt that i was

able to attend college with those japanese survivors in pearl harbor. but what set me back at first in japan to establish the academic relationship that turns into a very positive social relationship primarily with the family to survive the world war two as well as three officers of the japanese army. >> host: anything you would like to answer in response? >> it is so moving to hear

stories like that to. to know the we were on doc brent before. and discussing pearl harbor. and people do stupid things said in not have courage that we are resilient and i think. >> accounting americans were in japan 1941 quick summary were stuck there throughout the war? >> in did included people

late tokyo rose by the japanese propaganda. >> he was the japanese ambassador to japan that counterpoint here in washington. the grand niece the first japan orphan so listen a sentimental appointment for him as well. to save the progress of society but then to see that crumble when and he did

everything. nobody could make sense but he tried his best when he explained better than anybody of the japanese government he was almost in english to the country that he liked very much and what we see around me and tried very hard to avoid what he suspected was coming but when the war broke out everyone was in turn and

eventually they were exchanged for the map members of the japanese and the seat exchanged on the east coast of africa, 1942 and the ships have left respectively from new york i am not sure where in japan but yokohama that today would i think is lausanne being -- mozambique but they knew each other and respected each other and they were afraid during this swap that they would meet and would be uncomfortable and they did literally walking down the street of the city in which buses exchange was occurring and resolutely he kept his eyes for word even though he was

trying to catch his eye and hurt him to ignore his friend but he thought diplomatic niceties protocol required him not to equality of their country so from start to finish a was very painful. >> i think in your book, craig nelson ag was kept at the hot springs resort in virginia? >> what we found out is that it was broken by this that it was like two children the english were involved and there is nothing they could do to stop it but a piece of american slang at that time was the double cross. >> the next call comes from connecticut.

>> i have in two questions in that macarthur did not prepare very well from the short period of time before the japanese that the philippines and second no one ever seems to talk about that diplomatic attache to hawaii at the time that was actually doing spying for the japanese and commenting to japan of when they would be there and he also did intelligence work i think for one year before the attack dealt here anyone talk about him very much but thank you for your comments. >> vice bent quite a bit of time on the japanese spy he

did a fantastic job because the embassy were he pretended to work he would act like the good time charlie was a drinker not doing work everybody thought he was no good but he did that some of the one suspect was working for the japanese and outside of the and the seat he took aerial tours of the island and went swimming in the channel and did everything in fact, he went to a teahouse of deals skirts of honolulu's soil went to that teahouse and they spoke many times and how wonderful it was but you cannot see any of pearl harbor from their. >> key was much more of a self promoter more than a

real spy. you can hardly call him despite what he was doing anybody could do. pearl harbor is extremely easy to see if you just climb a little into the hills. he had some expertise to identify individual types of ships but he inflated much of his own legend as the years went on. and he became more bond like as the years went on but i don't want to wonder state his significance, he was providing vital intelligence including the day before the attack actually telling tokyo what i thought was probably subordinate

superiors to much that it looks like a good opportunity for a surprise attack. i am not sure that is wise to put that into a message that was intercepted. he is a fascinating character i agree an interval to the story. >> and there was the eighth hour delay from one the philippines and hawaii were attacked and one of the great mysteries to this day is puerto what was the cause they did there to do absolutely nothing? they could not imagine that in the same way. >> it troubled him that somehow macarthur escaped penalty for being surprised in a less excusable way and macarthur went on to great

things but he was only heard of the negative sense for the rest of his life. >> host: 8:00 a.m. honolulu what time in washington and how quickly did they found out what. >> it was 130 in the afternoon on sunday in washington. , the first were the secretary of the navy received was from a messenger for who showed up at his office were at that point he was talking with a chief of naval operations and i believe the assistant chief naval operations were there so they were there and they can and the message he was a newspaper guy as a vice-presidential candidate

1936. p. didn't really know the japanese naval message terminology he looked at the message and said they must mean the philippines has to be an error but they took the message he could read the sender and new the new folding go and said no this is pearl there is a raid under way at that moment. get that same moment jamal himself came out and stood on his lawn he lived a brand new quarters that was built for the commander of the pacific fleet and it overlooks the of harbor you can get a very clear view especially then.

he received the telephone call a report of a submarine attack off the channel then somebody said there is an air raid under way i am surprised he needed to know that by telephone i'm sure he could hear the planes but he stepped into his yard and currency was happening beneath him. that was one of the most poignant moments of american history. >> everything he had done he had succeeded all the statements in the previous 12 days were now literally blown up before his eyes and he knew his career was over at that point that this would be a catastrophe unfolding beneath him. and his neighbor stood with him on the lawn and

described his face to be as white as it is uniform and you really feel for him but that he could be so wrong and of course, . >> but washington knew within minutes but. >> yes. communications were far less sophisticated. we had no zero satellites for the distance there were no tv stations broadcasting live so essentially the march that evening to the cabinet, roosevelt could only provide sketchy details of what happened. they knew it was bad they do many people were killed, the totality of the strike it was difficult to find out. and they were not anxious to

make that public and then to tell the press they said 300 but then they said the affiliate's say it is much worse but then they say you give it to be enemies now you will save 300 parishes few go to the papers 1178 wounded and craig nelson reports from infancy to greatness that burns constituted 60 percent of the injured. now from the world war two veterans line could afternoon. >> caller: i was the veteran of world war ii i served in the philippines

and d-day okinawa after the war was over reword dispatched southeast of the philippines to pick up 21,000 soldiers and sailors we've made several trips but when i held guard duty duty, medic he wrote a note asap how did you learn to write that way classes said ucla and graduated last year and i went home my folks said stayed another two weeks away stayed another two weeks. and then my brother said stay another two weeks so

then they shut down and nobody got out so there i was a had a good job ucla. so we took 20 some thousand men some more hostile at us others were friendly so why do some of them like to tear me up? he said lot of them went to manchuria and came home will then went to a three yen in china mari were doing different things out there and then with the pacific on the different islands so it was part of a the propaganda they told them we are out there because of what the americans were doing. that is the story that i like to tell people. there a lot of people that

i've met that were very friendly and always smiling. >> host: have you visited some of the sites that you participated in world war two? >> caller: no. i have never been out there in my teenage years, was 18 drafted out of high-school. mine heart is out there was a high-school monitor up until a couple of years ago i would always stop to find out where the agents were from one girl said okinawa i said that we got talking a little bit and things have changed. she is taller than i am and

they whirl lot shorter. >> host: how old are you quick. >> double me 91 pretty soon. >> host: thanks for calling we're appreciate it. >> again i am moved by the words of the people who have gone through that experience . i wish they would write these things down so later generations benefit. >> what about the japanese veterans several were to? >> -- world war two? >> they will keep their memories to a themselves there is an oral history archive that does the on film interviews as well but not enough but as long as

they are there. >> you know, of any survivors but do you know, of any japanese survivors quick. >> i don't. my guess is if there are they are probably there this week but i don't know that. that is a good question. >> one of the great stories a soldier was a fascinating character was the lead pilot of pearl harbor with the state of the art technique my favorite was how they figured out how to do a torpedo because they had to

launch in shallow water but they realize that the americans had patented the technique so they come in with the spiralling dive they would drop 1500 yards before the target and then so they wouldn't crash that is why some americans to see the faces of those japanese pilots in day seven redraw up the torpedoes in the water would splash up to hit the wings. >> one of the interesting aspects is the fact with any sort of warning at all, just even in our the torpedo planes and the most vulnerable because they were

so low might not be able to do the damage they did because if any aircraft fire was there they would be hard to mess but the fact the fleet was still unaware with this extremely vulnerable aspect which was essential by far the greatest damage was done by torpedoes to the battleships. so that is why at any number of places at least the fleet all hands could have been on deck and waiting for what was coming. >> you tell the story of who shall later life. >> there are two stories one

was a man named jacob to mistake and prisoner by the japanese and as part of the raid was treated as a war criminal and was accused in prison and came to an awakening turning his life over to christianity but many years later he was preaching in japan to fukushima the who was also lost that the japanese had were repudiated and then they ended up preaching to gather actually all love descendants have become converts. >> the next call comes from hawaii.

>> caller: good morning. 1972 the first japanese immigrants came in the 18 eighties with the plantations but during the day of the attack a generation that had become american japanese from the hawaii air national guard wads and during the attack, he had to call people and secure them to say if places and one of them happen to be caucasian

and he was running towards her and she was in fear of her life. just thinking about that it is no surprise that the americans entered -- enter the japanese. >> also the and it was one of the biggest but my question with the of military installations but what you to comment on that. >> host: what do you do and why and where is she? >> eastern side of the island there is also a marine base attacked that day about 20 people died on that basis they have the memorial there and there will be coming up one of

them is named after a guy that fought i just wanted you to talk about the other installations as well. >> american defense for pearl harbor was the army air corps. and schofield there's also a marine base and an air station and also there is an incredible heroism with the army commander there who lined up to protect against sabotage but the air forces were complete the devastated

but the great moment says he will not take it anymore than polls the machine gun out and then starts to take down the japanese planes. hospital said he was shot 30 times. he was bleeding from 30 wounds his scalp was torn open and at the end of all of this tora, tora, tora just was not my day to die and one the middle of honor -- medal of honor. >> but that instant herewith some from the ship's but in fact, it was a very one-sided and gauge but we

did not shoot down very many planes only 29 north 39. not to diminish the heroism that did occur, the captain of one ship said if he could give the medal to all who acted heroically the whole crew would get a medal but roosevelt was asked that night when he was addressing the cabinet how many of them did we get and he quickly tamp down the notion that it was a fair fight because it wasn't. >> 10 years ago with the anniversary here is a picture. i said what did you think of that movie? the actresses were very pretty. [laughter] >> anything to add quick.

>> i am just overwhelmed but to have the bad luck to be born into show enormous commitment that the japanese state did not they just had to keep giving and giving and giving. >> host: was there a subterfuge in hawaii to the japanese americans that were living there quite. >> at what point greg. >> american government detected by a not so ussher how. the one problem is that the newspapers repeated the reports of a the whole country that anybody could be suspect of that kind of

information. so i think that is the blurry line. and stating the obvious but 40 percent of the hawaiian population were japanese or japanese descent and the irony of the attack on an island is so enormous and the fact the location was said was the peaceful venues. >> we know the internment camps have been did they happened in japan as well quick. >> yes said did. they were mostly housed in a mountainous resort that was isolated. >> host: georgia?

>> caller: hello. i am a veteran of the vietnam war and the spring of 1944 they did say with his discharge papers but the americans propensity or white supremacy could add have been a part of america not being prepared? that may be if dave boyd of taken the japanese to listen

to all that back channel talking that they would have supplied pearl harbor and the philippines? >> bank you all preview talk about the issue of racism in different ways in in your books let's go around the table. >> the point of white supremacy could have been prevented. >> host: talk about that however you want you talk about the issue from colonialism and imperialism. >> there is a lot of things of that reckless decision to enter a war that you're not certain that you will win doesn't compare to the history of colonialism that really is not the point but you can explain those

resentful feelings with the japanese leaders the way they felt that there is no excuse for those calamitous decision that you make four other people or the citizens who were supposed to be protecting the that is my feeling about it. that to be wrong or cheated has always been real. >> host: how do look at it steve twomey? >> i think racial superiority is a major explanation for why the attack happened. but the best evidence of that i would start with is the hours shortly after the

attack there were rumors in washington that the germans helped them to plan the attack with the implication being they were not skilled enough to do this on their own. this reflected the ongoing ethos with of military that the japanese were a second two-year military power and aircraft carriers were not too good and in some cases hampered with their ability. and people and the navy department who tried to counteract those that were born in japan to educate their superiors that they can fly airplanes and make good pilots but it was a very hard mentality to

overcome because they were just filled with how you would beat them in a minute and it would take nothing at all to overcome japan because they are not that good but when you have that type of mentality it puts you into a belief that the radically you imagine cut have happened but they could not pull it off. >> alibi to tell you three stories of racism and pearl harbor the first is intelligence that appears before the three admirals' and the department of for food does an incredible presentation of the japanese air crews have tenures experience fighting over china the japanese technology with two years of rule were to hit japanese fighter planes as he does this high-profile presentation people

roundtable start laughing he says were you laughing at? you're talking about those funny little people. so that when the command attack happened they thought it was out rages when those little yellow bastards did that to us when america is superior to japan but the other story has a happy ending doris miller was -- mr. miller wanted to escape the sharecropper family in texas said he joined the navy instead he came across the heavyweight champion of the ship and during the attack they said handley that ammunition and will fire the gun they said you fire this one and through

his great bravery he did win a star but he died in the philippine three years later people were very upset he did not win the medal of honor but then he became a hero of the civil-rights movement. >> host: and then got the award to replaced campbell and the pacific fleet we're talking about the 75th anniversary of pearl harbor we have about another hour and 25 minutes to go if you are online don't hang up. try social media. on facebook board twitter we will show you one more book cover, a survivor of the uss

arizona one of five of the 11 that we talked to this week. >> donald stratton where were you one december 7th 1941? >> i was on board the uss arizona at pearl harbor. >> host: what redoing? >> just getting ready to eat this there is nothing on sunday. >> host: how did you get on the arizona? how long were you in the navy greg. >> the little over a year. >> host: review enlistee quick. >> did you enlist?

in nike yes. because there was not much in nebraska such $21 a month sounded pretty good. >> host: what was your job greg. >> and naval seamen first class. >> what does that entail? >> maintenance of the guns when they come out of the of water we would paint them up and scrubbing and painting. >> host: what do you remember about december 7th? what this through that day. >> [laughter] i remember a lot of things. 530 in the morning we were

up and around with reveille we picked some oranges high-tech fiat and my camera to go into my locker to get something but the sailors were hollering and to take up a lot and then one of those planes and i had to go

>> once you reach your battle station what relabel to do? and then aside from the plane's of the dive bombers and then 90 degrees and then we could not shoot to the other side but they were not

reaching. >> of of a gallant men about when the bomb hit arizona when they get at that point? >> 2500-pound bomb. and the gasoline that blew up. 6300 feet tend the air. >> did you see the fireball at the time? >> how could you miss it? >> host: what do you recall about the noise or

the small? >> the fire ball went into the air. >> how are did you get off the ship? >> let to the director and then they would blow the smoke away but the uss

arizona takes four or five times but then we proceed to go across that line around 70 or 80 feet. >> host: how long did the attack last? >> i could not tell you. it is in the record books. >> host: 335 sailors got off the uss arizona 1100 to perished. >> 1177 perished how many are surviving today? >> will you be going to the reunion. >> when do we leave for hawaii? >> tomorrow.

>> were you injured in the attack quick. >> burns over 70 percent of my body. >> what was the recovery process like? >> it took one year. >> a ship me back to california and from there a medical discharge but then.

[inaudible] with the south pacific to land in new guinea then we would go to guadalcanal to pick up some troops and then to the detonation and then we could tell the people but then there was 100 ships that were damaged. . .

>> caller: how could i tell what they were thinking? >> host: you write about the fact that the draft board was a little perplexed you -- >> well, i had to go through the draft board to get to omaha, get ahold of the navy to go back into the service. and they weren't reluctant at all. they helped me very much.

>> lonny cook, ken pottses, and lauren bruin are the other five survivors over the pearl harbor attack. do you feel a special connection to them? >> well, lauren brunner was the director with me and went across the line -- one of the six that win across the line, him and are the only ones still alive. >> why did you wait so long fountain down your memoir? >> a thing that happened to do, just -- living day to day and week to week, year to year, whatever. nobody ever said anything about telling the story, and it came out a little bit one time, then a lady heard and it called her father, which was a writer, and he approached me, and from there

on that what happened. >> ask that's ken geyer yours cowriter. >> right. >> you list the failures of the u.s. military in planning for this attack and say the u.s. was not prepared, did not communicate and was overconfident. >> well, i can't assess to that but they sunk the sub off the harbor, and actually didn't pay much attention to it, and then the radar picked up all those planes coming in from the north, and on -- from a north end of the island and said they just planes -- b-17s from the united states, but there were too many planes there and they didn't pay much attention to it.

>> when you visit pearl harbor, does it bring at all back to life to you, that day? >> well, it's something that i think about every day, but it's nice to -- kind of hard but it's kind of nice to go back and pay homage to the sailors and marines and all the other air force bases and all the people that perished that day. >> donald stratton, survivor of the uss arizona on december 7, 1941, the attack in pearl harbor, is one of five still surviving, 335 men got off the ship that day, 1177 perished. thank you for spending a few minutes with us on booktv. >> okay. is that it? >> yes, sir. >> thank you very much.

>> appreciate your time. an honor to talk to you. >> thank you. all right. >> and that was donald stratton, one of five survivors of the uss arizona. steve twomey, did you spend a lot of time and get lot of of information from the survivors and. >> i have to confess my book wasn't about the survivors so i didn't speak with any who are still with us. in fact one of the difficult things about having been a journalist all my life was attempting to write about something which i could not interview people on the phone or in person. it was a new experience for me to do that. fortunately the archival record of pearl harbor is so voluminous you can get a sense of people's personalities and character as you read what they testified to.

plus there are many oral mountains. think the great gap in our knowledge involves husband kimmel. he testified a lot but was not given to writing -- wrote no auto biography well, the did, very bad one, but i don't believe he participated in any oral histories, and the letters he left behind at the university of wyoming don't really shed much on his thinking and his actions in this period. i would give anything to find letters that i am certain he was writing to his wife in the months before the attack. he was sort of, and romaines to deb remains a history about the attack. >> craig nelson have the oral histories been helpful.

>> what we found so fascinating is you look into the 50s, 60s, 0s, 80s, you can find nothing. my theory is that it were so traumatized it took until they were facing their own mortality and having grandchildren to breach that terrible ptsd they suffered. in the 90s and 00s, we have a fantastic record and then starts dying down again because it's too along ago. >> herry hotta, is world war ii discussed in japanese schools like we discuss it here? >> not at all. one of the great motivators in writing the book i wanted to figure it out for myself. being a high school student in the united states i first encountered this question, why did you attack us at pearl

harbor? i had no idea and i tried to explain, it was a rick dictatorship, and it didn't make sense so i started this question of white did japan launch a lop-sided war they were still to lose and still doesn't make sense to me logically, but i think i put my finger on the mall functioning of the system and also evasion and dilution of responsibility that is still a chronic problem in japanese culture today. the translation of my book in japan is called -- she sub toot ill is "origins of modern japan." not a very flattering -- the idea that nobody opens up to

responsibility and they think it -- nobody its responsible that mortality, and the fact that the origins of world war ii and pearl harbor, the fact it doesn't get discussed, that problem is perpetuated in the systemic environment of the cold war because america wanted a very powerful ally in japan against the theater which, by the way, is still on and don't want to upset the power that could rain in on the sort of leftist types that can challenge a conservative order that was perpetuated, despite the wartime government, many people stayed in power and the system bowl of -- wartimele symbol of japanese greatness, the empour roar, and it's nothing personal.

i don't have anything again the present emperor but the fact they take it for granted that he was not responsible, his institution was not responsible, or that only a group of people who were tried at the tokyo trial were responsible, sort of evades the whole question of why did japan star the war to begin with but concentrate on their own victimhood. they survived the air raids and atomic bombs as if they survived the earthquake and tsunami with a stiff upper lip. amaze something something to be respected but doesn't really solve the problem or the question of why did japan rage that war. >> host: here's a little oral history from the u.s. national

world war ii museum. >> i felt in my bones something major was about to happen it seemed inevitable. to the move to pearl harbor wasn't surprising or emotional. there was no, let give the yanks a taste of what they have coming. none of that. well, i get this is finally starting. the first wave was an hour ahead of us and the scheduled time for their attack was sunday at 8:00 a.m. i figured the first wave muss have arrived but i could not see oahu, and then just in, from under the cloud bank, i finally saw something glittering it would, and i knew had to be the konoway coastline and the air face. -- air base. headed out toward diamond head'

banked right, descending from a.l. tatoo of 3500-meters. then as the unit commander i gave the tornado make -- gave the order to make the assault. my mission in the second wave was to attack aircraft carriers and suppress the americans' emergency responsible but the carriers i was supposed to bomb wasn't there or we didn't know their actual location, at ferret i was disappointed because my targets weren't there at all the battleships were lined up in battleship alley, the tennessee, arizona, west virginia, maryland, and all that. i actually wound up attacking the arizona, but nothing happened as a result of my attack. what i mean by that is that after releasing the ordinary

ordnance, realized the e.r.a. was below the water line and sinking. the first wave hit the battleship and by bomb was wasted munition. i saw large object from 2,500 meeters or so i attacked. except there were no carriers. we were re attacking the battleships the first wave already hit. userry hotta you were noting your head. was is interpreted correctly? >> i cooperate hear the japanese clearly but what he seemed to have said made sense, that he was doing the best -- he was doing the best that he could do in the job he was given, and there was no sort of -- almost like being a good student and demonstrating your skills and diligence. i think that was probably how they survived this war, because

so many things didn't make sense. and so many things seemed meaningless to lose your life for, so just needed to concentrate on the job in front of you. >> host: craig nelson, was there a lot of vengeance in later battles in this war? >> well, you take this incredible moment that happened and the navy just responded with a fury. and the first thing they did was the unexamined heroes of pearl harbor, the salvage crews. they were able to resuscitate that entire operation, 96 ships think brought back all but three of them. the picture on me book is the shaw and ammunition deck and it is a bomb.

that ship is back in business and taking part in pacific campaign a year later. it's extraordinary they were able to do that and then you have this outpouring of rage to that midway four of the six japanese aircraft carriers were sunk, and the others were himmed down, and the yamamoto's ships was use as a target for atomic bomb. >> host: we have four lines set up. but we also have social media, if you can't get through on the phone line, tweet us,@booktv, and of course our e-mail, booktv@. [organ music] larry, centralia, washington, you're on. >> caller: i'm greatly enjoying this. i'm 80 years old so i was by during world war ii so we were

very well aware what was going can on 0, having the blackouts and night and the pulldown kurt taps, butout mentioned dory miller, the black man that manned the machine gun was killed in philippines, was actually killed off to the coast of -- a mall aircraft carrier, and sunk by a japanese submarine, the third day of the invasion. my cousin was aboard there and was killed on that. there were just a very few survivors. but my question was, don't share anything about unit 731, and the medical experimentation on people what the called termed as logs so they would dehumanize them, and no one was prosecuted after the war for war crimes on

that, and i just wonder who makes those decisions not to prosecute. in fact you hardly even hear it mentioned anymore. in china don't even mention tianimen square. the students there are not listed in history books out all. >> host: that's larry in centralia would who was five-year-old ore when pearl harbor appeared. any response? >> there's a terrific book, and it is not mind, called "war without mercy" about how savage the war in the pacific was, on both sides. there were certainly racial beliefs on both sides that contributed to just enormous atrocities. far more than in europe. and it's a fascinating book.

i'm blanking on the name of the author -- got a good plug. but i highly recommend that back to you for further discussion of just how awful that war was. >> host: albert on the line. a veteran of world war ii from houston, texas. hi, albert. please go ahead. >> caller: hi. i was -- always this talk that roosevelt said it was a day of infamy and so on but i could never understand why we were having blackouts on the island of oahu about six or eight months before the attack actually came. >> host: albert, where were you stayinged during world war ii? >> caller: hickam. >> what year. >> caller: from 1970 until 41.

>> host: how old are you in. >> i'm 96, be 97 in january. >> mess you. >> host: thank you for contributing. what about the blackouts? >> they were routinely practicing prior to december de. exactly that. hawaii had preparations in termeds of possible invasion for months. one of the aspects of this that i think is most interesting to people is how militarized hawai'i was prior to the attack. people were used to constant training by army and navy planes. you could hear the fleet practicing gunnery over the horizon. military convoys clogged roads all the time. honolulu was a booming city as the influx of army and navy troops kept building, and, yes,

there were blackouts regularly planned and scheduled in precision for, i think, what everyone knew was coming, which is war. this local magazine, monthly magazine "pair -- paradise of the pacific" was constantly talking about what is just beyond the horizon. so air raid practice was a given. >> host: i think in one of your books you talk about the fact that husband kimmel when he came on as chief, really boosted training very stringently. >> he did. one over the reasons -- the reason that so many people responded so quickly in opening minutes of the attack was due to him. he had relentlessly trained the fleet in the ten months he had been in charge and training was his thing. this was a task master, a drill

sargeant for the entire fleet. nothing escaped his attention. no detail was too small for him to pay attention and people would point out he shouldn't be paying that much attention him couldn't help himself. but he practiced -- he insisted on practicing maneuvers that everyone needed to be at their position, everyone needed to know their job, and by the late fall, people were saying to him, and in swept testimony, they had never seen the fleet in better condition than it was at that moment. so, what happened after december 7th, he wasn't there to see it, but the performance of the navy was due to him. >> host: what is own the cover of your book? >> it's a image of someone looking through binoculars for an enemy.

it's more representational than a depiction of someone on that day. userry hotta militarize it was 'before pearl harbor. >> it was militarized by default because so many people had to be sent off to battle in china, and the home front had to show their property or you would we dahl up up unpatriotickic. they would spy on each other, that they were performing patriotic duties duties duties g drills against possible fire. or air raided, actually, already. also, they had the job of distributing food, rationed food, amongst themselves

equitably and that was source of resentment for many families because felt -- a system of mutual distrust. then every sort of neighborhood association had an informer for the military police. it's speculated. it's nothing to prove but i think it was based on fear of being singled out. so people really kept really low profile. jazz music was banned and -- were shut down. there was know overtly western entertainment because people were still holding america football matches in 1941, but i think you didn't want to be singled out for all the wrong reasons. >> host: i think i read in your book that basically private cars

were banned because of the use of oil. they invented cars running on charcoal and one bottle of beer every six months or two -- >> can you imagine that now? >> host: john is in new york city, another world war ii veteran. john, please go ahead. >> caller: yeah. my story is, i was in japan part of the army to japan in september of 1945, and i got out of the service there and i continued to stay in japan for a total of five years. and i taught at a japanese university in another school, and anyway, i was wondering, about the japanese, hough they

got into this, and my experience is the man in the street really didn't seem to understand what they were doing. what happened. >> host: john, how were you treated in japan when you were there? >> well, as soon as possible i got out of the service, i continued to work in japanese university, and i was treated as a curiosity, of course, and i gave -- i talked to the japanese a lot, and i speak japanese. >> host: do you remember feeling angry after pearl harbor? >> caller: no. i was a young -- younger then,

and while we were all kind of crazy about the war, but win i was sent to japan, wasn't angry at the japanese at all. like i was curious. and my -- what i discovered is the man in the street really didn't have any feelings about the war at all. >> host: before we have our panel answer that question, just one final question. do you think it's fair too compare 9/11 to pearl harbor? >> caller: no. >> host: why? >> caller: well, because i think the japanese -- there were two groups of people there, and japanese. there were the common citizens who really not told very much and then there was the military

class, and i made kind of a study of that, because i was curious, and men i return to the united states from japan i gave 105 talked about my experiences to the local -- any convention or any kiwanis club, and my message was always the man in the street didn't know what was going on. >> host: thank you, sir. eri hotta. >> it's true that japan was not an open democracy for various reasons we discussed already. but to say that military was responsible be oversimply identifying the picture in my mind, because military is not a monolithic organ, and it was divided into different creeks,

different interests and navy and army never got along. so i think it's far more complicated structure, bargaining and dealmaking, plus civilians were involved in the decisionmaking as well, and the emperor in some indirect, very strange but very powerful way in the end. very much the glue holding together those different fragments of interests. so, i think it's okay to say that, of course, commoners, regular people in the street didn't really know why that happen, but then from -- not asking why happened. so, i think they should not be automatically excused or disengaged from the whole why did this happen picture, myself included, at the inheritor of the cleaning guilt.

i have the responsibility and one way of give that issue myself, people have different ways of dealing with it but to say that people didn't know what was going on. people in government didn't know what was going on so let try to figure out. >> host: did your family have a connection to world war ii? >> both any grandfathers didn't go to war for health reasons or the aim bit have great uncle who died in iwo jima. another one who -- english rid tour student was considered quite dispensable because he was not an engineering student so he was called to become a kamikaze pilot. the doesn't go. the war ends right before his mission, so i didn't know him enough because he died in his

60s and i was quite ignorant about these things and not really con shut -- conscious about this problem. think he lived with survival skills all along. i think he ran the pilot flight school somewhere in the west coast of america so he half immigrated to america in a twist of fate. don't think he knew why he was left to live. >> host: craig nelson, this is an e-mail from robert hyde in syracuse, new york. why did the japanese not invade and occupy the hawaiian islands? >> they were so's invading and occupying the southeast asia, they didn't have enough left

over to take on the 43,000 service men that were in hawai'i. so, i really think that as murder twomey said, hawai'i was a sideline island to expanse into southeast asia. want to explain one thing about the attack we haven't discussed yet ask that how really nutty this idea was. it miss identifies me about yamamoto he spent so mum time in meter and thought if we killed 2,004 on 3 american odds hawaii the american citizens are going to go, oh, we certainly can can't fight them. the will turn asia over to japan, and i can't understand why he got that idea. it's just so nutty and you take that as a foundation of why pearl harbor was attacked and it makes no sense. >> host: how long did the japan occupy the great expanse of sea

and asia? >> tomorrow them six months to get it, the middle of '42 they take over the empire of japan, and hold on to it until '44. so two and a half -- two years about. >> host: when was the first battle after pearl harbor. >> the great story is about midway which is another three our discussion. mitway happen three months after pearl harbor. the incredible doolittle raid. so that's the only time for -- twice in their entire life the navy and the army have cooperated. that april. and then sixths of pearl harbor comes midway, which completely turns the question to the pacific war and was -- nimitz

called it the greater squeaker of all time. >> thank you for letting me join your conversation. i have two quick things if left down the street from a pearl harbor survivor, william -- he commanded -- that spotted the japanese midget submarine. they couldn't confirm they such it but they found is in 2002 and ironically it was like four years later, december 7, 1944, that same ship that sunk the japans midget submarine was destroyed a kamikaze attack near the philippine island. the admiral told me a couple of things and he is buried in tipton north too far from another famous person, henry

meyers, the guy was a walking history book and i want to ask miss hotta, i knew a japanese naval officer from the self-defense came, met in the 1980s he told me they didn't call it world war ii, they called it the great pacific war and that how they viewed history, and he also mentioned that's an after in the japanese constitution that prohibits them from having any kind of military operations overseas. i'd like you to comment on those two points. thank you. >> host: one of you write about then captain ottobridge. tell the story. >> his store is well nonin it broad outlines. people don't understand or know what an extraordinary set of circumstances let to william outerbridge for being in

situation he was. in he was a executive officer of another destroyer and hated his captain. just couldn't stand the map and had been seeking to get a transfer off his destroyer in any way he could. he was hoping for a land assignment so he could be reunited with his family. in late november he was relieved and given command of his own ship, the uss ward. he took command of it on on friday, december 35th 5th. he never commanded a ship until friday, december 5th. on the 6th he went out on his first local ever and they were tasked with patrolling back and forth in front of the harbor channel and it was the next morning, when he is a sleep, that he is awakenedded with a call to come into the bridge, and they spot an only object in

the water and a man in his first job on the first day, and he didn't hesitate. he ordered his ship to hunt it down and open fire, and they did open fire, and they knew they hit it, too. it wouldn't be confirmed until the submarine was found, as the gentleman referred to, decades later. but they sent a message saying they had attacked this submarine. that's the object i think i should have said that. he didn't know it. they didn't know it. bit it was one of the midget submarines the japanese were use. unfortunately hi message alerting to his commanders kind of wound its way slowly up through peacetime, and the grip of peace was in people's mentality and didn't react swift enough.

he sent a letter to his wife a few days later saying -- took manned on friday, went to sea on sad, started the war on sunday. >> eri hotta, what about the call? >> good question. the terminology. a lat in the name and how one chooses to call a certain war reveals a lot about your political affiliation. pacific war or asia-pacific war is generally used in japan. by both right and left. i think it's a value-neutral, very sort of uncontestable term because of course war happened in that theater. i think extreme right is still preferred to call it greater war because they claimed that japan liberated southeast asia. i don't know how they extend the argument.

leftists, some people prefer to call itle war because they see the guying of the war as 1931, when japan -- japanese field army invited part of northeast china, so i think there's a lot in the maim but -- name but many more prefer to call it the value-free, neutral way of asia-pacific war. the second question has to do with the article nine, the no more -- which the present aberdeen done abe administration is trying to revise or doway because he as a sort of hawk thinks that japan didn't have the right to write its own constitution at the end of world war ii. i think it's true that in -- the suggestion of the including this

clause that renounces war as a sovereign right, japan, came about because of japanese tradition. there are some evidence to that, and there's been some research done on that. so, to say it was an american imposition to disarm japan and completely emasculate japan is wrong but that's how he viewses and he had been trying to correct that post war regime he called it because japan should have the right to defend itself and wage war if need be. so, he tried too pass security bills and did so successfully in the past year. but that actually put his administration in a very sensitive position. americans might welcome the japan finally sort of taking

more charge in the military matters and the east asian security in terms of actual military camabilities but also meaned that japan has to balance power itself, in the by solely relying on the united states help. so, that might mean that it's -- it deps on how the cold war in east asia ends and how japan faces up to its past and how other concerned governments of east asia deal with that and also all parties stop politicizing the memory to their advantage. >> you look like you wanted to add something. >> i didn't. >> host: craig nelson in your book, you cites' surveys of a japan citizens, american citizens, how they feel about

pearl harbor and heir rerowe seem na and nagasaki. >> a wonderful man went to all of the visitor comment cards at the arizona memorial of japanese descent and one that number one people that japanese was for the american movie about pearl harbor to mention hiroshima and nagasaki. when you go to the her shima memorial there's no mention of pearl harbor. i can't believe this is still going on 75 years later. >> no japanese prime minister has visited the pearl harbor. >> president obama what the first. >> the prime minister's wife made the trip but didn't mention

our the war started and how his government is dealing with it. thought that was strange. >> i think one of the great moments in this story happens when you see mccarthy is talked about as a stinker and in korea he is a tinker but when he goes to japan as supreme allied command, he gives a speech of the surrender that will make you burt burst into tears. it's incredible a professional soldier give as speech about peace that is so heartfelt. he begins the process where america supported the japanese, this two weeks after the surrender, and the civilians are going through the garbage for foot and macarthur says you have to send me money and people are starving. that are saying, what are you talking about?

we just defeated them and he said, give me butter or give me guns. so it lapped into the marshall plan. so after winning world war ii rebuilds japan and germany and that's incredible pearl harbor legacy. >> maybe on "in depth" we'll do a douglas macarthur. >> host: george in tucson, arizona, thank you for holding. you're on booktv. >> caller: thank you for taking my call, this is directed to the three authors. have any of them read the road to rainbow by henry cole or john tollens are rising sun, and if they have, has it end with the research in current or future books and my final comment,

hopefully they can answer this question. i remember a few years ago reading about the japanese imperial staff in the long-range war plans making the comment that there war was not to start until 1947 and then it would be against russia. have any of them run up against that comment? i'll rang up -- >> host: george, who was the first author, road to rainbow? john is gone. john tollen and rising son and road to rainbow. anybody? >> i read joan tollen's book of pearl harbor which has problems he buy into the notion of prior warning to a degree and i think the primary source he had in there was subsequently debunked.

but i don't in the the gentleman. >> host: there is a conspiracy theory in a sense about prior warning? >> oh, yes. >> host: facebook comments here. stanley says: i was there as na navy okayed. my dad set up in bed and said the japans are bombing pearl harbor and i'm not surprised and it was said it was roosevelt's way to rates the hackle another the americans. >> the very first guy to start the idea is one of the founders of me america first committee an antiroosevelt group. charles behindberg was involve in that group and then it was expanded on by kimmel's lawyer during one of the investigations and then followed up by a guy who wanted to take all the blame away from in the navy and pin it on the civilian government. so yaw heave three people who

got together and decided to push this, and what you have too do is imagine that for very sinister reasons, as of the fall of france in 1940, most americans realized he wad to do something, if we lostening land would -- lost england would be the only only people on the other side of germany so this idea we had to push america into it. there was no pushing. we were already had a ship taken apart by the japanese. without pearl harbor we would not have had to fight two wars on two oceans and would not have to become a global super power and keeping world war iii from happening. >> this back door theory that roost roosevelt knew and america

could go to war in europe doesn't hold. there's no guarantee that hitler was going to declare war on the united states. japan didn't go to war against the soviet union and nazis behalf so there was no reason that germany should go to war against the united states for japan. so, i think from the sort of logistical point of view, just doesn't hold. >> i. >> i would offer two very practical reason why i think on the 75th anniversary this is a theory we ought to bury forever. this first practical piece is we already knew the japanese were moving substantial military forces towards the southwest pacific, including one of our possessions, the philippines. all roosevelt had to do was sit back and wait and why no whether japan was going attack the

philippines, at which point we would have declared war. he didn't need to sacrifice the pacific fleet. the second reason is franklin roosevelt had no independent means of intelligence help depended all oway down the chain of command to eavesdroppers listening to japanese radio messages, and translating them, decoding them, passing them up the chain of command. so hundreds of people would have had to know in order for franklin roosevelt to know, and it is simply defies belief that all of those people would then good to their graves with their lips sealed with the greatest active treason in american history. >> i did a book about going to the moon about a third of when i was researching it and i talked to somebody like under the age of 40 that would say, you're going to show it was all made up. so, it's -- >> i think some people conspiratory minded.

>> host: on page 49 of consistentdown to pearl harbor you write that war was coming to the pacific and they all knew it and they all mean no one took that more seriously than husband kimmel. the key words, war was coming to the pacific. was that general knowledge? >> i think certainly by the last -- first week in december. it was so well-nope -- >> host: what about earlier? >> all three 1941 -- we were negotiating with japan. the idea that the japanese were in arm of nazi germany was common they were engaged in similar activity, and when kimmel took command of the fleet on february 1st, 1941, in his remarks to the fleet, he noted that there would be working hard in light of what we all know. i believe that with quote. and he is referring to what was likely in the pacific.

it was not a surprise in 1941. it was the target where it began. and i think that's really important for people to understand. on december -- i will share one small story about how likely it was or how common it was. a woman named helen doff traveled by ship from san francisco to hon lieu lie with two candidates. she got there and wrote a letter home saying the she was thrilled to be alive because she had assumed their passenger line we're be sunk by the japanese. that is how prevalent the idea that war was just around the corner was. she may have had an additional belief was her uncle was husband kimmel. but she said that she fully expected they would die and was relieved they did not. >> the second week of november,

general marshall held an off the record press conference with all of the leading journalists and wire services to get them ready that war was coming and told them, the danger period is the first week of december. after that, we'll have -- we won't have any problems because we'll have the b-17s in the philippines, bombing the eye islands of japan and coming back. someone pointed out the b-17 can't go from the philippines to japan and back. doesn't have the range. and "the new york times" published their off the record article and said this is a war we could lose. >> host: george marshall, secretary of the army? >> yes. >> host: pam, go ahead. >> caller: hi. i want to say first how much i enjoy booktv and i have awe your books. >> thank you. >> caller: it's difficult listening to some of this. i'm related to this mitchell grandfather was commanding a task group coming in that morning at dawn, and because he

had submarine watch on that how they spotted the midget submarine and when it was spotted, 1500-yards to the star board, the grandfather's yeoman is out at peril for the -- at pearl for the remembrance, and i spoke to radio guys before they passed away. but i just curious, going back -- historians about the significance of the submarines on this because it was naval doctrine and very well known that if you spotted one japan submarine, they knew to expect a very fast carrier force, not too far behind. and my graph g grandfather was commanding a -- he said admiral kimmel had them typically planning maneuvers and one in of maneuver was if a submarine was outside the mouth of pearl harbor or inside it. and so again, people were very

conscious and he had even given orders to counterman -- this caused the war warning in november. the codebreaks in his noticed two irtwo-thirds therefore the japanese submarine fleet moved east toward the marshalls and enough what that it meant. it went back to washington, and the final warning was sent november 22347. fdr ordered everybody to let the japanese make the first move and kimmel counter-mannedded that. i spoke to eye witnesses from the morning, the an -- my grandfather was in the to -- why he had submarine watch on is thaws hey had been falled from a meeting with the british across the pacific from a japan submarine. craig nelson? >> well threshing story of the

midget sub is amazing and there's still a pearl harbor mid-about them that exists to this day which is we found one in pearl harbor in 1960s, fully intact and it had no signs of human life in it at all, and the theory is that the officers aboard that submarine escaped into the hawaiian japanese american population and survived that way. but one of the many things mr. twomey has a different opinion about mr. kimmel, one thing that upsets me greatly is after he receive his war warning, the ships are still there with the youngest member as i board and only one boiler mitt, which means most only the dome hasn't electricity to defend. thes and i thought out of all the things mr. kimmel could have done, he could have done that. >> host: bob in lincoln, nebraska. hi, bob. >> caller: hello. miss hotta already answered my

primary can he about the education system over -- what was being taught about the war. have to go to my backup question, regarding the doolittle raids. after the doolittle took off and, quite frankly, damaged, but political -- what was the political thinking after the doolittle raid and repercussions up the chain of command how they let the bombers attack tokyo. >> well, in america it was considered a great victory because we had not had a world war ii victory yet on our team, on any of the allies. we had not had much happy news so it wag taken very well. in japanese it was taken very hard

because they allowed the emperor to be imperilled and launched plans to take out the final american defense force as midway. so you seek in the scheme of things the doolittle raid led directly to midway and also made americans suddenly change their opinion, even though the damage was minor, in the american mines they thought we thought that the -- britain and soviet union couldn't win a war against the great japanese and italian army. that was the great moment in history for that one. >> host: from your book, here is a couple of pictures. fdr on december 8th, and a hand-written speech. want to show our audience part of this speech. >> yesterday, december 7, 1941,

a date which will live in infamy , united states of america was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the empire of japan. the united states was at peace with that nation, and at the solicitation of japan, was still in conversation with its government and its emperor, looking toward the maintenance of peace in the pacific. with confidence in our armed forces, with the unbounding determines determination of our people we will gain the inevitable triumph, so help us god.

[applause] >> host: one draft with some markouts. >> i'd love to do that. >> host: that is the basically -- gave that -- >> gave dictation and then one redraft. >> host: did this speech get played in japan? covered? >> no. instead the broadcast tokyo's declaration -- tojo's decorate speech. and its pales in comparison looking it's now, and he had an unfortunate sort of -- not clear enunciation and does sound like a stage actor, but he was -- tojo was interesting propaganda tactics of the nazis to she wanted to stylize this

declaration speech in a very effective manner. i think it backfired. >> host: there seemed to in your book, seemed to be a lot of german influence in tokyo. is that fair? >> i think it's fair to the extent that americans also had lots of influence, and i think in 19th century, japanese looked up to the america more than europe but a they were both industrializing in a great -- so i think there was more good will on a civic level with americans than europeans ironically. i think the nazis had influence to the extent that so many people were -- intrigue it by the blitzkrieg excels. ...

>> >> so i being can the fascination is more theatrical in nature with my understanding. >> what would sparky to

write about pearl harbor with complex imasco around the table. >> the most pedestrian of the events that took a family vacation with my son and wife went out to the arizona memorial. i had been there before and the exhibit at the national monument are quite good and oddly enough but realize that the biographer of kimil decided there is the reason i wanted to write a book about him i wasn't a very introspective you would not get great revelations from him but once you get into when you get hooked and i thought that starting with the departure of the japanese.

>> so exactly how we got to that point i hope and that people would come to understand the complexity and also the drama that it was of a nonfiction thriller >> actually wanted to do this 15 years ago because i was living near ground zero they said you should go look at a from your roof ans guy was cloud free and i thought how could this be an accident? and then i blacked out for a couple of hours than spent three years with the some believable phobia. where is it going plexus so

trying to solve well i was having this problem attracting other people with fears of planes and they were survivors of pearl harbor. but i did not want to take a dog because it is 88 -- titanic thing to do when you go to the archives looking at a uh documents there are 48 feet long. it is like a nightmare but if you look at the definitive book civilians think of history but historians know that it is like water and it comes and goes. >> i do agree to interpret

history aside from what i said the personal things that beyond that this was a crime fiction reno's the outcome that there are sold many moments that could have turned around so was fascinated by the suspense building and also shakespearean as well because it was the weakness and almost tragic comedy not just a tragedy of what people were discussing or not discussing it highest levels of government as many audience members as possible >> host: craig nelson this

is for of new hampshire hampshire, give their assessment of the historical research such as the miracle at midway. >> the greatest book about japanese military and was working with macarthur in the history section in was to interview every single person with the archives however in 50 years time all of the information they could not talk about what would happen to them. verses the attack itself but he was worried about the leader sensibility so really

at one point. [laughter] but how much new stuff that we actually found. >> host: san diego thank you for holding. >> caller:. >> i have a comment and a question there is a terrific two volumes of world war two one of those articles at the time of the attack how he was hustled out of there and if i am not mistaken to mention that colorful character that truman got the real blame from hoover

because of the espionage it was entrenched in secrecy what do you think about that >> the fbi certainly was attuned to the japanese-american community at the consulate and that is how they learned on december december 3rd pet they started to burn the secret documents but the special agent in charge never thought there was any evidence of sabotage by the global community they did not know about the spy that was operating freely been although the people they wanted to round up which they did with the a list and

be list of the suspected japanese community did the fbi no? settle the had any knowledge that an attack was imminent. >> but one have been san august 1 of my favorite pearl harbor stories a triple agent working simultaneously in one of the models for james bond in says i have then sent to dss the american defense capabilities and one-third of them is about pearl harbor. because he thinks he cannot trust the agent and knows

that he is having an affair they're both what merry see you cannot trust someone having an affair with a married woman so of those serious warnings of pearl harbor. >> you're talking about the midget steps but how come the japanese had some of the most of advanced submarines how combat was not used as a primary weapon to search down the american carriers? and was there a second attack on pearl harbor by the seaplanes? >> we need to appreciate what a spectacularly dairying raid did this was of the party of japan. many people in its own navy just militarily could be pulled off.

some secrecy was a prime directive also important to remember they had no way of knowing if the fleet would be there or the carriers would be there when they left. so one of the questions they had to have answered was, was our plan going to succeed because the enemy was where we hoped they would be? they were hunting for it in a the harbour because that is when they were the most full verbal -- foldable but maybe only the 24 hours prior to the attack that they realized the wish and the help would be fulfilled except for the aircraft carrier.

so mentioned by reducing the larger submarines? they had no knowledge of where the fleet was and they were hoping it was with a found it. >> host: how did they keep that the secret? >> eight think by a the people at the top level to talk about washington d.c. they really did not know what was going on and how they had been informed and then he started to shake as he was reading even then he really did not declare war. because all of it was not included. so it was the sacrificial lamb basically because they

were not given enough time so that is why they were late to start with that the state department of so the treatment of all people. >> host: back to where we started by did the japanese attack pearl harbor? >> a1 to to keep us from interfering with their plans and wanted to strike out at the western power to show they were equal and wanted to ensure the petroleum to be out of under the thumb of the united states and that america will get them keep their asian colonies and to proceed in the war. >> host: was it military successful, steve twomey? >> i think the short answer is no.

certainly they achieved surprise pet yamamoto miscalculated complete the the response to the surprise . p. that this would weaken morale, it had exactly the reverse effect. militarily they achieved a limited sense to inflict severe damage on the fleet which we have talked about but the targets that would be the most important the battleship although people didn't know which was already peaking and perhaps have already peaked. they were slow and could not keep up with the aircraft carriers and those were the weapons of the future this is the first war that became apparent. so i thinking militarily probably did not achieve their goal. >> host: i disagree about yamamoto i do think he had

the split personality cool headed and of mind of a gambler who wanted to take a risk to show the world what he can do and what pearl harbor was about. >> host: last three hours we have been talking about the 75th anniversary of the attack on pearl harbor. here are the authors, eri hotta "japan 1941". steve twomey, "countdown to pearl harbor." craig nelson, "pearl harbor." thanks for being with us on booktv [inaudible conversations]

>> good morning proving once again if you want a nice crowd serve some food thanks for coming on behalf of the "national review" institute institute, is president and my fellow trustees of like to welcome you to the special conversation about an important book "a torch kept lit" great lives of the 20th century. i am the publisher of "national review".